On Liberty - Mill, John Stuart

8/12/2019 On Liberty - Mill, John Stuart

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/on-liberty-mill-john-stuart 1/661



On Liberty. By JohnStuart Mill.

With an Introduction byW. L. Courtney, LL.D.

The Walter Scott Publishing

Co., Ltd.London and Felling-on-Tyne

ew York and Melbourne

To the beloved and deploredmemory of her who was the



inspirer, and in part the author, oall that is best in my writings—thefriend and wife whose exaltedsense of truth and right was mystrongest incitement, and whoseapprobation was my chief reward— I dedicate this volume. Like all thaI have written for many years, i

belongs as much to her as to me; buthe work as it stands has had, in a

very insufficient degree, theinestimable advantage of her revision; some of the mosimportant portions having bee



reserved for a more careful re-examination, which they are nownever destined to receive. Were I

but capable of interpreting to theworld one-half the great thoughtsand noble feelings which are buriedin her grave, I should be the mediuof a greater benefit to it than is ever

likely to arise from anything that Ican write, unprompted and

unassisted by her all but unrivalledwisdom.



INTRODUCTION. I.

John Stuart Mill was born o

20th May 1806. He was a delicatechild, and the extraordinaryeducation designed by his father was not calculated to develop andimprove his physical powers. "Inever was a boy," he says; "never

played cricket." His exercise was

taken in the form of walks with hisfather, during which the elder Mill

lectured his son and examined hion his work. It is idle to speculate



on the possible results of a differentreatment. Mill remained delicatethroughout his life, but wasendowed with that intense mentalenergy which is so often combinedwith physical weakness. His youtwas sacrificed to an idea; he wasdesigned by his father to carry o

his work; the individuality of the boy was unimportant. A visit to the

south of France at the age ofourteen, in company with thefamily of General Sir SamuelBentham, was not without its



influence. It was a glimpse oanother atmosphere, though thestudious habits of his home lifewere maintained. Moreover, hederived from it his interest iforeign politics, which remainedone of his characteristics to the endof his life. In 1823 he was

appointed junior clerk in theExaminers' Office at the India

House.Mill's first essays were writtein the Traveller about a year beforehe entered the India House. Fro



that time forward his literary wor was uninterrupted save by attacks oillness. His industry wasstupendous. He wrote articles on ainfinite variety of subjects,

political, metaphysical,

philosophic, religious, poetical. Hediscovered Tennyson for his

generation, he influenced thewriting of Carlyle's French

evolution as well as its success.And all the while he was engaged istudying and preparing for his moreambitious works, while he rose step



by step at the India Office. His ssays on Unsettled Questions inolitical Economy were written i

1831, although they did not appear until thirteen years later. His Systemof Logic , the design of which was

even then fashioning itself in his brain, took thirteen years to

complete, and was actually published before the Political

conomy . In 1844 appeared thearticle on Michelet, which its author anticipated would cause somediscussion, but which did not create



the sensation he expected. Next year there were the "Claims of Labour"and "Guizot," and in 1847 hisarticles on Irish affairs in the

orning Chronicle . These yearswere very much influenced by his

friendship and correspondence witComte, a curious comradeship

between men of such differentemperament. In 1848 Mill

published his Political Economy , towhich he had given his seriousstudy since the completion of his

ogic . His articles and reviews,



though they involved a good deal owork—as, for instance, the re-

perusal of the Iliad and the Odysseyin the original before reviewinGrote's Greece —were recreation tothe student. The year 1856 saw hi

head of the Examiners' Office in theIndia House, and another two years

brought the end of his official work,owing to the transfer of India to the

Crown. In the same year his wifedied. Liberty was published shortlyafter, as well as the Thoughts on

arliamentary Reform , and no year



passed without Mill makinimportant contributions on the

political, philosophical, and ethicalquestions of the day.

Seven years after the death ohis wife, Mill was invited to contes

Westminster. His feeling on theconduct of elections made hi

refuse to take any personal action ithe matter, and he gave the frankest

expression to his political views, but nevertheless he was elected bya large majority. He was not aconventional success in the House;



as a speaker he lacked magnetism.But his influence was widely felt."For the sake of the House oCommons at large," said Mr.Gladstone, "I rejoiced in his advenand deplored his disappearance. He

did us all good." After only threeyears in Parliament, he was

defeated at the next GeneralElection by Mr. W. H. Smith. He

retired to Avignon, to the pleasantlittle house where the happiesyears of his life had been spent ithe companionship of his wife, and



continued his disinterested labours.He completed his edition of hisfather's Analysis of the Mind , andalso produced, in addition to lessimportant work, The Subjection oWomen , in which he had the active

co-operation of his step-daughter. A book on Socialism was under

consideration, but, like an earlier study of Sociology, it never was

written. He died in 1873, his lasyears being spent peacefully in the pleasant society of his step-daughter, from whose tender care

d ll l h h



and earnest intellectual sympathy hecaught maybe a far-off reflection othe light which had irradiated hisspiritual life.



II.

The circumstances under whic

John Stuart Mill wrote his Libertyare largely connected with theinfluence which Mrs. Taylor wielded over his career. Thededication is well known. Icontains the most extraordinary

panegyric on a woman that any

philosopher has ever penned."Were I but capable of interpreting

to the world one-half the greathoughts and noble feelings whic

b i d i h I h ld b



are buried in her grave, I should bethe medium of a greater benefit to ithan is ever likely to arise froanything that I can write,unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom." It is

easy for the ordinary worldlycynicism to curl a sceptical lip over

sentences like these. There may beexaggeration of sentiment, the

necessary and inevitable reaction oa man who was trained according tothe "dry light" of sounimpressionable a man as James

Mill th f th b t th



Mill, the father; but the passagequoted is not the only one in whicJohn Stuart Mill proclaims hisunhesitating belief in the intellectualinfluence of his wife. The treatiseo n Liberty was written especially

under her authority andencouragement, but there are many

earlier references to the power which she exercised over his mind.

Mill was introduced to her as earlyas 1831, at a dinner-party at Mr.Taylor's house, where were present,amongst others, Roebuck, W. J.

Fo and Miss Harriet Martinea



Fox, and Miss Harriet Martineau.The acquaintance rapidly ripenedinto intimacy and the intimacy intofriendship, and Mill was never weary of expatiating on all theadvantages of so singular a

relationship. In some of the presentation copies of his work o

olitical Economy , he wrote thefollowing dedication:—"To Mrs.

John Taylor, who, of all personsknown to the author, is the mosthighly qualified either to originateor to appreciate speculation o

social advancement this work is



social advancement, this work iswith the highest respect and esteededicated." An article on theenfranchisement of women wasmade the occasion for another encomium. We shall hardly be

wrong in attributing a much later book, The Subjection of Women ,

published in 1869, to the influencewielded by Mrs. Taylor. Finally,

the pages of the Autobiography rinwith the dithyrambic praise of his"almost infallible counsellor."

The facts of this remarkable

intimacy can easily be stated The



intimacy can easily be stated. Thedeductions are more difficult. Thereis no question that Mill's infatuatiowas the cause of considerabletrouble to his acquaintances andfriends. His father openly taxed hi

with being in love with another man's wife. Roebuck, Mrs. Grote,

Mrs. Austin, Miss HarrietMartineau were amongst those who

suffered because they made someallusion to a forbidden subject.Mrs. Taylor lived with her daughter in a lodging in the country; but i

1851 her husband died and the



1851 her husband died, and theMill made her his wife. Opinionswere widely divergent as to her merits; but every one agreed that upto the time of her death, in 1858,Mill was wholly lost to his friends.

George Mill, one of Mill's younger brothers, gave it as his opinion tha

she was a clever and remarkablewoman, but "nothing like what Joh

took her to be." Carlyle, in hisreminiscences, described her witambiguous epithets. She was"vivid," "iridescent," "pale and

passionate and sad-looking a



passionate and sad-looking, aliving-romance heroine of theroyalist volition and questionabledestiny." It is not possible to makemuch of a judgment like this, but weget on more certain ground when we

discover that Mrs. Carlyle said oone occasion that "she is thought to

be dangerous," and that Carlyleadded that she was worse tha

dangerous, she was patronising. Theoccasion when Mill and his wifewere brought into close contacwith the Carlyles is well known.

The manuscript of the first volume



The manuscript of the first volumeof the French Revolution had beelent to Mill, and was accidentally

burnt by Mrs. Mill's servant. Milland his wife drove up to Carlyle'sdoor, the wife speechless, the

husband so full of conversation thahe detained Carlyle with desperate

attempts at loquacity for two hours.But Dr. Garnett tells us, in his Life

of Carlyle , that Mill made asubstantial reparation for thecalamity for which he wasresponsible by inducing the

aggrieved author to accept half o



aggrieved author to accept half othe £200 which he offered. Mrs.Mill, as I have said, died in 1858,after seven years of happycompanionship with her husband,and was buried at Avignon. The

inscription which Mill wrote for her grave is too characteristic to be

omitted:—"Her great and lovinheart, her noble soul, her clear,

powerful, original, andcomprehensive intellect, made her the guide and support, the instructor in wisdom and the example i

goodness as she was the sole



goodness, as she was the soleearthly delight of those who had thehappiness to belong to her. Asearnest for all public good as shewas generous and devoted to allwho surrounded her, her influence

has been felt in many of the greatesimprovements of the age, and will

be in those still to come. Were thereeven a few hearts and intellects like

hers, this earth would already become the hoped-for Heaven."These lines prove the intensity oMill's feeling, which is not afraid o

abundant verbiage; but they also



abundant verbiage; but they also prove that he could not imaginewhat the effect would be on others,and, as Grote said, only Mill'sreputation could survive these andsimilar displays.

Every one will judge for himself of this romantic episode i

Mill's career, according to suchexperience as he may possess of the

philosophic mind and of the valueof these curious but not infrequenrelationships. It may have been a

piece of infatuation, or, if we prefer

to say so, it may have been the mos



to say so, it may have been the mosgracious and the most human pagein Mill's career. Mrs. Mill mayhave flattered her husband's vanity

by echoing his opinions, or she mayhave indeed been an Egeria, full o

inspiration and intellectualhelpfulness. What usually happens

in these cases,—although the philosopher himself, through his

belief in the equality of the sexes,was debarred from thinking so,—isthe extremely valuable action andreaction of two different classes

and orders of mind. To any one



ywhose thoughts have been occupiedwith the sphere of abstracspeculation, the lively and vivid

presentment of concrete fact comesas a delightful and agreeable shock.

The instinct of the woman ofteenables her not only to apprehend

but to illustrate a truth for which shewould be totally unable to give the

adequate philosophic reasoning. Othe other hand, the man, with themore careful logical methods andthe slow processes of formal

reasoning, is apt to suppose that the



g, p pphappy intuition which leaps to theconclusion is really based on theintellectual processes of which heis conscious in his own case. Thus

both parties to the happy contrac

are equally pleased. The abstractruth gets the concrete illustration;

the concrete illustration finds its proper foundation in a series o

abstract inquiries. Perhaps Carlyle'sepithets of "iridescent" and "vivid"refer incidentally to Mrs. Mill'squick perceptiveness, and thus

throw a useful light on the mutual



gadvantages of the common work ohusband and wife. But it savoursalmost of impertinence even toattempt to lift the veil on a mysterylike this. It is enough to say,

perhaps, that however much we maydeplore the exaggeration of Mill's

references to his wife, we recognisethat, for whatever reason, the pair

lived an ideally happy life.It still, however, remains toestimate the extent to which Mrs.Taylor, both before and after her

marriage with Mill, made actual



gcontributions to his thoughts and his

public work. Here I may be perhaps permitted to avail myself of what Ihave already written in a previouswork. [1] Mill gives us abundan

help in this matter in theutobiography . When first he knew

her, his thoughts were turning to thesubject of Logic. But his published

work on the subject owed nothing toher, he tells us, in its doctrines. Itwas Mill's custom to write thewhole of a book so as to get his

general scheme complete, and the



laboriously to re-write it in order to perfect the phrases and thecomposition. Doubtless Mrs. Taylor was of considerable help to him asa critic of style. But to be a critic o

doctrine she was hardly qualified.Mill has made some clear

admissions on this point. "The onlyactual revolution which has ever

taken place in my modes of thinkinwas already complete," [2] he says, before her influence became paramount. There is a curiously

humble estimate of his own powers



(to which Dr. Bain has calledattention), which reads at first sighas if it contradicted this. "During thegreater part of my literary life Ihave performed the office i

relation to her, which, from a rather early period, I had considered as

the most useful part that I wasqualified to take in the domain o

thought, that of an interpreter ooriginal thinkers, and mediator between them and the public." Sofar it would seem that Mill had sa

at the feet of his oracle; but observe



the highly remarkable exceptiowhich is made in the followinsentence:—"For I had always ahumble opinion of my own powersas an original thinker, except in

abstract science (logic,metaphysics, and the theoretic

rinciples of political economyand politics.) " [3] If Mill then wasan original thinker in logic,metaphysics, and the science oeconomy and politics, it is clear thahe had not learnt these from her

lips. And to most men logic and



metaphysics may be safely taken asforming a domain in whicoriginality of thought, if it can behonestly professed, is a sufficientitle of distinction.

Mrs. Taylor's assistance in theolitical Economy is confined to

certain definite points. The purelyscientific part was, we are assured,not learnt from her. "But it waschiefly her influence which gave tothe book that general tone by whicit is distinguished from all previous

expositions of political economy



that had any pretensions to bescientific, and which has made it souseful in conciliating minds whicthose previous expositions hadrepelled. This tone consisted

chiefly in making the proper distinction between the laws of the

production of wealth, which arereal laws of Nature, dependent othe properties of objects, and themodes of its distribution, which,subject to certain conditions,depend on human will.... I ha

indeed partially learnt this view o



things from the thoughts awakened in me by the speculations of St.Simonians ; but it was made a livin

principle, pervading and animatinthe book, by my wife's promptings."

[4] The part which is italicised isnoticeable. Here, as elsewhere,

Mill thinks out the matter byhimself; the concrete form of thethoughts is suggested or prompted

by the wife. Apart from this"general tone," Mill tells us thathere was a specific contribution.

"The chapter which has had a



greater influence on opinion than allthe rest, that on the Probable Futureof the Labouring Classes, is entirelydue to her. In the first draft of the

book that chapter did not exist. She

pointed out the need of such achapter, and the extreme

imperfection of the book without it;she was the cause of my writing it."From this it would appear that shegave Mill that tendency toSocialism which, while it lends a

progressive spirit to his

speculations on politics, at the same



time does not manifestly accordwith his earlier advocacy of peasan

proprietorships. Nor, again, is it, onthe face of it, consistent with thosedoctrines of individual liberty

which, aided by the intellectualcompanionship of his wife, he

propounded in a later work. Theideal of individual freedom is nothe ideal of Socialism, just as thainvocation of governmental aid towhich the Socialist resorts is noconsistent with the theory o

laisser-faire . Yet Liberty wasl d b ll d h f



planned by Mill and his wife iconcert. Perhaps a slighvisionariness of speculation was noless the attribute of Mrs. Mill thaan absence of rigid logical

principles. Be this as it may, sheundoubtedly checked the half-

recognised leanings of her husbandin the direction of Coleridge andCarlyle. Whether this was ainstance of her steadying influence,[5] or whether it added one moreunassimilated element to Mill's

diverse intellectual sustenance, mayb i l l f i W



be wisely left an open question. Wecannot, however, be wrong inattributing to her the parentage o

one book of Mill, The Subjection oWomen . It is true that Mill had

before learnt that men and womeought to be equal in legal, political,

social, and domestic relations. Thiswas a point on which he hadalready fallen foul of his father'sessay on Government . But Mrs.Taylor had actually written on thisvery point, and the warmth and

fervour of Mill's denunciations o' i d



women's servitude wereunmistakably caught from his wife'sview of the practical disabilities

entailed by the feminine position.

III.



Liberty was published in 1859,when the nineteenth century washalf over, but in its general spiritand in some of its specialtendencies the little tract belongsrather to the standpoint of the

eighteenth century than to that whicsaw its birth. In many of his

speculations John Stuart Mill formsa sort of connecting link betwee

the doctrines of the earlier Englisempirical school and those whic

we associate with the name of Mr.H b t S I hi L gi f



Herbert Spencer. In his Logic , for instance, he represents an advanceon the theories of Hume, and ye

does not see how profoundly thevictories of Science modify the

conclusions of the earlier thinker.Similarly, in his Political

conomy , he desires to improveand to enlarge upon Ricardo, andyet does not advance so far as themodifications of political economy

by Sociology, indicated by somelater—and especially German—

speculations on the subject. In thetract on Liberty Mill is advocatin



tract on Liberty , Mill is advocatinthe rights of the individual asagainst Society at the very openin

of an era that was rapidly coming tothe conclusion that the individual

had no absolute rights againsSociety. The eighteenth century

view is that individuals existedfirst, each with their own specialclaims and responsibilities; thathey deliberately formed a SocialState, either by a contract or otherwise; and that then finally they

limited their own action out oregard for the interests of the social



regard for the interests of the socialorganism thus arbitrarily produced.This is hardly the view of the

nineteenth century. It is possible thalogically the individual is prior to

the State; historically and in theorder of Nature, the State is prior to

the individual. In other words, sucrights as every single personality possesses in a modern world do no belong to him by an originalordinance of Nature, but are slowlyacquired in the growth and

development of the social state. It isnot the truth that individual liberties



not the truth that individual libertieswere forfeited by some deliberateact when men made themselves into

a Commonwealth. It is more true tosay, as Aristotle said long ago, that

man is naturally a political animal,that he lived under strict social

laws as a mere item, almost anonentity, as compared with theOrder, Society, or Community towhich he belonged, and that suc

privileges as he subsequentlyacquired have been obtained i

virtue of his growing importance asa member of a growin



a member of a growinorganisation. But if this is eveapproximately true, it seriously

restricts that liberty of theindividual for which Mill pleads.

The individual has no chance, because he has no rights, against the

social organism. Society can punishim for acts or even opinions whicare anti-social in character. Hisvirtue lies in recognising theintimate communion with hisfellows. His sphere of activity is

bounded by the common interest.Just as it is an absurd and exploded



Just as it is an absurd and explodedtheory that all men are originallyequal, so it is an ancient and false

doctrine to protest that a man has aindividual liberty to live and thin

as he chooses in any spirit oantagonism to that larger body o

which he forms an insignifican part. Nowadays this view of Society

and of its development, which welargely owe to the Philosophie

ositive of M. Auguste Comte, is so

familiar and possibly so damaginto the individual initiative that i



to the individual initiative, that i becomes necessary to advance and proclaim the truth which resides i

an opposite theory. All progress, aswe are aware, depends on the join

process of integration anddifferentiation; synthesis, analysis,

and then a larger synthesis seem toform the law of development. If iever comes to pass that Society istyrannical in its restrictions of theindividual, if, as for instance isome forms of Socialism, based o

deceptive analogies of Nature'sdealings the type is everything and



dealings, the type is everything andthe individual nothing, it must beconfidently urged in answer that the

fuller life of the future depends othe manifold activities, even thoug

they may be antagonistic, of theindividual. In England, at all events,

we know that government in all itsdifferent forms, whether as King, or as a caste of nobles, or as aoligarchical plutocracy, or even astrades unions, is so dwarfing in itsaction that, for the sake of the future,

the individual must revolt. Just asour former point of view limited the



our former point of view limited thevalue of Mill's treatise on Liberty ,so these considerations tend to

show its eternal importance. Theomnipotence of Society means a

dead level of uniformity. The claimof the individual to be heard, to say

what he likes, to do what he likes,to live as he likes, is absolutelynecessary, not only for the varietyof elements without which life is

poor, but also for the hope of afuture age. So long as individual

initiative and effort are recognisedas a vital element in English history,



as a vital element in English history,so long will Mill's Liberty , whiche confesses was based on a

suggestion derived from VonHumboldt, remain as a

indispensable contribution to thespeculations, and also to the healt

and sanity, of the world. What his wife really was to

Mill, we shall, perhaps, never know. But that she was an actualand vivid force, which roused the

latent enthusiasm of his nature, wehave abundant evidence. And when



she died at Avignon, though hisfriends may have regained a

almost estranged companionship,Mill was, personally, the poorer.

Into the sorrow of that bereavemenwe cannot enter: we have no righ

or power to draw the veil. It isenough to quote the simple words,so eloquent of an unspoken grie

"I can say nothing which coulddescribe, even in the faintesmanner, what that loss was and is.

But because I know that she wouldhave wished it, I endeavour to make



,the best of what life I have left, andto work for her purposes with suc

diminished strength as can bederived from thoughts of her, and

communion with her memory."W. L. COURTNEY.

London, July 5th, 1901 .

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Life of John Stuart Mill ,chapter vi. (Walter Scott.)

[2] Autobiography , p. 190.[3] Ibid. , p. 242.



[ ] , p[4] Autobiography , pp. 246,

247.

[5] Cf. an instructive page in the Autobiography , p. 252.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I. PAGE

INTRODUCTORY 1

CHAPTER II.

OF THE LIBERTY OFTHOUGHT AND 28



DISCUSSION

CHAPTER III.OF INDIVIDUALITY, ASONE OF THE ELEMENTSOF WELL-BEING

103

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE LIMITS TO THEAUTHORITY OF

SOCIETY OVER THEINDIVIDUAL

140

CHAPTER V



CHAPTER V.APPLICATIONS 177

The grand, leading principle, towards whichevery argument unfolded in

these pages directly converges,is the absolute and essential

importance of human

development in its richestdiversity.—Wilhelm Von

Humboldt: Sphere and Dutiesof Government .

ON LIBERTY.



CHAPTER I.



INTRODUCTORY.

The subject of this Essay is nothe so-called Liberty of the Will, sounfortunately opposed to themisnamed doctrine of Philosophical

ecessity; but Civil, or SocialLiberty: the nature and limits of the

power which can be legitimatelyexercised by society over theindividual. A question seldom

stated, and hardly ever discussed, igeneral terms, but which profoundly

influences the practicalcontroversies of the age by its laten



presence, and is likely soon to makeitself recognised as the vital

question of the future. It is so far from being new, that in a certain

sense, it has divided mankind,almost from the remotest ages; bu

in the stage of progress into whicthe more civilised portions of thespecies have now entered, i

presents itself under newconditions, and requires a differenand more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between Libertyand Authority is the most



conspicuous feature in the portionsof history with which we are

earliest familiar, particularly in thatof Greece, Rome, and England. Bu

in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes

of subjects, and the government. Byliberty, was meant protectionagainst the tyranny of the politicalrulers. The rulers were conceived(except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a

necessarily antagonistic position tothe people whom they ruled. They



consisted of a governing One, or agoverning tribe or caste, who

derived their authority froinheritance or conquest, who, at all

events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and

whose supremacy men did noventure, perhaps did not desire, tocontest, whatever precautions migh

be taken against its oppressiveexercise. Their power wasregarded as necessary, but also as

highly dangerous; as a weapowhich they would attempt to use



against their subjects, no less thaagainst external enemies. To

prevent the weaker members of thecommunity from being preyed upo

by innumerable vultures, it wasneedful that there should be a

animal of prey stronger than therest, commissioned to keep thedown. But as the king of the vultureswould be no less bent upon preyinon the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be

in a perpetual attitude of defenceagainst his beak and claws. The



aim, therefore, of patriots, was toset limits to the power which the

ruler should be suffered to exerciseover the community; and this

limitation was what they meant byliberty. It was attempted in two

ways. First, by obtaining arecognition of certain immunities,called political liberties or rights,which it was to be regarded as a

breach of duty in the ruler toinfringe, and which if he did

infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be



ustifiable. A second, and generallya later expedient, was the

establishment of constitutionalchecks; by which the consent of the

community, or of a body of somesort, supposed to represent its

interests, was made a necessarycondition to some of the moreimportant acts of the governin

power. To the first of these modesof limitation, the ruling power, inmost European countries, was

compelled, more or less, to submit.It was not so with the second; and to



attain this, or when already in somedegree possessed, to attain it more

completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers o

liberty. And so long as mankindwere content to combat one enemy

by another, and to be ruled by amaster, on condition of beingguaranteed more or lessefficaciously against his tyranny,they did not carry their aspirations

beyond this point.

A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, whe



men ceased to think it a necessity onature that their governors should

be an independent power, opposedin interest to themselves. I

appeared to them much better thathe various magistrates of the State

should be their tenants or delegates,revocable at their pleasure. In thaway alone, it seemed, could theyhave complete security that the

powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By

degrees, this new demand for elective and temporary rulers



became the prominent object of theexertions of the popular party,

wherever any such party existed;and superseded, to a considerable

extent, the previous efforts to limithe power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the rulin power emanate from the periodicalchoice of the ruled, some persons

began to think that too mucimportance had been attached to thelimitation of the power itself. That

(it might seem) was a resourceagainst rulers whose interests were



habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was,

that the rulers should be identifiedwith the people; that their interes

and will should be the interest andwill of the nation. The nation didnot need to be protected against itsown will. There was no fear of itstyrannising over itself. Let the rulers

be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and icould afford to trust them wit

power of which it could itseldictate the use to be made. Their

b h



power was but the nation's ow power, concentrated, and in a form

convenient for exercise. This modeof thought, or rather perhaps o

feeling, was common among the lasgeneration of European liberalism,in the Continental section of whicit still apparently predominates.Those who admit any limit to whaa government may do, except in thecase of such governments as theythink ought not to exist, stand out as

brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent.A i il f i i h b



A similar tone of sentiment might bythis time have been prevalent in our

own country, if the circumstanceswhich for a time encouraged it, had

continued unaltered.But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as i persons, success discloses faultsand infirmities which failure mighhave concealed from observation.The notion, that the people have noneed to limit their power over

themselves, might seem axiomatic,when popular government was ahi l d d b d



thing only dreamed about, or read oas having existed at some distan

period of the past. Neither was thanotion necessarily disturbed by suc

temporary aberrations as those othe French Revolution, the worst owhich were the work of a usurpinfew, and which, in any case,

belonged, not to the permanenworking of popular institutions, buto a sudden and convulsive outbreaagainst monarchical and aristocratic

despotism. In time, however, ademocratic republic came to occupy

l i f h h'



a large portion of the earth'ssurface, and made itself felt as one

of the most powerful members othe community of nations; and

elective and responsiblegovernment became subject to theobservations and criticisms whicwait upon a great existing fact. Iwas now perceived that suc

phrases as "self-government," and"the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true

state of the case. The "people" whoexercise the power are not alwaysth l ith th



the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-

government" spoken of is not thegovernment of each by himself, bu

of each by all the rest. The will othe people, moreover, practicallymeans, the will of the mosnumerous or the most active part othe people; the majority, or thosewho succeed in making themselvesaccepted as the majority: the

people, consequently, may desire to

oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed

g i t thi g i t th



against this, as against any other abuse of power. The limitation,

therefore, of the power ogovernment over individuals, loses

none of its importance when theholders of power are regularlyaccountable to the community, thatis, to the strongest party therein.This view of things, recommendinitself equally to the intelligence othinkers and to the inclination othose important classes in Europea

society to whose real or supposedinterests democracy is adverse, has

had no difficulty in establishin



had no difficulty in establishinitself; and in political speculations

"the tyranny of the majority" is nowgenerally included among the evils

against which society requires to beon its guard.Like other tyrannies, the tyranny

of the majority was at first, and isstill vulgarly, held in dread, chieflyas operating through the acts of the

public authorities. But reflectin persons perceived that when society

is itself the tyrant—societycollectively, over the separate

individuals who compose it its



individuals who compose it—itsmeans of tyrannising are no

restricted to the acts which it maydo by the hands of its political

functionaries. Society can and doesexecute its own mandates: and if iissues wrong mandates instead oright, or any mandates at all ithings with which it ought not tomeddle, it practises a social tyrannymore formidable than many kinds o

political oppression, since, thoug

not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means o

escape penetrating much more



escape, penetrating much moredeeply into the details of life, and

enslaving the soul itself. Protection,therefore, against the tyranny of the

magistrate is not enough: thereneeds protection also against thetyranny of the prevailing opinioand feeling; against the tendency osociety to impose, by other meansthan civil penalties, its own ideasand practices as rules of conduct othose who dissent from them; to

fetter the development, and, i possible, prevent the formation, o

any individuality not in harmony



any individuality not in harmonywith its ways, and compel all

characters to fashion themselvesupon the model of its own. There is

a limit to the legitimate interferenceof collective opinion witindividual independence: and tofind that limit, and maintain iagainst encroachment, is asindispensable to a good conditioof human affairs, as protectioagainst political despotism.



and by opinion on many thingswhich are not fit subjects for the

operation of law What these rules



operation of law. What these rulesshould be, is the principal questio

in human affairs; but if we except afew of the most obvious cases, it is

one of those which least progresshas been made in resolving. No twoages, and scarcely any twocountries, have decided it alike; andthe decision of one age or country isa wonder to another. Yet the peopleof any given age and country nomore suspect any difficulty in it,

than if it were a subject on whicmankind had always been agreed.

