On the phenomenology of the event

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Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and SurpriseAuthor(s): Franoise DasturSource: Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 4, Contemporary French Women Philosophers (Autumn, 2000),pp. 178-189Published by: Blackwell Publishingon behalf of Hypatia, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810684.

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Phenomenologyf the Event:WaitingandSurprise1FRANQOISEDASTURTranslatedyFranqoiseDastur,translation evisedbythe editor

How, asks Fran,oiseDastur,canphilosophyccount or thesuddenhappeningand thefactualityof theevent?Dasturaskshowphenomenology,nparticularheworkof Heidegger,Husserl,andMerleau-Ponty,maybe nterpretedsofferinguchanaccount.Sheargues hat he paradoxicalapacity f expectingurprisesalwaysinquestionnphenomenology, ndfor thisreason,sheconcludes, We houldnotoppose henomenologynd thethinking ftheevent. Weshould onnect hem;open-ness tophenomenamustbeidentifiedwithopennessounpredictability. hearticleoffersreflectionsn these ermson a phenomenologyf birth.

Canphilosophyaccountfor the suddenhappeningand the factualityof theevent if it is still traditionallydefined,as it has been since Plato,asa thinkingof the invariabilityand generalityof essences?This is the general questionfrom which I will begin.The questionof time and of the contingencyof timehas always,as EdmundHusserlrecallsat the beginningof his On thePhenom-enologyof theConsciousnessf InternalTime(1991), constituted the most cru-cial problemforphilosophy.This problemmarks he limits of its enterpriseofintellectualpossessionof the world. Fortime, which is, as Henri Bergsonsaid,the stuffof which thingsaremade,2 eemsto escape conceptualunderstandingin a radical manner.

As MauriceMerleau-Pontyhows in hisPhenomenologyf Perception1962),philosophycan give neither a realist nor an idealist solution to the problemof time. It does not succeed in locating it either in things themselves or inconsciousness.If, on the one hand, we consider time to be no more than a

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dimension of reality,we can no longer explain the relationshipbetween whatcomes firstandwhatfollows. The successionof events can only be establishedby consciousness,a consciousness which requires, n order to have a generalview of the successionof events, not to be completelyimmersed n time. Butwhatif, on the otherhand,we considertime to be a mere constructionof con-sciousness?Temporality tself becomes incomprehensible,insofar as it is theessence of time to be incompletelypresentto consciousness,to remainincom-pletelyconstituted,asHusserlwouldsay.Fortime,precisely, s not identicaltobeing, it is a processwhich is alwaysin becoming. It is alwaysof the orderofthe process,the passage,andthat which comes.Thereforerealism(which im-mersesthe subject in time to the point of destroyingall possibilityof a time-consciousness)andidealism(whichplacesconsciousness n apositionofover-viewinga timewhich no longerproceeds),areboth unable to clarifywhattheypretendto explain, that is, the relation of consciousness to time. For in bothcases,whatremainsout ofrangefor aphilosophicalinquirywhichwants to seein time either arealityoran idea isprecisely ts transitionalcharacter,ts non-being or non-essence, which is not, but proceeds.

Philosophycannot succeed in accountingfor the passageof time when ittakes the formof a simplerealismor idealism.In both cases it is led, inescap-ably, o think of the connection of the differentpartsof time asalready ealizedeither in the objector in the subject.But this time-synthesis, arfrombeinggiven, must on the contrarybe considered the most difficultphilosophicalproblem.Itssolutionshould be consideredthe most important ask of philoso-phy.This true hilosophy,whichwould be neither realistnoridealist,shouldbe able to account for the discontinuityof time andfor the fact that thereare,forus, events.Such a philosophyshouldbe able to explain the discontinuityof time, orwhat we could name the structuraleventualityof time.3The wordeventual-ity should not be taken here in its normalmeaning of possibility.4Speakingof the eventualityof time does not mean that time could be or notbe. Itshould, in my view, mean that time is in itself what bringscontingency,un-predictability,andchance into the world.Iwouldlike to demonstrate hat thistrue philosophywhich could take into account the contingency of time isnothing other than phenomenologyitself.What is phenomenology,in fact? ForHusserl,it was nothing other thanthe restitution of the most original idea of philosophywhich found its firstcoherent expressionwith Plato andAristotle andwhich constitutes the basisof Europeanphilosophyandscience. Husserldoes not see in phenomenology,as did Hegel, who wasthe firstto makean importantuse of this word,a merepropaedeuticto philosophyas such. He considersphenomenologyto be thepropername of a philosophywhich no longersituatestruthbeyondphenom-ena. And when Heideggerdeclares in one of his Marburger orlesungenhat

