TheProjectGutenbergEBookofOnLiberty,byJohnStuartMill

ThiseBookisfortheuseofanyoneanywhereatnocostandwith

almostnorestrictionswhatsoever.Youmaycopyit,giveitawayor

re-useitunderthetermsoftheProjectGutenbergLicenseincluded

withthiseBookoronlineatwww.gutenberg.org

Title:OnLiberty

Author:JohnStuartMill

ReleaseDate:January10,2011[EBook#34901]

Language:English

***STARTOFTHISPROJECTGUTENBERGEBOOKONLIBERTY***

ProducedbyCurtisWeyant,MartinPettitandtheOnline

DistributedProofreadingTeamathttp://www.pgdp.net

OnLiberty.By

JohnStuartMill.WithanIntroductionbyW.L.Courtney,LL.D.

TheWalterScottPublishingCo.,Ltd.LondonandFelling-on-TyneNewYorkandMelbourne

Tothebelovedanddeploredmemoryofherwhowastheinspirer,andinparttheauthor,ofallthatisbest in my writings—the friend and wife whose exalted sense of truth and right was my strongestincitement,andwhoseapprobationwasmychiefreward—Idedicatethisvolume.LikeallthatIhavewrittenformanyyears,itbelongsasmuchtoherastome;buttheworkasitstandshashad,inaveryinsufficient degree, the inestimable advantage of her revision; someof themost important portionshavingbeenreservedforamorecarefulre-examination,whichtheyarenowneverdestinedtoreceive.WereIbutcapableofinterpretingtotheworldone-halfthegreatthoughtsandnoblefeelingswhich

areburiedinhergrave,IshouldbethemediumofagreaterbenefittoitthaniseverlikelytoarisefromanythingthatIcanwrite,unpromptedandunassistedbyherallbutunrivalledwisdom.

INTRODUCTION.I.

JohnStuartMillwasbornon20thMay1806.Hewasadelicatechild,andtheextraordinaryeducationdesignedbyhisfatherwasnotcalculatedtodevelopandimprovehisphysicalpowers."Ineverwasaboy," he says; "never played cricket."His exercisewas taken in the formofwalkswith his father,duringwhichtheelderMilllecturedhissonandexaminedhimonhiswork.Itisidletospeculateonthe possible results of a different treatment. Mill remained delicate throughout his life, but wasendowedwith that intensemental energywhich is so often combinedwith physical weakness. Hisyouthwassacrificedtoanidea;hewasdesignedbyhisfathertocarryonhiswork;theindividualityoftheboywasunimportant.AvisittothesouthofFranceattheageoffourteen,incompanywiththefamilyofGeneralSirSamuelBentham,was notwithout its influence. Itwas a glimpse of anotheratmosphere,thoughthestudioushabitsofhishomelifeweremaintained.Moreover,hederivedfromithis interest inforeignpolitics,whichremainedoneofhischaracteristics totheendofhis life.In1823hewasappointedjuniorclerkintheExaminers'OfficeattheIndiaHouse.

Mill'sfirstessayswerewrittenintheTravelleraboutayearbeforeheenteredtheIndiaHouse.Fromthat time forward his literary workwas uninterrupted save by attacks of illness. His industry wasstupendous.Hewrotearticlesonaninfinitevarietyofsubjects,political,metaphysical,philosophic,religious,poetical.HediscoveredTennysonforhisgeneration,heinfluencedthewritingofCarlyle'sFrenchRevolutionaswellasitssuccess.Andallthewhilehewasengagedinstudyingandpreparingforhismoreambitiousworks,whileherosestepbystepattheIndiaOffice.HisEssaysonUnsettledQuestionsinPoliticalEconomywerewrittenin1831,althoughtheydidnotappearuntilthirteenyearslater. HisSystem of Logic, the design of which was even then fashioning itself in his brain, tookthirteenyearstocomplete,andwasactuallypublishedbeforethePoliticalEconomy.In1844appearedthearticleonMichelet,whichitsauthoranticipatedwouldcausesomediscussion,butwhichdidnotcreate thesensationheexpected.Nextyear therewere the"ClaimsofLabour"and"Guizot,"and in1847hisarticlesonIrishaffairsintheMorningChronicle.TheseyearswereverymuchinfluencedbyhisfriendshipandcorrespondencewithComte,acuriouscomradeshipbetweenmenofsuchdifferenttemperament.In1848MillpublishedhisPoliticalEconomy,towhichhehadgivenhisseriousstudysincethecompletionofhisLogic.Hisarticlesandreviews,thoughtheyinvolvedagooddealofwork—as,forinstance,there-perusaloftheIliadandtheOdysseyintheoriginalbeforereviewingGrote'sGreece—wererecreationtothestudent.Theyear1856sawhimheadoftheExaminers'OfficeintheIndiaHouse, and another two years brought the end of his officialwork, owing to the transfer ofIndiatotheCrown.Inthesameyearhiswifedied.Libertywaspublishedshortlyafter,aswellastheThoughtsonParliamentaryReform,andnoyearpassedwithoutMillmakingimportantcontributionsonthepolitical,philosophical,andethicalquestionsoftheday.

Sevenyears after thedeathofhiswife,Millwas invited to contestWestminster.His feelingon theconduct of elections made him refuse to take any personal action in the matter, and he gave thefrankestexpressiontohispoliticalviews,butneverthelesshewaselectedbyalargemajority.Hewasnot a conventional success in theHouse; as a speaker he lackedmagnetism.But his influencewaswidelyfelt."ForthesakeoftheHouseofCommonsatlarge,"saidMr.Gladstone,"Irejoicedinhisadventanddeploredhisdisappearance.Hedidusallgood."AfteronlythreeyearsinParliament,hewasdefeatedatthenextGeneralElectionbyMr.W.H.Smith.HeretiredtoAvignon,tothepleasant

littlehousewherethehappiestyearsofhislifehadbeenspentinthecompanionshipofhiswife,andcontinuedhisdisinterestedlabours.Hecompletedhiseditionofhisfather'sAnalysisoftheMind,andalso produced, in addition to less important work,The Subjection ofWomen, in which he had theactiveco-operationofhisstep-daughter.AbookonSocialismwasunderconsideration,but,likeanearlierstudyofSociology,itneverwaswritten.Hediedin1873,hislastyearsbeingspentpeacefullyinthepleasantsocietyofhisstep-daughter,fromwhosetendercareandearnestintellectualsympathyhecaughtmaybeafar-offreflectionofthelightwhichhadirradiatedhisspirituallife.

II.

The circumstances underwhich John StuartMill wrote hisLiberty are largely connectedwith theinfluencewhichMrs.Taylorwieldedoverhis career.Thededication iswellknown. It contains themostextraordinarypanegyriconawomanthatanyphilosopherhaseverpenned."WereIbutcapableof interpreting to theworldone-half thegreat thoughtsandnoble feelingswhichareburied inhergrave,IshouldbethemediumofagreaterbenefittoitthaniseverlikelytoarisefromanythingthatIcanwrite,unpromptedandunassistedbyherallbutunrivalledwisdom." It iseasy for theordinaryworldly cynicism to curl a sceptical lip over sentences like these. There may be exaggeration ofsentiment,thenecessaryandinevitablereactionofamanwhowastrainedaccordingtothe"drylight"ofsounimpressionableamanasJamesMill,thefather;butthepassagequotedisnottheonlyoneinwhichJohnStuartMillproclaimshisunhesitatingbeliefintheintellectualinfluenceofhiswife.ThetreatiseonLibertywaswrittenespeciallyunderherauthorityandencouragement,buttherearemanyearlierreferencestothepowerwhichsheexercisedoverhismind.Millwasintroducedtoherasearlyas1831,atadinner-partyatMr.Taylor'shouse,wherewerepresent,amongstothers,Roebuck,W.J.Fox, andMissHarrietMartineau.The acquaintance rapidly ripened into intimacy and the intimacyinto friendship, and Mill was never weary of expatiating on all the advantages of so singular arelationship. In some of the presentation copies of his work on Political Economy, he wrote thefollowingdedication:—"ToMrs.JohnTaylor,who,ofallpersonsknownto theauthor, is themosthighlyqualifiedeithertooriginateortoappreciatespeculationonsocialadvancement,thisworkiswiththehighestrespectandesteemdedicated."Anarticleontheenfranchisementofwomenwasmadetheoccasionforanotherencomium.Weshallhardlybewronginattributingamuchlaterbook,TheSubjectionofWomen,publishedin1869,totheinfluencewieldedbyMrs.Taylor.Finally,thepagesoftheAutobiographyringwiththedithyrambicpraiseofhis"almostinfalliblecounsellor."

Thefactsofthisremarkableintimacycaneasilybestated.Thedeductionsaremoredifficult.Thereisno question thatMill's infatuation was the cause of considerable trouble to his acquaintances andfriends.Hisfatheropenlytaxedhimwithbeinginlovewithanotherman'swife.Roebuck,Mrs.Grote,Mrs. Austin, Miss Harriet Martineau were amongst those who suffered because they made someallusiontoaforbiddensubject.Mrs.Taylorlivedwithherdaughterinalodginginthecountry;butin1851herhusbanddied,and thenMillmadeherhiswife.Opinionswerewidelydivergentas tohermerits; but everyone agreed that up to the timeofher death, in1858,Millwaswholly lost tohisfriends.GeorgeMill,oneofMill'syoungerbrothers,gaveitashisopinionthatshewasacleverandremarkable woman, but "nothing like what John took her to be." Carlyle, in his reminiscences,describedherwithambiguousepithets.Shewas"vivid," "iridescent," "paleandpassionateandsad-looking,aliving-romanceheroineoftheroyalistvolitionandquestionabledestiny."Itisnotpossibletomakemuchofajudgmentlikethis,butwegetonmorecertaingroundwhenwediscoverthatMrs.Carlylesaidononeoccasionthat"sheisthoughttobedangerous,"andthatCarlyleaddedthatshewasworsethandangerous,shewaspatronising.TheoccasionwhenMillandhiswifewerebroughtintoclose contact with the Carlyles is well known. The manuscript of the first volume of the FrenchRevolutionhadbeenlenttoMill,andwasaccidentallyburntbyMrs.Mill'sservant.MillandhiswifedroveuptoCarlyle'sdoor,thewifespeechless,thehusbandsofullofconversationthathedetainedCarlyle with desperate attempts at loquacity for two hours. But Dr. Garnett tells us, in hisLife ofCarlyle, thatMillmade a substantial reparation for the calamity for which hewas responsible byinducingtheaggrievedauthortoaccepthalfofthe£200whichheoffered.Mrs.Mill,asIhavesaid,

diedin1858,aftersevenyearsofhappycompanionshipwithherhusband,andwasburiedatAvignon.TheinscriptionwhichMillwroteforhergraveistoocharacteristictobeomitted:—"Hergreatandlovingheart,hernoblesoul,herclear,powerful,original,andcomprehensiveintellect,madehertheguideandsupport,theinstructorinwisdomandtheexampleingoodness,asshewasthesoleearthlydelightof thosewhohad thehappiness tobelong toher.Asearnest forallpublicgoodas shewasgenerousanddevotedtoallwhosurroundedher,herinfluencehasbeenfeltinmanyofthegreatestimprovementsoftheage,andwillbeinthosestilltocome.Werethereevenafewheartsandintellectslikehers,thisearthwouldalreadybecomethehoped-forHeaven."TheselinesprovetheintensityofMill'sfeeling,whichisnotafraidofabundantverbiage;buttheyalsoprovethathecouldnotimaginewhattheeffectwouldbeonothers,and,asGrotesaid,onlyMill'sreputationcouldsurvivetheseandsimilardisplays.

Every one will judge for himself of this romantic episode in Mill's career, according to suchexperience as he may possess of the philosophic mind and of the value of these curious but notinfrequentrelationships.Itmayhavebeenapieceofinfatuation,or,ifweprefertosayso,itmayhavebeenthemostgraciousandthemosthumanpageinMill'scareer.Mrs.Millmayhaveflatteredherhusband'svanitybyechoinghisopinions,orshemayhaveindeedbeenanEgeria,fullofinspirationandintellectualhelpfulness.Whatusuallyhappensinthesecases,—althoughthephilosopherhimself,through his belief in the equality of the sexes, was debarred from thinking so,—is the extremelyvaluableactionandreactionoftwodifferentclassesandordersofmind.Toanyonewhosethoughtshave been occupied with the sphere of abstract speculation, the lively and vivid presentment ofconcretefactcomesasadelightfulandagreeableshock.Theinstinctofthewomanoftenenableshernot only to apprehend but to illustrate a truth for which she would be totally unable to give theadequatephilosophicreasoning.Ontheotherhand,theman,withthemorecarefullogicalmethodsandtheslowprocessesofformalreasoning,isapttosupposethatthehappyintuitionwhichleapstotheconclusionisreallybasedontheintellectualprocessesofwhichheisconsciousinhisowncase.Thus both parties to the happy contract are equally pleased. The abstract truth gets the concreteillustration; the concrete illustration finds its proper foundation in a series of abstract inquiries.Perhaps Carlyle's epithets of "iridescent" and "vivid" refer incidentally to Mrs. Mill's quickperceptiveness, and thus throw a useful light on the mutual advantages of the common work ofhusbandandwife.Butitsavoursalmostofimpertinenceeventoattempttolifttheveilonamysterylikethis.Itisenoughtosay,perhaps,thathowevermuchwemaydeploretheexaggerationofMill'sreferencestohiswife,werecognisethat,forwhateverreason,thepairlivedanideallyhappylife.

It still, however, remains to estimate the extent to which Mrs. Taylor, both before and after hermarriagewithMill,made actual contributions to his thoughts and his publicwork.Here Imay beperhapspermittedtoavailmyselfofwhatIhavealreadywritteninapreviouswork.[1]MillgivesusabundanthelpinthismatterintheAutobiography.Whenfirstheknewher,histhoughtswereturningtothesubjectofLogic.Buthispublishedworkonthesubjectowednothingtoher,hetellsus,initsdoctrines.ItwasMill'scustomtowritethewholeofabooksoastogethisgeneralschemecomplete,andthenlaboriouslytore-writeitinordertoperfectthephrasesandthecomposition.DoubtlessMrs.Taylorwas of considerable help to him as a critic of style.But to be a critic of doctrine shewashardly qualified.Mill hasmade some clear admissions on this point. "The only actual revolutionwhichhasever takenplace inmymodesof thinkingwas already complete,"[2] he says, before herinfluencebecameparamount.Thereisacuriouslyhumbleestimateofhisownpowers(towhichDr.Bainhascalledattention),whichreadsatfirstsightasifitcontradictedthis."DuringthegreaterpartofmyliterarylifeIhaveperformedtheofficeinrelationtoher,which,fromaratherearlyperiod,IhadconsideredasthemostusefulpartthatIwasqualifiedtotakeinthedomainofthought,thatofan

interpreteroforiginalthinkers,andmediatorbetweenthemandthepublic."SofaritwouldseemthatMillhadsatatthefeetofhisoracle;butobservethehighlyremarkableexceptionwhichismadeinthefollowingsentence:—"ForIhadalwaysahumbleopinionofmyownpowersasanoriginalthinker,except inabstractscience(logic,metaphysics,andthetheoreticprinciplesofpoliticaleconomyandpolitics.)"[3] IfMill thenwasanoriginal thinker in logic,metaphysics,and thescienceofeconomyand politics, it is clear that he had not learnt these from her lips. And to most men logic andmetaphysicsmaybe safely takenas formingadomain inwhichoriginalityof thought, if it canbehonestlyprofessed,isasufficienttitleofdistinction.

Mrs.Taylor's assistance in thePoliticalEconomy is confined to certain definite points. The purelyscientificpartwas,weareassured,notlearntfromher."Butitwaschieflyherinfluencewhichgavetothe book that general tone by which it is distinguished from all previous expositions of politicaleconomy that had anypretensions to be scientific, andwhichhasmade it so useful in conciliatingminds which those previous expositions had repelled. This tone consisted chiefly in making theproper distinction between the laws of the production of wealth, which are real laws of Nature,dependent on the properties of objects, and themodes of its distribution,which, subject to certainconditions,dependonhumanwill....Ihadindeedpartiallylearntthisviewofthingsfromthethoughtsawakened inmeby thespeculationsofSt.Simonians;but itwasmadea livingprinciple,pervadingandanimatingthebook,bymywife'spromptings."[4]Thepartwhichisitalicisedisnoticeable.Here,aselsewhere,Millthinksoutthematterbyhimself;theconcreteformofthethoughtsissuggestedorprompted by the wife. Apart from this "general tone," Mill tells us that there was a specificcontribution."Thechapterwhichhashadagreaterinfluenceonopinionthanalltherest,thatontheProbableFuture of theLabouringClasses, is entirely due to her. In the first draft of the book thatchapterdidnotexist.Shepointedouttheneedofsuchachapter,andtheextremeimperfectionofthebookwithoutit;shewasthecauseofmywritingit."FromthisitwouldappearthatshegaveMillthattendencytoSocialismwhich,whileitlendsaprogressivespirittohisspeculationsonpolitics,atthesame time does not manifestly accord with his earlier advocacy of peasant proprietorships. Nor,again,isit,onthefaceofit,consistentwiththosedoctrinesofindividuallibertywhich,aidedbytheintellectual companionship of his wife, he propounded in a later work. The ideal of individualfreedom is not the ideal of Socialism, just as that invocation of governmental aid to which theSocialistresortsisnotconsistentwiththetheoryoflaisser-faire.YetLibertywasplannedbyMillandhiswifeinconcert.PerhapsaslightvisionarinessofspeculationwasnolesstheattributeofMrs.Millthan an absence of rigid logical principles. Be this as it may, she undoubtedly checked the half-recognised leaningsofherhusband in thedirectionofColeridgeandCarlyle.Whether thiswasaninstanceofhersteadyinginfluence,[5]orwhetheritaddedonemoreunassimilatedelementtoMill'sdiverseintellectualsustenance,maybewiselyleftanopenquestion.Wecannot,however,bewronginattributingtohertheparentageofonebookofMill,TheSubjectionofWomen.ItistruethatMillhadbeforelearntthatmenandwomenoughttobeequalinlegal,political,social,anddomesticrelations.Thiswasapointonwhichhehadalreadyfallenfoulofhisfather'sessayonGovernment.ButMrs.Taylorhadactuallywrittenonthisverypoint,andthewarmthandfervourofMill'sdenunciationsofwomen'sservitudewereunmistakablycaughtfromhiswife'sviewofthepracticaldisabilitiesentailedbythefeminineposition.

III.

Libertywaspublishedin1859,whenthenineteenthcenturywashalfover,butinitsgeneralspiritandin some of its special tendencies the little tract belongs rather to the standpoint of the eighteenthcenturythantothatwhichsawitsbirth.InmanyofhisspeculationsJohnStuartMillformsasortofconnecting link between the doctrines of the earlier English empirical school and thosewhichweassociatewiththenameofMr.HerbertSpencer.InhisLogic,forinstance,herepresentsanadvanceon the theoriesofHume,andyetdoesnot seehowprofoundly thevictoriesofSciencemodify theconclusionsoftheearlierthinker.Similarly,inhisPoliticalEconomy,hedesires to improveandtoenlargeuponRicardo,andyetdoesnotadvancesofarasthemodificationsofpoliticaleconomybySociology,indicatedbysomelater—andespeciallyGerman—speculationsonthesubject.InthetractonLiberty,MillisadvocatingtherightsoftheindividualasagainstSocietyattheveryopeningofanera that was rapidly coming to the conclusion that the individual had no absolute rights againstSociety. The eighteenth century view is that individuals existed first, each with their own specialclaims and responsibilities; that they deliberately formed a Social State, either by a contract orotherwise; and that then finally they limited their own action out of regard for the interests of thesocial organism thus arbitrarily produced. This is hardly the view of the nineteenth century. It ispossiblethatlogicallytheindividualispriortotheState;historicallyandintheorderofNature,theStateispriortotheindividual.Inotherwords,suchrightsaseverysinglepersonalitypossessesinamodernworlddonotbelongtohimbyanoriginalordinanceofNature,butareslowlyacquiredinthe growth and development of the social state. It is not the truth that individual liberties wereforfeitedbysomedeliberateactwhenmenmadethemselvesintoaCommonwealth.Itismoretruetosay,asAristotlesaidlongago,thatmanisnaturallyapoliticalanimal,thathelivedunderstrictsociallawsasamereitem,almostanonentity,ascomparedwiththeOrder,Society,orCommunitytowhichhebelonged,andthatsuchprivilegesashesubsequentlyacquiredhavebeenobtainedinvirtueofhisgrowingimportanceasamemberofagrowingorganisation.Butifthisisevenapproximatelytrue,itseriouslyrestrictsthatlibertyoftheindividualforwhichMillpleads.Theindividualhasnochance,because he has no rights, against the social organism. Society can punish him for acts or evenopinionswhich are anti-social in character.His virtue lies in recognising the intimate communionwithhisfellows.Hissphereofactivityisboundedbythecommoninterest.Justasitisanabsurdandexplodedtheorythatallmenareoriginallyequal,soitisanancientandfalsedoctrinetoprotestthatamanhasanindividuallibertytoliveandthinkashechoosesinanyspiritofantagonismtothatlargerbodyofwhichheformsaninsignificantpart.

Nowadays this view of Society and of its development, which we largely owe to thePhilosophiePositiveofM.AugusteComte, is so familiarandpossiblysodamaging to the individual initiative,thatitbecomesnecessarytoadvanceandproclaimthetruthwhichresidesinanoppositetheory.Allprogress,asweareaware,dependsonthejointprocessofintegrationanddifferentiation;synthesis,analysis,andthenalargersynthesisseemtoformthelawofdevelopment.IfitevercomestopassthatSociety is tyrannical in its restrictions of the individual, if, as for instance in some forms ofSocialism,basedondeceptiveanalogiesofNature'sdealings,thetypeiseverythingandtheindividualnothing, it must be confidently urged in answer that the fuller life of the future depends on themanifoldactivities,eventhoughtheymaybeantagonistic,oftheindividual.InEngland,atallevents,weknowthatgovernmentinallitsdifferentforms,whetherasKing,orasacasteofnobles,orasanoligarchicalplutocracy,orevenastradesunions,issodwarfinginitsactionthat,forthesakeofthe

future,theindividualmustrevolt.JustasourformerpointofviewlimitedthevalueofMill'streatiseonLiberty,sotheseconsiderationstendtoshowitseternalimportance.TheomnipotenceofSocietymeansadeadlevelofuniformity.Theclaimoftheindividualtobeheard,tosaywhathelikes,todowhathelikes,toliveashelikes,isabsolutelynecessary,notonlyforthevarietyofelementswithoutwhichlifeispoor,butalsoforthehopeofafutureage.SolongasindividualinitiativeandeffortarerecognisedasavitalelementinEnglishhistory,solongwillMill'sLiberty,whichheconfesseswasbasedona suggestionderived fromVonHumboldt, remainasan indispensablecontribution to thespeculations,andalsotothehealthandsanity,oftheworld.

WhathiswifereallywastoMill,weshall,perhaps,neverknow.Butthatshewasanactualandvividforce,which roused the latent enthusiasmofhisnature,wehaveabundant evidence.Andwhen shediedatAvignon,thoughhisfriendsmayhaveregainedanalmostestrangedcompanionship,Millwas,personally, the poorer. Into the sorrow of that bereavementwe cannot enter: we have no right orpowertodrawtheveil.Itisenoughtoquotethesimplewords,soeloquentofanunspokengrief—"Ican say nothingwhich could describe, even in the faintest manner, what that loss was and is. ButbecauseIknowthatshewouldhavewishedit,IendeavourtomakethebestofwhatlifeIhaveleft,andtoworkforherpurposeswithsuchdiminishedstrengthascanbederivedfromthoughtsofher,andcommunionwithhermemory."

W.L.COURTNEY.

LONDON,July5th,1901.

FOOTNOTES:

[1]LifeofJohnStuartMill,chaptervi.(WalterScott.)

[2]Autobiography,p.190.

[3]Ibid.,p.242.

[4]Autobiography,pp.246,247.

[5]Cf.aninstructivepageintheAutobiography,p.252.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTERI. PAGE

INTRODUCTORY 1

CHAPTERII.

OFTHELIBERTYOFTHOUGHTANDDISCUSSION 28

CHAPTERIII.OFINDIVIDUALITY,ASONEOFTHEELEMENTSOFWELL-BEING 103

CHAPTERIV.

OFTHELIMITSTOTHEAUTHORITYOFSOCIETYOVERTHEINDIVIDUAL 140

CHAPTERV.APPLICATIONS 177

The grand, leading principle, towardswhich every argument unfolded in these pages directlyconverges,istheabsoluteandessentialimportanceofhumandevelopmentinitsrichestdiversity.—WILHELMVONHUMBOLDT:SphereandDutiesofGovernment.

ONLIBERTY.

CHAPTERI.INTRODUCTORY.

The subject of this Essay is not the so-calledLiberty of theWill, so unfortunately opposed to themisnameddoctrineofPhilosophicalNecessity;butCivil,orSocialLiberty:thenatureandlimitsofthe power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldomstated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practicalcontroversiesoftheagebyitslatentpresence,andislikelysoontomakeitselfrecognisedasthevitalquestion of the future. It is so far frombeing new, that in a certain sense, it has dividedmankind,almostfromtheremotestages;butinthestageofprogressintowhichthemorecivilisedportionsofthe species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different andmorefundamentaltreatment.

ThestrugglebetweenLibertyandAuthorityisthemostconspicuousfeatureintheportionsofhistorywithwhichwe are earliest familiar, particularly in that ofGreece,Rome, andEngland.But in oldtimesthiscontestwasbetweensubjects,orsomeclassesofsubjects,andthegovernment.Byliberty,wasmeantprotectionagainstthetyrannyofthepoliticalrulers.Therulerswereconceived(exceptinsomeofthepopulargovernmentsofGreece)asinanecessarilyantagonisticpositiontothepeoplewhom they ruled.They consisted of a governingOne, or a governing tribe or caste,whoderivedtheirauthorityfrominheritanceorconquest,who,atallevents,didnotholditatthepleasureofthegoverned, andwhose supremacymen did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest,whateverprecautionsmightbetakenagainst itsoppressiveexercise.Theirpowerwasregardedasnecessary,butalsoashighlydangerous;asaweaponwhichtheywouldattempttouseagainsttheirsubjects,noless than against external enemies. To prevent theweakermembers of the community from beingpreyeduponbyinnumerablevultures,itwasneedfulthatthereshouldbeananimalofpreystrongerthantherest,commissionedtokeepthemdown.Butasthekingofthevultureswouldbenolessbentuponpreyingon the flock thananyof theminorharpies, itwas indispensable tobe in aperpetualattitudeofdefenceagainsthisbeakandclaws.Theaim,therefore,ofpatriots,wastosetlimitstothepowerwhich the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitationwaswhattheymeantbyliberty.Itwasattemptedintwoways.First,byobtainingarecognitionofcertainimmunities,calledpoliticallibertiesorrights,whichitwastoberegardedasabreachofdutyintherulertoinfringe,andwhichifhedidinfringe,specificresistance,orgeneralrebellion,washeldtobejustifiable.Asecond,andgenerallyalaterexpedient,wastheestablishmentofconstitutionalchecks;bywhichtheconsentofthecommunity,orofabodyofsomesort,supposedtorepresentitsinterests,wasmadeanecessaryconditiontosomeofthemoreimportantactsofthegoverningpower.Tothefirst of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled,moreor less, to submit. Itwasnot sowith the second; and to attain this, orwhenalready in somedegreepossessed,toattainitmorecompletely,becameeverywheretheprincipalobjectoftheloversofliberty.Andsolongasmankindwerecontenttocombatoneenemybyanother,andtoberuledbyamaster,onconditionofbeingguaranteedmoreorlessefficaciouslyagainsthistyranny,theydidnotcarrytheiraspirationsbeyondthispoint.

Atime,however,came,intheprogressofhumanaffairs,whenmenceasedtothinkitanecessityofnature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. Itappeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or

delegates,revocableattheirpleasure.Inthatwayalone,itseemed,couldtheyhavecompletesecuritythat the powers of governmentwould never be abused to their disadvantage.By degrees, this newdemand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of thepopularparty,whereveranysuchpartyexisted;andsuperseded,toaconsiderableextent,thepreviouseffortstolimitthepowerofrulers.Asthestruggleproceededformakingtherulingpoweremanatefromtheperiodicalchoiceoftheruled,somepersonsbegantothinkthattoomuchimportancehadbeenattachedtothelimitationofthepoweritself.That(itmightseem)wasaresourceagainstrulerswhose interestswerehabituallyopposed to thoseof thepeople.Whatwasnowwantedwas, that therulersshouldbeidentifiedwiththepeople;thattheirinterestandwillshouldbetheinterestandwillofthe nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its ownwill. Therewas no fear of itstyrannisingoveritself.Lettherulersbeeffectuallyresponsibletoit,promptlyremovablebyit,anditcouldaffordtotrustthemwithpowerofwhichitcoulditselfdictatetheusetobemade.Theirpowerwasbut thenation'sownpower,concentrated,andinaformconvenientforexercise.Thismodeofthought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of Europeanliberalism,intheContinentalsectionofwhichitstillapparentlypredominates.Thosewhoadmitanylimittowhatagovernmentmaydo,exceptinthecaseofsuchgovernmentsastheythinkoughtnottoexist,standoutasbrilliantexceptionsamongthepoliticalthinkersoftheContinent.Asimilartoneofsentimentmightbythistimehavebeenprevalentinourowncountry,ifthecircumstanceswhichforatimeencouragedit,hadcontinuedunaltered.

But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults andinfirmitieswhichfailuremighthaveconcealedfromobservation.Thenotion,thatthepeoplehavenoneed to limit theirpowerover themselves,mightseemaxiomatic,whenpopulargovernmentwasathingonlydreamedabout,orreadofashavingexistedatsomedistantperiodofthepast.NeitherwasthatnotionnecessarilydisturbedbysuchtemporaryaberrationsasthoseoftheFrenchRevolution,theworst of which were the work of a usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to thepermanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak againstmonarchical andaristocraticdespotism. In time,however, ademocratic republic came tooccupyalargeportionoftheearth'ssurface,andmadeitselffeltasoneofthemostpowerfulmembersofthecommunityofnations;andelectiveandresponsiblegovernmentbecamesubject totheobservationsandcriticismswhichwaituponagreatexistingfact.Itwasnowperceivedthatsuchphrasesas"self-government,"and"thepowerofthepeopleoverthemselves,"donotexpressthetruestateofthecase.The "people"who exercise the power are not always the same peoplewith those overwhom it isexercised;andthe"self-government"spokenofisnotthegovernmentofeachbyhimself,butofeachbyalltherest.Thewillofthepeople,moreover,practicallymeans,thewillofthemostnumerousorthemostactivepartofthepeople;themajority,orthosewhosucceedinmakingthemselvesacceptedas the majority: the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; andprecautions are asmuch needed against this, as against any other abuse of power. The limitation,therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when theholdersofpowerareregularlyaccountabletothecommunity, that is, tothestrongestpartytherein.Thisviewofthings,recommendingitselfequallytotheintelligenceofthinkersandtotheinclinationof those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy isadverse,hashadnodifficulty inestablishing itself;and inpoliticalspeculations"the tyrannyof themajority"isnowgenerallyincludedamongtheevilsagainstwhichsocietyrequirestobeonitsguard.

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread,chieflyasoperating through theactsof thepublicauthorities.But reflectingpersonsperceived thatwhensocietyisitselfthetyrant—societycollectively,overtheseparateindividualswhocomposeit—

itsmeansof tyrannising arenot restricted to the actswhich itmaydoby thehandsof its politicalfunctionaries.Societycananddoesexecuteitsownmandates:andifitissueswrongmandatesinsteadof right, or anymandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a socialtyrannymoreformidable thanmanykindsofpoliticaloppression,since, thoughnotusuallyupheldbysuchextremepenalties, it leaves fewermeansofescape,penetratingmuchmoredeeply into thedetailsoflife,andenslavingthesoulitself.Protection,therefore,againstthetyrannyofthemagistrateisnotenough:thereneedsprotectionalsoagainstthetyrannyoftheprevailingopinionandfeeling;against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas andpractices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, ifpossible, prevent the formation, of any individualitynot inharmonywith itsways, and compel allcharacters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimateinterferenceofcollectiveopinionwithindividualindependence:andtofindthatlimit,andmaintainitagainstencroachment,isasindispensabletoagoodconditionofhumanaffairs,asprotectionagainstpoliticaldespotism.

