Omar Ali Abdelmegeid

History 644

The Muslim Brotherhood in historical and periodical perspective

“We want to apply the basics of Shari’a law in a fair way that respects human rights and

personal rights” said Essam el Erian, the deputy head of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) -

the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-, to the Associated Press on December 4th

,

2011. The interview was two days after the recent parliamentary elections in Egypt after the

ousting of former dictator Mohammed Hosni Mubarak. The FJP won a forty percent of votes

during the first rounds of elections. It is odd to her that a political Islamic group such as the

Muslim Brotherhood would say terms like ‘human rights’ and ‘personal rights’. The current

Islamic political situation is very unique in its own nutshell, where the most powerful Salafi

party- Al- Nour party- refused to form an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. The January

25th

uprising, which toppled Hosni Mubarak, opened the door for different political groups and

ideologies to compete for power. The most notable group is the Muslim Brotherhood who is a

major political player since the British colonialism in Egypt. In this following research paper, I

will be analyzing the dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood from their ideology, political activity,

and the government’s view on the Brotherhood. My centralization of my argument is that the

Muslim Brotherhood has been an evolving organization that has changed its approach to the state

to different times and responded to different circumstance. I will also examine the approach of

each government towards the brotherhood politically. The monarchy era is marked with

alliances with the king who was perceived as a devout Muslim, even though he is a British client.

Moreover, the Brotherhood’s Jihadist wing is another important aspect to the Brotherhood in

terms of their resistance to British occupation and state repression. Their ideological leader

Hassan-Al-Banna was the father of this movement in Egypt and who posed a threat to the British

and their client monarchy who was assassinated in 1949. Al- Banna’s writings are important to

explore for the Brotherhood’s ideas and social-religious interoperation within different political

environments. The struggle against the state continued under the leadership of Nasser, even

though he stood for the country’s independence which was not enough for the Brotherhood. The

Nasserite years, under Gamal Abdel- Nasser, was marked with another wave of repression by the

government towards the Brotherhood. Nasser’s Egypt was a secular nationalist state, which

collided with the Islamic ideology of the Brotherhood and most notably Sayyid Qutb. Qutb’s

theory of Al-Jahhalyya is the founding pillar for a more radical approach towards the Nasserite

state. In this period, I will be concentrating on the relation of the Brotherhood with Nasser before

and after the 1952 military coup and the Islamic theory of Qutb for Egypt and anti- Nasserite

sentiments. During Sadat, I will argue that his policies in regard to the Brotherhood and the

international politics back fired on Sadat’s successful attempt to neutralize the Nasserite and

Communists. Sadat differed from Nasser with the treatment of the MB, and allowed them to run

as an opposition party. Thus, the ‘agreement’ between the MB and Sadat triggered two different

splits in the party, the Islamic Jihad Organization and the Islamic Society, which are Salafi in

ideological terms that advocated violence against the regime and ultimately assassinating Anwar

Sadat.

Earlier in history, Egypt was a colony of Britain and an autonomous state of the Ottoman

Empire. The First World War changed the balance of power and alliance of the West and East –

The Ottomans – in relations to the colonies and spheres of influence. As a result of the Sykes-

Picot agreement of 1916, Egypt officially came under the sphere of influence of the British. The

collapse of the Ottoman state and British colonialism paved the way for the birth of Islamic

revivalism and Arab Nationalism – as its counter balance.

The Egyptian revolution of 1919 was against British occupation and for the right for self-

determination under the leadership of the Wafd party. The success of the party did not lead to the

realization of the demands of the masses for independence, but to a constitutional monarchy and

a parliament, and nominal independence, with a large British military base remaining on

Egyptian soil. But the failure to accomplish true independence drove the anti-British parties to

fight for constitutionalism and drove the masses to the streets. Hassan- Al- Banna joined these

demonstrations against the British at the age of thirteen.1

The Muslim Brotherhood was establish in 1928 with the leadership of Imam and

Supreme Guide Hassan Al- Banna in Ismailia in Egypt, as an Islamic rebirth organization to

expand to the Arab and Islamic world and as an opposition to Turkish secular-nationalism of

Kamel Ataturk.2 During the 1920s, there appeared a wave of imitating the model of Turkish

republicanism with examples such as: rewriting Arabic in Latin, eliminating the position of the

Mufti, and substituting Al- Azhar and religious schools with secular oriented schools.3 In 1924,

Ataturk conducted military coups which overthrew the last Ottoman Sultan Abdel Hamid II.4

Four years later after the coup, the Ataturk eliminated the Turkic language with Latin language

and the clergy establishment by eliminating Shari’a law from the old Turkish constitution.

