On Lévi Strauss concept of structure.

On Lévi-Strauss' Concept of StructureAuthor(s): Nathan RotenstreichSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Mar., 1972), pp. 489-526Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126058Accessed: 17/03/2010 12:39

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CRITICAL STUDIES

ON L?VI-STRAUSS' CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE *

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

A. WHOLES AND STRUCTURES

I

Structure is a version of "form" provided that "form" is not

understood as an external shape or appearance but as an order

determining the meaning and the position of its components. Structure is a scheme of relations between components and events.

As such it is a variation of the concept of Gestalt, which can be

taken in this context as the background concept of the more

elaborate one of structure. To make this clearer let us refer to

Max Wertheimer's presentation of the nature of Gestalt as a whole

the behaviour of which is not determined by the individual

elements composing the whole, but by the intrinsic nature of the

whole.1 The assumption is that there are intrinsic natures to

wholes, and an illustration is a Beethoven symphony, where it

would be possible to select one part of the whole and work from

that towards an idea of a structural principle motivating and

determining the whole.2

Claude L?vi-Strauss is aware of his affinity with the thrust of

the Gestalt school. He suggests that he only adds the discipline of sociology or anthropology to those guided by the concept of

Gestalt.3 The structure is made of several elements, none of

which can undergo a change without effecting changes in all

* The paper is based on discussions held at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California.

1 Quoted from his "Gestalt Theory," in A Source Book of Psychology,

ed. Willis D. Ellis (New York: Humanities Press, 1950), p. 2. 2

"The General Theoretical Situation," ibid., p. 11. 3

Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 325.

490 NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

other elements.4 Yet one additional aspect has to be emphasized, that of possible prediction applied to a structure. The presence of the properties comprised in a structure makes it possible, accord

ing to him, to predict how the model will react if one or more of

its elements are submitted to certain modifications.5

An additional term used by L?vi-Strauss is that of "order" or

"order of order": The concept of the interrelationships between

the levels to which structural analysis can be applied. Order of

orders is comprised of formal properties of the whole made up of

sub-wholes, each of which corresponds to a given structural

level.6

A further step is taken when specific structures or orders are

presented as exhibiting the basic features of orders. The struc

tures listed, at least, as illustrations are kinships, political ideol

ogies, mythologies, ritual, art, code of etiquette and even

cooking.7 The discernment of these structures and their com

parative analysis, which takes into account the distribution of them

both historically and geographically, is indeed the subject-matter of structural anthropology.8

The implication seems to be twofold: first, that societies

are structures; and, second, that these structures are sub

divided into secondary structures, the latter lending themselves to

a description or definition with regard to a certain common core, like kinship, myth, etc. Thus "the order of orders" calls for an

investigation of orders to be defined by the concept of structure

on the one hand and by certain "material" specific meanings like

kinship, etc., on the other. What keeps the structures together is both their inner cohesiveness as an order of elements and the

organizing principle of certain meanings into different structures.

Human awareness itself is not placed in a position apart from

these different structures. Human consciousness is essentially

part of a structure and is shaped by the interaction of its different

ingredients. One may discern here an anti-Cartesian trend char

acteristic of structuralism. Interestingly enough, the integration

4 Op. cit., p. 279.

5 Loc. cit.

6 Ibid., p. 33.

7 Ibid., p. 46.

8 Ibid., p. 85.

ON LEVI-STRAUSS7 CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE 491

of consciousness in the structures is justified by underlining the

fact that only through structures do we not reduce social facts to

scattered fragments. Social facts are lived by men, and con

sciousness is as much a form of their reality as are their objective characteristics.9

Structures are viewed as invariants of human life and society. Here we have to distinguish between structures as such, like

kinship or the economic exchange, which are necessary com

ponents of human life; and the various and different expressions of these structures in societies empirically encountered. The

necessary aspect is the subject-matter of human knowledge proper, or the subject matter of science, since science is based on the dis

tinction between the contingent and the necessary. The con

tingent comprises the events and the variations, while the neces

sary connotes structures in their basic systematic forms.10

To be sure, this statement calls for an exploration of the

concept of necessity used here; whether the necessity, e.g., of

family structures in social existence occupies the same logical and

metaphysical position as the necessity of the law of gravitation. L?vi-Strauss seems not to be concerned with these differences

when he points to the analogy between structures and laws. He

considers it justified to move further and to assume not only formal invariants qua structures but also material invariants in

terms of materially meaningful structures.

It appears that for L?vi-Strauss the fundamental or even

primary human experience is that of grasping oppositions. These are called "binary oppositions," and they are referred to as

"certain incompatibilities which are consciously maintained by a

special group and which possess a normative value." lx

The

assumption seems to be that the rational grasp of the world

expresses itself in noticing oppositions; and by the same token

these oppositions can be rendered as guiding human behaviour, as would be the case in the opposition between sacred and profane. There are several attempts to list these oppositions, though one

9 Claude L?vi-Strauss: The Scope of Anthropology, translated by Sherry

Ortherand and Robert A. Pane (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p. 14. 10

Claude L?vi-Strauss: The Savage Mind (La Pens?e Sauvage) (Chi

cago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 21. 11

Structural Anthropology, p. 87.


wonders whether we do find a full list of them in any of the

writings. Some of the examples are the oppositions between hot

food and cold food; milky drink and alcoholic drink; fresh fruit

and fermented fruit.12 Other examples are taken from the scope of human life, like men and women; the right hand and the left

hand;13 birth and death; individual and collective.14 Leach

presents an even more comprehensive list of binary oppositions,

including this world and the other world, culture and nature.15

There is in L?vi-Strauss a tendency to present the data of the

world as structured in oppositions, as: two seasons, two sexes, two societies, etc. He suggests a connection, though he does not

elaborate the methodological grounding of it, between the binary

oppositions in the descriptive sense and that opposition in the

normative sense. He speaks about good season and bad season,

and points to the connection between good season and the male.

There are difficulties and contradictions encountered here, as he

points out, since in that interpretation not only power and

efficacy but sterility as well would have to be attributed to the

profane and female element.1'

Be this as it may, we have to reiterate that what we find here

are only suggestions and variations on the main theme of opposi tions grasped and expressed in activities of societies and in their

structures. In addition, there is an intimation of the connection

between the factual and the normative, indicating that in these

respective structures there is no clear-cut distinction between "is"

and "ought." Yet a full logical and methodological elaboration

is missing. The following are the questions which have to be asked in

this context: What makes the awareness of opposites into the

primordial mode of conceptualization, if we may use this term, of man's relation to the world; and what explains that precisely the opposites are the organizing kernels of the different structures ?

The philosophical reasoning behind this assumption is not clear

in L?vi-Strauss; that is to say, he does not elaborate the possibility

12 Loe. cit.

13 The Scope of Anthropology, p. 12.

14 The Savage Mind, p. 80.

15 E. Leach, L?vi-Strauss (London: Fontana Books, 1969), pp. 85, 69.


ON L?VI-STRAUSS7 CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE 493

that "the minimum of reasoning" is implied when opposites are

the fundamentum divisionis in the field of perception and con

ception. To elaborate this would lead L?vi-Strauss to a broader

view of the structure of knowledge and conception than he

presents and possibly attempts to present. On a more concrete level, there are several suggestions which

have to be mentioned at this point. L?vi-Strauss presupposes, in

his analysis of structures and the opposites comprised in struc

tures, the duality "man and world." After all, even when it is

assumed that man and world are embraced in the selfsame totality, the aspect of embracing does not do away with the aspects of the

difference in terms of the respective meaning of the partners?man and world. When he says "This is reciprocity of perspectives, in

which man and the world mirror each other," 17

he makes a state

ment which points precisely to the difference between the distinct

members in the totality, i.e., man and world. This totalized

duality, if we may use this description, is explicit in L?vi-Strauss'

presentation of the difference between religion and magic: "... it

can, in a sense, be said that religion consists in the humanization

of natural laws and magic in a naturalization of human laws?the

treatment of certain human actions as if they were an integral

part of the physical determinism. . . ." The distinction between

man and world or nature, and the distinction between directed

ness towards man on the one hand and towards nature on the

other, is presupposed, at least, in all the further distinctions and

oppositions comprehend or put forward.

