Olgiati G., The Genoese Colonies in Front of the Turkish Advance (1453-1475)

8/3/2019 Olgiati G., The Genoese Colonies in Front of the Turkish Advance (1453-1475)

1/9

THE GENOESE COLONIES IN FRONT OF THETURKISH ADV ANCE (1453-1475)

Giustina OLGIATI*

The situation of the Gerioese colonies in the East after the faof Constantinople is efficaciously reflected in two letters sent toGenoa, a few months distant the one from the other, from Pera andfrom Chios. In the first letter, written on the 23 rd of June 1453, theex-podesta of Pera, Angelo Giovanni Lomellino, related the tragicevents of the conquest of the Greek Capital city and the surrenderof the Genoese colo~y: the escape of the Christians ships, the sack,the demolition of all fortifications. That meant the order for Chiosto pay a tribute, and the possibility of Kaffa and tha other lands of

the Black Sea of being asked to pay some tributes too; that exortedthe government of Genoa and the Christians to intervene; it reveal-ed the wish of Mehmed to reach and to conquest Rome within twoyears(l).

On the 27 th of September 1453 , from Chios, Franco Giustini-ani, who should have succeeded Lomellino as the Podesta of Pera,.sentto sent to Genoa other details about the dramatic situation ofLatin peoples in the East. Pera was imposed a Turkish goverment,taxes from Chios and from the colonies were demanded in theBlack Sea, and the promises the Sultan had made were not reliable.it particular gave prominence to the fears of the habitants inspiredby the Eastern colonies, and the ir dubts about the future, especi-ay regarding the last initiative taken by Mehmed: the reinforce-ment of the fortress of Rumeli Hisary, to control the navigationthrough the Bosphorus, and therigging of at least two-hundred 00-

(*) Genova Universitesi Ortaa Tarihi Asistan.

(1) A. PERTUS!. La cada di Cosantinopoli .. I, Le esimonianze dei contemporanei.

Verona, 1976, pp. 39-51.

381 ~,


2/9

ats whose aim was ignored. It fnally pointed out the fact that onlyan intervention coming from the Westem powers could restrain aforther intervention of the Turkish power and avoid the Genoese

positions in the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea to fall qown(2)

For other twenty years, until the fall of Kaffa in 1475, the sameproblems, shown in those two letters, would be the preoccupationof the Eastem Latins in their everyday life and their relations with

(2) A. PERTUSI, La cadula di Costantinopoli, n, L'eco nel mondo, Verona, 1976, pp.98- 105. About the history of the Genoese colonies in Levant, see: C. MANFRONI,

Le relazioni tra Genova.l'Impero bizantino eiTurchi, in: "Atli della Sociea Iiguredi storia patria", XXVIII, Genova, 1898, pp. 577-973; R. S. LOPEZ Storia delle co-lonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo, Bolo8Oa, 1938; M. BALARD, La RomanieGenoise (XII. e. debut du XV.e sikle), in "Atli del la Societa Ugure di Storia Patri-a", XVIII (XCII), Genova, 1978; GEO PIST ARI0, iGin dell'Ollremare, ivico Is-tituto Colombiano, Stud e testi, Serie storica diretla da G. Pistarino, Genova 1988;Id., Genovesi d'Oriente, Civico lstituto Colombiano, Studi e testi, Serie storie stori-

.ca diretla da G. PiSlarno, in the press. About the participation of the Genoese to thedefence of Constantinople and the situation of their colonies in front of the Turkishadvanve, see A. ROCCATAGLIATA, Da Banzio a Chio nel1453, in Miscellaneade storia italiana e mediterranea per Nino Lamboglia, Collana Storica di fonti estudi diretla da G. Pistarino, 23, Genova, 1978, pp. 381-408; EAD., Con un notaiogenovese tra Pera e chio ne11453-1454, in "Revue des etudes sudest europeennes",

XVII, 1979, n.2 (April-June), pp. 219-239; G. PIST ARINO, Note ale fonti sulla , caduta di Coztantinopoli, in "Ai dell'Accademia Ugure di Scienze e Letlerre",XL,

