On the application of simple OR models to the Land Force

Peter J Dortmans, Stephen Bourn, Richard Egudo, Svetoslav Gaidow, Wayne Hobbs &

Denis Shine

Land Operations Division

Defence Science & Technology Organisation

Edinburgh, AUSTRALIA

Summary

• Defining Simple Modelling

• Some Land Force examples

• Food for thought

• Defining Simple Modelling

• Some Land Force examples

• Food for thought

Simple Models

All models are wrong – some models are useful!

Occam’s Razor –models should be as simple as possible, but no simpler!

? What is a ‘simple model’?

Simple vs Detailed Models:A viewpoint

Axis Simple models Detailed models Catch Phrase “Doing the right problem” “Doing the problem right”

Purpose Exploration and Refinement Assessment and Evaluation Aim Develop understanding Compare options

Philosophy

Driver Immediacy Precision Prior information Limited Detailed Typical Problem Ill-defined Well understood

Problem Space

Degrees of freedom Many Few Efficiency Metric Responsiveness Accuracy Deliverables Insights Answers

Solution Space

Effectiveness Metric Viability Validity

• Defining Simple Modelling

• Some Land Force examples

• Food for thought

Combat ID

? Question: What advantages do CID give?

Technique: Modified Lanchester

Combat ID -Data

)( AfaBbdt

dA )( BfbAa

dt

dB

Force Attrition coefficient Fratricide coefficient

A without CID a=0.6 fa=0.1

A with CID a=0.4 fa=0.02

B b=0.4 fb=0.1

fa and fb are fratricide coefficients

Combat ID - Results

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.90

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

w/out CIDwith CID BA

A

0 .45 0 .4 7 5 0.7 2

B

A

dA

dBB

A

dA

dB 1,max

Combat ID - Results

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.90

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

w/out CIDwith CID BA

A

0 .45 0 .4 7 5 0.7 2

B

A

dA

dBB

A

dA

dB 1,max

Initial state End state

Without CID With CID

00

0

BA

A

A0 B0

A B A B

0.231 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.858 0.0 0.877

0.375 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.558 0.0 0.642

0.459 0.85 1.0 0.158 0.0 0.0 0.254

0.769 1.0 0.3 0.919 0.0 0.941 0.0

Combat ID

? Question: What advantage do CID give?

Technique: Modified Lanchester

Better: Is CID always an advantage?

Minimise all blue casualties

vs minimise blue fratricide casualties

Tactical Effects

? Problem: Land forces in 2025?

Technique: Agent-based distillations

Explore problem space

o Create “conceptual forces” based on:• Engagement, Information Collection,

Communication, Decision Making, Sustainment, Movement, Protection

Tactical Effects – MANA simulation• e.g. Envelopment

– On contact: back away, fan out, then attacks

– Focus: Information Collection, Decision Making and Movement

Tactical Effects – MANA simulation

Default Scenario Envelopment Succeeding Envelopment Failing

• e.g. Envelopment

– On contact: back away, fan out, then attacks

– Focus: Information Collection, Decision Making and Movement

Tactical Effects - Observations

Tactical Effects - Observations

Tactical Effects

? Problem: Land forces in 2025?

Outcomes Areas of impact Synergies and antagonisms Emergent Behaviour Basis for further studies

Risk Management Matrix

? Comparing future force structures - 2015

What can go wrong? & What can get better?

Risk Management Matrix

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 LIKELIHOOD

1 2 3 4 5 E E H H M ALMOST

CERTAIN

M

H H E E

E E H M M

LIKELY M M H E E

E H M M L POSSIBLE

L M M H E

H H M L L UNLIKELY

L L M H H

H M L L L RARE

L L L M H

Risk Management Matrix

? Comparing future force structures - 2015

What can go wrong? & What can get better?

SME input – AHP facilitated

Risk Management Matrix

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 LIKELIHOOD

1 2 3 4 5 E E H H M ALMOST

CERTAIN

M

H H E E

E E H M M

LIKELY M M H E E

E H M M L POSSIBLE

L M M H E

H H M L L UNLIKELY

L L M H H

H M L L L RARE

L L L M H

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5E E H H M M H H E E

E E H M M M M H E E

E H M M L L M M H E

H H M L L L L M H H

H M L L L L L L M H

RARE

ALMOST CERTAIN

LIKELY

POSSIBLE

UNLIKELY

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES LIKELIHOOD POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES

Risk Management Matrix

? Comparing future force structures - 2015

What can go wrong? & What can get better?

SME input – AHP facilitated

Relative merits of forces and issues/risks

Asymmetric Conflict

? Problem: Adapting conventional forces to asymmetric threats

Techniques: Conceptual Modelling; SME input; Pair-wise comparisons

Asymmetric Conflict:

Asymmetric Conflict: Conceptual Model

Asymmetric Conflict Average Scores AAAS Descriptor Characteristic Blue Red

Secure 3.6 1.8 Communication Non-Secure 3.0 3.8 Precision 2.6 2.8 Engagement Non-Precision 3.4 1.8 Tactical 3.4 2.4 Movement Operational 3.8 3.0 HUMINT 1.8 3.6 Information

Collection SIGINT 3.8 1.6 Military 3.8 1.6 Sustainment Local 2.4 3.8 Physical 3.4 1.8 Protection Concealment 2.8 3.6 Tactical 3.4 3.4 Decision Making Operational 3.2 2.8

Asymmetric Conflict Average Scores AAAS Descriptor Characteristic Blue Red

Secure 3.6 1.8 Communication Non-Secure 3.0 3.8 Precision 2.6 2.8 Engagement Non-Precision 3.4 1.8 Tactical 3.4 2.4 Movement Operational 3.8 3.0 HUMINT 1.8 3.6 Information

Collection SIGINT 3.8 1.6 Military 3.8 1.6 Sustainment Local 2.4 3.8 Physical 3.4 1.8 Protection Concealment 2.8 3.6 Tactical 3.4 3.4 Decision Making Operational 3.2 2.8

Enhance HUMINT

Reduce Local Support

Asymmetric Conflict

? Problem: Adapting conventional forces to asymmetric threats

Techniques: Conceptual Modelling; SME input; Pair-wise comparisons

Indicate opportunities & threats

• Defining Simple Modelling

• Some Land Force examples

• Food for thought

Food for thought

• Simple models – scope problem– raise questions– set boundaries

• How do we assess their ‘goodness’?

• How do we manage ‘complexity’?

• How do we make sure they are used appropriately?

Questions