On authenticity: The question of truth in construction and autobiography

On authenticity: The question of truth in constructionand autobiography

Sara Collins

102 South Hill Park, London NW3 2SN – [email protected];

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(Final version accepted 11 January 2011)

Freud was occupied with the question of truth and its verification throughout hiswork. He looked to archaeology for an evidence model to support his ideas on recon-struction. He also referred to literature regarding truth in reconstruction, where hesaw shifts between historical fact and invention, and detected such swings in his owncase histories. In his late work Freud pondered over the impossibility of truth inreconstruction by juxtaposing truth with ‘probability’. Developments on the role offantasy and myth in reconstruction and contemporary debates over objectivityhave increasingly highlighted the question of ‘truth’ in psychoanalysis. I will arguethat ‘authenticity’ is a helpful concept in furthering the discussion over truth in recon-struction. Authenticity denotes that which is genuine, trustworthy and emotionallyaccurate in a reconstruction, as observed within the immediacy of the analyst ⁄patient interaction. As authenticity signifies genuineness in a contemporary contextits origins are verifiable through the analyst’s own observations of the analyticprocess itself. Therefore, authenticity is about the likelihood and approximation ofhistorical truth rather than its certainty. In that respect it links with Freud’s musingsover ‘probability’. Developments on writing ‘truths’ in autobiography mirror those inreconstruction, and lend corroborative support from another source.

Keywords: authenticity, probability, reconstruction, truth, autobiography, objectivity

Introduction

Truth: Freud’s search for the evidence in dialectics with literature

... one has to remember that the probable need not necessarily be the truth and thetruth not always probable.

(Freud, 1939a, p. 1)

This enigmatic statement by Freud (1939a) expresses his reflections on hiswork and on his own efforts to find appropriate criteria by which to judgethe evidence for truth. Claims for truth could not just be made; they had tobe substantiated by proof. In the case of his writings on Moses he was look-ing for some form of corroboration that his drastic conclusions aboutMoses’ origins were true. By his own accounts, his assertion that Moses wasan Egyptian rather than a Jew delayed the publication of Moses and Mono-theism (Freud, 1939b).

In the end he gave up the hope of finding objective proof when he couldnot assert that his ideas about Moses were the undisputed ‘truth’. He

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relinquished the attempt to find convincing evidence in this case, and evokedthe notion of ‘psychological probabilities’ instead: ‘‘... but I was not pre-pared to uphold them publicly, since they were based only on psychologicalprobabilities and lacked objective proof’’ (Freud, 1939a, p. 1).

Freud’s search for verification tools for his theories was an issue thatoccupied him throughout his working life. In this he engaged in a discoursewith literature as a means of investigating the very necessity for objectivetruth. The project of Moses and Monotheism, late in his work, brought thiscritical problem of evidence into sharp focus, which Freud again addressedthrough a dialectical engagement with literature.

Chianese (2008) maintains that: ‘‘... The recourse to literature was anythingbut superfluous in the birth and development of psychoanalysis’’ (p. 100). Hedraws attention to Freud’s extensive use of literature, as well as to his waver-ing attitude towards fiction in what he thought had to be a scientific progressof psychoanalysis. Chianese highlights the original title for Moses and Mono-theism, which was: ‘‘The Man Moses, a Historical Novel’’ (p. 11).

Freud’s engagement with the value of creative narration within psycho-analysis was a recurrent theme in his thinking on truth, especially when itcame to reconstruction. This is an area where the question of truth and theevidence for it were most pertinent. In Freud’s case histories, particularly inhis discussion of the case of Fraulein Elisabeth von R., he wonders why hiscase histories ‘‘should read like short stories, and that ... they lack the seri-ous stamp of science’’ (Breuer and Freud, 1893–95, p. 160).

From probability to authenticity

Chianese (2008) shows how Freud deals with the task of constructing the lifeof Moses with very few historical clues at his disposal. In this work Freud usesthe concept of ‘probability’ in an attempt to resolve the tension between factand speculation, and in order to bridge the gap between the two.

In another late work, Constructions in Analysis, Freud (1937) comes downon the side of producing in a patient ‘‘an assured conviction of the truth ofthe reconstruction’’ (p. 266). Yet he also retracts from the possibility of adefinitive truth in reconstruction ‘‘... which ... can often reach only a certaindegree of probability’’ (p. 260).

Freud, then, draws a distinction between probability and truth in recon-struction, by stating, as in the opening quote, that one is not the other, andvice versa. His thinking on probability differs from that of truth since prob-ability denotes psychological likelihood rather than certainty.

The notion of probability bridges what is for Freud a troubling gapbetween historical facts, on the one hand, and supposition, on the other.Probability in reconstruction, then, connotes likelihood and a degree of con-fidence in one’s conclusions about historical events – but only a degree –that something is likely to have occurred. A conclusion about the past isreached after weighing up a ratio of favourability of one possibility againstthe others, in a subliminal mathematical manner.

In this paper I propose to link Freud’s ‘probability’ in reconstruction with‘authenticity’. Morris (1993) maintained that: ‘‘... The use of criteria like

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‘authenticity’ and ‘genuineness’ ... extends only up to a point’’ (p. 51). But Ihold that the use of the term ‘authenticity’ can be extended further andlinked with Freud’s late notion of ‘probability’.

It is suggested that authenticity in psychoanalysis also differs from truth.In authenticity the analyst searches for genuineness and trustworthiness ofan historical account within the context of the transference and counter-transference relationship. The analyst’s observations are anchored in thepresent, and his ⁄ her thoughts about the past originate in the context of acontemporary relationship with the patient. In that way ‘authenticity’ inreconstruction denotes a genuineness of origin that is both sourced fromand is faithful to a unique and current stage of an analytic encounter. LikeFreud’s use of ‘probability’, authenticity in reconstruction differs from truthin that it lays no claim to undisputed certainty. Both probability andauthenticity are distinguishable from truth in that neither seeks to demon-strate a sole objective certainty.

This view of the past as being determined by the present is by no meansunique to psychoanalytic theory, and has been amply supported by existentialphilosophers, for example, May (1958) (whose thinking on temporality alsoencompasses the future). May states: ‘‘It has often been said that one’s pastdetermines one’s present and future. Let it be underlined that one’s presentand future – how he commits himself to existence at the moment – alsodetermines his past’’ (p. 88).