Butthoughthispropositionisnotlikelytobecontestedingeneralterms,thepracticalquestion,whereto place the limit—how tomake the fitting adjustment between individual independence and socialcontrol—is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existencevaluabletoanyone,dependsontheenforcementofrestraintsupontheactionsofotherpeople.Somerulesofconduct,therefore,mustbeimposed,bylawinthefirstplace,andbyopiniononmanythingswhich are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principalquestioninhumanaffairs;butifweexceptafewofthemostobviouscases,itisoneofthosewhichleastprogresshasbeenmadeinresolving.Notwoages,andscarcelyanytwocountries,havedecideditalike;andthedecisionofoneageorcountryisawondertoanother.Yetthepeopleofanygivenageand country nomore suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on whichmankind hadalwaysbeenagreed.Theruleswhichobtainamongthemselvesappeartothemself-evidentandself-justifying.Thisallbutuniversalillusionisoneoftheexamplesofthemagicalinfluenceofcustom,whichisnotonly,astheproverbsays,asecondnature,butiscontinuallymistakenforthefirst.Theeffectofcustom,inpreventinganymisgivingrespectingtherulesofconductwhichmankindimposeon one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generallyconsidered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each tohimself. People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by somewhoaspiretothecharacterofphilosophers,thattheirfeelings,onsubjectsofthisnature,arebetterthanreasons,andrenderreasonsunnecessary.Thepracticalprinciplewhichguidesthemtotheiropinionson the regulationofhumanconduct, is the feeling ineachperson'smind thateverybodyshouldberequiredtoactashe,andthosewithwhomhesympathises,wouldlikethemtoact.Noone,indeed,acknowledgestohimselfthathisstandardofjudgmentishisownliking;butanopiniononapointofconduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons,when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only manypeople'slikinginsteadofone.Toanordinaryman,however,hisownpreference,thussupported,isnotonlyaperfectlysatisfactoryreason,buttheonlyonehegenerallyhasforanyofhisnotionsofmorality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chiefguideintheinterpretationevenofthat.Men'sopinions,accordingly,onwhatislaudableorblamable,areaffectedbyall themultifariouscauseswhich influence theirwishes in regard to theconductofothers, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject.Sometimestheirreason—atothertimestheirprejudicesorsuperstitions:oftentheirsocialaffections,not seldom their anti-socialones, their envyor jealousy, their arroganceorcontemptuousness:but

mostcommonly, theirdesiresor fears for themselves—their legitimateor illegitimateself-interest.Whereverthereisanascendantclass,alargeportionofthemoralityofthecountryemanatesfromitsclass interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots,betweenplantersandnegroes,betweenprincesand subjects,betweennoblesand roturiers,betweenmenandwomen,hasbeenforthemostpartthecreationoftheseclassinterestsandfeelings:andthesentiments thus generated, react in turn upon themoral feelings of themembers of the ascendantclass,intheirrelationsamongthemselves.Where,ontheotherhand,aclass,formerlyascendant,haslostitsascendancy,orwhereitsascendancyisunpopular,theprevailingmoralsentimentsfrequentlybear the impressofan impatientdislikeof superiority.Anothergranddeterminingprincipleof therulesofconduct,bothinactandforbearance,whichhavebeenenforcedbylaworopinion,hasbeentheservilityofmankindtowardsthesupposedpreferencesoraversionsoftheirtemporalmasters,orof their gods. This servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectlygenuinesentimentsofabhorrence;itmademenburnmagiciansandheretics.Amongsomanybaserinfluences,thegeneralandobviousinterestsofsocietyhaveofcoursehadashare,andalargeone,inthedirectionofthemoralsentiments:less,however,asamatterofreason,andontheirownaccount,thanasaconsequenceofthesympathiesandantipathieswhichgrewoutofthem:andsympathiesandantipathieswhichhadlittleornothingtodowiththeinterestsofsociety,havemadethemselvesfeltintheestablishmentofmoralitieswithquiteasgreatforce.

Thelikingsanddislikingsofsociety,orofsomepowerfulportionofit,arethusthemainthingwhichhaspracticallydeterminedtheruleslaiddownforgeneralobservance,underthepenaltiesoflaworopinion.Andingeneral,thosewhohavebeeninadvanceofsocietyinthoughtandfeelinghaveleftthisconditionofthingsunassailedinprinciple,howevertheymayhavecomeintoconflictwithitinsomeof itsdetails.Theyhaveoccupiedthemselvesrather in inquiringwhat thingssocietyought tolikeordislike, than inquestioningwhether its likingsordislikings shouldbea law to individuals.Theypreferredendeavouringtoalterthefeelingsofmankindontheparticularpointsonwhichtheywere themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with hereticsgenerally.Theonlycaseinwhichthehighergroundhasbeentakenonprincipleandmaintainedwithconsistency,byanybutanindividualhereandthere, is thatofreligiousbelief:acaseinstructiveinmanyways,andnotleastsoasformingamoststrikinginstanceofthefallibilityofwhatiscalledthemoralsense:fortheodiumtheologicum, inasincerebigot, isoneofthemostunequivocalcasesofmoral feeling.Thosewho first broke the yokeofwhat called itself theUniversalChurch,were ingeneralaslittlewillingtopermitdifferenceofreligiousopinionasthatchurchitself.Butwhentheheatoftheconflictwasover,withoutgivingacompletevictorytoanyparty,andeachchurchorsectwasreducedtolimititshopestoretainingpossessionofthegrounditalreadyoccupied;minorities,seeingthattheyhadnochanceofbecomingmajorities,wereunderthenecessityofpleadingtothosewhomtheycouldnotconvert, forpermission todiffer. It isaccordinglyon thisbattle-field,almostsolely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds ofprinciple,and theclaimofsociety toexerciseauthorityoverdissentients,openlycontroverted.Thegreat writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly assertedfreedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being isaccountable toothers forhis religiousbelief.Yet sonatural tomankind is intolerance inwhatevertheyreallycareabout, thatreligiousfreedomhashardlyanywherebeenpracticallyrealised,exceptwherereligiousindifference,whichdislikestohaveitspeacedisturbedbytheologicalquarrels,hasaddeditsweighttothescale.Inthemindsofalmostallreligiouspersons,eveninthemosttolerantcountries, thedutyoftolerationisadmittedwithtacitreserves.Onepersonwillbearwithdissentinmattersofchurchgovernment,butnotofdogma;anothercantolerateeverybody,shortofaPapistor

aUnitarian;another,everyonewhobelievesinrevealedreligion;afewextendtheircharityalittlefurther,butstopatthebeliefinaGodandinafuturestate.Whereverthesentimentofthemajorityisstillgenuineandintense,itisfoundtohaveabatedlittleofitsclaimtobeobeyed.

InEngland, fromthepeculiarcircumstancesofourpoliticalhistory, thoughtheyokeofopinion isperhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of Europe; and there isconsiderable jealousyofdirect interference,by the legislativeor the executivepower,withprivateconduct;notsomuchfromanyjustregardfor theindependenceof theindividual,asfromthestillsubsistinghabitoflookingonthegovernmentasrepresentinganoppositeinteresttothepublic.Themajorityhavenotyet learnt to feel thepowerof thegovernment theirpower,or itsopinions theiropinions.Whentheydoso,individuallibertywillprobablybeasmuchexposedtoinvasionfromthegovernment, as it already is from public opinion. But, as yet, there is a considerable amount offeelingreadytobecalledforthagainstanyattemptofthelawtocontrolindividualsinthingsinwhichtheyhavenothithertobeenaccustomedtobecontrolledbyit;andthiswithverylittlediscriminationastowhetherthematteris,orisnot,withinthelegitimatesphereoflegalcontrol;insomuchthatthefeeling, highly salutary on thewhole, is perhaps quite as oftenmisplaced aswell grounded in theparticularinstancesofitsapplication.Thereis,infact,norecognisedprinciplebywhichtheproprietyor impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People decide according to theirpersonalpreferences.Some,whenevertheyseeanygoodtobedone,oreviltoberemedied,wouldwillinglyinstigatethegovernmenttoundertakethebusiness;whileothersprefertobearalmostanyamount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable togovernmental control.Andmen range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case,accordingtothisgeneraldirectionoftheirsentiments;oraccordingtothedegreeofinterestwhichtheyfeelintheparticularthingwhichitisproposedthatthegovernmentshoulddo,oraccordingtothebelieftheyentertainthatthegovernmentwould,orwouldnot,doitinthemannertheyprefer;butveryrarelyonaccountofanyopiniontowhichtheyconsistentlyadhere,astowhatthingsarefittobedonebyagovernment.Anditseemstomethatinconsequenceofthisabsenceofruleorprinciple,onesideisatpresentasoftenwrongastheother;theinterferenceofgovernmentis,withaboutequalfrequency,improperlyinvokedandimproperlycondemned.

Theobjectof thisEssay is toassertoneverysimpleprinciple,asentitled togovernabsolutely thedealingsofsocietywiththeindividualinthewayofcompulsionandcontrol,whetherthemeansusedbe physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. Thatprinciple is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, ininterferingwiththelibertyofactionofanyoftheirnumber,isself-protection.Thattheonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilisedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers.Hisowngood,eitherphysicalormoral,isnotasufficientwarrant.Hecannotrightfullybecompelledtodoorforbearbecauseitwillbebetterforhimtodoso,becauseitwillmakehimhappier,because,intheopinionsofothers, todosowouldbewise,orevenright.Thesearegoodreasonsforremonstratingwithhim,orreasoningwithhim,orpersuadinghim,orentreatinghim,butnotforcompellinghim,orvisitinghimwithanyevilincasehedootherwise.Tojustify that, theconduct fromwhich it isdesired todeterhimmustbecalculated toproduceevil tosomeoneelse.Theonlypartoftheconductofanyone,forwhichheisamenabletosociety,isthatwhich concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,absolute.Overhimself,overhisownbodyandmind,theindividualissovereign.

Itis,perhaps,hardlynecessarytosaythatthisdoctrineismeanttoapplyonlytohumanbeingsinthematurityoftheirfaculties.Wearenotspeakingofchildren,orofyoungpersonsbelowtheagewhich

the lawmayfixas thatofmanhoodorwomanhood.Thosewhoarestill inastate to requirebeingtakencareofbyothers,mustbeprotectedagainsttheirownactionsaswellasagainstexternalinjury.Forthesamereason,wemayleaveoutofconsiderationthosebackwardstatesofsocietyinwhichtherace itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneousprogressaresogreat,thatthereisseldomanychoiceofmeansforovercomingthem;andarulerfullofthespiritofimprovementiswarrantedintheuseofanyexpedientsthatwillattainanend,perhapsotherwise unattainable.Despotism is a legitimatemode of government in dealingwith barbarians,providedtheendbetheirimprovement,andthemeansjustifiedbyactuallyeffectingthatend.Liberty,as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind havebecomecapableofbeingimprovedbyfreeandequaldiscussion.Untilthen,thereisnothingforthembutimplicitobediencetoanAkbaroraCharlemagne,iftheyaresofortunateastofindone.Butassoonasmankindhaveattainedthecapacityofbeingguidedtotheirownimprovementbyconvictionor persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concernourselves),compulsion,eitherinthedirectformorinthatofpainsandpenaltiesfornon-compliance,isnolongeradmissibleasameanstotheirowngood,andjustifiableonlyforthesecurityofothers.

ItispropertostatethatIforegoanyadvantagewhichcouldbederivedtomyargumentfromtheideaofabstractright,asathingindependentofutility.Iregardutilityastheultimateappealonallethicalquestions;butitmustbeutilityinthelargestsense,groundedonthepermanentinterestsofmanasaprogressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity toexternalcontrol,onlyinrespecttothoseactionsofeach,whichconcerntheinterestofotherpeople.Ifanyonedoesanacthurtfultoothers,thereisaprimâfaciecaseforpunishinghim,bylaw,or,wherelegalpenaltiesarenotsafelyapplicable,bygeneraldisapprobation.Therearealsomanypositiveactsforthebenefitofothers,whichhemayrightfullybecompelledtoperform;suchas,togiveevidencein a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint worknecessarytotheinterestofthesocietyofwhichheenjoystheprotection;andtoperformcertainactsof individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect thedefenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he mayrightfullybemaderesponsibletosocietyfornotdoing.Apersonmaycauseeviltoothersnotonlybyhisactionsbutbyhisinaction,andineithercaseheisjustlyaccountabletothemfortheinjury.Thelattercase,itistrue,requiresamuchmorecautiousexerciseofcompulsionthantheformer.Tomakeanyoneanswerablefordoingeviltoothers,istherule;tomakehimanswerablefornotpreventingevil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and graveenoughtojustifythatexception.Inallthingswhichregardtheexternalrelationsoftheindividual,heis de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as theirprotector.Thereareoftengoodreasonsfornotholdinghimtotheresponsibility;butthesereasonsmustarisefromthespecialexpedienciesofthecase:eitherbecauseitisakindofcaseinwhichheisonthewholelikelytoactbetter,whenlefttohisowndiscretion,thanwhencontrolledinanywayinwhichsocietyhaveitintheirpowertocontrolhim;orbecausetheattempttoexercisecontrolwouldproduceotherevils,greaterthanthosewhichitwouldprevent.Whensuchreasonsastheseprecludethe enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacantjudgment seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judginghimselfall themore rigidly,because thecasedoesnotadmitofhisbeingmadeaccountable to thejudgmentofhisfellow-creatures.

Butthereisasphereofactioninwhichsociety,asdistinguishedfromtheindividual,has,ifany,onlyanindirectinterest;comprehendingallthatportionofaperson'slifeandconductwhichaffectsonlyhimself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and

participation.WhenIsayonlyhimself,Imeandirectly,andinthefirstinstance:forwhateveraffectshimself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on thiscontingency,willreceiveconsiderationinthesequel.This,then,istheappropriateregionofhumanliberty.Itcomprises,first,theinwarddomainofconsciousness;demandinglibertyofconscience,inthe most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion andsentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,moral, or theological. The liberty ofexpressingandpublishingopinionsmayseemtofallunderadifferentprinciple,sinceitbelongstothatpartoftheconductofanindividualwhichconcernsotherpeople;but,beingalmostofasmuchimportanceasthelibertyofthoughtitself,andrestingingreatpartonthesamereasons,ispracticallyinseparablefromit.Secondly,theprinciplerequireslibertyoftastesandpursuits;offramingtheplanof our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as mayfollow:withoutimpedimentfromourfellow-creatures,solongaswhatwedodoesnotharmthem,eventhoughtheyshouldthinkourconductfoolish,perverse,orwrong.Thirdly,fromthislibertyofeach individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals;freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining beingsupposedtobeoffullage,andnotforcedordeceived.

Nosocietyinwhichtheselibertiesarenot,onthewhole,respected,isfree,whatevermaybeitsformofgovernment;andnoneiscompletelyfreeinwhichtheydonotexistabsoluteandunqualified.Theonlyfreedomwhichdeservesthename,isthatofpursuingourowngoodinourownway,solongaswedonotattempttodepriveothersoftheirs,orimpedetheireffortstoobtainit.Eachistheproperguardianofhisownhealth,whetherbodily,ormentalandspiritual.Mankindaregreatergainersbysufferingeachothertoliveasseemsgoodtothemselves,thanbycompellingeachtoliveasseemsgoodtotherest.

Thoughthisdoctrineisanythingbutnew,and,tosomepersons,mayhavetheairofatruism,thereisno doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion andpractice.Societyhasexpendedfullyasmucheffortintheattempt(accordingtoitslights)tocompelpeople to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence.The ancient commonwealthsthoughtthemselvesentitledtopractise,andtheancientphilosopherscountenanced,theregulationofeverypartofprivateconductbypublicauthority,onthegroundthattheStatehadadeepinterestinthewholebodilyandmentaldisciplineofeveryoneofitscitizens;amodeofthinkingwhichmayhavebeen admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of beingsubverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and towhich even a short interval of relaxedenergyandself-commandmightsoeasilybefatal,thattheycouldnotaffordtowaitforthesalutarypermanent effects of freedom. In themodernworld, thegreater size of political communities, andabove all, the separation between spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction ofmen's consciences in other hands than thosewhich controlled their worldly affairs), prevented sogreatan interferenceby law in thedetailsofprivate life;but theenginesofmoral repressionhavebeenwieldedmorestrenuouslyagainstdivergencefromthereigningopinioninself-regarding,thaneven in social matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into theformation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of ahierarchy,seekingcontrolovereverydepartmentofhumanconduct,orbythespiritofPuritanism.And some of thosemodern reformerswho have placed themselves in strongest opposition to thereligionsofthepast,havebeennowaybehindeitherchurchesorsectsintheirassertionoftherightofspiritual domination: M. Comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Traité dePolitiquePositive,aimsatestablishing(thoughbymoralmorethanbylegalappliances)adespotismof society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of themost

rigiddisciplinarianamongtheancientphilosophers.

Apartfromthepeculiartenetsofindividualthinkers,thereisalsointheworldatlargeanincreasinginclinationtostretchundulythepowersofsocietyovertheindividual,bothbytheforceofopinionandevenbythatoflegislation:andasthetendencyofallthechangestakingplaceintheworldistostrengthensociety,anddiminishthepoweroftheindividual,thisencroachmentisnotoneoftheevilswhichtendspontaneouslytodisappear,but,onthecontrary,togrowmoreandmoreformidable.Thedisposition ofmankind,whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens to impose their own opinions andinclinationsasaruleofconductonothers,issoenergeticallysupportedbysomeofthebestandbysome of theworst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint byanythingbutwantofpower;andasthepowerisnotdeclining,butgrowing,unlessastrongbarrierofmoralconvictioncanberaisedagainstthemischief,wemustexpect,inthepresentcircumstancesoftheworld,toseeitincrease.

It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, weconfineourselvesinthefirstinstancetoasinglebranchofit,onwhichtheprincipleherestatedis,ifnotfully,yettoacertainpoint,recognisedbythecurrentopinions.ThisonebranchistheLibertyofThought: from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing.Although these liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political morality of allcountrieswhichprofessreligioustolerationandfreeinstitutions,thegrounds,bothphilosophicalandpractical, onwhich they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the generalmind, nor so thoroughlyappreciatedbymanyevenof the leadersofopinion, asmighthavebeenexpected.Thosegrounds,whenrightlyunderstood,areofmuchwiderapplicationthantoonlyonedivisionofthesubject,andathorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to theremainder. Those to whom nothing which I am about to say will be new, may therefore, I hope,excuseme,ifonasubjectwhichfornowthreecenturieshasbeensooftendiscussed,Iventureononediscussionmore.

CHAPTERII.OFTHELIBERTYOFTHOUGHTANDDISCUSSION.

Thetime, it is tobehoped, isgoneby,whenanydefencewouldbenecessaryof the"libertyof thepress" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we maysuppose,cannowbeneeded,againstpermittingalegislatureoranexecutive,notidentifiedininterestwiththepeople,toprescribeopinionstothem,anddeterminewhatdoctrinesorwhatargumentstheyshallbeallowedtohear.Thisaspectofthequestion,besides,hasbeensooftenandsotriumphantlyenforcedbyprecedingwriters,thatitneednotbespeciallyinsistedoninthisplace.ThoughthelawofEngland,onthesubjectofthepress,isasserviletothisdayasitwasinthetimeoftheTudors,thereis little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during sometemporarypanic,whenfearofinsurrectiondrivesministersandjudgesfromtheirpropriety;[6]and,speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended that the government,whethercompletelyresponsibletothepeopleornot,willoftenattempttocontroltheexpressionofopinion,exceptwhenindoingsoitmakesitselftheorganofthegeneralintoleranceofthepublic.Letus suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks ofexertinganypowerofcoercionunless inagreementwithwhat it conceives tobe theirvoice.But Idenytherightofthepeopletoexercisesuchcoercion,eitherbythemselvesorbytheirgovernment.Thepower itself is illegitimate.Thebestgovernmenthasnomore title to it than theworst. It is asnoxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in oropposition to it. If allmankindminus one,were of one opinion, andonly one personwere of thecontraryopinion,mankindwouldbenomorejustifiedinsilencingthatoneperson,thanhe,ifhehadthe power,would be justified in silencingmankind.Were an opinion a personal possession of novalueexcepttotheowner;if tobeobstructedintheenjoymentofitweresimplyaprivateinjury,itwouldmakesomedifferencewhethertheinjurywasinflictedonlyonafewpersonsoronmany.Butthe peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race;posterityaswellastheexistinggeneration;thosewhodissentfromtheopinion,stillmorethanthosewhoholdit.Iftheopinionisright,theyaredeprivedoftheopportunityofexchangingerrorfortruth:ifwrong,theylose,whatisalmostasgreatabenefit,theclearerperceptionandlivelierimpressionoftruth,producedbyitscollisionwitherror.

Itisnecessarytoconsiderseparatelythesetwohypotheses,eachofwhichhasadistinctbranchoftheargumentcorrespondingtoit.Wecanneverbesurethattheopinionweareendeavouringtostifleisafalseopinion;andifweweresure,stiflingitwouldbeanevilstill.

First: the opinionwhich it is attempted to suppress by authoritymay possibly be true. Thosewhodesire tosuppress it,ofcoursedeny its truth;but theyarenot infallible.Theyhavenoauthority todecidethequestionforallmankind,andexcludeeveryotherpersonfromthemeansofjudging.Torefuseahearingtoanopinion,becausetheyaresurethatitisfalse,istoassumethattheircertaintyisthesamethingasabsolutecertainty.Allsilencingofdiscussion isanassumptionof infallibility. Itscondemnationmaybeallowedtorestonthiscommonargument,nottheworseforbeingcommon.

Unfortunately for the good sense ofmankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the

weightintheirpracticaljudgment,whichisalwaysallowedtoitintheory;forwhileeveryonewellknows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their ownfallibility,oradmitthesuppositionthatanyopinion,ofwhichtheyfeelverycertain,maybeoneoftheexamplesof the error towhich theyacknowledge themselves tobe liable.Absoluteprinces,orotherswhoareaccustomedtounlimiteddeference,usuallyfeelthiscompleteconfidenceintheirownopinions on nearly all subjects. Peoplemore happily situated,who sometimes hear their opinionsdisputed,andarenotwhollyunusedtobesetrightwhentheyarewrong,placethesameunboundedrelianceonlyon suchof their opinions as are sharedby allwho surround them,or towhom theyhabituallydefer:forinproportiontoaman'swantofconfidenceinhisownsolitaryjudgment,doesheusuallyrepose,withimplicittrust,ontheinfallibilityof"theworld"ingeneral.Andtheworld,toeachindividual,meansthepartofitwithwhichhecomesincontact;hisparty,hissect,hischurch,hisclassofsociety:themanmaybecalled,bycomparison,almostliberalandlarge-mindedtowhomitmeans anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in thiscollective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches,classes,andpartieshavethought,andevennowthink, theexactreverse.Hedevolvesuponhisownworld the responsibilityof being in the right against thedissentientworldsof otherpeople; and itnevertroubleshimthatmereaccidenthasdecidedwhichofthesenumerousworldsistheobjectofhisreliance,andthatthesamecauseswhichmakehimaChurchmaninLondon,wouldhavemadehimaBuddhistoraConfucianinPekin.Yetitisasevidentinitselfasanyamountofargumentcanmakeit,that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions whichsubsequentageshavedeemednotonlyfalsebutabsurd;anditisascertainthatmanyopinions,nowgeneral,willberejectedbyfutureages,asitisthatmany,oncegeneral,arerejectedbythepresent.

The objection likely to be made to this argument, would probably take some such form as thefollowing.Thereisnogreaterassumptionofinfallibilityinforbiddingthepropagationoferror,thaninanyotherthingwhichisdonebypublicauthorityonitsownjudgmentandresponsibility.Judgmentisgiventomenthattheymayuseit.Becauseitmaybeusederroneously,arementobetoldthattheyought not to use it at all?To prohibitwhat they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption fromerror,but fulfilling theduty incumbenton them,although fallible, of actingon their conscientiousconviction.Ifwewerenevertoactonouropinions,becausethoseopinionsmaybewrong,weshouldleaveallourinterestsuncaredfor,andallourdutiesunperformed.Anobjectionwhichappliestoallconduct,canbenovalidobjectiontoanyconductinparticular.Itisthedutyofgovernments,andofindividuals,toformthetruestopinionstheycan;toformthemcarefully,andneverimposethemuponothersunlesstheyarequitesureofbeingright.Butwhentheyaresure(suchreasonersmaysay),itisnot conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrineswhichtheyhonestlythinkdangeroustothewelfareofmankind,eitherinthislifeorinanother,tobescattered abroadwithout restraint, becauseother people, in less enlightened times, havepersecutedopinionsnowbelievedtobetrue.Letustakecare,itmaybesaid,nottomakethesamemistake:butgovernmentsandnationshavemademistakesinotherthings,whicharenotdeniedtobefitsubjectsfortheexerciseofauthority:theyhavelaidonbadtaxes,madeunjustwars.Oughtwethereforetolayonnotaxes,and,underwhateverprovocation,makenowars?Men,andgovernments,mustacttothebestoftheirability.Thereisnosuchthingasabsolutecertainty,butthereisassurancesufficientforthepurposesofhumanlife.Wemay,andmust,assumeouropiniontobetruefortheguidanceofourown conduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by thepropagationofopinionswhichweregardasfalseandpernicious.

Ianswerthatitisassumingverymuchmore.Thereisthegreatestdifferencebetweenpresuminganopinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and

assumingitstruthforthepurposeofnotpermittingitsrefutation.Completelibertyofcontradictinganddisprovingouropinion,istheveryconditionwhichjustifiesusinassumingitstruthforpurposesof action; and on no other terms can a beingwith human faculties have any rational assurance ofbeingright.

Whenweconsidereitherthehistoryofopinion,ortheordinaryconductofhumanlife,towhatisittobeascribedthattheoneandtheotherarenoworsethantheyare?Notcertainlytotheinherentforceofthehumanunderstanding;for,onanymatternotself-evident,thereareninety-ninepersonstotallyincapableofjudgingofit,foronewhoiscapable;andthecapacityofthehundredthpersonisonlycomparative;forthemajorityoftheeminentmenofeverypastgenerationheldmanyopinionsnowknowntobeerroneous,anddidorapprovednumerousthingswhichnoonewillnowjustify.Whyisit,then,thatthereisonthewholeapreponderanceamongmankindofrationalopinionsandrationalconduct? If there really is thispreponderance—which theremustbe,unlesshumanaffairs are, andhavealwaysbeen,inanalmostdesperatestate—itisowingtoaqualityofthehumanmind,thesourceofeverythingrespectableinmaneitherasanintellectualorasamoralbeing,namely,thathiserrorsare corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not byexperience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted.Wrongopinionsandpracticesgraduallyyieldtofactandargument:butfactsandarguments,toproduceanyeffectonthemind,mustbebroughtbeforeit.Veryfewfactsareabletotelltheirownstory,withoutcomments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment,dependingontheoneproperty,thatitcanbesetrightwhenitiswrong,reliancecanbeplacedonitonlywhenthemeansofsettingitrightarekeptconstantlyathand.Inthecaseofanypersonwhosejudgmentisreallydeservingofconfidence,howhasitbecomeso?Becausehehaskepthismindopentocriticismofhisopinionsandconduct.Becauseithasbeenhispracticetolistentoallthatcouldbesaidagainsthim;toprofitbyasmuchofitaswasjust,andexpoundtohimself,anduponoccasiontoothers, the fallacyofwhatwas fallacious.Becausehehas felt, that theonlyway inwhichahumanbeingcanmake someapproach toknowing thewholeof a subject, isbyhearingwhat canbe saidaboutitbypersonsofeveryvarietyofopinion,andstudyingallmodesinwhichitcanbelookedatbyeverycharacterofmind.Nowisemaneveracquiredhiswisdominanymodebutthis;norisitinthenature of human intellect to becomewise in anyothermanner.The steadyhabit of correcting andcompleting his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt andhesitationincarryingitintopractice,istheonlystablefoundationforajustrelianceonit:for,beingcognisant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his positionagainstallgainsayers—knowingthathehassoughtforobjectionsanddifficulties,insteadofavoidingthem,andhasshutoutnolightwhichcanbethrownuponthesubjectfromanyquarter—hehasarighttothinkhisjudgmentbetterthanthatofanyperson,oranymultitude,whohavenotgonethroughasimilarprocess.

Itisnottoomuchtorequirethatwhatthewisestofmankind,thosewhoarebestentitledtotrusttheirown judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by thatmiscellaneous collection of a fewwise andmany foolish individuals, called the public. Themostintolerantofchurches, theRomanCatholicChurch,evenat thecanonisationofasaint,admits,andlistens patiently to, a "devil's advocate." The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted toposthumoushonours,untilallthatthedevilcouldsayagainsthimisknownandweighed.IfeventheNewtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as completeassuranceofitstruthastheynowdo.Thebeliefswhichwehavemostwarrantfor,havenosafeguardtoreston,butastandinginvitationtothewholeworldtoprovethemunfounded.Ifthechallengeisnotaccepted,orisacceptedandtheattemptfails,wearefarenoughfromcertaintystill;butwehavedonethebestthattheexistingstateofhumanreasonadmitsof;wehaveneglectednothingthatcouldgivethetruthachanceofreachingus:ifthelistsarekeptopen,wemayhopethatiftherebeabettertruth,itwillbefoundwhenthehumanmindiscapableofreceivingit;andinthemeantimewemayrelyonhavingattainedsuchapproachtotruth,asispossibleinourownday.Thisistheamountofcertaintyattainablebyafalliblebeing,andthisthesolewayofattainingit.

Strange it is, thatmenshouldadmit thevalidityof thearguments for freediscussion,butobject totheirbeing"pushedtoanextreme;"notseeingthatunlessthereasonsaregoodforanextremecase,they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuminginfallibility,when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjectswhich canpossiblybedoubtful,but think thatsomeparticularprincipleordoctrineshouldbeforbidden tobequestioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call anypropositioncertain,whilethereisanyonewhowoulddenyitscertaintyifpermitted,butwhoisnotpermitted,istoassumethatweourselves,andthosewhoagreewithus,arethejudgesofcertainty,andjudgeswithouthearingtheotherside.

In the present age—whichhas been described as "destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism"—inwhichpeoplefeelsure,notsomuchthattheiropinionsaretrue,asthattheyshouldnotknowwhattodowithoutthem—theclaimsofanopiniontobeprotectedfrompublicattackarerestednotsomuchonitstruth,asonitsimportancetosociety.Thereare,itisalleged,certainbeliefs,souseful,nottosayindispensabletowell-being,thatitisasmuchthedutyofgovernmentstoupholdthosebeliefs,astoprotectanyotheroftheinterestsofsociety.Inacaseofsuchnecessity,andsodirectlyinthelineoftheir duty, something less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even bind,governments, toacton theirownopinion,confirmedby thegeneralopinionofmankind. It isalsooftenargued,andstilloftenerthought,thatnonebutbadmenwoulddesiretoweakenthesesalutarybeliefs;andtherecanbenothingwrong,it is thought, inrestrainingbadmen,andprohibitingwhatonlysuchmenwouldwishtopractise.Thismodeofthinkingmakesthejustificationofrestraintsondiscussionnotaquestionof the truthofdoctrines,butof theirusefulness;andflatters itselfby thatmeans toescape theresponsibilityofclaiming tobean infallible judgeofopinions.But thosewhothussatisfythemselves,donotperceivethattheassumptionofinfallibilityismerelyshiftedfromonepoint toanother.Theusefulnessofanopinion is itselfmatterofopinion:asdisputable, asopen todiscussion, and requiring discussion asmuch, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of aninfalliblejudgeofopinionstodecideanopiniontobenoxious,astodecideittobefalse,unlesstheopinioncondemnedhasfullopportunityofdefendingitself.Anditwillnotdotosaythatthehereticmaybeallowedtomaintaintheutilityorharmlessnessofhisopinion,thoughforbiddentomaintainitstruth.Thetruthofanopinionispartofitsutility.Ifwewouldknowwhetherornotitisdesirablethatapropositionshouldbebelieved,isitpossibletoexcludetheconsiderationofwhetherornotitistrue?Intheopinion,notofbadmen,butofthebestmen,nobeliefwhichiscontrarytotruthcanbe

really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged withculpabilityfordenyingsomedoctrinewhichtheyaretoldisuseful,butwhichtheybelievetobefalse?Thosewhoareonthesideofreceivedopinions,neverfailtotakeallpossibleadvantageofthisplea;youdonotfindthemhandlingthequestionofutilityasifitcouldbecompletelyabstractedfromthatoftruth:onthecontrary,itis,aboveall,becausetheirdoctrineis"thetruth,"thattheknowledgeorthebelief of it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of the question ofusefulness,when an argument sovitalmaybe employedonone side, but not on theother.And inpointoffact,whenlaworpublicfeelingdonotpermitthetruthofanopiniontobedisputed,theyarejust as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they allow is an extenuation of itsabsolutenecessity,orofthepositiveguiltofrejectingit.

Inordermorefullytoillustratethemischiefofdenyingahearingtoopinionsbecausewe,inourownjudgment,havecondemnedthem, itwillbedesirable tofixdownthediscussiontoaconcretecase;and I choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me—in which the argumentagainst freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered thestrongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any of thecommonlyreceiveddoctrinesofmorality.Tofightthebattleonsuchground,givesagreatadvantagetoanunfairantagonist;sincehewillbesuretosay(andmanywhohavenodesiretobeunfairwillsayitinternally),Arethesethedoctrineswhichyoudonotdeemsufficientlycertaintobetakenundertheprotectionoflaw?IsthebeliefinaGodoneoftheopinions,tofeelsureofwhich,youholdtobeassuminginfallibility?ButImustbepermittedtoobserve,thatitisnotthefeelingsureofadoctrine(be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide thatquestion for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And Idenounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemnconvictions. However positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of theperniciousconsequences—notonlyoftheperniciousconsequences,but(toadoptexpressionswhichIaltogether condemn) the immorality and impietyof anopinion;yet if, inpursuanceof that privatejudgment, thoughbackedby thepublic judgmentofhiscountryorhiscontemporaries,hepreventstheopinionfrombeingheardinitsdefence,heassumesinfallibility.Andsofarfromtheassumptionbeinglessobjectionableorlessdangerousbecausetheopinioniscalledimmoralorimpious,thisisthecaseofallothersinwhichitismostfatal.Theseareexactlytheoccasionsonwhichthemenofone generation commit those dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror ofposterity.Itisamongsuchthatwefindtheinstancesmemorableinhistory,whenthearmofthelawhasbeenemployedtorootoutthebestmenandthenoblestdoctrines;withdeplorablesuccessastothemen,thoughsomeofthedoctrineshavesurvivedtobe(asifinmockery)invoked,indefenceofsimilarconducttowardsthosewhodissentfromthem,orfromtheirreceivedinterpretation.

MankindcanhardlybetoooftenremindedthattherewasonceamannamedSocrates,betweenwhomandthelegalauthoritiesandpublicopinionofhistime,theretookplaceamemorablecollision.Bornin an age andcountry abounding in individualgreatness, thismanhasbeenhandeddown tousbythosewhobestknewbothhimandtheage,asthemostvirtuousmaninit;whileweknowhimastheheadandprototypeofallsubsequentteachersofvirtue,thesourceequallyoftheloftyinspirationofPlatoandthejudiciousutilitarianismofAristotle,"imaëstridicolorchesanno,"thetwoheadspringsofethicalasofallotherphilosophy.Thisacknowledgedmasterofalltheeminentthinkerswhohavesince lived—whose fame, still growing aftermore than two thousand years, all but outweighs thewhole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious—was put to death by hiscountrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the godsrecognisedbytheState;indeedhisaccuserasserted(seethe"Apologia")thathebelievedinnogods

atall.Immorality,inbeing,byhisdoctrinesandinstructions,a"corruptorofyouth."Ofthesechargesthetribunal,thereiseverygroundforbelieving,honestlyfoundhimguilty,andcondemnedthemanwhoprobablyofallthenbornhaddeservedbestofmankind,tobeputtodeathasacriminal.