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there s not an ontologybesidesphenomenologyut scientificontology snothingelse thanphenomenology Heidegger 979,98),he situateshimselfin continuitywithHusserlwhilegivinga moreradicalorm o his thinking.Beyond llthatseparateshem,whatunitesboththinkersspreciselyheideathat there snothing o lookforbehindphenomena, ehindwhatshows tselfto us.Theobjectofphilosophysnothingother hanphenomenalitytself.Itisnot theidealworld fabeing-in-itself hichwouldbecompletely eparatedfromus.ThisiswhyHeidegger ppropriateshe maximof the return tothethings hemselves Heidegger 962,50) withwhichHusserlirstdefinedhetaskassignedophenomenologyHusserl 970b,252).Thequestions there-fore to findan access o the phenomenahemselves, ecause, s Goetheal-ready aid, theyarein themselves he doctrine Goethe1968,432).5Thetaskis to abstain romall speculation,uchas metaphysicalonstruction,whichcould eadto the elaborationf anabstractntology.And oneshouldputasideallpsychologicaleductionswhichendeavoro identify henomenaandsubjective xperience.Butthisdoesnotmean hatphenomenologyan be identified ythemeredescriptionf whatis givento experience.WhenHeidegger,n section7 ofBeing ndTime,declares And ustbecause he phenomena reproximallyand orthemostpartnotgiven, here s needforphenomenology Heidegger1962,60), he only appropriatesneofHusserl'sdeas.As earlyas in TheIdeaofPhenomenology,usserl addeclared hatthetaskofphenomenologyoesnot consistonly nlookingatthingsas ftheyare simplyhere'and ustneedto be 'seen, ' utinshowinghowtheyconstitute hemselvesora conscious-nesswhich is no longerconsidered, s it hadbeen in classicalphilosophy,the merecontainer f their mages Husserl 964,9). Tolet the constitutiveoperation ppear,which s at theoriginof thecompletely onstituted bjectwhichcomes ntoviewforus,requireshatthe existenceof thisobjectbe,asHusserlays,putinto bracketsrputto one side.Thisepoche,hissuspensionof theontological alidity hatthingshave forusin daily ifeis,accordingoHusserl,what ndicatesn a decisivemanner he access o thephilosophicalattitude.Butthisdoesnot amount o thephilosopherurning way rom herealworldnordero accessa celestialworldofeternal ssences.On the con-trary, ne lets thingsappear s theyaregivenasphenomenan the naturalattitudewhich s ours ndaily ife. In thisway,one becomes ttentive o theirmodesof appearingndgivenness.WhatHusserl alls phenomenologicalreduction oesnotpermitone to escape rom he sensible o an intelligibleworld. tdoesnotpermita movement f becomingntothe stability f idealessences. t letsappearhe temporalharacterf whatis givento us.It letsappearheprocess fphenomenalizationt theoriginofwhatwe call reality.Husserlalls transcendentalhenomenology hiskindofphilosophywhichallowsusto attend o theapparitionf thatwhichtranscendsonsciousness,