Authenticity is proposed as a helpful concept in the debates over the ques-tion of ‘truth’ in psychoanalysis. At times these discussions seem as thoughthey might have reached an impasse. The improbability of truth in recon-struction represents the general view that the past cannot be objectively veri-fied once we take into account the subjective, the internal and the emotivecolouring of historical facts.

Moreover, the concept of ‘authenticity’ in psychoanalysis rests on theassumption that past experiences are reconstructed in the immediacy of thepresent. The contemporary transference and countertransference experiencesoffer the emotive prism through which the past will be refracted. Thus therecan only be an approximation towards an objective historical claim for‘truth’ about childhood; and a reconstruction can be deemed ‘authentic’rather than ‘true’. Authenticity in reconstruction, then, is a particular formof dependability and trustworthiness of historical accounts, given within theanalytic discourse. These are validated through the transferential experiencesin the sessions themselves from which a reconstruction emerges. The origins,genuineness and dependability of what is being reconstructed are sourcedfrom within a present transference countertransference experience.

Contemporary developments on the question of truth

This paper addresses Freud’s (1937) term of ‘‘an assured conviction of thetruth’’ (p. 266) as an intensely contested notion, and as standing in opposi-tion to his own late musings on the notion of probability. I will show thestages through which psychoanalysis has moved since its original pursuit ofan objective construction of childhood, and the departures from the idea

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of truth in psychoanalysis, which have come down on the side of Freud’slate idea of probability. These developments on the question of truth havebeen salient to debates on the value and technique of reconstruction.

Parallel developments in relation to historical truth have taken place inliterature, particularly in autobiographical writings. There has been a longtradition of reference to literature in psychoanalytic thinking, starting fromFreud. Autobiography, especially, lends itself for comparison with recon-struction in psychoanalysis. In both cases the past is told from the platformof a current moment, and the telling is anchored in a present context. Thiscomparison, though not without its limitations, offers corroborativeevidence from an independent, external source that the kind of probing inrelation to truth that goes on in psychoanalysis, is part of a wider culturalconversation. This paper will explore the extent to which this parallel phe-nomenon can shed light on the question of truth in reconstruction.

Freud’s metaphor

When Freud (1937) used the term ‘construction’, he explained it throughmetaphors from archaeology, in which he was profoundly interested: ‘‘[Theanalyst’s] work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction,resembles to a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and buried …’’ (p. 259).

According to these metaphors, when fragments of a work of art, say avase, are found under layers of earth, these fragments testify to the pre-exis-tence of a whole vase, a real and concrete artefact that could have been seenand touched, before it was broken. The pieces that are dug out, these toocan be seen and touched. The archaeologist wishes to know what the wholevase looked like, and he ⁄ she goes about it by putting together the fragmentsraised from the debris, in order to reconstruct the actual original vase. Inthe work of construction, Freud (1937) saw his project as that of uncovering,by the lifting of repression, an accurate account of what actually happenedin childhood, which he called ‘‘the probable historical truth’’ (p. 261). In amanner analogous to that of the archaeologist who uses pieces of pottery,Freud used shards of memory, associations and symptoms with which topiece together a historical truth; and he believed, at this stage of his work,that it was a real and truthful experience that he had recovered.

When presenting a reconstruction to the patient, it was essential to deter-mine the time at which the experience occurred. This aspect of determininga point in time at which a relevant event took place was also explainedin terms of the archaeological metaphor. It was the idea of levels in anarchaeological dig, and how various levels correspond to different historicalperiods; a clear reference to Freud’s theory of developmental phases andhow they can impinge on one another:

… if an object makes its appearance in some particular level, it often remains to bedecided whether it belongs to that level or whether it was carried down to that levelowing to some subsequent disturbance. It is easy to imagine the correspondingdoubts that arise in the case of analytic constructions.

(Freud, 1937, p. 259)

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A main point in using this metaphoric device was to drive home his the-ory, of which he was convinced at the time, that it was possible to get downto the real objective truth of childhood events in a manner as indisputableas: a piece of pottery is a piece of pottery. The technique he derived fromthis theory was equally, seemingly, straightforward. After the initial stage ofremoving the layers of rubble, that is the lifting of the repression, the piecesof earthenware are revealed and memory is recovered. The next stage is toput together the scattered broken pieces so the whole artefact can be recon-stituted, that is piecing together the patient’s shards of recovered memory soas to present him ⁄ her with a reconstruction of a childhood event. And that,in essence, was what led to the patient’s recovery from symptoms, for ‘‘… ifthe analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him an assured convic-tion of the truth of the construction which achieves the same therapeuticresult as a recaptured memory’’ (Freud, 1937, pp. 265–6).

Myth, fantasy and reconstruction: Other views

Kris (1956), in one of the earlier indications of the problematic nature ofreconstruction, when conceived as a factual reflection of historical truth,pointed to a tension between reconstruction and truth. He highlighted diffi-culties in getting to the truth in reconstruction as patients develop their ownmyths about childhood events. He observed that: ‘‘Individuals use their auto-biographical memories … as a protective screen’’ (p. 653). Kris noticed thatpatients had become attached to their own revised version of their personalhistory, which became an important part of how they viewed themselves, andhe called it ‘a personal myth’ (ibid.). He also maintained that: ‘‘The autobio-graphical self-image has become heir to important early fantasies, which itpreserves’’ (ibid.). In other words, history as told by patients during analysisoften operates as a defence, and functions as an expression of early fantasiesrather than as a straightforward recollection of facts.

The significance of Kris’s writing is not only in revealing cracks inFreud’s use of an archaeological model for reconstruction earlier on, butalso in pointing out that the source of its difficulty is in the inevitable infil-tration of fantasy into any attempt at historical reconstruction.

Melanie Klein’s work on unconscious fantasy resulted in a clear departurefrom Freud’s archaeological construction model (Klein, 1927, 1975). Shefirmly placed the recollection of early life within the domain of internal real-ity, which, by its very nature, is subjective. She argued that links to the pastshould be made, but not at the expense of exploring early internal objectrelations and their attendant fantasies. Klein (1952) believed that: ‘‘Loveand hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences are also operative from thebeginning and are ab initio indivisibly linked with object-relations’’ (p. 53).It therefore followed that: ‘‘We have to go back again and again in analysisto the fluctuations between objects, loved and hated, external and internal,which dominate early infancy’’ (ibid.).