To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after thecondemnationofSocrates,wouldnotbeananticlimax:theeventwhichtookplaceonCalvaryrathermorethaneighteenhundredyearsago.Themanwholeftonthememoryofthosewhowitnessedhislifeandconversation,suchanimpressionofhismoralgrandeur, thateighteensubsequentcenturieshavedonehomagetohimastheAlmightyinperson,wasignominiouslyputtodeath,aswhat?Asablasphemer.Mendidnotmerelymistaketheirbenefactor;theymistookhimfortheexactcontraryofwhathewas,andtreatedhimasthatprodigyofimpiety,whichtheythemselvesarenowheldtobe,fortheir treatmentofhim.The feelingswithwhichmankindnowregard these lamentable transactions,especiallythelaterofthetwo,renderthemextremelyunjustintheirjudgmentoftheunhappyactors.These were, to all appearance, not bad men—not worse than men commonly are, but rather thecontrary;menwhopossessedinafull,orsomewhatmorethanafullmeasure,thereligious,moral,and patriotic feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our ownincluded, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected.The high-priestwhorenthisgarmentswhenthewordswerepronounced,which,accordingtoalltheideasofhiscountry,constitutedtheblackestguilt,wasinallprobabilityquiteassincereinhishorrorandindignation,asthe generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments theyprofess;andmostof thosewhonowshudderathisconduct, if theyhad lived inhis time,andbeenbornJews,wouldhaveactedpreciselyashedid.OrthodoxChristianswhoaretemptedtothinkthatthosewhostonedtodeaththefirstmartyrsmusthavebeenworsementhantheythemselvesare,oughttorememberthatoneofthosepersecutorswasSaintPaul.

Letusaddonemoreexample,themoststrikingofall,iftheimpressivenessofanerrorismeasuredbythewisdomandvirtueofhimwhofallsintoit.Ifeveranyone,possessedofpower,hadgroundsfor thinking himself the best andmost enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the EmperorMarcusAurelius.Absolutemonarchofthewholecivilisedworld,hepreservedthroughlifenotonlythemostunblemishedjustice,butwhatwaslesstobeexpectedfromhisStoicalbreeding,thetenderestheart. The few failings which are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence: while hiswritings,thehighestethicalproductoftheancientmind,differscarcelyperceptibly,iftheydifferatall, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a better Christian in all but thedogmaticsenseof theword, thanalmostanyof theostensiblyChristiansovereignswhohavesincereigned, persecutedChristianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity,withanopen,unfetteredintellect,andacharacterwhichledhimofhimselftoembodyinhismoralwritingstheChristianideal,heyetfailedtoseethatChristianitywastobeagoodandnotaneviltotheworld,withhisdutiestowhichhewassodeeplypenetrated.Existingsocietyheknewtobeinadeplorablestate.Butsuchasitwas,hesaw,orthoughthesaw,thatitwasheldtogether,andpreventedfrom being worse, by belief and reverence of the received divinities. As a ruler of mankind, hedeemed it hisdutynot to suffer society to fall inpieces; and sawnothow, if its existing tieswereremoved, anyothers couldbe formedwhich could againknit it together.Thenew religionopenlyaimedatdissolvingtheseties:unless,therefore,itwashisdutytoadoptthatreligion,itseemedtobehisdutytoputitdown.InasmuchthenasthetheologyofChristianitydidnotappeartohimtrueorofdivine origin; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucifiedGodwas not credible to him, and asystemwhichpurportedtorestentirelyuponafoundationtohimsowhollyunbelievable,couldnotbeforeseenbyhimtobethatrenovatingagencywhich,afterallabatements,ithasinfactprovedtobe; the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty,

authorised the persecution ofChristianity.Tomymind this is one of themost tragical facts in allhistory.Itisabitterthought,howdifferentathingtheChristianityoftheworldmighthavebeen,iftheChristianfaithhadbeenadoptedasthereligionoftheempireundertheauspicesofMarcusAureliusinsteadofthoseofConstantine.Butitwouldbeequallyunjusttohimandfalsetotruth,todeny,thatno one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching, was wanting to MarcusAureliusforpunishing,ashedid,thepropagationofChristianity.NoChristianmorefirmlybelievesthatAtheismisfalse,andtendstothedissolutionofsociety,thanMarcusAureliusbelievedthesamethingsofChristianity;hewho,ofallmenthenliving,mighthavebeenthoughtthemostcapableofappreciating it. Unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions,flattershimself thathe isawiserandbetterman thanMarcusAurelius—moredeeplyversed in thewisdomofhistime,moreelevatedinhisintellectaboveit—moreearnestinhissearchfortruth,ormoresingle-mindedinhisdevotionto itwhenfound;—lethimabstainfromthatassumptionof thejointinfallibilityofhimselfandthemultitude,whichthegreatAntoninusmadewithsounfortunatearesult.

Awareof the impossibilityofdefendingtheuseofpunishmentforrestrainingirreligiousopinions,byanyargumentwhichwillnot justifyMarcusAntoninus, theenemiesof religiousfreedom,whenhardpressed,occasionallyacceptthisconsequence,andsay,withDr.Johnson,thatthepersecutorsofChristianitywere in the right; that persecution is anordeal throughwhich truthought to pass, andalways passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, thoughsometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. This is a form of the argument forreligiousintolerance,sufficientlyremarkablenottobepassedwithoutnotice.

Atheorywhichmaintainsthattruthmayjustifiablybepersecutedbecausepersecutioncannotpossiblydoitanyharm,cannotbechargedwithbeingintentionallyhostiletothereceptionofnewtruths;butwecannotcommendthegenerosityofitsdealingwiththepersonstowhommankindareindebtedforthem.Todiscovertotheworldsomethingwhichdeeplyconcernsit,andofwhichitwaspreviouslyignorant;toprovetoitthatithadbeenmistakenonsomevitalpointoftemporalorspiritualinterest,isasimportantaserviceasahumanbeingcanrendertohisfellow-creatures,andincertaincases,asinthoseoftheearlyChristiansandoftheReformers,thosewhothinkwithDr.Johnsonbelieveittohave been themost precious gift which could be bestowed onmankind. That the authors of suchsplendidbenefitsshouldberequitedbymartyrdom;thattheirrewardshouldbetobedealtwithasthevilestofcriminals, isnot,uponthis theory,adeplorableerrorandmisfortune,forwhichhumanityshouldmourninsackclothandashes,butthenormalandjustifiablestateofthings.Thepropounderofanewtruth,accordingtothisdoctrine,shouldstand,asstood,inthelegislationoftheLocrians,theproposerofanewlaw,withahalterroundhisneck,tobeinstantlytightenedifthepublicassemblydidnot,onhearinghisreasons,thenandthereadopthisproposition.Peoplewhodefendthismodeoftreatingbenefactors,cannotbesupposedtosetmuchvalueonthebenefit;andIbelievethisviewofthe subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have beendesirableonce,butthatwehavehadenoughofthemnow.

But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasantfalsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which allexperiencerefutes.Historyteemswithinstancesof truthputdownbypersecution.Ifnotsuppressedforever,itmaybethrownbackforcenturies.Tospeakonlyofreligiousopinions:theReformationbrokeoutatleasttwentytimesbeforeLuther,andwasputdown.ArnoldofBresciawasputdown.FraDolcinowasputdown.Savonarolawasputdown.TheAlbigeoiswereputdown.TheVaudoiswereput down.TheLollardswereput down.TheHussiteswereput down.Even after the eraofLuther,

wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrianempire,Protestantismwasrootedout;and,most likely,wouldhavebeensoinEngland,hadQueenMarylived,orQueenElizabethdied.Persecutionhasalwayssucceeded,savewherethehereticsweretoostrongapartytobeeffectuallypersecuted.NoreasonablepersoncandoubtthatChristianitymighthave been extirpated in the Roman Empire. It spread, and became predominant, because thepersecutionswereonlyoccasional,lastingbutashorttime,andseparatedbylongintervalsofalmostundisturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has anyinherentpowerdenied toerror,ofprevailingagainst thedungeonand thestake.Menarenotmorezealousfortruththantheyoftenareforerror,andasufficientapplicationoflegalorevenofsocialpenaltieswillgenerallysucceedinstoppingthepropagationofeither.Therealadvantagewhichtruthhas,consistsinthis,thatwhenanopinionistrue,itmaybeextinguishedonce,twice,ormanytimes,butinthecourseofagestherewillgenerallybefoundpersonstorediscoverit,untilsomeoneofitsreappearancesfallsonatimewhenfromfavourablecircumstancesitescapespersecutionuntilithasmadesuchheadastowithstandallsubsequentattemptstosuppressit.

Itwillbesaid,thatwedonotnowputtodeaththeintroducersofnewopinions:wearenotlikeourfatherswhoslewtheprophets,weevenbuildsepulchrestothem.Itistruewenolongerputhereticstodeath;andtheamountofpenalinflictionwhichmodernfeelingwouldprobablytolerate,evenagainstthemostobnoxiousopinions,isnotsufficienttoextirpatethem.Butletusnotflatterourselvesthatweare yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for itsexpression,stillexistbylaw;andtheirenforcementisnot,eveninthesetimes,sounexampledastomake it at all incredible that theymay some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at thesummer assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man,[7] said to be of unexceptionableconductinallrelationsoflife,wassentencedtotwenty-onemonths'imprisonment,foruttering,andwritingonagate,someoffensivewordsconcerningChristianity.Withinamonthofthesametime,attheOldBailey,twopersons,ontwoseparateoccasions,[8]wererejectedasjurymen,andoneofthemgrosslyinsultedbythejudgeandbyoneofthecounsel,becausetheyhonestlydeclaredthattheyhadno theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,[9] for the same reason,was denied justice against athief.Thisrefusalofredresstookplaceinvirtueofthelegaldoctrine,thatnopersoncanbeallowedtogiveevidenceinacourtofjustice,whodoesnotprofessbeliefinaGod(anygodissufficient)andin a future state; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from theprotectionof the tribunals;whomaynot only be robbedor assaultedwith impunity, if noonebutthemselves,orpersonsofsimilaropinions,bepresent,butanyoneelsemayberobbedorassaultedwith impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence.The assumption onwhich this isgrounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who does not believe in a future state; aproposition which betokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it ishistorically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguishedintegrity and honour); and would bemaintained by no one who had the smallest conception howmanyofthepersonsingreatestreputewiththeworld,bothforvirtuesandforattainments,arewellknown,at least to their intimates, tobeunbelievers.Therule,besides, issuicidal,andcutsawayitsownfoundation.Underpretencethatatheistsmustbeliars,itadmitsthetestimonyofallatheistswhoarewilling to lie, and rejects only thosewho brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a detestedcreed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards itsprofessed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution; apersecution, too,havingthepeculiarity, that thequalificationforundergoingit, is thebeingclearlyprovednottodeserveit.Therule,andthetheoryitimplies,arehardlylessinsultingtobelieversthantoinfidels.Forifhewhodoesnotbelieveinafuturestate,necessarilylies,itfollowsthattheywhodo

believeareonlypreventedfromlying,ifpreventedtheyare,bythefearofhell.Wewillnotdotheauthorsandabettorsoftheruletheinjuryofsupposing,thattheconceptionwhichtheyhaveformedofChristianvirtueisdrawnfromtheirownconsciousness.

These, indeed,arebut ragsandremnantsofpersecution,andmaybe thought tobenotsomuchanindicationof thewishtopersecute,asanexampleof thatveryfrequent infirmityofEnglishminds,whichmakesthemtakeapreposterouspleasureintheassertionofabadprinciple,whentheyarenolongerbadenoughtodesiretocarryitreallyintopractice.Butunhappilythereisnosecurityinthestateofthepublicmind,thatthesuspensionofworseformsoflegalpersecution,whichhaslastedforabout the space of a generation, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as oftenruffledby attempts to resuscitatepast evils, as to introducenewbenefits.What is boastedof at thepresenttimeastherevivalofreligion,isalways,innarrowanduncultivatedminds,atleastasmuchtherevivalofbigotry;andwherethereisthestrongpermanentleavenofintoleranceinthefeelingsofapeople,whichatalltimesabidesinthemiddleclassesofthiscountry,itneedsbutlittletoprovokethem into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects ofpersecution.[10] For it is this—it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish,respectingthosewhodisownthebeliefstheydeemimportant,whichmakesthiscountrynotaplaceofmentalfreedom.Foralongtimepast,thechiefmischiefofthelegalpenaltiesisthattheystrengthenthesocialstigma.Itisthatstigmawhichisreallyeffective,andsoeffectiveisitthattheprofessionofopinionswhichareunderthebanofsocietyismuchlesscommoninEngland,thanis,inmanyothercountries, theavowalof thosewhichincurriskof judicialpunishment.Inrespect toallpersonsbutthose whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people,opinion,onthissubject,isasefficaciousaslaw;menmightaswellbeimprisoned,asexcludedfromthemeansofearningtheirbread.Thosewhosebreadisalreadysecured,andwhodesirenofavoursfrommeninpower,orfrombodiesofmen,orfromthepublic,havenothingtofearfromtheopenavowalofanyopinions,buttobeill-thoughtofandill-spokenof,andthisitoughtnottorequireavery heroicmould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal admisericordiam inbehalfofsuchpersons.Butthoughwedonotnowinflictsomuchevilonthosewhothinkdifferentlyfromus,asitwasformerlyourcustomtodo,itmaybethatwedoourselvesasmuchevilaseverbyour treatment of them. Socrateswas put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose like the sun inheaven,andspreaditsilluminationoverthewholeintellectualfirmament.Christianswerecasttothelions,but theChristianchurchgrewupastatelyandspreading tree,overtopping theolderand lessvigorousgrowths,andstifling themby itsshade.Ourmerelysocial intolerancekillsnoone, rootsout no opinions, but inducesmen to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for theirdiffusion.Withus,hereticalopinionsdonotperceptiblygain,orevenlose,groundineachdecadeorgeneration; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles ofthinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the generalaffairsofmankindwitheithera trueoradeceptive light.Andthus iskeptupastateof thingsverysatisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoninganybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutelyinterdicttheexerciseofreasonbydissentientsafflictedwiththemaladyofthought.Aconvenientplanforhavingpeaceintheintellectualworld,andkeepingallthingsgoingonthereinverymuchastheydo already.But thepricepaid for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the sacrificeof the entiremoralcourageofthehumanmind.Astateofthingsinwhichalargeportionofthemostactiveandinquiringintellectsfinditadvisabletokeepthegenuineprinciplesandgroundsoftheirconvictionswithintheirownbreasts,andattempt,inwhattheyaddresstothepublic,tofitasmuchastheycanoftheirownconclusionstopremiseswhichtheyhaveinternallyrenounced,cannotsendforththeopen,

fearlesscharacters,andlogical,consistentintellectswhoonceadornedthethinkingworld.Thesortofmenwhocanbelookedforunderit,areeithermereconformerstocommonplace,ortime-serversfortruth,whoseargumentsonallgreatsubjectsaremeantfortheirhearers,andarenotthosewhichhaveconvincedthemselves.Thosewhoavoidthisalternative,dosobynarrowingtheirthoughtsandinteresttothingswhichcanbespokenofwithoutventuringwithintheregionofprinciples,thatis,tosmall practicalmatters,whichwould come right of themselves, if but theminds ofmankindwerestrengthenedandenlarged,andwhichwillneverbemadeeffectuallyrightuntilthen:whilethatwhichwould strengthen and enlargemen'sminds, free and daring speculation on the highest subjects, isabandoned.

Thoseinwhoseeyesthisreticenceonthepartofhereticsisnoevil,shouldconsiderinthefirstplace,that inconsequenceof it there isneveranyfairand thoroughdiscussionofhereticalopinions;andthatsuchofthemascouldnotstandsuchadiscussion,thoughtheymaybepreventedfromspreading,donotdisappear.Butitisnotthemindsofhereticsthataredeterioratedmost,bythebanplacedonallinquirywhichdoesnotendintheorthodoxconclusions.Thegreatestharmdoneistothosewhoarenotheretics,andwhosewholementaldevelopmentiscramped,andtheirreasoncowed,bythefearofheresy.Whocancomputewhattheworldlosesinthemultitudeofpromisingintellectscombinedwithtimid characters,who dare not followout any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest itshould land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral?Amongthemwemayoccasionallyseesomemanofdeepconscientiousness,andsubtleandrefinedunderstanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, andexhauststheresourcesofingenuityinattemptingtoreconcilethepromptingsofhisconscienceandreasonwithorthodoxy,whichyethedoesnot,perhaps,totheendsucceedindoing.Noonecanbeagreat thinkerwhodoes not recognise, that as a thinker it is his first duty to followhis intellect towhateverconclusions itmaylead.Truthgainsmoreevenby theerrorsofonewho,withduestudyandpreparation, thinksforhimself, thanbythetrueopinionsof thosewhoonlyholdthembecausethey do not suffer themselves to think.Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to formgreat thinkers, thatfreedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and evenmore indispensable, toenableaveragehumanbeingstoattainthementalstaturewhichtheyarecapableof.Therehavebeen,andmay again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere ofmental slavery. But thereneverhasbeen,noreverwillbe,inthatatmosphere,anintellectuallyactivepeople.Whereanypeoplehas made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodoxspeculationwasforatimesuspended.Wherethereisatacitconventionthatprinciplesarenottobedisputed;wherethediscussionofthegreatestquestionswhichcanoccupyhumanityisconsideredtobeclosed,wecannothopetofindthatgenerallyhighscaleofmentalactivitywhichhasmadesomeperiodsofhistorysoremarkable.Neverwhencontroversyavoidedthesubjectswhicharelargeandimportantenoughtokindleenthusiasm,wasthemindofapeoplestirredupfromitsfoundations,andthe impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of thedignityof thinkingbeings.Ofsuchwehavehadanexample in theconditionofEuropeduring thetimesimmediatelyfollowingtheReformation;another,thoughlimitedtotheContinentandtoamorecultivatedclass,inthespeculativemovementofthelatterhalfoftheeighteenthcentury;andathird,ofstillbrieferduration, in the intellectual fermentationofGermanyduring theGoethianandFichteanperiod.Theseperiodsdifferedwidelyintheparticularopinionswhichtheydeveloped;butwerealikeinthis, thatduringall threetheyokeofauthoritywasbroken.Ineach,anoldmentaldespotismhadbeenthrownoff,andnonewonehadyettakenitsplace.TheimpulsegivenatthesethreeperiodshasmadeEuropewhat it now is.Every single improvementwhichhas takenplaceeither in thehumanmindorininstitutions,maybetraceddistinctlytooneorotherofthem.Appearanceshaveforsome

timeindicatedthatall threeimpulsesarewell-nighspent;andwecanexpectnofreshstart,untilweagainassertourmentalfreedom.

Letusnowpasstotheseconddivisionoftheargument,anddismissingthesuppositionthatanyofthereceived opinionsmay be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into theworth of themanner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed.Howeverunwillinglyapersonwhohasastrongopinionmayadmit thepossibility thathisopinionmaybefalse,heoughttobemovedbytheconsiderationthathowevertrueitmaybe,ifitisnotfully,frequently,andfearlesslydiscussed,itwillbeheldasadeaddogma,notalivingtruth.

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly)who think it enough if aperson assents undoubtingly towhat they think true, though he has no knowledgewhatever of thegrounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficialobjections.Suchpersons,iftheycanoncegettheircreedtaughtfromauthority,naturallythinkthatnogood,andsomeharm,comesofitsbeingallowedtobequestioned.Wheretheirinfluenceprevails,they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately,though itmay still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldompossible,andwhenitoncegetsin,beliefsnotgroundedonconvictionareapttogivewaybeforetheslightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility—assuming that the trueopinion abides in themind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against,argument—thisisnotthewayinwhichtruthoughttobeheldbyarationalbeing.Thisisnotknowingthetruth.Truth,thusheld,isbutonesuperstitionthemore,accidentallyclingingtothewordswhichenunciateatruth.

Iftheintellectandjudgmentofmankindoughttobecultivated,athingwhichProtestantsatleastdonotdeny,onwhatcanthesefacultiesbemoreappropriatelyexercisedbyanyone,thanonthethingswhichconcernhimsomuchthatitisconsiderednecessaryforhimtoholdopinionsonthem?Ifthecultivationoftheunderstandingconsistsinonethingmorethaninanother,itissurelyinlearningthegrounds of one's own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the firstimportancetobelieverightly,theyoughttobeabletodefendagainstatleastthecommonobjections.But, someonemay say, "Let thembe taught the groundsof their opinions. It does not follow thatopinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted. Persons who learngeometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise thedemonstrations; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds ofgeometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to disprove them."Undoubtedly:andsuchteachingsufficesonasubjectlikemathematics,wherethereisnothingatalltobesaidonthewrongsideofthequestion.Thepeculiarityoftheevidenceofmathematicaltruthsis,thatall theargument isononeside.Therearenoobjections,andnoanswers toobjections.Butoneverysubjectonwhichdifferenceofopinionispossible,thetruthdependsonabalancetobestruckbetween two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some otherexplanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, somephlogistoninsteadofoxygen;andithastobeshownwhythatothertheorycannotbethetrueone:anduntil this is shown, and untilwe know how it is shown,we do not understand the grounds of ouropinion.Butwhenweturntosubjectsinfinitelymorecomplicated,tomorals,religion,politics,socialrelations,andthebusinessoflife,three-fourthsoftheargumentsforeverydisputedopinionconsistindispellingtheappearanceswhichfavoursomeopiniondifferentfromit.Thegreatestorator,saveone,ofantiquity,hasleftitonrecordthathealwaysstudiedhisadversary'scasewithasgreat,ifnotwithstillgreater,intensitythanevenhisown.WhatCiceropractisedasthemeansofforensicsuccess,

requirestobeimitatedbyallwhostudyanysubjectinordertoarriveatthetruth.Hewhoknowsonlyhisownsideof thecase,knowslittleof that.Hisreasonsmaybegood,andnoonemayhavebeenabletorefutethem.Butifheisequallyunabletorefutethereasonsontheoppositeside;ifhedoesnotsomuchasknowwhattheyare,hehasnogroundforpreferringeitheropinion.Therationalpositionforhimwouldbesuspensionofjudgment,andunlesshecontentshimselfwiththat,heiseitherledbyauthority,oradopts,likethegeneralityoftheworld,thesidetowhichhefeelsmostinclination.Norisitenoughthatheshouldheartheargumentsofadversariesfromhisownteachers,presentedastheystatethem,andaccompaniedbywhattheyofferasrefutations.Thatisnotthewaytodojusticetothearguments,orbring them into realcontactwithhisownmind.Hemustbeable tohear themfrompersonswhoactuallybelievethem;whodefendtheminearnest,anddotheirveryutmostforthem.Hemust know them in theirmost plausible and persuasive form; hemust feel thewhole force of thedifficultywhichthetrueviewofthesubjecthastoencounteranddisposeof;elsehewillneverreallypossess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in ahundredofwhatarecallededucatedmenareinthiscondition;evenofthosewhocanarguefluentlyfortheiropinions.Theirconclusionmaybetrue,butitmightbefalseforanythingtheyknow:theyhaveneverthrownthemselvesintothementalpositionofthosewhothinkdifferentlyfromthem,andconsideredwhatsuchpersonsmayhavetosay;andconsequentlytheydonot,inanypropersenseoftheword,knowthedoctrinewhichtheythemselvesprofess.Theydonotknowthosepartsofitwhichexplainandjustifytheremainder;theconsiderationswhichshowthatafactwhichseeminglyconflictswithanotherisreconcilablewithit,orthat,oftwoapparentlystrongreasons,oneandnottheotheroughttobepreferred.Allthatpartofthetruthwhichturnsthescale,anddecidesthejudgmentofacompletelyinformedmind,theyarestrangersto;norisiteverreallyknown,buttothosewhohaveattended equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavoured to see the reasons of both in thestrongestlight.Soessentialisthisdisciplinetoarealunderstandingofmoralandhumansubjects,thatifopponentsofallimportanttruthsdonotexist,itisindispensabletoimaginethem,andsupplythemwiththestrongestargumentswhichthemostskilfuldevil'sadvocatecanconjureup.

Toabatetheforceoftheseconsiderations,anenemyoffreediscussionmaybesupposedtosay,thatthereisnonecessityformankindingeneraltoknowandunderstandallthatcanbesaidagainstorfortheiropinionsbyphilosophersandtheologians.Thatitisnotneedfulforcommonmentobeabletoexposeallthemisstatementsorfallaciesofaningeniousopponent.Thatitisenoughifthereisalwayssomebodycapableofansweringthem,sothatnothinglikelytomisleaduninstructedpersonsremainsunrefuted. That simpleminds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated onthem,maytrusttoauthorityfortherest,andbeingawarethattheyhaveneitherknowledgenortalenttoresolveeverydifficultywhichcanberaised,mayreposeintheassurancethatallthosewhichhavebeenraisedhavebeenorcanbeanswered,bythosewhoarespeciallytrainedtothetask.

Conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for it by those most easilysatisfiedwiththeamountofunderstandingoftruthwhichoughttoaccompanythebeliefofit;evenso,the argument for free discussion is no way weakened. For even this doctrine acknowledges thatmankindoughttohavearationalassurancethatallobjectionshavebeensatisfactorilyanswered;andhow are they to be answered if thatwhich requires to be answered is not spoken? or how can theanswer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it isunsatisfactory? If not the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve thedifficulties,mustmake themselves familiarwith thosedifficulties in theirmostpuzzling form;andthiscannotbeaccomplishedunlesstheyarefreelystated,andplacedinthemostadvantageouslightwhichtheyadmitof.TheCatholicChurchhasitsownwayofdealingwiththisembarrassingproblem.It makes a broad separation between those who can be permitted to receive its doctrines on

conviction,and thosewhomustaccept themon trust.Neither, indeed,areallowedanychoiceas towhat theywill accept;but theclergy, suchat least as canbe fully confided in,mayadmissiblyandmeritoriouslymakethemselvesacquaintedwiththeargumentsofopponents,inordertoanswerthem,and may, therefore, read heretical books; the laity, not unless by special permission, hard to beobtained.Thisdisciplinerecognisesaknowledgeoftheenemy'scaseasbeneficialtotheteachers,butfindsmeans,consistentwiththis,ofdenyingittotherestoftheworld:thusgivingtotheélitemorementalculture,thoughnotmorementalfreedom,thanitallowstothemass.Bythisdeviceitsucceedsin obtaining the kind ofmental superioritywhich its purposes require; for though culturewithoutfreedomnevermadealargeandliberalmind,itcanmakeaclevernisipriusadvocateofacause.Butin countries professing Protestantism, this resource is denied; since Protestants hold, at least intheory, that the responsibility for the choice of a religionmust be borne by each for himself, andcannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in the present state of the world, it is practicallyimpossible thatwritingswhich are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. If theteachersofmankindaretobecognisantofallthattheyoughttoknow,everythingmustbefreetobewrittenandpublishedwithoutrestraint.

If,however,themischievousoperationoftheabsenceoffreediscussion,whenthereceivedopinionsaretrue,wereconfinedtoleavingmenignorantofthegroundsofthoseopinions,itmightbethoughtthatthis,ifanintellectual,isnomoralevil,anddoesnotaffecttheworthoftheopinions,regardedintheir influenceon thecharacter.The fact,however, is, thatnotonly thegroundsof theopinionareforgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often themeaning of the opinion itself. Thewordswhichconveyit,ceasetosuggestideas,orsuggestonlyasmallportionofthosetheywereoriginallyemployedtocommunicate.Insteadofavividconceptionandalivingbelief,thereremainonlyafewphrasesretainedbyrote;or,ifanypart,theshellandhuskonlyofthemeaningisretained,thefineressencebeing lost.Thegreatchapter inhumanhistorywhich thisfactoccupiesandfills,cannotbetooearnestlystudiedandmeditatedon.

Itisillustratedintheexperienceofalmostallethicaldoctrinesandreligiouscreeds.Theyareallfullofmeaning andvitality to thosewhooriginate them, and to thedirect disciples of theoriginators.Theirmeaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into evenfullerconsciousness,solongasthestrugglelasts togivethedoctrineorcreedanascendencyoverothercreeds.Atlastiteitherprevails,andbecomesthegeneralopinion,oritsprogressstops;itkeepspossessionofthegroundithasgained,butceasestospreadfurther.Wheneitheroftheseresultshasbecomeapparent,controversyonthesubjectflags,andgraduallydiesaway.Thedoctrinehastakenitsplace, ifnotasa receivedopinion,asoneof theadmittedsectsordivisionsofopinion: thosewhohold it have generally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion from one of these doctrines toanother, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors.Insteadofbeing,asatfirst,constantlyonthealerteithertodefendthemselvesagainsttheworld,ortobringtheworldovertothem,theyhavesubsidedintoacquiescence,andneitherlisten,whentheycanhelpit,toargumentsagainsttheircreed,nortroubledissentients(iftherebesuch)withargumentsinits favour.Fromthis timemayusuallybedated thedecline in the livingpowerof thedoctrine.Weoftenheartheteachersofallcreedslamentingthedifficultyofkeepingupinthemindsofbelieversalivelyapprehensionofthetruthwhichtheynominallyrecognise,sothatitmaypenetratethefeelings,andacquirearealmasteryover theconduct.Nosuchdifficultyiscomplainedofwhile thecreedisstillfightingforitsexistence:eventheweakercombatantsthenknowandfeelwhattheyarefightingfor,andthedifferencebetweenitandotherdoctrines;andinthatperiodofeverycreed'sexistence,not a fewpersonsmay be found,who have realised its fundamental principles in all the forms ofthought,haveweighedandconsideredtheminalltheirimportantbearings,andhaveexperiencedthe

fulleffectonthecharacter,whichbeliefinthatcreedoughttoproduceinamindthoroughlyimbuedwith it.Butwhen ithascome tobeahereditarycreed,and tobe receivedpassively,notactively—whenthemindisnolongercompelled,inthesamedegreeasatfirst,toexerciseitsvitalpowersonthequestionswhichitsbeliefpresentstoit,thereisaprogressivetendencytoforgetallofthebeliefexcepttheformularies,ortogiveitadullandtorpidassent,asifacceptingitontrustdispensedwiththe necessity of realising it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almostceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases, sofrequentinthisageoftheworldasalmosttoformthemajority,inwhichthecreedremainsasitwereoutsidethemind,encrustingandpetrifyingitagainstallotherinfluencesaddressedtothehigherpartsofournature;manifesting itspowerbynotsufferinganyfreshand livingconviction toget in,butitselfdoingnothingforthemindorheart,exceptstandingsentineloverthemtokeepthemvacant.

Towhat an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted tomake the deepest impressionupon themindmayremain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realised in the imagination, the feelings, or theunderstanding,isexemplifiedbythemannerinwhichthemajorityofbelieversholdthedoctrinesofChristianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects—themaximsandpreceptscontainedintheNewTestament.Theseareconsideredsacred,andacceptedaslaws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in athousandguidesortestshisindividualconductbyreferencetothoselaws.Thestandardtowhichhedoesreferit,isthecustomofhisnation,hisclass,orhisreligiousprofession.Hehasthus,ontheonehand,acollectionofethicalmaxims,whichhebelievestohavebeenvouchsafedtohimbyinfalliblewisdomas rules forhisgovernment;andon theother,a setofevery-day judgmentsandpractices,whichgoacertainlengthwithsomeofthosemaxims,notsogreatalengthwithothers,standindirectopposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and theinterestsandsuggestionsofworldlylife.Tothefirstofthesestandardshegiveshishomage;totheotherhis realallegiance.AllChristiansbelieve that theblessedare thepoorandhumble,and thosewhoareill-usedbytheworld;thatitiseasierforacameltopassthroughtheeyeofaneedlethanforarichmantoenterthekingdomofheaven;thattheyshouldjudgenot,lesttheybejudged;thattheyshould swear not at all; that they should love their neighbour as themselves; that if one take theircloak,theyshouldgivehimtheircoatalso;thattheyshouldtakenothoughtforthemorrow;thatiftheywouldbeperfect,theyshouldsellallthattheyhaveandgiveittothepoor.Theyarenotinsincerewhentheysaythattheybelievethesethings.Theydobelievethem,aspeoplebelievewhattheyhavealways heard lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulatesconduct, theybelieve thesedoctrines justup to thepoint towhich it isusual toactupon them.Thedoctrinesintheirintegrityareserviceabletopeltadversarieswith;anditisunderstoodthattheyaretobeputforward(whenpossible)asthereasonsforwhateverpeopledothattheythinklaudable.Butanyonewhoremindedthemthatthemaximsrequireaninfinityofthingswhichtheynevereventhinkofdoing,wouldgainnothingbuttobeclassedamongthoseveryunpopularcharacterswhoaffecttobebetterthanotherpeople.Thedoctrineshavenoholdonordinarybelievers—arenotapowerintheirminds.Theyhave ahabitual respect for the soundof them,but no feelingwhich spreads from thewords to the things signified, and forces themind to take them in, andmake themconform to theformula.Wheneverconductisconcerned,theylookroundforMr.AandBtodirectthemhowfartogoinobeyingChrist.