The perception of nature in its relation to man emerges as a

primary datum of all structures. Man's perception in turn is

to be taken as an activity?and man is never merely a passive observer and spectator. This indeed is to some extent already

implied in the view that the primary perception of the world is in

terms of oppositions. To grasp oppositions is to exercise an

activity of selection, segregation and even evaluation, as the dis

tinction between sacred and profane indicates. This active ap

proach is expressed by L?vi-Strauss in the tendency to put into

prominence thinking as against perception, since perception would

17 Op. cit., p. 222.

18 Ibid., p. 221.


imply man's exposure to impressions, whilst thinking implies

systematization, though that systematization in turn is implement ed in various ways.19 L?vi-Strauss seems to assume or to pre

suppose human activity within the duality between man and

world; both the duality and the activity are fundamental data.

Human activity presupposes?and here again the philosophical

assumption is taken for granted and not elaborated?the openness of the world as the arena of action; and this openness in turn

enables the systematization of the structuring in various and

continuous ways and modes.

Thus we may sum up: structuring occurs vis-?-vis different

pairs of opposites. The primary pair is man and world or man

and nature. The awareness of the opposites is in itself a structur

ing qua perception of order, and the various ways of bringing

together the pairs of opposites is in turn an additional structure.

We do not start out with scattered concepts: we start with

structures and move to further structures. We start with order

and move from another order or to an order of orders.

There is a structure to the relation between these orders or

structures. This "structure of structures" is not just a static

relation of coexistence, i.e. language beside kinship, etc., or even

not one of subordination whereby a narrow structure such as rites

is comprised in or is secondary to a wider structure such as society.

II

Let us move now to an analysis of the relations pertaining between different structures. This analysis will in turn bring into prominence an additional aspect of invariability in the sum

total of human activity and existence.

Language occupies a preponderant position for L?vi-Strauss.

He himself points to the lesson he learned from linguistics and

views his approach as an extension to another field of structural

linguistics associated with Jacobson.20 This corresponds to the

previously mentioned extension of the concept of Gestalt not com

prised in the original Gestalt theory. Using a different termi

19 Op. cit., pp. 94-95.

20 Structural Anthropology, p. 233.

ON L?VI-STRAUSS' CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE 495

nology, L?vi-Strauss speaks about language as a totalizing entity or totalization.21

The prominent position of language can be explained by at

least two interrelated considerations: First, language is the

primary manifestation of human creativity or human activity versus the world. Anthropologically speaking, the line of

demarcation between culture and nature is not in tool-making but

in articulate speech. Thus the position of language as the

differentia specifica of man justifies turning language into a model

of structures prevalent in human existence.22 Second, Language

operates not on the level of consciousness but on the level of un

consciousness. "... an unreflecting totalization . . . which has its

reasons and of which man knows nothing." 23

There is probably an affinity between the unconscious char

acter of linguistic reactivity and its position as a constant factor

in social existence: "Language is ... a general phenomenon with

a very relative, but nevertheless very great, stability." 24

Lan

guage does not just flame up; it creates an order of its own; and

that order is present not only in the comprehensive structures of

linguistic units, but also with regard to the continuity over genera tions of men. The meaningful order which endures in time is an

essential feature of language. Though we do not find this for

mulation in L?vi-Strauss, we may be entitled to say that language as a created order endowed with stability becomes a kind of

parallel nature.

The position of language indicated before is enhanced by the

material texture of it. Language is the sum-total of symbols and

sounds, the two being understood as indications standing for

something else. The indications present objects but do not

resemble the objects represented: "The essential feature of lan

guage?as Ferdinand de Saussure so emphatically showed?is as a system of signs which have no material relationship with

what they are intended to signify." 25

And this view is reenforced


22 Conversations with Claude L?vi-Strauss, ed. C. Charbonnier (Lon

don: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 149. 23

The Savage Mind, p. 252. 24

Conversations, pp. 60-61. 25

Ibid., p. 108.


by the reference to Pierce's celebrated definition, according to

which a sign is "that which replaces something for someone." 26

"The choice of the sign may be arbitrary, but it retains an in

herent value . . . which becomes associated with its semantic

function and modulates." 27

Eventually the scope of science is

enlarged and structuralism goes beyond language proper, as

sounds permeated with meaning. The broader concept intro

duced is that of message or communication. Traffic regulations

using the colours green and red use signs to convey a message.

Generally speaking, messages are vehicles of communication.

Communication becomes here the genus; signs are the instru

ments and language proper is just ones species of the genus. Social existence is based on a whole complex of forms of com

munication.28

To communicate is not only to transmit information; it com

prises different domains of sharing as well. Starting with com

munication as an exchange of ideas, we move to an enlarged

version of communication as an exchange in general, that

exchange being accomplished or performed according to certain

rules. Thus we speak about languages or exchange systems in

different contexts : mythical language ; the oral and gestical signs, of which ritual is composed; marriage rules; kinship systems;

customary laws; and certain terms and conditions of economic

exchange.29 This omnipresence of language or communication

leads to the description of the subject-matter and direction of

anthropological research: "If men communicate by means of

symbols and signs, then, for anthropology, which is a conversa

tion of men with men, everything is symbol and sign, when it

acts as intermediary between two subjects." 30

The contact between subjects depends on the intermediary of signs. There are no subjects outside the systems of signs, and

here again we encounter the anti-Cartesian trend of structuralism

which does not provide for the independent position of the cogito,



28 Ibid., p. 357.


30 Ibid., p. 20.

ON L?VI-STRAUSS' CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE 497

since the subject is essentially and ab initio involved in structures

of communication.

Methodologically speaking, the shift to the notion of com

munication provides the advantage of presenting an overriding

concept for the different disciplines of the social sciences, or for

what is called "consolidation" of these disciplines. Moreover, since we are concerned with systems of communications, we are

concerned with the study of rules and have little concern with the

nature of the partners.31 The disregard for the partners and the

preponderance of the rules is, as it were, the anthropological

expression of the anti-Cartesian trend.

The programmatic objective of the theory is to explore the

necessary components of human existence as against the con

tingent components. We realize now that the most necessary of

all is the component of communication. Whatever occurs empir

ically between human beings occurs in the context of communica

tion. An additional methodological advantage seems to lie in

the fact that there are only limited modes of communication?

though there is no attempt for a kind of transcendental deduction

of those modes of communication.

In societies, communication occurs; and this seems to be

just a fact, on three different levels: communication of women, communication of goods and services, and communication of

messages. There is naturally a correspondence between these

modes of communication and the respective scholarly disciplines:

kinship studies deal with marriage; economics deal with goods and services; while linguistics deal with messages.32 These modes

of communication can be viewed also as forms of exchange which

are interrelated. Since we deal with different expressions of com

munication in general and interrelation between the different sub

headings or particular modes of communication, it is legitimate to seek what is called as a terminus technicus "homologies" between these modes of communication. The task is to put forward the formal characteristics of each type of communication

considered independently, and to deal with the transformations


32 Ibid., p. 296.


which make possible the transition from one mode of communica

tion to another mode.33

There is thus a factual and a structural interrelation between

these modes of communication. From the factual point of view

it can be shown in many cases that the system of marriage is not

independent of the system of exchange of goods, since marriages are sometimes performed between families or tribes because of

economic considerations. This is to show that, factually speak

ing, in many cases there can be no clear-cut separation between

modes of communication. But, secondly, there is a structural

intersection between these various modes, since there prevails an

analogy or what is called homology between all these different

modes of communication. Exchange, that is to say exchange between families, exchange of goods and exchange of informa

tion and messages, is the structural common feature of all modes

of communication. Thus the intersection is not only grounded in

empirical considerations but also in the possibilities inherent in

these modes of communication to enter into relations of mutual

exchangeability. This seems to be a rather important point, since what is attempted here is an exploration of the interrelation

between the empirical reasoning and the systematic structure, the

intimation being that empirical considerations do not stand alone

and have their fundamental grounding in the structures them

selves. There is a correspondence between the empirical level

and the structural level.