Genova i984, pp. 4. i3; ID., iGenovesi nel Levante fra it tramonto di Costantino. poli e ['[mpero otlomano, in Aspetli ddia vita economica medievale. Atli del Con-vegno di sludi net X anniversario della morte di Federigo Melis. Firenze.Pisa.Pranto, 10-/4 marzo 1984, Frienze, 1985, pp. 91.125; ID., La caduta di Costanti-nopoli: da Pera genovese a Galata turca, in La soria dei Genovesi, V, Genova,1985, pp 7.47; ID., The Genoese in Pera. Turkish Galata, in "Mediterranean Histo-rical Review", I, n. i,giugno i986, pp. 63-85 (halian edition: iGenovesi in PeraGalata turca, in ID., iGin dell'Oltremare C L ., pp. 409-456); ID., Tra iGenovesidell'Oriente turca dal tramonto del Medioevo al primo tempo dell'eta moderna, in"Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Letlere:', XLIII, Genova, 1988, pp. 200-2i2; G. OLGIATI, Angelo Giovanni Lomellino: atlivita politica e mercantitedell'ultimo podesta di Pera, n AA.VV. La storia dei Genovesi, XI: Genova 1989,pp. i39- 196; EAD., iGenovesi in Oriente dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli, in"Studi Balcanici", Quademi di Clio- 8, Roma 1989, pp. 45-59; EAD., Genovesialladifesa di Constantinopoli, in "Atli del'Accademia Ligure di Scenze eletlere", Geno-va, 1990, pp. 492.503, For the editions of sources: L.T. BEYGRANO, Prima seriedi documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, in "Ai della Societa ligure di Storiapatria", XIII, Genova, 1877, pp.97-317; ID., Seconda serie di documenti riguardan-ti la colonia di Pera, ibidem, pp. 931-1003; A.ROCCATAGLIATA, Notai genovesiin Ol/remare. Atli rogati a Pera e Mi/itene. i,Pera (1408-1490): II, Militene (14.54-1460), Collana slorica di fonti e studi diretla da G. Pistarino, 34.i-2, Genova 1982;EAD., Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atli rogati a Chio (1453-1454,1470-1471),Collana storia di ronti e studi diretla da G. Pistarino, 35, Genova 1982; GIUSTINAOLGIATI, Documeni genove.vi sulla caduta di Costantinopoli , Civico Istituto Co-

lombiano, Studi e testi, Seri e storica direUa da G. Pistarino, in the press.

382


3/9

-

i

their natiye land: it was impossible to reach the Black Sea, becauseof the bombardments of the Rumeli Hisary fortress; the Sultan de-manded taxes always heavier, in exchange for a peace not alwaysproteeted; the Turkish navy that periodically cane into sight as asign of the precarious political situation; they called out the Wes-tem countries for help, tiying like ihat to avoid a tragedy, that, ho-wever, seemed unavoidable by then.

The Westem countdes, besides, had aready known about thesefears, eve n before the fall of Constantinople . The paym~nt of taxesto the Turks, in exchance for some commercial facilities or for theirkeeping peace, was customary practice in Mehmed Father's times,

The Sultan Murad II. The new s conceming the military potential ofthe Turks and their probable objectives reached the West, not onlythrough the reports of the colony's authorities, bm also through themerchants that made business in the Eastem countries. Mehmed in-dended to build a fortress on the west side of Bosphorus, and theCouncil of Genoa had heard about this purpose in March 1452, be-fore the beginning of its construction. In such circomstances, evenif the Govemment recognized the serious danger that wa:s to hap-pen, it had not approved any measure implying a military or diplo-matic intervention of Genoa; the community of Pera tad to attendto the matter, sending al1!bassadors to the Sultan to convince him,but only using timely and deferential speeches, to give up his pur-pose(3).

The Rumeli Hisary fortress, raised in a few months, from Aprilto August 1452, symbolized from its rising the failure of the non-"intervention policy that the Westem states had followed when thesiege of Costantinople was imminent. In ~ovember 1452, theassault from the fortress against the Venetian ships revealed witho-

ut any doubt the war functionof the castle rightly called " Boghaz -Kesen" by the builders, as it was the "Blockade of the Straits"(4).The' peace treaties with the Sultan did not constitute a security forany ship crossing the Bosphorus anymore: all the ships steered to-wards or coming from the Black Sea were checked from the Tur-kish garrissson and had to paya tax on their way cmssing the Bosp-horus. After the fall of Constantinople, the Rumeli Hisary fortressbecame a nearly insuperable obstacle for the Genoese who, unlike

(3) L. T. BELGRAN, Prima serie cit., n. CXLlV, pp. 221-223 (March 13, 1452).