The rules which obtain amon



The rules which obtain amonthemselves appear to them self-

evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the

examples of the magical influenceof custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, buis continually mistaken for the first.The effect of custom, in preventinany misgiving respecting the rulesof conduct which mankind imposeon one another, is all the more

complete because the subject is oneon which it is not generally

considered necessary that reasons



considered necessary that reasonsshould be given, either by one

person to others, or by each tohimself. People are accustomed to

believe, and have been encouragedin the belief by some who aspire tothe character of philosophers, thatheir feelings, on subjects of thisnature, are better than reasons, andrender reasons unnecessary. The

practical principle which guides

them to their opinions on the

regulation of human conduct, is thefeeling in each person's mind tha

everybody should be required to ac



everybody should be required to acas he, and those with whom he

sympathises, would like them to act.o one, indeed, acknowledges to

himself that his standard oudgment is his own liking; but aopinion on a point of conduct, nosupported by reasons, can onlycount as one person's preference;and if the reasons, when given, area mere appeal to a similar

preference felt by other people, it is

still only many people's likininstead of one. To an ordinary man,

however, his own preference, thus



however, his own preference, thussupported, is not only a perfectly

satisfactory reason, but the only onehe generally has for any of his

notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expresslywritten in his religious creed; andhis chief guide in the interpretatioeven of that. Men's opinions,accordingly, on what is laudable or

blamable, are affected by all the

multifarious causes which influence



there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the

country emanates from its class



yinterests, and its feelings of class

superiority. The morality betweenSpartans and Helots, betwee

planters and negroes, betwee princes and subjects, betweenobles and roturiers, between meand women, has been for the mos

part the creation of these classinterests and feelings: and thesentiments thus generated, react i

turn upon the moral feelings of the

members of the ascendant class, itheir relations among themselves.

Where, on the other hand, a class,



, , ,formerly ascendant, has lost its

ascendancy, or where itsascendancy is unpopular, the

prevailing moral sentimentsfrequently bear the impress of aimpatient dislike of superiority.Another grand determinin

principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, whichave been enforced by law or

opinion, has been the servility o

mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their

temporal masters, or of their gods.



p , gThis servility, though essentially

selfish, is not hypocrisy; it givesrise to perfectly genuine sentiments

of abhorrence; it made men bur magicians and heretics. Among somany baser influences, the generaland obvious interests of societyhave of course had a share, and alarge one, in the direction of themoral sentiments: less, however, as

a matter of reason, and on their ow

account, than as a consequence othe sympathies and antipathies

which grew out of them: and



gsympathies and antipathies whic

had little or nothing to do with theinterests of society, have made

themselves felt in the establishmenof moralities with quite as greaforce.

The likings and dislikings osociety, or of some powerful

portion of it, are thus the main thinwhich has practically determined

the rules laid down for general

observance, under the penalties olaw or opinion. And in general,

those who have been in advance oh h d f l h



society in thought and feeling have

left this condition of thingsunassailed in principle, however

they may have come into conflicwith it in some of its details. Theyhave occupied themselves rather iinquiring what things society oughto like or dislike, than iquestioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to

individuals. They preferred

endeavouring to alter the feelings omankind on the particular points o

which they were themselvesh i l h h k



heretical, rather than make commo

cause in defence of freedom, witheretics generally. The only case in

which the higher ground has beetaken on principle and maintainedwith consistency, by any but anindividual here and there, is that oreligious belief: a case instructivein many ways, and not least so asforming a most striking instance o

the fallibility of what is called the

moral sense: for the odiumtheologicum , in a sincere bigot, is

one of the most unequivocal casesf l f li Th h fi



of moral feeling. Those who firs

broke the yoke of what called itselthe Universal Church, were i

general as little willing to permidifference of religious opinion asthat church itself. But when the heaof the conflict was over, withoutgiving a complete victory to any

party, and each church or sect wasreduced to limit its hopes to

retaining possession of the ground i

already occupied; minorities, seeinthat they had no chance of becomin

majorities, were under the necessityf l di t th h th



of pleading to those whom they

could not convert, for permission todiffer. It is accordingly on this

battle-field, almost solely, that therights of the individual againssociety have been asserted on broadgrounds of principle, and the claiof society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted.The great writers to whom the

world owes what religious liberty i

possesses, have mostly assertedfreedom of conscience as a

indefeasible right, and deniedb l t l th t h b i g i



absolutely that a human being is

accountable to others for hisreligious belief. Yet so natural to

mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religiousfreedom has hardly anywhere bee

practically realised, except wherereligious indifference, whicdislikes to have its peace disturbed

by theological quarrels, has added

its weight to the scale. In the minds

of almost all religious persons,even in the most tolerant countries,

the duty of toleration is admittedwith tacit reserves One person will



with tacit reserves. One person will

bear with dissent in matters ochurch government, but not o

dogma; another can tolerateeverybody, short of a Papist or aUnitarian; another, every one who

believes in revealed religion; a fewextend their charity a little further,

but stop at the belief in a God and ia future state. Wherever the

sentiment of the majority is still

genuine and intense, it is found tohave abated little of its claim to be

obeyed.In England from the peculiar



In England, from the peculiar

circumstances of our politicalhistory, though the yoke of opinion

is perhaps heavier, that of law islighter, than in most other countriesof Europe; and there is considerableealousy of direct interference, by

the legislative or the executive power, with private conduct; not somuch from any just regard for the

independence of the individual, as

from the still subsisting habit olooking on the government as

representing an opposite interest tothe public The majority have no



the public. The majority have no

yet learnt to feel the power of thegovernment their power, or its

opinions their opinions. When theydo so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed toinvasion from the government, as ialready is from public opinion. But,as yet, there is a considerableamount of feeling ready to be called

forth against any attempt of the law

to control individuals in things iwhich they have not hitherto bee

accustomed to be controlled by it;and this with very little



and this with very little

discrimination as to whether thematter is, or is not, within the

legitimate sphere of legal control;insomuch that the feeling, highlysalutary on the whole, is perhapsquite as often misplaced as wellgrounded in the particular instancesof its application. There is, in fact,no recognised principle by whic

the propriety or impropriety o

government interference iscustomarily tested. People decide

according to their personalpreferences Some whenever they



preferences. Some, whenever they

see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly

instigate the government toundertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount osocial evil, rather than add one tothe departments of human interestsamenable to governmental control.And men range themselves on one

or the other side in any particular

case, according to this generaldirection of their sentiments; or

according to the degree of intereswhich they feel in the particular



which they feel in the particular

thing which it is proposed that thegovernment should do, or accordin

to the belief they entertain that thegovernment would, or would not,do it in the manner they prefer; buvery rarely on account of anyopinion to which they consistentlyadhere, as to what things are fit to

be done by a government. And it

seems to me that in consequence o

this absence of rule or principle,one side is at present as ofte

wrong as the other; the interferenceof government is with about equal



of government is, with about equal

frequency, improperly invoked andimproperly condemned.The object of this Essay is to

assert one very simple principle, asentitled to govern absolutely thedealings of society with theindividual in the way of compulsioand control, whether the means used

be physical force in the form o

legal penalties, or the moral



to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because i

will make him happier, because, inthe opinions of others, to do so



the opinions of others, to do so

would be wise, or even right. Theseare good reasons for remonstratinwith him, or reasoning with him, or

persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case hedo otherwise. To justify that, theconduct from which it is desired todeter him must be calculated to

produce evil to some one else. The

only part of the conduct of any one,for which he is amenable to society,

is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself,



p y ,

his independence is, of right,absolute. Over himself, over hisown body and mind, the individualis sovereign.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessaryto say that this doctrine is meant toapply only to human beings in thematurity of their faculties. We arenot speaking of children, or o

young persons below the age whic

the law may fix as that of manhoodor womanhood. Those who are still

in a state to require being taken careof by others, must be protected



y , p

against their own actions as well asagainst external injury. For the samereason, we may leave out oconsideration those backward statesof society in which the race itselmay be considered as in its nonage.The early difficulties in the way ospontaneous progress are so great,that there is seldom any choice o

means for overcoming them; and a

ruler full of the spirit oimprovement is warranted in the use

of any expedients that will attain aend, perhaps otherwise



, p p

unattainable. Despotism is alegitimate mode of government idealing with barbarians, providedthe end be their improvement, andthe means justified by actuallyeffecting that end. Liberty, as a

principle, has no application to anystate of things anterior to the timewhen mankind have become

capable of being improved by free

and equal discussion. Until then,there is nothing for them but implici

obedience to an Akbar or aCharlemagne, if they are so



g y

fortunate as to find one. But as sooas mankind have attained thecapacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or

persuasion (a period long sincereached in all nations with whowe need here concern ourselves),compulsion, either in the direcform or in that of pains and

penalties for non-compliance, is no

longer admissible as a means totheir own good, and justifiable only

for the security of others.It is proper to state that I forego



any advantage which could bederived to my argument from theidea of abstract right, as a thinindependent of utility. I regardutility as the ultimate appeal on allethical questions; but it must beutility in the largest sense, groundedon the permanent interests of man asa progressive being. Those

interests, I contend, authorise the

subjection of individual spontaneityto external control, only in respec

to those actions of each, whicconcern the interest of other people.



If any one does an act hurtful toothers, there is a primâ facie casefor punishing him, by law, or,where legal penalties are not safelyapplicable, by generaldisapprobation. There are alsomany positive acts for the benefit oothers, which he may rightfully becompelled to perform; such as, to

give evidence in a court of justice;

to bear his fair share in the commodefence, or in any other joint wor

necessary to the interest of thesociety of which he enjoys the



protection; and to perform certaiacts of individual beneficence, sucas saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect thedefenceless against ill-usage, thingswhich whenever it is obviously aman's duty to do, he may rightfully

be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil

to others not only by his actions bu



of the individual, he is de jureamenable to those whose interests

are concerned, and if need be, tosociety as their protector. There are



often good reasons for not holdinhim to the responsibility; but thesereasons must arise from the specialexpediencies of the case: either

because it is a kind of case in whiche is on the whole likely to ac

better, when left to his owndiscretion, than when controlled iany way in which society have it i

their power to control him; or

because the attempt to exercisecontrol would produce other evils,

greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these



preclude the enforcement oresponsibility, the conscience of theagent himself should step into thevacant judgment seat, and protecthose interests of others which haveno external protection; judginhimself all the more rigidly,

because the case does not admit ohis being made accountable to the

udgment of his fellow-creatures.

But there is a sphere of action iwhich society, as distinguished

from the individual, has, if any, onlyan indirect interest; comprehendin



all that portion of a person's life andconduct which affects only himself,or if it also affects others, only wittheir free, voluntary, andundeceived consent and

participation. When I say onlyhimself, I mean directly, and in thefirst instance: for whatever affectshimself, may affect others through

himself; and the objection whic

may be grounded on thiscontingency, will receive

consideration in the sequel. This,then, is the appropriate region o



human liberty. It comprises, first,the inward domain oconsciousness; demanding liberty oconscience, in the moscomprehensive sense; liberty othought and feeling; absolutefreedom of opinion and sentimenon all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or

theological. The liberty o

expressing and publishing opinionsmay seem to fall under a differen

principle, since it belongs to tha part of the conduct of an individual



which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importanceas the liberty of thought itself, andresting in great part on the samereasons, is practically inseparablefrom it. Secondly, the principlerequires liberty of tastes and

pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; o

doing as we like, subject to suc

consequences as may follow:without impediment from our

fellow-creatures, so long as whawe do does not harm them, eve



though they should think our conducfoolish, perverse, or wrong.Thirdly, from this liberty of eacindividual, follows the liberty,within the same limits, ocombination among individuals;freedom to unite, for any purpose

not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed

to be of full age, and not forced or

deceived. No society in which these

liberties are not, on the whole,respected, is free, whatever may be



its form of government; and none iscompletely free in which they donot exist absolute and unqualified.The only freedom which deservesthe name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so longas we do not attempt to deprive

others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the

proper guardian of his own health,

whether bodily, or mental andspiritual. Mankind are greater

gainers by suffering each other tolive as seems good to themselves,



than by compelling each to live asseems good to the rest.Though this doctrine is anythin

but new, and, to some persons, mayhave the air of a truism, there is nodoctrine which stands more directlyopposed to the general tendency o

existing opinion and practice.Society has expended fully as muc

effort in the attempt (according to

its lights) to compel people toconform to its notions of personal,

as of social excellence. The anciencommonwealths thought themselves



entitled to practise, and the ancien philosophers countenanced, theregulation of every part of privateconduct by public authority, on theground that the State had a deepinterest in the whole bodily andmental discipline of every one of its

citizens; a mode of thinking whicmay have been admissible in small

republics surrounded by powerful

enemies, in constant peril of beinsubverted by foreign attack or

internal commotion, and to whiceven a short interval of relaxed



energy and self-command might soeasily be fatal, that they could noafford to wait for the salutary

permanent effects of freedom. In themodern world, the greater size o

political communities, and aboveall, the separation between spiritual

and temporal authority (whic placed the direction of men's

consciences in other hands tha

those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so grea

an interference by law in the detailsof private life; but the engines o



moral repression have beewielded more strenuously againsdivergence from the reigninopinion in self-regarding, than evein social matters; religion, the mos

powerful of the elements whichave entered into the formation o

moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the

ambition of a hierarchy, seeking



despotism of society over theindividual, surpassing anythin

contemplated in the political idealof the most rigid disciplinaria



among the ancient philosophers.Apart from the peculiar tenets oindividual thinkers, there is also ithe world at large an increasininclination to stretch unduly the

powers of society over theindividual, both by the force o

opinion and even by that olegislation: and as the tendency o

all the changes taking place in the

world is to strengthen society, anddiminish the power of the

individual, this encroachment is noone of the evils which tend



spontaneously to disappear, but, onthe contrary, to grow more andmore formidable. The disposition omankind, whether as rulers or asfellow-citizens to impose their owopinions and inclinations as a ruleof conduct on others, is so

energetically supported by some othe best and by some of the wors

feelings incident to human nature,

that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want o

power; and as the power is nodeclining, but growing, unless a



strong barrier of moral convictiocan be raised against the mischief,we must expect, in the presencircumstances of the world, to see iincrease.

It will be convenient for theargument, if, instead of at once

entering upon the general thesis, weconfine ourselves in the firs

instance to a single branch of it, o

which the principle here stated is, inot fully, yet to a certain point,

recognised by the current opinions.This one branch is the Liberty o



Thought: from which it isimpossible to separate the cognateliberty of speaking and of writing.Although these liberties, to someconsiderable amount, form part othe political morality of allcountries which profess religious

toleration and free institutions, thegrounds, both philosophical and

practical, on which they rest, are

perhaps not so familiar to thegeneral mind, nor so thoroughly

appreciated by many even of theleaders of opinion, as might have



been expected. Those grounds,when rightly understood, are omuch wider application than to onlyone division of the subject, and athorough consideration of this par of the question will be found the

best introduction to the remainder.

Those to whom nothing which I aabout to say will be new, may

therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a

subject which for now threecenturies has been so ofte

discussed, I venture on onediscussion more.



CHAPTER II. OF THE

LIBERTY OFTHOUGHT AND



DISCUSSION.

The time, it is to be hoped, isgone by, when any defence would

be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securitiesagainst corrupt or tyrannicalgovernment. No argument, we maysuppose, can now be needed,against permitting a legislature or

an executive, not identified iinterest with the people, to

prescribe opinions to them, anddetermine what doctrines or wha



arguments they shall be allowed tohear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and sotriumphantly enforced by precedinwriters, that it need not be speciallyinsisted on in this place. Though thelaw of England, on the subject o

the press, is as servile to this day asit was in the time of the Tudors,

there is little danger of its bein

actually put in force agains political discussion, except durin

some temporary panic, when fear oinsurrection drives ministers and[6]



udges from their propriety; and,speaking generally, it is not, inconstitutional countries, to beapprehended that the government,whether completely responsible tothe people or not, will often attempto control the expression of opinion,

except when in doing so it makesitself the organ of the general

intolerance of the public. Let us

suppose, therefore, that thegovernment is entirely at one wit

the people, and never thinks oexerting any power of coercio



unless in agreement with what iconceives to be their voice. But Ideny the right of the people toexercise such coercion, either bythemselves or by their government.The power itself is illegitimate. The

best government has no more title to

it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted i

accordance with public opinion,

than when in or opposition to it. Iall mankind minus one, were of one

opinion, and only one person wereof the contrary opinion, mankind



would be no more justified isilencing that one person, than he, ihe had the power, would beustified in silencing mankind. Were

an opinion a personal possession ono value except to the owner; if to

be obstructed in the enjoyment of i

were simply a private injury, itwould make some difference

whether the injury was inflicted

only on a few persons or on many.But the peculiar evil of silencing the

expression of an opinion is, that it isrobbing the human race; posterity as



well as the existing generation;those who dissent from the opinion,still more than those who hold it. Ithe opinion is right, they aredeprived of the opportunity oexchanging error for truth: if wrong,they lose, what is almost as great a

benefit, the clearer perception andlivelier impression of truth,

produced by its collision wit



desire to suppress it, of course denyits truth; but they are not infallible.

They have no authority to decide thequestion for all mankind, andexclude every other person from the



means of judging. To refuse ahearing to an opinion, because theyare sure that it is false, is to assumethat their certainty is the same thinas absolute certainty. All silencingof discussion is an assumption o

infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this commo

argument, not the worse for bein

common.Unfortunately for the good sense

of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying theweight in their practical judgment,



which is always allowed to it itheory; for while every one wellknows himself to be fallible, fewthink it necessary to take any

precautions against their owfallibility, or admit the supposition

that any opinion, of which they feelvery certain, may be one of the

examples of the error to which they

acknowledge themselves to beliable. Absolute princes, or others

who are accustomed to unlimiteddeference, usually feel thiscomplete confidence in their ow



opinions on nearly all subjects.People more happily situated, whosometimes hear their opinionsdisputed, and are not wholly unusedto be set right when they are wrong,

place the same unbounded reliance

only on such of their opinions as areshared by all who surround them, or

to whom they habitually defer: for

in proportion to a man's want oconfidence in his own solitary

udgment, does he usually repose,with implicit trust, on theinfallibility of "the world" i



general. And the world, to eachindividual, means the part of it witwhich he comes in contact; his

party, his sect, his church, his classof society: the man may be called,

by comparison, almost liberal and

large-minded to whom it meansanything so comprehensive as his

own country or his own age. Nor is



London, would have made him aBuddhist or a Confucian in Pekin.

Yet it is as evident in itself as anyamount of argument can make it, thaages are no more infallible tha

d d l h h ld



individuals; every age having heldmany opinions which subsequenages have deemed not only false buabsurd; and it is as certain that manyopinions, now general, will berejected by future ages, as it is tha

many, once general, are rejected bythe present.

The objection likely to be made

to this argument, would probablytake some such form as the

following. There is no greater assumption of infallibility iforbidding the propagation of error,h i h hi hi h i



than in any other thing which isdone by public authority on its owudgment and responsibility.

Judgment is given to men that theymay use it. Because it may be usederroneously, are men to be told that

they ought not to use it at all? To prohibit what they think pernicious,

is not claiming exemption fro

error, but fulfilling the dutyincumbent on them, althoug

fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. If wewere never to act on our opinions,b h i i b



because those opinions may bewrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. An objectionwhich applies to all conduct, can beno valid objection to any conduct i

particular. It is the duty ogovernments, and of individuals, to

form the truest opinions they can; to

form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they

are quite sure of being right. Buwhen they are sure (such reasonersmay say), it is not conscientiousnessb t di t h i k f ti



but cowardice to shrink from actinon their opinions, and allowdoctrines which they honestly thindangerous to the welfare omankind, either in this life or ianother, to be scattered abroad

without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened times,

have persecuted opinions now

believed to be true. Let us take care,it may be said, not to make the same

mistake: but governments andnations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to befit bj t f th i



fit subjects for the exercise oauthority: they have laid on badtaxes, made unjust wars. Ought wetherefore to lay on no taxes, and,under whatever provocation, makeno wars? Men, and governments,

must act to the best of their ability.There is no such thing as absolute

certainty, but there is assurance

sufficient for the purposes of humalife. We may, and must, assume our

opinion to be true for the guidanceof our own conduct: and it isassuming no more when we forbidbad men to pervert society by the



bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which weregard as false and pernicious.

I answer that it is assuming verymuch more. There is the greatesdifference between presuming a

opinion to be true, because, witevery opportunity for contesting it,

it has not been refuted, and

assuming its truth for the purpose onot permitting its refutation.

Complete liberty of contradictinand disproving our opinion, is thevery condition which justifies us iassuming its truth for purposes o



assuming its truth for purposes oaction; and on no other terms can a

being with human faculties have anyrational assurance of being right.

When we consider either thehistory of opinion, or the ordinary

conduct of human life, to what is ito be ascribed that the one and the

other are no worse than they are?

ot certainly to the inherent force othe human understanding; for, on any

matter not self-evident, there areninety-nine persons totallyincapable of judging of it, for onewho is capable; and the capacity o



who is capable; and the capacity othe hundredth person is onlycomparative; for the majority of theeminent men of every pasgeneration held many opinions nowknown to be erroneous, and did or

approved numerous things which noone will now justify. Why is it,

then, that there is on the whole a

preponderance among mankind orational opinions and rational

conduct? If there really is this preponderance—which there mus be, unless human affairs are, andhave always been in an almos



have always been, in an almosdesperate state—it is owing to aquality of the human mind, thesource of everything respectable iman either as an intellectual or as amoral being, namely, that his errors

are corrigible. He is capable orectifying his mistakes, by

discussion and experience. Not by

experience alone. There must bediscussion, to show how experience

is to be interpreted. Wrong opinionsand practices gradually yield to facand argument: but facts andarguments to produce any effect o



arguments, to produce any effect othe mind, must be brought before it.Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to

bring out their meaning. The wholestrength and value, then, of huma

udgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right

when it is wrong, reliance can be



has felt, that the only way in whica human being can make some

approach to knowing the whole of asubject, is by hearing what can besaid about it by persons of everyvariety of opinion and studying all



variety of opinion, and studying allmodes in which it can be looked a

by every character of mind. Nowise man ever acquired his wisdo

in any mode but this; nor is it in thenature of human intellect to become

wise in any other manner. Thesteady habit of correcting and

completing his own opinion by

collating it with those of others, sofar from causing doubt and

hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stablefoundation for a just reliance on it:for, being cognisant of all that can,



for, being cognisant of all that can,at least obviously, be said againsthim, and having taken up his

position against all gainsayers—

knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead

of avoiding them, and has shut ouno light which can be thrown upo

the subject from any quarter—he

has a right to think his judgmen better than that of any person, or any

multitude, who have not gonethrough a similar process.It is not too much to require tha

what the wisest of mankind, those



what the wisest of mankind, thosewho are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary towarrant their relying on it, should

be submitted to by thamiscellaneous collection of a few

wise and many foolish individuals,called the public. The mos

intolerant of churches, the Roma

Catholic Church, even at thecanonisation of a saint, admits, and

listens patiently to, a "devil'sadvocate." The holiest of men, iappears, cannot be admitted to

posthumous honours, until all tha



p ,the devil could say against him isknown and weighed. If even the

ewtonian philosophy were no

permitted to be questioned, mankindcould not feel as complete

assurance of its truth as they nowdo. The beliefs which we have mos

warrant for, have no safeguard to

rest on, but a standing invitation tothe whole world to prove the

unfounded. If the challenge is noaccepted, or is accepted and theattempt fails, we are far enougfrom certainty still; but we have



y ;done the best that the existing stateof human reason admits of; we haveneglected nothing that could give the

truth a chance of reaching us: if thelists are kept open, we may hope

that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is

capable of receiving it; and in the

meantime we may rely on havinattained such approach to truth, as is

possible in our own day. This is theamount of certainty attainable by afallible being, and this the sole wayof attaining it.



gStrange it is, that men should

admit the validity of the argumentsfor free discussion, but object to

their being "pushed to an extreme;"not seeing that unless the reasons

are good for an extreme case, theyare not good for any case. Strange

that they should imagine that they

are not assuming infallibility, whenthey acknowledge that there should

be free discussion on all subjectswhich can possibly be doubtful , buthink that some particular principleor doctrine should be forbidden to



be questioned because it is socertain , that is, because they arecertain that it is certain. To call any

proposition certain, while there isany one who would deny its

certainty if permitted, but who is no permitted, is to assume that we

ourselves, and those who agree



would desire to weaken thesesalutary beliefs; and there can be

nothing wrong, it is thought, irestraining bad men, and prohibitinwhat only such men would wish to

practise. This mode of thinkin



makes the justification of restraintson discussion not a question of thetruth of doctrines, but of their

usefulness; and flatters itself by thameans to escape the responsibility

of claiming to be an infallible judgeof opinions. But those who thus

satisfy themselves, do not perceive

that the assumption of infallibility ismerely shifted from one point to

another. The usefulness of anopinion is itself matter of opinion:as disputable, as open todiscussion, and requiring discussio



as much, as the opinion itself. Thereis the same need of an infallibleudge of opinions to decide a

opinion to be noxious, as to decideit to be false, unless the opinio

condemned has full opportunity odefending itself. And it will not do

to say that the heretic may be

allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, thoug

forbidden to maintain its truth. Thetruth of an opinion is part of itsutility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a



proposition should be believed, is i possible to exclude theconsideration of whether or not it is

true? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief whic

is contrary to truth can be reallyuseful: and can you prevent suc

men from urging that plea, whe



indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of the question o

usefulness, when an argument sovital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. And in point ofact, when law or public feeling do



not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as littletolerant of a denial of its usefulness.