Once the affinity between modes of communication is made

prominent, the tendency is to obliterate the differences between

them, e.g. the difference between exchange of words and exchange of goods, let alone between human beings. L?vi-Strauss seems to

be aware of these striking differences with regard to the sub

stantive aspect of communication, if we may use this expression. But just the same he is rather quick in pointing out the structural

homology between one level of communication and another:

". . . These results can be achieved only by treating marriage

regulations and kinship systems as a kind of language. . . .

That the women of the group, who are circulated between clans,

33 Op. cit., p. 83.


lineages, or families in place of words of the group, which are

circulated between individuals, does not at all change the fact

that the essential aspect of the phenomenon is identical in both

cases." 34

Let us recall what has previously been said?that the

emphasis is laid on the rules and not on the partners. Hence we

encounter here a disregard for the substantive difference between

e.g. women and words. The difference stressed is that of

circulation between individuals as against circulation between

groups, since again the emphasis is on the process of circulation

and its rules and not on those who are circulated. Structuralism

amounts here to a kind of reductionism to rules as against

partners. The difference?and after all this difference is grasped even when it cannot be listed as a "binary opposition"?between

words and human beings is not taken into account.

The affinity between the different structures is rendered in the

concept of transformation or permutation, which in turn is the

concomitant concept of that of communication. Once more,

language is taken as a model; the concept of transformation is

extricated from language. Language has to be guided by rules, and thus has to be cohesive. This cohesiveness, though it is

inaccessible to observation in an isolated system, will be revealed

in the study of transformations.35 Signs and symbols can only function in so far as they belong to systems. The property of a system of signs is to be transformable or, in other words, translatable.36

The concept of transformation as a guiding principle of social

observation is derived from an additional source beyond that of

translation and its application to language. To comprehend a

social reality is to translate to our own way of understanding the

rules pertaining to the reality which is the subject-matter of our

investigation. When we consider systems of belief or of social

organization, the question we ask ourselves is: "What does all

this mean or signify?," and the answer to this question forces


35 The Scope, p. 31.

36 Loe. cit.


us to translate the subject-matter of our investigation into lan

guage rules originally stated in a different code,37 which is in this

case our own code. Again, the question of translatability provides the difference between language proper and poetry, since poetry cannot be translated except at the cost of serious distortions, while

the mythical value of the myth is preserved even in the worst

translation.38 Ultimately we come here to the statement ?f an

overriding methodical principle: "... For any given model there

should be a possibility of ordering a series of transformations,

resulting in a group of models of the same type." 39

From this consideration, the homology leading to the possi

bility of translation from one level of communication to another

one is warranted. L?vi-Strauss goes further and considers the

transmutations within one level of communication, i.e., the pos

sible transformations between different, or what appear to be

different, myths, in one system of mythology (the Greek one, for

instance) and even a transmutation from one mythology to another

mythology (e.g. Greek and Indian). He attempts to construct

a table of possible permutations between the terms and the empir ical phenomenon studied; for instance, the OEdipus myth is only one possible combination of the terms among other possible com

binations; or else the Orpheus-Eurydice myth is a structural per mutation of the Demeter-Persephone myth.

The essence of structuralism can be summed up in the follow

ing points: There are wholes of action and behavior. With

respect to human-social existence, these wholes are language,

kinship and economics. The affinity between these structures

inheres not only in their formal character as structure but also

in the material character of the activity running through these

structures, i.e., communication.

Since communication is a way of using symbols, and symbols are primarily linguistic, there is an affinity between all modes of

structures and language. This affinity provides for the exchange or translation from one structure to the other?thus warranting

operationally, as it were, the common core of the different

37 Op. cit., p. 18.


39 Ibid., p. 279.


structures. Along with the transmutation between different struc

tures, there are transmutations within the respective structures; and this way of investigation applies mainly to the myths. Sug

gested is a repository of mythic themes, the latter being rather

limited in their content. The emphasis on structure is one on

organization. The emphasis on exchange within the structures

and the exchange among the structures exhibits a kind of formal

or formalistic undertone inherent in human creativity. Preference is thus given to the formal aspects of the domains

investigated. This formal or even formalistic aspect is inherent

in human creativity. L?vi-Strauss is aware of the?only? methodical character of the ideas employed in the investigation of structures when he says that a concrete society can never be

reduced to its structure; 40

or when he puts it even into a stronger formulation that the term "social structure" has nothing to do

with empirical reality but with models which are built after it.41

But in the sanie context he speaks about "raw materials" out of

which models making up the social structure are built; and we

come back again to the question of the partners, since to some

extent the partners forming what is called "social relations" are

the raw material. But in the programmatic presentation itself

it is clear that social structure has to be viewed as a method to be

applied to any kind of social studies, similar to the structural

analysis current in other disciplines. The distinction implied here is one between a model and

reality and seems to be just a reformulation of Max Weber's

concept of the Ideal Type applied to investigations conducted by social sciences. Though L?vi-Strauss sees it mandatory for the

sake of the conception of the real to remove the lived (v?cu), he

still implies in this theory that there is an affinity between the

inherent structure of the expressions of human creativity and the

deliberate use of the structurist method as presenting models

applied to human creativity. There is a lesser gap, to put it in

comparative terms, between social reality and the model than is

assumed in the notion of the Ideal Type. Social reality studied is

not a pure embodiment of one model, nor does it correspond

40 Op. cit., p. 327.

41 Ibid., p. 279.


exactly to one or to the other type theoretically discerned; 42

nevertheless, the formalism implied and operating in real human

life is reiterated on the level of the method. The operation of

formalism in human life seems to be essentially unconscious ; while the presentation of structures as a method and as a model

is obviously deliberate and conscious.

At this juncture we have to go beyond the concept of structure

in the limited sense of the term to some of the implied notions

related to human nature and motivations of human behaviour. Structuralism ceases to be a theory of social research and of social

action and becomes, willy-nilly, a kind of philosophical anthro

pology engaged not only in a methodological investigation but

assuming a harmony between investigation and the to-be

investigated human creativity.43

B. STRUCTURES AND HUMAN NATURE

III

L?vi-Strauss is an anthropologist in the empirical sense, concerned with the exploration of societies and cultures. As such, his concern with the subject-matter needs no further justification

by way of extracting the lesson to be learned from the anthropo

logical studies. But the fact is that L?vi-Strauss makes some

scattered or systematic incursions into a field related to, but going

beyond, that of his empirical studies. He points out some funda

mental issues of a methodological character or of a substantive

character, the latter carrying a philosophical innuendo. It is

with these facets of L?vi-Strauss' presentation that we are con

cerned now.

Let us start with L?vi-Strauss' own comment on the method

he employs in his exploration and analysis of the anthropological data. Structures discerned in the data are guiding the immanent

meaning of the data. Structures are a guiding tool to be used in


43 Consult on L?vi-Strauss' theory of human mind in general Eug?ne

Fleishmann, "L'esprit humain selon Claude L?vi-Strauss," Archives Euro

p?enne de Sociologie, VII/I (1966), 27 ff.


order to point to the data. He assumes that unless we approach the data with a conceptual framework, the data themselves could

not be discerned or identified.44

It is not accidental that he points to structures as the neces

sary component in the sum-total of social reality. He implicitly

rejects the view that a discipline concerned with social data is or

can be idiographic, i.e., that it can be an exploration of the partic ular or singular events as they come and go. The dichotomy of

idiographic and nomothetic?or Verstehen and Erkl?ren, as the

dichotomies were elaborated in the nineteenth and twentieth

century philosophy of humanities (Geisteswissenschaften)?is

replaced by the view that there is more of a similarity between the

study of social phenomena and the study of natural events than

some schools assumed; in both areas the phenomena studied are

comprehended in networks of relationships. In the area of social

studies, the interrelationship between becoming and the charac

teristic features of that which becomes is stressed; and this, in

turn, corresponds to the interrelation between structures and

events. A corollary to this methodological approach is to be

found in the rejection of the method of induction using methods

borrowed from the logic of John Stuart Mill:45 we do not arrive

at the formulation of the generic concept of structure and at the

formulation of certain recurring structures organizing the

phenomena by way of a conclusion based on induction, listing different phenomena and trying to find post factum the common

denominator of all of them or of the bulk of them. We approach the phenomena with the view or the presupposition that there are

structures, and we discern the structures in the phenomena at

stake.