Nowwemaybewellassuredthatthecasewasnotthus,butfarotherwise,withtheearlyChristians.Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despisedHebrewsintothereligionoftheRomanempire.Whentheirenemiessaid,"SeehowtheseChristianslove one another" (a remark not likely to bemade by anybody now), they assuredly had amuch

livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause,probably,it ischieflyowingthatChristianitynowmakessolittleprogressinextendingitsdomain,andaftereighteencenturies,isstillnearlyconfinedtoEuropeansandthedescendantsofEuropeans.Evenwith thestrictlyreligious,whoaremuchinearnestabout theirdoctrines,andattachagreateramountofmeaningtomanyofthemthanpeopleingeneral,itcommonlyhappensthatthepartwhichisthuscomparativelyactiveintheirmindsisthatwhichwasmadebyCalvin,orKnox,orsomesuchpersonmuchnearerincharactertothemselves.ThesayingsofChristcoexistpassivelyintheirminds,producinghardlyanyeffectbeyondwhatiscausedbymerelisteningtowordssoamiableandbland.Therearemanyreasons,doubtless,whydoctrineswhicharethebadgeofasectretainmoreoftheirvitalitythanthosecommontoallrecognisedsects,andwhymorepainsaretakenbyteacherstokeeptheirmeaningalive;butonereasoncertainlyis,thatthepeculiardoctrinesaremorequestioned,andhavetobeoftenerdefendedagainstopengainsayers.Bothteachersandlearnersgotosleepattheirpost,assoonasthereisnoenemyinthefield.

The same thingholds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines—thoseof prudence andknowledgeoflife,aswellasofmoralsorreligion.Alllanguagesandliteraturesarefullofgeneralobservations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations whicheverybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received astruisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of apainful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseenmisfortuneordisappointment,doesapersoncalltomindsomeproverborcommonsaying,familiartohimallhis life, themeaningofwhich, ifhehadeverbefore felt it ashedoesnow,wouldhavesavedhimfromthecalamity.Thereareindeedreasonsforthis,otherthantheabsenceofdiscussion:there aremany truths ofwhich the fullmeaning cannot be realised, until personal experience hasbroughtithome.Butmuchmoreofthemeaningevenofthesewouldhavebeenunderstood,andwhatwas understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had beenaccustomed to hear it arguedpro and con by peoplewho did understand it. The fatal tendency ofmankindtoleaveoffthinkingaboutathingwhenit isnolongerdoubtful, is thecauseofhalf theirerrors.Acontemporaryauthorhaswellspokenof"thedeepslumberofadecidedopinion."

Butwhat!(itmaybeasked)Istheabsenceofunanimityanindispensableconditionoftrueknowledge?Is itnecessary thatsomepartofmankindshouldpersist inerror, toenableanytorealise the truth?Doesabeliefceasetoberealandvitalassoonasitisgenerallyreceived—andisapropositionneverthoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind haveunanimouslyaccepteda truth,does the truthperishwithin them?Thehighestaimandbestresultofimproved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in theacknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has notachieveditsobject?Dothefruitsofconquestperishbytheverycompletenessofthevictory?

Iaffirmnosuchthing.Asmankindimprove,thenumberofdoctrineswhicharenolongerdisputedordoubtedwillbeconstantlyontheincrease:andthewell-beingofmankindmayalmostbemeasuredbythenumberandgravityofthetruthswhichhavereachedthepointofbeinguncontested.Thecessation,on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of theconsolidationofopinion;aconsolidationassalutaryinthecaseoftrueopinions,asitisdangerousandnoxiouswhen theopinionsareerroneous.But though thisgradualnarrowingof theboundsofdiversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable andindispensable,wearenotthereforeobligedtoconcludethatallitsconsequencesmustbebeneficial.Thelossofsoimportantanaidtotheintelligentandlivingapprehensionofatruth,asisaffordedby

thenecessityofexplainingitto,ordefendingitagainst,opponents,thoughnotsufficienttooutweigh,isno triflingdrawback from, thebenefitof itsuniversal recognition.Where thisadvantagecannolonger be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide asubstitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to thelearner'sconsciousness,as if theywerepresseduponhimbyadissentientchampion,eager forhisconversion.

But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. TheSocraticdialectics,somagnificentlyexemplifiedinthedialoguesofPlato,wereacontrivanceofthisdescription.Theywereessentiallyanegativediscussionofthegreatquestionsofphilosophyandlife,directedwith consummate skill to thepurposeof convincing anyonewhohadmerely adopted thecommonplacesofreceivedopinion,thathedidnotunderstandthesubject—thatheasyetattachednodefinitemeaning to thedoctrinesheprofessed; inorder that,becomingawareofhis ignorance,hemightbeputinthewaytoattainastablebelief,restingonaclearapprehensionbothofthemeaningofdoctrinesandoftheirevidence.Theschooldisputationsofthemiddleageshadasomewhatsimilarobject.Theywereintendedtomakesurethatthepupilunderstoodhisownopinion,and(bynecessarycorrelation)theopinionopposedtoit,andcouldenforcethegroundsoftheoneandconfutethoseoftheother.Theselast-mentionedcontestshadindeedtheincurabledefect,thatthepremisesappealedtowere taken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to themind, they were in everyrespectinferiortothepowerfuldialecticswhichformedtheintellectsofthe"Socraticiviri":butthemodernmindowesfarmoretoboththanit isgenerallywillingtoadmit,andthepresentmodesofeducationcontainnothingwhichinthesmallestdegreesuppliestheplaceeitheroftheoneoroftheother.Apersonwhoderivesallhisinstructionfromteachersorbooks,evenifheescapethebesettingtemptationofcontentinghimselfwithcram,isundernocompulsiontohearbothsides;accordinglyitisfarfromafrequentaccomplishment,evenamongthinkers,toknowbothsides;andtheweakestpartofwhateverybodysaysindefenceofhisopinion,iswhatheintendsasareplytoantagonists.Itisthefashionofthepresenttimetodisparagenegativelogic—thatwhichpointsoutweaknessesintheoryor errors in practice,without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticismwould indeed bepoorenoughasanultimateresult;butasameanstoattaininganypositiveknowledgeorconvictionworthythename,itcannotbevaluedtoohighly;anduntilpeopleareagainsystematicallytrainedtoit,therewillbefewgreatthinkers,andalowgeneralaverageofintellect,inanybutthemathematicalandphysicaldepartmentsofspeculation.Onanyothersubjectnoone'sopinionsdeservethenameofknowledge,exceptsofarashehaseitherhadforceduponhimbyothers,orgonethroughofhimself,thesamementalprocesswhichwouldhavebeenrequiredofhimincarryingonanactivecontroversywithopponents.That,therefore,whichwhenabsent,itissoindispensable,butsodifficult,tocreate,howworse thanabsurdis it toforego,whenspontaneouslyofferingitself! If thereareanypersonswhocontestareceivedopinion,orwhowilldosoiflaworopinionwillletthem,letusthankthemfor it, open ourminds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for uswhatweotherwiseought,ifwehaveanyregardforeitherthecertaintyorthevitalityofourconvictions,todowithmuchgreaterlabourforourselves.

Itstillremainstospeakofoneoftheprincipalcauseswhichmakediversityofopinionadvantageous,andwillcontinuetodosountilmankindshallhaveenteredastageofintellectualadvancementwhichatpresentseemsatanincalculabledistance.Wehavehithertoconsideredonlytwopossibilities:thatthereceivedopinionmaybefalse,andsomeotheropinion,consequently,true;orthat,thereceived

opinionbeing true, a conflictwith theopposite error is essential toa clear apprehension anddeepfeelingofitstruth.Butthereisacommonercasethaneitherofthese;whentheconflictingdoctrines,insteadofbeingone trueand theother false,share the truthbetween them;and thenonconformingopinionisneededtosupplytheremainderofthetruth,ofwhichthereceiveddoctrineembodiesonlyapart.Popularopinions,on subjectsnotpalpable to sense, areoften true,but seldomornever thewhole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, butexaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths bywhich they ought to be accompanied andlimited.Hereticalopinions,ontheotherhand,aregenerallysomeofthesesuppressedandneglectedtruths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truthcontainedinthecommonopinion,orfrontingitasenemies,andsettingthemselvesup,withsimilarexclusiveness,asthewholetruth.Thelattercaseishithertothemostfrequent,as,inthehumanmind,one-sidednesshasalwaysbeentherule,andmany-sidednesstheexception.Hence,eveninrevolutionsof opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought tosuperadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another;improvementconsistingchieflyinthis,thatthenewfragmentoftruthismorewanted,moreadaptedto theneedsof the time, than thatwhich itdisplaces.Suchbeing thepartial characterofprevailingopinions, evenwhen restingona true foundation; everyopinionwhichembodies somewhatof theportionof truthwhich thecommonopinionomits,ought tobeconsideredprecious,withwhateveramountoferrorandconfusionthattruthmaybeblended.Nosoberjudgeofhumanaffairswillfeelboundtobeindignantbecausethosewhoforceonournoticetruthswhichweshouldotherwisehaveoverlooked,overlooksomeofthosewhichwesee.Rather,hewillthinkthatsolongaspopulartruthisone-sided,itismoredesirablethanotherwisethatunpopulartruthshouldhaveone-sidedasserterstoo; suchbeingusually themost energetic, and themost likely to compel reluctant attention to thefragmentofwisdomwhichtheyproclaimasifitwerethewhole.

Thus,intheeighteenthcentury,whennearlyalltheinstructed,andallthoseoftheuninstructedwhowereledbythem,werelostinadmirationofwhatiscalledcivilisation,andofthemarvelsofmodernscience,literature,andphilosophy,andwhilegreatlyoverratingtheamountofunlikenessbetweenthemenofmodernandthoseofancienttimes,indulgedthebeliefthatthewholeofthedifferencewasintheirownfavour;withwhatasalutaryshockdidtheparadoxesofRousseauexplodelikebombshellsin the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements torecombineinabetterformandwithadditionalingredients.Notthatthecurrentopinionswereonthewhole farther from the truth than Rousseau's were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; theycontainedmoreofpositive truth,andverymuchlessoferror.Nevertheless there layinRousseau'sdoctrine,andhasfloateddownthestreamofopinionalongwithit,aconsiderableamountofexactlythosetruthswhichthepopularopinionwanted;andthesearethedepositwhichwasleftbehindwhenthefloodsubsided.Thesuperiorworthofsimplicityoflife,theenervatinganddemoralisingeffectofthe trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideaswhich have never been entirely absentfromcultivatedmindssinceRousseauwrote;andtheywillintimeproducetheirdueeffect,thoughatpresentneedingtobeassertedasmuchasever,andtobeassertedbydeeds,forwords,onthissubject,havenearlyexhaustedtheirpower.

In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party ofprogressorreform,arebothnecessaryelementsofahealthystateofpoliticallife;untiltheoneortheother shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress,knowinganddistinguishingwhat is fit tobepreserved fromwhatought tobesweptaway.Eachofthese modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a greatmeasure the opposition of the other that keeps eachwithin the limits of reason and sanity.Unless

opinionsfavourabletodemocracyandtoaristocracy,topropertyandtoequality,toco-operationandtocompetition,toluxuryandtoabstinence,tosocialityandindividuality,tolibertyanddiscipline,andalltheotherstandingantagonismsofpracticallife,areexpressedwithequalfreedom,andenforcedanddefendedwithequal talentandenergy, there isnochanceofbothelementsobtaining theirdue;onescaleissuretogoupandtheotherdown.Truth,inthegreatpracticalconcernsoflife,issomucha question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficientlycapaciousandimpartialtomaketheadjustmentwithanapproachtocorrectness,andithastobemadebytheroughprocessofastrugglebetweencombatantsfightingunderhostilebanners.Onanyofthegreatopenquestionsjustenumerated,ifeitherofthetwoopinionshasabetterclaimthantheother,notmerelytobetolerated,buttobeencouragedandcountenanced,itistheonewhichhappensattheparticulartimeandplacetobeinaminority.Thatistheopinionwhich,forthetimebeing,representsthe neglected interests, the side of humanwell-beingwhich is in danger of obtaining less than itsshare.Iamawarethatthereisnot,inthiscountry,anyintoleranceofdifferencesofopiniononmostof thesetopics.Theyareadducedtoshow,byadmittedandmultipliedexamples, theuniversalityofthe fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, achance of fair-play to all sides of the truth. When there are persons to be found, who form anexceptiontotheapparentunanimityoftheworldonanysubject,eveniftheworldisintheright,itisalwaysprobablethatdissentientshavesomethingworthhearingtosayforthemselves,andthattruthwouldlosesomethingbytheirsilence.

Itmaybeobjected,"Butsome receivedprinciples,especiallyonthehighestandmostvitalsubjects,aremorethanhalf-truths.TheChristianmorality,forinstance,isthewholetruthonthatsubject,andifanyoneteachesamoralitywhichvariesfromit,heiswhollyinerror."Asthisisofallcasesthemostimportantinpractice,nonecanbefittertotestthegeneralmaxim.ButbeforepronouncingwhatChristianmoralityisorisnot,itwouldbedesirabletodecidewhatismeantbyChristianmorality.IfitmeansthemoralityoftheNewTestament,Iwonderthatanyonewhoderiveshisknowledgeofthisfrom the book itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended, as a complete doctrine ofmorals. The Gospel always refers to a pre-existing morality, and confines its precepts to theparticulars in which that morality was to be corrected, or superseded by a wider and higher;expressing itself,moreover, in termsmostgeneral,often impossible tobe interpreted literally,andpossessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation. Toextractfromitabodyofethicaldoctrine,haseverbeenpossiblewithoutekingitoutfromtheOldTestament,thatis,fromasystemelaborateindeed,butinmanyrespectsbarbarous,andintendedonlyforabarbarouspeople.St.Paul,adeclaredenemytothisJudaicalmodeofinterpretingthedoctrineandfillinguptheschemeofhisMaster,equallyassumesapre-existingmorality,namely,thatoftheGreeksandRomans;andhisadvicetoChristiansisinagreatmeasureasystemofaccommodationtothat;eventotheextentofgivinganapparentsanctiontoslavery.WhatiscalledChristian,butshouldratherbe termed theological,morality,wasnot theworkofChristor theApostles, but isofmuchlater origin, having been gradually built up by theCatholic church of the first five centuries, andthoughnotimplicitlyadoptedbymodernsandProtestants,hasbeenmuchlessmodifiedbythemthanmighthavebeenexpected.Forthemostpart,indeed,theyhavecontentedthemselveswithcuttingoffthe additionswhichhadbeenmade to it in themiddle ages, each sect supplying theplaceby freshadditions,adaptedtoitsowncharacterandtendencies.Thatmankindoweagreatdebttothismorality,andtoitsearlyteachers,Ishouldbethelastpersontodeny;butIdonotscrupletosayofit,thatitis,inmanyimportantpoints,incompleteandone-sided,andthatunlessideasandfeelings,notsanctionedbyit,hadcontributedtotheformationofEuropeanlifeandcharacter,humanaffairswouldhavebeenin a worse condition than they now are. Christianmorality (so called) has all the characters of a

reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive;passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather thanenergeticPursuitofGood:initsprecepts(ashasbeenwellsaid)"thoushaltnot"predominatesundulyover"thoushalt."Initshorrorofsensuality,itmadeanidolofasceticism,whichhasbeengraduallycompromisedawayintooneoflegality.Itholdsoutthehopeofheavenandthethreatofhell,astheappointedandappropriatemotivestoavirtuouslife:inthisfallingfarbelowthebestoftheancients,anddoingwhatliesinittogivetohumanmoralityanessentiallyselfishcharacter,bydisconnectingeachman'sfeelingsofdutyfromtheinterestsofhisfellow-creatures,exceptsofarasaself-interestedinducementisofferedtohimforconsultingthem.Itisessentiallyadoctrineofpassiveobedience;itinculcatessubmissiontoallauthoritiesfoundestablished;whoindeedarenot tobeactivelyobeyedwhentheycommandwhatreligionforbids,butwhoarenottoberesisted,far lessrebelledagainst,foranyamountofwrongtoourselves.Andwhile,inthemoralityofthebestPagannations,dutytotheStateholdsevenadisproportionateplace,infringingonthejustlibertyoftheindividual;inpurelyChristianethics,thatgranddepartmentofdutyisscarcelynoticedoracknowledged.ItisintheKoran,nottheNewTestament,thatwereadthemaxim—"Arulerwhoappointsanymantoanoffice,whenthereisinhisdominionsanothermanbetterqualifiedforit,sinsagainstGodandagainsttheState."What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains inmodernmorality, is derivedfromGreekandRomansources,notfromChristian;as,eveninthemoralityofprivatelife,whateverexistsofmagnanimity,high-mindedness,personaldignity,eventhesenseofhonour,isderivedfromthe purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of astandardofethicsinwhichtheonlyworth,professedlyrecognised,isthatofobedience.

I am as far as any one frompretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in theChristianethics,ineverymannerinwhichitcanbeconceived,orthatthemanyrequisitesofacompletemoraldoctrinewhichitdoesnotcontain,donotadmitofbeingreconciledwithit.FarlesswouldIinsinuatethisofthedoctrinesandpreceptsofChristhimself.IbelievethatthesayingsofChristareall,thatIcan see anyevidenceof theirhavingbeen intended tobe; that theyare irreconcilablewithnothingwhichacomprehensivemoralityrequires;thateverythingwhichisexcellentinethicsmaybebroughtwithin them,with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who haveattempted to deduce from themanypractical systemof conductwhatever.But it is quite consistentwiththis, tobelievethattheycontain,andweremeanttocontain,onlyapartofthetruth;thatmanyessential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, norintendedtobeprovidedfor, in therecordeddeliverancesof theFounderofChristianity,andwhichhavebeenentirelythrownasideinthesystemofethicserectedonthebasisofthosedeliverancesbytheChristianChurch.Andthisbeingso,IthinkitagreaterrortopersistinattemptingtofindintheChristiandoctrine thatcomplete rule forourguidance,which itsauthor intended it to sanctionandenforce, but only partially to provide. I believe, too, that this narrow theory is becoming a gravepracticalevil,detractinggreatlyfromthevalueofthemoraltrainingandinstruction,whichsomanywell-meaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote. I much fear that byattempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type, and discarding thosesecularstandards(asforwantofabetternametheymaybecalled)whichheretoforeco-existedwithandsupplementedtheChristianethics,receivingsomeofitsspirit,andinfusingintoitsomeoftheirs,therewill result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of character,which, submititselfas itmay towhat itdeems theSupremeWill, is incapableof rising toorsympathising in theconception of SupremeGoodness. I believe that other ethics than anywhich can be evolved fromexclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moralregenerationofmankind;andthattheChristiansystemisnoexceptiontotherule,thatinanimperfect

stateofthehumanmind,theinterestsoftruthrequireadiversityofopinions.Itisnotnecessarythatinceasing to ignore the moral truths not contained in Christianity, men should ignore any of thosewhichitdoescontain.Suchprejudice,oroversight,whenitoccurs,isaltogetheranevil;butitisonefromwhich we cannot hope to be always exempt, andmust be regarded as the price paid for aninestimable good. The exclusive pretensionmade by a part of the truth to be thewhole,must andoughttobeprotestedagainst,andifareactionaryimpulseshouldmaketheprotestorsunjustintheirturn, thisone-sidedness, like theother,maybe lamented,butmustbe tolerated. IfChristianswouldteachinfidelstobejusttoChristianity,theyshouldthemselvesbejusttoinfidelity.Itcandotruthnoservicetoblinkthefact,knowntoallwhohavethemostordinaryacquaintancewithliteraryhistory,thatalargeportionofthenoblestandmostvaluablemoralteachinghasbeenthework,notonlyofmenwhodidnotknow,butofmenwhoknewandrejected,theChristianfaith.

Idonotpretendthatthemostunlimiteduseofthefreedomofenunciatingallpossibleopinionswouldputanendtotheevilsofreligiousorphilosophicalsectarianism.Everytruthwhichmenofnarrowcapacityareinearnestabout,issuretobeasserted,inculcated,andinmanywaysevenactedon,asifno other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. Iacknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freestdiscussion,but isoftenheightenedandexacerbatedthereby; thetruthwhichought tohavebeen,butwas not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded asopponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterestedbystander, that this collision of opinionsworks its salutary effect.Not the violent conflict betweenpartsofthetruth,butthequietsuppressionofhalfofit,istheformidableevil:thereisalwayshopewhenpeopleareforcedtolistentobothsides; it iswhentheyattendonlytoonethaterrorshardenintoprejudices,andtruthitselfceasestohavetheeffectoftruth,bybeingexaggeratedintofalsehood.And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit inintelligentjudgmentbetweentwosidesofaquestion,ofwhichonlyoneisrepresentedbyanadvocatebeforeit,truthhasnochancebutinproportionaseverysideofit,everyopinionwhichembodiesanyfractionofthetruth,notonlyfindsadvocates,butissoadvocatedastobelistenedto.

Wehavenowrecognisedthenecessitytothementalwell-beingofmankind(onwhichalltheirotherwell-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on fourdistinctgrounds;whichwewillnowbrieflyrecapitulate.

First, ifanyopinioniscompelledtosilence, thatopinionmay,foraughtwecancertainlyknow,betrue.Todenythisistoassumeourowninfallibility.

Secondly,thoughthesilencedopinionbeanerror,itmay,andverycommonlydoes,containaportionoftruth;andsincethegeneralorprevailingopiniononanysubjectisrarelyorneverthewholetruth,itisonlybythecollisionofadverseopinions,thattheremainderofthetruthhasanychanceofbeingsupplied.

Thirdly,evenifthereceivedopinionbenotonlytrue,butthewholetruth;unlessitissufferedtobe,andactuallyis,vigorouslyandearnestlycontested,itwill,bymostofthosewhoreceiveit,beheldinthemannerofaprejudice,withlittlecomprehensionorfeelingofitsrationalgrounds.Andnotonlythis,but,fourthly,themeaningofthedoctrineitselfwillbeindangerofbeinglost,orenfeebled,anddeprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal

profession,inefficaciousforgood,butcumberingtheground,andpreventingthegrowthofanyrealandheartfeltconviction,fromreasonorpersonalexperience.

Beforequittingthesubjectoffreedomofopinion,itisfittotakesomenoticeofthosewhosay,thatthefreeexpressionofallopinionsshouldbepermitted,oncondition that themannerbe temperate,and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion.Muchmight be said on the impossibility of fixingwhere these supposedboundsare tobeplaced; for if the testbeoffence to thosewhoseopinion isattacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling andpowerful,andthateveryopponentwhopushesthemhard,andwhomtheyfinditdifficulttoanswer,appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent.But this,though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more fundamentalobjection.Undoubtedlythemannerofassertinganopinion,eventhoughitbeatrueone,maybeveryobjectionable,andmayjustlyincurseverecensure.Buttheprincipaloffencesofthekindaresuchasitismostlyimpossible,unlessbyaccidentalself-betrayal,tobringhometoconviction.Thegravestofthemis,toarguesophistically,tosuppressfactsorarguments,tomisstatetheelementsofthecase,ormisrepresenttheoppositeopinion.Butallthis,eventothemostaggravateddegree,issocontinuallydoneinperfectgoodfaith,bypersonswhoarenotconsidered,andinmanyotherrespectsmaynotdeserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate groundsconscientiouslytostampthemisrepresentationasmorallyculpable;andstilllesscouldlawpresumetointerferewith thiskindofcontroversialmisconduct.Withregardtowhat iscommonlymeantbyintemperatediscussion,namelyinvective,sarcasm,personality,andthelike,thedenunciationoftheseweaponswould deservemore sympathy if itwere ever proposed to interdict them equally to bothsides;butitisonlydesiredtorestraintheemploymentofthemagainsttheprevailingopinion:againsttheunprevailingtheymaynotonlybeusedwithoutgeneraldisapproval,butwillbelikelytoobtainfor himwhouses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation.Yetwhatevermischiefarisesfromtheiruse,isgreatestwhentheyareemployedagainstthecomparativelydefenceless;andwhatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from thismode of asserting it, accruesalmostexclusivelytoreceivedopinions.Theworstoffenceofthiskindwhichcanbecommittedbyapolemic,istostigmatisethosewhoholdthecontraryopinionasbadandimmoralmen.Tocalumnyof this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are ingeneral fewanduninfluential, andnobodybut themselves feelmuch interest in seeing justicedonethem;butthisweaponis,fromthenatureofthecase,deniedtothosewhoattackaprevailingopinion:theycanneitheruseitwithsafetytothemselves,nor,iftheycould,woulditdoanythingbutrecoilontheirowncause.Ingeneral,opinionscontrarytothosecommonlyreceivedcanonlyobtainahearingbystudiedmoderationof language,and themostcautiousavoidanceofunnecessaryoffence, fromwhich they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasuredvituperationemployedonthesideoftheprevailingopinion,reallydoesdeterpeoplefromprofessingcontraryopinions,andfromlisteningtothosewhoprofessthem.Fortheinterest,therefore,oftruthand justice, it is farmore important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than theother;and,forexample,ifitwerenecessarytochoose,therewouldbemuchmoreneedtodiscourageoffensiveattacksoninfidelity,thanonreligion.Itis,however,obviousthatlawandauthorityhavenobusinesswithrestrainingeither,whileopinionought,ineveryinstance,todetermineitsverdictbythecircumstancesoftheindividualcase;condemningeveryone,onwhicheversideoftheargumentheplaces himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candour, or malignity, bigotry, orintoleranceoffeelingmanifestthemselves;butnotinferringthesevicesfromthesidewhichapersontakes,thoughitbethecontrarysideofthequestiontoourown:andgivingmeritedhonourtoeveryone,whateveropinionhemayhold,whohascalmnesstoseeandhonestytostatewhathisopponentsand their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing backwhichtells,orcanbesupposedtotell,intheirfavour.Thisistherealmoralityofpublicdiscussion;andifoftenviolated,Iamhappytothinkthattherearemanycontroversialistswhotoagreatextentobserve

it,andastillgreaternumberwhoconscientiouslystrivetowardsit.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give them an emphatic contradiction,occurredtheGovernmentPressProsecutionsof1858.Thatill-judgedinterferencewiththelibertyofpublic discussion has not, however, inducedme to alter a singleword in the text, nor has it at allweakenedmyconvictionthat,momentsofpanicexcepted,theeraofpainsandpenaltiesforpoliticaldiscussionhas, in our own country, passed away.For, in the first place, the prosecutionswere notpersisted in; and, in the second, they were never, properly speaking, political prosecutions. Theoffence charged was not that of criticising institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but ofcirculatingwhatwasdeemedanimmoraldoctrine,thelawfulnessofTyrannicide.

If theargumentsof thepresentchapterareofanyvalidity, thereought toexist thefullest libertyofprofessinganddiscussing,asamatterofethicalconviction,anydoctrine,howeverimmoralitmaybeconsidered.Itwould,therefore,beirrelevantandoutofplacetoexaminehere,whetherthedoctrineofTyrannicidedeserves that title. I shallcontentmyselfwithsaying, that thesubjecthasbeenatalltimesoneoftheopenquestionsofmorals;thattheactofaprivatecitizeninstrikingdownacriminal,who,byraisinghimselfabovethelaw,hasplacedhimselfbeyondthereachoflegalpunishmentorcontrol,hasbeenaccountedbywholenations,andbysomeofthebestandwisestofmen,notacrime,butanactofexaltedvirtue;and that, rightorwrong, it isnotof thenatureofassassination,butofcivil war. As such, I hold that the instigation to it, in a specific case,may be a proper subject ofpunishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a probable connection can beestablishedbetweentheactandtheinstigation.Eventhen,itisnotaforeigngovernment,buttheverygovernment assailed, which alone, in the exercise of self-defence, can legitimately punish attacksdirectedagainstitsownexistence.

[7] Thomas Pooley, Bodmin Assizes, July 31, 1857. In December following, he received a freepardonfromtheCrown.

[8]GeorgeJacobHolyoake,August17,1857;EdwardTruelove,July,1857.

[9]BarondeGleichen,Marlborough-StreetPoliceCourt,August4,1857.

[10]Amplewarningmaybedrawn from the large infusionof thepassionsof apersecutor,whichmingledwiththegeneraldisplayoftheworstpartsofournationalcharacterontheoccasionoftheSepoyinsurrection.Theravingsoffanaticsorcharlatansfromthepulpitmaybeunworthyofnotice;but the heads of the Evangelical party have announced as their principle, for the government ofHindoosandMahomedans, thatnoschoolsbesupportedbypublicmoneyinwhichtheBible isnottaught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real orpretendedChristians.AnUnder-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the12thofNovember,1857,isreportedtohavesaid:"Tolerationoftheirfaith"(thefaithofahundredmillionsofBritishsubjects),"thesuperstitionwhichtheycalledreligion,bytheBritishGovernment,hadhadtheeffectofretardingtheascendencyoftheBritishname,andpreventingthesalutarygrowthofChristianity....Tolerationwasthegreatcorner-stoneofthereligiouslibertiesofthiscountry;butdonotletthemabusethatpreciouswordtoleration.Asheunderstoodit,itmeantthecompletelibertyto all, freedomofworship,amongChristians,whoworshippedupon the same foundation. ItmeanttolerationofallsectsanddenominationsofChristianswhobelievedintheonemediation."Idesireto

callattentiontothefact,thatamanwhohasbeendeemedfittofillahighofficeinthegovernmentofthiscountry,underaliberalMinistry,maintainsthedoctrinethatallwhodonotbelieveinthedivinityofChristarebeyondthepaleoftoleration.Who,afterthisimbeciledisplay,canindulgetheillusionthatreligiouspersecutionhaspassedaway,nevertoreturn?

CHAPTERIII.OFINDIVIDUALITY,ASONEOFTHEELEMENTSOFWELL-

BEING.

Suchbeingthereasonswhichmakeitimperativethathumanbeingsshouldbefreetoformopinions,andtoexpresstheiropinionswithoutreserve;andsuchthebanefulconsequencestotheintellectual,andthroughthattothemoralnatureofman,unlessthislibertyiseitherconceded,orassertedinspiteofprohibition;letusnextexaminewhetherthesamereasonsdonotrequirethatmenshouldbefreetoactupontheiropinions—tocarrytheseoutintheirlives,withouthindrance,eitherphysicalormoral,from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of courseindispensable. No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, evenopinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as toconstitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolestedwhensimply circulated through the press, butmay justly incur punishment when delivered orally to anexcitedmob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, orwhen handed about among the samemob in the formofaplacard.Acts,ofwhateverkind,which,without justifiablecause,doharm toothers, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by theunfavourablesentiments,and,whenneedful,bytheactiveinterferenceofmankind.Thelibertyoftheindividualmustbe thusfar limited;hemustnotmakehimselfanuisance tootherpeople.But ifherefrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his owninclinationandjudgmentinthingswhichconcernhimself,thesamereasonswhichshowthatopinionshouldbefree,provealsothatheshouldbeallowed,withoutmolestation,tocarryhisopinionsintopracticeathisowncost.Thatmankindarenotinfallible;thattheirtruths,forthemostpart,areonlyhalf-truths;thatunityofopinion,unlessresultingfromthefullestandfreestcomparisonofoppositeopinions,isnotdesirable,anddiversitynotanevil,butagood,untilmankindaremuchmorecapablethan at present of recognising all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes ofaction,notlessthantotheiropinions.Asitisusefulthatwhilemankindareimperfectthereshouldbedifferentopinions,soisitthatthereshouldbedifferentexperimentsofliving;thatfreescopeshouldbegiventovarietiesofcharacter,shortofinjurytoothers;andthattheworthofdifferentmodesoflifeshouldbeprovedpractically,whenanyonethinksfittotrythem.Itisdesirable,inshort,thatinthings which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not theperson'sowncharacter,butthetraditionsorcustomsofotherpeoplearetheruleofconduct,thereiswanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient ofindividualandsocialprogress.

Inmaintainingthisprinciple,thegreatestdifficultytobeencountereddoesnotlieintheappreciationofmeanstowardsanacknowledgedend,butintheindifferenceofpersonsingeneraltotheenditself.Ifitwerefeltthatthefreedevelopmentofindividualityisoneoftheleadingessentialsofwell-being;thatitisnotonlyaco-ordinateelementwithallthatisdesignatedbythetermscivilisation,instruction,education,culture,butisitselfanecessarypartandconditionofallthosethings;therewouldbenodangerthatlibertyshouldbeunder-valued,andtheadjustmentoftheboundariesbetweenitandsocialcontrolwouldpresentnoextraordinarydifficulty.Buttheevilis,thatindividualspontaneityishardlyrecognisedbythecommonmodesofthinking,ashavinganyintrinsicworth,ordeservinganyregardonitsownaccount.Themajority,beingsatisfiedwiththewaysofmankindastheynoware(foritis

theywhomakethemwhattheyare),cannotcomprehendwhythosewaysshouldnotbegoodenoughforeverybody;andwhatismore,spontaneityformsnopartoftheidealofthemajorityofmoralandsocial reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebelliousobstructiontothegeneralacceptanceofwhatthesereformers,intheirownjudgment,thinkwouldbebestformankind.Fewpersons,outofGermany,evencomprehendthemeaningofthedoctrinewhichWilhelmvonHumboldt,soeminentbothasasavantandasapolitician,madethetextofatreatise—that"theendofman,orthatwhichisprescribedbytheeternalorimmutabledictatesofreason,andnotsuggestedbyvagueandtransientdesires,isthehighestandmostharmoniousdevelopmentofhispowerstoacompleteandconsistentwhole;"that,therefore,theobject"towardswhicheveryhumanbeingmustceaselesslydirecthisefforts,andonwhichespeciallythosewhodesigntoinfluencetheirfellow-menmusteverkeep theireyes, is the individualityofpoweranddevelopment;" that for thistherearetworequisites,"freedom,andavarietyofsituations;"andthatfromtheunionofthesearise"individualvigourandmanifolddiversity,"whichcombinethemselvesin"originality."[11]

Little,however,aspeopleareaccustomedtoadoctrinelikethatofVonHumboldt,andsurprisingasitmaybetothemtofindsohighavalueattachedtoindividuality,thequestion,onemustneverthelessthink, can only be one of degree.No one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should doabsolutelynothingbutcopyoneanother.Noonewouldassertthatpeopleoughtnottoputintotheirmodeoflife,andintotheconductoftheirconcerns,anyimpresswhateveroftheirownjudgment,oroftheirownindividualcharacter.Ontheotherhand,itwouldbeabsurdtopretendthatpeopleoughttoliveasifnothingwhateverhadbeenknownintheworldbeforetheycameintoit;asifexperiencehadasyetdonenothingtowardsshowingthatonemodeofexistence,orofconduct,ispreferabletoanother.Nobodydeniesthatpeopleshouldbesotaughtandtrainedinyouth,astoknowandbenefitbytheascertainedresultsofhumanexperience.Butitistheprivilegeandproperconditionofahumanbeing,arrivedatthematurityofhisfaculties,touseandinterpretexperienceinhisownway.Itisforhimtofindoutwhatpartofrecordedexperienceisproperlyapplicabletohisowncircumstancesandcharacter.Thetraditionsandcustomsofotherpeopleare,toacertainextent,evidenceofwhattheirexperiencehastaughtthem;presumptiveevidence,andassuch,haveaclaimtohisdeference:but,inthe first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly.Secondly,theirinterpretationofexperiencemaybecorrect,butunsuitabletohim.Customsaremadeforcustomarycircumstances,andcustomarycharacters:andhiscircumstancesorhischaractermaybeuncustomary.Thirdly, though the customsbe both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet toconformtocustom,merelyascustom,doesnoteducateordevelopinhimanyofthequalitieswhichare the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judgment,discriminative feeling,mental activity, and evenmoral preference, are exercisedonly inmaking achoice.Hewhodoesanythingbecauseitisthecustom,makesnochoice.Hegainsnopracticeeitherin discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, areimproved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merelybecauseothersdoit,nomorethanbybelievingathingonlybecauseothersbelieveit.Ifthegroundsofanopinionarenotconclusivetotheperson'sownreason,hisreasoncannotbestrengthened,butislikely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as areconsentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are notconcerned),itissomuchdonetowardsrenderinghisfeelingsandcharacterinertandtorpid,insteadofactiveandenergetic.