The utmost they allow is aextenuation of its absolute

necessity, or of the positive guilt orejecting it.

In order more fully to illustrate

the mischief of denying a hearing toopinions because we, in our ow

udgment, have condemned them, iwill be desirable to fix down thediscussion to a concrete case; and Ichoose, by preference, the cases



which are least favourable to me— in which the argument againsfreedom of opinion, both on the

score of truth and on that of utility,is considered the strongest. Let the

opinions impugned be the belief in aGod and in a future state, or any o

the commonly received doctrines o

morality. To fight the battle on suchground, gives a great advantage to

an unfair antagonist; since he will be sure to say (and many who haveno desire to be unfair will say iinternally), Are these the doctrines

h h d d ff l



which you do not deem sufficientlycertain to be taken under the

protection of law? Is the belief in a

God one of the opinions, to feelsure of which, you hold to be

assuming infallibility? But I must be permitted to observe, that it is no

the feeling sure of a doctrine (be i

what it may) which I call aassumption of infallibility. It is the

undertaking to decide that questioor others , without allowing them tohear what can be said on thecontrary side. And I denounce and

b hi i h



reprobate this pretension not theless, if put forth on the side of mymost solemn convictions. However

positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of the

pernicious consequences—not onlyof the pernicious consequences, bu

(to adopt expressions which I

altogether condemn) the immoralityand impiety of an opinion; yet if, i pursuance of that private judgment,though backed by the publicudgment of his country or his

contemporaries, he prevents thei i f b i h d i i



opinion from being heard in itsdefence, he assumes infallibility.And so far from the assumptio

being less objectionable or lessdangerous because the opinion is

called immoral or impious, this isthe case of all others in which it is

most fatal. These are exactly the



from them , or from their receivedinterpretation.Mankind can hardly be too ofte

reminded that there was once a manamed Socrates, between whom andthe legal authorities and public

i i f hi ti th t k l



opinion of his time, there took placea memorable collision. Born in aage and country abounding i

individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those

who best knew both him and theage, as the most virtuous man in it;

while we know him as the head and

prototype of all subsequent teachersof virtue, the source equally of thelofty inspiration of Plato and theudicious utilitarianism of Aristotle,

"i maëstri di color che sanno ," thetwo headsprings of ethical as of allother philosophy This



other philosophy. Thisacknowledged master of all theeminent thinkers who have since

lived—whose fame, still growinafter more than two thousand years,

all but outweighs the wholeremainder of the names which make

his native city illustrious—was pu

to death by his countrymen, after audicial conviction, for impiety andimmorality. Impiety, in denying thegods recognised by the State;indeed his accuser asserted (see the"Apologia") that he believed in nogods at all Immorality in being by



gods at all. Immorality, in being, byhis doctrines and instructions, a"corruptor of youth." Of these

charges the tribunal, there is everyground for believing, honestly found

him guilty, and condemned the manwho probably of all then born had

deserved best of mankind, to be pu



Almighty in person, wasignominiously put to death, as what?As a blasphemer. Men did notmerely mistake their benefactor;they mistook him for the exaccontrary of what he was, and treatedhim as that prodigy of impiety



him as that prodigy of impiety,which they themselves are now heldto be, for their treatment of him. The

feelings with which mankind nowregard these lamentable

transactions, especially the later othe two, render them extremely

unjust in their judgment of the

unhappy actors. These were, to allappearance, not bad men—noworse than men commonly are, burather the contrary; men who

possessed in a full, or somewhamore than a full measure, thereligious moral and patriotic



religious, moral, and patrioticfeelings of their time and people:the very kind of men who, in all

times, our own included, have everychance of passing through life

blameless and respected. The high- priest who rent his garments whe

the words were pronounced, which,

according to all the ideas of hiscountry, constituted the blackestguilt, was in all probability quite assincere in his horror andindignation, as the generality orespectable and pious men now arein the religious and moral



in the religious and moralsentiments they profess; and most othose who now shudder at his

conduct, if they had lived in histime, and been born Jews, would

have acted precisely as he did.Orthodox Christians who are

tempted to think that those who

stoned to death the first martyrsmust have been worse men than theythemselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors wasSaint Paul.

Let us add one more example,the most striking of all if the



the most striking of all, if theimpressiveness of an error ismeasured by the wisdom and virtue

of him who falls into it. If ever anyone, possessed of power, had

grounds for thinking himself the besand most enlightened among hiscotemporaries, it was the Emperor

Marcus Aurelius. Absolute monarchof the whole civilised world, he preserved through life not only themost unblemished justice, but whawas less to be expected from hisStoical breeding, the tenderesheart. The few failings which are



heart. The few failings which areattributed to him, were all on theside of indulgence: while his

writings, the highest ethical producof the ancient mind, differ scarcely

perceptibly, if they differ at all,from the most characteristicteachings of Christ. This man, a

better Christian in all but thedogmatic sense of the word, thaalmost any of the ostensiblyChristian sovereigns who havesince reigned, persecutedChristianity. Placed at the summit oall the previous attainments o



all the previous attainments ohumanity, with an open, unfetteredintellect, and a character which led

him of himself to embody in hismoral writings the Christian ideal,

he yet failed to see that Christianitywas to be a good and not an evil tothe world, with his duties to whic

he was so deeply penetrated.Existing society he knew to be in adeplorable state. But such as it was,he saw, or thought he saw, that itwas held together, and preventedfrom being worse, by belief andreverence of the received divinities.



As a ruler of mankind, he deemed ihis duty not to suffer society to fall

in pieces; and saw not how, if itsexisting ties were removed, any

others could be formed which couldagain knit it together. The newreligion openly aimed at dissolvin

these ties: unless, therefore, it washis duty to adopt that religion, iseemed to be his duty to put idown. Inasmuch then as the theologyof Christianity did not appear to hitrue or of divine origin; inasmuch asthis strange history of a crucified



g yGod was not credible to him, and asystem which purported to res

entirely upon a foundation to him sowholly unbelievable, could not be

foreseen by him to be tharenovating agency which, after allabatements, it has in fact proved to

be; the gentlest and most amiable o philosophers and rulers, under asolemn sense of duty, authorised the

persecution of Christianity. To mymind this is one of the most tragicalfacts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the



g , gChristianity of the world might have

been, if the Christian faith had bee

adopted as the religion of theempire under the auspices o

Marcus Aurelius instead of those oConstantine. But it would beequally unjust to him and false to

truth, to deny, that no one pleawhich can be urged for punishinanti-Christian teaching, waswanting to Marcus Aurelius for

punishing, as he did, the propagation of Christianity. NoChristian more firmly believes tha



y

Atheism is false, and tends to thedissolution of society, than Marcus

Aurelius believed the same thingsof Christianity; he who, of all me

then living, might have been thoughthe most capable of appreciating it.Unless any one who approves o

punishment for the promulgation oopinions, flatters himself that he is awiser and better man than MarcusAurelius—more deeply versed ithe wisdom of his time, moreelevated in his intellect above it— more earnest in his search for truth,



or more single-minded in hisdevotion to it when found;—let hi

abstain from that assumption of theoint infallibility of himself and the

multitude, which the greaAntoninus made with so unfortunatea result.

Aware of the impossibility odefending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions, byany argument which will not justifyMarcus Antoninus, the enemies oreligious freedom, when hard

pressed, occasionally accept this



consequence, and say, with Dr.Johnson, that the persecutors o

Christianity were in the right; tha persecution is an ordeal throug

which truth ought to pass, andalways passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end,

powerless against truth, thougsometimes beneficially effectiveagainst mischievous errors. This isa form of the argument for religiousintolerance, sufficiently remarkablenot to be passed without notice.

A theory which maintains that



truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution canno

possibly do it any harm, cannot becharged with being intentionally

hostile to the reception of newtruths; but we cannot commend thegenerosity of its dealing with the

persons to whom mankind areindebted for them. To discover tothe world something which deeplyconcerns it, and of which it was

previously ignorant; to prove to ithat it had been mistaken on somevital point of temporal or spiritual



interest, is as important a service asa human being can render to his

fellow-creatures, and in certaicases, as in those of the early

Christians and of the Reformers,those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the mos

precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind. That theauthors of such splendid benefitsshould be requited by martyrdom;that their reward should be to bedealt with as the vilest of criminals,is not, upon this theory, a



deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn i

sackcloth and ashes, but the normaland justifiable state of things. The

propounder of a new truth,according to this doctrine, shouldstand, as stood, in the legislation o

the Locrians, the proposer of a newlaw, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the publicassembly did not, on hearing hisreasons, then and there adopt his

proposition. People who defend thismode of treating benefactors, canno



be supposed to set much value othe benefit; and I believe this view

of the subject is mostly confined tothe sort of persons who think tha

new truths may have been desirableonce, but that we have had enougof them now.

But, indeed, the dictum that trutalways triumphs over persecution,is one of those pleasant falsehoodswhich men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces,

but which all experience refutes.History teems with instances o



truth put down by persecution. If nosuppressed for ever, it may be

thrown back for centuries. To speak only of religious opinions: the

Reformation broke out at leastwenty times before Luther, and was put down. Arnold of Brescia was

put down. Fra Dolcino was pudown. Savonarola was put down.The Albigeois were put down. TheVaudois were put down. TheLollards were put down. TheHussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever



persecution was persisted in, it wassuccessful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders,

the Austrian empire, Protestantismwas rooted out; and, most likely,

would have been so in England, hadQueen Mary lived, or QueeElizabeth died. Persecution has

always succeeded, save where theheretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. Noreasonable person can doubt thaChristianity might have beeextirpated in the Roman Empire. Ispread, and became predominant,



because the persecutions were onlyoccasional, lasting but a short time,

and separated by long intervals oalmost undisturbed propagandism. I

is a piece of idle sentimentality thatruth, merely as truth, has anyinherent power denied to error, o



time when from favourablecircumstances it escapes persecution until it has made suchead as to withstand all subsequenattempts to suppress it.

It will be said, that we do nonow put to death the introducers o



new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we

even build sepulchres to them. It istrue we no longer put heretics to

death; and the amount of penalinfliction which modern feelinwould probably tolerate, eve



said to be of unexceptionableconduct in all relations of life, wassentenced to twenty-one months'imprisonment, for uttering, andwriting on a gate, some offensivewords concerning Christianity.Within a month of the same time, at



the Old Bailey, two persons, on twoseparate occasions, [8] were

rejected as jurymen, and one othem grossly insulted by the judge

and by one of the counsel, becausethey honestly declared that they hadno theological belief; and a third, a

foreigner,[9]

for the same reason,was denied justice against a thief.This refusal of redress took place ivirtue of the legal doctrine, that no

person can be allowed to giveevidence in a court of justice, whodoes not profess belief in a God



(any god is sufficient) and in afuture state; which is equivalent to

declaring such persons to beoutlaws, excluded from the

protection of the tribunals; who maynot only be robbed or assaultedwith impunity, if no one but

themselves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, but any oneelse may be robbed or assaultedwith impunity, if the proof of thefact depends on their evidence. Theassumption on which this isgrounded, is that the oath is



worthless, of a person who does no believe in a future state; a

proposition which betokens mucignorance of history in those who

assent to it (since it is historicallytrue that a large proportion oinfidels in all ages have bee

persons of distinguished integrityand honour); and would bemaintained by no one who had thesmallest conception how many othe persons in greatest repute witthe world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well known, a



least to their intimates, to beunbelievers. The rule, besides, is

suicidal, and cuts away its owfoundation. Under pretence tha

atheists must be liars, it admits thetestimony of all atheists who arewilling to lie, and rejects only those

who brave the obloquy of publiclyconfessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thusself-convicted of absurdity so far asregards its professed purpose, ca

be kept in force only as a badge ohatred, a relic of persecution; a



persecution, too, having the peculiarity, that the qualification for

undergoing it, is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule,

and the theory it implies, are hardlyless insulting to believers than toinfidels. For if he who does no

believe in a future state, necessarilylies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented frolying, if prevented they are, by thefear of hell. We will not do theauthors and abettors of the rule theinjury of supposing, that the

i hi h h h f d



conception which they have formedof Christian virtue is drawn fro

their own consciousness.These, indeed, are but rags and

remnants of persecution, and may bethought to be not so much aindication of the wish to persecute,

as an example of that very frequeninfirmity of English minds, whicmakes them take a preposterous

pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry ireally into practice. But unhappily

h i i i h



there is no security in the state othe public mind, that the suspensio

of worse forms of legal persecution,which has lasted for about the space

of a generation, will continue. Ithis age the quiet surface of routineis as often ruffled by attempts to

resuscitate past evils, as tointroduce new benefits. What is

boasted of at the present time as therevival of religion, is always, inarrow and uncultivated minds, aleast as much the revival of bigotry;and where there is the stron

l f i l i



permanent leaven of intolerance ithe feelings of a people, which a

all times abides in the middleclasses of this country, it needs but

little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they havenever ceased to think proper objects

of persecution. [10] For it is this—iis the opinions men entertain, andthe feelings they cherish, respectinthose who disown the beliefs theydeem important, which makes thiscountry not a place of mentalfreedom. For a long time past, the

hi f i hi f f th l l lti



chief mischief of the legal penaltiesis that they strengthen the social

stigma. It is that stigma which isreally effective, and so effective is

it that the profession of opinionswhich are under the ban of societyis much less common in England,

than is, in many other countries, theavowal of those which incur risk oudicial punishment. In respect to

all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make theindependent of the good will oother people, opinion, on this

bj t i ffi i l



subject, is as efficacious as law;men might as well be imprisoned,

as excluded from the means oearning their bread. Those whose

bread is already secured, and whodesire no favours from men i power, or from bodies of men, or

from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of anyopinions, but to be ill-thought of andill-spoken of, and this it ought not torequire a very heroic mould toenable them to bear. There is noroom for any appeal a

misericordiam in behalf of suc



misericordiam in behalf of suc persons. But though we do not now

inflict so much evil on those whothink differently from us, as it was

formerly our custom to do, it may bethat we do ourselves as much evilas ever by our treatment of them.

Socrates was put to death, but theSocratic philosophy rose like thesun in heaven, and spread itsillumination over the wholeintellectual firmament. Christianswere cast to the lions, but theChristian church grew up a stately

and spreading tree overtopping the



and spreading tree, overtopping theolder and less vigorous growths,

and stifling them by its shade. Our merely social intolerance kills no

one, roots out no opinions, buinduces men to disguise them, or toabstain from any active effort for

their diffusion. With us, hereticalopinions do not perceptibly gain, or even lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking andstudious persons among whom they

originate without ever lighting up



originate, without ever lighting upthe general affairs of mankind wit

either a true or a deceptive light.And thus is kept up a state of things

very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasan process of fining or imprisonin

anybody, it maintains all prevailingopinions outwardly undisturbed,while it does not absolutelyinterdict the exercise of reason bydissentients afflicted with themalady of thought. A convenient

plan for having peace in the

intellectual world and keeping all



intellectual world, and keeping allthings going on therein very much as

they do already. But the price paidfor this sort of intellectual

pacification, is the sacrifice of theentire moral courage of the humamind. A state of things in which a

large portion of the most active andinquiring intellects find it advisableto keep the genuine principles andgrounds of their convictions withitheir own breasts, and attempt, iwhat they address to the public, tofit as much as they can of their ow

conclusions to premises which they



conclusions to premises which theyhave internally renounced, canno

send forth the open, fearlesscharacters, and logical, consisten

intellects who once adorned thethinking world. The sort of mewho can be looked for under it, are

either mere conformers tocommonplace, or time-servers for truth, whose arguments on all greasubjects are meant for their hearers,and are not those which haveconvinced themselves. Those whoavoid this alternative, do so by

narrowing their thoughts and



narrowing their thoughts andinterest to things which can be

spoken of without venturing withithe region of principles, that is, tosmall practical matters, whicwould come right of themselves, i

but the minds of mankind were

strengthened and enlarged, andwhich will never be madeeffectually right until then: whilethat which would strengthen andenlarge men's minds, free anddaring speculation on the highessubjects, is abandoned.

Those in whose eyes this



Those in whose eyes thisreticence on the part of heretics is

no evil, should consider in the firs place, that in consequence of ithere is never any fair and thorougdiscussion of heretical opinions;and that such of them as could no

stand such a discussion, though theymay be prevented from spreading,do not disappear. But it is not theminds of heretics that aredeteriorated most, by the ban placedon all inquiry which does not end ithe orthodox conclusions. The

greatest harm done is to those who



greatest harm done is to those whoare not heretics, and whose whole

mental development is cramped,and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute whatthe world loses in the multitude o

promising intellects combined wit

timid characters, who dare nofollow out any bold, vigorous,independent train of thought, lest ishould land them in somethinwhich would admit of beinconsidered irreligious or immoral?Among them we may occasionally

see some man of deep



see some man of deepconscientiousness, and subtle and

refined understanding, who spendsa life in sophisticating with aintellect which he cannot silence,and exhausts the resources oingenuity in attempting to reconcile

the promptings of his conscienceand reason with orthodoxy, whichyet he does not, perhaps, to the endsucceed in doing. No one can be agreat thinker who does norecognise, that as a thinker it is hisfirst duty to follow his intellect to

whatever conclusions it may lead.



whatever conclusions it may lead.Truth gains more even by the errors

of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, tha by the true opinions of those whoonly hold them because they do nosuffer themselves to think. Not tha



character, it has been because thedread of heterodox speculation wasfor a time suspended. Where thereis a tacit convention that principlesare not to be disputed; where thediscussion of the greatest questionswhich can occupy humanity is

considered to be closed, we canno



,hope to find that generally hig

scale of mental activity which hasmade some periods of history soremarkable. Never whecontroversy avoided the subjectswhich are large and importan

enough to kindle enthusiasm, wasthe mind of a people stirred up froits foundations, and the impulsegiven which raised even persons othe most ordinary intellect to

something of the dignity of thinkin beings. Of such we have had a

example in the condition of Europed h d l



p pduring the times immediately

following the Reformation; another,though limited to the Continent andto a more cultivated class, in thespeculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a

third, of still briefer duration, in theintellectual fermentation oGermany during the Goethian andFichtean period. These periodsdiffered widely in the particular

opinions which they developed; buwere alike in this, that during all

three the yoke of authority wasb k I h ld l



y y broken. In each, an old mental

despotism had been thrown off, andno new one had yet taken its place.The impulse given at these three

periods has made Europe what inow is. Every single improvemen

which has taken place either in thehuman mind or in institutions, may

be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three

impulses are well-nigh spent; andwe can expect no fresh start, until

we again assert our mental freedom.L h d



gLet us now pass to the second

division of the argument, anddismissing the supposition that anyof the received opinions may befalse, let us assume them to be true,and examine into the worth of the

manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is nofreely and openly canvassed.However unwillingly a person whohas a strong opinion may admit the

possibility that his opinion may befalse, he ought to be moved by the

consideration that however true ib if it i t f ll f tl



may be, if it is not fully, frequently,

and fearlessly discussed, it will beheld as a dead dogma, not a livintruth.

There is a class of persons(happily not quite so numerous as

formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to whathey think true, though he has noknowledge whatever of the groundsof the opinion, and could not make a

tenable defence of it against themost superficial objections. Suc

persons, if they can once get their d t ght f th it



creed taught from authority,

naturally think that no good, andsome harm, comes of its beinallowed to be questioned. Wheretheir influence prevails, they makeit nearly impossible for the

received opinion to be rejectedwisely and considerately, though itmay still be rejected rashly andignorantly; for to shut out discussioentirely is seldom possible, and

when it once gets in, beliefs nogrounded on conviction are apt to

give way before the slightessemblance of an argument Waiving



semblance of an argument. Waiving,

however, this possibility— assuming that the true opinioabides in the mind, but abides as a

prejudice, a belief independent of,and proof against, argument—this is



him to hold opinions on them? If thecultivation of the understandinconsists in one thing more than ianother, it is surely in learning thegrounds of one's own opinions.

Whatever people believe, osubjects on which it is of the firs

importance to believe rightly, theyought to be able to defend against a



ought to be able to defend against a

least the common objections. But,some one may say, "Let them betaught the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow thaopinions must be merely parroted

because they are never heardcontroverted. Persons who lear geometry do not simply commit thetheorems to memory, but understandand learn likewise the

demonstrations; and it would beabsurd to say that they remai

ignorant of the grounds ogeometrical truths because they



geometrical truths, because they

never hear any one deny, andattempt to disprove them."Undoubtedly: and such teachinsuffices on a subject likemathematics, where there is nothin

at all to be said on the wrong sideof the question. The peculiarity othe evidence of mathematical truthsis, that all the argument is on oneside. There are no objections, and

no answers to objections. But oevery subject on which difference

of opinion is possible, the trutdepends on a balance to be struc



depends on a balance to be struc

between two sets of conflictinreasons. Even in natural philosophy,there is always some other explanation possible of the samefacts; some geocentric theory

instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and ihas to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: anduntil this is shown, and until we

know how it is shown, we do nounderstand the grounds of our

opinion. But when we turn tosubjects infinitely more



subjects infinitely more

complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of thearguments for every disputedopinion consist in dispelling the

appearances which favour someopinion different from it. Thegreatest orator, save one, oantiquity, has left it on record thathe always studied his adversary's

case with as great, if not with stillgreater, intensity than even his own.

What Cicero practised as the meansof forensic success requires to be



of forensic success, requires to be

imitated by all who study anysubject in order to arrive at thetruth. He who knows only his owside of the case, knows little of that.His reasons may be good, and no

one may have been able to refutethem. But if he is equally unable torefute the reasons on the oppositeside; if he does not so much asknow what they are, he has no

ground for preferring either opinion.The rational position for him would

be suspension of judgment, andunless he contents himself with that,



unless he contents himself with that,

he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of theworld, the side to which he feelsmost inclination. Nor is it enougthat he should hear the arguments o

adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, andaccompanied by what they offer asrefutations. That is not the way todo justice to the arguments, or brin

them into real contact with his owmind. He must be able to hear the

from persons who actually believethem; who defend them in earnest,



them; who defend them in earnest,

and do their very utmost for them.He must know them in their mos plausible and persuasive form; hemust feel the whole force of thedifficulty which the true view of the

subject has to encounter anddispose of; else he will never really

possess himself of the portion otruth which meets and removes thadifficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred

of what are called educated men arein this condition; even of those who

can argue fluently for their opinions.Their conclusion may be true, but i



y ,

might be false for anything theyknow: they have never throwthemselves into the mental positioof those who think differently frothem, and considered what suc

persons may have to say; andconsequently they do not, in any

proper sense of the word, know thedoctrine which they themselves

profess. They do not know those

parts of it which explain and justifythe remainder; the considerations

which show that a fact whicseemingly conflicts with another is



g y

reconcilable with it, or that, of twoapparently strong reasons, one andnot the other ought to be preferred.All that part of the truth which turnsthe scale, and decides the judgmen

of a completely informed mind, theyare strangers to; nor is it ever reallyknown, but to those who haveattended equally and impartially to

both sides, and endeavoured to see

the reasons of both in the strongeslight. So essential is this discipline

to a real understanding of moral andhuman subjects, that if opponents o



j , pp

all important truths do not exist, it isindispensable to imagine them, andsupply them with the strongesarguments which the most skilfuldevil's advocate can conjure up.

To abate the force of theseconsiderations, an enemy of freediscussion may be supposed to say,that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and

understand all that can be saidagainst or for their opinions by

philosophers and theologians. Thait is not needful for common men to



be able to expose all themisstatements or fallacies of aingenious opponent. That it isenough if there is always somebodycapable of answering them, so tha

nothing likely to misleaduninstructed persons remainsunrefuted. That simple minds,having been taught the obviousgrounds of the truths inculcated o

them, may trust to authority for therest, and being aware that they have

neither knowledge nor talent toresolve every difficulty which ca



be raised, may repose in theassurance that all those which have been raised have been or can beanswered, by those who arespecially trained to the task.

Conceding to this view of thesubject the utmost that can beclaimed for it by those most easilysatisfied with the amount ounderstanding of truth which ough

to accompany the belief of it; eveso, the argument for free discussio

is no way weakened. For even thisdoctrine acknowledges that mankind



g

ought to have a rational assurancethat all objections have beesatisfactorily answered; and howare they to be answered if thawhich requires to be answered is

not spoken? or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if theobjectors have no opportunity oshowing that it is unsatisfactory? Inot the public, at least the

philosophers and theologians whoare to resolve the difficulties, mus

make themselves familiar witthose difficulties in their mos



puzzling form; and this cannot beaccomplished unless they are freelystated, and placed in the mosadvantageous light which they admiof. The Catholic Church has its ow

way of dealing with thisembarrassing problem. It makes a

broad separation between thosewho can be permitted to receive itsdoctrines on conviction, and those

who must accept them on trust.either, indeed, are allowed any

choice as to what they will accept; but the clergy, such at least as can



be fully confided in, mayadmissibly and meritoriously makethemselves acquainted with thearguments of opponents, in order toanswer them, and may, therefore,

read heretical books; the laity, notunless by special permission, hardto be obtained. This disciplinerecognises a knowledge of theenemy's case as beneficial to the

teachers, but finds means, consistenwith this, of denying it to the rest o

the world: thus giving to the élitemore mental culture, though no



more mental freedom, than it allowsto the mass. By this device isucceeds in obtaining the kind omental superiority which its

purposes require; for though culture



be kept from the uninstructed. If theteachers of mankind are to becognisant of all that they ought toknow, everything must be free to bewritten and published withou

restraint.If, however, the mischievous

operation of the absence of freediscussion, when the received



opinions are true, were confined toleaving men ignorant of the groundsof those opinions, it might bethought that this, if an intellectual, isno moral evil, and does not affec



undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as thestruggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other

creeds. At last it either prevails,and becomes the general opinion, or

its progress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has



gained, but ceases to spread further.When either of these results has become apparent, controversy othe subject flags, and gradually diesaway. The doctrine has taken its

place, if not as a received opinion,as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those whohold it have generally inherited, noadopted it; and conversion from one

of these doctrines to another, beingnow an exceptional fact, occupies

little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as afi l h l i h



first, constantly on the alert either todefend themselves against theworld, or to bring the world over tothem, they have subsided intoacquiescence, and neither listen,

when they can help it, to argumentsagainst their creed, nor troubledissentients (if there be such) witarguments in its favour. From thistime may usually be dated the

decline in the living power of thedoctrine. We often hear the teachers

of all creeds lamenting the difficultyof keeping up in the minds ob li li l h i



believers a lively apprehension othe truth which they nominallyrecognise, so that it may penetratethe feelings, and acquire a realmastery over the conduct. No suc

difficulty is complained of whilethe creed is still fighting for itsexistence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel whathey are fighting for, and the

difference between it and other doctrines; and in that period o

every creed's existence, not a few persons may be found, who haveli d it f d t l i i l



realised its fundamental principlesin all the forms of thought, haveweighed and considered them in alltheir important bearings, and haveexperienced the full effect on the

character, which belief in that creedought to produce in a mindthoroughly imbued with it. But wheit has come to be a hereditary creed,and to be received passively, not

actively—when the mind is nolonger compelled, in the same

degree as at first, to exercise itsvital powers on the questions whicits belief presents to it there is a



its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all othe belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, asif accepting it on trust dispensed

with the necessity of realising it iconsciousness, or testing it by

personal experience; until it almosceases to connect itself at all witthe inner life of the human being.