Yet L?vi-Strauss apparently does not take the view that the

presupposition of the concept of structure is a pragmatic or

methodological assumption only, put forward for the sake of

exploration. Structures correspond to or express the built-in

character of thinking and language as the major expression of

thinking. We know about the structure before we know the

empirical phenomena dispersed in time or dealt with in remote


45 Ibid., p. 33.


societies since structures are inherent in the very nature of our

approach to the world. Though the expression I am going to

propose at this juncture cannot be found in L?vi-Strauss, it seems

to be appropriate to suggest that he presupposes here a kind of

phenomenological awareness of structures, this awareness being

implied in that of the interrelation between man and world. This

is not meant to imply that the awareness is a conscious one,

accompanied by self-reflection ; the contrary is the case. Yet the

implicit structure and the implicit awareness of structures ac

company all activities and formulations.

The exploration of the primitive societies and of the savage mind has its additional justification in the relation existing between

structures and the primitive society and the mind of its members.

Characteristic of the savage mind is its "intransigent refusal . . .

to allow anything human (or even living) to remain alien to it." 46

In this sense, we may say that the savage mind finds its expression in a grasp of comprehensive totalities, bringing together different

fields of activity and linking what might go by the name nature on

the one hand and culture on the other. The savage mind is a

mode par excellence of awareness of grasping totalities.

In so far as the modern scientific attitude or the scientific

spirit is engaged in the investigation of structures, it has to be

viewed as continuing the mind of the savage societies. It presents also tools and concepts to enable us to articulate the structures

inherent in the savage mind; the assumption is that the savage mind lacks that self-reflection. But L?vi-Strauss goes further

than this. According to him, the scientific spirit in its most

modern form will have contributed to legitimize the principles of

savage thought and to re-establish it in its rightful place.47 Now, one wonders what this legitimization is about: is it to show that

the savage thought is a structure, and thus an expression of human

creativity; or is it to show that it has, comparatively speaking vis-?-vis the modern mind or thought, a superior position? This

ambivalence is expressed somehow emphatically in the Inaugural Lecture on the assumption of the Chair at the College de France:

there L?vi-Strauss says that he assumes the position of being the


47 Ibid., p. 269.


witness to or for the primitive societies. To be a witness is to

bring evidence, to present points, and even to argue for. But he

precedes the statement about being a witness by saying that he

will be their pupil.48 And one wonders what is the status of a

pupil. Is he taught by the master things which have a normative

position for him now, or is he brought by the master to see broad

horizons of reality and creativity? Be it as it may, there is more

here than a detached interest in a subject-matter; there is an

indication of an involvement or engagement. There seems to be an additional attraction, of a broader or

more philosophical motivation, in the concern with the primitive societies and their creations. Though L?vi-Strauss makes the

rhythm of opposites the running thread of creative expression, underneath these binary opposites is a duality between spontaneity and rule or restraint, or even constraint. In one of his articles,49

L?vi-Strauss characterizes the area of myth as the one where the

mind is engaged in the most free fashion in its own creative

spontaneity. It therefore interested him, he says, to explore whether or not precisely in this area the mind is obeying rules and

laws. It was clear that rules and laws are obeyed in the area of

marriage and kinship; now he found that there are rules even in

myth-poetic activity. Hence, he draws the conclusion that, since

the mind is determined even in this area, it is bound to be even

more determined in other areas.

This sounds like a kind of a fortiori argument: the thrust

toward creativity is characteristic of the manifestation of the

mind. But that thrust is essentially expressed within certain

boundaries. If this interaction between expansive creativity and

boundaries is to be found in the domain of the myth, then we can

conclude that there is no manifestation which is free from this

interaction. The assumption is that there is such an interaction; and this assumption again can be viewed as phenomenologically

present and empirically warranted or embodied in kinship sys

tems, etc. The appearance of the selfsame interaction in the area

of myth is the crucial empirical confirmation of the phenomeno

48 The Scope, p. 253.

49 "R?ponse ? quelques questions," Esprit, 31e ann?e (November 1963),

p. 630.


logical thesis. Actually, what L?vi-Strauss seems to be implying here is that the inter-action which Kant, or Cassierer following

Kant, took to be characteristic of reason, is characteristic of the

mind, mind (both esprit and pens?e) being the sum-total of the

agents of human creativity and their expression. There is implied, and again one has to recall Kant, a creativity spontaneously

ordered; and only the assumption of that creativity enables L?vi

Strauss to speak about a logical order of what myths seek to

explain.50 Logic, in turn, consists of the establishment of neces

sary connections.51

Logic is inherent in creativity. Creativity takes place within

necessary connections, be they of a syllogistic character in the

Aristotelian sense, or of the binary character explored by L?vi

Strauss in his anthropological interpretations. The philosophical

anthropological conclusion which we have to derive from this

analysis is the notion of the primacy of thinking as characteristic

of man. L?vi-Strauss does not escape this conclusion, though he

may present it in an empirical and thus a societal context. The

natural species in totemism, he says, are chosen not because

they are "good to eat" but because they are "good to think." 52

Whether the concept of the primacy of thinking can leave us in

the system as it is presented or not is one of the questions we shall

concern ourselves with presently.

Thinking as the primary activity of men and discerning of

structures as symbolic orders of signs enabling their mutual

exchangeability?these two features of the empirical anthro

pological theory of L?vi-Strauss seem to be the substrate for his

theory as to the universality of human nature. L?vi-Strauss takes

the view that the invariance present on the empirical level points to the universality on the fundamental level, that of human

nature.53

One wonders whether there is an empirical-factual reason for

the assumption that anthropology is concerned with invariants

discerned empirically in primitive societies; and why it should


51 Ibid., p. 35.

52 Totemism, tr. R. Needham, with an Introduction by Roger C. Poole

(Penguin Books, 1969), p. 162. 53

The Scope of Anthropology, p. 40.


have a special "familiy resemblance" to the problem of universality of human essence. The bringing together of the anthropological

findings with the philosophical question seems to be a philo

sophical decision based on phenomenological findings about think

ing as the primary human activity which takes different shapes in

different symbolic structures. Even the position attributed to

language as the defining feature of human essence, as conceived

by Wilhelm von Humboldt, cannot be taken as a position arrived

at by way of induction. The assignment of this position is based

on viewing, e.g., the parallelism between linguistic articulation

and the discursive character of thinking or that between under

standing referring to meanings and bestowing meanings on

sounds, etc. This exploration, which is not based on induction, can be based on what the phenomenologists call "Ideation."

IV

The final goal is to arrive at certain universal forms of

thought and morality, and the most prominent universal phenom enon is the incest taboo.54 There is a relation between structures

and the incest taboo, because human kinship is involved in that

taboo. What is occupying the position of truly elementary units are not isolated families but relations between them.55 The

understanding of the relations between members of the same

family emerges now as the logical and formal conditions of the

incest prohibition. In another statement, the incest taboo is

presented as the logical, or perhaps moral, condition of the very

kinship relation, since that relation is a direct result of the

universal presence of an incest taboo." ... in human society a

man must obtain a woman from another man who gives him a

daughter or a sister." 56

Nevertheless it is difficult to understand

how the fact that a man must obtain a woman from another man, or that a man is not the father of his wife?how these engender the incest taboo. Truly, the incest taboo makes it impossible for

the unit of a kinship to consist of one familiy, since it must always

54 Op. cit., pp. 41 and 51.

55 Ibid., p. 51.

56 Ibid., p. 46.


link two families or two consaguinous groups.57 But just the

same, it does not follow that the incest prohibition establishes the

kinship system.