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that is, to the birth of the object which consciousnessconstitutes as its op-posite.Husserlcannot remainon the level of a staticphenomenologywhich couldonly account forthe alreadyconstitutedobject, for what is empiricallygiven.Very earlyon he feels compelledto develop a genetic phenomenologywhosetask is to elucidate the processat the origin of the opposition of subjectandobject.The entirephenomenologyof temporality hat Husserldevelopsin hisLessons n 1905 can be considered as a phenomenologyof the advent of thesubjectto itself. For what is at stake in these Lessons s to bringto light whatHusserlcalls what s ultimatelyand trulyabsolute Husserl1962, 216): thisenigmatic intimacy of consciousness and time at the origin of the doubleconstitution ofworldandsubject.Such a task isparadoxical. tmeansallowingthe appearanceof the conditions of all appearingand bringingto light theprocessof thesegregationof the 'within' and the 'without '(Merleau-Ponty1968, 118) which Merleau-Pontysays is neverfinished (jamaischose aite)( 1968, 237), but,on the contrary,always n becoming.Husserl ries in his Les-sons to reconstitute after he event, with the help of such concepts as pro-tention, retention, and original impression,the movement of the temporal-ization which remains in itself invisible. In this regardhe remains in closeproximityto Kant,who had alwaysaffirmed he invisibilityof time and whodefined schematizm,the processby which consciousnessconstitutes the ob-ject, as an artconcealed in the depthsof human soul (Kant 1933, 183).The phenomenologyof the becoming of subjectand worldcan thereforeonly be a phenomenology of the inapparent(Phanomenologiees Unschein-baren),to quote one of Heidegger'sexpressions rom his last seminar in 1973(Heidegger1977, 137). But in his structureof eventuality this inappearanceorinvisibilityof time doesnot refer o a level transcendingperception.On thecontrary, t refersto the genesisof perceptionitself. The limit that phenom-enologyencountershere is not externalbut internal. It can onlybe discoveredin and by the phenomenological attitude. Forsuch an invisibility is not, asMerleau-Pontyrightlyunderlines,an absoluteinvisibility,but the invisibilityof thisworld.It is the dimensionof invisibilitywhich is impliedin the visibleitself and which can thereforeonly be discovered within the visible (1968,225). This is the reasonwhy, in his unfinished last book The VisibleandtheInvisible 1968), Merleau-Pontysketches the outlines of an ontologyfromwithin (Merleau-Ponty1968, 225), of an endo-ontology 226) which con-stitutes the trueachievement of his Phenomenologyf Perception1962).But is such a phenomenologyof becoming,which identifies itself with anontologywhich remains nternalto phenomenality,andwhich pretendsto letthe dynamiccharacterof phenomenalityappear,already n itself a phenom-enologyof the event? For t ispossibleto think the comingof time, itsadvenire,itscoming upto us,withoutproperly hinkingitssuddenrise,itscomingout of

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itself,which refers o the Latinverbevenire,iterallyex-venire,rom which theword event comes.But what is an event, in fact?At first,we can only defineit as whatwas notexpected, what arrivesunexpectedly and comes to us by surprise,what de-scends upon us, the accident in the literal meaning of the Latin verbaccidofrom which the word accident derives. The event in the strongsense of theword is thereforealwaysa surprise,something which takes possessionof usin an unforeseenmanner,without warning,and which bringsus towardsanunanticipatedfuture.The eventum,which arises n the becoming,constitutessomethingwhich is irremediably xcessive in comparisonto the usualrepre-sentationof timeas flow.Itappearsassomethingthat dislocatestimeandgivesa new formto it, somethingthat putsthe flow of time out of joint andchangesits direction.So the event appearsas that which intimately threatens the synchronyof transcendental ife or existence, in other words,the mutualimplicationofthe differentpartsof times:retention andprotentionforHusserl; hrownnessandproject (Geworfenheit ndEntwurf)forHeidegger.The exteriorityof theevent introducesa split between past and future and so allows the appear-anceofdifferentpartsof time asdis-located.The event pro-duces, n the literalmeaningof the word,the differenceof past and future and exhibits this dif-ferencethrough ts suddenhappening.The event constitutesthe dehiscenceof time, its coming out of itself in differentdirections,which Heideggercallsekstasis, he factthat it nevercoincideswith itself,and which Levinasnamesdia-chrony(Levinas1987,32). Forthe event, assuch, isupsetting.Itdoesnotintegrateitselfas a specificmoment in the flow of time. It changesdrasticallythe whole style of an existence (Husserl1970a, 31). It does not happen in aworld-it is,on the contrary,asif a new worldopensupthrough tshappening.The event constitutesthe critical momentof temporality-a criticalmomentwhich neverthelessallowsthe continuity of time.This non-coincidence with oneself which allows the possibilityof beingopen to new events, of beingtransformedby them oreven destroyedbythem,is also that which makesof the subjecta temporalbeing, an ex-istantbeing, abeingwhich is ableconstantlyto get out of itself.Openness to the accident isthereforeconstitutive of the existence of the humanbeing. Such an opennessgives human being a destiny and makesone's life an adventureand not theanticipateddevelopmentof a program.It becomes clear that a phenomenologywhich obeyed its own injunctionto returnto things themselves could not be content to remain an eideticphenomenology-the thinking of what remainsinvariablein experience. Itmustbecome, accordingto the youngHeidegger's erminology,a hermeneu-tics of facticity 6: n interpretationof all that can be foundin existence and isnot reducibleto ideality,which is essentiallyvariableand transitory.Such a

