National Expansion Overview Spring 2010 On the CUSP: Stop BSI.
On the CUSP: STOP BSI The Science of Improving Patient Safety
description
Transcript of On the CUSP: STOP BSI The Science of Improving Patient Safety
© 2009
On the CUSP: STOP BSIOn the CUSP: STOP BSIThe Science of Improving Patient The Science of Improving Patient
SafetySafety
© 2009
Immersion Call OverviewImmersion Call Overview
Week 1: Project overview
Week 2: Science of Improving Patient Safety
Week 3: Eliminating CLABSI
Week 4: The Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP)
Week 5: Building a Team
Week 6: Physician Engagement
© 2009
Learning ObjectivesLearning Objectives
• To recognize that every system is designed to achieve the results it gets
• To identify the basic principles of safe design that apply to both technical and team work
• To discuss how teams make wise decisions
© 2009
The Marvel of Modern MedicineThe Marvel of Modern Medicine
© 2009
ConditionCondition % of Recommended Care Received
Low back pain 68.5
Coronary artery disease 68.0
Hypertension 64.7
Depression 57.7
Orthopedic conditions 57.2
Colorectal cancer 53.9
Asthma 53.5
Benign prostatic hyperplasia 53.0
Hyperlipidemia 48.6
Diabetes mellitus 45.4
Headaches 45.2
Urinary tract infection 40.7
Hip fracture 22.8
Alcohol dependence 10.5
RAND Study Confirms Continued Quality RAND Study Confirms Continued Quality Gap Gap
1. McGlynn EA, Asch SM, Adams J, et al., N Engl J Med, 2003.
© 2009
The Problem is LargeThe Problem is Large• In U.S. Healthcare system
– 7% of patients suffer a medication error 2
– On average, every patient admitted to an ICU suffers an adverse event 3,4
– 44,000- 98,000 people die in hospitals each year as the result of
medical errors 5
– Nearly 100,000 deaths from HAIs 6
– Estimated 30,000 to 62,000 deaths from CLABSIs 7
– Cost of HAIs is $28-33 billion 7
• 8 countries report similar findings to the U.S.2. Bates DW, Cullen DJ, Laird N, et al., JAMA, 19953. Donchin Y, Gopher D, Olin M, et al., Crit Care Med, 1995.4. Andrews L, Stocking C, Krizek T, et al., Lancet, 1997.5. Kohn L, Corrigan J, Donaldson M., To Err Is Human, 1999.6. Klevens M, Edwards J, Richards C, et al., PHR, 20077. Ending Health Care-Associated Infections, AHRQ, 2009.
© 2009
How Can These Errors How Can These Errors Happen?Happen?
• People are fallible• Medicine is still treated as an art, not
science• Need to view the delivery of healthcare as
a science• Need systems that catch mistakes before
they reach the patient
© 2009
Understanding the Science of Understanding the Science of SafetySafety
© 2009
How Can We Improve?How Can We Improve?Understand the Science of SafetyUnderstand the Science of Safety
• Every system is perfectly designed to achieve the results it gets
• Understand principles of safe design – standardize, create checklists, learn when things go wrong
• Recognize these principles apply to technical and team work
• Teams make wise decisions when there is diverse and independent input
Caregivers are not to blameCaregivers are not to blame
© 2009
SystemSystem FailureFailure LeadingLeading toto ThisThis
ErrorError
Catheter pulled withPatient sitting
Communication betweenresident and nurse
Lack of protocol For catheter removal
Inadequate trainingand supervision
Patient suffers
Venous air embolism
8. Pronovost PJ, Wu Aw, Sexton, JB et al., Ann Int Med, 2004.9. Reason J, Hobbs A., 2000.
© 2009
System Factors Impact SafetySystem Factors Impact Safety
HospitalHospital
Departmental FactorsDepartmental Factors
Work EnvironmentWork Environment
Team FactorsTeam Factors
Individual ProviderIndividual Provider
Task FactorsTask Factors
Patient CharacteristicsPatient Characteristics
InstitutionalInstitutional
10. Adapted from Vincent C, Taylor- Adams S, Stanhope N., BMJ, 1998.
© 2009
Evidence Regarding the Impact of ICU Evidence Regarding the Impact of ICU Organization on PerformanceOrganization on Performance
• Physicians11
• Nurses12
• Pharmacists13
11. Pronovost P, Angus D, Dorman T, et al., JAMA, 2002.12. Pronovost P, Dang D, Dorman T, et al., ECP, 2001.13. Pronovost P, Jenckes M, Dorman T, et al., JAMA, 1999.
© 2009
Fatal Aviation Accidents per Fatal Aviation Accidents per Million DeparturesMillion Departures
14. Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents, Aviation Safety Boeing Commercial Airplanes, July 2009.