Again, a natural, as it were, coincidence is assumed here

between the universality of the incest taboo and the universality of human nature; and since we speak about prohibitions, we

have to imply human awareness and not only factual features of

human nature. How this coincidence comes about is not explain

ed, and one wonders whether a stringent structuralist position can

indeed explain that coincidence at all. Structuralism assumes that

human consciousness is involved in structures and that there is no

consciousness outside the particular structures?as the anti

Cartesian trend would again indicate. Yet precisely here, vis

?-vis the phenomenon of the incest prohibition, we come across

an awareness which shapes the structures and is not initially immersed in them. To entertain the notion of the prohibition of

the incest is to think about relations in terms of those permitted and those forbidden. If it is said that the incest prohibition is the

basis of human society in a sense,58 then clearly the awareness of

prohibitions occupies a primary position; and we encounter here

an inter-action between features of kinship and normative com

mands in which there is no way to separate the two. Be that as

it may, we are bound to conclude that to think about relations is

not to be part of the relations thought about. Moreover, to move

from the awareness of relations to an imperative of prohibiting certain relations is a step which presupposes thinking. That

thinking in turn shapes structures, but is not an outcome, let

alone an ingredient, of any of these structures. L?vi-Strauss does

not face here the psycho-analytic theory of the roots of the incest

taboo?and here it is immaterial, for the sake of fundamental con

siderations, whether or not that theory is empirically founded.

The psychoanalytic theory suggested that there are incestuous

desires and that the incest taboo suppresses these desires. This

theory suggests that not a network of relations entertained but a

revulsion of the desires of the sons drives them beyond the

limited family unit. The important point is that the incest taboo

57 Op. cit., p. 72.

58 Ibid., p. 32.


is not based on the structure of the family or of kinship, but

has to be imposed on the desires?or else that the imposition itself

has its roots in the repressed desires. One may say that the incest

taboo presupposes by way of a feeling or Weltgef?hl or by way of an act of reflection a distinction of a genealogical and moral

character between the source of life and one's share in it, let us

say parents and siblings, and one's own activity and involvement

in reproducing life. This factual distinction is implied or pre

supposed in the incest prohibition. The step taken in the direc

tion of the incest taboo is the step from awareness of facts to a

prohibition forbidding the turning of the source of life com

monly shared into a partner in the procreation of life. This is an

act of thinking, an additional act of thinking which presupposes the awareness of the relations and goes beyond this awareness.

L?vi-Strauss cannot escape the problem of the transition from the

"is" to the "ought," and there is no factual justification for such a

transition, however worded. This transition always implies an

act of thinking, and it might be one of the anthropologist's tasks

to explain the ways thinking operates; that it to say, to explain when self-reflective thinking emerges, and when it is thinking

lacking self-reflection.

All this amounts virtually to a conclusion that structuralism

may be viewed as an attempt to present the universality of struc

tures as exhibiting the universality of human nature. But one

may wonder whether the only exhibition of the universality of

human nature is to be found in structures; perhaps there are

additional universal human traits related to the detached charac

ter of thinking. Thinking may entertain different meanings and

is not essentially confined to meanings interwoven in symbolic structures. It may be autonomous to the extent of being a struc

tures-shaping factor.

A parallel systematic difficulty emerges vis-?-vis the symbolic character of the structures. Structures are by definition sym bolic forms implying signs and signification. The operational

manifestation of that character of structures is the mutual ex

changeability between the major structures. This theory of

structures is based on a certain, let us say, limited interpretation of symbols and symbolic forms. A symbol is a sign and a message in L?vi-Strauss' reading of the nature symbols. For the sign to


operate there has to be a receiver of the sign and there has to be

a message conveyed. Fundamentally, poetry is a borderline case

because it is a language or a linguistic mode that is not ex

changeable, since poetry is non-translatable. In addition, abstract

painting is considered by L?vi-Strauss as a kind of decadence or

disintegration because it does not convey a message. By not

referring to objects it ceases to be a sign. This seems to be a very severe limitation imposed on the

concept of symbols. First, let us make some factual observations:

granting that poetry cannot be translated in the strict sense of the

term, there are different modes of translation in addition to the

literal one. There is a kind of "empathie" re-wording, and very

great works of poetry were and are translated in this fashion. To

some extent, the Shakespeare renaissance in nineteenth-century

Germany?so closely tied up with the translations by Schlegel and Tieck?is a case in point. Poetry has a receiver, either the

poet himself or the public. Poetry engenders a grasp of mean

ings, perhaps more than one meaning. It embodies one mode of

conveying meanings through a field of association, or precisely

by not being unequivocal. Language with a referential character

can be by definition more univocal than language lacking the

reference. But what L?vi-Strauss considers to be a borderline

case?poetry?and a deterioration?abstract art?might just

as

well be a manifestation of the potentiality inherent in creativity, that is to say, bringing about insulated worlds of art or wholes

whose meanings are enclosed in themselves and are not "porous"

(not pointing to the objects referred to). This is the case with

abstract painting's being non-representational: it does not signify, but creates its own realm of objects; or, the pointing itself is its

own reference. Somehow L?vi-Strauss lets thinking stop with

the referential symbolism and does not let this symbolism run its

course by way of abstracting from its referential character.

This amounts to the conclusion that L?vi-Strauss takes care

only of what Edward S apir has called referential symbolism. But perhaps, and this is a very important point for an anthro

pologist engaged in empirical research, precisely referential sym bolism is already an abstraction, and thus a later stage in the

development of symbolism. Those who assume that language, m our sense, is rooted in cries or in eruption of emotional tensions,


have to see referential language as a subsequent development of the

language symbolism. There is no anthropological or philo

sophical reason to assume that once reaching the stage of refer

ential symbolism, symbolism ceases to operate; or that the non

referential symbolism has to be evaluated by the yardstick of the

referential symbolism. We may assume that beyond or perhaps above the expression of emotional tensions there is an expression of designing and shaping, as is the case with abstract painting. Karl B?hler 's theory of language has to be considered in this

context, and one does not find in L?vi-Strauss an attempt to come

to grips with the theory of Cassirer, which, at this point, is related

to Karl B?hler 's theory of language.

Making referential symbolism into the yardstick and standard

of evaluation is related to L?vi-Strauss' theory or critique of

modern culture. We shall deal now with this topic. All in all

we may say that L?vi-Strauss presents a two-fold view: (a) modern

society and civilization, compared with primitive society,

represents a decline; and (b) since disorder is inherent in modern

society, society drifts or is moved toward more than a decline, toward the Untergang des Abendlandes.

There is a nostalgic aspect of some sort with regard to pre abstract art, and that nostalgic aspect exhibits possibly the tinge of nostalgia in the system in general. In the pre-abstract art,

according to L?vi-Strauss, an inter-connection of facets was

presented or, to use the technical term, a structure was made

visible: the works of art allowed a person to re-live the relation

ship between sea and land. A port was a human settlement not

completely destroyed; and, generally speaking, there was a

natural relationship between geology, geography and vegetation.59 L?vi-Strauss is aware of the difference between the anthropological interest in remote societies and the interest in one's own society.