Then are seen the cases, so frequenin this age of the world as almost to

form the majority, in which thecreed remains as it were outside themind encrusting and petrifying i



mind, encrusting and petrifying iagainst all other influencesaddressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by nosuffering any fresh and livin

conviction to get in, but itself doinnothing for the mind or heart, excepstanding sentinel over them to keepthem vacant.

To what an extent doctrines

intrinsically fitted to make thedeepest impression upon the mind

may remain in it as dead beliefs,without being ever realised in theimagination the feelings or the



imagination, the feelings, or theunderstanding, is exemplified by themanner in which the majority o

believers hold the doctrines oChristianity. By Christianity I here

mean what is accounted such by allchurches and sects—the maximsand precepts contained in the New

Testament. These are consideredsacred, and accepted as laws, by all

professing Christians. Yet it isscarcely too much to say that no

one Christian in a thousand guidesor tests his individual conduct byreference to those laws The



reference to those laws. Thestandard to which he does refer it,is the custom of his nation, hisclass, or his religious profession.He has thus, on the one hand, a

collection of ethical maxims, whiche believes to have beevouchsafed to him by infallible

wisdom as rules for his government;and on the other, a set of every-day

udgments and practices, which go acertain length with some of those

maxims, not so great a length witothers, stand in direct opposition tosome and are on the whole a



some, and are, on the whole, acompromise between the Christiacreed and the interests andsuggestions of worldly life. To thefirst of these standards he gives his

homage; to the other his realallegiance. All Christians believethat the blessed are the poor and

humble, and those who are ill-used by the world; that it is easier for a

camel to pass through the eye of aneedle than for a rich man to enter

the kingdom of heaven; that theyshould judge not, lest they beudged; that they should swear not a



udged; that they should swear not aall; that they should love their neighbour as themselves; that if onetake their cloak, they should givehim their coat also; that they should

take no thought for the morrow; thaif they would be perfect, theyshould sell all that they have and

give it to the poor. They are notinsincere when they say that they

believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe

what they have always heard laudedand never discussed. But in thesense of that living belief whic



sense of that living belief whicregulates conduct, they believethese doctrines just up to the pointo which it is usual to act upothem. The doctrines in their integrity

are serviceable to pelt adversarieswith; and it is understood that theyare to be put forward (whe

possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they thin

laudable. But any one whoreminded them that the maxims

require an infinity of things whicthey never even think of doing,would gain nothing but to be



would gain nothing but to beclassed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrineshave no hold on ordinary believers

are not a power in their minds.They have a habitual respect for thesound of them, but no feeling whic

spreads from the words to the thingssignified, and forces the mind to

t a k e them in, and make theconform to the formula. Whenever

conduct is concerned, they looround for Mr. A and B to directthem how far to go in obeyin



them how far to go in obeyinChrist.

Now we may be well assuredthat the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians.

Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from aobscure sect of the despised

Hebrews into the religion of theRoman empire. When their enemies

said, "See how these Christianslove one another" (a remark no

likely to be made by anybody now),they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed



g gthan they have ever had since. Andto this cause, probably, it is chieflyowing that Christianity now makesso little progress in extending its

domain, and after eighteecenturies, is still nearly confined toEuropeans and the descendants o

Europeans. Even with the strictlyreligious, who are much in earnes

about their doctrines, and attach agreater amount of meaning to many

of them than people in general, icommonly happens that the par which is thus comparatively active



p yin their minds is that which wasmade by Calvin, or Knox, or somesuch person much nearer icharacter to themselves. The



open gainsayers. Both teachers andlearners go to sleep at their post, assoon as there is no enemy in the

field.The same thing holds true,

generally speaking, of all traditionaldoctrines—those of prudence and

knowledge of life, as well as omorals or religion. All languagesand literatures are full of general



gobservations on life, both as to whait is, and how to conduct oneself iit; observations which everybodyknows, which everybody repeats, or

hears with acquiescence, which arereceived as truisms, yet of whicmost people first truly learn the

meaning, when experience,generally of a painful kind, has

made it a reality to them. Howoften, when smarting under some

unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person callto mind some proverb or commo



saying, familiar to him all his life,the meaning of which, if he had ever

before felt it as he does now, wouldhave saved him from the calamity.

There are indeed reasons for this,other than the absence odiscussion: there are many truths o

which the full meaning cannot berealised, until personal experience

has brought it home. But much moreof the meaning even of these would

have been understood, and whawas understood would have beefar more deeply impressed on the



mind, if the man had beeaccustomed to hear it argued proa n d con by people who didunderstand it. The fatal tendency o

mankind to leave off thinking aboua thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their

errors. A contemporary author haswell spoken of "the deep slumber o

a decided opinion."But what! (it may be asked) Is

the absence of unanimity aindispensable condition of trueknowledge? Is it necessary tha



some part of mankind should persisin error, to enable any to realise thetruth? Does a belief cease to be realand vital as soon as it is generally

received—and is a propositionever thoroughly understood andfelt unless some doubt of i

remains? As soon as mankind haveunanimously accepted a truth, does

the truth perish within them? Thehighest aim and best result o

improved intelligence, it hashitherto been thought, is to unitemankind more and more in the



acknowledgment of all importantruths: and does the intelligenceonly last as long as it has noachieved its object? Do the fruits o

conquest perish by the verycompleteness of the victory?

I affirm no such thing. As

mankind improve, the number odoctrines which are no longer

disputed or doubted will beconstantly on the increase: and the

well-being of mankind may almos be measured by the number andgravity of the truths which have



reached the point of beinuncontested. The cessation, on onequestion after another, of seriouscontroversy, is one of the necessary

incidents of the consolidation oopinion; a consolidation as salutaryin the case of true opinions, as it is

dangerous and noxious when theopinions are erroneous. But thoug

this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is

necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable andindispensable, we are not therefore



obliged to conclude that all itsconsequences must be beneficial.The loss of so important an aid tothe intelligent and livin

apprehension of a truth, as isafforded by the necessity oexplaining it to, or defending i

against, opponents, though nosufficient to outweigh, is no triflin

drawback from, the benefit of itsuniversal recognition. Where this

advantage can no longer be had, Iconfess I should like to see theteachers of mankind endeavourin



to provide a substitute for it; somecontrivance for making thedifficulties of the question as

present to the learner's

consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentienchampion, eager for his conversion.

But instead of seekincontrivances for this purpose, they

have lost those they formerly had.The Socratic dialectics, so

magnificently exemplified in thedialogues of Plato, were acontrivance of this description.



They were essentially a negativediscussion of the great questions o

philosophy and life, directed witconsummate skill to the purpose o

convincing any one who had merelyadopted the commonplaces oreceived opinion, that he did no

understand the subject—that he asyet attached no definite meaning to

the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his

ignorance, he might be put in theway to attain a stable belief, restinon a clear apprehension both of the

f d d f h



meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputationsof the middle ages had a somewhasimilar object. They were intended

to make sure that the pupilunderstood his own opinion, and(by necessary correlation) the

opinion opposed to it, and couldenforce the grounds of the one and

confute those of the other. Theselast-mentioned contests had indeed

the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were takefrom authority, not from reason;

d di i li h i d



and, as a discipline to the mind,they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics whicformed the intellects of the

"Socratici viri": but the moder mind owes far more to both than iis generally willing to admit, and

the present modes of educatiocontain nothing which in the

smallest degree supplies the placeeither of the one or of the other. A

person who derives all hisinstruction from teachers or books,even if he escape the besettin

i f i hi l



temptation of contenting himselwith cram, is under no compulsioto hear both sides; accordingly it isfar from a frequent accomplishment,

even among thinkers, to know botsides; and the weakest part of whaeverybody says in defence of his

opinion, is what he intends as areply to antagonists. It is the fashio

of the present time to disparagenegative logic—that which points

out weaknesses in theory or errorsin practice, without establishin positive truths. Such negative

iti i ld i d d b



criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but asa means to attaining any positiveknowledge or conviction worthy the

name, it cannot be valued toohighly; and until people are agaisystematically trained to it, there

will be few great thinkers, and alow general average of intellect, i

any but the mathematical and physical departments o

speculation. On any other subject noone's opinions deserve the name oknowledge, except so far as he hasith h d f d hi b



either had forced upon him byothers, or gone through of himself,the same mental process whicwould have been required of him i

carrying on an active controversywith opponents. That, therefore,which when absent, it is so

indispensable, but so difficult, tocreate, how worse than absurd is i

to forego, when spontaneouslyoffering itself! If there are any

persons who contest a receivedopinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thanthem for it open our minds to liste



them for it, open our minds to listeto them, and rejoice that there issome one to do for us what weotherwise ought, if we have any

regard for either the certainty or thevitality of our convictions, to dowith much greater labour for

ourselves.

It still remains to speak of oneof the principal causes which make

diversity of opinion advantageous,and will continue to do so untilmankind shall have entered a stageof intellectual advancement whic



of intellectual advancement whicat present seems at an incalculabledistance. We have hithertoconsidered only two possibilities:

that the received opinion may befalse, and some other opinion,consequently, true; or that, the

received opinion being true, aconflict with the opposite error is

essential to a clear apprehensioand deep feeling of its truth. Bu

there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflictindoctrines, instead of being one trueand the other false share the trut



and the other false, share the trut between them; and thenonconforming opinion is needed tosupply the remainder of the truth, o



kept them down, and either seekinreconciliation with the trutcontained in the common opinion,

or fronting it as enemies, and settinthemselves up, with similar

exclusiveness, as the whole truth.The latter case is hitherto the mos

frequent, as, in the human mind,one-sidedness has always been therule, and many-sidedness theexception Hence even i



exception. Hence, even irevolutions of opinion, one part othe truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to

superadd, for the most part onlysubstitutes one partial andincomplete truth for another;

improvement consisting chiefly ithis, that the new fragment of truth is

more wanted, more adapted to theneeds of the time, than that which idisplaces. Such being the partialcharacter of prevailing opinions,even when resting on a truefoundation; every opinion whic



foundation; every opinion whicembodies somewhat of the portioof truth which the common opinioomits, ought to be considered

precious, with whatever amount oerror and confusion that truth may

be blended. No sober judge o

human affairs will feel bound to beindignant because those who force

on our notice truths which weshould otherwise have overlooked,overlook some of those which wesee. Rather, he will think that solong as popular truth is one-sided, iis more desirable than otherwise



is more desirable than otherwisethat unpopular truth should haveone-sided asserters too; such beinusually the most energetic, and the

most likely to compel reluctanattention to the fragment of wisdowhich they proclaim as if it were

the whole.Thus, in the eighteenth century,

when nearly all the instructed, andall those of the uninstructed whowere led by them, were lost iadmiration of what is calledcivilisation, and of the marvels omodern science, literature, and



modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatlyoverrating the amount of unlikeness

between the men of modern and

those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of thedifference was in their own favour;

with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like

bombshells in the midst, dislocatinthe compact mass of one-sidedopinion, and forcing its elements torecombine in a better form and witadditional ingredients. Not that thecurrent opinions were on the whole



current opinions were on the wholefarther from the truth thaRousseau's were; on the contrary,they were nearer to it; they

contained more of positive truth,and very much less of error.

evertheless there lay i

Rousseau's doctrine, and has floateddown the stream of opinion alon

with it, a considerable amount oexactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and theseare the deposit which was lef

behind when the flood subsided.The superior worth of simplicity o



p p ylife, the enervating anddemoralising effect of the trammelsand hypocrisies of artificial society,

are ideas which have never beeentirely absent from cultivatedminds since Rousseau wrote; and

they will in time produce their dueeffect, though at present needing to

be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, othis subject, have nearly exhaustedtheir power.

In politics, again, it is almost acommonplace, that a party of order



p , p yor stability, and a party of progressor reform, are both necessaryelements of a healthy state o

political life; until the one or theother shall have so enlarged itsmental grasp as to be a party

equally of order and of progress,knowing and distinguishing what is

fit to be preserved from what oughto be swept away. Each of thesemodes of thinking derives its utilityfrom the deficiencies of the other;

but it is in a great measure theopposition of the other that keeps



pp peach within the limits of reason andsanity. Unless opinions favourableto democracy and to aristocracy, to

property and to equality, to co-

operation and to competition, toluxury and to abstinence, to

sociality and individuality, toliberty and discipline, and all the

other standing antagonisms o practical life, are expressed witequal freedom, and enforced anddefended with equal talent andenergy, there is no chance of bothelements obtaining their due; one



gscale is sure to go up and the other down. Truth, in the great practicalconcerns of life, is so much a

question of the reconciling and

combining of opposites, that veryfew have minds sufficiently

capacious and impartial to make theadjustment with an approach to

correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. On any of the greaopen questions just enumerated, ieither of the two opinions has a



p better claim than the other, notmerely to be tolerated, but to beencouraged and countenanced, it is

the one which happens at the

particular time and place to be in aminority. That is the opinion which,

for the time being, represents theneglected interests, the side o

human well-being which is idanger of obtaining less than itsshare. I am aware that there is not,in this country, any intolerance odifferences of opinion on most othese topics. They are adduced to



show, by admitted and multipliedexamples, the universality of thefact, that only through diversity o

opinion is there, in the existing state

of human intellect, a chance of fair- play to all sides of the truth. Whe

there are persons to be found, whoform an exception to the apparen

unanimity of the world on anysubject, even if the world is in theright, it is always probable thadissentients have something worthearing to say for themselves, andthat truth would lose something by



their silence.It may be objected, "But some

received principles, especially o

the highest and most vital subjects,

are more than half-truths. TheChristian morality, for instance, is

the whole truth on that subject, andif any one teaches a morality whic

varies from it, he is wholly ierror." As this is of all cases themost important in practice, none ca

be fitter to test the general maxim.But before pronouncing whaChristian morality is or is not, i



would be desirable to decide whais meant by Christian morality. If itmeans the morality of the New

Testament, I wonder that any one

who derives his knowledge of thisfrom the book itself, can suppose

that it was announced, or intended,as a complete doctrine of morals.

The Gospel always refers to a pre-existing morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in whicthat morality was to be corrected,or superseded by a wider andhigher; expressing itself, moreover,



in terms most general, ofteimpossible to be interpretedliterally, and possessing rather the



namely, that of the Greeks and

Romans; and his advice toChristians is in a great measure a

system of accommodation to that;even to the extent of giving a

apparent sanction to slavery. Whatis called Christian, but shouldrather be termed theological,morality, was not the work of Christor the Apostles, but is of much later origin, having been gradually buil



up by the Catholic church of the firsfive centuries, and though noimplicitly adopted by moderns and

Protestants, has been much less

modified by them than might have been expected. For the most part,

indeed, they have contentedthemselves with cutting off the

additions which had been made to iin the middle ages, each secsupplying the place by fresadditions, adapted to its owcharacter and tendencies. Thamankind owe a great debt to this



morality, and to its early teachers, I

should be the last person to deny; but I do not scruple to say of it, tha

it is, in many important points,

incomplete and one-sided, and thaunless ideas and feelings, no

sanctioned by it, had contributed tothe formation of European life and

character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than theynow are. Christian morality (socalled) has all the characters of areaction; it is, in great part, a

protest against Paganism. Its idealh h



is negative rather than positive;

passive rather than active;Innocence rather than Nobleness;

Abstinence from Evil, rather tha

energetic Pursuit of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said)

"thou shalt not" predominatesunduly over "thou shalt." In its

horror of sensuality, it made an idolof asceticism, which has beegradually compromised away intoone of legality. It holds out the hopeof heaven and the threat of hell, asthe appointed and appropriate

i i lif i hi



motives to a virtuous life: in this

falling far below the best of theancients, and doing what lies in it to

give to human morality a

essentially selfish character, bydisconnecting each man's feelings o

duty from the interests of hisfellow-creatures, except so far as a

self-interested inducement isoffered to him for consulting them.It is essentially a doctrine o

passive obedience; it inculcatessubmission to all authorities foundestablished; who indeed are not tob i l b d h h



be actively obeyed when they

command what religion forbids, buwho are not to be resisted, far less

rebelled against, for any amount o

wrong to ourselves. And while, inthe morality of the best Paga

nations, duty to the State holds evea disproportionate place, infringin

on the just liberty of the individual;in purely Christian ethics, that granddepartment of duty is scarcelynoticed or acknowledged. It is ithe Koran, not the New Testament,that we read the maxim—"A ruler

h i t t ffi



who appoints any man to an office,

when there is in his dominionsanother man better qualified for it,

sins against God and against the

State." What little recognition theidea of obligation to the public

obtains in modern morality, isderived from Greek and Roma

sources, not from Christian; as,even in the morality of private life,whatever exists of magnanimity,high-mindedness, personal dignity,even the sense of honour, is derivedfrom the purely human, not the

ligi t f d ti d



religious part of our education, and

never could have grown out of astandard of ethics in which the only

worth, professedly recognised, is

that of obedience.I am as far as any one fro

pretending that these defects arenecessarily inherent in the Christia

ethics, in every manner in which ican be conceived, or that the manyrequisites of a complete moraldoctrine which it does not contain,do not admit of being reconciledwith it. Far less would I insinuatethis of the doctrines and precepts o



this of the doctrines and precepts o

Christ himself. I believe that thesayings of Christ are all, that I ca

see any evidence of their havin

been intended to be; that they areirreconcilable with nothing which a

comprehensive morality requires;that everything which is excellent i

ethics may be brought within them,with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it byall who have attempted to deducefrom them any practical system oconduct whatever. But it is quiteconsistent with this to believe tha



consistent with this, to believe tha

they contain, and were meant tocontain, only a part of the truth; tha

many essential elements of the

highest morality are among thethings which are not provided for,

nor intended to be provided for, inthe recorded deliverances of the

Founder of Christianity, and whichhave been entirely thrown aside ithe system of ethics erected on the

basis of those deliverances by theChristian Church. And this being so,I think it a great error to persist iattempting to find in the Christia



attempting to find in the Christia

doctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended

it to sanction and enforce, but only

partially to provide. I believe, too,that this narrow theory is becomin

a grave practical evil, detractingreatly from the value of the moral

training and instruction, which somany well-meaning persons arenow at length exerting themselves to

promote. I much fear that byattempting to form the mind andfeelings on an exclusively religioustype and discarding those secular



type, and discarding those secular

standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) whic

heretofore co-existed with and

supplemented the Christian ethics,receiving some of its spirit, and

infusing into it some of theirs, therewill result, and is even now

resulting, a low, abject, servile typeof character, which, submit itself asit may to what it deems the SupremeWill, is incapable of rising to or sympathising in the conception oSupreme Goodness. I believe thaother ethics than any which can be



other ethics than any which can be

evolved from exclusively Christiasources, must exist side by side

with Christian ethics to produce the

moral regeneration of mankind; andthat the Christian system is no

exception to the rule, that in aimperfect state of the human mind,

the interests of truth require adiversity of opinions. It is nonecessary that in ceasing to ignorethe moral truths not contained iChristianity, men should ignore anyof those which it does contain. Sucprejudice or oversight when i



prejudice, or oversight, when i

occurs, is altogether an evil; but iis one from which we cannot hope

to be always exempt, and must be

regarded as the price paid for ainestimable good. The exclusive

pretension made by a part of thetruth to be the whole, must and

ought to be protested against, and ia reactionary impulse should makethe protestors unjust in their turn,this one-sidedness, like the other,may be lamented, but must betolerated. If Christians would teacinfidels to be just to Christianity



infidels to be just to Christianity,

they should themselves be just toinfidelity. It can do truth no service

to blink the fact, known to all who

have the most ordinary acquaintancewith literary history, that a large

portion of the noblest and mosvaluable moral teaching has bee

the work, not only of men who didnot know, but of men who knew andrejected, the Christian faith.

I do not pretend that the mosunlimited use of the freedom oenunciating all possible opinionswould put an end to the evils o



would put an end to the evils o

religious or philosophicalsectarianism. Every truth which me

of narrow capacity are in earnes

about, is sure to be asserted,inculcated, and in many ways eve

acted on, as if no other truth existedin the world, or at all events none

that could limit or qualify the first. Iacknowledge that the tendency of allopinions to become sectarian is nocured by the freest discussion, but isoften heightened and exacerbatedthereby; the truth which ought tohave been, but was not, seen, bein



have been, but was not, seen, bein

rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons

regarded as opponents. But it is no

on the impassioned partisan, it is othe calmer and more disinterested

bystander, that this collision oopinions works its salutary effect.

ot the violent conflict betwee parts of the truth, but the quiesuppression of half of it, is theformidable evil: there is alwayshope when people are forced tolisten to both sides; it is when theyattend only to one that errors harde



y

into prejudices, and truth itselceases to have the effect of truth, by

being exaggerated into falsehood.

And since there are few mentalattributes more rare than tha

udicial faculty which can sit iintelligent judgment between two

sides of a question, of which onlyone is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but i proportion as every side of it, everyopinion which embodies anyfraction of the truth, not only findsadvocates, but is so advocated as to



,

be listened to.

We have now recognised the

necessity to the mental well-beinof mankind (on which all their other

well-being depends) of freedom oopinion, and freedom of the

expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we willnow briefly recapitulate.

First, if any opinion iscompelled to silence, that opiniomay, for aught we can certainlyknow, be true. To deny this is to



, y

assume our own infallibility.Secondly, though the silenced

opinion be an error, it may, and

very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the

general or prevailing opinion oany subject is rarely or never the

whole truth, it is only by thecollision of adverse opinions, thathe remainder of the truth has anychance of being supplied.

Thirdly, even if the receivedopinion be not only true, but thewhole truth; unless it is suffered to



be, and actually is, vigorously andearnestly contested, it will, by mos

of those who receive it, be held i

the manner of a prejudice, witlittle comprehension or feeling o

its rational grounds. And not onlythis, but, fourthly, the meaning of the

doctrine itself will be in danger o being lost, or enfeebled, anddeprived of its vital effect on thecharacter and conduct: the dogma

becoming a mere formal profession,inefficacious for good, bucumbering the ground, and



g g

preventing the growth of any realand heartfelt conviction, fro

reason or personal experience.

Before quitting the subject ofreedom of opinion, it is fit to take

some notice of those who say, thatthe free expression of all opinionsshould be permitted, on conditiothat the manner be temperate, anddo not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said ot h e impossibility of fixing wherethese supposed bounds are to be

placed; for if the test be offence to



those whose opinion is attacked, Ithink experience testifies that this

offence is given whenever the attac

is telling and powerful, and thaevery opponent who pushes the

hard, and whom they find it difficulto answer, appears to them, if heshows any strong feeling on thesubject, an intemperate opponent.But this, though an importanconsideration in a practical point oview, merges in a more fundamentalobjection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even thoug



it be a true one, may be veryobjectionable, and may justly incur

severe censure. But the principal

offences of the kind are such as it ismostly impossible, unless by

accidental self-betrayal, to brinhome to conviction. The gravest othem is, to argue sophistically, tosuppress facts or arguments, tomisstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion.But all this, even to the mosaggravated degree, is so continuallydone in perfect good faith, by



persons who are not considered,and in many other respects may no

deserve to be considered, ignoran

or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds

conscientiously to stamp themisrepresentation as morallyculpable; and still less could law

presume to interfere with this kindof controversial misconduct. Withregard to what is commonly mean

by intemperate discussion, namelyinvective, sarcasm, personality, andthe like, the denunciation of these



weapons would deserve moresympathy if it were ever proposed

to interdict them equally to bot

sides; but it is only desired torestrain the employment of the

against the prevailing opinion:against the unprevailing they maynot only be used without generaldisapproval, but will be likely toobtain for him who uses them the

praise of honest zeal and righteousindignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greateswhen they are employed against the



comparatively defenceless; andwhatever unfair advantage can be

derived by any opinion from this

mode of asserting it, accrues almosexclusively to received opinions.

The worst offence of this kindwhich can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatise those whohold the contrary opinion as badand immoral men. To calumny othis sort, those who hold anyunpopular opinion are peculiarlyexposed, because they are igeneral few and uninfluential, and



nobody but themselves feel mucinterest in seeing justice done them;

but this weapon is, from the nature

of the case, denied to those whoattack a prevailing opinion: they ca

neither use it with safety tothemselves, nor, if they could,would it do anything but recoil otheir own cause. In general,opinions contrary to thosecommonly received can only obtaia hearing by studied moderation olanguage, and the most cautiousavoidance of unnecessary offence,



from which they hardly ever deviateeven in a slight degree withou

losing ground: while unmeasured

vituperation employed on the sideof the prevailing opinion, really

does deter people from professincontrary opinions, and frolistening to those who profess them.For the interest, therefore, of trutand justice, it is far more importanto restrain this employment ovituperative language than the other;and, for example, if it werenecessary to choose, there would be



much more need to discourageoffensive attacks on infidelity, than

on religion. It is, however, obvious

that law and authority have no business with restraining either,

while opinion ought, in everyinstance, to determine its verdict bythe circumstances of the individualcase; condemning every one, owhichever side of the argument he

places himself, in whose mode oadvocacy either want of candour, or malignity, bigotry, or intolerance ofeeling manifest themselves; but no



inferring these vices from the sidewhich a person takes, though it be

the contrary side of the question to

our own: and giving merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he

may hold, who has calmness to seeand honesty to state what hisopponents and their opinions reallyare, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing bacwhich tells, or can be supposed totell, in their favour. This is the realmorality of public discussion; and ioften violated, I am happy to thin



that there are many controversialistswho to a great extent observe it, and

a still greater number who

conscientiously strive towards it.

FOOTNOTES:[6] These words had scarcely

been written, when, as if to givethem an emphatic contradiction,occurred the Government PressProsecutions of 1858. That ill-

judged interference with the libertyof public discussion has not,



however, induced me to alter asingle word in the text, nor has it at

all weakened my conviction that,

moments of panic excepted, the eraof pains and penalties for political

discussion has, in our own country, passed away. For, in the first place,the prosecutions were not persisted

in; and, in the second, they werenever, properly speaking, political prosecutions. The offence charged

was not that of criticisinginstitutions, or the acts or persons orulers, but of circulating what was



deemed an immoral doctrine, thelawfulness of Tyrannicide.

If the arguments of the present

chapter are of any validity, thereought to exist the fullest liberty of

professing and discussing, as amatter of ethical conviction, anydoctrine, however immoral it may

be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to

examine here, whether the doctrineof Tyrannicide deserves that title. I

shall content myself with saying,that the subject has been at all times



one of the open questions of morals;that the act of a private citizen in

striking down a criminal, who, by

raising himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of

legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations,and by some of the best and wisestof men, not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue; and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of

assassination, but of civil war. Assuch, I hold that the instigation to it,in a specific case, may be a proper



subject of punishment, but only if anovert act has followed, and at least

a probable connection can be

established between the act and theinstigation. Even then, it is not a

foreign government, but the verygovernment assailed, which alone,in the exercise of self-defence, canlegitimately punish attacks directed

against its own existence.[7] Thomas Pooley, Bodmin

Assizes, July 31, 1857. InDecember following, he received a

free pardon from the Crown.



[8] George Jacob Holyoake,August 17, 1857; Edward Truelove,

July, 1857.