Hewholetstheworld,orhisownportionofit,choosehisplanoflifeforhim,hasnoneedofanyotherfacultythantheape-likeoneofimitation.Hewhochooseshisplanforhimself,employsallhisfaculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather

materialsfordecision,discriminationtodecide,andwhenhehasdecided,firmnessandself-controltoholdtohisdeliberatedecision.Andthesequalitiesherequiresandexercisesexactlyinproportionasthepartofhisconductwhichhedeterminesaccordingtohisownjudgmentandfeelingsisalargeone.Itispossiblethathemightbeguidedinsomegoodpath,andkeptoutofharm'sway,withoutanyofthesethings.Butwhatwillbehiscomparativeworthasahumanbeing?Itreallyisofimportance,notonlywhatmendo,butalsowhatmannerofmen theyare thatdo it.Among theworksofman,whichhumanlifeisrightlyemployedinperfectingandbeautifying,thefirstinimportancesurelyismanhimself.Supposingitwerepossibletogethousesbuilt,corngrown,battlesfought,causestried,andevenchurcheserectedandprayerssaid,bymachinery—byautomatonsinhumanform—itwouldbe a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even themen andwomenwho at presentinhabit themorecivilisedpartsof theworld,andwhoassuredlyarebutstarvedspecimensofwhatnaturecanandwillproduce.Humannatureisnotamachinetobebuiltafteramodel,andsettodoexactlytheworkprescribedforit,butatree,whichrequirestogrowanddevelopitselfonallsides,accordingtothetendencyoftheinwardforceswhichmakeitalivingthing.

Itwillprobablybeconcededthatitisdesirablepeopleshouldexercisetheirunderstandings,andthatan intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, isbetter thanablindandsimplymechanicaladhesion to it.Toacertainextent it isadmitted, thatourunderstandingshouldbeourown:butthereisnotthesamewillingnesstoadmitthatourdesiresandimpulsesshouldbeourownlikewise;orthattopossessimpulsesofourown,andofanystrength,isanythingbutaperilandasnare.Yetdesiresandimpulsesareasmuchapartofaperfecthumanbeing,asbeliefsandrestraints:andstrongimpulsesareonlyperilouswhennotproperlybalanced;whenoneset of aims and inclinations is developed into strength,while others,which ought to co-existwiththem,remainweakandinactive.Itisnotbecausemen'sdesiresarestrongthattheyactill;itisbecausetheir consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weakconscience.Thenaturalconnectionistheotherway.Tosaythatoneperson'sdesiresandfeelingsarestrongerandmorevariousthanthoseofanother,ismerelytosaythathehasmoreoftherawmaterialofhumannature,andisthereforecapable,perhapsofmoreevil,butcertainlyofmoregood.Strongimpulsesarebutanothernameforenergy.Energymaybe turned tobaduses;butmoregoodmayalwaysbemadeofanenergeticnature,thanofanindolentandimpassiveone.Thosewhohavemostnatural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The samestrong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the sourcefrom whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. It isthrough the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not byrejectingthestuffofwhichheroesaremade,becauseitknowsnothowtomakethem.Apersonwhosedesiresandimpulsesarehisown—aretheexpressionofhisownnature,asithasbeendevelopedandmodifiedbyhisownculture—issaidtohaveacharacter.Onewhosedesiresandimpulsesarenothisown,hasnocharacter,nomorethanasteam-enginehasacharacter.If,inadditiontobeinghisown,hisimpulsesarestrong,andareunderthegovernmentofastrongwill,hehasanenergeticcharacter.Whoeverthinksthatindividualityofdesiresandimpulsesshouldnotbeencouragedtounfolditself,must maintain that society has no need of strong natures—is not the better for containing manypersonswhohavemuchcharacter—andthatahighgeneralaverageofenergyisnotdesirable.

Insomeearlystatesofsociety,theseforcesmightbe,andwere,toomuchaheadofthepowerwhichsocietythenpossessedofdiscipliningandcontrollingthem.Therehasbeenatimewhentheelementofspontaneityandindividualitywasinexcess,andthesocialprinciplehadahardstrugglewithit.Thedifficulty thenwas, to inducemenof strongbodies orminds to payobedience to any ruleswhichrequired them to control their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the

PopesstrugglingagainsttheEmperors,assertedapoweroverthewholeman,claimingtocontrolallhislifeinordertocontrolhischaracter—whichsocietyhadnotfoundanyothersufficientmeansofbinding.But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the dangerwhich threatenshumannatureisnottheexcess,butthedeficiency,ofpersonalimpulsesandpreferences.Thingsarevastly changed, since thepassionsof thosewhowere strongby stationor bypersonal endowmentwere in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be rigorouslychainedup to enable the personswithin their reach to enjoy anyparticle of security. In our times,fromthehighestclassofsocietydowntothelowest,everyonelivesasundertheeyeofahostileanddreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, theindividual,orthefamily,donotaskthemselves—whatdoIprefer?or,whatwouldsuitmycharacteranddisposition?or,whatwouldallowthebestandhighest inmetohavefair-play,andenable it togrow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done bypersonsofmystationandpecuniarycircumstances?or(worsestill)whatisusuallydonebypersonsofastationandcircumstancessuperiortomine?Idonotmeanthattheychoosewhatiscustomary,inpreferencetowhatsuitstheirowninclination.Itdoesnotoccurtothemtohaveanyinclination,exceptforwhatiscustomary.Thustheminditselfisbowedtotheyoke:eveninwhatpeopledoforpleasure,conformityisthefirstthingthoughtof;theylikeincrowds;theyexercisechoiceonlyamongthingscommonlydone:peculiarityoftaste,eccentricityofconduct,areshunnedequallywithcrimes:untilbydintofnotfollowingtheirownnature,theyhavenonaturetofollow:theirhumancapacitiesarewithered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and aregenerallywithouteitheropinionsorfeelingsofhomegrowth,orproperlytheirown.Nowisthis,orisitnot,thedesirableconditionofhumannature?

Itisso,ontheCalvinistictheory.Accordingtothat,theonegreatoffenceofmanisSelf-will.Allthegoodofwhichhumanityiscapable,iscomprisedinObedience.Youhavenochoice;thusyoumustdo,andnootherwise:"whateverisnotaduty,isasin."Humannaturebeingradicallycorrupt,thereisnoredemptionforanyoneuntilhumannatureiskilledwithinhim.Tooneholdingthistheoryoflife,crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil: man needs nocapacity,butthatofsurrenderinghimselftothewillofGod:andifheusesanyofhisfacultiesforanyother purpose but to do that supposedwillmore effectually, he is betterwithout them. That is thetheoryofCalvinism;and it isheld, in amitigated form,bymanywhodonot consider themselvesCalvinists;themitigationconsistingingivingalessasceticinterpretationtotheallegedwillofGod;assertingittobehiswillthatmankindshouldgratifysomeoftheirinclinations;ofcoursenotinthemannertheythemselvesprefer,but inthewayofobedience, that is, inawayprescribedtothembyauthority;and,therefore,bythenecessaryconditionsofthecase,thesameforall.

Insomesuchinsidiousformthereisatpresentastrongtendencytothisnarrowtheoryoflife,andtothe pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronises.Many persons, no doubt,sincerelythinkthathumanbeingsthuscrampedanddwarfed,areastheirMakerdesignedthemtobe;justasmanyhavethoughtthattreesareamuchfinerthingwhenclippedintopollards,orcutoutintofiguresofanimals,thanasnaturemadethem.Butifitbeanypartofreligiontobelievethatmanwasmadebyagoodbeing,itismoreconsistentwiththatfaithtobelieve,thatthisBeinggaveallhumanfaculties that theymightbecultivatedandunfolded,notrootedoutandconsumed,andthathe takesdelight in everynearer approachmadebyhis creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them,everyincreaseinanyoftheircapabilitiesofcomprehension,ofaction,orofenjoyment.ThereisadifferenttypeofhumanexcellencefromtheCalvinistic;aconceptionofhumanityashavingitsnaturebestowedonitforotherpurposesthanmerelytobeabnegated."Paganself-assertion"isoneof theelements of human worth, as well as "Christian self-denial."[12] There is a Greek ideal of self-

development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blendswith, but does notsupersede.ItmaybebettertobeaJohnKnoxthananAlcibiades,butitisbettertobeaPericlesthaneither;norwouldaPericles,ifwehadoneinthesedays,bewithoutanythinggoodwhichbelongedtoJohnKnox.

Itisnotbywearingdownintouniformityallthatisindividualinthemselves,butbycultivatingitandcalling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beingsbecomeanobleandbeautifulobjectofcontemplation;andastheworkspartakethecharacterofthosewho do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating,furnishingmoreabundantaliment tohighthoughtsandelevatingfeelings,andstrengtheningthetiewhichbindseveryindividualtotherace,bymakingtheraceinfinitelybetterworthbelongingto.Inproportion to thedevelopmentofhis individuality,eachpersonbecomesmorevaluable tohimself,andisthereforecapableofbeingmorevaluabletoothers.Thereisagreaterfulnessoflifeabouthisownexistence,andwhenthereismorelifeintheunitsthereismoreinthemasswhichiscomposedof them.Asmuchcompressionas isnecessary toprevent the stronger specimensofhumannaturefrom encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is amplecompensationeveninthepointofviewofhumandevelopment.Themeansofdevelopmentwhichtheindividual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, arechieflyobtainedattheexpenseofthedevelopmentofotherpeople.Andeventohimselfthereisafullequivalentinthebetterdevelopmentofthesocialpartofhisnature,renderedpossiblebytherestraintput upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops thefeelingsandcapacitieswhichhavethegoodofothersfortheirobject.Buttoberestrainedinthingsnotaffectingtheirgood,bytheirmeredispleasure,developsnothingvaluable,exceptsuchforceofcharacterasmayunfolditselfinresistingtherestraint.Ifacquiescedin,itdullsandbluntsthewholenature. To give any fair-play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should beallowedtoleaddifferent lives. Inproportionas this latitudehasbeenexercised inanyage,has thatage been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long asIndividuality exists under it; andwhatever crushes individuality is despotism, bywhatever name itmaybecalled,andwhetheritprofessestobeenforcingthewillofGodortheinjunctionsofmen.

HavingsaidthatIndividualityisthesamethingwithdevelopment,andthatitisonlythecultivationofindividualitywhichproduces,orcanproduce,well-developedhumanbeings,Imighthereclosetheargument:forwhatmoreorbettercanbesaidofanyconditionofhumanaffairs,thanthatitbringshuman beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of anyobstruction to good, than that it prevents this? Doubtless, however, these considerations will notsuffice toconvince thosewhomostneedconvincing;and it isnecessaryfurther toshow, that thesedevelopedhumanbeingsareofsomeusetotheundeveloped—topointouttothosewhodonotdesireliberty,andwouldnotavailthemselvesofit,thattheymaybeinsomeintelligiblemannerrewardedforallowingotherpeopletomakeuseofitwithouthindrance.

Inthefirstplace,then,Iwouldsuggestthattheymightpossiblylearnsomethingfromthem.Itwillnotbedeniedbyanybody,thatoriginalityisavaluableelementinhumanaffairs.Thereisalwaysneedofpersonsnotonlytodiscovernewtruths,andpointoutwhenwhatwereoncetruthsaretruenolonger,butalsotocommencenewpractices,andsettheexampleofmoreenlightenedconduct,andbettertasteandsenseinhumanlife.Thiscannotwellbegainsaidbyanybodywhodoesnotbelievethattheworldhasalreadyattainedperfectioninallitswaysandpractices.Itistruethatthisbenefitisnotcapableofbeing rendered by everybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison with the whole ofmankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, would be likely to be any improvement on

establishedpractice.Butthesefewarethesaltoftheearth;withoutthem,humanlifewouldbecomeastagnantpool.Notonlyisittheywhointroducegoodthingswhichdidnotbeforeexist;itistheywhokeep the life in those which already existed. If there were nothing new to be done, would humanintellectceasetobenecessary?Woulditbeareasonwhythosewhodotheoldthingsshouldforgetwhytheyaredone,anddothemlikecattle,notlikehumanbeings?Thereisonlytoogreatatendencyinthebestbeliefsandpracticestodegenerateintothemechanical;andunlesstherewereasuccessionofpersonswhoseever-recurringoriginalitypreventsthegroundsofthosebeliefsandpracticesfrombecomingmerely traditional, such deadmatter would not resist the smallest shock from anythingreally alive, and therewouldbeno reasonwhycivilisation shouldnotdieout, as in theByzantineEmpire.Personsofgenius,itistrue,are,andarealwayslikelytobe,asmallminority;butinordertohavethem,itisnecessarytopreservethesoilinwhichtheygrow.Geniuscanonlybreathefreelyinanatmosphereoffreedom.Personsofgeniusare,exvitermini,moreindividualthananyotherpeople—lesscapable,consequently,offittingthemselves,withouthurtfulcompression,intoanyofthesmallnumberofmouldswhichsocietyprovidesinordertosaveitsmembersthetroubleofformingtheirowncharacter.Iffromtimiditytheyconsenttobeforcedintooneofthesemoulds,andtoletallthatpartofthemselveswhichcannotexpandunderthepressureremainunexpanded,societywillbelittlethebetter for their genius. If they are of a strong character, andbreak their fetters, theybecomeamark for the societywhich has not succeeded in reducing them to commonplace, to point atwithsolemnwarning as "wild," "erratic," and the like;much as if one should complain of theNiagarariverfornotflowingsmoothlybetweenitsbankslikeaDutchcanal.

Iinsistthusemphaticallyontheimportanceofgenius,andthenecessityofallowingittounfolditselffreelybothinthoughtandinpractice,beingwellawarethatnoonewilldenythepositionintheory,butknowingalsothatalmosteveryone,inreality,istotallyindifferenttoit.Peoplethinkgeniusafinething if it enablesaman towriteanexcitingpoem,orpaintapicture.But in its true sense, thatoforiginalityinthoughtandaction,thoughnoonesaysthatitisnotathingtobeadmired,nearlyall,atheart, think that they can do verywellwithout it.Unhappily this is too natural to bewondered at.Originalityistheonethingwhichunoriginalmindscannotfeeltheuseof.Theycannotseewhatitisto do for them: how should they? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not beoriginality.Thefirstservicewhichoriginalityhastorenderthem,isthatofopeningtheireyes:whichbeing once fully done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. Meanwhile,recollectingthatnothingwaseveryetdonewhichsomeonewasnotthefirsttodo,andthatallgoodthingswhich exist are the fruits of originality, let them bemodest enough to believe that there issomething still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need oforiginality,thelesstheyareconsciousofthewant.

In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or supposed mentalsuperiority,thegeneraltendencyofthingsthroughouttheworldistorendermediocritytheascendantpoweramongmankind.Inancienthistory, in themiddleages,andinadiminishingdegree throughthelongtransitionfromfeudalitytothepresenttime,theindividualwasapowerinhimself;andifhehadeithergreattalentsorahighsocialposition,hewasaconsiderablepower.Atpresentindividualsarelostinthecrowd.Inpoliticsitisalmostatrivialitytosaythatpublicopinionnowrulestheworld.The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they makethemselvestheorganofthetendenciesandinstinctsofmasses.Thisisastrueinthemoralandsocialrelations of private life as in public transactions.Thosewhose opinions goby the nameof publicopinion,arenotalwaysthesamesortofpublic:inAmericatheyarethewholewhitepopulation;inEngland,chieflythemiddleclass.Buttheyarealwaysamass,thatistosay,collectivemediocrity.Andwhatisastillgreaternovelty,themassdonotnowtaketheiropinionsfromdignitariesinChurchor

State, fromostensible leaders, or frombooks. Their thinking is done for thembymenmuch likethemselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through thenewspapers.Iamnotcomplainingofall this.Idonotassert thatanythingbetter iscompatible,asageneralrule,withthepresentlowstateofthehumanmind.Butthatdoesnothinderthegovernmentofmediocrity from being mediocre government. No government by a democracy or a numerousaristocracy,eitherinitspoliticalactsorintheopinions,qualities,andtoneofmindwhichitfosters,everdidorcouldriseabovemediocrity,exceptinsofarasthesovereignManyhaveletthemselvesbeguided(whichintheirbesttimestheyalwayshavedone)bythecounselsandinfluenceofamorehighlygiftedandinstructedOneorFew.Theinitiationofallwiseornoblethings,comesandmustcome from individuals; generally at first from someone individual.The honour and glory of theaveragemanis thathe iscapableoffollowingthat initiative; thathecanrespond internally towiseandnoble things,andbe led to themwithhiseyesopen. Iamnotcountenancing thesortof"hero-worship"which applauds the strongman of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of theworldandmakingitdohisbiddinginspiteofitself.Allhecanclaimis,freedomtopointouttheway.Thepowerofcompellingothersintoit,isnotonlyinconsistentwiththefreedomanddevelopmentofalltherest,butcorruptingtothestrongmanhimself.Itdoesseem,however,thatwhentheopinionsofmasses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, thecounterpoiseandcorrectivetothattendencywouldbe,themoreandmorepronouncedindividualityofthosewhostandonthehighereminencesofthought.Itisinthesecircumstancesmostespecially,that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differentlyfrom themass. Inother times therewasnoadvantage in theirdoing so,unless theyactednotonlydifferently,butbetter. In thisage themereexampleofnonconformity, themere refusal tobend theknee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to makeeccentricityareproach,itisdesirable,inordertobreakthroughthattyranny,thatpeopleshouldbeeccentric.Eccentricityhasalwaysaboundedwhenandwherestrengthofcharacterhasabounded;andthe amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius,mentalvigour,andmoralcouragewhichitcontained.Thatsofewnowdaretobeeccentric,marksthechiefdangerofthetime.

Ihavesaidthatitisimportanttogivethefreestscopepossibletouncustomarythings,inorderthatitmayintimeappearwhichofthesearefittobeconvertedintocustoms.Butindependenceofaction,anddisregardofcustomarenotsolelydeservingofencouragementfor thechancetheyaffordthatbettermodesofaction,andcustomsmoreworthyofgeneraladoption,maybestruckout;nor is itonlypersonsofdecidedmentalsuperioritywhohaveajustclaimtocarryontheirlivesintheirownway.Thereisnoreasonthatallhumanexistencesshouldbeconstructedonsomeone,orsomesmallnumberofpatterns.Ifapersonpossessesanytolerableamountofcommon-senseandexperience,hisownmodeoflayingouthisexistenceisthebest,notbecauseitisthebestinitself,butbecauseitishisownmode.Humanbeingsarenotlikesheep;andevensheeparenotundistinguishablyalike.Amancannotgetacoatorapairofbootstofithim,unlesstheyareeithermadetohismeasure,orhehasawholewarehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit himwith a life thanwith a coat, or arehumanbeingsmore likeoneanother in theirwholephysicalandspiritualconformation than in theshapeoftheirfeet?Ifitwereonlythatpeoplehavediversitiesoftaste,thatisreasonenoughfornotattemptingtoshapethemallafteronemodel.Butdifferentpersonsalsorequiredifferentconditionsfortheirspiritualdevelopment;andcannomoreexisthealthilyinthesamemoral,thanallthevarietyofplantscaninthesamephysical,atmosphereandclimate.Thesamethingswhicharehelpstoonepersontowardsthecultivationofhishighernature,arehindrancestoanother.Thesamemodeoflifeisahealthyexcitement toone,keepingallhisfacultiesofactionandenjoyment in theirbestorder,

whiletoanother it isadistractingburthen,whichsuspendsorcrushesall internal life.Suchare thedifferencesamonghumanbeings in their sourcesofpleasure, their susceptibilitiesofpain,and theoperation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a correspondingdiversityintheirmodesoflife,theyneitherobtaintheirfairshareofhappiness,norgrowuptothemental,moral,andaestheticstatureofwhichtheirnatureiscapable.Whythenshouldtolerance,asfaras the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extortacquiescencebythemultitudeoftheiradherents?Nowhere(exceptinsomemonasticinstitutions)isdiversityoftasteentirelyunrecognised;apersonmay,withoutblame,eitherlikeordislikerowing,orsmoking,ormusic,orathleticexercises,orchess,orcards,orstudy,becauseboththosewholikeeachofthesethings,andthosewhodislikethem,aretoonumeroustobeputdown.Buttheman,andstillmorethewoman,whocanbeaccusedeitherofdoing"whatnobodydoes,"orofnotdoing"whateverybodydoes,"isthesubjectofasmuchdepreciatoryremarkasifheorshehadcommittedsomegravemoraldelinquency.Personsrequiretopossessatitle,orsomeotherbadgeofrank,oroftheconsiderationofpeopleofrank,tobeabletoindulgesomewhatintheluxuryofdoingastheylikewithoutdetrimenttotheirestimation.Toindulgesomewhat,Irepeat:forwhoeverallowthemselvesmuchof that indulgence, incur theriskofsomethingworse thandisparagingspeeches—theyare inperilofacommissiondelunatico,andofhavingtheirpropertytakenfromthemandgiventotheirrelations.[13]

Thereisonecharacteristicofthepresentdirectionofpublicopinion,peculiarlycalculatedtomakeitintolerant of anymarked demonstration of individuality. The general average ofmankind are notonlymoderate in intellect, but alsomoderate in inclinations: they have no tastes orwishes strongenoughto incline themtodoanythingunusual,andtheyconsequentlydonotunderstandthosewhohave,andclassallsuchwiththewildandintemperatewhomtheyareaccustomedtolookdownupon.Now,inadditiontothisfactwhichisgeneral,wehaveonlytosupposethatastrongmovementhassetintowardstheimprovementofmorals,anditisevidentwhatwehavetoexpect.Inthesedayssuchamovementhassetin;muchhasactuallybeeneffectedinthewayofincreasedregularityofconduct,anddiscouragementofexcesses;andthereisaphilanthropicspiritabroad,fortheexerciseofwhichthere isnomore invitingfield than themoralandprudential improvementofour fellow-creatures.These tendenciesof the timescause thepublic tobemoredisposed thanatmost formerperiods toprescribe general rules of conduct, and endeavour to make every one conform to the approvedstandard.Andthatstandard,expressortacit,istodesirenothingstrongly.Itsidealofcharacteristobewithoutanymarkedcharacter;tomaimbycompression,likeaChineselady'sfoot,everypartofhuman naturewhich stands out prominently, and tends tomake the personmarkedly dissimilar inoutlinetocommonplacehumanity.

Asisusuallythecasewithidealswhichexcludeone-halfofwhatisdesirable,thepresentstandardofapprobationproducesonlyaninferiorimitationoftheotherhalf.Insteadofgreatenergiesguidedbyvigorous reason,andstrong feelingsstronglycontrolledbyaconscientiouswill, its result isweakfeelingsandweakenergies,whichthereforecanbekept inoutwardconformity torulewithoutanystrengtheitherofwillorof reason.Alreadyenergeticcharactersonany large scalearebecomingmerelytraditional.Thereisnowscarcelyanyoutletforenergyinthiscountryexceptbusiness.Theenergy expended in that may still be regarded as considerable. What little is left from thatemployment,isexpendedonsomehobby;whichmaybeauseful,evenaphilanthropichobby,butisalwayssomeonething,andgenerallyathingofsmalldimensions.ThegreatnessofEnglandisnowall collective: individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit ofcombining;andwiththisourmoralandreligiousphilanthropistsareperfectlycontented.ButitwasmenofanotherstampthanthisthatmadeEnglandwhatithasbeen;andmenofanotherstampwillbe

neededtopreventitsdecline.

The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being inunceasingantagonismtothatdispositiontoaimatsomethingbetterthancustomary,whichiscalled,according tocircumstances, the spiritof liberty,or thatofprogressor improvement.Thespiritofimprovementisnotalwaysaspiritofliberty,foritmayaimatforcingimprovementsonanunwillingpeople; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally andtemporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source ofimprovementisliberty,sincebyitthereareasmanypossibleindependentcentresofimprovementasthere are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love ofliberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway ofCustom, involving at least emancipationfromthatyoke;andthecontestbetweenthetwoconstitutesthechiefinterestofthehistoryofmankind.Thegreaterpartoftheworldhas,properlyspeaking,nohistory,becausethedespotismofCustomiscomplete.ThisisthecaseoverthewholeEast.Customisthere,inallthings,thefinalappeal;justiceandrightmeanconformitytocustom;theargumentofcustomnoone,unlesssometyrantintoxicatedwithpower,thinksofresisting.Andweseetheresult.Thosenationsmustoncehavehadoriginality;theydidnot startoutof thegroundpopulous, lettered, andversed inmanyof theartsof life; theymadethemselvesallthis,andwerethenthegreatestandmostpowerfulnationsintheworld.Whataretheynow?Thesubjectsordependantsoftribeswhoseforefatherswanderedintheforestswhentheirshadmagnificentpalacesandgorgeoustemples,butoverwhomcustomexercisedonlyadividedrulewithlibertyandprogress.Apeople,itappears,maybeprogressiveforacertainlengthoftime,andthenstop:whendoesitstop?Whenitceasestopossessindividuality.IfasimilarchangeshouldbefallthenationsofEurope, itwillnotbeinexactly thesameshape: thedespotismofcustomwithwhichthesenations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes singularity, but it doesnotpreclude change, provided all change together. We have discarded the fixed costumes of ourforefathers;everyonemuststilldresslikeotherpeople,butthefashionmaychangeonceortwiceayear.Wethustakecarethatwhenthereischange,itshallbeforchange'ssake,andnotfromanyideaofbeautyorconvenience;forthesameideaofbeautyorconveniencewouldnotstrikealltheworldat the same moment, and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at another moment. But we areprogressive aswell as changeable:we continuallymake new inventions inmechanical things, andkeep themuntil they are again superseded by better;we are eager for improvement in politics, ineducation,eveninmorals,thoughinthislastourideaofimprovementchieflyconsistsinpersuadingor forcing other people to be as good as ourselves. It is not progress that we object to; on thecontrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. It isindividualitythatwewaragainst:weshouldthinkwehaddonewondersifwehadmadeourselvesallalike;forgettingthattheunlikenessofonepersontoanotherisgenerallythefirstthingwhichdrawsthe attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or thepossibility,bycombiningtheadvantagesofboth,ofproducingsomethingbetterthaneither.WehaveawarningexampleinChina—anationofmuchtalent,and,insomerespects,evenwisdom,owingtothe rare good fortune of having been provided at an early periodwith a particularly good set ofcustoms, the work, in somemeasure, ofmen to whom even themost enlightened Europeanmustaccord,undercertainlimitations,thetitleofsagesandphilosophers.Theyareremarkable,too,intheexcellenceof theirapparatusfor impressing,asfaraspossible, thebestwisdomtheypossessuponeverymindinthecommunity,andsecuringthatthosewhohaveappropriatedmostofitshalloccupythepostsofhonourandpower.Surelythepeoplewhodidthishavediscoveredthesecretofhumanprogressiveness,andmusthavekeptthemselvessteadilyattheheadofthemovementoftheworld.Onthecontrary,theyhavebecomestationary—haveremainedsoforthousandsofyears;andiftheyare

evertobefartherimproved,itmustbebyforeigners.TheyhavesucceededbeyondallhopeinwhatEnglishphilanthropistsaresoindustriouslyworkingat—inmakingapeopleallalike,allgoverningtheirthoughtsandconductbythesamemaximsandrules;andthesearethefruits.Themodernrégimeofpublicopinionis,inanunorganisedform,whattheChineseeducationalandpoliticalsystemsareinanorganised;andunlessindividualityshallbeablesuccessfullytoassert itselfagainst thisyoke,Europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend to becomeanotherChina.

What is it thathashithertopreservedEuropefromthis lot?WhathasmadetheEuropeanfamilyofnations an improving, instead of a stationary portion ofmankind?Not any superior excellence inthem,which,when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity ofcharacterandculture.Individuals,classes,nations,havebeenextremelyunlikeoneanother:theyhavestruckoutagreatvarietyofpaths,eachleadingtosomethingvaluable;andalthoughateveryperiodthose who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would havethoughtitanexcellentthingifalltherestcouldhavebeencompelledtotravelhisroad,theirattemptsto thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in timeendured to receive the good which the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, whollyindebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive andmany-sided development. But it alreadybegins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards theChineseidealofmakingallpeoplealike.M.deTocqueville,inhislastimportantwork,remarkshowmuchmore theFrenchmenof thepresentdayresembleoneanother, thandid thoseevenof the lastgeneration. The same remarkmight bemade of Englishmen in a far greater degree. In a passagealready quoted fromWilhelm vonHumboldt, he points out two things as necessary conditions ofhumandevelopment,becausenecessary to renderpeopleunlikeoneanother;namely, freedom,andvarietyofsituations.Thesecondofthesetwoconditionsisinthiscountryeverydaydiminishing.Thecircumstanceswhichsurrounddifferentclassesandindividuals,andshapetheircharacters,aredailybecomingmoreassimilated.Formerly,differentranks,differentneighbourhoods,differenttradesandprofessions,livedinwhatmightbecalleddifferentworlds;atpresent,toagreatdegreeinthesame.Comparativelyspeaking,theynowreadthesamethings,listentothesamethings,seethesamethings,gotothesameplaces,havetheirhopesandfearsdirectedtothesameobjects,havethesamerightsand liberties,and thesamemeansofasserting them.Greatasare thedifferencesofpositionwhichremain,theyarenothingtothosewhichhaveceased.Andtheassimilationisstillproceeding.Allthepolitical changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high.Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under commoninfluences,andgives themaccess to thegeneralstockoffactsandsentiments. Improvements in themeans of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personalcontact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. Theincrease of commerce andmanufactures promotes it, by diffusingmorewidely the advantages ofeasy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition,wherebythedesireofrisingbecomesnolongerthecharacterofaparticularclass,butofallclasses.Amorepowerfulagencythanevenallthese,inbringingaboutageneralsimilarityamongmankind,isthecompleteestablishment,inthisandotherfreecountries,oftheascendencyofpublicopinionintheState.Asthevarioussocialeminenceswhichenabledpersonsentrenchedonthemtodisregardtheopinion of the multitude, gradually become levelled; as the very idea of resisting the will of thepublic,whenitispositivelyknownthattheyhaveawill,disappearsmoreandmorefromthemindsofpractical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity—any substantivepowerinsociety,which,itselfopposedtotheascendencyofnumbers,isinterestedintakingunderits

protectionopinionsandtendenciesatvariancewiththoseofthepublic.

ThecombinationofallthesecausesformssogreatamassofinfluenceshostiletoIndividuality,thatitis not easy to see how it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless theintelligent part of the public can bemade to feel its value—to see that it is good there should bedifferences,eventhoughnotforthebetter,eventhough,asitmayappeartothem,someshouldbefortheworse.If theclaimsofIndividualityareevertobeasserted, thetimeisnow,whilemuchisstillwanting to complete the enforcedassimilation. It isonly in the earlier stages that any standcanbesuccessfully made against the encroachment. The demand that all other people shall resembleourselves,growsbywhatitfeedson.Ifresistancewaitstilllifeisreducednearlytooneuniformtype,all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous andcontrarytonature.Mankindspeedilybecomeunabletoconceivediversity,whentheyhavebeenforsometimeunaccustomedtoseeit.

FOOTNOTES:

[11]TheSphereandDutiesofGovernment, fromtheGermanofBaronWilhelmvonHumboldt,pp.11-13.

[12]Sterling'sEssays.

[13] There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence onwhich, of lateyears, any person can be judicially declared unfit for themanagement of his affairs; and after hisdeath, his disposal of his property canbe set aside, if there is enoughof it topay the expensesoflitigation—whicharechargedonthepropertyitself.Alltheminutedetailsofhisdailylifearepriedinto, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and describingfacultiesofthelowestofthelow,bearsanappearanceunlikeabsolutecommonplace, is laidbeforethejuryasevidenceofinsanity,andoftenwithsuccess;thejurorsbeinglittle,ifatall,lessvulgarandignorant than thewitnesses;while the judges,with thatextraordinarywantofknowledgeofhumannatureandlifewhichcontinuallyastonishesusinEnglishlawyers,oftenhelptomisleadthem.Thesetrialsspeakvolumesas to thestateof feelingandopinionamong thevulgarwith regard tohumanliberty. So far from setting any value on individuality—so far from respecting the rights of eachindividual toact, in things indifferent,asseemsgood tohisownjudgmentand inclinations, judgesandjuriescannotevenconceivethatapersoninastateofsanitycandesiresuchfreedom.Informerdays, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest putting them in amadhouseinstead:itwouldbenothingsurprisingnowadayswerewetoseethisdone,andthedoersapplaudingthemselves,because,insteadofpersecutingforreligion,theyhadadoptedsohumaneandChristianamodeoftreatingtheseunfortunates,notwithoutasilentsatisfactionattheirhavingtherebyobtainedtheirdeserts.