© 2009
Principles of Safe DesignPrinciples of Safe Design
• Standardize – Eliminate steps if possible
• Create independent checks
• Learn when things go wrong– What happened– Why– What did you do to reduce risk– How do you know it worked
© 2009
StandardizeStandardize
© 2009
Line Cart Contents – 4 DrawersLine Cart Contents – 4 Drawers
© 2009
Eliminate StepsEliminate Steps
© 2009
Create Independent ChecksCreate Independent Checks
© 2009
2 Year Results from 103 2 Year Results from 103 ICUsICUs
Time periodTime period Median CRBSI rateMedian CRBSI rate Incidence rate ratioIncidence rate ratio
BaselineBaseline 2.7 1
Peri-interventionPeri-intervention 1.6 0.76
0-3 months0-3 months 0 0.62
4-6 months4-6 months 0 0.56
7-9 months7-9 months 0 0.47
10-12 months10-12 months 0 0.42
13-15 months13-15 months 0 0.37
16-18 months16-18 months 0 0.34
15. Pronovost P, Needham D, Berenholtz S et al., N Engl J Med, 2006.
© 2009
Principles of Safe Design Apply to Principles of Safe Design Apply to Technical and Team WorkTechnical and Team Work
Basic Components and Process of Basic Components and Process of CommunicationCommunication
16. Dayton E, Henriksen K, Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf, 2007.
© 2009
% o
f res
pond
ents
repo
rting
abo
ve a
dequ
ate
team
wor
k
ICU Physicians and ICU RN ICU Physicians and ICU RN CollaborationCollaboration
17. ICUSRS Data from Needham D, Thompson D, Holzmueller C, et al., Crit Care Med, 2004.
© 2009
Teamwork ToolsTeamwork Tools
• Staff Safety Assessment• Daily goals• AM briefing• Shadowing• Barrier Identification and
Mitigation• Learning from Defects
© 2009
Systems Systems
• Every system is designed to achieve the results it gets
• To improve performance we need to change systems
• Start with pilot test one patient, one day, one physician, one room
© 2009
Teams Make Wise Decisions When There Teams Make Wise Decisions When There is Diverse and Independent Inputis Diverse and Independent Input
• Wisdom of Crowds
• Alternate between convergent and divergent thinking
• Get from the dance floor to the balcony level
18. Heifetz R, Leadership Without Easy Answers,1994.
© 2009
Don’t Play Man DownDon’t Play Man Down
When you feel something say When you feel something say somethingsomething
© 2009
RecapRecap
• Develop lenses to see systems • Work to standardize one process• Infuse these principles of standardization and
independent checks in other processes• Don’t play man down
© 2009
Action ItemsAction Items
• Have all members of the CUSP/CLABSI Team view the Science of Improving Patient Safety video
• Put together a roster of who on your unit needs to view the Science of Safety video
• Develop a plan to have all staff on your unit view the Science of Improving Patient Safety video– Assess what technologies you have available for staff
to view– Identify times for viewing it (e.g., staff meetings,
individual admin hours)
© 2009
Works ConsultedWorks Consulted1. McGlynn E, Asch S, Adams J, et al. The quality of health care delivered to adults in the
United States. N Engl J Med. 2003;348 (26): 2635-45.2. Bates DW, Cullen DJ, Laird N, et al. Incidence of adverse drug events and potential
adverse drug events. JAMA. 1995;274(1):29-34. 3. Donchin Y, Gopher D, Olin M, et al., A look into the nature and causes of human errors in
the intensive care unit. Crit Care Med. 23:294-300,1995.4. Andrews LB, Stocking C, Krizek T, et al., An alternative strategy for studying adverse
events in medical care. Lancet. 349:309-313,1997.5. Kohn L, Corrigan J, Donaldson M. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System.
Washington, DC: National Acad Pr; 1999.6. Klevens M, Edwards J, Richards C, et al., Estimating Health Care-Associated Infections
and Deaths in U.S. Hospitals, 2002. PHR.122:160-166,2007. 7. Ending Health Care-Associated Infections, AHRQ, Rockville,MD, 2009.
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/haicusp.htm.8. Pronovost P, Wu A, Sexton J, et al. Acute decompensation after removing a central line:
practical approaches to increasing safety in the intensive care unit. Ann Int Med. 2004;140(12):1025-1033.
9. Reason J, Hobbs A. Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000.
10.Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Stanhope N. Framework for analysing risk and safety in clinical medicine. BMJ. 1998; 316: 1154–7.
11.Pronovost P, Angus D, et al. Physician staffing patterns and clinical outcomes in critically ill patients: a systematic review. JAMA. 2002;288(17):2151-2162.
12.Pronovost P, Dang D, Dorman T, et al. Intensive care unit nurse staffing and the risk for complications after abdominal aortic surgery. Effective clinical practice: ECP. 2001;4(5):199-206.
© 2009
Works ConsultedWorks Consulted13.Pronovost P, Jenckes M, Dorman T, et al. Organizational characteristics of intensive
care units related to outcomes of abdominal aortic surgery. JAMA. 1999;281(14):1310–7.14.Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents: Worldwide Operations
1959-2008. Boeing News Releases/Statements. July 2009. Aviation Safety Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Web. 21 Jan 2010. <www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf>.
15.Pronovost P, Needham D, Berenholtz S et al. An intervention to decrease catheter-related bloodstream infections in the ICU. New Engl J Med. 2006;355(26):2725-32.
16.Dayton E, Henriksen K. Communication Failure: Basic components, contributing factors, and the call for structure. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2007; 33(1): 34-47.
17.Needham D, Thompson D, Holzmueller C, et al. A system factors analysis of airway events from the Intensive Care Unit Safety Reporting System (ICUSRS). Crit Care Med. 2004;32:2227-33.
18.Heifetz R, Leadership Without Easy Answers, President and Fellows of Harvard College,1994.