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phenomenologyouldno longerbe a thinkingof beingand essenceonly.Itmustalsobea thinkingof whatmaybe andofcontingency.t shouldnotbeonlya thinkingof theapriorifphenomenality.t mustalsobea thinkingofthe aposteriorindof the after vent. Thequestions not tooppose adicallya thinkingofbeingoressence o a thinkingof the otheror of the accident.Rather t is a matterof showinghow a phenomenologyf the eventconsti-tutes hemostappropriateccomplishmentf thephenomenologicalroject.It is not thedestitution r theimpossibilityfphenomenologicaliscourse,ssome hinkers f the radicalxteriorityf the Other-I meanLevinas, utalsoDerridan his lastwritings-seemto believe.What in HusserlianndHeideggerianhenomenologyouldmakepossi-ble aphenomenologicalhinking f the event?Weshouldry o answerhis na syntheticandorganizedmannern order o defend he thesisof a possiblephenomenologyf the event. For he moment mustbe contentwithsomereflections n thepossibilityf aphenomenologicaliscourse nthephenom-enonofexpectation ndsurprise hichcouldbederived rom heanalyses fHusserl ndHeidegger.

Againstallexpectation, ven if it hasbeenpartially xpectedandantici-pated,such is in fact the essence f the event. Basedon this we couldsaywithoutparadoxhatit is an impossibleossible. heevent,in its internalcontradiction,s the impossiblewhichhappens,n spiteof everything,n aterrifyingrmarvelousmanner. talways omes o usbysurprise,rfrom hatsidewhence,precisely,twasnotexpected.Thedifficult askofphenomenol-ogy sthereforeo think hisexcess oexpectationhat istheevent.Thephe-nomenology f eventualitys in a similarposition o the phenomenologyfmortality.Death,as an event,is also thatwhichalwayshappensagainstallexpectation,always oo early, omethingmpossiblehatnevertheless ap-pens.It comes o uswithoutcoming romus. It takesplace n the impersonalmanner f this event thathappens lsoto othersandit is themostuniversalevent for ivingbeings.Onecouldsaythatdeath sthe eventparexcellence,except hat it isneverpresent,tneverpresently appens.t doesnotopenupaworld,butrather loses tforever.tdoesnotconstitute blankorgap nsidetemporalityr adiachronicmomentwhichcouldbetheoriginofa newcon-figuration f possibilities.t is the simple,simultaneousestruction f syn-chronyanddiachrony. hat iswhydeath, ar rombeinganevent,has beenlegitimately efinedbyHeidegger sthe possibilityarexcellenceHeidegger1962,307). Deathremains or usa possibilityhatwe willneverrealize,noteven insuicide,which sonlyawayofescapingheessential assivityfdeathwhichdefineshuman xistencemostdeeply seeHeidegger 962,299-311).