CHAPTERIV.OFTHELIMITSTOTHEAUTHORITYOFSOCIETYOVER

THEINDIVIDUAL.

What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself?Where does theauthority of society begin?Howmuchof human life shouldbe assigned to individuality, andhowmuchtosociety?

Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. Toindividualityshouldbelong thepartof life inwhich it ischiefly the individual that is interested; tosociety,thepartwhichchieflyinterestssociety.

Thoughsocietyisnotfoundedonacontract,andthoughnogoodpurposeisansweredbyinventingacontract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection ofsocietyowesareturnforthebenefit,andthefactoflivinginsocietyrendersitindispensablethateachshouldbeboundtoobserveacertainlineofconducttowardstherest.Thisconductconsists,first,innot injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interestswhich, either by express legalprovisionorbytacitunderstanding,oughttobeconsideredasrights;andsecondly,ineachperson'sbearinghisshare(tobefixedonsomeequitableprinciple)ofthelaboursandsacrificesincurredfordefending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society isjustifiedinenforcing,atallcoststothosewhoendeavourtowithholdfulfilment.Noristhisallthatsocietymaydo.Theactsofanindividualmaybehurtfultoothers,orwantingindueconsiderationfortheirwelfare,withoutgoingthelengthofviolatinganyoftheirconstitutedrights.Theoffendermaythenbejustlypunishedbyopinionthoughnotbylaw.Assoonasanypartofaperson'sconductaffectsprejudiciallytheinterestsofothers,societyhasjurisdictionoverit,andthequestionwhetherthegeneralwelfarewillorwillnotbepromotedbyinterferingwithit,becomesopentodiscussion.Butthereisnoroomforentertaininganysuchquestionwhenaperson'sconductaffectstheinterestsofnopersonsbesideshimself,orneedsnotaffect themunless they like(all thepersonsconcernedbeingoffullage,andtheordinaryamountofunderstanding).Inallsuchcasesthereshouldbeperfectfreedom,legalandsocial,todotheactionandstandtheconsequences.

Itwouldbeagreatmisunderstandingofthisdoctrine,tosupposethatitisoneofselfishindifference,whichpretends that humanbeingshavenobusinesswith eachother's conduct in life, and that theyshouldnotconcernthemselvesaboutthewell-doingorwell-beingofoneanother,unlesstheirowninterest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterestedexertiontopromotethegoodofothers.Butdisinterestedbenevolencecanfindotherinstrumentstopersuadepeopletotheirgood,thanwhipsandscourges,eitheroftheliteralorthemetaphoricalsort.Iam the lastperson toundervalue the self-regardingvirtues; theyareonly second in importance, ifevensecond,tothesocial.Itisequallythebusinessofeducationtocultivateboth.Buteveneducationworksbyconvictionandpersuasionaswellasbycompulsion,anditisbytheformeronlythat,whentheperiodofeducationispast,theself-regardingvirtuesshouldbeinculcated.Humanbeingsowetoeachotherhelptodistinguishthebetterfromtheworse,andencouragementtochoosetheformerandavoidthelatter.Theyshouldbeforeverstimulatingeachothertoincreasedexerciseoftheirhigherfaculties,andincreaseddirectionoftheirfeelingsandaimstowardswiseinsteadoffoolish,elevatinginsteadofdegrading,objectsandcontemplations.Butneitheroneperson,noranynumberofpersons,

iswarrantedinsayingtoanotherhumancreatureofripeyears,thatheshallnotdowithhislifeforhisownbenefitwhathechoosestodowithit.Heisthepersonmostinterestedinhisownwell-being:theinterestwhichanyotherperson,exceptincasesofstrongpersonalattachment,canhaveinit, istrifling,comparedwiththatwhichhehimselfhas;theinterestwhichsocietyhasinhimindividually(exceptastohisconducttoothers)isfractional,andaltogetherindirect:while,withrespecttohisownfeelingsandcircumstances,themostordinarymanorwomanhasmeansofknowledgeimmeasurablysurpassing those thatcanbepossessedbyanyoneelse.The interferenceof society tooverrulehisjudgment andpurposes inwhat only regards himself,must be groundedongeneral presumptions;whichmaybealtogetherwrong,andevenifright,areaslikelyasnottobemisappliedtoindividualcases,bypersonsnobetteracquaintedwiththecircumstancesofsuchcasesthanthosearewholookatthemmerelyfromwithout.Inthisdepartment,therefore,ofhumanaffairs,Individualityhasitsproperfieldofaction.Intheconductofhumanbeingstowardsoneanother,itisnecessarythatgeneralrulesshouldforthemostpartbeobserved,inorderthatpeoplemayknowwhattheyhavetoexpect;butineachperson'sownconcerns,hisindividualspontaneityisentitledtofreeexercise.Considerationstoaidhisjudgment,exhortationstostrengthenhiswill,maybeofferedtohim,evenobtrudedonhim,byothers;buthehimselfisthefinaljudge.Allerrorswhichheislikelytocommitagainstadviceandwarning,are faroutweighedby theevilofallowingothers toconstrainhim towhat theydeemhisgood.

Idonotmeanthatthefeelingswithwhichapersonisregardedbyothers,oughtnottobeinanywayaffectedbyhisself-regardingqualitiesordeficiencies.Thisisneitherpossiblenordesirable.Ifheiseminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object ofadmiration.Heissomuchthenearertotheidealperfectionofhumannature.Ifheisgrosslydeficientinthosequalities,asentimenttheoppositeofadmirationwillfollow.Thereisadegreeoffolly,andadegreeofwhatmaybecalled(thoughthephraseisnotunobjectionable) lownessordepravationoftaste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders himnecessarilyandproperlyasubjectofdistaste,or,inextremecases,evenofcontempt:apersoncouldnothavetheoppositequalitiesinduestrengthwithoutentertainingthesefeelings.Thoughdoingnowrongtoanyone,apersonmaysoactastocompelustojudgehim,andfeeltohim,asafool,orasabeingofaninferiororder:andsincethis judgmentandfeelingareafactwhichhewouldprefer toavoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeableconsequence towhichhe exposeshimself. Itwouldbewell, indeed, if thisgoodofficeweremuchmore freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one personcouldhonestlypointouttoanotherthathethinkshiminfault,withoutbeingconsideredunmannerlyorpresuming.Wehavearight,also, invariousways, toactuponourunfavourableopinionofanyone, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours.We are not bound, forexample,toseekhissociety;wehavearighttoavoidit(thoughnottoparadetheavoidance),forwehavearighttochoosethesocietymostacceptabletous.Wehavearight,anditmaybeourduty,tocautionothersagainsthim,ifwethinkhisexampleorconversationlikelytohaveaperniciouseffecton those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional goodoffices,exceptthosewhichtendtohisimprovement.Inthesevariousmodesapersonmaysufferveryseverepenaltiesatthehandsofothers,forfaultswhichdirectlyconcernonlyhimself;buthesuffersthesepenaltiesonlyinsofarastheyarethenatural,and,asitwere,thespontaneousconsequencesofthefaultsthemselves,notbecausetheyarepurposelyinflictedonhimforthesakeofpunishment.Apersonwhoshowsrashness,obstinacy,self-conceit—whocannotlivewithinmoderatemeans—whocannot restrainhimself fromhurtful indulgences—whopursues animalpleasures at the expenseofthoseoffeelingandintellect—mustexpecttobeloweredintheopinionofothers,andtohavealess

shareof their favourablesentiments;butof thishehasnoright tocomplain,unlesshehasmeritedtheirfavourbyspecialexcellenceinhissocialrelations,andhasthusestablishedatitletotheirgoodoffices,whichisnotaffectedbyhisdemeritstowardshimself.

What Icontendfor is, that the inconvenienceswhicharestrictly inseparable fromtheunfavourablejudgmentofothers,aretheonlyonestowhichapersonshouldeverbesubjectedforthatportionofhis conduct and characterwhich concernshis owngood, butwhichdoesnot affect the interests ofothers in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment.Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his ownrights; falsehood or duplicity in dealingwith them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages overthem; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury—these are fit objects of moralreprobation,and,ingravecases,ofmoralretributionandpunishment.Andnotonlytheseacts,butthedispositionswhichleadtothem,areproperlyimmoral,andfitsubjectsofdisapprobationwhichmayrisetoabhorrence.Crueltyofdisposition;maliceandill-nature;thatmostanti-socialandodiousofall passions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity; irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentmentdisproportionedtotheprovocation;theloveofdomineeringoverothers;thedesiretoengrossmorethan one's share of advantages (the πλεονεξἱα [Greek: pleonexia] of theGreeks); the pridewhichderives gratification from the abasement of others; the egotismwhich thinks self and its concernsmoreimportantthaneverythingelse,anddecidesalldoubtfulquestionsinitsownfavour;—thesearemoral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faultspreviously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may becarried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want ofpersonaldignityandself-respect;buttheyareonlyasubjectofmoralreprobationwhentheyinvolveabreachofdutytoothers,forwhosesaketheindividualisboundtohavecareforhimself.Whatarecalleddutiestoourselvesarenotsociallyobligatory,unlesscircumstancesrenderthemat thesametimedutiestoothers.Thetermdutytooneself,whenitmeansanythingmorethanprudence,meansself-respectorself-development;andfornoneoftheseisanyoneaccountabletohisfellow-creatures,becausefornoneofthemisitforthegoodofmankindthathebeheldaccountabletothem.

The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect ofprudenceorofpersonaldignity,andthereprobationwhichisduetohimforanoffenceagainsttherightsofothers, isnotamerelynominaldistinction.Itmakesavastdifferencebothinourfeelingsandinourconducttowardshim,whetherhedispleasesusinthingsinwhichwethinkwehavearighttocontrolhim,orinthingsinwhichweknowthatwehavenot.Ifhedispleasesus,wemayexpressourdistaste,andwemaystandalooffromapersonaswellasfromathingthatdispleasesus;butweshall not therefore feel called on tomake his life uncomfortable.We shall reflect that he alreadybears,orwillbear,thewholepenaltyofhiserror;ifhespoilshislifebymismanagement,weshallnot,forthatreason,desiretospoil itstillfurther: insteadofwishingtopunishhim,weshallratherendeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils hisconduct tends tobringuponhim.Hemaybe tous anobjectofpity, perhapsofdislike, butnotofanger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall thinkourselvesjustifiedindoingisleavinghimtohimself,ifwedonotinterferebenevolentlybyshowinginterest or concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for theprotectionofhisfellow-creatures,individuallyorcollectively.Theevilconsequencesofhisactsdonotthenfallonhimself,butonothers;andsociety,astheprotectorofallitsmembers,mustretaliateonhim;mustinflictpainonhimfortheexpresspurposeofpunishment,andmusttakecarethatitbesufficientlysevere.Intheonecase,heisanoffenderatourbar,andwearecalledonnotonlytositinjudgmentonhim,but,inoneshapeoranother,toexecuteourownsentence:intheothercase,itisnot

ourparttoinflictanysufferingonhim,exceptwhatmayincidentallyfollowfromourusingthesamelibertyintheregulationofourownaffairs,whichweallowtohiminhis.

Thedistinctionherepointedoutbetweenthepartofaperson'slifewhichconcernsonlyhimself,andthatwhichconcernsothers,manypersonswillrefusetoadmit.How(itmaybeasked)cananypartoftheconductofamemberofsocietybeamatterofindifferencetotheothermembers?Nopersonisanentirelyisolatedbeing;itisimpossibleforapersontodoanythingseriouslyorpermanentlyhurtfultohimself,withoutmischiefreachingatleasttohisnearconnections,andoftenfarbeyondthem.Ifheinjureshisproperty,hedoesharm to thosewhodirectlyor indirectlyderivedsupport from it,andusually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If hedeteriorateshisbodilyormentalfaculties,henotonlybringseviluponallwhodependedonhimforanyportionoftheirhappiness,butdisqualifieshimselfforrenderingtheserviceswhichheowestohisfellow-creaturesgenerally;perhapsbecomesaburthenontheiraffectionorbenevolence;andifsuchconductwereveryfrequent,hardlyanyoffencethatiscommittedwoulddetractmorefromthegeneralsumofgood.Finally,ifbyhisvicesorfolliesapersondoesnodirectharmtoothers,heisnevertheless(itmaybesaid)injuriousbyhisexample;andoughttobecompelledtocontrolhimself,forthesakeofthosewhomthesightorknowledgeofhisconductmightcorruptormislead.

Andeven (itwillbeadded) if theconsequencesofmisconductcouldbeconfined to theviciousorthoughtlessindividual,oughtsocietytoabandontotheirownguidancethosewhoaremanifestlyunfitforit?Ifprotectionagainstthemselvesisconfessedlyduetochildrenandpersonsunderage,isnotsociety equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are asinjurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the actsprohibitedbylaw,why(itmaybeasked)shouldnotlaw,sofarasisconsistentwithpracticabilityandsocial convenience, endeavour to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidableimperfectionsoflaw,oughtnotopinionatleasttoorganiseapowerfulpoliceagainstthesevices,andvisitrigidlywithsocialpenaltiesthosewhoareknowntopractisethem?Thereisnoquestionhere(itmaybesaid)aboutrestrictingindividuality,orimpedingthetrialofnewandoriginalexperimentsinliving.Theonlythingsitissoughttopreventarethingswhichhavebeentriedandcondemnedfromthebeginningoftheworlduntilnow;thingswhichexperiencehasshownnottobeusefulorsuitableto any person's individuality. Theremust be some length of time and amount of experience, afterwhichamoralorprudentialtruthmayberegardedasestablished:anditismerelydesiredtopreventgeneration after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to theirpredecessors.

Ifullyadmitthatthemischiefwhichapersondoestohimself,mayseriouslyaffect,boththroughtheirsympathies and their interests, those nearly connectedwith him, and in aminor degree, society atlarge.When,byconductofthissort,apersonisledtoviolateadistinctandassignableobligationtoanyotherpersonorpersons,thecaseistakenoutoftheself-regardingclass,andbecomesamenabletomoraldisapprobationinthepropersenseoftheterm.If,forexample,aman,throughintemperanceorextravagance,becomesunabletopayhisdebts,or,havingundertakenthemoralresponsibilityofafamily,becomes from the samecause incapableof supportingor educating them,he isdeservedlyreprobated,andmightbejustlypunished;butitisforthebreachofdutytohisfamilyorcreditors,notfor theextravagance.If theresourceswhichought tohavebeendevotedto them,hadbeendivertedfromthemforthemostprudentinvestment,themoralculpabilitywouldhavebeenthesame.GeorgeBarnwellmurderedhisuncletogetmoneyforhismistress,butifhehaddoneittosethimselfupinbusiness,hewouldequallyhavebeenhanged.Again,inthefrequentcaseofamanwhocausesgrief

tohisfamilybyaddictiontobadhabits,hedeservesreproachforhisunkindnessoringratitude;butsohemay for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to thosewithwhomhepasseshislife,orwhofrompersonaltiesaredependentonhimfortheircomfort.Whoeverfailsintheconsiderationgenerallyduetotheinterestsandfeelingsofothers,notbeingcompelledbysomemoreimperativeduty,orjustifiedbyallowableself-preference,isasubjectofmoraldisapprobationforthatfailure,butnotforthecauseofit,norfortheerrors,merelypersonaltohimself,whichmayhave remotely led to it. In like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding,fromtheperformanceofsomedefinitedutyincumbentonhimtothepublic,heisguiltyofa social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or apoliceman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definitedamage,oradefiniteriskofdamage,eithertoanindividualortothepublic,thecaseistakenoutoftheprovinceofliberty,andplacedinthatofmoralityorlaw.

Butwithregardtothemerelycontingent,or,asitmaybecalled,constructiveinjurywhichapersoncauses to society, by conductwhich neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasionsperceptiblehurttoanyassignableindividualexcepthimself;theinconvenienceisonewhichsocietycanafford tobear, for thesakeof thegreatergoodofhumanfreedom.Ifgrownpersonsare tobepunished fornot takingproper careof themselves, Iwould rather itwere for theirown sake, thanunder pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefitswhichsocietydoesnotpretend it has a right to exact.But I cannot consent to argue thepoint as ifsocietyhadnomeansofbringingitsweakermembersuptoitsordinarystandardofrationalconduct,exceptwaitingtill theydosomethingirrational,andthenpunishingthem,legallyormorally,forit.Societyhashadabsolutepoweroverthemduringalltheearlyportionoftheirexistence:ithashadthewholeperiodofchildhoodandnonageinwhichtotrywhetheritcouldmakethemcapableofrationalconductinlife.Theexistinggenerationismasterbothofthetrainingandtheentirecircumstancesofthegeneration tocome; itcannot indeedmake themperfectlywiseandgood,because it is itselfsolamentablydeficientingoodnessandwisdom;anditsbesteffortsarenotalways,inindividualcases,itsmost successfulones;but it is perfectlywell able tomake the risinggeneration, as awhole, asgoodas,andalittlebetterthan,itself.Ifsocietyletsanyconsiderablenumberofitsmembersgrowupmerechildren,incapableofbeingactedonbyrationalconsiderationofdistantmotives,societyhasitself toblamefor theconsequences.Armednotonlywithall thepowersofeducation,butwith theascendencywhichtheauthorityofareceivedopinionalwaysexercisesoverthemindswhoareleastfitted to judge for themselves; and aided by thenatural penaltieswhich cannot be prevented fromfalling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not societypretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in thepersonalconcernsofindividuals,inwhich,onallprinciplesofjusticeandpolicy,thedecisionoughtto rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor is there anything which tendsmore todiscreditandfrustratethebettermeansofinfluencingconduct,thanaresorttotheworse.Iftherebeamong thosewhom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of thematerial ofwhichvigorousandindependentcharactersaremade,theywillinfalliblyrebelagainsttheyoke.Nosuchpersonwilleverfeelthatothershavearighttocontrolhiminhisconcerns,suchastheyhavetopreventhimfrominjuringthemintheirs;anditeasilycomestobeconsideredamarkofspiritandcouragetoflyinthefaceofsuchusurpedauthority,anddowithostentationtheexactoppositeofwhatitenjoins;asinthefashionofgrossnesswhichsucceeded,inthetimeofCharlesII.,tothefanaticalmoralintoleranceofthePuritans.Withrespecttowhatissaidofthenecessityofprotectingsocietyfromthebadexamplesettoothersbytheviciousortheself-indulgent;itistruethatbadexamplemayhaveaperniciouseffect,especiallytheexampleofdoingwrongtootherswithimpunitytothewrong-

doer.Butwearenowspeakingofconductwhich,whileitdoesnowrongtoothers,issupposedtodogreatharmtotheagenthimself:andIdonotseehowthosewhobelievethis,canthinkotherwisethanthattheexample,onthewhole,mustbemoresalutarythanhurtful,since,ifitdisplaysthemisconduct,itdisplaysalsothepainfulordegradingconsequenceswhich,iftheconductisjustlycensured,mustbesupposedtobeinallormostcasesattendantonit.

But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personalconduct,isthatwhenitdoesinterfere,theoddsarethatitinterfereswrongly,andinthewrongplace.Onquestionsofsocialmorality,ofdutytoothers,theopinionofthepublic,thatis,ofanoverrulingmajority, thoughoftenwrong, is likely tobestilloftener right;becauseonsuchquestions theyareonly required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which somemode of conduct, ifallowedtobepractised,wouldaffectthemselves.Buttheopinionofasimilarmajority,imposedasalawontheminority,onquestionsofself-regardingconduct,isquiteaslikelytobewrongasright;forinthesecasespublicopinionmeans,atthebest,somepeople'sopinionofwhatisgoodorbadforother people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfectindifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, andconsideringonlytheirownpreference.Therearemanywhoconsiderasaninjurytothemselvesanyconductwhich they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religiousbigot,whenchargedwithdisregardingthereligiousfeelingsofothers,hasbeenknowntoretortthattheydisregardhisfeelings,bypersistingintheirabominableworshiporcreed.Butthereisnoparitybetweenthefeelingofapersonforhisownopinion,andthefeelingofanotherwhoisoffendedathisholdingit;nomorethanbetweenthedesireofathieftotakeapurse,andthedesireoftherightownertokeepit.Andaperson'stasteisasmuchhisownpeculiarconcernashisopinionorhispurse.Itiseasyforanyonetoimagineanidealpublic,whichleavesthefreedomandchoiceofindividualsinalluncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct whichuniversalexperiencehascondemned.Butwherehastherebeenseenapublicwhichsetanysuchlimitto its censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience? In itsinterferenceswithpersonalconduct it is seldomthinkingofanythingbut theenormityofactingorfeelingdifferentlyfromitself;andthisstandardofjudgment,thinlydisguised,ishelduptomankindasthedictateofreligionandphilosophy,bynine-tenthsofallmoralistsandspeculativewriters.Theseteachthatthingsarerightbecausetheyareright;becausewefeelthemtobeso.Theytellustosearchinourownmindsandheartsforlawsofconductbindingonourselvesandonallothers.Whatcanthepoorpublicdobutapplytheseinstructions,andmaketheirownpersonalfeelingsofgoodandevil,iftheyaretolerablyunanimousinthem,obligatoryonalltheworld?

Theevilherepointedoutisnotonewhichexistsonlyintheory;anditmayperhapsbeexpectedthatIshouldspecify the instances inwhich thepublicof thisageandcountry improperly invests itsownpreferenceswiththecharacterofmorallaws.Iamnotwritinganessayontheaberrationsofexistingmoralfeeling.Thatistooweightyasubjecttobediscussedparenthetically,andbywayofillustration.Yetexamplesarenecessary,toshowthattheprincipleImaintainisofseriousandpracticalmoment,and that I amnot endeavouring to erect abarrier against imaginaryevils.And it isnotdifficult toshow,byabundant instances, that toextend theboundsofwhatmaybecalledmoralpolice,until itencroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the mostuniversalofallhumanpropensities.

Asafirstinstance,considertheantipathieswhichmencherishonnobettergroundsthanthatpersonswhose religious opinions are different from theirs, do not practise their religious observances,especiallytheirreligiousabstinences.Tocitearathertrivialexample,nothinginthecreedorpractice

ofChristiansdoesmore toenvenomthehatredofMahomedansagainst them, than the factof theireatingpork.TherearefewactswhichChristiansandEuropeansregardwithmoreunaffecteddisgust,thanMussulmansregardthisparticularmodeofsatisfyinghunger.Itis,inthefirstplace,anoffenceagainst their religion; but this circumstancebynomeans explains either thedegreeor thekindoftheir repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by allMussulmansaccountedwrong,butnotdisgusting.Theiraversiontothefleshofthe"uncleanbeast"is,on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea ofuncleanness,whenonce it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in thosewhosepersonalhabitsareanythingbutscrupulouslycleanly,andofwhichthesentimentofreligiousimpurity,sointenseintheHindoos,isaremarkableexample.Supposenowthatinapeople,ofwhomthemajoritywereMussulmans,thatmajorityshouldinsistuponnotpermittingporktobeeatenwithinthe limits of the country. This would be nothing new inMahomedan countries.[14] Would it be alegitimate exercise of themoral authority of public opinion? and if not,why not?The practice isreally revolting tosuchapublic.Theyalsosincerely think that it is forbiddenandabhorredby theDeity.Neithercouldtheprohibitionbecensuredasreligiouspersecution.Itmightbereligiousinitsorigin,but itwouldnotbepersecution for religion, sincenobody's religionmakes it aduty to eatpork. The only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regardingconcernsofindividualsthepublichasnobusinesstointerfere.

Tocomesomewhatnearerhome:themajorityofSpaniardsconsideritagrossimpiety,offensiveinthe highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the RomanCatholic;andnootherpublicworshipislawfulonSpanishsoil.ThepeopleofallSouthernEuropelookuponamarriedclergyasnotonlyirreligious,butunchaste,indecent,gross,disgusting.WhatdoProtestantsthinkoftheseperfectlysincerefeelings,andoftheattempttoenforcethemagainstnon-Catholics?Yet,ifmankindarejustifiedininterferingwitheachother'slibertyinthingswhichdonotconcerntheinterestsofothers,onwhatprincipleisitpossibleconsistentlytoexcludethesecases?orwhocanblamepeoplefordesiringtosuppresswhattheyregardasascandalinthesightofGodandman? No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personalimmorality,thanismadeoutforsuppressingthesepracticesintheeyesofthosewhoregardthemasimpieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we maypersecuteothersbecauseweareright,andthattheymustnotpersecuteusbecausetheyarewrong,wemustbewareofadmittingaprincipleofwhichweshouldresentasagrossinjusticetheapplicationtoourselves.

The preceding instancesmay be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingenciesimpossibleamongus:opinion,inthiscountry,notbeinglikelytoenforceabstinencefrommeats,ortointerferewithpeopleforworshipping,andforeithermarryingornotmarrying,accordingtotheircreed or inclination. The next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with libertywhich we have by no means passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficientlypowerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, they haveendeavoured,withconsiderablesuccess, toputdownallpublic,andnearlyallprivate,amusements:especiallymusic, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and thetheatre. There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality andreligion theserecreationsarecondemned;and thosepersonsbelongingchiefly to themiddleclass,whoaretheascendantpowerinthepresentsocialandpoliticalconditionofthekingdom,itisbynomeansimpossiblethatpersonsofthesesentimentsmayatsometimeorothercommandamajorityinParliament.Howwilltheremainingportionofthecommunityliketohavetheamusementsthatshallbepermitted to them regulatedby the religious andmoral sentiments of the stricterCalvinists and

Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively piousmembers of society to mind their own business? This is precisely what should be said to everygovernmentandeverypublic,whohavethepretensionthatnopersonshallenjoyanypleasurewhichtheythinkwrong.Butiftheprincipleofthepretensionbeadmitted,noonecanreasonablyobjecttoitsbeingactedoninthesenseofthemajority,orotherpreponderatingpowerinthecountry;andallpersonsmust be ready to conform to the ideaof aChristian commonwealth, as understoodby theearly settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed inregainingitslostground,asreligionssupposedtobedeclininghavesooftenbeenknowntodo.

To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than the one last mentioned.There is confessedly a strong tendency in themodernworld towards a democratic constitution ofsociety,accompaniedornotbypopularpoliticalinstitutions.Itisaffirmedthatinthecountrywherethis tendency is most completely realised—where both society and the government are mostdemocratic—the United States—the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a moreshowyor costly style of living than they canhope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerablyeffectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for a personpossessing a very large income, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur populardisapprobation.Thoughsuchstatementsasthesearedoubtlessmuchexaggeratedasarepresentationof existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but aprobableresultofdemocraticfeeling,combinedwiththenotionthatthepublichasarighttoavetoonthe manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes. We have only further to suppose aconsiderablediffusionofSocialistopinions,anditmaybecomeinfamousintheeyesofthemajoritytopossessmorepropertythansomeverysmallamount,oranyincomenotearnedbymanuallabour.Opinions similar in principle to these, already prevail widely among the artisan class, andweighoppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its ownmembers. It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in manybranchesofindustry,aredecidedlyofopinionthatbadworkmenoughttoreceivethesamewagesasgood,andthatnooneoughttobeallowed,throughpieceworkorotherwise,toearnbysuperiorskillor industrymore than others canwithout it.And they employ amoral police,which occasionallybecomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, alarger remuneration for a more useful service. If the public have any jurisdiction over privateconcerns,Icannotseethatthesepeopleareinfault,orthatanyindividual'sparticularpubliccanbeblamedforassertingthesameauthorityoverhisindividualconduct,whichthegeneralpublicassertsoverpeopleingeneral.

But,withoutdwellinguponsupposititiouscases,thereare,inourownday,grossusurpationsupontheliberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatenedwith some expectationofsuccess,andopinionsproposedwhichassertanunlimitedrightinthepublicnotonlytoprohibitbylaw everythingwhich it thinkswrong, but in order to get atwhat it thinkswrong, to prohibit anynumberofthingswhichitadmitstobeinnocent.

Underthenameofpreventingintemperance,thepeopleofoneEnglishcolony,andofnearlyhalftheUnited States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks,exceptformedicalpurposes:forprohibitionoftheirsaleisinfact,asitisintendedtobe,prohibitionoftheiruse.Andthoughtheimpracticabilityofexecutingthelawhascauseditsrepealinseveralofthe States which had adopted it, including the one fromwhich it derives its name, an attempt hasnotwithstandingbeencommenced,andisprosecutedwithconsiderablezealbymanyoftheprofessedphilanthropists,toagitateforasimilarlawinthiscountry.Theassociation,or"Alliance"asitterms

itself,which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicitygiven to a correspondencebetween itsSecretary andoneof thevery fewEnglishpublicmenwhohold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley's share in thiscorrespondenceiscalculatedtostrengthenthehopesalreadybuiltonhim,bythosewhoknowhowraresuchqualitiesasaremanifestedinsomeofhispublicappearances,unhappilyareamongthosewhofigureinpoliticallife.TheorganoftheAlliance,whowould"deeplydeploretherecognitionofanyprinciplewhichcouldbewrestedtojustifybigotryandpersecution,"undertakestopointoutthe"broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles from those of the association. "Allmattersrelatingtothought,opinion,conscience,appeartome,"hesays,"tobewithoutthesphereoflegislation;allpertainingtosocialact,habit,relation,subjectonlytoadiscretionarypowervestedintheStateitself,andnotintheindividual,tobewithinit."Nomentionismadeofathirdclass,differentfromeither of these, viz. acts andhabitswhich are not social, but individual; although it is to thisclass,surely,thattheactofdrinkingfermentedliquorsbelongs.Sellingfermentedliquors,however,istrading,andtradingisasocialact.Buttheinfringementcomplainedofisnotonthelibertyoftheseller,butonthatofthebuyerandconsumer;sincetheStatemightjustaswellforbidhimtodrinkwine,aspurposelymakeitimpossibleforhimtoobtainit.TheSecretary,however,says,"Iclaim,asacitizen,arighttolegislatewhenevermysocialrightsareinvadedbythesocialactofanother."Andnow for the definition of these "social rights." "If anything invadesmy social rights, certainly thetraffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating andstimulatingsocialdisorder.Itinvadesmyrightofequality,byderivingaprofitfromthecreationofamisery, I am taxed to support. It impedesmy right to freemoral and intellectual development, bysurroundingmypathwithdangers,andbyweakeninganddemoralisingsociety,fromwhichIhavearight to claimmutual aid and intercourse."A theory of "social rights," the like ofwhichprobablyneverbeforefounditswayintodistinctlanguage—beingnothingshortofthis—thatitistheabsolutesocial rightof every individual, that everyother individual shall act in every respect exactly asheought;thatwhosoeverfailsthereofinthesmallestparticular,violatesmysocialright,andentitlesmetodemandfromthelegislaturetheremovalof thegrievance.Somonstrousaprinciple isfarmoredangerousthananysingleinterferencewithliberty;thereisnoviolationoflibertywhichitwouldnotjustify;itacknowledgesnorighttoanyfreedomwhatever,exceptperhapstothatofholdingopinionsinsecret,withouteverdisclosingthem:forthemomentanopinionwhichIconsidernoxious,passesanyone'slips,itinvadesallthe"socialrights"attributedtomebytheAlliance.Thedoctrineascribestoallmankindavestedinterestineachother'smoral,intellectual,andevenphysicalperfection,tobedefinedbyeachclaimantaccordingtohisownstandard.

Anotherimportantexampleofillegitimateinterferencewiththerightfullibertyoftheindividual,notsimply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, isSabbatarian legislation.Withoutdoubt,abstinenceononedayintheweek,sofarastheexigenciesoflifepermit,fromtheusualdailyoccupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficialcustom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observedwithout a general consent to that effectamongtheindustriousclasses,therefore,insofarassomepersonsbyworkingmayimposethesamenecessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, theobservancebyothersofthecustom,bysuspendingthegreateroperationsofindustryonaparticularday. But this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual'sobservanceofthepractice,doesnotapplytotheself-chosenoccupationsinwhichapersonmaythinkfit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions onamusements.Itistruethattheamusementofsomeistheday'sworkofothers;butthepleasure,nottosay theuseful recreation, ofmany, isworth the labourof a few,provided theoccupation is freely

chosen,andcanbefreelyresigned.TheoperativesareperfectlyrightinthinkingthatifallworkedonSunday,sevendays'workwouldhavetobegivenforsixdays'wages:butsolongasthegreatmassofemployments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work,obtainaproportionalincreaseofearnings;andtheyarenotobligedtofollowthoseoccupations,iftheypreferleisuretoemolument.Ifafurtherremedyissought,itmightbefoundintheestablishmentbycustomofaholidayonsomeotherdayof theweekfor thoseparticularclassesofpersons.Theonlyground, therefore,onwhichrestrictionsonSundayamusementscanbedefended,mustbethatthey are religiously wrong; a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protestedagainst."DeoruminjuriæDiiscuræ."Itremainstobeprovedthatsocietyoranyofitsofficersholdsacommission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also awrongtoourfellow-creatures.Thenotionthatitisoneman'sdutythatanothershouldbereligious,was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted,would fullyjustifythem.ThoughthefeelingwhichbreaksoutintherepeatedattemptstostoprailwaytravellingonSunday, in theresistanceto theopeningofMuseums,andthelike,hasnot thecrueltyof theoldpersecutors, thestateofmind indicatedby it is fundamentally thesame. It isadeterminationnot totolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by thepersecutor'sreligion.ItisabeliefthatGodnotonlyabominatestheactofthemisbeliever,butwillnotholdusguiltlessifweleavehimunmolested.