A distinction is present between respect for societies very different

from our own and an active participation in the transformation

of our own society.60 Understanding other societies, we are

struck by certain contradictions observed by us; yet, witnessing certain decisions or modes of behaviour in our own society, we

59 Op. cit., p. 97.



are filled with indignation and disgust. Moreover, that value

judgement applies to our own society, but does not apply to the

remote societies.61 Yet this is not the whole story. L?vi-Strauss

is engaged in an evaluation by way of comparison between the

structure of primitive societies and the structure?or rather the

absence of it?of modern societies. Since he is engaged in a

comparison, both methodologically and normatively, he applies a standard: either a single one or a multi-facted one, but just the

same a standard. In this comparison, the primitive society ranks

higher than modern society since it conforms more to the

universality of human nature than is the case with modern

society. What are these standards? The primitive societies, the

subject matter of anthropology, are non-civilized, without a system of writing, and are pre- or non-industrial; yet behind these

qualifying negative expressions a positive reality is hidden: these

societies are to a far greater degree than the others based on

personal relationships, on concrete relations between individuals.62

It is thus clear that the factor of personal relations emerges as the

standard of comparison justifying the attribution of superiority to

primitive society over the modern one. Modern society is

impregnated with what might be called objective creations or

objectivizations which stand up against the personal relations

characteristic of primitive society. Primitive society, based on

personal relations, lacks social stratification and gaps between

classes of people; and, what is even more important, it is based on

unanimity in the participation in the social process. Since L?vi

Strauss is conscious of Rousseau's influence upon him, we may

put it in Rousseau's terms: primitive society is based on a kind of

harmolny between the will of the all and the general will. The

aspect of the absence of inequality or the division within a society is related to the fact that primitive societies are basically struc

tures, while modern culture destroys structure and mistakes place because of its propensity for domination of nature.63

An even further link is asserted between the thrust towards

the domination of nature and the propensity for the domination

61 Conversations, pp. 13-14.


63 Conversations, p. 34.


of man by

man. In order to establish the ascendence over nature,

man had to subjugate man and treat one section of mankind as an

object. This being so, we can no longer give a simple unequi vocal answer to the questions raised by the concept of progress.64 Leach quotes

an even stronger and more moralistic statement

about placing the world before life, life before man, and the

respect for others before self-interest.65

In societies called primitive we observe a collective participa tion in culture, in religious ceremonies and in the life of the

community in general. All these are thought to be expressions of

the unanimity and supportive of that unanimity. When we use

political terminology, we say that there must be no minority: "The society tries to go on functioning like a clock in which all the

parts of the mechanism work together farmoniously, and not like

those machines which seem to conceal a latent antagonism at the

very center of their mechanism?the antagonism between the

source of heat and the cooling device." 66

There is an implicit or

explicit interconnection between domination of man by man and

the disappearance of unanimity or else emergence of minorities

in a society. Both are just aspects of disorder, and are called

"entropy." The term entropy, as applied here, has its explana tion in the way modern societies are characterized: they are

engaged in a perpetual change; they are "hot" societies involved

in a process which leads to dissolution in heat. L?vi-Strauss used

a thermo-dynamic term for what Durkheim called anomie, being a state of society in which the norms of conduct are disappearing and disorientation revails.

This distinction between the primitive and the modern

societies is amplified by the term "society versus culture." About

primitive peoples, it is said that they produce very little order by means of their culture, and indeed they produce very little

entropy. Civilized people, on the other hand, produce a great deal of order in their cultures. This is shown by mechanization

and by the great achievements of civilization. But just the same, civilized peoples produce a great deal of entropy in their cultures

64 Op. cit., p. 31.

65 E. Leach, op. cit., p. 37.

66 Conversations, pp. 45, 41.


in the form of social conflicts and political struggles.67 All in all, the shift from society to culture or to industrial civilization has a

de-humanizing effect.68 It is not only the case that our modern

societies make extensive use of the steam-engine; structurally,

they resemble a steam engine in that they work on the basis of

a difference in potential, which finds concrete expression in differ

ent forms of social hierarchy.69 All this sounds very suggestive. Yet we have to pause and

ponder as to the inner consistency of the view and its adequacy.

Speaking about consistency, we encounter a difficulty: L?vi

Strauss tries to discern the invariants of societies and their

corresponding invariants in human nature. If there are universal

human traits that are essential human traits, how can the historical

process suppress them or even make them disappear? Is it not a

characteristic feature of essence that it prevails over appearance? This would suggest that structures would have the upper hand

when they clash with contingencies. Do not contingencies,

capable of suppressing structures, become essences themselves; or does?or does not?the distinction between essence and con

tingencies cease to be a meaningful distinction and become, at

most, a verbal one? Since L?vi-Strauss tends to assume a

harmony between universal human essence and the structures

encountered on the level of the subject-matter of anthropology, he

is somehow driven to the conclusion that once these structures

disappear or are swept away by the entropy of modern societies, structures in general disappear. This seems to be a logical or

methodological leap. To be sure, if the view is presented as a reminder against the

simple-minded version of the idea of ideology of historical

progress, then it is a very valuable warning indeed. Since what

L?vi-Strauss is presenting is a view that stresses historical reality and historical process as a way of becoming what historical

reality is, there is a loss. In this particular characterization, the

predetermined order, where things are together, is lost. Taking

advantage of a well-known formulation, we may say that L?vi

67 Op. cit., p. 41.

68 Ibid., p. 42.

69 Ibid., p. 33.


Strauss presents his own version, and a very rich one indeed, of

the distinction between status and contract?primitive societies

being based on status, the modern ones on contract. But he

seems to exclude a priori the possibility of creating an order, that

is to say, of not drifting into anomie or entropy when individuals

stand alone in the first place and try to establish a community or

participation from that position. The predetermined community is lost, but the perpetual possibility of bringing about a com

munity through acts of deliberation is an open possibility, always a possibility and always open because the very relation to open ness never brings about an ultimate and final achievement. The

given is lost and the created or the to be created emerges. The norm of individuality and its correlate as the norm of

freedom are one-sided norms as those of equality and of unanimity are one-sided. For maintaining a given collectivity men payed the price of absence of individuality as a fact and as a norm; for

the emergence of individuality as a fact and as a norm men paid with the lack of a primary community and of a possible clash

between different norms?as the clash between the norm of free

dom and that of equality would exemplify. The conceptual and

factual error implied at this point in L?vi-Strauss' conception is

due to his tendency to identify universal human nature with a

particular historical manifestation of human creativity, instead

of identifying it with the whole gamut of historical creativity. The gamut is less harmonious, and its identification with human

nature makes the view even less harmonious; but perhaps we pay with the loss of harmony for achieving a more adequate systematic

position.

Absolutism in terms of human nature and relativism in terms

of the historical amplitude seems to be a more systematic and

sounder position than that which assumes the conformity between

universal human nature and a certain concrete manifestation of

it in a certain societal shape, i.e. that of the primitive society. The shift from society to culture, in L?vi-Strauss' wording,

amounts to a shift from structures to objectivity and objectifica tion. This seems to be plausible; but, nevertheless, it calls for a

certain qualification. To be sure, the modern scientific world

view emerged through the medium of a polemic against the tradi

tional world-view, worded in Biblical terms or else in a com


bination between the Biblical and the Aristotelian notions. Hence

the anti-traditional trend is inherent in the historical presuppose tions of the scientific world-outlook. Moreover, since the modern

scientific world-outlook recognizes the authority of reason on one

hand and experimentation on the other, this double authority defies any possibility of a predetermined reliance on traditions and

world-views carried over through generations. There is an additional aspect to this. The principle of

objectivity is tantamount to the principle of giving an account

of the state of affairs as it is. Hence this principle implies the

emancipation of the world-view from the involvement with "sub

jective" consciousness and its integrated position within the

structures. Objectivity puts the involvement of the subject in

"brackets" and thus, indeed, destroys the structure of involvement

between man and the world. The concept of presupposition as

applied by Kant to modern science does not mean a structure of

involvement between consciousness and the world; it means the

dependence of the statements related to nature on assumptions and functions related to the unity of consciousness in the tran

scendental, and thus logical, sense.

This short restatement warrants L?vi-Strauss' view that

modern society related to the modern world-outlook undermines

the traditional structure. But L?vi-Strauss seems to be oblivious

at this point to the fact that a new concept of structure emerges in the modern world-view; namely

a structure centered around

the concept of objectivity. The structure is the world or nature

in its totality, and hypothetical principles like, for instance, the

principle of causality. They bring about or articulate universal

networks of relationships and thus establish structures. It might be considered a one-sided view to take the exchangeable struc

tures of the primitive world-outlook not only as an historical fact

but also as models for what structures essentially are or have to be.

L?vi-Strauss seems to be involved again in a kind of hypostatic

reasoning, making structures empirically encountered into models

or Platonic ideas. This leads him to the conclusion that since

traditional structures got lost en route and there is no involvement

of consciousness in nature, structures are absent. Against this

view we have to maintain: as universal human nature is to some

extent involved in history, and to some extent is kept apart from


it, so structures have their manifestation in history but are not

identical with any particular historical embodiments, there is

no total merger between the idea of structure and the structures

empirically studied or embodied.