Feldman (2007) provides a recent discussion on the issue of the possiblevalue of links between the present and past history and its implication forthe question of truth. He looks at ‘‘the role of reconstruction in bringing



about psychic change’’ (p. 609). This may be done by way of the analystholding in mind aspects of the patient’s history. But, although ‘‘links withthe past can be enriching, giving the patient a greater sense of integrationand meaningful continuity ...’’ (p. 616), his clear view is that there is no needto investigate the patient’s early childhood extensively, since historicalobjects are available for immediate examination in the live transference,which reveals unconscious early phantasies in relation to early internalobjects. Internally, infantile history is being revised and reconstructed asearly internal object relationships mutate through life, by processes ofprojection and introjection, until they are played out in a contemporaryinteraction between patient and analyst.

On the question of historical truth in reconstruction, Feldman’s focus isfirmly on the legitimacy of the present in providing clues about truths inrelation to the patient’s history. The live exchanges in the here and now andtheir analysis provide the vital evidence as to whether a claim about a per-son in the past is true or false. Therefore it is from the examination of whatis at hand and immediate ‘‘out of which a different [my italics] historical per-spective may emerge’’ (p. 609). That is, the present affects and transformsnotions of the past that hitherto were held as ‘truths’.

In this Feldman concurs with Kris’s (1956) ideas on screen memories andtheir potential for distortion, although his explanation as to why it is thatpatients edit their past stems from a different conceptual framework.

Feldman also believes that the analyst’s own emotional responses in thecountertransference inform the formulation of interpretations, when they arejudged to be the patient’s projections.

An analyst’s heightened alertness to his own affective states in the ‘here andnow’ involves the important work of differentiating the patient’s projectionsfrom his own private emotions. While Feldman does not call it by name, thisprocess of differentiation touches on what others have come to refer to as thedistinction between objectivity and subjectivity in the analytic setting.

The challenge of intersubjectivity

Subjectivity is central to the question of truth in reconstruction. The moreearly fantasies and internal objects play a part in reconstruction the moresusceptible the process of reconstruction becomes to subjectivity and there-fore to un-truth.

Early allusions to the analyst’s difficulty in maintaining objectivity appearin Freud (1912), when he refers to the analyst’s selectivity in focusing onsome aspects of the historical information given to him by the patient, whilenot on others. Approaching the problem of objectivity differently, Bion(1967) famously looked towards avoiding any bias in the analyst’s mind bymaintaining that the analyst should approach each session without memoryof previous ones. But the issue of objectivity versus subjectivity in the workof reconstruction has come into ever sharper focus.

Renik (1996, 1998, 2001, 2004) repeatedly questioned the position ofthe analyst as an objective practitioner, and proposed that neutrality wasimpossible if not detrimental to the psychoanalytic process: ‘‘[The] personal

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influence by the analyst is at the heart of technique’’ (Renik, 1996, p. 495).He was making a case for the analyst’s subjectivity to be acknowledged andconsidered intrinsic to the analytic process, rather than being regarded as anobstacle to it. Since the patient’s subjectivity has never been seriouslyquestioned, it follows that psychoanalysis is ‘intersubjective’.

A number of authors have responded to Renik’s challenge, includingSpillius (2004) whose critique focuses on Renik’s basic premise that truth isrelative to specific circumstances. Her views relate to those of other oppo-nents of Renik’s position such as Cavell (1998) and Blass (2003), who, in turn,scrutinized Renik’s notions of ‘subjectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘truth’, and pointedto what they considered problematic in the way he employed those notions.

Bell (2009), too, criticizes Renik’s view on truth in psychoanalytic practice,which is ‘truth is what works’ (Renik, p. 492, in Bell, 2009, p. 342). Belldescribes this postmodernist stance as belonging to ‘‘a peculiar new ortho-doxy ...’’ (p. 332). He opposes a dogmatically relativist model of truth: ‘‘Thecelebration of multiplicity, pluralism and the abandonment of a conceptionof truthfulness opposes [my italics] some features of psychoanalysis that are,I believe, central to its world-view’’ (p. 334).

At the same time he holds that we are obliged to struggle continually withquestions over truth, and that, in fact, this is part of what it is to be human:‘‘The distinctions between objective and subjective, inner and outer ... andour struggle with these apparent polarities is constitutive of our humanity’’(pp. 344–5).

However, Hanly’s (1990, 1992) investigation of truth in psychoanalyticpractice reaches a different conclusion. Hanly (1990) acknowledges that thedebate over the concept of truth in psychoanalysis is ‘‘a core issue in ourcurrent differences’’ (p. 375). This concurs with Wallerstein (1992), Rangell(1988) and others who see the debate and tensions over truth in contempo-rary psychoanalysis as central to its future development. They also indicatehow they think that the way this debate develops, and the extent to whichit is resolved, would have an impact on the future of psychoanalysis as aunified discipline.

Hanly (1990) advocates that we look at truth from the perspective of thetwo philosophical theories of truth: correspondence and coherence. Accord-ing to the correspondence theory, there can be room only for one truth,while in the latter theory of coherence there could be ‘‘more than one truedescription of the world’’ (Hanly, 1992, p. 2). He offers this distinction as aprinciple by which to evaluate truth in psychoanalysis and holds that theprinciple of correspondence (which regards one truth) is the one that bestfits psychoanalytic theorizing. Hanly appeals for the preservation of truth inpsychoanalysis; that is, truth through correspondence, or the one truth:‘‘Truth is the one value that psychoanalysis is obliged to pursue’’ (p. 216).

Yet Ogden (1999) expands on the subjective uniqueness of the analytic sit-uation, which would preclude the notion of singular objectivity. Accordingto him, intersubjectivity in the analytic relationship is a given, and analystsshould harness it in the service of the clinical endeavour. Referring toWinnicott’s (1960) iconic phrase ‘‘There is no such a thing as an infant ...’’(p. 39, fn. 1), Ogden draws extensive analogies between the interconnected



Winnicottian mother–baby dyad and that of the analytic situation. Ogden’s(1999) concept of ‘‘the analytic third’’ (p. 461) incorporates intersubjectivity.It is in the unique space created between the two subjectivities, that of thepatient and that of the analyst, in which the analytic third resides. Thisconcept, too, shuns claims for one objective truth.

Intersubjectivity is now part of common parlance in contemporary psycho-analysis, and the notion of the possibility for ‘the’ definitive objectivity andtruth in the analytic situation has taken a back seat.