Icannotrefrainfromaddingtotheseexamplesofthelittleaccountcommonlymadeofhumanliberty,thelanguageofdownrightpersecutionwhichbreaksoutfromthepressofthiscountry,wheneveritfeels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon ofMormonism.Muchmight be said on theunexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion founded on it, theproduct of palpable imposture, not even supported by theprestige of extraordinary qualities in itsfounder,isbelievedbyhundredsofthousands,andhasbeenmadethefoundationofasociety,intheageofnewspapers,railways,andtheelectrictelegraph.Whathereconcernsusis,thatthisreligion,likeotherandbetterreligions,hasitsmartyrs;thatitsprophetandfounderwas,forhisteaching,puttodeathbyamob;thatothersofitsadherentslosttheirlivesbythesamelawlessviolence;thattheywereforciblyexpelled,inabody,fromthecountryinwhichtheyfirstgrewup;while,nowthattheyhavebeenchasedintoasolitaryrecessinthemidstofadesert,manyinthiscountryopenlydeclarethatitwouldberight(onlythatitisnotconvenient)tosendanexpeditionagainstthem,andcompelthem by force to conform to the opinions of other people. The article of theMormonite doctrinewhich is thechiefprovocative to theantipathywhich thusbreaks through theordinaryrestraintsofreligious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, andHindoos,andChinese,seemstoexciteunquenchableanimositywhenpractisedbypersonswhospeakEnglish,andprofesstobeakindofChristians.NoonehasadeeperdisapprobationthanIhaveofthisMormoninstitution;bothforotherreasons,andbecause,farfrombeinginanywaycountenancedbytheprincipleofliberty,itisadirectinfractionofthatprinciple,beingamererivetingofthechainsofonehalfofthecommunity,andanemancipationoftheotherfromreciprocityofobligationtowardsthem.Still, itmustberememberedthat thisrelationisasmuchvoluntaryonthepartof thewomenconcernedinit,andwhomaybedeemedthesufferersbyit,asisthecasewithanyotherformofthemarriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in thecommon ideas and customs of theworld, which teachingwomen to thinkmarriage the one thingneedful,make it intelligible thatmany awoman should prefer being one of several wives, to notbeingawifeatall.Othercountriesarenotaskedtorecognisesuchunions,orreleaseanyportionoftheirinhabitantsfromtheirownlawsonthescoreofMormoniteopinions.Butwhenthedissentientshaveconcededtothehostilesentimentsofothers,farmorethancouldjustlybedemanded;whenthey

have left the countries towhich their doctrineswere unacceptable, and established themselves in aremotecorneroftheearth,whichtheyhavebeenthefirsttorenderhabitabletohumanbeings;it isdifficulttoseeonwhatprinciplesbutthoseoftyrannytheycanbepreventedfromlivingthereunderwhat laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfectfreedomofdeparturetothosewhoaredissatisfiedwiththeirways.Arecentwriter,insomerespectsofconsiderablemerit,proposes(tousehisownwords),notacrusade,butacivilizade,against thispolygamouscommunity,toputanendtowhatseemstohimaretrogradestepincivilisation.Italsoappearssotome,butIamnotawarethatanycommunityhasarighttoforceanothertobecivilised.So longas thesufferersby thebad lawdonot invokeassistancefromothercommunities, Icannotadmit that persons entirely unconnectedwith themought to step in and require that a condition ofthings with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end tobecauseitisascandaltopersonssomethousandsofmilesdistant,whohavenopartorconcerninit.Let themsendmissionaries, if theyplease, topreachagainst it;andlet them,byanyfairmeans(ofwhichsilencingtheteachersisnotone),opposetheprogressofsimilardoctrinesamongtheirownpeople.Ifcivilisationhasgotthebetterofbarbarismwhenbarbarismhadtheworldtoitself,itistoomuch to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after havingbeen fairly got under, should revive andconquer civilisation.A civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy,must first havebecome so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has thecapacity,orwilltakethetrouble,tostandupforit.Ifthisbeso,thesoonersuchacivilisationreceivesnoticetoquit,thebetter.Itcanonlygoonfrombadtoworse,untildestroyedandregenerated(liketheWesternEmpire)byenergeticbarbarians.

FOOTNOTE:

[14] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious andenterprising tribe, thedescendantsof thePersianfire-worshippers, flyingfromtheirnativecountrybefore the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoosovereigns,onconditionofnoteatingbeef.Whenthoseregionsafterwardsfellunderthedominionof Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, onconditionofrefrainingfrompork.Whatwasatfirstobediencetoauthoritybecameasecondnature,andtheParseestothisdayabstainbothfrombeefandpork.Thoughnotrequiredbytheirreligion,thedouble abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in theEast, is areligion.

CHAPTERV.APPLICATIONS.

Theprinciplesassertedinthesepagesmustbemoregenerallyadmittedasthebasisfordiscussionofdetails, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government andmoralscanbeattemptedwithanyprospectofadvantage.ThefewobservationsIproposetomakeonquestionsofdetail, aredesigned to illustrate theprinciples, rather than to follow themout to theirconsequences. I offer, not somuch applications, as specimens of application;whichmay serve tobringintogreaterclearnessthemeaningandlimitsofthetwomaximswhichtogetherformtheentiredoctrineof thisEssay,and toassist the judgment inholding thebalancebetween them, in thecaseswhereitappearsdoubtfulwhichofthemisapplicabletothecase.

Themaximsare, first, that the individual is not accountable to society forhis actions, in so far astheseconcerntheinterestsofnopersonbuthimself.Advice, instruction,persuasion,andavoidancebyotherpeople if thoughtnecessaryby themfor theirowngood,are theonlymeasuresbywhichsociety can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for suchactionsasareprejudicialtotheinterestsofothers,theindividualisaccountableandmaybesubjectedeithertosocialortolegalpunishments,ifsocietyisofopinionthattheoneortheotherisrequisiteforitsprotection.

Inthefirstplace,itmustbynomeansbesupposed,becausedamage,orprobabilityofdamage,totheinterestsofothers,canalone justify the interferenceofsociety, that therefore italwaysdoes justifysuch interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily andthereforelegitimatelycausespainorlosstoothers,orinterceptsagoodwhichtheyhadareasonablehope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad socialinstitutions,butareunavoidablewhilethoseinstitutionslast;andsomewouldbeunavoidableunderanyinstitutions.Whoeversucceedsinanovercrowdedprofession,orinacompetitiveexamination;whoeverispreferredtoanotherinanycontestforanobjectwhichbothdesire,reapsbenefitfromthelossofothers,fromtheirwastedexertionandtheirdisappointment.Butitis,bycommonadmission,betterforthegeneralinterestofmankind,thatpersonsshouldpursuetheirobjectsundeterredbythissort of consequences. In other words, society admits no rights, either legal or moral, in thedisappointedcompetitors, to immunityfromthiskindofsuffering;andfeelscalledon to interfere,onlywhenmeansofsuccesshavebeenemployedwhichitiscontrarytothegeneralinteresttopermit—namely,fraudortreachery,andforce.

Again,tradeisasocialact.Whoeverundertakestosellanydescriptionofgoodstothepublic,doeswhataffectstheinterestofotherpersons,andofsocietyingeneral;andthushisconduct,inprinciple,comeswithinthejurisdictionofsociety:accordingly,itwasonceheldtobethedutyofgovernments,in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes ofmanufacture.But it isnowrecognised, thoughnot tillaftera longstruggle, thatboth thecheapnessandthegoodqualityofcommoditiesaremosteffectuallyprovidedforbyleavingtheproducersandsellersperfectlyfree,underthesolecheckofequalfreedomtothebuyersforsupplyingthemselveselsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from,though equally solidwith, theprinciple of individual liberty asserted in thisEssay.Restrictionsontrade,oronproductionforpurposesoftrade,areindeedrestraints;andallrestraint,quârestraint,isanevil:but the restraints inquestionaffectonly thatpartof conductwhich society is competent to

restrain,andarewrongsolelybecause theydonot reallyproduce the resultswhich it isdesired toproducebythem.AstheprincipleofindividuallibertyisnotinvolvedinthedoctrineofFreeTrade,so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine: as forexample,what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration;how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerousoccupations,shouldbeenforcedonemployers.Suchquestionsinvolveconsiderationsofliberty,onlyinsofarasleavingpeopletothemselvesisalwaysbetter,cæterisparibus,thancontrollingthem:butthattheymaybelegitimatelycontrolledfortheseends,isinprincipleundeniable.Ontheotherhand,therearequestionsrelatingtointerferencewithtrade,whichareessentiallyquestionsofliberty;suchastheMaineLaw,alreadytouchedupon;theprohibitionoftheimportationofopiumintoChina;therestrictionofthesaleofpoisons;allcases,inshort,wheretheobjectoftheinterferenceistomakeitimpossibleordifficulttoobtainaparticularcommodity.Theseinterferencesareobjectionable,notasinfringementsonthelibertyoftheproducerorseller,butonthatofthebuyer.

Oneof theseexamples, thatof thesaleofpoisons,opensanewquestion; theproper limitsofwhatmaybecalledthefunctionsofpolice;howfarlibertymaylegitimatelybeinvadedforthepreventionof crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautionsagainst crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. Thepreventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice ofliberty,thanthepunitoryfunction;forthereishardlyanypartofthelegitimatefreedomofactionofahumanbeingwhichwouldnotadmitofbeingrepresented,andfairlytoo,asincreasingthefacilitiesforsomeformorotherofdelinquency.Nevertheless,ifapublicauthority,orevenaprivateperson,seesanyoneevidentlypreparingtocommitacrime,theyarenotboundtolookoninactiveuntilthecrime is committed, butmay interfere to prevent it. If poisonswere never bought or used for anypurposeexcept thecommissionofmurder, itwouldberight toprohibit theirmanufactureandsale.Theymay,however,bewantednotonlyforinnocentbutforusefulpurposes,andrestrictionscannotbe imposed in the one case without operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of publicauthoritytoguardagainstaccidents.Ifeitherapublicofficeroranyoneelsesawapersonattemptingtocrossabridgewhichhadbeenascertainedtobeunsafe,andtherewerenotimetowarnhimofhisdanger, theymight seize him and turn him back,without any real infringement of his liberty; forlibertyconsistsindoingwhatonedesires,andhedoesnotdesiretofallintotheriver.Nevertheless,whenthereisnotacertainty,butonlyadangerofmischief,noonebutthepersonhimselfcanjudgeof the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore(unlessheisachild,ordelirious,orinsomestateofexcitementorabsorptionincompatiblewiththefulluseofthereflectingfaculty),heought,Iconceive,tobeonlywarnedofthedanger;notforciblypreventedfromexposinghimselftoit.Similarconsiderations,appliedtosuchaquestionasthesaleofpoisons,mayenableus todecidewhichamong thepossiblemodesof regulationareorarenotcontrarytoprinciple.Suchaprecaution,forexample,as thatof labellingthedrugwithsomewordexpressiveofitsdangerouscharacter,maybeenforcedwithoutviolationofliberty:thebuyercannotwishnot toknowthat the thinghepossesseshaspoisonousqualities.But torequire inallcases thecertificate of a medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, toobtain the article for legitimate uses.The onlymode apparent tome, inwhich difficultiesmay bethrown in thewayofcrimecommitted through thismeans,withoutany infringement,worth takinginto account, upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes,consists inprovidingwhat, in theapt languageofBentham, iscalled"preappointedevidence."Thisprovisionisfamiliar toeveryonein thecaseofcontracts. It isusualandright that the law,whenacontract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain

formalitiesshouldbeobserved,suchassignatures,attestationofwitnesses,andthelike,inorderthatincaseofsubsequentdispute,theremaybeevidencetoprovethatthecontractwasreallyenteredinto,andthattherewasnothinginthecircumstancestorenderitlegallyinvalid:theeffectbeing,tothrowgreatobstaclesinthewayoffictitiouscontracts,orcontractsmadeincircumstanceswhich,ifknown,woulddestroytheirvalidity.Precautionsofasimilarnaturemightbeenforcedinthesaleofarticlesadaptedtobeinstrumentsofcrime.Theseller,forexample,mightberequiredtoenterintoaregistertheexacttimeofthetransaction,thenameandaddressofthebuyer,theprecisequalityandquantitysold;toaskthepurposeforwhichitwaswanted,andrecordtheanswerhereceived.Whentherewasnomedicalprescription,thepresenceofsomethirdpersonmightberequired,tobringhomethefacttothepurchaser,incasethereshouldafterwardsbereasontobelievethatthearticlehadbeenappliedtocriminalpurposes.Suchregulationswouldingeneralbenomaterialimpedimenttoobtainingthearticle,butaveryconsiderableonetomakinganimproperuseofitwithoutdetection.

Therightinherentinsociety,towardoffcrimesagainstitselfbyantecedentprecautions,suggeststheobviouslimitationstothemaxim,thatpurelyself-regardingmisconductcannotproperlybemeddledwithinthewayofpreventionorpunishment.Drunkenness,forexample,inordinarycases,isnotafitsubject for legislative interference;but Ishoulddeemitperfectly legitimate thataperson,whohadoncebeenconvictedofanyactofviolencetoothersundertheinfluenceofdrink,shouldbeplacedunder a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, heshould be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, thepunishment towhichhewouldbe liable for thatotheroffenceshouldbe increased inseverity.Themakinghimselfdrunk,inapersonwhomdrunkennessexcitestodoharmtoothers,isacrimeagainstothers.So,again, idleness,except inapersonreceivingsupport fromthepublic,orexceptwhen itconstitutesabreachofcontract,cannotwithouttyrannybemadeasubjectoflegalpunishment;butifeither from idlenessor fromanyother avoidablecause, aman fails toperformhis legalduties toothers,asforinstancetosupporthischildren,itisnotyrannytoforcehimtofulfilthatobligation,bycompulsorylabour,ifnoothermeansareavailable.

Again,therearemanyactswhich,beingdirectlyinjuriousonlytotheagentsthemselves,oughtnottobelegallyinterdicted,butwhich,ifdonepublicly,areaviolationofgoodmannersandcomingthuswithinthecategoryofoffencesagainstothersmayrightfullybeprohibited.Ofthiskindareoffencesagainstdecency;onwhichitisunnecessarytodwell,theratherastheyareonlyconnectedindirectlywithour subject, theobjection topublicitybeingequally strong in thecaseofmanyactionsnot inthemselvescondemnable,norsupposedtobeso.

Thereisanotherquestiontowhichananswermustbefound,consistentwiththeprincipleswhichhavebeenlaiddown.Incasesofpersonalconductsupposedtobeblamable,butwhichrespectforlibertyprecludessocietyfrompreventingorpunishing,becausetheevildirectlyresultingfallswhollyontheagent;whattheagentisfreetodo,oughtotherpersonstobeequallyfreetocounselorinstigate?Thisquestion is not free fromdifficulty.The case of a personwho solicits another to do an act, is notstrictlyacaseofself-regardingconduct.Togiveadviceorofferinducementstoanyone,isasocialact,andmay therefore, likeactions ingeneralwhichaffectothers,besupposedamenable tosocialcontrol.Butalittlereflectioncorrectsthefirstimpression,byshowingthatifthecaseisnotstrictlywithinthedefinitionofindividualliberty,yetthereasonsonwhichtheprincipleofindividuallibertyisgrounded,areapplicabletoit.Ifpeoplemustbeallowed,inwhateverconcernsonlythemselves,toact as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with oneanother about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions.Whatever it ispermitted todo, itmustbepermitted toadvise todo.Thequestion isdoubtful,only

whentheinstigatorderivesapersonalbenefitfromhisadvice;whenhemakesithisoccupation,forsubsistence or pecuniary gain, to promotewhat society and the state consider to be an evil. Then,indeed,anewelementofcomplicationisintroduced;namely,theexistenceofclassesofpersonswithaninterestopposedtowhatisconsideredasthepublicweal,andwhosemodeoflivingisgroundedonthecounteractionofit.Oughtthistobeinterferedwith,ornot?Fornication,forexample,mustbetolerated,andsomustgambling;butshouldapersonbefree tobeapimp,or tokeepagambling-house?Thecaseisoneofthosewhichlieontheexactboundarylinebetweentwoprinciples,anditisnotatonceapparenttowhichofthetwoitproperlybelongs.Thereareargumentsonbothsides.Onthesideoftolerationitmaybesaid,thatthefactoffollowinganythingasanoccupation,andlivingorprofitingbythepracticeofit,cannotmakethatcriminalwhichwouldotherwisebeadmissible;thattheactshouldeitherbeconsistentlypermittedorconsistentlyprohibited;thatiftheprincipleswhichwehavehithertodefendedaretrue,societyhasnobusiness,associety,todecideanythingtobewrongwhichconcernsonlytheindividual;thatitcannotgobeyonddissuasion,andthatonepersonshouldbeasfreetopersuade,asanothertodissuade.Inoppositiontothisitmaybecontended,thatalthoughthepublic,ortheState,arenotwarrantedinauthoritativelydeciding,forpurposesofrepressionorpunishment, that suchor suchconductaffectingonly the interestsof the individual isgoodorbad,they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least adisputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring toexcludetheinfluenceofsolicitationswhicharenotdisinterested,ofinstigatorswhocannotpossiblybeimpartial—whohaveadirectpersonal interestononeside,andthatsidetheonewhichtheStatebelievestobewrong,andwhoconfessedlypromoteitforpersonalobjectsonly.Therecansurely,itmaybeurged,benothinglost,nosacrificeofgood,bysoorderingmattersthatpersonsshallmaketheirelection,eitherwiselyorfoolishly,ontheirownprompting,asfreeaspossiblefromtheartsofpersonswhostimulatetheir inclinationsfor interestedpurposesof theirown.Thus(itmaybesaid)thoughthestatutesrespectingunlawfulgamesareutterlyindefensible—thoughallpersonsshouldbefree togamble in theirownoreachother'shouses,or inanyplaceofmeetingestablishedby theirown subscriptions, and open only to themembers and their visitors—yet public gambling-housesshouldnotbepermitted.Itistruethattheprohibitionisnevereffectual,andthatwhateveramountoftyrannical power is given to the police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under otherpretences;buttheymaybecompelledtoconducttheiroperationswithacertaindegreeofsecrecyandmystery, so that nobodyknows anything about thembut thosewho seek them; andmore than this,society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these arguments; I will not venture todecidewhethertheyaresufficienttojustifythemoralanomalyofpunishingtheaccessary,whentheprincipal is (andmust be) allowed to go free; or fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not thefornicator,thegambling-housekeeper,butnotthegambler.Stilllessoughtthecommonoperationsofbuyingandsellingtobeinterferedwithonanalogousgrounds.Almosteveryarticlewhichisboughtandsoldmaybeusedinexcess,andthesellershaveapecuniaryinterestinencouragingthatexcess;butnoargumentcanbefoundedonthis,infavour,forinstance,oftheMaineLaw;becausetheclassofdealersinstrongdrinks,thoughinterestedintheirabuse,areindispensablyrequiredforthesakeoftheirlegitimateuse.Theinterest,however,ofthesedealersinpromotingintemperanceisarealevil,and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees, which but for thatjustificationwouldbeinfringementsoflegitimateliberty.

A furtherquestion is,whether theState,while it permits, shouldnevertheless indirectlydiscourageconductwhichitdeemscontrarytothebestinterestsoftheagent;whether,forexample,itshouldtakemeasurestorenderthemeansofdrunkennessmorecostly,oraddtothedifficultyofprocuringthem,by limiting the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions, many

distinctionsrequiretobemade.Totaxstimulantsforthesolepurposeofmakingthemmoredifficultto be obtained, is ameasure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; andwould bejustifiableonlyifthatwerejustifiable.Everyincreaseofcostisaprohibition,tothosewhosemeansdo not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them forgratifying aparticular taste.Their choiceofpleasures, and theirmodeof expending their income,after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their ownconcern, and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight tocondemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue.But itmustberememberedthattaxationforfiscalpurposesisabsolutelyinevitable;thatinmostcountriesitisnecessarythataconsiderablepartofthattaxationshouldbeindirect;thattheState,therefore,cannothelpimposingpenalties,whichtosomepersonsmaybeprohibitory,ontheuseofsomearticlesofconsumption.ItishencethedutyoftheStatetoconsider,intheimpositionoftaxes,whatcommoditiestheconsumerscanbestspare;andàfortiori,toselectinpreferencethoseofwhichitdeemstheuse,beyondaverymoderatequantity,tobepositivelyinjurious.Taxation,therefore,ofstimulants,uptothepointwhichproducesthelargestamountofrevenue(supposingthattheStateneedsalltherevenuewhichityields)isnotonlyadmissible,buttobeapprovedof.

Thequestionofmaking the saleof thesecommoditiesamoreor lessexclusiveprivilege,mustbeanswereddifferently,accordingtothepurposestowhichtherestrictionisintendedtobesubservient.Allplacesofpublicresortrequiretherestraintofapolice,andplacesofthiskindpeculiarly,becauseoffencesagainstsocietyareespeciallyapttooriginatethere.Itis,therefore,fittoconfinethepowerofsellingthesecommodities(atleastforconsumptiononthespot)topersonsofknownorvouched-for respectabilityofconduct; tomakesuchregulationsrespectinghoursofopeningandclosingasmay be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the licence if breaches of the peacerepeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if itbecomesarendezvousforconcoctingandpreparingoffencesagainstthelaw.AnyfurtherrestrictionIdonotconceivetobe, inprinciple, justifiable.Thelimitationinnumber,forinstance,ofbeerandspirit-houses,fortheexpresspurposeofrenderingthemmoredifficultofaccess,anddiminishingtheoccasionsoftemptation,notonlyexposesalltoaninconveniencebecausetherearesomebywhomthefacilitywouldbeabused,butissuitedonlytoastateofsocietyinwhichthelabouringclassesareavowedly treatedaschildrenorsavages,andplacedunderaneducationofrestraint, tofit themforfutureadmissiontotheprivilegesoffreedom.Thisisnottheprincipleonwhichthelabouringclassesareprofessedlygovernedinanyfreecountry;andnopersonwhosetsduevalueonfreedomwillgivehisadhesiontotheirbeingsogoverned,unlessafteralleffortshavebeenexhaustedtoeducatethemforfreedomandgovern themasfreemen,and ithasbeendefinitivelyproved that theycanonlybegovernedaschildren.Thebarestatementofthealternativeshowstheabsurdityofsupposingthatsucheffortshavebeenmadeinanycasewhichneedsbeconsideredhere.Itisonlybecausetheinstitutionsof this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice whichbelongtothesystemofdespotic,orwhatiscalledpaternal,government,whilethegeneralfreedomofourinstitutionsprecludestheexerciseoftheamountofcontrolnecessarytorendertherestraintofanyrealefficacyasamoraleducation.

ItwaspointedoutinanearlypartofthisEssay,thatthelibertyoftheindividual,inthingswhereintheindividual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals toregulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons butthemselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicatedremainsunaltered;butsincethatwillmaychange,itisoftennecessary,eveninthingsinwhichtheyaloneareconcerned,thattheyshouldenterintoengagementswithoneanother;andwhentheydo,itis

fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet in the laws, probably, of everycountry,thisgeneralrulehassomeexceptions.Notonlypersonsarenotheldtoengagementswhichviolatetherightsofthirdparties,butitissometimesconsideredasufficientreasonforreleasingthemfromanengagement,thatitisinjurioustothemselves.Inthisandmostothercivilisedcountries,forexample, an engagement bywhich a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as aslave,wouldbenullandvoid;neitherenforcedbylawnorbyopinion.Thegroundforthuslimitinghispowerofvoluntarilydisposingofhisownlotinlife,isapparent,andisveryclearlyseeninthisextremecase.Thereasonfornotinterfering,unlessforthesakeofothers,withaperson'svoluntaryacts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses isdesirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for byallowinghimtotakehisownmeansofpursuingit.Butbysellinghimselfforaslave,heabdicateshisliberty;heforegoesanyfutureuseofit,beyondthatsingleact.Hethereforedefeats,inhisowncase,theverypurposewhich is the justificationof allowinghim todisposeofhimself.He is no longerfree;butisthenceforthinapositionwhichhasnolongerthepresumptioninitsfavour,thatwouldbeaffordedbyhisvoluntarilyremaininginit.Theprincipleoffreedomcannotrequirethatheshouldbefreenottobefree.Itisnotfreedom,tobeallowedtoalienatehisfreedom.Thesereasons,theforceofwhichissoconspicuousinthispeculiarcase,areevidentlyoffarwiderapplication;yetalimitiseverywheresettothembythenecessitiesoflife,whichcontinuallyrequire,notindeedthatweshouldresignour freedom,but thatweshouldconsent to thisand theother limitationof it.Theprinciple,however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agentsthemselves,requiresthatthosewhohavebecomeboundtooneanother,inthingswhichconcernnothird party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without suchvoluntaryrelease,thereareperhapsnocontractsorengagements,exceptthosethatrelatetomoneyormoney's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever ofretractation.BaronWilhelmvonHumboldt,intheexcellentessayfromwhichIhavealreadyquoted,states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve personal relations or services, shouldnever be legally binding beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most important of theseengagements,marriage, having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings ofboththepartiesareinharmonywithit,shouldrequirenothingmorethanthedeclaredwillofeitherparty to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and too complicated, to be discussed in aparenthesis,andItouchonitonlysofarasisnecessaryforpurposesofillustration.Iftheconcisenessand generality of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to contenthimselfwith enunciating his conclusionwithout discussing the premises, hewould doubtless haverecognisedthat thequestioncannotbedecidedongroundssosimpleas those towhichheconfineshimself.Whenaperson, either by expresspromiseor by conduct, has encouraged another to relyuponhiscontinuingtoactinacertainway—tobuildexpectationsandcalculations,andstakeanypartofhisplanoflifeuponthatsupposition,anewseriesofmoralobligationsarisesonhisparttowardsthat person, which may possibly be overruled, but cannot be ignored. And again, if the relationbetween twocontractingpartieshasbeenfollowedbyconsequences toothers; if ithasplaced thirdparties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage, has even called third parties intoexistence,obligationsariseonthepartofboththecontractingpartiestowardsthosethirdpersons,thefulfilment of which, or at all events the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected by thecontinuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract. It does notfollow,norcanIadmit,thattheseobligationsextendtorequiringthefulfilmentofthecontractatallcoststothehappinessofthereluctantparty;buttheyareanecessaryelementinthequestion;andevenif,asVonHumboldtmaintains,theyoughttomakenodifferenceinthelegalfreedomofthepartiestorelease themselves from the engagement (and I also hold that they ought not to make much

difference),theynecessarilymakeagreatdifferenceinthemoralfreedom.Apersonisboundtotakeall these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step whichmay affect such importantinterestsofothers;andifhedoesnotallowproperweighttothoseinterests,heismorallyresponsibleforthewrong.Ihavemadetheseobviousremarksforthebetterillustrationofthegeneralprincipleofliberty,andnotbecausetheyareatallneededontheparticularquestion,which,onthecontrary,isusuallydiscussedasiftheinterestofchildrenwaseverything,andthatofgrownpersonsnothing.

Ihave alreadyobserved that, owing to the absenceof any recognisedgeneralprinciples, liberty isoftengrantedwhereitshouldbewithheld,aswellaswithheldwhereitshouldbegranted;andoneofthecasesinwhich,inthemodernEuropeanworld,thesentimentoflibertyisthestrongest,isacasewhere, inmyview, it isaltogethermisplaced.Apersonshouldbefree todoashe likes inhisownconcerns;butheoughtnottobefreetodoashelikesinactingforanother,underthepretextthattheaffairsofanotherarehisownaffairs.TheState,whileitrespectsthelibertyofeachinwhatspeciallyregards himself, is bound tomaintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which itallowshimtopossessoverothers.Thisobligation isalmostentirelydisregardedin thecaseof thefamily relations,acase, in itsdirect influenceonhumanhappiness,more important thanallotherstaken together.Thealmostdespoticpowerofhusbandsoverwivesneednotbeenlargeduponherebecausenothingmoreisneededforthecompleteremovaloftheevil,thanthatwivesshouldhavethesamerights,andshouldreceivetheprotectionoflawinthesamemanner,asallotherpersons;andbecause,onthissubject,thedefendersofestablishedinjusticedonotavailthemselvesofthepleaofliberty,butstandforthopenlyasthechampionsofpower.Itisinthecaseofchildren,thatmisappliednotionsof liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by theState of its duties.Onewould almostthinkthataman'schildrenweresupposedtobeliterally,andnotmetaphorically,apartofhimself,sojealous is opinionof the smallest interferenceof lawwith his absolute and exclusive control overthem;morejealousthanofalmostanyinterferencewithhisownfreedomofaction:somuchlessdothegeneralityofmankindvaluelibertythanpower.Consider,forexample,thecaseofeducation.Isitnotalmostaself-evidentaxiom,thattheStateshouldrequireandcompeltheeducation,uptoacertainstandard,ofeveryhumanbeingwhoisbornitscitizen?Yetwhoistherethatisnotafraidtorecogniseandassert thistruth?Hardlyanyoneindeedwilldenythatit isoneofthemostsacreddutiesoftheparents(or,aslawandusagenowstand,thefather),aftersummoningahumanbeingintotheworld,to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others andtowardshimself.Butwhilethisisunanimouslydeclaredtobethefather'sduty,scarcelyanybody,inthiscountry,willbeartohearofobliginghimtoperformit.Insteadofhisbeingrequiredtomakeanyexertionorsacrificeforsecuringeducationtothechild,itislefttohischoicetoacceptitornotwhenitisprovidedgratis!Itstillremainsunrecognised,thattobringachildintoexistencewithoutafairprospectofbeingable,notonlytoprovidefoodforitsbody,butinstructionandtrainingforitsmind,isamoralcrime,bothagainsttheunfortunateoffspringandagainstsociety;andthatiftheparentdoesnot fulfil this obligation, theState ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of theparent.

Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to thedifficultiesaboutwhattheStateshouldteach,andhowitshouldteach,whichnowconvertthesubjectinto amere battle-field for sects and parties, causing the time and labourwhich should have beenspentineducating,tobewastedinquarrellingabouteducation.Ifthegovernmentwouldmakeupitsmindtorequireforeverychildagoodeducation,itmightsaveitselfthetroubleofprovidingone.Itmight leave to parents to obtain the educationwhere and how they pleased, and content itselfwithhelping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire schoolexpensesofthosewhohavenooneelsetopayforthem.Theobjectionswhichareurgedwithreason

againstStateeducation,donotapply to theenforcementofeducationby theState,but to theState'stakingupon itself todirect that education;which is a totallydifferent thing.That thewholeor anylarge part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one indeprecating.All thathasbeen saidof the importanceof individualityof character, anddiversity inopinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity ofeducation.AgeneralStateeducationisamerecontrivanceformouldingpeopletobeexactlylikeoneanother;andasthemouldinwhichitcaststhemisthatwhichpleasesthepredominantpowerinthegovernment,whetherthisbeamonarch,apriesthood,anaristocracy,orthemajorityoftheexistinggeneration, inproportionas it is efficient and successful, it establishesadespotismover themind,leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by theState,shouldonlyexist,ifitexistatall,asoneamongmanycompetingexperiments,carriedonforthepurposeofexampleandstimulus,tokeeptheothersuptoacertainstandardofexcellence.Unless,indeed,whensocietyingeneralisinsobackwardastatethatitcouldnotorwouldnotprovideforitselfanyproperinstitutionsofeducation,unlessthegovernmentundertookthetask;then,indeed,thegovernment may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools anduniversities, as itmay that of joint stock companies,when private enterprise, in a shape fitted forundertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the country. But in general, if the countrycontainsasufficientnumberofpersonsqualified toprovideeducationundergovernmentauspices,the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntaryprinciple,under theassuranceof remunerationaffordedbya lawrenderingeducationcompulsory,combinedwithStateaidtothoseunabletodefraytheexpense.

The instrument for enforcing the lawcouldbenoother thanpublic examinations, extending to allchildren, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must beexamined,toascertainifhe(orshe)isabletoread.Ifachildprovesunable,thefather,unlesshehassome sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, ifnecessary,byhislabour,andthechildmightbeputtoschoolathisexpense.Onceineveryyeartheexamination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make theuniversal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge,virtuallycompulsory.Beyondthatminimum,thereshouldbevoluntaryexaminationsonallsubjects,atwhichallwhocomeuptoacertainstandardofproficiencymightclaimacertificate.TopreventtheState from exercising, through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, theknowledgerequiredforpassinganexamination(beyondthemerelyinstrumentalpartsofknowledge,suchaslanguagesandtheiruse)should,eveninthehigherclassofexaminations,beconfinedtofactsand positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics,shouldnotturnonthetruthorfalsehoodofopinions,butonthematteroffactthatsuchandsuchanopinion isheld,on suchgrounds,by suchauthors,or schools,orchurches.Under this system, therisinggenerationwouldbenoworseoffinregardtoalldisputedtruths,thantheyareatpresent;theywouldbebroughtupeitherchurchmenordissentersastheynoware,thestatemerelytakingcarethattheyshouldbeinstructedchurchmen,orinstructeddissenters.Therewouldbenothingtohinderthemfrombeingtaughtreligion,iftheirparentschose,atthesameschoolswheretheyweretaughtotherthings.Allattemptsbythestatetobiastheconclusionsofitscitizensondisputedsubjects,areevil;butitmayveryproperlyoffertoascertainandcertifythatapersonpossessestheknowledge,requisitetomakehisconclusions,onanygivensubject,worthattendingto.AstudentofphilosophywouldbethebetterforbeingabletostandanexaminationbothinLockeandinKant,whicheverofthetwohetakesupwith,orevenifwithneither:andthere isnoreasonableobjection toexamininganatheist in theevidencesofChristianity,providedheisnotrequiredtoprofessabeliefinthem.Theexaminations,

however,inthehigherbranchesofknowledgeshould,Iconceive,beentirelyvoluntary.Itwouldbegiving too dangerous a power to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one fromprofessions,evenfromtheprofessionofteacher,forallegeddeficiencyofqualifications:andIthink,withWilhelmvonHumboldt, thatdegrees, orotherpublic certificatesof scientificorprofessionalacquirements,shouldbegiventoallwhopresentthemselvesforexamination,andstandthetest;butthatsuchcertificatesshouldconfernoadvantageovercompetitors,otherthantheweightwhichmaybeattachedtotheirtestimonybypublicopinion.