Hassan Al- Banna would preach the importance for Islamic Shari’a and an Islamic caliphate once

again in the Muslim world. Al- Banna writes:

To take this course means to strengthen Arab unity, in the first place; and in the second,

to strengthen Islamic unity. The Islamic world in its entirely will support us through its spirit, its

sensibility, its sympathy, and its endorsement and will see in us brethren whom it will stand

behind as they stand behind it, and whom it will support as they support it. And herein lays a

great moral advantage that no intelligent person will spurn.5

Al- Banna was born in October 1906 in a village called Al- Hamudiah in the governorate

of Al- Bahriah to a father who was a watch-smith and a part time prayers caller.6 Al- Banna’s

upbringing is very important in terms of his interpretation of Islam and education from an early

age. At the age of 8, Al- Banna began to learn the Quran and later joined a religious group for

children in elementary school known as: “Jamey at Ma’a Al- Moharmat.” 7Interestingly enough,

Al- Banna began at the age of thirteen to play a leadership role in his own group – negating the

sins – which sent out letters to people whose actions were deemed as “Un- Islamic.” 8 In

September 1927, Al- Banna was hired as a teacher of the Arabic language in an elementary

school in Ismailia, where the city was segregated into a foreign section and a native section.9

The resident areas of the British were highly Anglo-fied and Westernized where there

were great mansions with full services such as water, electricity, and cleaning services. 10

The

Egyptians were being discriminated against and lived in poor and unsanitary conditions. British

settlements came with the British military and economic interests such as the Suez Canal and the

surrounding military bases to provide protection for the Canal at any given time. For Al- Banna,

the struggle against colonialism and domestic corruption had to work for four goals for

mobilization:

First, the masses must be reconnected with their religion as it is the only way for a better

life. Second, the community must be cleaned up from the perverted and sinful life style. Third,

the ideologies that temp the community into the wrong direction have to be confronted. Fourth,

the importance of establishing a well guided organization to help the community from perversion

and sin is at vital need.11

Al- Banna’s central message is the need for liberation and reconstruction for Egypt and

Dar-al- Islam. The first, liberation of the nation – from British occupation – is vital for the

country’s freedom, independence and sovereignty.12

The second, reconstruction of the nation for

its own progress is a vital step in pursuing social perfection.13

Islam is the only way forward for

Al- Banna’s view of social advancement: “It is our belief that the first way, the way of Islam, its

principles and its fundamental assumptions, is the only way that ought to be followed, and

towards which the present and future nation should be oriented.”14

It is clear from Al- Banna’s

orientation that compromising and settling for anything other than Islam is not the solution. For

example, the fifth conference of the Muslim brotherhood in 1939 concluded: “Islam is a

complete political, economic, social system with the Quran and the Prophet’s Hadith as its basis.

Finally, Islam is compatible with anytime and place.”15

Banna’s first recruits were from the working class, like Hafez Abdel Hamid who was a

carpenter; Foua’d who worked at a laundry, Abdel Rahman who was a driver, Zakria Al-

Magarbi who was a bicycle repairman.16

The name of the organization came from Banna’s

slogan: “We are brothers in the service for Islam; hence, we are the Muslim Brotherhood. In late

1932, Banna moved to Cairo to resume his paid job as a teacher and began to expand the

brotherhood grass roots influence. Banna’s organizing included the establishment of classes and

seminars on Tuesdays, the publication of al Najzia, the organization of popular committees in

rural areas, finally, the mobilization for the case of Palestine and an Islamic doctrine.17

The

organization began to discipline members memorizing the Quran, Suna, Hadith, and working in

charities and later becoming more involved in community outreach.18

Membership growth went

from 40 students in 1932 to 300 students in 1935.19

Farouk assumed power after the death of his father Foua’d in May of the year 1936.

Farouk was a client of the British like his father.20

But the Brotherhood had seen Farouk as a

prominent figure and an ally due to his religious upbringing by Sheikh Al- Marzi, who described

the king as the Imam who would impose Shari’a doctrine.21

The political alliance between the

Brotherhood and the palace were for the following reasons: the elimination of communists,

reduction of Al- Wafd’s political influence, and legitimization of the monarch’s rule. The new

alliance resulted in political clashes between the Wafd party and the Brotherhood over internal

politics and secular law. El Nahas Pasha - Chairman of the Wafd and later Prime Minister –

stated: “The opportunism of religion in politics is not the solution for civil rule.”22

Banna’s

response was: “Islam is a religion, state, Quran, and the sword and one is not useful without the

other.”23

In other words, Islam is the cure for all the internal problems of Egypt.