[9] Baron de Gleichen,Marlborough-Street Police Court,

August 4, 1857.[10] Ample warning may bedrawn from the large infusion of the

passions of a persecutor, whichmingled with the general display of

the worst parts of our nationalcharacter on the occasion of the

Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the



pulpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the Evangelical



millions of British subjects), "the

superstition which they calledreligion, by the British Government,

had had the effect of retarding theascendency of the British name, and preventing the salutary growth of Christianity.... Toleration was thegreat corner-stone of the religiousliberties of this country; but do notlet them abuse that precious word

toleration. As he understood it, itmeant the complete liberty to all,



freedom of worship, among Christians, who worshipped upon

the same foundation . It meant

toleration of all sects anddenominations of Christians who

believed in the one mediation ." Idesire to call attention to the fact,that a man who has been deemed fit

to fill a high office in thegovernment of this country, under a

liberal Ministry, maintains thedoctrine that all who do not believe

in the divinity of Christ are beyondthe pale of toleration. Who, after



this imbecile display, can indulgethe illusion that religious

persecution has passed away, never

to return?



CHAPTER III. OFINDIVIDUALITY, AS

ONE OF THEELEMENTS OFWELL-BEING.

Such being the reasons whicmake it imperative that huma

beings should be free to for opinions, and to express their

i i i h d



opinions without reserve; and sucthe baneful consequences to the

intellectual, and through that to the

moral nature of man, unless thisliberty is either conceded, or

asserted in spite of prohibition; leus next examine whether the samereasons do not require that meshould be free to act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either

physical or moral, from their

fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This las

i i f i di bl



proviso is of course indispensable.o one pretends that actions should

be as free as opinions. On the

contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances

in which they are expressed aresuch as to constitute their expression a positive instigation tosome mischievous act. An opinionthat corn-dealers are starvers of the

poor, or that private property isrobbery, ought to be unmolested

when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur

i h t h d li d ll



punishment when delivered orallyto an excited mob assembled before

the house of a corn-dealer, or when

handed about among the same mobin the form of a placard. Acts, o

whatever kind, which, withouustifiable cause, do harm to others,may be, and in the more importancases absolutely require to be,controlled by the unfavourablesentiments, and, when needful, bythe active interference of mankind.

The liberty of the individual mus be thus far limited; he must no

k hi lf i t th



make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains fro

molesting others in what concerns

them, and merely acts according tohis own inclination and judgment i

things which concern himself, thesame reasons which show thaopinion should be free, prove alsothat he should be allowed, withoumolestation, to carry his opinionsinto practice at his own cost. Thamankind are not infallible; that their

truths, for the most part, are onlyhalf-truths; that unity of opinion,

unless resulting from the fullest and



unless resulting from the fullest andfreest comparison of opposite

opinions, is not desirable, and

diversity not an evil, but a good,until mankind are much more

capable than at present orecognising all sides of the truth,are principles applicable to men'smodes of action, not less than totheir opinions. As it is useful thatwhile mankind are imperfect thereshould be different opinions, so is i

that there should be differenexperiments of living; that free

scope should be given to varieties



scope should be given to varietiesof character, short of injury to

others; and that the worth o

different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one

thinks fit to try them. It is desirable,in short, that in things which do no primarily concern others,individuality should assert itself.Where, not the person's owcharacter, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule

of conduct, there is wanting one othe principal ingredients of huma

happiness and quite the chie



happiness, and quite the chieingredient of individual and social

progress.

In maintaining this principle, thegreatest difficulty to be encountered

does not lie in the appreciation omeans towards an acknowledgedend, but in the indifference o

persons in general to the end itself.If it were felt that the freedevelopment of individuality is oneof the leading essentials of well-

being; that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is

designated by the terms civilisation



designated by the terms civilisation,instruction, education, culture, but is

itself a necessary part and conditio

of all those things; there would beno danger that liberty should be

under-valued, and the adjustment othe boundaries between it andsocial control would present noextraordinary difficulty. But the evilis, that individual spontaneity ishardly recognised by the commomodes of thinking, as having any

intrinsic worth, or deserving anyregard on its own account. The

majority being satisfied with the



majority, being satisfied with theways of mankind as they now are

(for it is they who make them wha

they are), cannot comprehend whythose ways should not be good

enough for everybody; and what ismore, spontaneity forms no part othe ideal of the majority of moraland social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as atroublesome and perhaps rebelliousobstruction to the general

acceptance of what these reformers,in their own judgment, think would

be best for mankind Few persons



be best for mankind. Few persons,out of Germany, even comprehend

the meaning of the doctrine whic

Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both as a savant and as a politician,

made the text of a treatise—that "theend of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, andnot suggested by vague and transiendesires, is the highest and mosharmonious development of his

powers to a complete and consistenwhole;" that, therefore, the objec

"towards which every human bein



towards which every human beinmust ceaselessly direct his efforts,

and on which especially those who

design to influence their fellow-memust ever keep their eyes, is the

individuality of power anddevelopment;" that for this there aretwo requisites, "freedom, and avariety of situations;" and that frothe union of these arise "individualvigour and manifold diversity,"which combine themselves i

"originality." [11]Little, however, as people are

accustomed to a doctrine like that o



accustomed to a doctrine like that oVon Humboldt, and surprising as it

may be to them to find so high a

value attached to individuality, thequestion, one must nevertheless

think, can only be one of degree. Noone's idea of excellence in conducis that people should do absolutelynothing but copy one another. Noone would assert that people oughnot to put into their mode of life,and into the conduct of their

concerns, any impress whatever otheir own judgment, or of their ow

individual character On the other



individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend

that people ought to live as i

nothing whatever had been knowin the world before they came into

it; as if experience had as yet donenothing towards showing that onemode of existence, or of conduct, is

preferable to another. Nobodydenies that people should be sotaught and trained in youth, as toknow and benefit by the ascertained

results of human experience. But iis the privilege and proper

condition of a human being, arrivedh f h f l



condition of a human being, arrivedat the maturity of his faculties, to

use and interpret experience in his

own way. It is for him to find outwhat part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his owcircumstances and character. Thetraditions and customs of other

people are, to a certain extent,evidence of what their experiencehas taught them ; presumptiveevidence, and as such, have a clai

to his deference: but, in the firs place, their experience may be too

narrow; or they may not havei d i i h l S dl



narrow; or they may not haveinterpreted it rightly. Secondly,

their interpretation of experience

may be correct, but unsuitable tohim. Customs are made for customary circumstances, andcustomary characters: and hiscircumstances or his character may

be uncustomary. Thirdly, though thecustoms be both good as customs,and suitable to him, yet to confor to custom, merely as custom, does

not educate or develop in him anyof the qualities which are the

distinctive endowment of a humab i Th h f l i



being. The human faculties o

perception, judgment,

discriminative feeling, mentalactivity, and even moral preference,are exercised only in making achoice. He who does anythin

because it is the custom, makes nochoice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is

best. The mental and moral, like themuscular powers, are improved

only by being used. The facultiesare called into no exercise by doin

a thing merely because others do it,th b b li i thi



g y ,no more than by believing a thin

only because others believe it. If the

grounds of an opinion are noconclusive to the person's owreason, his reason cannot bestrengthened, but is likely to beweakened by his adopting it: and ithe inducements to an act are nosuch as are consentaneous to hisown feelings and character (whereaffection, or the rights of others, are

not concerned), it is so much donetowards rendering his feelings and

character inert and torpid, insteadf ti d g ti



p ,of active and energetic.

He who lets the world, or his

own portion of it, choose his plan olife for him, has no need of any

other faculty than the ape-like oneof imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all hisfaculties. He must use observatioto see, reasoning and judgment toforesee, activity to gather materialsfor decision, discrimination to

decide, and when he has decided,firmness and self-control to hold to

his deliberate decision. And theseliti h i d i



qualities he requires and exercises

exactly in proportion as the part o

his conduct which he determinesaccording to his own judgment andfeelings is a large one. It is possiblethat he might be guided in somegood path, and kept out of harm'sway, without any of these things.But what will be his comparativeworth as a human being? It really isof importance, not only what me

do, but also what manner of methey are that do it. Among the works

of man, which human life is rightlyemployed in perfecting and



g yemployed in perfecting and

beautifying, the first in importance

surely is man himself. Supposing iwere possible to get houses built,corn grown, battles fought, causestried, and even churches erectedand prayers said, by machinery—byautomatons in human form—iwould be a considerable loss toexchange for these automatons evethe men and women who at presen

inhabit the more civilised parts othe world, and who assuredly are

but starved specimens of whanature can and will produce Huma



nature can and will produce. Huma

nature is not a machine to be buil

after a model, and set to do exactlythe work prescribed for it, but atree, which requires to grow anddevelop itself on all sides,according to the tendency of theinward forces which make it aliving thing.

It will probably be concededthat it is desirable people should

exercise their understandings, andthat an intelligent following o

custom, or even occasionally aintelligent deviation from custom is



intelligent deviation from custom, is

better than a blind and simply

mechanical adhesion to it. To acertain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own:

but there is not the same willingnessto admit that our desires andimpulses should be our owlikewise; or that to possessimpulses of our own, and of anystrength, is anything but a peril and

a snare. Yet desires and impulsesare as much a part of a perfec

human being, as beliefs andrestraints: and strong impulses are



restraints: and strong impulses are

only perilous when not properly

balanced; when one set of aims andinclinations is developed intostrength, while others, which oughto co-exist with them, remain weaand inactive. It is not because men'sdesires are strong that they act ill; iis because their consciences areweak. There is no naturalconnection between strong impulses

and a weak conscience. The naturalconnection is the other way. To say

that one person's desires andfeelings are stronger and more



feelings are stronger and more

various than those of another, is

merely to say that he has more of theraw material of human nature, andis therefore capable, perhaps omore evil, but certainly of moregood. Strong impulses are buanother name for energy. Energymay be turned to bad uses; but moregood may always be made of aenergetic nature, than of an indolen

and impassive one. Those who havemost natural feeling, are always

those whose cultivated feelings maybe made the strongest The same



be made the strongest. The same

strong susceptibilities which make

the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source frowhence are generated the mos

passionate love of virtue, and thesternest self-control. It is througthe cultivation of these, that society

both does its duty and protects itsinterests: not by rejecting the stuf of which heroes are made, because

it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses

are his own—are the expression ohis own nature, as it has bee



his own nature, as it has bee

developed and modified by his ow

culture—is said to have a character.One whose desires and impulsesare not his own, has no character,no more than a steam-engine has acharacter. If, in addition to being hisown, his impulses are strong, andare under the government of a stronwill, he has an energetic character.Whoever thinks that individuality o

desires and impulses should not beencouraged to unfold itself, mus

maintain that society has no need ostrong natures—is not the better for



strong natures is not the better for

containing many persons who have

much character—and that a higgeneral average of energy is nodesirable.

In some early states of society,these forces might be, and were, toomuch ahead of the power whicsociety then possessed odisciplining and controlling them.There has been a time when the

element of spontaneity andindividuality was in excess, and the

social principle had a hard strugglewith it. The difficulty then was, to



w t t. e d cu ty t e was, to

induce men of strong bodies or

minds to pay obedience to any ruleswhich required them to control their impulses. To overcome thisdifficulty, law and discipline, likethe Popes struggling against theEmperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to controlall his life in order to control hischaracter—which society had no

found any other sufficient means o binding. But society has now fairly

got the better of individuality; andthe danger which threatens huma



g

nature is not the excess, but the

deficiency, of personal impulsesand preferences. Things are vastlychanged, since the passions of thosewho were strong by station or by

personal endowment were in a stateof habitual rebellion against lawsand ordinances, and required to be

rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy

any particle of security. In our times, from the highest class o

society down to the lowest, everyone lives as under the eye of a



y

hostile and dreaded censorship. No

only in what concerns others, but iwhat concerns only themselves, theindividual, or the family, do not ask themselves—what do I prefer? or,what would suit my character anddisposition? or, what would allowthe best and highest in me to have

fair-play, and enable it to grow andthrive? They ask themselves, wha

is suitable to my position? what isusually done by persons of my

station and pecuniarycircumstances? or (worse still)



( )

what is usually done by persons of a

station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that theychoose what is customary, in

preference to what suits their owinclination. It does not occur tothem to have any inclination, excepfor what is customary. Thus the

mind itself is bowed to the yoke:even in what people do for

pleasure, conformity is the firsthing thought of; they like in crowds;

they exercise choice only amonthings commonly done: peculiarity



g y p y

of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are

shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their ownature, they have no nature tofollow: their human capacities arewithered and starved: they becomeincapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally

without either opinions or feelingsof home growth, or properly their

own. Now is this, or is it not, thedesirable condition of huma

nature?It is so, on the Calvinistic



theory. According to that, the one

great offence of man is Self-will.All the good of which humanity iscapable, is comprised iObedience. You have no choice;thus you must do, and no otherwise:"whatever is not a duty, is a sin."Human nature being radically

corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed

within him. To one holding thistheory of life, crushing out any o

the human faculties, capacities, andsusceptibilities, is no evil: ma



needs no capacity, but that o

surrendering himself to the will oGod: and if he uses any of hisfaculties for any other purpose buto do that supposed will moreeffectually, he is better withoutthem. That is the theory oCalvinism; and it is held, in a

mitigated form, by many who do noconsider themselves Calvinists; the

mitigation consisting in giving aless ascetic interpretation to the

alleged will of God; asserting it to be his will that mankind should



gratify some of their inclinations; o

course not in the manner theythemselves prefer, but in the way oobedience, that is, in a way

prescribed to them by authority;and, therefore, by the necessaryconditions of the case, the same for all.

In some such insidious for there is at present a strong tendency

to this narrow theory of life, and tothe pinched and hidebound type o

human character which i patronises. Many persons, no doubt,



sincerely think that human beings

thus cramped and dwarfed, are astheir Maker designed them to be;ust as many have thought that trees

are a much finer thing when clippedinto pollards, or cut out into figuresof animals, than as nature madethem. But if it be any part o

religion to believe that man wasmade by a good being, it is more

consistent with that faith to believe,that this Being gave all huma

faculties that they might becultivated and unfolded, not rooted



out and consumed, and that he takes

delight in every nearer approacmade by his creatures to the idealconception embodied in them, everyincrease in any of their capabilitiesof comprehension, of action, or oenjoyment. There is a different typeof human excellence from the

Calvinistic; a conception ohumanity as having its nature

bestowed on it for other purposesthan merely to be abnegated. "Paga

self-assertion" is one of theelements of human worth, as well as



"Christian self-denial." [12] There is

a Greek ideal of self-development,which the Platonic and Christiaideal of self-government blendswith, but does not supersede. It may

be better to be a John Knox than aAlcibiades, but it is better to be aPericles than either; nor would a

Pericles, if we had one in thesedays, be without anything good

which belonged to John Knox.It is not by wearing down into

uniformity all that is individual ithemselves, but by cultivating it and



calling it forth, within the limits

imposed by the rights and interestsof others, that human beings becomea noble and beautiful object ocontemplation; and as the works

partake the character of those whodo them, by the same process humalife also becomes rich, diversified,

and animating, furnishing moreabundant aliment to high thoughts

and elevating feelings, andstrengthening the tie which binds

every individual to the race, bymaking the race infinitely better



worth belonging to. In proportion to

the development of hisindividuality, each person becomesmore valuable to himself, and istherefore capable of being morevaluable to others. There is agreater fulness of life about his owexistence, and when there is more

life in the units there is more in themass which is composed of them.

As much compression as isnecessary to prevent the stronger

specimens of human nature froencroaching on the rights of others,



cannot be dispensed with; but for

this there is ample compensatioeven in the point of view of humadevelopment. The means odevelopment which the individualloses by being prevented frogratifying his inclinations to theinjury of others, are chiefly

obtained at the expense of thedevelopment of other people. And

even to himself there is a fullequivalent in the better developmen

of the social part of his nature,rendered possible by the restrain



put upon the selfish part. To be held

to rigid rules of justice for the sakeof others, develops the feelings andcapacities which have the good oothers for their object. But to berestrained in things not affectintheir good, by their meredispleasure, develops nothin

valuable, except such force ocharacter as may unfold itself i

resisting the restraint. If acquiescedin, it dulls and blunts the whole

nature. To give any fair-play to thenature of each, it is essential tha



different persons should be allowed

to lead different lives. In proportioas this latitude has been exercisedin any age, has that age beenoteworthy to posterity. Evendespotism does not produce itsworst effects, so long asIndividuality exists under it; and

whatever crushes individuality isdespotism, by whatever name it may

be called, and whether it professesto be enforcing the will of God or

the injunctions of men.Having said that Individuality is



the same thing with development,

and that it is only the cultivation oindividuality which produces, or can produce, well-developedhuman beings, I might here close theargument: for what more or better can be said of any condition ohuman affairs, than that it brings

human beings themselves nearer tothe best thing they can be? or wha

worse can be said of anyobstruction to good, than that i

prevents this? Doubtless, however,these considerations will not suffice



to convince those who most need

convincing; and it is necessaryfurther to show, that thesedeveloped human beings are osome use to the undeveloped—to

point out to those who do not desireliberty, and would not availthemselves of it, that they may be i

some intelligible manner rewardedfor allowing other people to make

use of it without hindrance.In the first place, then, I would

suggest that they might possiblylearn something from them. It will



not be denied by anybody, that

originality is a valuable element ihuman affairs. There is always needof persons not only to discover newtruths, and point out when whawere once truths are true no longer,

but also to commence new practices, and set the example o

more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life.

This cannot well be gainsaid byanybody who does not believe tha

the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and



practices. It is true that this benefi

is not capable of being rendered byeverybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison with thewhole of mankind, whoseexperiments, if adopted by others,would be likely to be anyimprovement on established

practice. But these few are the salof the earth; without them, huma

life would become a stagnant pool.ot only is it they who introduce

good things which did not beforeexist; it is they who keep the life i



those which already existed. If there

were nothing new to be done,would human intellect cease to benecessary? Would it be a reasonwhy those who do the old thingsshould forget why they are done,and do them like cattle, not likehuman beings? There is only too

great a tendency in the best beliefsand practices to degenerate into the

mechanical; and unless there were asuccession of persons whose ever-

recurring originality prevents thegrounds of those beliefs and



practices from becoming merelytraditional, such dead matter wouldnot resist the smallest shock froanything really alive, and therewould be no reason whycivilisation should not die out, as ithe Byzantine Empire. Persons ogenius, it is true, are, and are

always likely to be, a smallminority; but in order to have them,

it is necessary to preserve the soilin which they grow. Genius can

only breathe freely in aatmosphere of freedom. Persons o



genius are, ex vi termini , moreindividual than any other people— less capable, consequently, ofitting themselves, without hurtfulcompression, into any of the smallnumber of moulds which society

provides in order to save itsmembers the trouble of formin

their own character. If from timiditythey consent to be forced into one o

these moulds, and to let all that par of themselves which cannot expand

under the pressure remaiunexpanded, society will be little



the better for their genius. If they areof a strong character, and break their fetters, they become a mark for the society which has not succeededin reducing them to commonplace,to point at with solemn warning as"wild," "erratic," and the like; mucas if one should complain of the

iagara river for not flowinsmoothly between its banks like a

Dutch canal.I insist thus emphatically on the

importance of genius, and thenecessity of allowing it to unfold



itself freely both in thought and i practice, being well aware that noone will deny the position in theory,

but knowing also that almost everyone, in reality, is totally indifferentto it. People think genius a fine thinif it enables a man to write aexciting poem, or paint a picture.

But in its true sense, that ooriginality in thought and action,

though no one says that it is not athing to be admired, nearly all, a

heart, think that they can do verywell without it. Unhappily this is



too natural to be wondered at.Originality is the one thing whicunoriginal minds cannot feel the useof. They cannot see what it is to dofor them: how should they? If theycould see what it would do for them, it would not be originality.The first service which originality

has to render them, is that oopening their eyes: which bein

once fully done, they would have achance of being themselves

original. Meanwhile, recollectinthat nothing was ever yet done



which some one was not the first todo, and that all good things whicexist are the fruits of originality, letthem be modest enough to believethat there is something still left for ito accomplish, and assurethemselves that they are more ineed of originality, the less they are

conscious of the want.In sober truth, whatever homage

may be professed, or even paid, toreal or supposed mental superiority,

the general tendency of thingsthroughout the world is to render



mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history,in the middle ages, and in adiminishing degree through the lontransition from feudality to the

present time, the individual was a power in himself; and if he hadeither great talents or a high social

position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are

lost in the crowd. In politics it isalmost a triviality to say that public

opinion now rules the world. Theonly power deserving the name is



that of masses, and of governmentswhile they make themselves theorgan of the tendencies and instinctsof masses. This is as true in themoral and social relations o

private life as in publictransactions. Those whose opinionsgo by the name of public opinion,

are not always the same sort o public: in America they are the

whole white population; in England,chiefly the middle class. But they

are always a mass, that is to say,collective mediocrity. And what is



a still greater novelty, the mass donot now take their opinions frodignitaries in Church or State, froostensible leaders, or from books.Their thinking is done for them bymen much like themselves,addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment,

through the newspapers. I am nocomplaining of all this. I do no

assert that anything better iscompatible, as a general rule, witthe present low state of the humamind. But that does not hinder the



government of mediocrity fro being mediocre government. Nogovernment by a democracy or anumerous aristocracy, either in its

political acts or in the opinions,qualities, and tone of mind which ifosters, ever did or could riseabove mediocrity, except in so far

as the sovereign Many have lethemselves be guided (which i

their best times they always havedone) by the counsels and influenceof a more highly gifted andinstructed One or Few. The



initiation of all wise or noblethings, comes and must come froindividuals; generally at first frosome one individual. The honour and glory of the average man is thahe is capable of following thainitiative; that he can respondinternally to wise and noble things,

and be led to them with his eyesopen. I am not countenancing the

sort of "hero-worship" whicapplauds the strong man of geniusfor forcibly seizing on thegovernment of the world and



making it do his bidding in spite oitself. All he can claim is, freedomto point out the way. The power ocompelling others into it, is not onlyinconsistent with the freedom anddevelopment of all the rest, bucorrupting to the strong mahimself. It does seem, however, that

when the opinions of masses omerely average men are everywhere

become or becoming the dominan power, the counterpoise andcorrective to that tendency would

be, the more and more pronounced



individuality of those who stand othe higher eminences of thought. It isin these circumstances mosespecially, that exceptionalindividuals, instead of beindeterred, should be encouraged iacting differently from the mass. Iother times there was no advantage

in their doing so, unless they actednot only differently, but better. In

this age the mere example ononconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself aservice. Precisely because the



tyranny of opinion is such as tomake eccentricity a reproach, it isdesirable, in order to break througthat tyranny, that people should beeccentric. Eccentricity has alwaysabounded when and where strengtof character has abounded; and theamount of eccentricity in a society

has generally been proportional tothe amount of genius, mental vigour,

and moral courage which icontained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.



I have said that it is important togive the freest scope possible touncustomary things, in order that imay in time appear which of theseare fit to be converted into customs.But independence of action, anddisregard of custom are not solelydeserving of encouragement for the

chance they afford that better modesof action, and customs more worthy

of general adoption, may be strucout; nor is it only persons o

decided mental superiority whohave a just claim to carry on their



lives in their own way. There is noreason that all human existencesshould be constructed on some one,or some small number of patterns. Ia person possesses any tolerableamount of common-sense and

experience, his own mode of layinout his existence is the best, no

because it is the best in itself, bu because it is his own mode. Huma

beings are not like sheep; and evesheep are not undistinguishablyalike. A man cannot get a coat or a

pair of boots to fit him, unless they



are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful tochoose from: and is it easier to fihim with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like oneanother in their whole physical and

spiritual conformation than in theshape of their feet? If it were only

that people have diversities of taste,that is reason enough for no

attempting to shape them all after one model. But different personsalso require different conditions for their spiritual development; and ca



no more exist healthily in the samemoral, than all the variety of plantscan in the same physical,atmosphere and climate. The samethings which are helps to one

person towards the cultivation o

his higher nature, are hindrances toanother. The same mode of life is a

healthy excitement to one, keepinall his faculties of action and

enjoyment in their best order, whileto another it is a distracting burthen,which suspends or crushes allinternal life. Such are the



differences among human beings itheir sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and theoperation on them of differen

physical and moral agencies, thaunless there is a correspondin

diversity in their modes of life, theyneither obtain their fair share o

happiness, nor grow up to themental, moral, and aesthetic stature

of which their nature is capable.Why then should tolerance, as far asthe public sentiment is concerned,extend only to tastes and modes o



life which extort acquiescence bythe multitude of their adherents?

owhere (except in some monasticinstitutions) is diversity of tasteentirely unrecognised; a persomay, without blame, either like or

dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic exercises, or

chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like each of these

things, and those who dislike them,are too numerous to be put down.But the man, and still more thewoman, who can be accused either



of doing "what nobody does," or onot doing "what everybody does," isthe subject of as much depreciatoryremark as if he or she hadcommitted some grave moraldelinquency. Persons require to

possess a title, or some other badgeof rank, or of the consideration o

people of rank, to be able to indulgesomewhat in the luxury of doing as

they like without detriment to their estimation. To indulge somewhat, Irepeat: for whoever allowthemselves much of that indulgence,



incur the risk of something worsethan disparaging speeches—theyare in peril of a commission delunatico , and of having their

property taken from them and giveto their relations. [13]

There is one characteristic othe present direction of public

opinion, peculiarly calculated tomake it intolerant of any marked

demonstration of individuality. Thegeneral average of mankind are noonly moderate in intellect, but alsomoderate in inclinations: they have

h h



no tastes or wishes strong enough toincline them to do anything unusual,and they consequently do nounderstand those who have, andclass all such with the wild andintemperate whom they are

accustomed to look down upon.ow, in addition to this fact which

is general, we have only to supposethat a strong movement has set i

towards the improvement of morals,and it is evident what we have toexpect. In these days such amovement has set in; much has

ll b ff d i h



actually been effected in the way oincreased regularity of conduct, anddiscouragement of excesses; andthere is a philanthropic spiriabroad, for the exercise of whicthere is no more inviting field tha

the moral and prudentialimprovement of our fellow-

creatures. These tendencies of thetimes cause the public to be more

disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rulesof conduct, and endeavour to makeevery one conform to the approved

d d A d h d d



standard. And that standard, expressor tacit, is to desire nothinstrongly. Its ideal of character is to

be without any marked character; tomaim by compression, like aChinese lady's foot, every part o

human nature which stands ou prominently, and tends to make the

person markedly dissimilar ioutline to commonplace humanity.