But if death is for us the pre-eminent ossibility, sHeidegger ays, his

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impliesa redefinitionof the traditionalconcept of possibility.For in the phil-osophicaltradition,possibility s opposedto reality.It isconsideredsomethingless than reality.Buthere, in the light of death,possibilityis defined assome-thingmorepre-eminentthanrealityand cannot be compared o it. In thephe-nomenological perspective,possibility is the locus of excess with regards oreality.This allowsus to considerpossibilityas a higher categorythan reality.Possibility s somethingother than a categorywhich is a structureof things. Itis a structureof existence, an existential, asHeideggercalls it, since the modeof being of human existence is not the mode of being of the res (that is,realitas),but the mode of being ashavingto be (in otherwords,aspossibility).Becausethe human being is a mortalbeing and, in existing, has a constantrelation to its own death, it constantlyremainsin the mode of possibility.Itremains n the modeof a structuralanticipationtowards ts own being,whichremainsunrealized or as long as it exists.In fact, this determinationof possibility as existential in Heideggerhadalreadybeen prepared n Husserl's ntentional analysis.Husserl himself un-derlinesin his CartesianMeditations1960) the originalityof this kind of in-tentional analysis in comparisonwith the ordinary,unbracketedanalysisofhumanlife. This originalitycomesfrom the specificityof intentional life thatcan never be understoodas a totality of data, but ratheras an ensemble ofsignifications.What does it mean forconsciousnessto be in the mode not ofsomething alreadygiven, but of signification?According to Husserlit im-plies asurpassing f the intention in the intention itself, 7n otherwords, hefact that the intentional act alwaysexceeds what is given in itself.

Phenomenological explanation deals not only with given data, but withpotentialities.This meansthatphenomenologyis not merelythe theoryof thecorrelationof noesisand noema,or of the cogitoand of its cogitatum,but es-tablishesthe principleof the necessary urpassing f the intentumn the intentioitself.This impliesthat the cogitatum,he object of consciousness,is nevergiven once andfor all. It can alwaysbe explicatedin a morecompletemannerin regard o the context in which it appears,or,as Husserlsays,in regard oits internal and external horizon.The original operation of the intentionalanalysisconsists in unveiling the potentialities impliedin the actualstate ofconsciousness.The intentional analysiscan thereforebe consideredas the ba-sis of a phenomenologyof expectation. This is a phenomenologyof the ten-sion of consciousnesstowardsan objectwhich remainsopen to the validationor invalidation of its anticipationsaccordingto the development of forevernew horizons.We could even say that excess is the rulehere, because there is alwaysanaddition in what is experienced which can never be completely correlatedwith the intention. It caneven be consideredasatthe originof the intentionalmovement itself, in the sense that a total fulfillmentof intentionality, or a