The Wafd party was a petty- bourgeois party with members even from the upper-class

autocracy and their politics did not represent the masses of the Egyptian people. The Anglo-

Egyptian treaty of 1936, which Nahas signed was the main schism between the two parties, with

the Brotherhood full opposing it.24

The treaty gave Britain permanent military rights during a

threat of war or direct war, which was viewed as a continuation of colonialism by the

Brotherhood and the vast majority of Egyptians. As a result of the treaty, the British tightened

their grip over Egypt during the Second World War. The British installed Nahas Pasha as Prime

minister after surrounding the monarch’s palace to commit to an alliance against Nazi

Germany.25

During this war, Banna became a strong political oppositional figure in Egyptian

politics who was received as a threat to both the British and the monarchy. British forces

arrested Banna and other leaders during an anti- British rally in October 1941.26

The Nahas

cabinet banned the Brotherhood’s newspapers and magazines in an effort to prevent an uprising

against the British.27

Brotherhood politics were influential to the point of shifting public opinion

against Egypt’s entrance into the Second World War.28

In retaliation, the British arrested seven

prominent Brotherhood members under the accusation of aiding the German Commander

Rommel during Al- Alamen battle.29

The hostility towards the British was just a reaction towards Western civilization and

colonialism. The West, for Banna, is a failing society and civilization whose foundations will fall

apart from its own vices, like its political dictatorships and economic crises.30

Their treaties and

representative democracy are a failure, along with the League of Nations which has no influence

over unjust policies toward the oppressed.31

The West is blinded with materialism as he states:

“All of humanity is tormented, wretched, worried, and confused having been scorched by the

fires of greed and materialism. They are in dire need of some sweet portion of the waters of True

Islam to wash from them the filth of misery and lead them to happiness.”32

The British attempted

in the 1930s to bribe Al- Banna and his Brotherhood with more than 10,000 British pounds, but

Banna refused with a statement: “The hand that wants cannot take. And the hand that takes

doesn’t fight back. We are Mujahidin with our own money; not with other people’s money, only

true to ourselves and not others.”33

Hence, Banna was aware that the money was going to buy off

the Brotherhood to support British interests.

The Brotherhood was always sidelined during the electoral politics. During the elections

of 1942, Al- Banna was not able to run for electoral politics for the House of Representatives

after British- Nahas threats of his party’s liquidation, even though it was Banna’s constitutional

right to pursue a representative’s seat.34

Despite not running in the elections, Banna was able to

convince the government to allow the Brotherhood to organize from a grass roots level, to make

Islamic holidays as official holidays, and for Arabic to become the official language in all

foreign owned businesses and companies.35

Imposing Shari’a law is the founding pillar for

Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood through reform, electoral politics, and other legislative means. His

argument was that public Islamic institutions are the perfection in respect to the individual, the

family, and the nation. Therefore, Islamic institutions, for Banna, benefit every aspect of their

material and spiritual lives.36

In his message to the monarch, Banna says: “A reform of the law,

so that it will conform to Islamic legislation in every branch.”37

In short, constitutionalist law

was invalid due to its secular nature that differed from Islamic values and traditions.

In 1943, the Brotherhood began social programs in the rural areas of Cairo and

surrounding towns that included providing electricity, solving personal issues, and free public

health.38

Banna believed that public health and other social services were needed to advance

Egyptian society and aiding the needy was essential as a duty for every Muslim. He states: “All

of this – public services – testifies to Islam’s deep concern for the health of the umma at large, to

the strenuous efforts it made in order to safeguard it, and to its receptivity to anything that might

conduce to its welfare and happiness in this important respect.”39

In 1945, The Muslim

Brotherhood’s young membership was more than 4,500 and its popular base was more than 1500

membership committees.40

The brotherhood’s recruitment base was not limited to the student

and young population, but also extended into the villages and industries. The Brotherhood

provided more than 250,000 jobs to unemployed in small industrial projects and small

workshops.41

The mass employment showed the significance of the Brotherhood in terms of

mobilization and recruitment. Their aim was to experiment “Islamic economy’ to its fullest

capacity.42

Therefore, an Islamic economy would change the masses aspirations for wealth and

materialism and Zakat and other religious duties would be fulfilled.

Jihad was an important pillar for establishing an Islamic state and society. Young

Brotherhood members participated in the 1936-1939 Palestinian revolt against the Zionist project

where they received their first military training and organizing.43

In 1940, Hassan Al- Banna and

five high ranking Brotherhood members agreed upon the establishment of the “Secret

Apparatus” or “Special Organization” with the ideological basis of Islamic Jihad.44

The Secret

Apparatus provided a training program on the study of the Quran and Hadith with regard to Jihad

along with weaponry training, coded language, and toleration to torture and punishment.45

With

this new formation, Banna said that: “The Muslim Brotherhood will use power and when they

use this power will be honest and sincere first, and then waiting and then they get the dignity and

pride, and bear all the consequences of this position with all satisfaction and relief.”46

Banna’s

discourse is virtually exposed on the issue of Jihad in terms of establishing an Islamic state

through an Islamic army that gives martyrdom to its officers and follows its Islamic doctrine and

duties47

. In late 1946, the Special Organization conducted resistance actions by planting bombs

in British institutions and British personal.48

The police cracked down on members and

supporters of the Brotherhood.