Basically L?vi-Strauss believes that modern culture is accom

panied by the suppression of human relations in society, sacrific

ing them for the sake of objectivity. Here again he seems to

point to a very serious phenomenon indeed. Yet one may wonder

whether he has his finger on what is the essential issue at stake.

The principle of objectivity is related to the principle of freedom:

only a free man can be engaged in an objective pursuit of research

and in an attempt to find out what the structure of the universe is.

The dialectic of the relationship between the principle of freedom

and the principle of objectivity seems to lie in the invasion of the

principle of objectivity into the area of the human individuals

who as such entertain freedom exhibited in their intentionality toward objectivity. This invasion makes, or may make, the free

human individuals into objects; and thus a contradiction emerges between the position of being an object and that of a subject whose

essential feature is freedom. The modern world-outlook did not

find a universally acceptable resolution of this dialectic dilemma

inherent in it. The paradox of assuming that human beings are

objectively free although they are not objects might be one way of

resolving the dilemma; but there are, as we know, no universally

acceptable philosophical solutions. There are only universally

envisaged philosophical problems, and the modern world-outlook

articulates or puts into prominence precisely that philosophical

problem.

It could be argued that the philosophical and human problem of modern society and modern world-outlook lies precisely in the

tendency to build a structure which would entail both existence

based on freedom and knowledge and the intent to be ruled by the

principle of objectivity. Here the problem would be overstructur

ing (structure of knowledge as the exclusive structure) rather than

the destruction of structures; the different levels of intervention

in human life and the attempts to control and manipulate human

responses would be an indication of this overstructuring. L?vi-Strauss' sketchy philosophy of history or of culture seems

to presuppose a preference for the primitive. This preference


expresses itself in his two correlated notions, namely, the notion

of the unconsciousness and that of history. Let us turn now to

an examination of these notions.

L?vi-Strauss takes his model from linguistics; and language, in his eyes, is a kind of structural phenomenon par excellence.

One of the features of language is its operation on the level of

unconsciousness : "... structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to the study of unconscious

infrastructure." In another context he speaks about "unconscious

thought"; this is rather a vague expression, but it may serve as

a clue to the notion of unconsciousness as it is applied in his

writings. Further still: ". . . the unconscious activity of the

mind consists in imposing forms upon content, and . . . these

forms are fundamentally the same for all minds, ancient and

modern, primitive and civilized. ... It is necessary and sufficient

to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution

and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other customs."

70

There is a qualification here to the extent that, since the

unconscious forms operate on all levels of culture, one may

wonder how this view can be made consonant with that stressing the disruption of structures characteristic of modern society. But having dealt with that topic in the preceding context, we

may notice that, according to the view presented here, the essen

tial feature of the formative impact of a structure is that it operates

unconsciously. Why is it so? One can hardly find an explana

tion, except when one takes the model of the primitive society as

studied by L?vi-Strauss as a binding model. L?vi-Strauss himself

does not seem to cling to his presentation when he says that "at

the present time people are trying deliberately and systematically to invent new forms, and that in [his] view is precisely the sign of a state of crisis."

71 This statement seems to be more con

sonant with the thrust of L?vi-Strauss' general position than the

view quoted before.

The usage of the concept or the term "unconscious" might be misleading because of the impact that pychoanalysis, at least its

70 Structural Anthropology, pp. 21, 33, 56.



Freudian version, has on the present-day jargon. Lack of

awareness is not the most significant aspect or facet in the

Freudian concept of unconsciousness. Unconsciousness is reserv

ed for a certain factor in human behaviour, namely the instincts

or the urges of the Id. The point is that the unconscious

represents instinctual impulses or repressed instinctual impulses. Since L?vi-Strauss refers to the unconscious formation or un

conscious thinking, and not to unconscious drives and urges

aiming at a libidinal satisfaction, one wonders whether the

dichotomy of unconscious and conscious is as fundamental as it

appears to be in this context.

The dichotomy of unconscious versus conscious has somehow

its corollary in the dichotomy of anthropology and history. By and large, the concept of history is used in the sense of the study of the course of events in time; it is that aspect of history which

goes by the name of historia rerum gestarum. But L?vi-Strauss

goes further in suggesting the difference between ethnography and history on the one hand, and social anthropology and sociology on the other: the former aim at gathering data, while the latter

deal with models constructed from these data. And here he

seems to follow some of the distinctions present in Max Weber.

One hears at this point a reservation with regard to history, since historical research is concerned with individual data and

as such tends to be idiographic. As against those who have seen

in the character of historical research an independent significance and even an advantage (Dilthey would be the prominent repre sentative of the view), L?vi-Strauss is inclined to see in research

that approaches the data without applying to them models?and

structures are indeed models?a disadvantage. Yet he moves

toward a dissociation from history, an one may discern several

reasons behind the anti-historical position which eventually

emerges out of L?vi-Strauss' writings. In speaking about an

anti-historical position, we have to refer to history more as a

course of events in time than as a study of these events, i.e.

history as res gestae. First he says that history is a vague term, or that the field of history cannot be dilineated: "What was said

yesterday is history, what was said a minute ago is history." 72

72 Op. cit., p. 12.


Provided that the interpretation suggested here is correct, we may

say that history is just the course of events in time, and time as

such does not delineate any meaningful contexts or patterns of

events in it. To delineate these patterns we have to go beyond

events, that is to say, we have to go to structures; these are not

just events in time, since they presuppose the formative quality of the mind. That formative quality seems to refer to events

but is not of the order of events.

Since the formative capacity of the mind is operating primarily

unconsciously, L?vi-Strauss seems to draw the line of demarcation

between history and anthropology, both in the sense of the course

of events and in that of the study of the course of events.

The dichotomy between conscious and unconscious takes a

somewhat different direction. The anthropologist, this is how

it is stated now, goes forward, seeking to attain through the

conscious (of which he is always aware) more and more of the

unconscious; whereas the historian advances, so to speak, back

ward, keeping his eye fixed on concrete and specific activities

from which he withdraws only to consider them from a more com

plete and richer perspective.73 L?vi-Strauss quotes Marx's saying about men who make their own history but do not know that

they are making it: he interprets that saying as implying his

own distinction between the conscious and unconscious. Even

tually this saying justifies first history and second anthro

pology. Yet at the same time the attempt is made to show that

the two approaches are inseparable. One wonders why and

whether the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious

corresponds that neatly to the distinction between anthropology and history, as it is intimated in these statements.

Granting that primitive societies are principally motivated

by unconscious formations, does it follow that historical societies

cannot be or are not motivated by unconscious formative opera tions? If our historical concern is with the understanding of

phenomena, and we are led in our research to assume that certain

historical events cannot be explained by other than unconscious

formative intervention, why are we bound to assume that the

explanation of the unconsciousness is essentially inapplicable in

73 Op. cit., p. 24.


historical research? Granting that history moves away from

traditional structures, does it also move away from human nature

to the extent that human nature is no longer motivated, at least

partially, by unconscious operations of the mind? Do we have to assume, for instance, that an historical agent is always

aware

of the motivation and objectives of his actions? Do we have to assume that the historical experience of France versus Germany on

the collective level is always consciously present in the minds of

those who decide on actions of France vis-?-vis Germany? Or do we rather have to assume that the historical experience is taken

for granted and that it motivates the actions without being neces

sarily spelled out, or without the historical agents spelling out

the different ingredients of that experience? We can sum up by

saying that the dichotomy of the conscious and unconscious is not

as sharp as it is presented by L?vi-Strauss.