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complete adequacyof the significationto the object, would entirely destroythem. It becomes clearthat, accordingto Husserl,there is a parallelbetweenthe perceptionof an object and the perceptionof the other human being. Inbothcases,therearepartswhich arenot perceived,but areonly appresented,as Husserlsays.This means that their existence is co-implicated in what isactually perceived:forexample, the hidden faces of a cube, or the actual ex-periences (dieErlebnisse) f others. That there is a partof experiencenot ac-tuallypresentis the rule of intentionalphenomenology,since the mereidea ofa completefulfillmentof the intention woulddestroythe basisof intentional-ity.The intentional relation to the other humanbeing cannot be understoodas aspecialcaseof the generalintentional relation to objects.On the contrary,it must be understood as the very matrix of intentionality. It unfolds itselfwhereexpectationwill never be completelyfulfilledand where the menace ofnon-fulfillmentcan never be completelyavoided.If there is the foundation for a phenomenologyof expectation in Husser-lian intentional analysisas well as in Heideggerianexistential analysis,couldone find the basisfor a phenomenologyof surprise n these philosophies?Isnot the veryidea of a phenomenologyof surprisean absurdity?We know thatit is possibleand even necessaryto hope beyondall hopes and to expecttheunexpected as Heraclitussaysin fragment18 (Heraclitus1987, 19). To mymindthere is no doubtthat HusserlandHeideggerwere able to thematizethisopenness to the indetermination of the future,but what is happeningwhenthis excess impliedin the event fractures he horizon of possibilitiesin such amannerthat the mere encounter with the event becomesimpossible?How canwe account for these moments of crisis,of living death, of trauma,when thewhole rangeof possibilitiesof a humanbeing becomes unable to integratethediscordanceof the event and collapses completely?Twoexamplescould be mentioned here: the mourningof a loved one andreligiousconversion. In both cases a transition is made not with regards o aloss of aparticularpossibilitybut with regardso the radical ossof the totalityofpossibilitieswhich we call aworld. In suchcriticalperiods,weexperienceurincapacityto experiencethe traumatizing vent. In spite of having expectedthe death of somebodyseriouslyill, it remainsa surprise.It feels beyond allanticipation. What happens is not included in the program. t is the un-foreseen,in the truesense of the word. It is whatcontradictsand ruinsexpec-tation in its verystructure.Such experiences are very rare,and Husserl and Merleau-Pontyexplainthat ordinaryexperiencepresupposesan originary aith in the stabilityof theworldand the presumption hat experiencewill alwayshave the same style(Merleau-Ponty1968,3-4; Husserl1970a, 31). But we finda striking mageofsuch existential rises in psychosis.The schizophrenic, orexample,experi-ences the loss ofwhat seemsevident to other humanbeings.S/he experiences

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the lossof worldand the breakingf theordinaryoherenceof experience.8S/heisthereforeondemnedo terror nd o theimpossibilityf communicat-ingwiththingsandotherhumanbeings.Suchasubjecthas losttheabilityofopeningoneself oeventuality ndofexperiencinghereconfigurationfpos-sibilitieshatanewandunexpectedventrequiresromus.For t istheeventitselfwhichrequiresntegrationn a newconfigurationf possibilities.Onedoesnot decide reely ochangeone'sworld, r to become onverted.We canspeak fthe eventneither n the activenor n thepassive oice.It canchangeus andeven happen o usonlyifweare ntherightdisposition. his ispre-cisely he disposition hich smissingn thepsychoticperson.We canspeakabout he eventonlyin the thirdvoiceandin a pasttime,in the modeof ithappenedo me. We neverexperiencehegreat ventsofour ifeascontemporaneous.hisisquiteclearasfaras the firstgreat ventofour ife is concerned.Wedidnot ask orourbirth,and his istestimonyo thefactthatwe arenot at theoriginofourownexistence.Tobebor means hatwe areconditionedbya pastthatwasneverpresento us. It canonlybe ap-propriatedyuslater,by assuminghesedeterminationsfourexistence hatwehavenotchosen.There stherefore surprisen us in relationoourbirth.It is thepermanenturprisef beingbornwhich is constitutive f ourbeing.It is testimonyo the uncontrollableharacter f thisproto-event. n eachnewevent there s a repetitionof the proto-event f birth.It is as if we re-experience,n a newevent,this radical oveltyof whathappensorthe firsttime, s wellas theimpossibilityfcoincidingwiththeeventitself,which nits suddenapparitionisconnectshepast rom he future.Theexistingbeinghasno controloversuchasurprisend t isin away heeventwhichgives heorderhere,butto be orderedequireshe collaborationof the one who obeys.One is not completelypassivein relation to the event,even if its meaningstill remainsobscure.We keep tryingto give a meaningtoit. It is only in relation o this attemptednterpretationf everythinghathappensandthisinterpretativeehavior snothingother hanthebeing nthe world f thehuman)hataneventcanbeexperiencedsa trauma.HusserlandHeideggerothsawapassivitywithinour ntentional ctivity tselfandafacticity fexistencewhichcanonlybeassumed ndnotchosen.Husserl idso with his theoryofpassivegenesisorsynthesis.Heidegger id soby tightlyconnectingacticity sthebeing hrown o the world f thehumanbeingandexistentiality s the incorporationf facticity nto the configurationf theprojectof thisprospectiveeingthatHeideggerallsman.Weshouldnotopposephenomenologyndthethinkingof the event.Weshould onnectthem;opennesso phenomenamustbeidentifiedwithopen-ness to unpredictability.his paradoxicalapacityof expectingsurprisesalwaysn questionn phenomenology.Merleau-Pontyeclaresn TheVisibleand heInvisiblehat philosophyas neverspoken.. of thepassivity four