Repression was not only triggered by the actions of the Special Organization but with the

vast discontent with British occupation in Egypt. Throughout Cairo, young students took the

streets to demand an end to British occupation and resulted in violent clashes, leading to the

resignation of Prime Minister Naqahursi after public pressure.49

To add insult, the new Primer

Al- Sedqi signed another treaty with the British in regarding free passage for residence for

British military.50

The power of mobilization of the Brotherhood appeared in August 29, 1947

with a call for a general strike to boycott all British goods and services in Egypt.51

The critical

mass and militant actions of the Brotherhood resulted in two things; the liquidation of the party

and the assassination of Hassan- Al- Banna.

In January 1952, a series of confrontations and conflicts between the British army, the

Egyptian police, the Palace and Al- Wafd, a few dozen riots caused chaos and anarchy in Cairo.

The same issues of social- economic and independence had yet not been resolved.52

On July 23,

1952, a group known as “The free officers movement,” conducted a military coup d’état against

the British-installed monarchy. Their revolution stood for nationalism, economic development,

republicanism, and Pan- Arabism. Gamal Abdel Nasser would become the figure and the leader

for Pan- Arabism. The Brotherhood had been operating underground since the assassination of

Al- Banna and the seizing up of their economic trade and influence by the government in 1949.

Since then, the Brotherhood strengthened their military and police network through the remains

of the Special Organization and through religious seminars preached by their cleric Abdul

Rahman Al- Sandi.53

Nasser came in first contact with the Brotherhood’s military network

through Abdel Munim Abdel Raouf in 1949. In early 1950, Nasser began to split away from the

brotherhood’s Islamic discipline by forming the “free officers.”54

Despite factionalism, Nasser

held an emergency meeting with the Supreme Guide – Hassan al- Hudaybi – to consult over the

coup and the role for the Brotherhood. Al- Hudaybi agreed to support Nasser and his free

officers under two conditions; the first the officers are obligated to follow all Islamic doctrine

and impose them. Second, the Brotherhood members are allowed to hold key offices in different

ministers. Two days before the coup, agreement was reached over the two conditions.55

On July 23rd

, members of the Brotherhood did their tasks of securing government

buildings and mobilizing people on the streets to support the coup.56

Cracks within the Nasser

and Brotherhood alliance were seen immediately after ousting King Farouk. The Brotherhood’s

military and police networks were more dominant than Nasser’s base and popularity. The first

schism between Nasser and the Brotherhood was over land reform. Nasser proposed no more

than 100 acres as private property and the distribution of five acres to every landless peasant to

prevent any foreign investments entering into the country.57

The Brotherhood viewed this as an

action over the right to private property according to religious doctrine; their proposal was 500

acres as private property.58

Deputy Chairman of the Brotherhood Omar Al Tilmisani refused the

idea of participating in the regime and boycotting it altogether, after Nasser’s exploitation of the

Brotherhood’s mass base and networks during the coup.59

In later 1952, the following statement

was published by the Brotherhood: “The Muslim Brotherhood has the right and the right of the

people should have had the right to stand against Nasser from the beginning, and the Egyptian

people shouldn’t have accepted the revolution. We bare responsibility for we spread the

message.”60

The Revolutionary Command Council declared that all political parties were void

and abolished, which included the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Communist Party, and Al-

Wafd.61

The abolishment of political parties meant that politics were consolidated into one

channel through the government revolutionary council and Gamal Abdel Nasser.

On 26th

October 1954, an unknown gunman tried to assassinate Abdel Nasser during his

speech in Mansheya Square, Alexandria.62

The assassination attempt was used a pretext to

conduct a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.63

On the same night, the government

organized tribunals with the name “Public Trials” for the brotherhood.64

More than 6000

members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested, including Said Qutb.65

Said Qutb

represented a more radical wing within the incarcerated brotherhood members. Like many of his

brothers, he had supported the political vision of Nasser.66

His sentence was life with hard labor,

but received a pardon after Iraqi President Salam Arif pleaded on his behalf.67

Nasser’s objective

was simple: to dismantle the brotherhood in two steps: to divide the leadership of the

Brotherhood and to undermine the political competition.68

The imprisonment of young members

and house arrest for the leadership created a new political vacuum within the leadership and the

general body of the organization.69

Said Qutb filled that political vacuum through his

radicalization in prison and ideological gap within the leadership.70

There was no doubt, after

his imprisonment and torture, that he viewed Nasser and his state as UN –Islamic. In 1957,

prison guards in Turra, where Qutb was imprisoned, killed more than 23 Brotherhood members

and another 46 were wounded in reaction to the prisoners refusing to leave the prison to break

rock in the nearby mountain.71

In the period of 1957- 1958 was a time frame of change within the brotherhood

leadership where the political vacuum was substituted with political revivalism.72