(4) F. BABINGER, Melmed der Eroherer und seine Zeit, Munchen, 1953. talian edii-

on: Maometto il ConquistalOre ed il suo tempo, Torino, 1967, pp. 81-85.

383


4/9

the Venetians, had not obtained any treaty from the Sultan that co-uld have secured, at least in theory, the free passaage through the

Straits. it now. became vious that at any time the fortress was ableto blockade the entrance in the Black Sea according to the Sultan'swills. The survival of the colones of the Republic of Genoa, eventhe most remote ones, who represented the last survival of Christ-endom n the see now completely submitted to Turks and Tartars,was now really precarious and drammatical. For other twenty ye-ars, the survival of Kaffa .and other Genoese territories of the BlackSea depended upon the captains of the fleets of the Bank of San Gi-orgio and the merchants that accepted, sometimes at the cost of~he-ir life, the risk to break through the big Turkish blocking.

, . .

The important business of the colonies , that called the merc-hands back to the East, even after the fall of Constantinople, wasperhaps one of the reasons why Mehmed, even if he could do it,had not begun immediately to conquest the Latin territories in theEast. The year1y tax that had to pay, in 1453 and 1454 ,all the terri-tories depending upon Genoa, was actually an important source ofincome , and increased according to what Mehmed wished.

As Genoa and its colonies were far the one from the other, theagreements conceming the taxes were estabilished by the Turksand the representatives of the colonies, without any direct interven-tion coming from Genoa.The habitants of Chios, Lesbos and Enoshad to paya tax to the boats and the messengers sent by the Sultan.The habitants of Kaffa sent their representatives to Mehmed, to as-sure their own safety, but they didn't want, or perhaps they couldnot save the colony of Samastri, eve n with such agreements(5) . Thefact that these taxes had been accepted by the colonies populationswithout the acceptance from their natiye lands did not compromise

the availability of the agreements, based not on the rights but on themilitary force of the Turks. The possession of Pera, who se habi-tants had decided to surrender to the Sultan without the interventionof the Genoese govemment could not be daimed by Genoa .onlybecause of the rights of the Rebublic. However, an attempt ~ad be-en made in that w~y from the Doge of Genoa, in 1454, through thediplomatic mission he had' sent to the Sultan. The ambassadors,

(5) A. VIGNA, Codice diplomatico delle colonie Tauro-liguri durante la signoriade/l'U.fficio diSan Giorgio (MCCCCUII-MCCCCLXXV). in "Alti della Societa ligu-

re di soriapatria", LV, Genova, 1868, n. cxvn, pp. 297-301 (March 18, July 1 Au-gust 13, 1455); F. BABINGER, MaomettO, cil., p. 110.

384


5/9

Baldassarre Marruffo and Lucano Spinola, had to ask for the rest-tution of the colony and the reconstruction of its fortifications paidby the Turks, but without pointing out the fact that Pera had always

been the Sultan and his predecessors' possession and that if Genoahad controlled Pera again, it only would have become the coffer ofall the precious goods coming from the West, useful for the Otto- .man House(6). . .

The recovery of Pera seemed impossible. But other Genoesecolonies were able to act as commercial junctions useful for bothLatins and Turks. Chios was one ofthese colonies, abie to preserveits independence till 1566. The other Genoese territories, guarante-es of the safety, were on the contrary very precaious. In exchange

their locals had to pay very heavy taxes without any help from themother land. Anyho\J/, the increasing taxes were always reported tothe Genoese government, as the proof of the increasing of dificulti-es and the request of a reduction of taxation, or arming that the Re-public had to pay. Besides, the Council of Genoa intended someti-mes not to eonsider reay those dem and s of interventions sinee theSultan would have proteeted and would not have attaeked thoselands from which he reeeived a regular ineomeO).

Such an estimation was not completely wrong since Mehmedwanted to include the islands of Chios,Lesbos and Enos in the terri-tories under his protection, in the treaty signed with Venice in 1454(B). However, payment of taxes and eonsequently the safety of thecoloni~s were sti dependent on the Sultan's wills and sometimesby some unponderable faetors. On 1455, that is because of the cla-im of a credit due to Franceseo Draperio, coaborator of the Otto-man House since the times of Murad I1,that Focea passed into theTurki"sh hands for which Chios paid very heavy taxes because of itsimportant business of alum(9). On the same year, the death of Dori-

no iGattilusio, Prinee of Lesbos induced the Sultan to double the

(6) L.T. DELGRANO. Prina serie cit.. n. CLlV, pp: 261.270 (March i i, 1454).(7) Sae Archive of Genoa (A.S.G), ARCHtVtO SEGRETO (A.S.), Frammenti di Di.