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activity,asValeryspokeof abodyofthespirit 1968, 221). This passivityof ouractivityisnothing other than the processof temporalizationwhichhappensinusasthinking beingswithoutbeingtheproductof ourthought.ForasMerleau-Pontyunderlines, I am not even the author of that hollow that formswithinme by the passagefrom the present to the retention, it is not I who makesmyself think any more than it is I who makes my heart beat (1968, 221).New as our initiativesmaybe, they come to be bornin this field of beingthatis human spirit, in which something, or the absence of something, can beinscribed.A great,contemporaryFrenchphenomenologist,Henri Maldiney,createda newword, transpassibilite,o expressourcapacityto undergoevents,insofar as this impliesfor us an active opening to a field of receptivity(Mal-diney 1991, 114). To lack the capacityto open oneself to what happens,nolongerto welcome the unexpected, is in fact a markof psychosis.Phenomenologyprivilegesneither the interiorityof expectation nor theexteriorityof surprise. t establishesas preliminary o experience neither thereceptivityof the subjectnor the activity of the object. It tries to think thestrangecoincidence of both. One could demonstratethat Heideggertriedtothink this almostunthinkablecoincidence of Beingand man. He attemptedthis by means of the wordEreignis.Ereignismeansnot only happening theordinarymeaningof the word in German) but also, following its doubleety-mology in both popularand scientificuse, appropriation nd appearingoview. ntakingthispositionIamarguingagainst hosecontemporaryhinkerswho have declared hat the thinkingof the event andthe thinkingof the otherrequiresa mode of thinkingother than the phenomenologicalone. There canbe no thinking of the event which is not at the same time a thinking of phe-nomenality.NOTESWeverywarmlyhankthe editorof EtudesPhinomenologiquesorpermissiono re-producehis versionof the article.Ed.1. Lecture ivenin Prague, eptember 998,in the seminar rganizedy theInstitute f Philosophy.implified nglish ersionof Pour nephenomenologieel'evenement:'attente t lasurprise, tudes Mnomenologiques5, 1997:59-75.2. See,forexample,Bergson1963, 71-72) andBergson1944,371-72).3. See,in thisregard,heremarkablerticlebyClaudeRomano, LePossible tl'evnement (Romano1993),fromwhichIhavedrawnmuch nspiration.4. Here, hereaderhouldbeaware f differencesetween heconnotations feventualiten the sensegivento thiswordbyFrancoiseDastur ereandeventualitynEnglish.Eventualite,n thiscontext,refersmoregenerallyo possibility,hance,un-certainty, ontingency, nd the hypothetical,whereas he English ventualityeferseither o thatwhichultimatelyesults, rto a possible,ixedevent.Ed.

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5. Cited in Heidegger(1976, 12).6. OntologieHermeneutik erFaktizitat) was the title of Heidegger'ssummersemestercourseof 1923. See Heidegger(1923).7. See Husserl (1960, 48): Phenomenological explication makes clear what isincludedand only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum (forex-

ample 'the other side') by making present in phantasythe potential perceptionsthatwould makethe invisible visible.8. See, forexample,the discussion n Blankenburg 1991), cited in Dastur 1997).Ed.

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Heidegger,Martin. 1923. Ontologie(Hermeneutik erFaktizitit). In Gesamtausgabe,Band63. Frankfurt m Main:Klostermann..1962. Beingandtime.Trans.John Macquarrie nd EdwardRobinson.Oxford:

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On the phenomenology of the event

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