There were

three factors that contributed to this change. First, the prisoners were able to communicate and

exchange ideas; second, networks of communications were set up with the prisoners and the

leadership on the outside; third, Nasser’s grip began to relax on the organization and pardoned

several members and gave lesser sentences to others.73

Qutb was among the few who were

released on health concerns and resided in the prison hospital. His space was used to discuss and

exchange ideas with other prisoners during their visitation for their own treatment.74

The two

most notable ideas were Takfir (infidelity) and Jahilyyia (ignorance) in his most conservational

book: Signposts along the Road. The leadership of the brotherhood was well aware of his

writings and its content. Qutb’s perspective was formed with disillusion from the Nasserite

secular state during his imprisonment and torture. Signpost along the Road became the center

piece for attracting young Brotherhood members who avoided the mass incarceration of

1954.75

Qutb did not analyze society from its political, economic, social conditions to evaluate

social illnesses, but from the stand point of morality and social well-being. His views on

secularism, whether towards liberal capitalism democracy or Marxist communism, were not the

suitable methods to govern society through the discourse of material wealth dictatorial

systems.76

Western civilization, being secular, is deemed in decline not because of lack of wealth

or military power, but the lack of values within the leadership to guide the people.77

Qutb’s vision of a new society is the purist form of Islam, the strictest interpretation of

religion. The Muslim community is the guide for all of humanity to follow towards the ‘right

path.”78

At the same time, the Islamic society is not fit to lead the world for it has no evidence -

currently- to make the world bow down before it.79

For Qutb, only through collective action to

take leadership is the way to ‘revive’ the Islamic community back to its rightful spot in history.80

The concept of Al- Jahilyyia appears in the language of Qutb. Ignorance is a result of

extraordinary success from material wealth which opposes the rule and authority of Allah.81

This ignorance is seen from the actions of man, like colonialism, collectivism, and oppression of

the self and individual.82

Islam is the only way forward for humanity, as Qutb describes: “Sooner

or later, this revival will succeed in assuming the leadership of humanity.”83

Qutb characterizes

the role of the vanguard as ‘committed to its nature, and its essential tasks.84

The Quran as the

pillar for guidance as it’s not a book for enjoyment, literature, or history; rather it is a way of

life.85

In short, Qutb viewed the Nasserite state as an illegitimate state with a leadership of

Jahilyyia concept. In Qutb’s theory, Nasser’s collectivist state was seen unfit to lead society due

to its secularist nature and its economic orientation. Moreover, Nasser’s deals with the Soviet

Union were seen as unholy by the radical Islamists – or Qutbists.

The first faction from the Brotherhood occurred during the years 1957-1958 known later

as “Nizam 1965” or ‘Organization 1965” outside of prison walls by recently released

Brotherhood members who ended their short prison sentences.86

The purpose of the organization

was to regroup brotherhood members to struggle against al- Jahilyyia of Nasserite state.87

The

organization’s recruitment required the memorization of Banna’s letters and messages,

understanding the four Mathaib, and Quran and Shari’a.88

The brotherhood took a passive

position towards the regime after the Turra massacre with demobilization and extreme caution.89

The radical shift from the brotherhood is seen within the Nizam’s 1965 program which

designated Signpost along the road as a mandatory reading and the adoption of its program’s

orientation. Members were disciplined to create consciousness, to politicize the people with their

orientation to establish an Islamic state. More importantly, an Islamic state must be established

through the grass roots elements and not through a coup and the protection of the organization

with the presence of an armed militia from the state apparatus.”90

The main objection of Qutb

towards Nasser was Nasser’s conduct in regard to the amount of repression and use of violence

in order to bring reform and change.91

Qutb claims: “To emerge from Jahilyyia as the

distinguished and unique first generation did, then, it is best that we be alert at all times to the

nature of our path and the road we must follow.”92

Revivalism of Islam is to critically look at the

first generation of Muslims and be aware of the social surroundings.

The new organization disappointed the leadership of the Brotherhood, namely Hassan al

– Hudaybi who stated “Signposts along the Road disappointed me in Said Qutb, may God

preserve him, and Qutb has lost his path for preaching and the straight path.”93

Qutb’s

organization was detected in 1965, which resulted in a second wave of repression of the Muslim

Brotherhood. Qutb was hanged in August of 1966.94

Nizam 1965 was charged with conspiracy to

assassinate the president and to overthrow the government through violent means. The members

who received the death penalty were viewed as heroes, which signify the growth of

communalism within the rank and file of imprisoned brotherhood members.95

The execution of

Said Qutb changed the course of the brotherhood’s ideological activism and conciliation with the

Nasserite regime was seen as illegitimate, namely the Qutbists.96

Repression was the main tool for demobilization of the Brotherhood that the regime

conducted on a daily basis through the intelligence community, police force, and the military.