As is usually the case witideals which exclude one-half owhat is desirable, the presenstandard of approbation produces

l i f i i it ti f th



only an inferior imitation of theother half. Instead of great energiesguided by vigorous reason, andstrong feelings strongly controlled

by a conscientious will, its result isweak feelings and weak energies,

which therefore can be kept ioutward conformity to rule withou

any strength either of will or oreason. Already energetic

characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional. Thereis now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country excep

b siness The energ e pended i



business. The energy expended ithat may still be regarded asconsiderable. What little is lef from that employment, is expendedon some hobby; which may be auseful, even a philanthropic hobby,

but is always some one thing, andgenerally a thing of small

dimensions. The greatness oEngland is now all collective:

individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with thisour moral and religious



progress or improvement The spiri



progress or improvement. The spiriof improvement is not always aspirit of liberty, for it may aim atforcing improvements on aunwilling people; and the spirit oliberty, in so far as it resists such

attempts, may ally itself locally andtemporarily with the opponents o

improvement; but the only unfailinand permanent source o

improvement is liberty, since by itthere are as many possibleindependent centres of improvemenas there are individuals. The

progressive principle however in



progressive principle, however, ineither shape, whether as the love oliberty or of improvement, isantagonistic to the sway of Custom,involving at least emancipatiofrom that yoke; and the contes

between the two constitutes thechief interest of the history o

mankind. The greater part of theworld has, properly speaking, no

history, because the despotism oCustom is complete. This is thecase over the whole East. Custom isthere, in all things, the final appeal;

ustice and right mean conformity to



ustice and right mean conformity tocustom; the argument of custom noone, unless some tyrant intoxicatedwith power, thinks of resisting. Andwe see the result. Those nationsmust once have had originality; they

did not start out of the ground populous, lettered, and versed i

many of the arts of life; they madethemselves all this, and were the

the greatest and most powerfulnations in the world. What are theynow? The subjects or dependants otribes whose forefathers wandered

in the forests when theirs had



in the forests when theirs hadmagnificent palaces and gorgeoustemples, but over whom custoexercised only a divided rule witliberty and progress. A people, itappears, may be progressive for a

certain length of time, and then stop:when does it stop? When it ceases

to possess individuality. If a similar change should befall the nations o

Europe, it will not be in exactly thesame shape: the despotism ocustom with which these nations arethreatened is not precisely

stationariness It proscribes



stationariness. It proscribessingularity, but it does not precludechange, provided all changetogether. We have discarded thefixed costumes of our forefathers;every one must still dress like other

people, but the fashion may changeonce or twice a year. We thus take

care that when there is change, ishall be for change's sake, and no

from any idea of beauty or convenience; for the same idea o beauty or convenience would nostrike all the world at the same

moment and be simultaneously



moment, and be simultaneouslythrown aside by all at another moment. But we are progressive aswell as changeable: we continuallymake new inventions in mechanicalthings, and keep them until they are

again superseded by better; we areeager for improvement in politics,

in education, even in morals, thougin this last our idea of improvemen

chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as goodas ourselves. It is not progress thawe object to; on the contrary, we

flatter ourselves that we are the



flatter ourselves that we are themost progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we should think we haddone wonders if we had madeourselves all alike; forgetting tha

the unlikeness of one person toanother is generally the first thin

which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type,

and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining theadvantages of both, of producinsomething better than either. We

have a warning example in China—



have a warning example in China a nation of much talent, and, in somerespects, even wisdom, owing tothe rare good fortune of having bee

provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the

work, in some measure, of men towhom even the most enlightened

European must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages

and philosophers. They areremarkable, too, in the excellenceof their apparatus for impressing, asfar as possible, the best wisdo

they possess upon every mind in the



y p p ycommunity, and securing that thosewho have appropriated most of ishall occupy the posts of honour and

power. Surely the people who didthis have discovered the secret o

human progressiveness, and mushave kept themselves steadily at the

head of the movement of the world.On the contrary, they have become

stationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they areever to be farther improved, it mus

be by foreigners. They have

succeeded beyond all hope in wha



y pEnglish philanthropists are soindustriously working at—imaking a people all alike, allgoverning their thoughts andconduct by the same maxims and

rules; and these are the fruits. Themodern régime of public opinion is,

in an unorganised form, what theChinese educational and political

systems are in an organised; andunless individuality shall be ablesuccessfully to assert itself againsthis yoke, Europe, notwithstandin

its noble antecedents and its



professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.

What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot?What has made the European family

of nations an improving, instead oa stationary portion of mankind?

ot any superior excellence ithem, which, when it exists, exists

as the effect, not as the cause; butheir remarkable diversity ocharacter and culture. Individuals,classes, nations, have bee

extremely unlike one another: they



y yhave struck out a great variety o

paths, each leading to somethinvaluable; and although at every

period those who travelled idifferent paths have been intoleran

of one another, and each wouldhave thought it an excellent thing i

all the rest could have beecompelled to travel his road, their

attempts to thwart each other'sdevelopment have rarely had any permanent success, and each has itime endured to receive the good

which the others have offered.



Europe is, in my judgment, whollyindebted to this plurality of pathsfor its progressive and many-sideddevelopment. But it already beginsto possess this benefit in a

considerably less degree. It isdecidedly advancing towards the

Chinese ideal of making all peoplealike. M. de Tocqueville, in his last

important work, remarks how mucmore the Frenchmen of the presenday resemble one another, than didthose even of the last generation.

The same remark might be made o



Englishmen in a far greater degree.In a passage already quoted froWilhelm von Humboldt, he pointsout two things as necessaryconditions of human development,

because necessary to render peopleunlike one another; namely,

freedom, and variety of situations.The second of these two conditions

is in this country every daydiminishing. The circumstanceswhich surround different classesand individuals, and shape their

characters, are daily becomin



more assimilated. Formerly,different ranks, differenneighbourhoods, different tradesand professions, lived in what migh

be called different worlds; a

present, to a great degree in thesame. Comparatively speaking, they

now read the same things, listen tothe same things, see the same things,go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the sameobjects, have the same rights andliberties, and the same means o

asserting them. Great as are the



differences of position whicremain, they are nothing to thosewhich have ceased. And theassimilation is still proceeding. Allthe political changes of the age

promote it, since they all tend toraise the low and to lower the high.

Every extension of educatio promotes it, because educatio brings people under commoinfluences, and gives them access tothe general stock of facts andsentiments. Improvements in the

means of communication promote it,



by bringing the inhabitants of distan places into personal contact, andkeeping up a rapid flow of changesof residence between one place andanother. The increase of commerce

and manufactures promotes it, bydiffusing more widely the

advantages of easy circumstances,and opening all objects of ambition,even the highest, to generalcompetition, whereby the desire orising becomes no longer thecharacter of a particular class, bu

of all classes. A more powerful



agency than even all these, i bringing about a general similarityamong mankind, is the completeestablishment, in this and other freecountries, of the ascendency o

public opinion in the State. As thevarious social eminences whic

enabled persons entrenched on theto disregard the opinion of themultitude, gradually becomelevelled; as the very idea oresisting the will of the public,when it is positively known tha

they have a will, disappears more



and more from the minds o practical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity—any substantive power in society, which, itself opposed to

the ascendency of numbers, isinterested in taking under its

protection opinions and tendenciesat variance with those of the public.The combination of all these

causes forms so great a mass oinfluences hostile to Individuality,that it is not easy to see how it ca

stand its ground. It will do so wit



increasing difficulty, unless theintelligent part of the public can bemade to feel its value—to see that iis good there should be differences,even though not for the better, even

though, as it may appear to them,some should be for the worse. If the

claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, whilemuch is still wanting to completethe enforced assimilation. It is onlyin the earlier stages that any standcan be successfully made agains

the encroachment. The demand thall h l h ll bl



all other people shall resembleourselves, grows by what it feedson. If resistance waits till life isreduced nearly to one uniform type,all deviations from that type will

come to be considered impious,immoral, even monstrous and

contrary to nature. Mankindspeedily become unable to conceivediversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] The Sphere and Duties of f h f



Government , from the German of Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp.

11-13.[12] Sterling's Essays .

[13] There is something both

contemptible and frightful in the sor of evidence on which, of late years,

any person can be judiciallydeclared unfit for the management

of his affairs; and after his death,his disposal of his property can beset aside, if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation—

which are charged on the propertyi lf All h i d il f hi



itself. All the minute details of hisdaily life are pried into, and

whatever is found which, seen

through the medium of the perceiving and describing faculties

of the lowest of the low, bears anappearance unlike absolute

commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, andoften with success; the jurors being

little, if at all, less vulgar andignorant than the witnesses; whilethe judges, with that extraordinary

want of knowledge of human natured lif hi h ti ll



and life which continuallyastonishes us in English lawyers,often help to mislead them. These

trials speak volumes as to the stateof feeling and opinion among the

vulgar with regard to human liberty.So far from setting any value on

individuality—so far fromrespecting the rights of eachindividual to act, in things

indifferent, as seems good to hisown judgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even

conceive that a person in a state of it d i h f d I



sanity can desire such freedom. Informer days, when it was proposedto burn atheists, charitable people

used to suggest putting them in amadhouse instead: it would be

nothing surprising nowadays werewe to see this done, and the doers

applauding themselves, because,instead of persecuting for religion,they had adopted so humane and

Christian a mode of treating theseunfortunates, not without a silent

satisfaction at their having thereby

obtained their deserts.



CHAPTER IV. OF



THE LIMITS TO THEAUTHORITY OFSOCIETY OVER THE

INDIVIDUAL.What, then, is the rightful limi

to the sovereignty of the individualover himself? Where does theauthority of society begin? Howmuch of human life should beassigned to individuality, and how

much to society?Each will receive its proper



Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more

particularly concerns it. To

individuality should belong the par of life in which it is chiefly the

individual that is interested; tosociety, the part which chiefly

interests society.Though society is not foundedon a contract, and though no good

purpose is answered by inventing acontract in order to deduce socialobligations from it, every one who

receives the protection of societyowes a return for the benefit and



owes a return for the benefit, andthe fact of living in society rendersit indispensable that each should be

bound to observe a certain line oconduct towards the rest. This

conduct consists, first, in noinjuring the interests of one another;

or rather certain interests which,either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to beconsidered as rights; and secondly,in each person's bearing his share(to be fixed on some equitable

principle) of the labours andsacrifices incurred for defending the



sacrifices incurred for defending thesociety or its members from injuryand molestation. These conditions

society is justified in enforcing, aall costs to those who endeavour to

withhold fulfilment. Nor is this allthat society may do. The acts of a

individual may be hurtful to others,or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going thelength of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender maythen be justly punished by opinio

though not by law. As soon as anypart of a person's conduct affects



part of a person s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,society has jurisdiction over it, and

the question whether the generalwelfare will or will not be

promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. Bu

there is no room for entertaining anysuch question when a person'sconduct affects the interests of no

persons besides himself, or needsnot affect them unless they like (allthe persons concerned being of full

age, and the ordinary amount ounderstanding) In all such cases



understanding). In all such casesthere should be perfect freedom,legal and social, to do the actio

and stand the consequences.It would be a grea

misunderstanding of this doctrine, tosuppose that it is one of selfis

indifference, which pretends thahuman beings have no business witeach other's conduct in life, and thathey should not concern themselvesabout the well-doing or well-beinof one another, unless their own

interest is involved. Instead of anydiminution, there is need of a grea



diminution, there is need of a greaincrease of disinterested exertion to

promote the good of others. Bu

disinterested benevolence can findother instruments to persuade

people to their good, than whipsand scourges, either of the literal or

the metaphorical sort. I am the las person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are onlysecond in importance, if evesecond, to the social. It is equallythe business of education to

cultivate both. But even educatioworks by conviction and persuasio



works by conviction and persuasioas well as by compulsion, and it is

by the former only that, when the

period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be

inculcated. Human beings owe toeach other help to distinguish the

better from the worse, andencouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should befor ever stimulating each other toincreased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction o

their feelings and aims towardswise instead of foolish, elevatin



,instead of degrading, objects andcontemplations. But neither one

person, nor any number of persons,is warranted in saying to another

human creature of ripe years, that heshall not do with his life for his

own benefit what he chooses to dowith it. He is the person mosinterested in his own well-being:the interest which any other person,except in cases of strong personalattachment, can have in it, is trifling,

compared with that which hehimself has; the interest whic



;society has in him individually(except as to his conduct to others)

is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his

own feelings and circumstances, themost ordinary man or woman has

means of knowledge immeasurablysurpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. Theinterference of society to overrulehis judgment and purposes in whaonly regards himself, must be

grounded on general presumptions;which may be altogether wrong, and



y g g,even if right, are as likely as not to

be misapplied to individual cases,

by persons no better acquaintedwith the circumstances of suc

cases than those are who look athem merely from without. In this

department, therefore, of humaaffairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct ohuman beings towards one another,it is necessary that general rulesshould for the most part be

observed, in order that people mayknow what they have to expect; bu



y pin each person's own concerns, hisindividual spontaneity is entitled to

free exercise. Considerations to aidhis judgment, exhortations to

strengthen his will, may be offeredto him, even obtruded on him, by

others; but he himself is the finaludge. All errors which he is likelyto commit against advice andwarning, are far outweighed by theevil of allowing others to constraihim to what they deem his good.

I do not mean that the feelingswith which a person is regarded by



p g yothers, ought not to be in any wayaffected by his self-regardin

qualities or deficiencies. This isneither possible nor desirable. If he

is eminent in any of the qualitieswhich conduce to his own good, he

is, so far, a proper object oadmiration. He is so much thenearer to the ideal perfection ohuman nature. If he is grosslydeficient in those qualities, asentiment the opposite of admiratio

will follow. There is a degree ofolly, and a degree of what may be



called (though the phrase is nounobjectionable) lowness or

depravation of taste, which, thougit cannot justify doing harm to the

person who manifests it, rendershim necessarily and properly a

subject of distaste, or, in extremecases, even of contempt: a persocould not have the oppositequalities in due strength withouentertaining these feelings. Thougdoing no wrong to any one, a perso

may so act as to compel us to judgehim, and feel to him, as a fool, or as



a being of an inferior order: andsince this judgment and feeling are a

fact which he would prefer toavoid, it is doing him a service to

warn him of it beforehand, as of anyother disagreeable consequence to

which he exposes himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good officewere much more freely renderedthan the common notions o

politeness at present permit, and ione person could honestly point ou

to another that he thinks him in fault,without being considered



unmannerly or presuming. We havea right, also, in various ways, to ac

upon our unfavourable opinion oany one, not to the oppression of his

individuality, but in the exercise oours. We are not bound, for

example, to seek his society; wehave a right to avoid it (though noto parade the avoidance), for wehave a right to choose the societymost acceptable to us. We have aright, and it may be our duty, to

caution others against him, if wethink his example or conversatio



likely to have a pernicious effect othose with whom he associates. We

may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, excep

those which tend to hisimprovement. In these various

modes a person may suffer verysevere penalties at the hands oothers, for faults which directlyconcern only himself; but he suffersthese penalties only in so far as theyare the natural, and, as it were, the

spontaneous consequences of thefaults themselves, not because they



are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person

who shows rashness, obstinacy,self-conceit—who cannot live

within moderate means—whocannot restrain himself from hurtful

indulgences—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those ofeeling and intellect—must expecto be lowered in the opinion oothers, and to have a less share otheir favourable sentiments; but o

this he has no right to complain,unless he has merited their favour



by special excellence in his socialrelations, and has thus established a

title to their good offices, which isnot affected by his demerits towards

himself.What I contend for is, that the

inconveniences which are strictlyinseparable from the unfavourableudgment of others, are the only

ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of hisconduct and character whic

concerns his own good, but whicdoes not affect the interests o



others in their relations with him.Acts injurious to others require a

totally different treatment.Encroachment on their rights;

infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his ow

rights; falsehood or duplicity idealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence frodefending them against injury— these are fit objects of moral

reprobation, and, in grave cases, omoral retribution and punishment.



And not only these acts, but thedispositions which lead to them, are

properly immoral, and fit subjectsof disapprobation which may rise to

abhorrence. Cruelty of disposition;malice and ill-nature; that most anti-

social and odious of all passions,envy; dissimulation and insincerity;irascibility on insufficient cause,and resentment disproportioned tothe provocation; the love odomineering over others; the desire

to engross more than one's share oadvantages (the πλεονεξ α [Greek:



pleonexia] of the Greeks); the pridewhich derives gratification from the

abasement of others; the egotiswhich thinks self and its concerns

more important than everything else,and decides all doubtful questions

in its own favour;—these are moralvices, and constitute a bad andodious moral character: unlike theself-regarding faults previouslymentioned, which are not properlyimmoralities, and to whatever pitc

they may be carried, do noconstitute wickedness. They may be



proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-

respect; but they are only a subjecof moral reprobation when they

involve a breach of duty to others,for whose sake the individual is

bound to have care for himself.What are called duties to ourselvesare not socially obligatory, unlesscircumstances render them at thesame time duties to others. The ter duty to oneself, when it means

anything more than prudence, meansself-respect or self-development;



and for none of these is any oneaccountable to his fellow-creatures,

because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held

accountable to them.The distinction between the lossof consideration which a persomay rightly incur by defect o

prudence or of personal dignity, andthe reprobation which is due to hifor an offence against the rights oothers, is not a merely nominal

distinction. It makes a vasdifference both in our feelings and



in our conduct towards him,whether he displeases us in things

in which we think we have a right tocontrol him, or in things in whic

we know that we have not. If hedispleases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloofrom a person as well as from athing that displeases us; but weshall not therefore feel called on tomake his life uncomfortable. Weshall reflect that he already bears,

or will bear, the whole penalty ohis error; if he spoils his life by

h ll f



mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still

further: instead of wishing to punishim, we shall rather endeavour to

alleviate his punishment, byshowing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to

bring upon him. He may be to us aobject of pity, perhaps of dislike,

but not of anger or resentment; weshall not treat him like an enemy osociety: the worst we shall thin

ourselves justified in doing isleaving him to himself, if we do noi f b l l b h i



interfere benevolently by showininterest or concern for him. It is far

otherwise if he has infringed therules necessary for the protection o

his fellow-creatures, individuallyor collectively. The evilconsequences of his acts do not thefall on himself, but on others; andsociety, as the protector of all itsmembers, must retaliate on him;must inflict pain on him for theexpress purpose of punishment, and

must take care that it be sufficientlysevere. In the one case, he is aff d b d



offender at our bar, and we arecalled on not only to sit in judgmen

on him, but, in one shape or another,to execute our own sentence: in the

other case, it is not our part toinflict any suffering on him, excepwhat may incidentally follow froour using the same liberty in theregulation of our own affairs, whicwe allow to him in his.

The distinction here pointed ou between the part of a person's life

which concerns only himself, andthat which concerns others, many

ill f d i H



persons will refuse to admit. How(it may be asked) can any part of the

conduct of a member of society be amatter of indifference to the other

members? No person is an entirelyisolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself,without mischief reaching at least tohis near connections, and often far

beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who

directly or indirectly derivedsupport from it, and usuallydi i i h b t l



diminishes, by a greater or lessamount, the general resources of the

community. If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he no

only brings evil upon all whodepended on him for any portion otheir happiness, but disqualifieshimself for rendering the serviceswhich he owes to his fellow-creatures generally; perhaps

becomes a burthen on their affectioor benevolence; and if such conduc

were very frequent, hardly anyoffence that is committed would

d t t f th g l



detract more from the general suof good. Finally, if by his vices or

follies a person does no direct har to others, he is nevertheless (it may

be said) injurious by his example;and ought to be compelled tocontrol himself, for the sake othose whom the sight or knowledgeof his conduct might corrupt or mislead.

And even (it will be added) ithe consequences of misconduc

could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society

to abandon to their own guidance



to abandon to their own guidancethose who are manifestly unfit for

it? If protection against themselvesis confessedly due to children and

persons under age, is not societyequally bound to afford it to personsof mature years who are equallyincapable of self-government? Igambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious tohappiness, and as great a hindrance

to improvement, as many or most othe acts prohibited by law, why (it

may be asked) should not law so



may be asked) should not law, sofar as is consistent wit

practicability and socialconvenience, endeavour to repress

these also? And as a supplement tothe unavoidable imperfections olaw, ought not opinion at least toorganise a powerful police againsthese vices, and visit rigidly witsocial penalties those who areknown to practise them? There is noquestion here (it may be said) abou

restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and

original experiments in living The



original experiments in living. Theonly things it is sought to preven

are things which have been triedand condemned from the beginnin

of the world until now; things whicexperience has shown not to beuseful or suitable to any person'sindividuality. There must be somelength of time and amount oexperience, after which a moral or

prudential truth may be regarded asestablished: and it is merely desired

to prevent generation after generation from falling over the

same precipice which has been fatal



same precipice which has been fatalto their predecessors.

I fully admit that the mischiewhich a person does to himself,

may seriously affect, both througtheir sympathies and their interests,those nearly connected with him,and in a minor degree, society alarge. When, by conduct of this sort,a person is led to violate a distincand assignable obligation to anyother person or persons, the case is

taken out of the self-regarding class,and becomes amenable to moral

disapprobation in the proper sense



disapprobation in the proper senseof the term. If, for example, a man,

through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to

pay his debts, or, having undertakenthe moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same causeincapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedlyreprobated, and might be justly

punished; but it is for the breach oduty to his family or creditors, no

for the extravagance. If theresources which ought to have bee

devoted to them had been diverted



devoted to them, had been divertedfrom them for the most pruden

investment, the moral culpabilitywould have been the same. George

Barnwell murdered his uncle to gemoney for his mistress, but if he haddone it to set himself up in business,he would equally have been hanged.Again, in the frequent case of a mawho causes grief to his family byaddiction to bad habits, he deservesreproach for his unkindness or

ingratitude; but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves

vicious if they are painful to those



vicious, if they are painful to thosewith whom he passes his life, or

who from personal ties aredependent on him for their comfort.

Whoever fails in the consideratiogenerally due to the interests andfeelings of others, not beincompelled by some moreimperative duty, or justified byallowable self-preference, is asubject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause o

it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may

have remotely led to it In like



have remotely led to it. In likemanner, when a person disables

himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance o

some definite duty incumbent ohim to the public, he is guilty of asocial offence. No person ought to

be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty.Whenever, in short, there is a

definite damage, or a definite ris

of damage, either to an individualor to the public, the case is take

out of the province of liberty, and



out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

But with regard to the merelycontingent, or, as it may be called,

constructive injury which a persocauses to society, by conduct whichneither violates any specific duty tothe public, nor occasions

perceptible hurt to any assignableindividual except himself; theinconvenience is one which society

can afford to bear, for the sake o

the greater good of human freedom.If grown persons are to be punished

for not taking proper care o



for not taking proper care othemselves, I would rather it were

for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them fro

impairing their capacity orendering to society benefits whicsociety does not pretend it has aright to exact. But I cannot consento argue the point as if society hadno means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard

of rational conduct, except waitin

till they do something irrational, andthen punishing them, legally or

morally, for it. Society has had



morally, for it. Society has hadabsolute power over them during all

the early portion of their existence:it has had the whole period o

childhood and nonage in which totry whether it could make thecapable of rational conduct in life.The existing generation is master

both of the training and the entirecircumstances of the generation tocome; it cannot indeed make the

perfectly wise and good, because i

is itself so lamentably deficient igoodness and wisdom; and its bes

efforts are not always, in individual



y ,cases, its most successful ones; bu

it is perfectly well able to make therising generation, as a whole, as

good as, and a little better than,itself. If society lets anyconsiderable number of its membersgrow up mere children, incapableof being acted on by rationalconsideration of distant motives,society has itself to blame for the

consequences. Armed not only with

all the powers of education, buwith the ascendency which the

authority of a received opinio



y palways exercises over the minds

who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the

natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those whoincur the distaste or the contempt othose who know them; let nosociety pretend that it needs,

besides all this, the power to issuecommands and enforce obedience i

the personal concerns o

individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the

decision ought to rest with those



gwho are to abide the consequences.

or is there anything which tendsmore to discredit and frustrate the

better means of influencing conduct,than a resort to the worse. If there be among those whom it isattempted to coerce into prudenceor temperance, any of the materialof which vigorous and independencharacters are made, they will

infallibly rebel against the yoke. No

such person will ever feel thaothers have a right to control him i

his concerns, such as they have to



y prevent him from injuring them i

theirs; and it easily comes to beconsidered a mark of spirit and

courage to fly in the face of sucusurped authority, and do withostentation the exact opposite owhat it enjoins; as in the fashion ogrossness which succeeded, in thetime of Charles II., to the fanaticalmoral intolerance of the Puritans.

With respect to what is said of the

necessity of protecting society frothe bad example set to others by the

vicious or the self-indulgent; it ish b d l h



gtrue that bad example may have a

pernicious effect, especially theexample of doing wrong to others

with impunity to the wrong-doer.But we are now speaking of conducwhich, while it does no wrong toothers, is supposed to do great har to the agent himself: and I do nosee how those who believe this, cathink otherwise than that the

example, on the whole, must be

more salutary than hurtful, since, iit displays the misconduct, i

displays also the painful or d di hi h i



degrading consequences which, i

the conduct is justly censured, mus be supposed to be in all or mos

cases attendant on it.But the strongest of all thearguments against the interferenceof the public with purely personalconduct, is that when it doesinterfere, the odds are that iinterferes wrongly, and in the wron

place. On questions of social

morality, of duty to others, theopinion of the public, that is, of a

overruling majority, though ofteni lik l b ill f



wrong, is likely to be still oftener

right; because on such questionsthey are only required to judge o

their own interests; of the manner iwhich some mode of conduct, iallowed to be practised, wouldaffect themselves. But the opinioof a similar majority, imposed as alaw on the minority, on questions oself-regarding conduct, is quite as

likely to be wrong as right; for i

these cases public opinion means, athe best, some people's opinion o

what is good or bad for other l hil ft it d



people; while very often it does no

even mean that; the public, with themost perfect indifference, passin

over the pleasure or convenience othose whose conduct they censure,and considering only their ow

preference. There are many whoconsider as an injury to themselvesany conduct which they have adistaste for, and resent it as an

outrage to their feelings; as a

religious bigot, when charged witdisregarding the religious feelings

of others, has been known to retor th t th di g d hi f li g b



that they disregard his feelings, by

persisting in their abominableworship or creed. But there is no

parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and thefeeling of another who is offendedat his holding it; no more tha

between the desire of a thief to takea purse, and the desire of the righowner to keep it. And a person's

taste is as much his own peculiar

concern as his opinion or his purse.It is easy for any one to imagine a

ideal public, which leaves thefreedom and choice of individuals



freedom and choice of individuals

in all uncertain matters undisturbed,and only requires them to abstai

from modes of conduct whicuniversal experience hascondemned. But where has there

been seen a public which set anysuch limit to its censorship? or when does the public trouble itselabout universal experience? In its

interferences with personal conduc

it is seldom thinking of anything buthe enormity of acting or feelin

differently from itself; and thisstandard of judgment thinly



standard of judgment, thinly

disguised, is held up to mankind asthe dictate of religion and

philosophy, by nine-tenths of allmoralists and speculative writers.These teach that things are righ

because they are right; because wefeel them to be so. They tell us tosearch in our own minds and heartsfor laws of conduct binding o

ourselves and on all others. Wha

can the poor public do but applythese instructions, and make their

own personal feelings of good andevil if they are tolerably unanimous



evil, if they are tolerably unanimous

in them, obligatory on all theworld?