But Gabbard (1997) has attempted a theoretical accommodation withaspects of the intersubjective stance, and argued against a polarization ofviews on whether an analyst is subjective or objective. He offers a synthesisbetween the two opposing positions. On the one hand, objectivity is seminalto psychoanalytic practice by virtue of ‘‘the analyst’s position as an object,external to the thinking mind or subjectivity of the patient ...’’ (p. 15). Onthe other hand, ‘‘What is to be avoided is a conviction in the analyst that aspecific a priori truth is already known at the outset of the treatment ...’’ (p.24). Rather than looking to uncover a specific pre-existing truth, Gabbardbelieves that analysts who possess ‘‘a degree of patience and a measure oftheoretical flexibility will usually find that a unique form of psychoanalytictruth emerges. Meaning is both constructed and discovered’’ (ibid.).

Gabbard’s reference to ‘‘a unique form of psychoanalytic truth’’ (ibid.) issignificant. It indicates a specific and new kind of truth, neither objectivenor subjective, but a truth distinctive to the psychoanalytic situation. And itis this notion of constructing an inimitable, psychoanalytically genuine real-ity that I propose to call ‘authenticity’.

Reconstruction in contemporary psychoanalysis

After Freud the practice of reconstruction has not kept its central place,partly due to the critique which this concept has attracted in relation to itscapacity really to capture historical truth. There followed a marked shift toworking within the ‘here and now’. Polarity and tension developed asbetween the practice of working within the transference (the here andnow – the present) and reconstruction (the past). The decline in the use ofreconstruction as a psychoanalytic tool is closely related to discussions onhow memory can be recovered, which, in turn, is salient to the question oftruth in reconstruction. This was widely written about by Blum (1980, 1999)and others (Grotstein, 1999; Robsbrow, 1993; Schafer, 1997). Schafer’s(1997) review of attitudes to reconstruction particularly highlights the differ-ence of approach as between Klein, her immediate followers and those ofthe contemporary Kleinians.

Thus the discussion over ‘truth’ in reconstruction has moved across con-siderable ground. Gabbard (1997) is one of a number of contemporaryauthors who, in conceding the decline of objectivity in the consulting room,have recognized the impossibility of retrieving a true historical past.

Ogden (1996) and others (e.g. Renik, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004) portray thepatient and therapist as creating a story of the patient’s life, re-mouldingtheir own new ⁄ old vase between them, so to speak, in the context of their

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current and unique relationship. This is a far cry from the depiction of thescientifically oriented analyst, on an assignment to unearth an objective real-ity from the past, and to reconstruct a pre-existing vase – a picture conjuredup in Freud’s (1937) original notion of reconstruction. However, it shouldbe borne in mind that viewing Freud as the scientist chasing after true, pre-existing historical facts is only partially accurate. Towards the end of hiswork, Freud considered the notion of probability as the more suitable con-cept for the question of what degree of truth could realistically be achievedin reconstruction.

Partly in response to the theoretical debates on truth, contemporaryapproaches in psychoanalytic technique have also seen a significant shift ofemphasis on temporality, from talking about the past, to working almostentirely in the present, in the ‘here and now’. As a result of this the use andfunction of ‘reconstruction’ in psychoanalytic technique has been signifi-cantly altered.

In the modern era ‘reconstruction’ has therefore taken on a new meaning.It is set in motion through a present state combining both explicit andimplicit elements. That present moment in the analytic situation triggers theact of recollecting, or rather the act of reassembling fragments of memoryinto a new shape of the past, in the present. Since the past is not now, it istherefore fundamentally bound with the present by the process of negation.That is, we know of the past as such only if we think of it in the context ofthe present, as the not now. In summary, what we call a reconstructionof the past within the modern perspective is a synthesis between shards ofmemory and the organisation of these fragments in the present on the stageof the transference–countertransference relationship. Ogden (1999) states:‘‘The analytic experience occurs on the cusp of the past and the present,and involves a ‘past’ that is being created anew (for both analyst and analy-sand) by means of an experience generated between analyst and analysand...’’ (p. 471).

A clinical example

A male patient in his late 30s, of Scottish background, was suffering fromsevere anxiety associated with the discovery by his wife of his fetishist cross-dressing. His marriage of 15 years came under severe strain when his wifebecame aware of his compulsion to wear women’s leg-wear, and she threa-tened to leave him.

He had felt compelled to put on women’s stockings and shoes since aboutthe age of 11. In parallel to his secretive fetishist activities, which intenselyexcited and frightened him, he led a seemingly ‘normal’ life, and he hadbuilt careful, foolproof protection against discovery. He kept the two partsof his life strictly separate. He had taken all major decisions in his life withhis fetishist compulsion in mind. This too was part of the excitement, fearand sexual charge. A year before he came to treatment he was seen ‘‘dressedas a woman from the knees down’’ by his younger son. It precipitated adeep crisis. In addition to the threat of separation from his wife, hefeared discovery and dismissal by his employers – an academic scientific



institution – with catastrophic consequences to his career. In his turmoil hesought help.

In the initial stages of the four times weekly treatment on the couch, hetalked about his fetishist cross-dressing in great detail, describing himself asa ‘‘gender enhanced man’’. He set out to convince me of the harmlessness ofhis activities, and of their fulfilling functions for him. He elaborated in anidealized manner on the exquisite sensations that being in female garb affor-ded him.

Throughout the first part of the nine year analysis, the patient hardlymentioned his mother. He said only that she had died six years prior tocommencement of the treatment. She had been a warm person, but muchthe passive parent of the two, who deferred to her husband’s authority. Incontrast, father, a retired businessman, was prominent in the material. Hehad been an important influence in the patient’s early life in promoting hiseducation and academic achievements. But father was also portrayed asbeing a cruel person who delighted in deriding and ridiculing people, includ-ing the patient. As a child John would seek to be spared his father’s sadisticverbal onslaughts by aligning himself with father, laughing with him at hiscruel jokes and showing admiration for their wit. Together they meted outverbal humiliations on his siblings.

The wish to dress up in women’s clothes and the fact that initially he hadalways dressed in his mother’s clothes are evidently signs of very early prob-lematic and confused identifications. There are indications of early projectiveidentification processes relating to a persecutory object, appearing in themanifest material as castration anxieties ⁄ wishes relating to father. These arerelated to an unconscious wish to escape into and be contained within themother’s body and be enveloped within her. In turn, these wishes gave riseto more frightening claustrophobic feelings of being engulfed, swallowed upand annihilated by mother, and a resultant wish to escape away from herbody into being ‘a man’ again, ensued. This occurred in a relentless patho-logical cycle of moving in and out of the female faÅade with its concomitantexciting, calming yet threatening states of mind. At the same time, ‘dressingup’ gave an illusion of containment of feelings through the escaping intoand away from female mode, according to his wish.