Political activism of opposition disappeared between 1954 and 1967.97

Nasser’s populist

government gave social democratic reforms for better living standards with the expansion of the

public sector, subsidized foods, price control, and low income housing.98

Universal education

was the strongest mechanism for demobilization for the regime with the promise of a

governmental job.99

In 1954, the government lowered university fees, expanded access to

scholarships, and the education budget was made as a priority.100

In the mid – 1950s, all Egyptian

universities were put under state control and with the banning of independent student unions the

only channel was through the government sponsored youth party.101

The government also

monitored the university staff, faculty, and students.102

New courses like “Arab Society,” and

“The July 23rd

Revolution” were introduced into the university’s educational system and were

required for every student to attend.103

The most significant student group that was backed by the

government was the “Socialist Youth Organization” which was set up in 1965 to counter balance

the newly discovered Muslim Brotherhood underground cell on university campuses.104

The most independent voice for Islamic preaching and teachings was Al- Azhar. The

Nasserite regime began to consolidate its voice through favorable appointments of the Grand

Mufti and other religious officials and figures.105

Nasser’s rhetoric combined “Socialism”

and”Islamic” contexts while addressing the people. The political loyalty of the educated youth

was crumbling away after the regime’s military defeat by Israel in 1967 and the appearance of

weakness.106

After the Six-Day War defeat, the young educated politicized graduates were being

disenfranchised with the regime and signs of “political withdrawal” occurred. The defeat

triggered new waves of uprisings, demonstrations, sit- INS, and massive student

mobilizations.107

In February 1968, industrial workers in Helwan protested against the regime’s

light sentence towards the military generals.108

University Students from Cairo and Alexandria

marched outside their campuses inspired with their industrial workers for the first time since

1954.109

The regime realized that it was on trial and the anger was geared towards them. As a

result, the government began to reduce the authority of the University Guards; approved new

student newspapers; and allowed a more flexible legal framework for more student activity such

as protests, marches, etc.110

hence, education was important in demobilizing political activity

from all sectors within society and countered an attempt by the Islamists to retake their political

platform.

On 28th

September 1970, the ideals of Nasserism and Pan- Arabism suffered a setback

with the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Anwar Sadat took his place as President and achieved the

1973 victory over Israel. The reign of Sadat differed from that of Nasser in terms of global

alliances and internal policies. In may 15th

, 1971marked a new revolution in the Egyptian politics

with two shifts in internal politics. The first was the crackdown on the pro- Nasserite factions

within the government after Nasser’s Death.111

The second was the reliance on liberal policies in

terms of political representation and the economic distribution Mubarak which were a result

from the state- run experiment of Nasserism and the 1967 defeat.112

The political slogans began

to change from “Unity and Socialism” to “Islam is the solution.” The first meetings between

Sadat and the Brotherhood was in the beginning of 1971 with members who were in exile in

Saudi Arabia and discussed the problems they both faced like the strength of the communists and

Nasser’s legacy of demonization of the Brotherhood.113

In late1973, the government and the

Brotherhood leadership – Omar Al- Tilmisani- agreed upon a release date and the refusal of the

Brotherhood to oppose the government in political matters.114

The deal was composed with six

points – 3 for each- for both the government and the Brotherhood. The government agreed upon

releasing all Brotherhood members and terminating their court cases, allowing them to operate in

their economic and social strongholds and not to interfere with their Islamic preaching in public

places.115

The brotherhood agreed upon renouncing violence, non -resist towards the government

policies, and no more picking up arms towards the state.116

The last number of releases of

members was in March 22, 1975.117

The schism between the brotherhood and the state has been

gone in terms of repression and torture. The evolution was on a mutual agreement to weaken

leftist opposition parties and move away from Nasser’s legacy.

The Brotherhood took advantage of the protection of the state to increase its membership

and recruitment with no intention to overthrow the government.118

The Brotherhood formed

alliance with the Egyptian petty bourgeoisie to spread the discourse of ‘peaceful’ change and the

elimination of group that sought change through violent means.119

The Brotherhood regained its

strength with the backing of members who fled the country during Nasser’s era to the Arab Gulf

states where they accumulated a large amount of wealth.120

In 1973, Hassan – al Hudaybi

traveled for Hajj and attended the international conference for the Muslim Brotherhood with

delegates from Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.121

The conference was not only to get funds

from these wealthy members but to give birth to Banna’s vision of ‘Islamic Internationalism’ and

the spread of the Islamic message.122

In 1977, the brotherhood and Islamists students took over students unions in eight

universities across the country.123

On university campus Islamists groups organized Islamic

orientated student movements in the early 1970s with the support of the government to counter

balance the communists and Nasserites student unions around the country.124

The government

and these new cells collaborated together to attack leftists and Nasserites on college campuses

and sometimes even Christian Copts with lead pipes and organized mobs.125

The intelligence

community began to realize the threat that it created with the aiding of these groups who in

reality began to clash with the state.126

The political alliance between the Brotherhood and the

state began to dissolve after the creation of split factions within the Brotherhood.127