The evil here pointed out is noone which exists only in theory; andit may perhaps be expected that Ishould specify the instances iwhich the public of this age andcountry improperly invests its ow

preferences with the character o

moral laws. I am not writing a

essay on the aberrations of existinmoral feeling. That is too weighty a

subject to be discussedparenthetically and by way o



parenthetically, and by way o

illustration. Yet examples arenecessary, to show that the

principle I maintain is of seriousand practical moment, and that I anot endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it isnot difficult to show, by abundantinstances, that to extend the boundsof what may be called moral police,

until it encroaches on the mos

unquestionably legitimate liberty othe individual, is one of the mos

universal of all human propensities.As a first instance consider the



As a first instance, consider the

antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons

whose religious opinions aredifferent from theirs, do not practisetheir religious observances,especially their religiousabstinences. To cite a rather trivialexample, nothing in the creed or

practice of Christians does more to

envenom the hatred of Mahomedans

against them, than the fact of their eating pork. There are few acts

which Christians and Europeansregard with more unaffected



regard with more unaffected

disgust, than Mussulmans regardthis particular mode of satisfyin

hunger. It is, in the first place, anoffence against their religion; buthis circumstance by no meansexplains either the degree or thekind of their repugnance; for winealso is forbidden by their religion,and to partake of it is by all

Mussulmans accounted wrong, bu

not disgusting. Their aversion to theflesh of the "unclean beast" is, o

the contrary, of that peculiar character resembling an instinctive



character, resembling an instinctive

antipathy, which the idea ouncleanness, when once ithoroughly sinks into the feelings,seems always to excite even ithose whose personal habits areanything but scrupulously cleanly,and of which the sentiment oreligious impurity, so intense in theHindoos, is a remarkable example.

Suppose now that in a people, o

whom the majority wereMussulmans, that majority should

insist upon not permitting pork to beeaten within the limits of the



eaten within the limits of the

country. This would be nothing newin Mahomedan countries. [14] Wouldit be a legitimate exercise of themoral authority of public opinion?and if not, why not? The practice isreally revolting to such a public.They also sincerely think that it isforbidden and abhorred by theDeity. Neither could the prohibition

be censured as religious

persecution. It might be religious iits origin, but it would not be

persecution for religion, sincenobody's religion makes it a duty to



nobody s religion makes it a duty to

eat pork. The only tenable ground ocondemnation would be, that witthe personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individualsthe public has no business tointerfere.

To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniardsconsider it a gross impiety,

offensive in the highest degree to

the Supreme Being, to worship hiin any other manner than the Roma

Catholic; and no other publicworship is lawful on Spanish soil.



p p

The people of all Southern Europelook upon a married clergy as noonly irreligious, but unchaste,indecent, gross, disgusting. What doProtestants think of these perfectlysincere feelings, and of the attempto enforce them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind areustified in interfering with eac

other's liberty in things which do

not concern the interests of others,on what principle is it possible

consistently to exclude these cases?or who can blame people for



p p

desiring to suppress what theyregard as a scandal in the sight oGod and man? No stronger case ca

be shown for prohibiting anythinwhich is regarded as a personalimmorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in theeyes of those who regard them asimpieties; and unless we are willin

to adopt the logic of persecutors,

and to say that we may persecuteothers because we are right, and

that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we mus



y g,

beware of admitting a principle owhich we should resent as a grossinjustice the application toourselves.

The preceding instances may beobjected to, although unreasonably,as drawn from contingenciesimpossible among us: opinion, ithis country, not being likely to

enforce abstinence from meats, or to

interfere with people for worshipping, and for either

marrying or not marrying, accordinto their creed or inclination. The



next example, however, shall betaken from an interference witliberty which we have by no means

passed all danger of. Wherever thePuritans have been sufficiently

powerful, as in New England, andin Great Britain at the time of theCommonwealth, they haveendeavoured, with considerable

success, to put down all public, and

nearly all private, amusements:especially music, dancing, public

games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the



theatre. There are still in thiscountry large bodies of persons bywhose notions of morality andreligion these recreations arecondemned; and those persons

belonging chiefly to the middleclass, who are the ascendant power in the present social and politicalcondition of the kingdom, it is by no

means impossible that persons o

these sentiments may at some timeor other command a majority i

Parliament. How will the remainin portion of the community like to



have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by thereligious and moral sentiments othe stricter Calvinists andMethodists? Would they not, withconsiderable peremptoriness,desire these intrusively piousmembers of society to mind their own business? This is precisely

what should be said to every

government and every public, whohave the pretension that no perso

shall enjoy any pleasure which theythink wrong. But if the principle o



the pretension be admitted, no onecan reasonably object to its beinacted on in the sense of themajority, or other preponderating

power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform tothe idea of a Christiacommonwealth, as understood bythe early settlers in New England, i

a religious profession similar to

theirs should ever succeed iregaining its lost ground, as

religions supposed to be declininhave so often been known to do.



To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realisedthan the one last mentioned. Thereis confessedly a strong tendency ithe modern world towards ademocratic constitution of society,accompanied or not by popular

political institutions. It is affirmedthat in the country where this

tendency is most completely

realised—where both society andthe government are most democratic

the United States—the feeling othe majority, to whom any



appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they cahope to rival is disagreeable,operates as a tolerably effectualsumptuary law, and that in many

parts of the Union it is reallydifficult for a person possessing avery large income, to find any modeof spending it, which will not incur

popular disapprobation. Thoug

such statements as these aredoubtless much exaggerated as a

representation of existing facts, thestate of things they describe is no



only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democraticfeeling, combined with the notiothat the public has a right to a vetoon the manner in which individualsshall spend their incomes. We haveonly further to suppose aconsiderable diffusion of Socialisopinions, and it may become

infamous in the eyes of the majority

to possess more property than somevery small amount, or any income

not earned by manual labour.Opinions similar in principle to



these, already prevail widelyamong the artisan class, and weigoppressively on those who areamenable to the opinion chiefly othat class, namely, its ownmembers. It is known that the badworkmen who form the majority othe operatives in many branches oindustry, are decidedly of opinion

that bad workmen ought to receive

the same wages as good, and that noone ought to be allowed, throug

piecework or otherwise, to earn bysuperior skill or industry more tha



others can without it. And theyemploy a moral police, whicoccasionally becomes a physicalone, to deter skilful workmen froreceiving, and employers frogiving, a larger remuneration for amore useful service. If the publichave any jurisdiction over privateconcerns, I cannot see that these

people are in fault, or that any

individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same

authority over his individualconduct, which the general public



asserts over people in general.But, without dwelling uposupposititious cases, there are, iour own day, gross usurpationsupon the liberty of private lifeactually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some

expectation of success, andopinions proposed which assert a

unlimited right in the public not only

to prohibit by law everything whicit thinks wrong, but in order to get a

what it thinks wrong, to prohibit anynumber of things which it admits to



be innocent.Under the name of preventinintemperance, the people of oneEnglish colony, and of nearly halthe United States, have beeinterdicted by law from making anyuse whatever of fermented drinks,

except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact,

as it is intended to be, prohibitio

of their use. And though theimpracticability of executing the

law has caused its repeal in severalof the States which had adopted it,



including the one from which iderives its name, an attempt hasnotwithstanding been commenced,and is prosecuted with considerablezeal by many of the professed

philanthropists, to agitate for asimilar law in this country. The

association, or "Alliance" as iterms itself, which has been formed

for this purpose, has acquired some

notoriety through the publicity giveto a correspondence between its

Secretary and one of the very fewEnglish public men who hold that a



politician's opinions ought to befounded on principles. LordStanley's share in thiscorrespondence is calculated tostrengthen the hopes already builon him, by those who know howrare such qualities as are

manifested in some of his publicappearances, unhappily are amon

those who figure in political life.

The organ of the Alliance, whowould "deeply deplore the

recognition of any principle whiccould be wrested to justify bigotry



and persecution," undertakes to point out the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides suc principles from those of theassociation. "All matters relating tothought, opinion, conscience,appear to me," he says, "to be

without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit,

relation, subject only to a

discretionary power vested in theState itself, and not in the

individual, to be within it." Nomention is made of a third class,



different from either of these, viz.acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to thisclass, surely, that the act of drinkingfermented liquors belongs. Sellinfermented liquors, however, istrading, and trading is a social act.

But the infringement complained ois not on the liberty of the seller, but

on that of the buyer and consumer;

since the State might just as wellforbid him to drink wine, as

purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The Secretary,



however, says, "I claim, as acitizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by thesocial act of another." And now for the definition of these "socialrights." "If anything invades mysocial rights, certainly the traffic i

strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by

constantly creating and stimulatin

social disorder. It invades my rightof equality, by deriving a profit

from the creation of a misery, I amtaxed to support. It impedes my



right to free moral and intellectualdevelopment, by surrounding my path with dangers, and byweakening and demoralisinsociety, from which I have a right toclaim mutual aid and intercourse."A theory of "social rights," the like

of which probably never beforefound its way into distinct language

being nothing short of this—tha

it is the absolute social right oevery individual, that every other

individual shall act in every respecexactly as he ought; that whosoever



fails thereof in the smalles particular, violates my social right,and entitles me to demand from thelegislature the removal of thegrievance. So monstrous a principleis far more dangerous than anysingle interference with liberty;

there is no violation of libertywhich it would not justify; i

acknowledges no right to any

freedom whatever, except perhapsto that of holding opinions in secret,

without ever disclosing them: for the moment an opinion which I



consider noxious, passes any one'slips, it invades all the "socialrights" attributed to me by theAlliance. The doctrine ascribes toall mankind a vested interest in eacother's moral, intellectual, and eve

physical perfection, to be defined

by each claimant according to hisown standard.

Another important example o

illegitimate interference with therightful liberty of the individual, no

simply threatened, but long sincecarried into triumphant effect, is



Sabbatarian legislation. Withoutdoubt, abstinence on one day in theweek, so far as the exigencies olife permit, from the usual dailyoccupation, though in no respecreligiously binding on any excepJews, is a highly beneficial custom.

And inasmuch as this custom canno be observed without a general

consent to that effect among the

industrious classes, therefore, in sofar as some persons by workin

may impose the same necessity oothers, it may be allowable and



right that the law should guaranteeto each, the observance by others othe custom, by suspending thegreater operations of industry on a

particular day. But this justification,grounded on the direct intereswhich others have in eac

individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-

chosen occupations in which a

person may think fit to employ hisleisure; nor does it hold good, in the

smallest degree, for legalrestrictions on amusements. It is



true that the amusement of some isthe day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to say the usefulrecreation, of many, is worth thelabour of a few, provided theoccupation is freely chosen, and ca

be freely resigned. The operatives

are perfectly right in thinking that iall worked on Sunday, seven days'

work would have to be given for si

days' wages: but so long as the greamass of employments are

suspended, the small number whofor the enjoyment of others mus



still work, obtain a proportionalincrease of earnings; and they arenot obliged to follow thoseoccupations, if they prefer leisure toemolument. If a further remedy issought, it might be found in theestablishment by custom of a

holiday on some other day of theweek for those particular classes o

persons. The only ground, therefore,

on which restrictions on Sundayamusements can be defended, mus

be that they are religiously wrong; amotive of legislation which never



can be too earnestly protestedagainst. "Deorum injuriæ Diiscuræ." It remains to be proved thasociety or any of its officers holds acommission from on high to avengeany supposed offence toOmnipotence, which is not also a

wrong to our fellow-creatures. Thenotion that it is one man's duty tha

another should be religious, was the

foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and

if admitted, would fully justifythem. Though the feeling whic



breaks out in the repeated attemptsto stop railway travelling oSunday, in the resistance to theopening of Museums, and the like,has not the cruelty of the old

persecutors, the state of mindindicated by it is fundamentally the

same. It is a determination not totolerate others in doing what is

permitted by their religion, because

it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It is a belie

that God not only abominates the acof the misbeliever, but will not hold



us guiltless if we leave hiunmolested.I cannot refrain from adding to

these examples of the little accouncommonly made of human liberty,the language of downrigh

persecution which breaks out fro

the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the

remarkable phenomenon o

Mormonism. Much might be said othe unexpected and instructive fact,

that an alleged new revelation, anda religion founded on it, the produc



of palpable imposture, not evesupported by the prestige oextraordinary qualities in itsfounder, is believed by hundreds othousands, and has been made thefoundation of a society, in the age onewspapers, railways, and the

electric telegraph. What hereconcerns us is, that this religion,

like other and better religions, has

its martyrs; that its prophet andfounder was, for his teaching, put to

death by a mob; that others of itsadherents lost their lives by the



same lawless violence; that theywere forcibly expelled, in a body,from the country in which they firsgrew up; while, now that they have

been chased into a solitary recess ithe midst of a desert, many in thiscountry openly declare that it would

be right (only that it is noconvenient) to send an expeditio

against them, and compel them by

force to conform to the opinions oother people. The article of the

Mormonite doctrine which is thechief provocative to the antipathy



which thus breaks through theordinary restraints of religioustolerance, is its sanction o

polygamy; which, though permittedto Mahomedans, and Hindoos, andChinese, seems to exciteunquenchable animosity whe

practised by persons who speaEnglish, and profess to be a kind o

Christians. No one has a deeper

disapprobation than I have of thisMormon institution; both for other

reasons, and because, far fro being in any way countenanced bythe principle of liberty, it is a direct



infraction of that principle, being amere riveting of the chains of onehalf of the community, and anemancipation of the other froreciprocity of obligation towardsthem. Still, it must be remembered

that this relation is as mucvoluntary on the part of the wome

concerned in it, and who may be

deemed the sufferers by it, as is thecase with any other form of the

marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, ithas its explanation in the commo



ideas and customs of the world,which teaching women to thinmarriage the one thing needful,make it intelligible that many awoman should prefer being one oseveral wives, to not being a wife

at all. Other countries are not askedto recognise such unions, or release

any portion of their inhabitants fro

their own laws on the score oMormonite opinions. But when the

dissentients have conceded to thehostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be



demanded; when they have left thecountries to which their doctrineswere unacceptable, and establishedthemselves in a remote corner of theearth, which they have been the firsto render habitable to human beings;

it is difficult to see on wha principles but those of tyranny they

can be prevented from living there

under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggressio

on other nations, and allow perfecfreedom of departure to those whoare dissatisfied with their ways. A



recent writer, in some respects oconsiderable merit, proposes (touse his own words), not a crusade,

but a civilizade , against this polygamous community, to put anend to what seems to him a

retrograde step in civilisation. Ialso appears so to me, but I am no

aware that any community has a

right to force another to becivilised. So long as the sufferers

by the bad law do not invokeassistance from other communities,I cannot admit that persons entirely



unconnected with them ought to stepin and require that a condition othings with which all who aredirectly interested appear to besatisfied, should be put an end to

because it is a scandal to persons

some thousands of miles distant,who have no part or concern in it.

Let them send missionaries, if they

please, to preach against it; and lethem, by any fair means (of whic

silencing the teachers is not one),oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people.



If civilisation has got the better o barbarism when barbarism had theworld to itself, it is too much to

profess to be afraid lest barbarism,after having been fairly got under,should revive and conquer

civilisation. A civilisation that canthus succumb to its vanquished

enemy, must first have become so

degenerate, that neither itsappointed priests and teachers, nor

anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a

l



civilisation receives notice to quit,the better. It can only go on from

bad to worse, until destroyed andregenerated (like the WesternEmpire) by energetic barbarians.

FOOTNOTE:

[14] The case of the Bombay

Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and

enterprising tribe, the descendantsof the Persian fire-worshippers,flying from their native countryb f h C li h i d i



before the Caliphs, arrived inWestern India, they were admitted

to toleration by the Hindoosovereigns, on condition of noteating beef. When those regions

afterwards fell under the dominion

of Mahomedan conquerors, theParsees obtained from them a

continuance of indulgence, on

condition of refraining from pork.What was at first obedience to

authority became a second nature,and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though no

i d b h i li i h



required by their religion, thedouble abstinence has had time togrow into a custom of their tribe;

and custom, in the East, is areligion.

CHAPTER V.APPLICATIONS.

The principles asserted in thesepages must be more generally



pages must be more generallyadmitted as the basis for discussio

of details, before a consistenapplication of them to all the

various departments of governmenand morals can be attempted wit

any prospect of advantage. The fewobservations I propose to make oquestions of detail, are designed toillustrate the principles, rather tha

to follow them out to their consequences. I offer, not so much

applications, as specimens oapplication; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the

i g d li it f th t



meaning and limits of the twomaxims which together form theentire doctrine of this Essay, and toassist the judgment in holding the

balance between them, in the caseswhere it appears doubtful which o

them is applicable to the case.The maxims are, first, that the

individual is not accountable to

society for his actions, in so far asthese concern the interests of no

person but himself. Advice,instruction, persuasion, andavoidance by other people ithought necessary by them for their



thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures bywhich society can justifiablyexpress its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct.Secondly, that for such actions as

are prejudicial to the interests oothers, the individual is accountable

and may be subjected either to

social or to legal punishments, isociety is of opinion that the one or

the other is requisite for its protection.In the first place, it must by no

means be supposed because



means be supposed, becausedamage, or probability of damage,to the interests of others, can aloneustify the interference of society,

that therefore it always does justifysuch interference. In many cases, a

individual, in pursuing a legitimateobject, necessarily and therefore

legitimately causes pain or loss to

others, or intercepts a good whicthey had a reasonable hope o

obtaining. Such oppositions ointerest between individuals oftearise from bad social institutions,but are unavoidable while those



but are unavoidable while thoseinstitutions last; and some would beunavoidable under any institutions.Whoever succeeds in aovercrowded profession, or in acompetitive examination; whoever

is preferred to another in anycontest for an object which bot

desire, reaps benefit from the loss

of others, from their wastedexertion and their disappointment.

But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest omankind, that persons should pursuetheir objects undeterred by this sor



their objects undeterred by this sor of consequences. In other words,society admits no rights, either legalor moral, in the disappointedcompetitors, to immunity from thiskind of suffering; and feels called

on to interfere, only when means osuccess have been employed whic

it is contrary to the general interes



processes of manufacture. But it isnow recognised, though not till after

a long struggle, that both thecheapness and the good quality ocommodities are most effectuallyprovided for by leaving the



provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free,under the sole check of equalfreedom to the buyers for supplyin

themselves elsewhere. This is theso-called doctrine of Free Trade,

which rests on grounds differenfrom, though equally solid with, the

principle of individual liberty

asserted in this Essay. Restrictionson trade, or on production for

purposes of trade, are indeedrestraints; and all restraint, quârestraint, is an evil: but therestraints in question affect only tha



restraints in question affect only tha part of conduct which society iscompetent to restrain, and arewrong solely because they do no

really produce the results which iis desired to produce by them. As

the principle of individual liberty isnot involved in the doctrine of Free

Trade, so neither is it in most of the

questions which arise respecting thelimits of that doctrine: as for

example, what amount of publiccontrol is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration;how far sanitary precautions, or



how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect work-

people employed in dangerousoccupations, should be enforced o

employers. Such questions involveconsiderations of liberty, only in so

far as leaving people to themselvesis always better, cæteris paribus ,

than controlling them: but that they

may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle

undeniable. On the other hand, thereare questions relating tointerference with trade, which areessentially questions of liberty; suc



essentially questions of liberty; sucas the Maine Law, already touchedupon; the prohibition of theimportation of opium into China; the

restriction of the sale of poisons; allcases, in short, where the object o

the interference is to make iimpossible or difficult to obtain a

particular commodity. These

interferences are objectionable, noas infringements on the liberty of the

producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.One of these examples, that o

the sale of poisons, opens a new



p , pquestion; the proper limits of whamay be called the functions o

police; how far liberty may

legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident.

It is one of the undisputed functionsof government to take precautions

against crime before it has bee

committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive

function of government, however, isfar more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly



p y ; yany part of the legitimate freedom oaction of a human being whicwould not admit of bein

represented, and fairly too, asincreasing the facilities for some

form or other of delinquency.evertheless, if a public authority,

or even a private person, sees any

one evidently preparing to commit acrime, they are not bound to look o

inactive until the crime iscommitted, but may interfere to prevent it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose



g y p pexcept the commission of murder, itwould be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may,

however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes,

and restrictions cannot be imposedin the one case without operating i

the other. Again, it is a proper

office of public authority to guardagainst accidents. If either a public

officer or any one else saw a persoattempting to cross a bridge whichad been ascertained to be unsafe,and there were no time to warn hi



of his danger, they might seize himand turn him back, without any realinfringement of his liberty; for

liberty consists in doing what onedesires, and he does not desire to

fall into the river. Nevertheless,when there is not a certainty, but

only a danger of mischief, no one

but the person himself can judge othe sufficiency of the motive whic

may prompt him to incur the risk: ithis case, therefore (unless he is achild, or delirious, or in some stateof excitement or absorptio



incompatible with the full use of thereflecting faculty), he ought, Iconceive, to be only warned of the

danger; not forcibly prevented froexposing himself to it. Similar

considerations, applied to such aquestion as the sale of poisons, may

enable us to decide which amon

the possible modes of regulation areor are not contrary to principle.

Such a precaution, for example, asthat of labelling the drug with someword expressive of its dangerouscharacter, may be enforced without



violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that thething he possesses has poisonous

qualities. But to require in all casesthe certificate of a medical

practitioner, would make itsometimes impossible, always

expensive, to obtain the article for

legitimate uses. The only modeapparent to me, in which difficulties

may be thrown in the way of crimecommitted through this means,without any infringement, worttaking into account, upon the liberty



of those who desire the poisonoussubstance for other purposes,consists in providing what, in the

apt language of Bentham, is called"preappointed evidence." This

provision is familiar to every one ithe case of contracts. It is usual and

right that the law, when a contract is

entered into, should require as thecondition of its enforcin

performance, that certaiformalities should be observed,such as signatures, attestation owitnesses, and the like, in order tha



in case of subsequent dispute, theremay be evidence to prove that thecontract was really entered into,

and that there was nothing in thecircumstances to render it legally

invalid: the effect being, to throwgreat obstacles in the way o

fictitious contracts, or contracts

made in circumstances which, iknown, would destroy their

validity. Precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the saleof articles adapted to be instrumentsof crime. The seller, for example,



might be required to enter into aregister the exact time of thetransaction, the name and address o

the buyer, the precise quality andquantity sold; to ask the purpose for

which it was wanted, and record theanswer he received. When there

was no medical prescription, the

presence of some third person migh be required, to bring home the fac

to the purchaser, in case thereshould afterwards be reason to believe that the article had beeapplied to criminal purposes. Suc



regulations would in general be nomaterial impediment to obtaininthe article, but a very considerable

one to making an improper use of iwithout detection.

The right inherent in society, toward off crimes against itself by

antecedent precautions, suggests the

obvious limitations to the maxim,that purely self-regardin

misconduct cannot properly bemeddled with in the way o prevention or punishment.Drunkenness, for example, i



ordinary cases, is not a fit subjecfor legislative interference; but Ishould deem it perfectly legitimate

that a person, who had once beeconvicted of any act of violence to

others under the influence of drink,should be placed under a special

legal restriction, personal to

himself; that if he were afterwardsfound drunk, he should be liable to

a penalty, and that if when in thatstate he committed another offence,the punishment to which he would

be liable for that other offence



should be increased in severity. Themaking himself drunk, in a persowhom drunkenness excites to do

harm to others, is a crime againsothers. So, again, idleness, excep

in a person receiving support frothe public, or except when i

constitutes a breach of contract,

cannot without tyranny be made asubject of legal punishment; but i

either from idleness or from anyother avoidable cause, a man failsto perform his legal duties to others,as for instance to support hish ld f



children, it is no tyranny to forcehim to fulfil that obligation, bycompulsory labour, if no other

means are available.Again, there are many acts

which, being directly injurious onlyto the agents themselves, ought no

to be legally interdicted, but which,

if done publicly, are a violation ogood manners and coming thus

within the category of offencesagainst others may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offencesagainst decency; on which it is

d ll h h



unnecessary to dwell, the rather asthey are only connected indirectlywith our subject, the objection to

publicity being equally strong in thecase of many actions not i

themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so.

There is another question to

which an answer must be found,consistent with the principles whichave been laid down. In cases o

personal conduct supposed to be blamable, but which respect for liberty precludes society fro

i i hi b h



preventing or punishing, because theevil directly resulting falls whollyon the agent; what the agent is free

to do, ought other persons to beequally free to counsel or instigate?

This question is not free frodifficulty. The case of a person who

solicits another to do an act, is no

strictly a case of self-regardinconduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a socialact, and may therefore, like actionsin general which affect others, besupposed amenable to social

t l B t littl fl ti



control. But a little reflectiocorrects the first impression, byshowing that if the case is no

strictly within the definition oindividual liberty, yet the reasons

on which the principle of individualliberty is grounded, are applicable

to it. If people must be allowed, i

whatever concerns only themselves,to act as seems best to themselves atheir own peril, they must equally

be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; toexchange opinions, and give and

i gg ti Wh t it i



receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permittedto advise to do. The question is

doubtful, only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his

advice; when he makes it hisoccupation, for subsistence or

pecuniary gain, to promote wha

society and the state consider to bean evil. Then, indeed, a newelement of complication isintroduced; namely, the existence oclasses of persons with an interesopposed to what is considered asthe public weal and whose mode o



the public weal, and whose mode oliving is grounded on thecounteraction of it. Ought this to be

interfered with, or not? Fornication,for example, must be tolerated, and

so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to

keep a gambling-house? The case is

one of those which lie on the exac boundary line between two principles, and it is not at onceapparent to which of the two i

properly belongs. There arearguments on both sides. On theside of toleration it may be said



side of toleration it may be said,that the fact of following anything asan occupation, and living or

profiting by the practice of it,cannot make that criminal whic

would otherwise be admissible; thathe act should either be consistently

permitted or consistently

prohibited; that if the principleswhich we have hitherto defendedare true, society has no business, associety, to decide anything to bewrong which concerns only theindividual; that it cannot go beyonddissuasion and that one perso



dissuasion, and that one persoshould be as free to persuade, asanother to dissuade. In opposition to

this it may be contended, thaalthough the public, or the State, are

not warranted in authoritativelydeciding, for purposes of repressio

or punishment, that such or suc

conduct affecting only the interestsof the individual is good or bad,they are fully justified in assuming,if they regard it as bad, that its

being so or not is at least adisputable question: That, this beinsupposed they cannot be actin



supposed, they cannot be actinwrongly in endeavouring to excludethe influence of solicitations whic

are not disinterested, of instigatorswho cannot possibly be impartial—

who have a direct personal intereson one side, and that side the one

which the State believes to be

wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objectsonly. There can surely, it may beurged, be nothing lost, no sacrificeof good, by so ordering matters tha

persons shall make their election,either wisely or foolishly on their



either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possiblefrom the arts of persons who

stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own.

Thus (it may be said) though thestatutes respecting unlawful games

are utterly indefensible—though all

persons should be free to gamble itheir own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting established

by their own subscriptions, andopen only to the members and their visitors—yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted It is



houses should not be permitted. It istrue that the prohibition is never effectual, and that whatever amoun

of tyrannical power is given to the police, gambling-houses can always

be maintained under other pretences; but they may be

compelled to conduct their

operations with a certain degree osecrecy and mystery, so that nobodyknows anything about them but thosewho seek them; and more than this,society ought not to aim at. There isconsiderable force in thesearguments; I will not venture to



arguments; I will not venture todecide whether they are sufficient toustify the moral anomaly o

punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed

to go free; or fining or imprisoninthe procurer, but not the fornicator,the gambling-house keeper, but not

the gambler. Still less ought thecommon operations of buying andselling to be interfered with oanalogous grounds. Almost everyarticle which is bought and soldmay be used in excess, and thesellers have a pecuniary interest i



sellers have a pecuniary interest iencouraging that excess; but noargument can be founded on this, i

favour, for instance, of the MaineLaw; because the class of dealers i

strong drinks, though interested itheir abuse, are indispensablyrequired for the sake of their

legitimate use. The interest,however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a realevil, and justifies the State iimposing restrictions and requiringuarantees, which but for thaustification would be infringements



ustification would be infringementsof legitimate liberty.