In the initial stages, I was someone to be avoided and firmly kept at a dis-tance. He was very frightened of me and, while he desperately needed to tellme about the crises in his life, he did this in a compulsive evacuative mannerwithout being able to hear what I had to say.

Although I was with a patient who was asking for help, I could not besure if and when he was being honest, and what it was he was deliberatelykeeping secret from me. I felt an uncomfortable, nagging sense of dubious-ness and mistrust – more so at the beginning – about what he was tellingme. This reflected the patient’s profound anxieties about being in the ses-sions, and his uncertainties as to whether or not I was someone safe for himto be with.

Later on he talked to me of his initial fantasies in relation to the treat-ment: in equal measures he hoped and dreaded that I would take control of

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– like an engulfing mother and a castrating father – a major decision hethought he needed to make about his life.

He said he had at first imagined that I would be bound to see my jobas helping him out of the complicated state of his sexuality in the follow-ing way: he had always nurtured a strong compelling wish to live fully asa woman. And so he thought that the treatment would inevitably lead himto see that the best solution for him would be to actually become awoman.

He had met a friendly man from a North African country, a surgeon whoperformed sex change operations. The man offered to take him into his pri-vate clinic. Thus in the transference I became the terrifying accomplice tothe castrating internal father, while at the same time I would be poised, inhis mind, as a ‘seemingly helpful’ mother. I think he saw me as the motherwho passively went along with the dominating father. She never protested atthe cruelties father meted out and was herself subjected to them. She wasnot present in the material. He deeply suspected that I would not be able tooffer an analytic presence of containment and restraint to the sadistic self-mutilating fantasies associated with the internal father.

Talking about onset

John talked to me twice about the onset of his fetishism. The first time wasat the beginning of treatment and the second time was about 18 monthsinto it.

The first time: his first memory of being interested in women’s shoes goesback to the age of about 11. He was with a school-friend at the friend’shouse. Walking up the staircase, they passed by the friend’s sister’s room,and on the floor he saw a pair of high-heeled shoes. He felt enormouslyintrigued by and attracted to the woman’s shoes. From then on whenever hemet girls he was as much interested in their leg-wear as in the girls them-selves, wishing he had those shoes for himself. He said he was sure it waswhen he was about 11 and not later when it started, and sought to validatethis point of onset by means of recounting other events that took place atthat time.

The second occasion on which John recounted his memory of the onset ofhis symptoms was in a session about 18 months into the treatment. Againhe recalled that he was aged about 11 at the time his fetishist behaviourstarted, but this time the context of this event was entirely different. Thistime the story was that he was at home. He happened to read an article inthe newspaper that lay on the kitchen table about the harmful effects ofhigh-heeled shoes on women’s legs and backs. He immediately felt concernfor his mother, who wore high stiletto shoes. He recalled going to her bed-room to look at her shoes and found himself stepping into them. And,according to him, that was it. In other words it was the event that propelledhim onto his lifelong obsession with fetishism and cross-dressing. He subse-quently tried on his mother’s stockings, and recalled lingering for hours byhis mother’s bedroom cupboard, opening the drawers. He commented onremembering its specific scent at the time of recounting the event to me.



This intimate smell he contrasted with the pervasive smoke odour in thehouse – both his parents were heavy smokers – which he disliked.

The two reported instances of ‘onset’, one at a friend’s house and oneat home, are distinctly different from each other, though they were bothtold with an equal sense of conviction as to their historical ‘truth’. At thetime the patient told me of his second version of onset he was notconsciously aware of his first account. His accounts of onset were spontane-ous, as the patient himself was keen to establish the history of his fetishistbehaviour.

Two questions might be asked here. Firstly, are any of these two versionsof onset a real historical event? Secondly, why did the version change? Whilewe cannot have the definitive answer to the first question, the answer to thesecond question, that is, why did the story change in a space of 18 months,can be found in the framework of the therapeutic relationship in which theseearly memories were recounted. It is suggested that the contemporarycontext of the transference, in each case, affected the patient’s historicalconstruction of the onset of his symptoms.

The contemporary transference context

In the first, early account the patient is at a friend’s house; he is in a corri-dor, and as a passer-by he is looking into a room that belongs to a youngwoman – his friend’s sister – where he sees a pair of high-heeled shoes. Thisinitial encounter with the object that is to become his fetish has a remote,tangential and unintended quality to it. The shoes belong to a hithertounknown person.

The telling of this first meeting took place during the beginning oftreatment when the mother had a marginal presence in the discourse. Thematerial in that initial stage was primarily about the sadistic father. I haveaddressed, in the transference, his dread at facing a denigrating and cuttingfather figure each time he saw me with no mitigating maternal warmth pres-ent. He confirmed this dread by saying that he had believed, when he firstcame to see me, that I would put the matter of his gender identity at thetop of my agenda and that I might convince him to have a sex change so asto sort out what I might consider his sexual ambiguities once and for all.As discussed above, in this way he attributed a degree of omnipotence to meand felt that I had the capacity to say something, even in passing, thatcould change and affect his entire life. This was linked to how he thoughtthat the accidental chance glance at shoes on the floor fixed the course ofhis sexual life. This object, from then on, assumed an omnipotent fetishisticpower over him. Therefore, at that stage, making contact with the analystwas felt to be dangerous and had to be avoided. Any fleeting experience hehad of emotional contact was regarded as tangential and peripheral to hissessions, not part of them, precisely because of its potential impact.

Before the second account of onset the patient had mentioned his motherseveral times and talked about her at some length. He was surprised at hav-ing omitted her from his memory and tearfully experienced some grief andsadness at her loss, for the first time since her death, according to him.

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At this stage the patient was beginning to look somewhat less frightenedwhen he came into the room.

The second instance of historical onset, told about 18 months into thetreatment, is set in a different domestic scene altogether: he is at home, inthe kitchen. He has just glanced at a newspaper on the kitchen table and hiseye catches an article about how stiletto shoes damage backs. He isovercome by anxiety about his mother and immediately goes to check thedamaging object for himself. He is taking himself into the parental bedroomwhere he puts on his mother’s shoes. The experience becomes libidinallycharged as he deals with his anxiety by sexualizing the object of fear.