Ayman Al-

Zawahiri is the most notable Islamist who shifted away from the Muslim Brotherhood in the late

1960s/early 1970s. Al- Zawahiri justification to move away with his statement: “I look at the

history of the Islamist movement over the past few decades and see how the Muslim

Brotherhood fell into the trap of conversation and dialogue with the government with their first

leader Hassan Al- Banna and leaders after him.”128

The Jihadist movements were distanced

themselves from the Brotherhood for their weakness for conversation and collaboration with the

regime.

The Brotherhood also abandoned the ‘takfr’ with the recognition of liberal democracy of

the Sadat state which is seen by Qutbists, Jihadist, and others as the most un Islamic way and

opposition to Shari’a law.129

Hence, Salafism became inevitable reality in Egypt after the rise of

the Islamic Jihad Organization in late 1977 in cities of Upper Egypt like Al- Minyya and

Assyut.130

The idea of “an obligation of absence’ became the central idea for militant Islamists

that obligated them to wage Jihad on the state that characterized with infidelity.131

Only through

the power of violence can Islamic revivalism be reborn which the heart of the argument of the

obligation.132

The obligation viewed the laws of the states as Kafr since it was in competition

with Shari’a law.133

The jihad organizations opposed the Brotherhood’s policy of dialogue with

the government as their obligation ‘commanded them’ under the pretext: “reform is not the way

to bring about an Islamic state nor is taking political seat will bring about change.”134

In 1977, Egypt experienced three major events each of which had very powerful political

effects. The first was the massive demonstrations against the government’s decision to eliminate

food subsidies which were blamed on communists.135

The second was a Jihadist group known al-

Takfir wal Higra kidnapped a former religious minister of endowments in exchange for their

members who were sent to prison that left the cleric dead and several others injured.136

The third

happened in November after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.137

The social- economic factor drove a

lot of people into poverty with the elimination of subsidized goods which created a lot of

tensions within Egyptian society. The rise of Islamist groups through violent actions began in

early 1977 with different splinter groups from the Brotherhood and young brotherhood members

released from prisoner who were radicalized from Qutb’s ideas. The international scene did not

help Sadat’s credibility within the Islamist movement.

The Camp David accords were viewed as aiding the enemy of Islam (Israel) and the

brotherhood did not support them either.138

The Iranian Islamic revolution was an inspiration for

these militant groups to seize power.139

Salafism viewed as an example and model to take over

the country through grass roots, violence, and political rhetoric.”140

The ousted Shah of Iranian

visit to Egypt made Sadat look like client for the United States along with the Camp David

accords.141

Sadat’s policies internally and externally along with mixed reactionary Islamic

radicalism caused the Islamic Jihad Organization to assassinate Sadat. Aboud Al- Zumor was

one of the most famous and main conspirators who assassinated President Sadat along with his

brother Tariq and Khaled Al- Islambouli who was the main assassin of Sadat during the military

parade. All three were part of the Islamic Jihad Organization who viewed the world through the

‘Obligation of Absence’ and Sadat’s compliance with the west.142

In an interview (1993) he was

asked about his plans of the attempted coup after the assassination of Sadat. His response was:

“The plan was to spread the work of Allah through the course of facilitating the assassination

plot and to prepare young people for the retaliation of the state after the plot.143

For Zumor, the

IJO was prepared for war with the government such preparation were weapon training, security,

and medical treatment facilities.144

Zumor admitted that an Islamic state was not possible during

that period due to the lack of experience of the young members and the chaos that would result

from it if it happens.145

In his interview, Zumor admitted to have ‘ regard’ plotting the

assassination of President Answer Sadat and claimed that to de-radicalize the youth from such

‘mistakes’ that he committed was good parental guidance, better educational systems, and

through mass Dawa.146

The realization of Zumor and other leaders from the violent groups

viewed violence as the means that did not achieve the end – an Islamic state. The government

continued to crackdown on all Islamists parties under Hosni Mubarak. The region of Mubarak

with the discourse of secularism verse Islamism with the full support of the government by the

west was pit of politics for the past 3 decades. Mubarak’s Egypt repression towards the Islamist

parties and underground cells created an atmosphere of violence from both sides of the conflict.

In Conclusion, the Mubarak government used the Brotherhood in order to receive

military aid from the United States as well as political and international support. Mubarak’s

regime continued the line of repression of the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist organization that was produced its own time and

evaluated through the years. Hassan- Al- Banna changed the interpretation of politics in Islam

for good, his mentality was a product of his time, and his ideals still remained the same until

today for the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s usage of violence ended during the Nasserite

years after the level of repression, torture, and imprisonment of its membership and leadership.