A further question is, whether

the State, while it permits, shouldnevertheless indirectly discourage

conduct which it deems contrary tothe best interests of the agent;whether, for example, it should take

measures to render the means odrunkenness more costly, or add tothe difficulty of procuring them, bylimiting the number of the places osale. On this as on most other

practical questions, manydistinctions require to be made. To



qtax stimulants for the sole purposeof making them more difficult to be

obtained, is a measure differinonly in degree from their entire

prohibition; and would beustifiable only if that wereustifiable. Every increase of cost is

a prohibition, to those whose meansdo not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice o pleasures, and their mode oexpending their income, after



p g ,satisfying their legal and moralobligations to the State and to

individuals, are their own concern,and must rest with their ow

udgment. These considerations mayseem at first sight to condemn theselection of stimulants as special



can best spare; and à fortiori , toselect in preference those of whicit deems the use, beyond a verymoderate quantity, to be positivelyinjurious. Taxation, therefore, ostimulants, up to the point whic

produces the largest amount o



p g

revenue (supposing that the Stateneeds all the revenue which i

yields) is not only admissible, buto be approved of.

The question of making the saleof these commodities a more or lessexclusive privilege, must be

answered differently, according tothe purposes to which the restrictiois intended to be subservient. All

places of public resort require therestraint of a police, and places othis kind peculiarly, becauseoffences against society are



especially apt to originate there. Iis, therefore, fit to confine the

power of selling these commodities(at least for consumption on the

spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability oconduct; to make such regulations



spirit-houses, for the express purpose of rendering them moredifficult of access, and diminishinthe occasions of temptation, noonly exposes all to ainconvenience because there aresome by whom the facility would be



abused, but is suited only to a stateof society in which the labourin

classes are avowedly treated aschildren or savages, and placed

under an education of restraint, to fithem for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is no

the principle on which the labourinclasses are professedly governed iany free country; and no person whosets due value on freedom will givehis adhesion to their being sogoverned, unless after all effortshave been exhausted to educate



them for freedom and govern theas freemen, and it has bee

definitively proved that they caonly be governed as children. The

bare statement of the alternativeshows the absurdity of supposinthat such efforts have been made i

any case which needs be consideredhere. It is only because theinstitutions of this country are amass of inconsistencies, that thingsfind admittance into our practicewhich belong to the system odespotic, or what is called paternal,



government, while the generalfreedom of our institutions

precludes the exercise of the amounof control necessary to render the

restraint of any real efficacy as amoral education.It was pointed out in an early

part of this Essay, that the liberty othe individual, in things wherein theindividual is alone concerned,implies a corresponding liberty iany number of individuals toregulate by mutual agreement sucthings as regard them jointly, and



regard no persons but themselves.This question presents no difficulty,

so long as the will of all the personsimplicated remains unaltered; bu

since that will may change, it isoften necessary, even in things inwhich they alone are concerned,

that they should enter intoengagements with one another; andwhen they do, it is fit, as a generalrule, that those engagements should

be kept. Yet in the laws, probably,of every country, this general rulehas some exceptions. Not only



persons are not held to engagementswhich violate the rights of third

parties, but it is sometimesconsidered a sufficient reason for

releasing them from an engagement,that it is injurious to themselves. Ithis and most other civilised

countries, for example, aengagement by which a persoshould sell himself, or allowhimself to be sold, as a slave,would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion.The ground for thus limiting his



power of voluntarily disposing ohis own lot in life, is apparent, and

is very clearly seen in this extremecase. The reason for not interfering,

unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, isconsideration for his liberty. His

voluntary choice is evidence thawhat he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, andhis good is on the whole bes

provided for by allowing him totake his own means of pursuing it.But by selling himself for a slave,



he abdicates his liberty; he foregoesany future use of it, beyond tha

single act. He therefore defeats, ihis own case, the very purpose

which is the justification oallowing him to dispose of himself.He is no longer free; but is

thenceforth in a position which hasno longer the presumption in itsfavour, that would be afforded byhis voluntarily remaining in it. The

principle of freedom cannot requirethat he should be free not to be free.It is not freedom, to be allowed to



alienate his freedom. Thesereasons, the force of which is so

conspicuous in this peculiar case,are evidently of far wider

application; yet a limit iseverywhere set to them by thenecessities of life, whic

continually require, not indeed thawe should resign our freedom, buthat we should consent to this andthe other limitation of it. The

principle, however, which demandsuncontrolled freedom of action iall that concerns only the agents



themselves, requires that those whohave become bound to one another,

in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one

another from the engagement: andeven without such voluntaryrelease, there are perhaps no

contracts or engagements, excepthose that relate to money or money's worth, of which one caventure to say that there ought to beno liberty whatever of retractation.Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, inthe excellent essay from which I



have already quoted, states it as hisconviction, that engagements whic

involve personal relations or services, should never be legally

binding beyond a limited duratioof time; and that the most importanof these engagements, marriage,

having the peculiarity that itsobjects are frustrated unless thefeelings of both the parties are iharmony with it, should requirenothing more than the declared willof either party to dissolve it. Thissubject is too important, and too



complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch on it only

so far as is necessary for purposesof illustration. If the conciseness

and generality of Baron Humboldt'sdissertation had not obliged him ithis instance to content himself wit

enunciating his conclusion withoudiscussing the premises, he woulddoubtless have recognised that thequestion cannot be decided ogrounds so simple as those to whiche confines himself. When a person,either by express promise or by



conduct, has encouraged another torely upon his continuing to act in a

certain way—to build expectationsand calculations, and stake any par

of his plan of life upon thasupposition, a new series of moralobligations arises on his par

towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but canno be ignored. And again, if therelation between two contractin

parties has been followed byconsequences to others; if it has

placed third parties in any peculiar



position, or, as in the case omarriage, has even called third

parties into existence, obligationsarise on the part of both the

contracting parties towards thosethird persons, the fulfilment owhich, or at all events the mode o

fulfilment, must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption othe relation between the original

parties to the contract. It does nofollow, nor can I admit, that theseobligations extend to requiring thefulfilment of the contract at all costs



to the happiness of the reluctan party; but they are a necessary

element in the question; and even if,as Von Humboldt maintains, they

ought to make no difference in thelegal freedom of the parties torelease themselves from the

engagement (and I also hold thathey ought not to make muchdifference), they necessarily make agreat difference in the moral freedom. A person is bound to takeall these circumstances intoaccount, before resolving on a step



which may affect such importaninterests of others; and if he does

not allow proper weight to thoseinterests, he is morally responsible

for the wrong. I have made theseobvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle

of liberty, and not because they areat all needed on the particular question, which, on the contrary, isusually discussed as if the interesof children was everything, and thaof grown persons nothing.

I have already observed that,

i h b f



owing to the absence of anyrecognised general principles,

liberty is often granted where ishould be withheld, as well as

withheld where it should begranted; and one of the cases iwhich, in the modern Europea

world, the sentiment of liberty is thestrongest, is a case where, in myview, it is altogether misplaced. A

person should be free to do as helikes in his own concerns; but heought not to be free to do as he likesin acting for another, under the

h h ff i f h



pretext that the affairs of another arehis own affairs. The State, while i

respects the liberty of each in whaspecially regards himself, is bound

to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which iallows him to possess over others.

This obligation is almost entirelydisregarded in the case of the familyrelations, a case, in its direcinfluence on human happiness, moreimportant than all others taketogether. The almost despotic

power of husbands over wives need

b l d h b



not be enlarged upon here becausenothing more is needed for the

complete removal of the evil, thathat wives should have the same

rights, and should receive the protection of law in the samemanner, as all other persons; and

because, on this subject, thedefenders of established injusticedo not avail themselves of the pleaof liberty, but stand forth openly asthe champions of power. It is in thecase of children, that misappliednotions of liberty are a real obstacle

t th f lfil t b th St t f it



to the fulfilment by the State of itsduties. One would almost think tha

a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically,

a part of himself, so jealous isopinion of the smallest interferenceof law with his absolute and

exclusive control over them; moreealous than of almost any

interference with his own freedoof action: so much less do thegenerality of mankind value libertythan power. Consider, for example,the case of education. Is it no

l t lf id t i th t th



almost a self-evident axiom, that theState should require and compel the

education, up to a certain standard,of every human being who is bor

its citizen? Yet who is there that isnot afraid to recognise and asser this truth? Hardly any one indeed

will deny that it is one of the mossacred duties of the parents (or, aslaw and usage now stand, thefather), after summoning a huma

being into the world, to give to tha being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life

towards others and towards



towards others and towardshimself. But while this is

unanimously declared to be thefather's duty, scarcely anybody, in

this country, will bear to hear oobliging him to perform it. Insteadof his being required to make any

exertion or sacrifice for securineducation to the child, it is left tohis choice to accept it or not when iis provided gratis! It still remainsunrecognised, that to bring a childinto existence without a fair

prospect of being able, not only to

provide food for its body but



provide food for its body, butinstruction and training for its mind,

is a moral crime, both against theunfortunate offspring and agains

society; and that if the parent doesnot fulfil this obligation, the Stateought to see it fulfilled, at the

charge, as far as possible, of the parent.

Were the duty of enforcinguniversal education once admitted,there would be an end to thedifficulties about what the Stateshould teach, and how it should

teach which now convert the



teach, which now convert thesubject into a mere battle-field for

sects and parties, causing the timeand labour which should have bee

spent in educating, to be wasted iquarrelling about education. If thegovernment would make up its mind

t o require for every child a goodeducation, it might save itself thetrouble of providing one. It mighleave to parents to obtain theeducation where and how they

pleased, and content itself withelping to pay the school fees of the

poorer class of children and



poorer class of children, anddefraying the entire school expenses

of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections whic

are urged with reason against Stateeducation, do not apply to theenforcement of education by the

State, but to the State's taking upoitself to direct that education; whicis a totally different thing. That thewhole or any large part of theeducation of the people should be iState hands, I go as far as any one ideprecating. All that has been said

of the importance of individuality o



of the importance of individuality ocharacter, and diversity in opinions

and modes of conduct, involves, asof the same unspeakable

importance, diversity of education.A general State education is a merecontrivance for moulding people to

be exactly like one another; and asthe mould in which it casts them isthat which pleases the predominan

power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, aaristocracy, or the majority of theexisting generation, in proportion as

it is efficient and successful i



it is efficient and successful, iestablishes a despotism over the

mind, leading by natural tendency toone over the body. An educationestablished and controlled by theState, should only exist, if it exist aall, as one among many competin

experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, tokeep the others up to a certaistandard of excellence. Unless,indeed, when society in general isin so backward a state that it couldnot or would not provide for itsel

any proper institutions of education



any proper institutions of education,unless the government undertook the

task; then, indeed, the governmenmay, as the less of two great evils,take upon itself the business oschools and universities, as it maythat of joint stock companies, whe

private enterprise, in a shape fittedfor undertaking great works oindustry, does not exist in thecountry. But in general, if thecountry contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provideeducation under governmen

auspices the same persons would



auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give a

equally good education on thevoluntary principle, under theassurance of remuneration afforded

by a law rendering educatiocompulsory, combined with State

aid to those unable to defray theexpense.

The instrument for enforcing thelaw could be no other than publicexaminations, extending to allchildren, and beginning at an earlyage. An age might be fixed at which

every child must be examined to



every child must be examined, toascertain if he (or she) is able to

read. If a child proves unable, thefather, unless he has some sufficientground of excuse, might besubjected to a moderate fine, to beworked out, if necessary, by his

labour, and the child might be put toschool at his expense. Once ievery year the examination should

be renewed, with a graduallyextending range of subjects, so as tomake the universal acquisition, andwhat is more, retention, of a certai

minimum of general knowledge,



minimum of general knowledge,virtually compulsory. Beyond that

minimum, there should be voluntaryexaminations on all subjects, awhich all who come up to a certaistandard of proficiency might claia certificate. To prevent the State

from exercising, through thesearrangements, an improper influence over opinion, theknowledge required for passing aexamination (beyond the merelyinstrumental parts of knowledge,such as languages and their use)

should, even in the higher class o



should, even in the higher class oexaminations, be confined to facts

and positive science exclusively.The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics,should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the

matter of fact that such and such aopinion is held, on such grounds, bysuch authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, therising generation would be noworse off in regard to all disputedtruths, than they are at present; they

would be brought up either



g pchurchmen or dissenters as they

now are, the state merely takincare that they should be instructedchurchmen, or instructed dissenters.There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, i

their parents chose, at the sameschools where they were taughother things. All attempts by thestate to bias the conclusions of itscitizens on disputed subjects, are

evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a perso

possesses the knowledge, requisitek h l



p g , qto make his conclusions, on any

given subject, worth attending to. Astudent of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand aexamination both in Locke and iKant, whichever of the two he takes

up with, or even if with neither: andthere is no reasonable objection toexamining an atheist in theevidences of Christianity, providedhe is not required to profess a belie

in them. The examinations,however, in the higher branches o

knowledge should, I conceive, bei l l I ld b



g , ,entirely voluntary. It would be

giving too dangerous a power togovernments, were they allowed toexclude any one from professions,even from the profession of teacher,for alleged deficiency o

qualifications: and I think, witWilhelm von Humboldt, thatdegrees, or other public certificatesof scientific or professionalacquirements, should be given to all

who present themselves for examination, and stand the test; bu

that such certificates should confer d i



no advantage over competitors,

other than the weight which may beattached to their testimony by publicopinion.

It is not in the matter oeducation only, that misplaced

notions of liberty prevent moralobligations on the part of parentsfrom being recognised, and legalobligations from being imposed,where there are the stronges

grounds for the former always, andin many cases for the latter also.

The fact itself, of causing thei t f h b i i



gexistence of a human being, is one

of the most responsible actions ithe range of human life. Toundertake this responsibility—to

bestow a life which may be either acurse or a blessing—unless the

being on whom it is to be bestowedwill have at least the ordinarychances of a desirable existence, isa crime against that being. And in acountry either over-peopled, or

threatened with being so, to producechildren, beyond a very small

number, with the effect of reducinth d f l b b th i



the reward of labour by their

competition, is a serious offenceagainst all who live by theremuneration of their labour. Thelaws which, in many countries othe Continent, forbid marriage

unless the parties can show that theyhave the means of supporting afamily, do not exceed the legitimate

powers of the state: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a

question mainly dependent on localcircumstances and feelings), they

are not objectionable as violationsof liberty Such laws are



of liberty. Such laws are

interferences of the state to prohibia mischievous act—an act injuriousto others, which ought to be asubject of reprobation, and socialstigma, even when it is not deemed

expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to realinfringements of the freedom of theindividual, in things which concer

only himself, would repel theattempt to put any restraint upon his

inclinations when the consequenceof their indulgence is a life or



of their indulgence is a life, or

lives, of wretchedness anddepravity to the offspring, witmanifold evils to those sufficientlywithin reach to be in any wayaffected by their actions. When we

compare the strange respect omankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, wemight imagine that a man had aindispensable right to do harm to

others, and no right at all to pleasehimself without giving pain to any

one.I have reserved for the las



I have reserved for the las

place a large class of questionsrespecting the limits of governmeninterference, which, though closelyconnected with the subject of thisEssay, do not, in strictness, belong

to it. These are cases in which thereasons against interference do noturn upon the principle of liberty:the question is not about restraininthe actions of individuals, but abou

helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause

to be done, something for their benefit instead of leaving it to be



benefit, instead of leaving it to be

done by themselves, individually,or in voluntary combination.The objections to governmen

interference, when it is not such asto involve infringement of liberty,

may be of three kinds.The first is, when the thing to be

done is likely to be better done byindividuals than by the government.Speaking generally, there is no one

so fit to conduct any business, or todetermine how or by whom it shall

be conducted, as those who arepersonally interested in it This



personally interested in it. This

principle condemns theinterferences, once so common, othe legislature, or the officers ogovernment, with the ordinary

processes of industry. But this part

of the subject has been sufficientlyenlarged upon by politicaleconomists, and is not particularlyrelated to the principles of thisEssay.

The second objection is morenearly allied to our subject. In many

cases, though individuals may nodo the particular thing so well o



do the particular thing so well, o

the average, as the officers ogovernment, it is neverthelessdesirable that it should be done bythem, rather than by the government,as a means to their own mental

education—a mode of strengthenintheir active faculties, exercisintheir judgment, and giving them afamiliar knowledge of the subjectswith which they are thus left to deal.

This is a principal, though not thesole, recommendation of jury trial

(in cases not political); of free andpopular local and municipal



popular local and municipal

institutions; of the conduct oindustrial and philanthropicenterprises by voluntaryassociations. These are noquestions of liberty, and are

connected with that subject only byremote tendencies; but they arequestions of development. I

belongs to a different occasion frothe present to dwell on these things

as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar trainin

of a citizen, the practical part of thepolitical education of a free people,



political education of a free people,

taking them out of the narrow circleof personal and family selfishness,and accustoming them to thecomprehension of joint interests, themanagement of joint concerns—

habituating them to act from publicor semi-public motives, and guidetheir conduct by aims which uniteinstead of isolating them from oneanother. Without these habits and

powers, a free constitution caneither be worked nor preserved, as

is exemplified by the too-oftetransitory nature of political



transitory nature of political

freedom in countries where it doesnot rest upon a sufficient basis olocal liberties. The management o

purely local business by thelocalities, and of the grea

enterprises of industry by the unioof those who voluntarily supply the

pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantageswhich have been set forth in this

Essay as belonging to individualityof development, and diversity o

modes of action. Governmenoperations tend to be everywhere



p y

alike. With individuals andvoluntary associations, on thecontrary, there are variedexperiments, and endless diversityof experience. What the State ca

usefully do, is to make itself acentral depository, and activecirculator and diffuser, of theexperience resulting from manytrials. Its business is to enable eac

experimentalist to benefit by theexperiments of others, instead o

tolerating no experiments but itsown.



The third, and most cogenreason for restricting theinterference of government, is thegreat evil of adding unnecessarily toits power. Every function

superadded to those alreadyexercised by the government, causesits influence over hopes and fears to

be more widely diffused, andconverts, more and more, the active

and ambitious part of the public intohangers-on of the government, or o

some party which aims at becominthe government. If the roads, the



g ,

railways, the banks, the insuranceoffices, the great joint-stoccompanies, the universities, and the

public charities, were all of the branches of the government; if, i

addition, the municipal corporationsand local boards, with all that nowdevolves on them, becamedepartments of the centraladministration; if the employés o

all these different enterprises wereappointed and paid by the

government, and looked to thegovernment for every rise in life;



g y

not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of thelegislature would make this or anyother country free otherwise than iname. And the evil would be

greater, the more efficiently andscientifically the administrativemachinery was constructed—themore skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands

and heads with which to work it. IEngland it has of late bee

proposed that all the members of thecivil service of government should



be selected by competitiveexamination, to obtain for thoseemployments the most intelligenand instructed persons procurable;and much has been said and writte

for and against this proposal. Oneof the arguments most insisted on byits opponents, is that the occupatioof a permanent official servant othe State does not hold out sufficien

prospects of emolument andimportance to attract the highes

talents, which will always be ableto find a more inviting career in the



professions, or in the service ocompanies and other public bodies.One would not have been surprisedif this argument had been used bythe friends of the proposition, as a

answer to its principal difficulty.Coming from the opponents it isstrange enough. What is urged as aobjection is the safety-valve of the

proposed system. If indeed all the

high talent of the country could bedrawn into the service of the

government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well



inspire uneasiness. If every part othe business of society whicrequired organised concert, or largeand comprehensive views, were ithe hands of the government, and i

government offices wereuniversally filled by the ablest men,all the enlarged culture and

practised intelligence in the country,except the purely speculative,

would be concentrated in anumerous bureaucracy, to whom

alone the rest of the communitywould look for all things: the



multitude for direction and dictatioin all they had to do; the able andaspiring for personal advancement.To be admitted into the ranks of this

bureaucracy, and when admitted, to

rise therein, would be the soleobjects of ambition. Under thisrégime, not only is the outside

public ill-qualified, for want o practical experience, to criticise or

check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the

accidents of despotic or the naturalworking of popular institutions



occasionally raise to the summit aruler or rulers of reformininclinations, no reform can beeffected which is contrary to theinterest of the bureaucracy. Such is

the melancholy condition of theRussian empire, as is shown in theaccounts of those who have hadsufficient opportunity oobservation. The Czar himself is

powerless against the bureaucratic body; he can send any one of the

to Siberia, but he cannot gover without them, or against their will.



On every decree of his they have atacit veto, by merely refraining frocarrying it into effect. In countriesof more advanced civilisation andof a more insurrectionary spirit, the

public, accustomed to expeceverything to be done for them bythe State, or at least to do nothinfor themselves without asking frothe State not only leave to do it, bu

even how it is to be done, naturallyhold the State responsible for all

evil which befalls them, and whethe evil exceeds their amount o



patience, they rise against thegovernment and make what is calleda revolution; whereupon somebodyelse, with or without legitimateauthority from the nation, vaults into

the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes omuch as it did before; the

bureaucracy being unchanged, andnobody else being capable of takin

their place.A very different spectacle is

exhibited among a peopleaccustomed to transact their ow



business. In France, a large part othe people having been engaged imilitary service, many of whohave held at least the rank of non-commissioned officers, there are i

every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead,and improvise some tolerable plaof action. What the French are imilitary affairs, the Americans are

in every kind of civil business; lethem be left without a government,

every body of Americans is able toimprovise one, and to carry on tha



or any other public business with asufficient amount of intelligence,order, and decision. This is whatevery free people ought to be: and a

people capable of this is certain to

be free; it will never let itself beenslaved by any man or body omen because these are able to seizeand pull the reins of the centraladministration. No bureaucracy ca

hope to make such a people as thisdo or undergo anything that they do

not like. But where everything isdone through the bureaucracy,



nothing to which the bureaucracy isreally adverse can be done at all.The constitution of such countries isan organisation of the experienceand practical ability of the nation,

into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; andthe more perfect that organisation isin itself, the more successful idrawing to itself and educating for

itself the persons of greatescapacity from all ranks of the

community, the more complete isthe bondage of all, the members oh b i l d d F h



the bureaucracy included. For thegovernors are as much the slaves otheir organisation and discipline, asthe governed are of the governors.A Chinese mandarin is as much the

tool and creature of a despotism asthe humblest cultivator. Anindividual Jesuit is to the utmosdegree of abasement the slave of hisorder, though the order itself exists

for the collective power andimportance of its members.

It is not, also, to be forgotten,that the absorption of all thei i l bilit f th t i t



principal ability of the country intothe governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and

progressiveness of the body itself.Banded together as they are—

working a system which, like allsystems, necessarily proceeds in agreat measure by fixed rules—theofficial body are under the constantemptation of sinking into indolen

routine, or, if they now and thendesert that mill-horse round, o

rushing into some half-examinedcrudity which has struck the fancyf l di g b f th



of some leading member of thecorps: and the sole check to theseclosely allied, though seeminglyopposite, tendencies, the onlystimulus which can keep the ability

of the body itself up to a higstandard, is liability to the watchfulcriticism of equal ability outside the

body. It is indispensable, therefore,that the means should exist,

independently of the government, oforming such ability, and furnishing

it with the opportunities andexperience necessary for a correcudgment of great practical affairs



udgment of great practical affairs.If we would possess permanently askilful and efficient body ofunctionaries—above all, a bodyable to originate and willing to

adopt improvements; if we wouldnot have our bureaucracydegenerate into a pedantocracy, this

body must not engross all theoccupations which form and

cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.

To determine the point at whichevils, so formidable to humafreedom and advancement begin or



freedom and advancement, begin, or rather at which they begin to

predominate over the benefitsattending the collective applicatioof the force of society, under its

recognised chiefs, for the removalof the obstacles which stand in theway of its well-being; to secure asmuch of the advantages ocentralised power and intelligence,

as can be had without turning intogovernmental channels too great a

proportion of the general activity, isone of the most difficult andcomplicated questions in the art o



complicated questions in the art ogovernment. It is, in a greameasure, a question of detail, iwhich many and variousconsiderations must be kept i

view, and no absolute rule can belaid down. But I believe that the

practical principle in which safety

resides, the ideal to be kept iview, the standard by which to test

all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be

conveyed in these words: thegreatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the



consistent with efficiency; but thegreatest possible centralisation oinformation, and diffusion of it frothe centre. Thus, in municipaladministration, there would be, as

in the New England States, a verymi nute division among separateofficers, chosen by the localities, o

all business which is not better lef to the persons directly interested;

but besides this, there would be, ieach department of local affairs, a

central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government.The organ of this superintendence



The organ of this superintendencewould concentrate, as in a focus, thevariety of information andexperience derived from theconduct of that branch of public

business in all the localities, froeverything analogous which is donein foreign countries, and from the

general principles of politicalscience. This central organ should

have a right to know all that is done,and its special duty should be tha

of making the knowledge acquiredin one place available for others.Emancipated from the petty



Emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of alocality by its elevated position andcomprehensive sphere oobservation, its advice would

naturally carry much authority; buits actual power, as a permanentinstitution, should, I conceive, be

limited to compelling the localofficers to obey the laws laid dow

for their guidance. In all things no provided for by general rules, those

officers should be left to their owudgment, under responsibility totheir constituents For the violatio



their constituents. For the violatioof rules, they should be responsibleto law, and the rules themselvesshould be laid down by thelegislature; the central

administrative authority onlywatching over their execution, andif they were not properly carried

into effect, appealing, according tothe nature of the case, to the tribunal

to enforce the law, or to theconstituencies to dismiss the

functionaries who had not executedit according to its spirit. Such, in itsgeneral conception, is the central



general conception, is the centralsuperintendence which the Poor Law Board is intended to exerciseover the administrators of the Poor Rate throughout the country.

Whatever powers the Boardexercises beyond this limit, wereright and necessary in that peculiar

case, for the cure of rooted habits omaladministration in matters deeply

affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no

locality has a moral right to makeitself by mismanagement a nest opauperism, necessarily overflowin



pauperism, necessarily overflowininto other localities, and impairinthe moral and physical condition othe whole labouring community.The powers of administrative

coercion and subordinatelegislation possessed by the Poor Law Board (but which, owing to the

state of opinion on the subject, arevery scantily exercised by them),

though perfectly justifiable in a caseof first-rate national interest, would

be wholly out of place in thesuperintendence of interests purelylocal. But a central organ o



ginformation and instruction for allthe localities, would be equallyvaluable in all departments oadministration. A government



run, is the worth of the individualscomposing it; and a State whic

postpones the interests of their

mental expansion and elevation, to alittle more of administrative skill,

or of that semblance of it whic practice gives, in the details o

business; a State which dwarfs itsmen, in order that they may be moredocile instruments in its hands eve



for beneficial purposes, will findthat with small men no great thincan really be accomplished; andthat the perfection of machinery to

which it has sacrificed everything,will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, i

order that the machine might wor more smoothly, it has preferred to

banish.

On Liberty - Mill, John Stuart

Documents

Transcript of On Liberty - Mill, John Stuart