The shift in the surrounding scenes of the two accounts of onset is impor-tant, as it moves from an external to an internal location. It changes fromhis being in a corridor in someone else’s home, and looking into a room inthe first instance, to him being in a central ⁄ maternal part of his own home– the kitchen – in the second account. In my view, the shift in the scenarioof onset from one story to the next reflects the change of quality in thetransference relationship from the first time of telling to the second. That is,a change from a remote and peripheral contact to one that is less so. Inboth cases the contemporary state of the transference represented an emo-tional platform from which the patient viewed and invited me to reconstructthe past. Put another way: the present shaped and affected the quality ofmemory of a past event, in terms of the details of its surrounding setting,thus altering the historical account.

And so John constructed the past to fit his evolving present. This changealso served as a communication about his relationship with me. At thebeginning he was a frightened ‘outsider’ in my consulting room, and on thesecond occasion he could potentially see himself inside an analytic home, inthe presence of a maternal figure.

It is maintained that a reconstruction of the past, taking place, as it does,within the transference in the present, is affected and reshaped by it. Thecurrent transference relationship influences the reconstructed memory ofthe past. Equally, a reconstruction affects and alters the transference. Thepatient’s experience of the analyst can shift as a result of a given recon-struction. Therefore, it is posited, it would be more helpful to look at areconstruction not from the point of view of whether or not it is ‘true’. Ratherwe could ask whether or not it is authentic, that is, whether it possesses emo-tional genuineness that originates within the unique analytic encounter.

In the case of John, neither version could be the ‘one undisputed truth’since there were two contradictory versions, both reported with equal con-viction of the ‘truth’. We could attempt to investigate which version is themore likely to be factually and historically accurate. Or we could argue asto which one better fits the analyst’s understanding of the larger matrix ofthe patient’s early life and his relationships to his objects. But it is likely wewould reach an impasse. Instead, it could be more useful to allow that bothversions were ‘authentic’ reconstructions, each within its own specificgenuine context in which it was constructed. In this way the source ofinformation necessary for the answer to our enquiry would not be in theanalyst’s theories about the past. Rather the answer would stem from



his ⁄ her understanding of the transference relationship in the present, at thetime of telling, when the evidence is readily available, and with less room fordisputes over origins. Thus, the question of truth in historical accountsbecomes less material in the clinical practice of reconstruction.

Reconstruction: A literary parallel

Spence (1982) drew on narration in literature to highlight the debate overreconstruction in psychoanalysis. He focused on what changes through theact of telling and how it remoulds memory, as language intervenes betweenperception and memory on the one hand and the act of storytelling on theother. The told story, the one with compromises made in the service of a‘narrative fit’, could stand for, and even replace the truth. Significantly, thisalso happens within the process of reconstruction. Spence explicates howlistening to free associations is more active than we might have liked tothink, again because of the wish to articulate and reconstruct a coherentnarrative.

A parallel with literature helps underscore current discussions on truth inreconstruction. Both disciplines have as their main concern the humancondition and the unconscious, and a particular similarity exists betweenreconstruction in psychoanalysis and autobiography in literature. The simi-larity is in what happens to personal history through the act of telling. Thiscan shed light on how, in reconstruction, the past temporality is refractedthrough the prism of the present analytic context.

The author wishes to write his ⁄ her autobiography at a particular contem-porary stage of ‘now’; this is serving a current need in their lives. Thepatient too is with his ⁄ her analyst in a specific ‘present’ moment of theanalytic relationship. And it is within that present context that a past recon-struction occurs.

Both disciplines face the salient question of ‘truth’ regarding what is beingremembered about the past. The debates over truth in psychoanalysis havetheir counterpart in autobiography, thus reflecting a general cultural trend.

A parallel with literature thus offers a form of corroborative externalvalidity through another discipline to the question of truth in psycho-analysis. It points to a common factor which is located in wider culturalphenomena. For example, there is a current view in quantum physics that,depending on what tools are being used to observe a particle, the particlewill behave according to those tools and will be different under a differentapparatus. Put simply, there is no such thing as documenting an ancient vir-gin island. The minute the first scientists arrive to observe that primordialisland, their very presence in it precludes it from any longer being a virginisland.

However, a literary parallel for reconstruction is not without its limita-tions. Being an art form, autobiographical writing, performed at one’s owndesk, is primarily regulated by artistic concerns serving the purpose of a per-sonal wish to tell a story. It does not seek to promote psychic change in theother, in the way psychoanalysis does, in a uniquely intimate way within ananalytic relationship.

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Contemporary autobiographies and historical accuracy: An example

Recent years have seen an increased erosion of boundaries between truthand fiction in autobiographical writings. The range of new styles of depar-tures from truth in autobiographical writing is being conceived at such apace that critics and essayists are struggling to coin terms to describe them.A couple of such newly coined terms, demonstrating how truth and fictionhave almost become indistinct from each other, are ‘confessional fiction’and ‘scripted reality memoir’.

Literary theorists, who grapple with the phenomenon of fictionalizedautobiography, widely refer to it as the integral part of the process of self-discovery. Eakin (1985, 1999) sees it as a vital aspect of the contemporarypreoccupation with the very process of searching for and constructing one’sidentity, and with the lifelong drawn out attempt at making sense of one’slife as it evolves. He emphasizes the fictional aspect of autobiography, whichhe sees as an endeavour of self-discovery and self-making at the same time.He illustrates the interplay between living lives on the one hand and recon-structing lives into stories that notate memories in the form of autobio-graphical writings, thus affecting and moulding lives, on the other. Butreconstruction in literature differs in an essential way from reconstructionwithin psychoanalysis. A literary reconstruction fundamentally lacks theframework of the transference. It does not employ the same understandingof psychic phenomena, the unconscious, and the analytic process that bringsabout psychic change within an analytic relationship. However, this way ofunderstanding modern autobiographical writing does show a general cul-tural convergence of views between literature and psychoanalysis and, morespecifically, between autobiography and reconstruction.

A Million Little Pieces by James Frey (2003) tells the story of a 23 year-old alcohol and drug-dependent young man, and how he copes withtreatment in a rehabilitation centre. It chronicles his life as he enters rehabil-itation and follows him through his six-week treatment, as well as telling thereader his earlier experiences.