Nasser’s repression created new radical wing of Said Qutb and the theory of Jahilyyia. Sadat

used the Brotherhood as leverage to neutralize the Nasserite and the communists. Moreover, his

international politics triggered the Salafi movement to take action against him and his state.

Islamist politics in Egypt will continue especially without the Mubarak.

1 Nada, Subhi Hassan, The Muslim Brotherhood: (Tanta, House of Culture and Knowledge Publication, 2005).13

2 Mubarak, Hisham, The Terrorist are Coming: A Comparative Study between the Muslim Brotherhood and the

other Islamist Organizations from 1928 until 1994. (Cairo, The Markaza Publication House, 1995). 32

3 Ali, Abdel Rahim, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Revivalism Problem (Cairo, The Markaz Publication

House.2004). 2

4 Mubarak, 32

5 Al- Banna, Hassan. Towards the Light. Ed. Roxanne L. Euben.(New Jersey; Princeton University Press,2009. 57

6 Nada, 12

7 Nada, 12

8 Nada, 12

9 Nada, 14

10 Nada, 14

11 Nada, 18

12 Banna, 57

13 Banna, 57

14 Banna, 57

15 Nada, 27

16 Ali, 25

17 Ali, 25

18 Ali, 26

19 Ali, 26

20 Nada, 28

21 Ali, 28

22 Ali, 27

23 Ali, 28

24 Nada, 28

25 Nada, 31

26 Nada, 32

27 Nada, 33

28 Nada, 33

29 Nada, 34

30 Banna, 59

31 Banna, 59

32 Banna, 59

33 Nada, 21

34 Nada, 39

35 Nada, 40

36 Banna, 63

37 Banna, 74

38 Ali, 29

39 Banna, 65

40 Ali, 29

41

Nada, 48 42

Nada, 48 43

Nada, 36 44

Nada, 37 45

Nada, 37 46

Mubarak, 32 47

Banna, 63 48

Nada, 54 49

Nada, 54 50

Nada, 55 51

Ali, 28 52

Ali, 30 53

Nada, 134 54

Nada, 134 55

Nada, 137 56

Nada, 138 57

Nada, 142 58

Nada, 143 59

Nada, 143 60

Nada, 145 61

Nada, 148 62

Nada, 152 63 Barbara Zollner, “ Prison Talk : The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser’s

Persecution, 1954- 1970,” International Journal Middle East Studies (2007), 414

64 Ali, 58

65 Mubarak, 47

66 Zollner, 414

67 Mubarak, 47

68 Zollner, 414

69 Zollner, 414

70 Zollner, 415

71 Mubarak, 47

72 Mubarak, 47

73 Zollner, 416

74 Zollner, 416

75 Mubarak, 48

76 Qutb

77 Qutb 136

78 Qutb 136

79 Qutb 138

80 Qutb 138

81 Qutb 138

82 Qutb 139

83 Qutb 139

84 Qutb 139

85 Qutb 141

86 Zollner, 418

87 Mubarak, 64

88 Mubarak, 65

89 Mubarak, 66

90

Mubarak, 71 91

Zollner, 419 92

Qutb 144 93

Mubarak, 72 94

Zollner, 419 95

Zollner, 419 96

Zollner, 420 97

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. Mobilizing Islam, Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt. (New York;

Columbia University Press, 2003). 23 98

Wickham, 24. 99

Wickham,24 100

Wickham, 25 101

Wickham, 29 102

Wickham, 29 103

Wickham,30 104

Wickham, 31 105

Wickham, 31 106

Wickham, 31 107

Wickham,32 108

Wickham,32 109

Wickham,32 110

Wickham, 33 111

Mubarak, 111 112

Mubarak, 111 113

Mubarak, 113 114

Mubarak, 113 115

Mubarak, 114 116

Mubarak, 115 117

Mubarak, 115 118

Mubarak, 116 119

Mubarak, 117 120

Mubarak, 120 121

Mubarak, 121 122

Mubarak, 72 123

Ali,72 124

Mubarak, 158 125

Mubarak, 158 126

Mubarak, 159 127

Ali, 73 128

Mubarak, 75 129

Ali, 75 130

Al Wardani, Salih. The Islamist Movement in Egypt : A view from the reality of the seventies. 166 131

Al Wardani, 168 132

Al Wardani, 168 133

Al Wardani, 168 134

Al Wardani, 169 135

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, “Egypt’s Islamic Militants,” Middle East International Reports, 103, (Feb, 1982). 5 136

Ibrahim,5 137

Ibrahim,5 138

Ali,78 139

Al Wardani,200 140

Mubarak,161

141

Mubarak,161 142

Zumor , 30 143

Zumor , 60 144

Zumor , 62 145

Zumor , 100 146

Zumor , 235