Itisnotinthematterofeducationonly,thatmisplacednotionsoflibertypreventmoralobligationsonthepartofparentsfrombeingrecognised,andlegalobligationsfrombeingimposed,wheretherearethestrongestgroundsfortheformeralways,andinmanycasesforthelatteralso.Thefactitself,ofcausingtheexistenceofahumanbeing,isoneofthemostresponsibleactionsintherangeofhumanlife.Toundertakethisresponsibility—tobestowa lifewhichmaybeeitheracurseorablessing—unlessthebeingonwhomitistobebestowedwillhaveatleasttheordinarychancesofadesirableexistence,isacrimeagainstthatbeing.Andinacountryeitherover-peopled,orthreatenedwithbeingso,toproducechildren,beyondaverysmallnumber,withtheeffectofreducingtherewardoflabourbytheircompetition,isaseriousoffenceagainstallwholivebytheremunerationoftheirlabour.Thelawswhich,inmanycountriesontheContinent,forbidmarriageunlessthepartiescanshowthattheyhavethemeansofsupportingafamily,donotexceedthelegitimatepowersofthestate:andwhethersuchlawsbeexpedientornot(aquestionmainlydependentonlocalcircumstancesandfeelings),theyarenot objectionable as violationsof liberty.Such laws are interferencesof the state to prohibit amischievousact—anact injurious toothers,whichought tobeasubjectof reprobation,andsocialstigma,evenwhenitisnotdeemedexpedienttosuperaddlegalpunishment.Yetthecurrentideasofliberty,whichbendsoeasilytorealinfringementsofthefreedomoftheindividual,inthingswhichconcern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when theconsequenceof their indulgence is a life, or lives, ofwretchedness anddepravity to theoffspring,withmanifoldevilstothosesufficientlywithinreachtobeinanywayaffectedbytheiractions.Whenwecomparethestrangerespectofmankindforliberty,withtheirstrangewantofrespectforit,wemightimaginethatamanhadanindispensablerighttodoharmtoothers,andnorightatalltopleasehimselfwithoutgivingpaintoanyone.

I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of governmentinterference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness,belongtoit.Thesearecasesinwhichthereasonsagainstinterferencedonotturnupontheprincipleofliberty:thequestionisnotaboutrestrainingtheactionsofindividuals,butabouthelpingthem:itisaskedwhetherthegovernmentshoulddo,orcausetobedone,somethingfortheirbenefit,insteadofleavingittobedonebythemselves,individually,orinvoluntarycombination.

Theobjectionstogovernmentinterference,whenitisnotsuchastoinvolveinfringementofliberty,maybeofthreekinds.

The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by thegovernment.Speakinggenerally,thereisnoonesofittoconductanybusiness,ortodeterminehowor by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principlecondemnstheinterferences,oncesocommon,ofthelegislature,ortheofficersofgovernment,withtheordinaryprocessesofindustry.Butthispartofthesubjecthasbeensufficientlyenlargeduponbypoliticaleconomists,andisnotparticularlyrelatedtotheprinciplesofthisEssay.

Thesecondobjectionismorenearlyalliedtooursubject.Inmanycases,thoughindividualsmaynot

do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is neverthelessdesirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as ameans to their ownmental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, andgiving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is aprincipal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free andpopularlocalandmunicipalinstitutions;oftheconductofindustrialandphilanthropicenterprisesbyvoluntaryassociations.Thesearenotquestionsofliberty,andareconnectedwiththatsubjectonlybyremotetendencies;buttheyarequestionsofdevelopment.Itbelongstoadifferentoccasionfromthepresenttodwellonthesethingsaspartsofnationaleducation;asbeing,intruth,thepeculiartrainingofacitizen,thepracticalpartofthepoliticaleducationofafreepeople,takingthemoutofthenarrowcircle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of jointinterests, the management of joint concerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-publicmotives, and guide their conduct by aimswhich unite instead of isolating them from one another.Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved, as isexemplifiedbythetoo-oftentransitorynatureofpoliticalfreedomincountrieswhereitdoesnotrestuponasufficientbasisoflocalliberties.Themanagementofpurelylocalbusinessbythelocalities,andof thegreatenterprisesof industryby theunionof thosewhovoluntarilysupply thepecuniarymeans, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay asbelongingtoindividualityofdevelopment,anddiversityofmodesofaction.Governmentoperationstend tobeeverywherealike.With individualsandvoluntaryassociations,on thecontrary, therearevariedexperiments,andendlessdiversityofexperience.What theStatecanusefullydo, is tomakeitselfacentraldepository,andactivecirculatoranddiffuser,oftheexperienceresultingfrommanytrials.Itsbusinessistoenableeachexperimentalisttobenefitbytheexperimentsofothers,insteadoftoleratingnoexperimentsbutitsown.

Thethird,andmostcogentreasonforrestrictingtheinterferenceofgovernment,isthegreatevilofadding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by thegovernment, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts,moreandmore,theactiveandambitiouspartofthepublicintohangers-onofthegovernment,orofsome party which aims at becoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, theinsuranceoffices,thegreatjoint-stockcompanies,theuniversities,andthepubliccharities,wereallof them branches of the government; if, in addition, themunicipal corporations and local boards,withallthatnowdevolvesonthem,becamedepartmentsofthecentraladministration;iftheemployésof all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to thegovernment for every rise in life; not all the freedomof thepress andpopular constitutionof thelegislaturewouldmakethisoranyothercountryfreeotherwisethaninname.Andtheevilwouldbegreater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed—themoreskilfulthearrangementsforobtainingthebestqualifiedhandsandheadswithwhichtoworkit.InEnglandithasoflatebeenproposedthatallthemembersofthecivilserviceofgovernmentshouldbe selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments themost intelligent andinstructedpersonsprocurable;andmuchhasbeensaidandwrittenforandagainstthisproposal.Oneof the argumentsmost insisted on by its opponents, is that the occupation of a permanent officialservantoftheStatedoesnotholdoutsufficientprospectsofemolumentandimportancetoattractthehighesttalents,whichwillalwaysbeabletofindamoreinvitingcareerintheprofessions,orintheserviceofcompaniesandotherpublicbodies.Onewouldnothavebeensurprised if thisargumenthadbeenusedbythefriendsoftheproposition,asananswertoitsprincipaldifficulty.Comingfromtheopponentsitisstrangeenough.Whatisurgedasanobjectionisthesafety-valveoftheproposed

system.Ifindeedallthehightalentofthecountrycouldbedrawnintotheserviceofthegovernment,a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of thebusinessofsocietywhichrequiredorganisedconcert,orlargeandcomprehensiveviews,wereinthehandsofthegovernment,andifgovernmentofficeswereuniversallyfilledbytheablestmen,alltheenlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would beconcentratedinanumerousbureaucracy,towhomalonetherestofthecommunitywouldlookforallthings: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring forpersonaladvancement.Tobeadmittedintotheranksofthisbureaucracy,andwhenadmitted,torisetherein,wouldbethesoleobjectsofambition.Underthisrégime,notonlyistheoutsidepublicill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticise or check the mode of operation of thebureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutionsoccasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can beeffectedwhichiscontrarytotheinterestofthebureaucracy.SuchisthemelancholyconditionoftheRussian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity ofobservation.TheCzar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body; he can send anyoneofthemtoSiberia,buthecannotgovernwithoutthem,oragainsttheirwill.Oneverydecreeofhistheyhavea tacitveto,bymerely refraining fromcarrying it intoeffect. In countriesofmoreadvancedcivilisationandof amore insurrectionary spirit, thepublic, accustomed toexpect everything tobedoneforthembytheState,oratleasttodonothingforthemselveswithoutaskingfromtheStatenotonlyleavetodoit,butevenhowitistobedone,naturallyholdtheStateresponsibleforallevilwhichbefallsthem,andwhentheevilexceedstheiramountofpatience,theyriseagainstthegovernmentandmakewhat is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authorityfrom the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes onmuch as it did before; the bureaucracybeingunchanged, andnobody else being capable of takingtheirplace.

Averydifferentspectacleisexhibitedamongapeopleaccustomedtotransacttheirownbusiness.InFrance,alargepartofthepeoplehavingbeenengagedinmilitaryservice,manyofwhomhaveheldat least the rank of non-commissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection severalpersonscompetenttotakethelead,andimprovisesometolerableplanofaction.WhattheFrencharein military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without agovernment, everybodyofAmericans is able to improviseone, and to carryon thator anyotherpublicbusinesswithasufficientamountofintelligence,order,anddecision.Thisiswhateveryfreepeopleoughttobe:andapeoplecapableofthisiscertaintobefree;itwillneverletitselfbeenslavedby any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the centraladministration.Nobureaucracycanhopetomakesuchapeopleasthisdoorundergoanythingthatthey do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which thebureaucracyisreallyadversecanbedoneatall.Theconstitutionofsuchcountriesisanorganisationof the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose ofgoverningtherest;andthemoreperfectthatorganisationisinitself,themoresuccessfulindrawingtoitselfandeducatingforitselfthepersonsofgreatestcapacityfromallranksofthecommunity,themorecompleteisthebondageofall,themembersofthebureaucracyincluded.Forthegovernorsareas much the slaves of their organisation and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. AChinesemandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. AnindividualJesuitistotheutmostdegreeofabasementtheslaveofhisorder,thoughtheorderitselfexistsforthecollectivepowerandimportanceofitsmembers.

It isnot,also, tobeforgotten, that theabsorptionofall theprincipalabilityof thecountry into the

governingbodyisfatal,soonerorlater,tothementalactivityandprogressivenessofthebodyitself.Banded together as they are—working a systemwhich, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in agreatmeasure by fixed rules—the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking intoindolent routine, or, if they now and then desert thatmill-horse round, of rushing into somehalf-examinedcruditywhichhasstruckthefancyofsomeleadingmemberofthecorps:andthesolechecktothesecloselyallied,thoughseeminglyopposite,tendencies,theonlystimuluswhichcankeeptheabilityof thebody itselfup toahighstandard, is liability to thewatchfulcriticismofequalabilityoutside the body. It is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of thegovernment, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experiencenecessaryforacorrectjudgmentofgreatpracticalaffairs.Ifwewouldpossesspermanentlyaskilfuland efficient body of functionaries—above all, a body able to originate and willing to adoptimprovements;ifwewouldnothaveourbureaucracydegenerateintoapedantocracy,thisbodymustnotengrossalltheoccupationswhichformandcultivatethefacultiesrequiredforthegovernmentofmankind.

Todeterminethepointatwhichevils,soformidabletohumanfreedomandadvancement,begin,orratheratwhichtheybegintopredominateoverthebenefitsattendingthecollectiveapplicationoftheforceofsociety,underitsrecognisedchiefs,fortheremovaloftheobstacleswhichstandinthewayofitswell-being;tosecureasmuchoftheadvantagesofcentralisedpowerandintelligence,ascanbehadwithoutturningintogovernmentalchannelstoogreataproportionofthegeneralactivity,isoneofthemostdifficultandcomplicatedquestionsintheartofgovernment.Itis,inagreatmeasure,aquestionofdetail, inwhichmanyandvariousconsiderationsmustbekept inview,andnoabsoluterulecanbelaiddown.ButIbelievethatthepracticalprincipleinwhichsafetyresides,theidealtobekept inview, thestandardbywhich to testallarrangements intendedforovercoming thedifficulty,maybeconveyedinthesewords:thegreatestdisseminationofpowerconsistentwithefficiency;butthe greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. Thus, inmunicipal administration, there would be, as in the New England States, a very minute divisionamongseparateofficers,chosenbythelocalities,ofallbusinesswhichisnotbetterlefttothepersonsdirectly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a centralsuperintendence, forming a branch of the general government. The organ of this superintendencewouldconcentrate,asinafocus,thevarietyofinformationandexperiencederivedfromtheconductof that branchof public business in all the localities, fromeverything analogouswhich is done inforeign countries, and from the general principles of political science. This central organ shouldhave a right to knowall that is done, and its special duty shouldbe that ofmaking theknowledgeacquiredinoneplaceavailableforothers.Emancipatedfromthepettyprejudicesandnarrowviewsof a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice wouldnaturallycarrymuchauthority;butitsactualpower,asapermanentinstitution,should,Iconceive,belimitedtocompellingthelocalofficerstoobeythelawslaiddownfortheirguidance.Inallthingsnotprovided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgment, underresponsibilitytotheirconstituents.Fortheviolationofrules,theyshouldberesponsibletolaw,andtherulesthemselvesshouldbelaiddownbythelegislature;thecentraladministrativeauthorityonlywatchingovertheirexecution,andiftheywerenotproperlycarriedintoeffect,appealing,accordingto the nature of the case, to the tribunal to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss thefunctionarieswhohadnotexecuted it according to its spirit.Such, in itsgeneral conception, is thecentralsuperintendencewhichthePoorLawBoardisintendedtoexerciseovertheadministratorsofthePoorRatethroughoutthecountry.WhateverpowerstheBoardexercisesbeyondthislimit,wererightandnecessaryinthatpeculiarcase,forthecureofrootedhabitsofmaladministrationinmatters

deeply affectingnot the localitiesmerely, but thewhole community; since no locality has amoralright to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into otherlocalities, and impairing themoral andphysical conditionof thewhole labouringcommunity.ThepowersofadministrativecoercionandsubordinatelegislationpossessedbythePoorLawBoard(butwhich, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), thoughperfectly justifiable in a case of first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in thesuperintendenceof interestspurely local.Butacentralorganof informationand instructionforallthe localities,wouldbeequallyvaluable inalldepartmentsofadministration.Agovernmentcannothave too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individualexertionanddevelopment.Themischiefbeginswhen,insteadofcallingforththeactivityandpowersof individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing,advising,and,uponoccasion,denouncing,itmakesthemworkinfetters,orbidsthemstandasideanddoestheirworkinsteadofthem.TheworthofaState,inthelongrun,istheworthoftheindividualscomposingit;andaStatewhichpostponestheinterestsoftheirmentalexpansionandelevation,toalittlemoreof administrative skill, orof that semblanceof itwhichpracticegives, in thedetailsofbusiness;aStatewhichdwarfsitsmen,inorderthattheymaybemoredocileinstrumentsinitshandsevenforbeneficialpurposes,willfindthatwithsmallmennogreatthingcanreallybeaccomplished;and that the perfection ofmachinery towhich it has sacrificed everything,will in the end avail itnothing,forwantofthevitalpowerwhich,inorderthatthemachinemightworkmoresmoothly,ithaspreferredtobanish.

EndoftheProjectGutenbergEBookofOnLiberty,byJohnStuartMill

***ENDOFTHISPROJECTGUTENBERGEBOOKONLIBERTY***

*****Thisfileshouldbenamed34901-h.htmor34901-h.zip*****

Thisandallassociatedfilesofvariousformatswillbefoundin:

http://www.gutenberg.org/3/4/9/0/34901/

ProducedbyCurtisWeyant,MartinPettitandtheOnline

DistributedProofreadingTeamathttp://www.pgdp.net

Updatededitionswillreplacethepreviousone--theoldeditions

willberenamed.

Creatingtheworksfrompublicdomainprinteditionsmeansthatno

oneownsaUnitedStatescopyrightintheseworks,sotheFoundation

(andyou!)cancopyanddistributeitintheUnitedStateswithout

permissionandwithoutpayingcopyrightroyalties.Specialrules,

setforthintheGeneralTermsofUsepartofthislicense,applyto

copyinganddistributingProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworksto

protectthePROJECTGUTENBERG-tmconceptandtrademark.Project

Gutenbergisaregisteredtrademark,andmaynotbeusedifyou

chargefortheeBooks,unlessyoureceivespecificpermission.Ifyou

donotchargeanythingforcopiesofthiseBook,complyingwiththe

rulesisveryeasy.YoumayusethiseBookfornearlyanypurpose

suchascreationofderivativeworks,reports,performancesand

research.Theymaybemodifiedandprintedandgivenaway--youmaydo

practicallyANYTHINGwithpublicdomaineBooks.Redistributionis

subjecttothetrademarklicense,especiallycommercial

redistribution.

***START:FULLLICENSE***

THEFULLPROJECTGUTENBERGLICENSE

PLEASEREADTHISBEFOREYOUDISTRIBUTEORUSETHISWORK

ToprotecttheProjectGutenberg-tmmissionofpromotingthefree

distributionofelectronicworks,byusingordistributingthiswork

(oranyotherworkassociatedinanywaywiththephrase"Project

Gutenberg"),youagreetocomplywithallthetermsoftheFullProject

Gutenberg-tmLicense(availablewiththisfileoronlineat

http://gutenberg.org/license).

Section1.GeneralTermsofUseandRedistributingProjectGutenberg-tm

electronicworks

1.A.ByreadingorusinganypartofthisProjectGutenberg-tm

electronicwork,youindicatethatyouhaveread,understand,agreeto

andacceptallthetermsofthislicenseandintellectualproperty

(trademark/copyright)agreement.Ifyoudonotagreetoabidebyall

thetermsofthisagreement,youmustceaseusingandreturnordestroy

allcopiesofProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworksinyourpossession.

IfyoupaidafeeforobtainingacopyoforaccesstoaProject

Gutenberg-tmelectronicworkandyoudonotagreetobeboundbythe

termsofthisagreement,youmayobtainarefundfromthepersonor

entitytowhomyoupaidthefeeassetforthinparagraph1.E.8.

1.B."ProjectGutenberg"isaregisteredtrademark.Itmayonlybe

usedonorassociatedinanywaywithanelectronicworkbypeoplewho

agreetobeboundbythetermsofthisagreement.Thereareafew

thingsthatyoucandowithmostProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworks

evenwithoutcomplyingwiththefulltermsofthisagreement.See

paragraph1.Cbelow.TherearealotofthingsyoucandowithProject

Gutenberg-tmelectronicworksifyoufollowthetermsofthisagreement

andhelppreservefreefutureaccesstoProjectGutenberg-tmelectronic

works.Seeparagraph1.Ebelow.

1.C.TheProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundation("theFoundation"

orPGLAF),ownsacompilationcopyrightinthecollectionofProject

Gutenberg-tmelectronicworks.Nearlyalltheindividualworksinthe

collectionareinthepublicdomainintheUnitedStates.Ifan

individualworkisinthepublicdomainintheUnitedStatesandyouare

locatedintheUnitedStates,wedonotclaimarighttopreventyoufrom

copying,distributing,performing,displayingorcreatingderivative

worksbasedontheworkaslongasallreferencestoProjectGutenberg

areremoved.Ofcourse,wehopethatyouwillsupporttheProject

Gutenberg-tmmissionofpromotingfreeaccesstoelectronicworksby

freelysharingProjectGutenberg-tmworksincompliancewiththetermsof

thisagreementforkeepingtheProjectGutenberg-tmnameassociatedwith

thework.Youcaneasilycomplywiththetermsofthisagreementby

keepingthisworkinthesameformatwithitsattachedfullProject

Gutenberg-tmLicensewhenyoushareitwithoutchargewithothers.

1.D.Thecopyrightlawsoftheplacewhereyouarelocatedalsogovern

whatyoucandowiththiswork.Copyrightlawsinmostcountriesarein

aconstantstateofchange.IfyouareoutsidetheUnitedStates,check

thelawsofyourcountryinadditiontothetermsofthisagreement

beforedownloading,copying,displaying,performing,distributingor

creatingderivativeworksbasedonthisworkoranyotherProject

Gutenberg-tmwork.TheFoundationmakesnorepresentationsconcerning

thecopyrightstatusofanyworkinanycountryoutsidetheUnited

States.

1.E.UnlessyouhaveremovedallreferencestoProjectGutenberg:

1.E.1.Thefollowingsentence,withactivelinksto,orotherimmediate

accessto,thefullProjectGutenberg-tmLicensemustappearprominently

wheneveranycopyofaProjectGutenberg-tmwork(anyworkonwhichthe

phrase"ProjectGutenberg"appears,orwithwhichthephrase"Project

Gutenberg"isassociated)isaccessed,displayed,performed,viewed,

copiedordistributed:

ThiseBookisfortheuseofanyoneanywhereatnocostandwith

almostnorestrictionswhatsoever.Youmaycopyit,giveitawayor

re-useitunderthetermsoftheProjectGutenbergLicenseincluded

withthiseBookoronlineatwww.gutenberg.org

1.E.2.IfanindividualProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworkisderived

fromthepublicdomain(doesnotcontainanoticeindicatingthatitis

postedwithpermissionofthecopyrightholder),theworkcanbecopied

anddistributedtoanyoneintheUnitedStateswithoutpayinganyfees

orcharges.Ifyouareredistributingorprovidingaccesstoawork

withthephrase"ProjectGutenberg"associatedwithorappearingonthe

work,youmustcomplyeitherwiththerequirementsofparagraphs1.E.1

through1.E.7orobtainpermissionfortheuseoftheworkandthe

ProjectGutenberg-tmtrademarkassetforthinparagraphs1.E.8or

1.E.9.

1.E.3.IfanindividualProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworkisposted

withthepermissionofthecopyrightholder,youruseanddistribution

mustcomplywithbothparagraphs1.E.1through1.E.7andanyadditional

termsimposedbythecopyrightholder.Additionaltermswillbelinked

totheProjectGutenberg-tmLicenseforallworkspostedwiththe

permissionofthecopyrightholderfoundatthebeginningofthiswork.

1.E.4.DonotunlinkordetachorremovethefullProjectGutenberg-tm

Licensetermsfromthiswork,oranyfilescontainingapartofthis

workoranyotherworkassociatedwithProjectGutenberg-tm.

1.E.5.Donotcopy,display,perform,distributeorredistributethis

electronicwork,oranypartofthiselectronicwork,without

prominentlydisplayingthesentencesetforthinparagraph1.E.1with

activelinksorimmediateaccesstothefulltermsoftheProject

Gutenberg-tmLicense.

1.E.6.Youmayconverttoanddistributethisworkinanybinary,

compressed,markedup,nonproprietaryorproprietaryform,includingany

wordprocessingorhypertextform.However,ifyouprovideaccesstoor

distributecopiesofaProjectGutenberg-tmworkinaformatotherthan

"PlainVanillaASCII"orotherformatusedintheofficialversion

postedontheofficialProjectGutenberg-tmwebsite(www.gutenberg.org),

youmust,atnoadditionalcost,feeorexpensetotheuser,providea

copy,ameansofexportingacopy,orameansofobtainingacopyupon

request,oftheworkinitsoriginal"PlainVanillaASCII"orother

form.AnyalternateformatmustincludethefullProjectGutenberg-tm

Licenseasspecifiedinparagraph1.E.1.

1.E.7.Donotchargeafeeforaccessto,viewing,displaying,

performing,copyingordistributinganyProjectGutenberg-tmworks

unlessyoucomplywithparagraph1.E.8or1.E.9.

1.E.8.Youmaychargeareasonablefeeforcopiesoforproviding

accesstoordistributingProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworksprovided

that

-Youpayaroyaltyfeeof20%ofthegrossprofitsyouderivefrom

theuseofProjectGutenberg-tmworkscalculatedusingthemethod

youalreadyusetocalculateyourapplicabletaxes.Thefeeis

owedtotheowneroftheProjectGutenberg-tmtrademark,buthe

hasagreedtodonateroyaltiesunderthisparagraphtothe

ProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundation.Royaltypayments

mustbepaidwithin60daysfollowingeachdateonwhichyou

prepare(orarelegallyrequiredtoprepare)yourperiodictax

returns.Royaltypaymentsshouldbeclearlymarkedassuchand

senttotheProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundationatthe

addressspecifiedinSection4,"Informationaboutdonationsto

theProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundation."

-Youprovideafullrefundofanymoneypaidbyauserwhonotifies

youinwriting(orbye-mail)within30daysofreceiptthats/he

doesnotagreetothetermsofthefullProjectGutenberg-tm

License.Youmustrequiresuchausertoreturnor

destroyallcopiesoftheworkspossessedinaphysicalmedium

anddiscontinuealluseofandallaccesstoothercopiesof

ProjectGutenberg-tmworks.

-Youprovide,inaccordancewithparagraph1.F.3,afullrefundofany

moneypaidforaworkorareplacementcopy,ifadefectinthe

electronicworkisdiscoveredandreportedtoyouwithin90days

ofreceiptofthework.

-Youcomplywithallothertermsofthisagreementforfree

distributionofProjectGutenberg-tmworks.

1.E.9.IfyouwishtochargeafeeordistributeaProjectGutenberg-tm

electronicworkorgroupofworksondifferenttermsthanareset

forthinthisagreement,youmustobtainpermissioninwritingfrom

boththeProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundationandMichael

Hart,theowneroftheProjectGutenberg-tmtrademark.Contactthe

FoundationassetforthinSection3below.

1.F.

1.F.1.ProjectGutenbergvolunteersandemployeesexpendconsiderable

efforttoidentify,docopyrightresearchon,transcribeandproofread

publicdomainworksincreatingtheProjectGutenberg-tm

collection.Despitetheseefforts,ProjectGutenberg-tmelectronic

works,andthemediumonwhichtheymaybestored,maycontain

"Defects,"suchas,butnotlimitedto,incomplete,inaccurateor

corruptdata,transcriptionerrors,acopyrightorotherintellectual

propertyinfringement,adefectiveordamageddiskorothermedium,a

computervirus,orcomputercodesthatdamageorcannotbereadby

yourequipment.

1.F.2.LIMITEDWARRANTY,DISCLAIMEROFDAMAGES-Exceptforthe"Right

ofReplacementorRefund"describedinparagraph1.F.3,theProject

GutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundation,theowneroftheProject

Gutenberg-tmtrademark,andanyotherpartydistributingaProject

Gutenberg-tmelectronicworkunderthisagreement,disclaimall

liabilitytoyoufordamages,costsandexpenses,includinglegal

fees.YOUAGREETHATYOUHAVENOREMEDIESFORNEGLIGENCE,STRICT

LIABILITY,BREACHOFWARRANTYORBREACHOFCONTRACTEXCEPTTHOSE

PROVIDEDINPARAGRAPH1.F.3.YOUAGREETHATTHEFOUNDATION,THE

TRADEMARKOWNER,ANDANYDISTRIBUTORUNDERTHISAGREEMENTWILLNOTBE

LIABLETOYOUFORACTUAL,DIRECT,INDIRECT,CONSEQUENTIAL,PUNITIVEOR

INCIDENTALDAMAGESEVENIFYOUGIVENOTICEOFTHEPOSSIBILITYOFSUCH

DAMAGE.

1.F.3.LIMITEDRIGHTOFREPLACEMENTORREFUND-Ifyoudiscovera

defectinthiselectronicworkwithin90daysofreceivingit,youcan

receivearefundofthemoney(ifany)youpaidforitbysendinga

writtenexplanationtothepersonyoureceivedtheworkfrom.Ifyou

receivedtheworkonaphysicalmedium,youmustreturnthemediumwith

yourwrittenexplanation.Thepersonorentitythatprovidedyouwith

thedefectiveworkmayelecttoprovideareplacementcopyinlieuofa

refund.Ifyoureceivedtheworkelectronically,thepersonorentity

providingittoyoumaychoosetogiveyouasecondopportunityto

receivetheworkelectronicallyinlieuofarefund.Ifthesecondcopy

isalsodefective,youmaydemandarefundinwritingwithoutfurther

opportunitiestofixtheproblem.

1.F.4.Exceptforthelimitedrightofreplacementorrefundsetforth

inparagraph1.F.3,thisworkisprovidedtoyou'AS-IS'WITHNOOTHER

WARRANTIESOFANYKIND,EXPRESSORIMPLIED,INCLUDINGBUTNOTLIMITEDTO

WARRANTIESOFMERCHANTIBILITYORFITNESSFORANYPURPOSE.

1.F.5.Somestatesdonotallowdisclaimersofcertainimplied

warrantiesortheexclusionorlimitationofcertaintypesofdamages.

Ifanydisclaimerorlimitationsetforthinthisagreementviolatesthe

lawofthestateapplicabletothisagreement,theagreementshallbe

interpretedtomakethemaximumdisclaimerorlimitationpermittedby

theapplicablestatelaw.Theinvalidityorunenforceabilityofany

provisionofthisagreementshallnotvoidtheremainingprovisions.

1.F.6.INDEMNITY-YouagreetoindemnifyandholdtheFoundation,the

trademarkowner,anyagentoremployeeoftheFoundation,anyone

providingcopiesofProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworksinaccordance

withthisagreement,andanyvolunteersassociatedwiththeproduction,

promotionanddistributionofProjectGutenberg-tmelectronicworks,

harmlessfromallliability,costsandexpenses,includinglegalfees,

thatarisedirectlyorindirectlyfromanyofthefollowingwhichyoudo

orcausetooccur:(a)distributionofthisoranyProjectGutenberg-tm

work,(b)alteration,modification,oradditionsordeletionstoany

ProjectGutenberg-tmwork,and(c)anyDefectyoucause.

Section2.InformationabouttheMissionofProjectGutenberg-tm

ProjectGutenberg-tmissynonymouswiththefreedistributionof

electronicworksinformatsreadablebythewidestvarietyofcomputers

includingobsolete,old,middle-agedandnewcomputers.Itexists

becauseoftheeffortsofhundredsofvolunteersanddonationsfrom

peopleinallwalksoflife.

Volunteersandfinancialsupporttoprovidevolunteerswiththe

assistancetheyneed,arecriticaltoreachingProjectGutenberg-tm's

goalsandensuringthattheProjectGutenberg-tmcollectionwill

remainfreelyavailableforgenerationstocome.In2001,theProject

GutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundationwascreatedtoprovideasecure

andpermanentfutureforProjectGutenberg-tmandfuturegenerations.

TolearnmoreabouttheProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundation

andhowyoureffortsanddonationscanhelp,seeSections3and4

andtheFoundationwebpageathttp://www.pglaf.org.

Section3.InformationabouttheProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchive

Foundation

TheProjectGutenbergLiteraryArchiveFoundationisanonprofit

501(c)(3)educationalcorporationorganizedunderthelawsofthe

stateofMississippiandgrantedtaxexemptstatusbytheInternal

RevenueService.TheFoundation'sEINorfederaltaxidentification

numberis64-6221541.Its501(c)(3)letterispostedat

http://pglaf.org/fundraising.ContributionstotheProjectGutenberg

LiteraryArchiveFoundationaretaxdeductibletothefullextent

permittedbyU.S.federallawsandyourstate'slaws.

TheFoundation'sprincipalofficeislocatedat4557MelanDr.S.

Fairbanks,AK,99712.,butitsvolunteersandemployeesarescattered

throughoutnumerouslocations.Itsbusinessofficeislocatedat

809North1500West,SaltLakeCity,UT84116,(801)596-1887,email

business@pglaf.org.Emailcontactlinksanduptodatecontact

informationcanbefoundattheFoundation'swebsiteandofficial

pageathttp://pglaf.org

Foradditionalcontactinformation:

Dr.GregoryB.Newby

ChiefExecutiveandDirector

gbnewby@pglaf.org

Section4.InformationaboutDonationstotheProjectGutenberg

LiteraryArchiveFoundation

ProjectGutenberg-tmdependsuponandcannotsurvivewithoutwide

spreadpublicsupportanddonationstocarryoutitsmissionof

increasingthenumberofpublicdomainandlicensedworksthatcanbe

freelydistributedinmachinereadableformaccessiblebythewidest

arrayofequipmentincludingoutdatedequipment.Manysmalldonations

($1to$5,000)areparticularlyimportanttomaintainingtaxexempt

statuswiththeIRS.

TheFoundationiscommittedtocomplyingwiththelawsregulating

charitiesandcharitabledonationsinall50statesoftheUnited

States.Compliancerequirementsarenotuniformandittakesa

considerableeffort,muchpaperworkandmanyfeestomeetandkeepup

withtheserequirements.Wedonotsolicitdonationsinlocations

wherewehavenotreceivedwrittenconfirmationofcompliance.To

SENDDONATIONSordeterminethestatusofcomplianceforany

particularstatevisithttp://pglaf.org

Whilewecannotanddonotsolicitcontributionsfromstateswherewe

havenotmetthesolicitationrequirements,weknowofnoprohibition

againstacceptingunsoliciteddonationsfromdonorsinsuchstateswho

approachuswithofferstodonate.

Internationaldonationsaregratefullyaccepted,butwecannotmake

anystatementsconcerningtaxtreatmentofdonationsreceivedfrom

outsidetheUnitedStates.U.S.lawsaloneswampoursmallstaff.

PleasechecktheProjectGutenbergWebpagesforcurrentdonation

methodsandaddresses.Donationsareacceptedinanumberofother

waysincludingchecks,onlinepaymentsandcreditcarddonations.

Todonate,pleasevisit:http://pglaf.org/donate

Section5.GeneralInformationAboutProjectGutenberg-tmelectronic

works.

ProfessorMichaelS.HartistheoriginatoroftheProjectGutenberg-tm

conceptofalibraryofelectronicworksthatcouldbefreelyshared

withanyone.Forthirtyyears,heproducedanddistributedProject

Gutenberg-tmeBookswithonlyaloosenetworkofvolunteersupport.

ProjectGutenberg-tmeBooksareoftencreatedfromseveralprinted

editions,allofwhichareconfirmedasPublicDomainintheU.S.

unlessacopyrightnoticeisincluded.Thus,wedonotnecessarily

keepeBooksincompliancewithanyparticularpaperedition.

MostpeoplestartatourWebsitewhichhasthemainPGsearchfacility:

http://www.gutenberg.org

ThisWebsiteincludesinformationaboutProjectGutenberg-tm,

includinghowtomakedonationstotheProjectGutenbergLiterary

ArchiveFoundation,howtohelpproduceourneweBooks,andhowto

subscribetoouremailnewslettertohearaboutneweBooks.