A Million Little Pieces has generated criticism for exaggerating the truthand adding fiction to the story in an attempt to attract sympathy. Criticscast doubt on its value as a genuine memoir. It seems that this was a caseof a memoir veering into fiction a little too far, as, for example, Frey allegeshe underwent a complex dental treatment without any anaesthesia. Othersdefended the author by saying that what mattered most was not the factualtruth in his book, but its value as a therapeutic tool for other addicts. Theauthor defends himself by saying that inconsistencies with facts did notsubstantially change the meaning of the story, and that the book remained‘emotionally true’: ‘‘It is a subjective truth, altered by the mind’’ (Frey,2006).

The idea of a ‘subjective truth, altered by the mind’ stands out. It refersto the effects of temporality on reconstruction, albeit in the literary sphere.That is, the mind, at some stage after an event has taken place in a timepast, alters and reshapes that event according to a contemporary context orpresent need, and the outcome is a subjective truth. This intriguing notion



of ‘a truth altered by the mind’ in autobiography is applicable to reconstruc-tion in psychoanalysis.

Ogden, Gabbard and others have argued for a measure of subjectivity thatalters the truth in the contemporary psychoanalytic arena. It can be statedthat this contemporary perspective over truth in reconstruction can betraced to Freud’s work, when, in the course of his own deliberationsover truth in reconstruction, he mused over the idea of ‘probability’ asdistinguishable from truth. It is this, then, that I am proposing to call‘authenticity’.

Conclusion

Freud’s archaeological metaphor, describing reconstruction as puttingtogether unearthed shards of actual memories, is only one side of his delib-erations over truth, which preoccupied him throughout his work. The other,no less significant side of his thinking, was a dynamic dialectics over histori-cal fact and invention, which saw him engage with literature and which heput to use in Moses and Monotheism. Freud’s late work illuminates the twodifferent aspects of his deliberations over historical fact and invention inpsychoanalysis, especially in reconstruction. In recounting this struggle overtruth, towards the end of his life, Freud made use of the term ‘probability’.

Looking at other fields for his models of the mind and for the validationof their concepts, Freud looked at archaeology, but he was also engaged ina dialogue with literature throughout his work. This tension between factand fiction, truth and invention particularly applies to Freud’s deliberationsover truth in reconstruction.

The debate over truth in reconstruction has progressed and broadenedfirst through the works of Melanie Klein with the emphasis on fantasy andthen through others who have brought into the debate the related issues ofobjectivity and subjectivity in the analytic situation.

There seems to have emerged a broad understanding that historical truthcannot be unequivocally known due to the role of unconscious fantasy anddue to it being constructed in a present temporality with its own currentinfluences and perspectives. Recent knowledge about memory informs usthat some aspects of memory can neither be stored nor be recovered in alibrary fashion without the subjectivity of the storing and recovering pro-cesses affecting aspects of the memory content.

It is stated that current enquiries over truth and objectivity in psychoanal-ysis have their rudimentary beginnings in Freud’s musings on the notionof truth in relation to ‘probability’. He postulated that probability was notthe truth and implied he had to settle for a form of approximation of thetruth, which he called ‘probability’. The term ‘authenticity’ helps to circum-vent what seems to have become somewhat of an impasse over the notion ofthe historical versus the improbable truth. The term of ‘authenticity’, setwithin a context of contemporary psychoanalytic thinking on truth, takesinto account post-Freudian developments on truth in reconstruction. Thatis, it refers to reconstruction as a remembering, editing and narrating thepast within the context of the transference. ‘Authenticity’ seeks to describe

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not objective accuracy of historical fact in reconstruction, but a genuinenessof an historical account as faithfully told and accurately nuanced within ananalytic session. An authentic reconstruction is available for immediate scru-tiny as to its trustworthiness and dependability since its validity is anchoredin the analytic relationship itself.

A similar dynamic process exists in arriving at a conclusion that some-thing might be ‘authentic’ and that something might be ‘probable’, aconcept considered by Freud in juxtaposition to ‘truth’. Comparable aspectsof thought process underlie both notions. That process comprises a rationalscanning of likelihoods and a weighing up of possibilities before settlingon a conclusion that something is probable or authentic. While the term‘probability’ suited Freud’s scientific world, it is stated that ‘authenticity’better encompasses modern developments in psychoanalysis. The use of‘authenticity’ takes into account current debates over the likelihood and ⁄ orunlikelihood of truth and precision in recovered memories in reconstructionoccurring in the context of the analytic relationship.

Contemporary developments regarding truth in the field of autobiographymirror those in psychoanalysis. In a way similar to Freud’s method of draw-ing on other fields, and illustrating a general cultural phenomenon, thisparallel too adds substantiating weight to the nature of questioning overtruth in reconstruction currently taking place within psychoanalysis.

… What might have been is an abstraction

Remaining a perpetual possibility

Only in a world of speculation.

What might have been and what has been

Point to one end, which is always present ...

(T.S. Eliot, 1935, Burnt Norton, p. 177)

Translations of summary

Uber Authentizitat: zur Frage der Wahrheit von Konstruktion und Autobiographie. Die Frageder Wahrheit und der Verfizierung hat Freud in seinem gesamten Werk besch�ftigt. Er zog die Arch�olo-gie als Evidenzmodell heran, um seine �berlegungen zur Rekonstruktion zu begr�nden. �berdiesrekurrierte er im Zusammenhang mit der Wahrheit der Rekonstruktion auf die Literatur, wo ihm einSchwanken zwischen historischem Fakt und Erfindung begegnete, das er auch in seinen eigenen Fallges-chichten entdeckte. In seinem sp�teren Werk dachte er �ber die Unmçglichkeit einer wahrheitsgetreuenRekonstruktion nach, indem er Wahrheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit einander gegen�berstellte. Entwicklun-gen �ber die Rolle, die Phantasie und Mythos bei der Rekonstruktion spielen, sowie aktuelle Debatten�ber Objektivit�t haben der Frage nach der ,,Wahrheit’’ in der Psychoanalyse zus�tzliches Gewichtverliehen. Ich vertrete die These, dass ,,Authentizit�t’’ ein Konzept ist, das die Diskussion �ber denWahrheitsgehalt von Rekonstruktionen erleichtert. Der Begriff Authentizit�t bezeichnet das, was an einerRekonstruktion, gemessen an den Beobachtungen in der unmittelbaren Analytiker-Patient-Interaktion,wahrhaftig ist, glaubw�rdig und emotional zutreffend. Da Authentizit�t auf Wahrhaftigkeit verweist,kçnnen ihre Urspr�nge im aktuellen Kontext anhand der Beobachtungen, die der Analytiker �ber denanalytischen Prozess als solchen anstellt, verifiziert werden. Deshalb bezeichnet ,,Authentizit�t’’ keineWahrheitsgewissheit, sondern eine Wahrscheinlichkeit und eine Ann�herung an die historische Wahrheit.So gesehen, besteht ein Zusammenhang mit Freud �berlegungen zur ,,Wahrscheinlichkeit’’. TheoretischeEntwicklungen �ber das autobiographische Schreiben der ,,Wahrheit’’ spiegeln jene �ber den



Wahrheitsgehalt von Rekonstruktionen wider und dienen zugleich als weitere, einer anderen Quelle ent-stammende Best�tigung.