The view taken is that the entering into open historical

time, that stepping out from the patterns of tradition, carries

with it a move toward deliberation, reflection, self-aware deci

sions, and the like. L?vi-Strauss seems to look nostalgically backward to situations where all these selfconscious activities were

absent. Yet since in his view thinking is the predominant human

activity, one may wonder whether the shift from thinking to

thinking of thinking, or the move from unconscious thinking to

conscious thinking, is that dramatic or catastrophic. The shift

from the Id to the I might be dramatic, but not the move from

thinking to thinking of thinking. Thinking is not necessarily tied up with this or that content. It moves around, and thus it

may think of itself. Spinoza's notion of the infinite series of the

idea of the idea might be a philosophical description to be con

sidered at this juncture. The distinction between thinking lacking self-awareness and

thinking accompanied by self-awareness looms large in the

presentation of L?vi-Strauss; this distinction in turn has its im

pact on his evaluation of history qua the course of historical events

given to rise to historical consciousness. We should not, then, draw a distinction between "societies with no history" and

"societies which have histories." In fact, every human society has a history, and they all go equally far back, since all history dates from the birth of mankind. But whereas so-called primitive


societies are surrounded by the substance of history and try to

remain impervious to it, modern societies interiorize history, as

it were, and turn it into the motive power of their development.74 The interiorization of history amounts essentially to aware

ness of change as the accompanying notion and even as the prin

ciple of existence and activity. To be surrounded by the sub

stance of history amounts supposedly to dwelling in time yet

lacking the awareness that dwelling in time is tantamount to

change. The relative lack of change in the "cold" societies

explains the difference in the mode of historical consciousness per

taining to primitive societies on the one hand and to the post

primitive societies on the other.

Indeed this is an important point. Yet one may wonder

whether the juxtaposition presented is as sharp as it is stated by L?vi-Strauss. The facticity of existing in time is bound to be

present both on the level of primitive societies and on that of

post-primitive ones. To live in time amounts to an existence

which is somehow aware that life does not begin with those living

presently. This awareness is nourished or generated by the con

tinuous existence of language and by the turnover of generations which come and go. While the experience of language appro

priated from the ancestors may nourish awareness of continuity and thus of endurance, the experience of the changing of genera

tions, rooted as it is in the biological rhythm of existence, may nourish awareness of the mode of change characteristic of exist

ence in time, and hence eventually of existence in history.75 There is essentially no dwelling in time and history which

lacks totally the awareness of both continuity and change. On

this, L?vi-Strauss seems to be right: the interaction and the

unstable equilibrium between these directions of awareness may and do shift in different historical eras and thus in different

cultures. This shifting equilibrium is part of the historical

change and thus calls for a kind of meta-awareness of history. Modern society and modern culture are prone to emphasize?and

perhaps overemphasize?the aspect of change, making change


75 Consult the present author's article: "The Ontological Status of

History," The American Philosophical Quarterly, January 1972.


itself into a norm of existence and behaviour. If L?vi-Strauss

means to say that internalization of history amounts to a mode

of consciousness that makes change into a norm and thus pursues

change for its own sake, here again he is probably right. The

qualification which is called forth relates to the dichotomy "hot"

and "cold" and to the place of history proper in post-modern societies. The reason for this exclusive, as it were, affinity between history and modernity lies in the attempt to say that

change destroys structures: wherever there is an overemphasis on change, there is an overemphasis on history. What seems to

be lacking in this statement is the assertion that the logic of

historical existence brings about the pendulum of emphasis vis-?-vis time, i.e. duration and change. It it does not bring about the pendulum, at least it lends itself to the interpretation

which stresses the continuity aspect and, as now, the change

aspect. There is more of a binary opposition in historical time

than is assumed by L?vi-Strauss.

Related to this analysis of continuity versus change is the

analysis of the emergence of writing as the major tool of the

"historical civilization." The precondition of totalization of

knowledge and utilization of past experience is, we feel more

or less intuitively, the source of our civilization. For the sake

of this truly major cultural acquisition is writing. Writing refers to "reserve stock." Human beings stop living from day to

day, as they did when they depended on hunting and or on the

gathering of fruit. When civilization moves to accumulated expe rience of many generations which was handed dawn from one to

the other, it needs an effective tool for preserving that accumulated

experience. The major changes in human civilization, including the domestication of animals, presuppose long periods of time, and great, prolonged and concentrated experimentation. All this

accumulated experience has to be preserved and thus calls for the

invention of writing.76 In addition to the previously made

distinctions between history and anthropology, a new feature

comes to the forefront, since the anthropologist is understood as

above all interested in unwritten data, being principally con



cerned with things which men ordinarily think of recording on

stone or on paper.77

Writing is not an invention related to the change which

occurred in the time-horizon of man along the line of the shift

from primitive to modern society. Writing is related to the

sense of continuity and accumulation implied in that continuity. Information accumulated across the generations cannot be pre served just by being stocked in an individual's memory.

Accumulation carries over past experience, past treasures of

literature and wisdom. These do not belong to the given and

immediate surroundings of the present, but are deemed significant for the present. Hence we encounter in writing a situation

whereby generations both meet and remain separated. The

application of writing exhibits both the rhythm of change and

the rhythm of continuity characteristic of historical time and of

historical consciousness with reference to time. Here, the insight of L?vi-Strauss excedes his explicit theory.

Thinking as a predominant human quality has its conse

quences in the scope of the relationship between man and nature.

These consequences, in turn, have their impact on the momentum

of history which cannot be detached from the changing pattern of the relationship between man and nature. In this context

the kinship structure is again a case in point. A family in the

biological sense is ubiquitous in human society. But what gives it its socio-cultural character is not what it retains from nature but

that in which it diverges from nature. And indeed it is said in

very explicit words: "A kinship system does not consist in the

objective ties of descent or consanguinity between individuals.

It exists only in human consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the spontaneous development of a real

situation." 78

To be sure, we can take exception to the terminology used

here, since we ask whether spontaneous is synonymous with

arbitrary, and further, what is a "real situation"? Leaving aside

these issues, we may assume that the conception presented here

attempts to shift the emphasis from the intervention in nature


78 Ibid., p. 50.


by human beings to the interpretation of nature by human con

sciousness. Human consciousness forms nature, turning and

molding the biological substrate into structures of kinship. This

formation by consciousness expresses itself eventually in institu

tions?and kinship is an institution. Thus consciousness as

viewed here by L?vi-Strauss and perhaps malgr? soi is eventually endowed with an objectifying capacity. The acts of interpreta tion accompanied by acts of transformation are two most pro

minent and interrelated modes of acts?cooking is obviously not

the production of food but the transformation of materials. Thus

we come back to the position of consciousness; and no argument in terms of the distinction between the conscious and the uncon

scious can undo that fundamental position of consciousness,

despite the attempt to integrate it in structures.

There is a prevailing controversy as to L?vi-Strauss' rela

tionships to Marx and to Hegel. This was generated by his rather

frequent references to Marx and by his employment of the term

dialectic, which is rather vague. There is no need to go into this

controversy once we see the significance of the statement on the

relationship of consciousness to nature as being formative and

interpretative and not as being productive. To use Marx ' s language,

for L?vi-Strauss the first historical deeds are interpretation and

transformation?and not, as for Marx, economic production. If

this is so, then we may understand the remark of L?vi-Strauss

that we may accept the Marxist position for that which occurred in

Western Europe since the fourteenth century up to the present moment. But he does not believe that this position could be

applied to all phases of human development.79

However, we may see a suitable distinction between the

Marxist view which explains human development through the

process of clashes between classes and the philosophical-anthro

pological position which takes production as the discerning feature of man. If we make this distinction, we may look on both

interpretation and transformation and on production as expres sions of consciousness. Both are rooted in consciousness and

79 Les Lettres Fran?aises, No. 1165, January 1967. Quoted by:

Urs Jaeggi, Ordnung und Chaos, Der Strukturalismus als Methode und Mode

(Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1968), p. 24.


lack, therefore, the independent self-sufficient character. They may even clash, both being present in the same situation and era

of human history. The stress on consciousness allows for a

variety of expressions in terms of human acts, as it does in terms

of structures of human behaviour and orders of actions.

We thus come back to the fundamental philosophical point;

namely, whether human nature can be identified with a certain

manifestation of that nature in historical development or not.

The empirical seems to be related to the constant and the trans

empirical; but they are not identical, neither factually nor as a

matter of principle.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

On Lévi Strauss concept of structure.

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