Acerca de la autenticidad: la cuestion de la verdad en la construccion y en la autobiografıa.Freud se interes� en la cuesti�n de la verdad y su verificaci�n a lo largo de su obra: acudi� a laarqueolog�a para obtener un modelo de evidencia que respaldara sus ideas sobre la reconstrucci�n. Tam-bi�n se refiri� a la literatura en lo que concierne a la verdad en la reconstrucci�n, e identific� desplazam-ientos entre hechos hist�ricos e invenciones. Adem�s, detect� este tipo de vaivenes en sus propiashistorias cl�nicas. En su obra tard�a reflexion� acerca de la imposibilidad de alcanzar la verdad a trav�sde la reconstrucci�n mediante la yuxtaposici�n de verdad y probabilidad. Los desarrollos sobre el papelde la fantas�a y del mito en la reconstrucci�n y los debates actuales acerca de la objetividad han destaca-do cada vez m�s la cuesti�n de la ‘verdad’ en psicoan�lisis. Sostengo que la ‘autenticidad’ es un conceptoffltil para profundizar la discusi�n sobre la verdad en la reconstrucci�n. La autenticidad denota los aspec-tos genuinos, confiables y emocionalmente acertados de una reconstrucci�n, tal como se observa en lainmediatez de la interacci�n analista ⁄ paciente. En la medida en que la autenticidad indica veracidad enun contexto contempor�neo, sus or�genes pueden verificarse a trav�s de las observaciones del analistaacerca del proceso anal�tico mismo. Por ello, la autenticidad alude a la plausibilidad y aproximaci�n dela verdad hist�rica antes que a su certeza. En ese respecto, se conecta con las meditaciones de Freudacerca de la ‘probabilidad’. Los desarrollos sobre la escritura de la ‘verdad’ en la autobiograf�a secorresponden con los avances sobre la reconstrucci�n y aportan un respaldo corroborativo originado enotra fuente.

Sur l’authenticite: La question de verite dans la construction et l’autobiographie. Tout au longde son oeuvre, Freud a �t� pr�occup� par la question de v�rit� et sa v�rification. Il s’est tourn� versl’arch�ologie afin de trouver un modle de soutien pour ses id�es sur la reconstruction. Il a aussi faitallusion � la litt�rature quant � la v�rit� dans la reconstruction, o� il a vu des changements entre les faitshistoriques et l’invention, et il a d�tect� de tels balancements dans ses propres anamnses. Vers la fin deson oeuvre, Freud a r�fl�chi � la possibilit� de la v�rit� dans la reconstruction en juxtaposant la v�rit� �la probabilit�. Des d�veloppements du r le de la fantaisie et le mythe dans la reconstruction, et les dis-cussions contemporaines sur l’objectivit� ont de plus en plus accentu� la question de ‘v�rit�’ dans lapsychanalyse. Je soutiendrai l’id�e que ‘l’authenticit�’ est un concept utile pour avancer la discussion dela v�rit� dans la reconstruction. L’authenticit� d�note ce qui est vrai, digne de confiance et �motionnelle-ment juste dans une construction, comme observ� dans l’imm�diatet� de l’interaction analyste ⁄ patient.Comme l’authenticit� signifie sinc�rit�, ses origines peuvent Þtre v�rifi�es dans un contexte contemporain� travers des observations propres de l’analyste du processus analytique en soi. Ainsi, l’authenticit� con-cerne la probabilit� et l’approximation de la v�rit� historique plut t que dans sa certitude. A cet �gard ily a des liens avec les songeries de Freud sur la ‘probabilit�’. Des d�veloppements sur le fait d¢�crire ‘lesv�rit�s’ dans l’autobiographie refltent ceux de la reconstruction, et prÞtent du soutien qui corrobored’une autre source.

Sull’autenticita: La questione della verita nella ricostruzione e autobiografia. Per tutta la sua vitaprofessionale, Freud si interessato alla questione della verit� e della sua verifica, ricorrendo anche all’ar-cheologia come modello per illustrare il suo concetto di ricostruzione. Si inoltre rifatto alla letteratura,in cui trovava, riflesso nei vari passaggi fra fatto storico e invenzione, il concetto di verit� nella ricostruzi-one. Questi passaggi li ritrov� anche nelle narrazioni dei suoi pazienti. Nella sua opera pi� tarda, Freudriflette sull’impossibilit� di raggiungere la verit� nella ricostruzione, concependo l’idea di una narrazionein cui verit� effettiva e verit� probabile si giustappongono. I pi� recenti progressi sul ruolo della fantasiae del mito nella ricostruzione e i dibattiti contemporanei sull’oggettivit� ci portano sempre pi� spesso aconfrontarci con il tema della ‘verit�’ in psicoanalisi. I questo lavoro avanzo l’ipotesi che l’ ‘autenticit�’sia un concetto importante per portare avanti il dibattito sulla questione della verit� nella ricostruzione.Il concetto di ‘autenticit�’, nel contesto attuale, denota un fatto percepito come ‘vero’ dall’analista, grazieall’osservazione di quest’ultimo del processo analitico stesso. Quindi, l’autenticit� implica concetti diprobabilit� e approssimazione della verit� storica, piuttosto che concetti di certezza. In questo senso,questo termine attuale pu� essere ricondotto alle riflessioni freudiane sulla ‘probabilit�’. I dibattiti svilup-patisi a proposito della verit� negli scritti autobiografici, riflettono le pi� recenti idee a proposito dellaricostruzione e costituiscono dunque un’ulteriore fonte di corroborazione del concetto di autenticit�.

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On authenticity: The question of truth in construction and autobiography

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