I'ersorum 7 12A (March 5, 1455): " ... dicens morem csse Turcons ut eos tueanlurel proegan qu sihi lrihularii faci sint".

(B) E. CORNET, Giorn'ale del/'a.uedio di Cosantinopoli 1453 di Nicolt> Barharo, cor-redato di noe e docmeni, Vienna, IB56, n.14. pp. BO-B2.

(9) A. VIGNA, cit., n. CXVlI, pp. 297.301 (March IB, July IB, August 13, 1455); M.LHEERS, Les GblOis le connerrce de ralun a lafin du Moyen Age, in "Revued'hisloirc economique cl socialc", 32, 1954. p. 50; F. BABINGER, Maomctlo cit.,

pp. 139.141.

385


6/9


7/9

four Genoese .commercial wessels, mareaver in a lack of wind.They often tried to fight against smaIl possessions, trying to ava idthe island the most fortified or protected by Genoese ships. Same

admirals like Balta-Oghlu, Hamza Beg and Junus Pasha provokedthe Sultan to anger because' they were incapable in front of theenemy(l3) .

The origin of the terror caused by the Turkish fleets was basedupon a collective influence and not upon real facts. It was conveyed

.to the West, together with the demand of military helps to the mot-her-country. The Genoese Govemment couldn't ignore those de-mands, even if from the 15 november 1453 no colony was under

the jurisdiction of the Republic of Genoa anymore, at least in te-ory .After the fall of Constantinople Genoa had lost Pera, had saIdthe colonies of Black Sea to the Bank of San Giorgio, the administ-rator of Famagosta; it till partially controlled Chios, given out bycontract to the Maonese, and Gattilusio's possessions, nominally fe-udataries of the Byzantine Empire and therefore protected by theRepublic. Despite, in front of the Turkish threat, Genoa confirrnedwithout hesitations his lies with those Eastem Latins, who were notconsidered as Genoese citizens though. The interventions in favourof the Eastem colonies, however, we:e always somewhat unusual

measures, decided to face only same serious dangers, without anyreal provided plans. After the suppression of the Officium Provisio-nis Romanie (the magistrature at the head of the colonies), due tothe selling of the lands of theBlack Sea, the "management" of theGenoese interest in the East was assured by officials elected only atthe right momet, as'the Officiales rerum Chiensium et Mitilenensi-um entrusted with the measures to take to protect Chios and Les-bos, threatened by the Turkish fleet(l4) . '

. .

Each ,mesure to help the Eastem colonies was taken in. ordernot to be considered from the Sultan as hostilities in front of him.Besides, the dramatic situation of Kaffa, that a single order of theSultan could have condamned to a complete isolation, did not allo-wed Genoa to think of a fight with Turks. In case of conflict, theGenoese could not trust any secure allies. The Turkish threat didn'trepresent the glue for a possible reconciliation of the Western Sta-tes able to caneel the causes of mutual tensions. Mareaver, the' old

(13) F. BABINGER,Maometto cit., pp. 93-94,139-141,43.(14) A.S.G.,A.S.,Frammenti di Diversorum 712A.

387


8/9

oppostons in the colonies had not appeased: the tensions with

Greeks, in Chios; the difficult cohabitation between the Genoese of

Famagosta and the king of Cyprus; the fights, in Kaffa, with the

Armenian minority and, outside, with the Khan-tartars.

While, "in the West, nowonly the Pontifex dreamt of an impos-

sible crusade, the Genoese Government had to subordinate the pro-

tection of the colonies to problems that threatened the Republic sa-

fety. The common risk, on the contrary, led to the mutual

collaboration of the Eastem Genoese, at least during the moment s

of absolute emergeney. In 1455, same groups of mercenary sol,diersof Pera origin were engaged from the captain of Famagosta to pro-

tect the colony(l5); in 1458, the representatives of the Maona sentletters to ask a military intervention in favour of Lesbs, where

most of the population of Chios, threaten with plague, had sheltered(16). .

Till the fall of Constantinople, Chios carried on an important

activity to co-ordinate military helps between East and West; those

helps were of ten very Iate, especially because of the war against

Alphonso of Aragon, and discharging the costs on the shipping bu-

siness and on the incomes coming from the colonies. As the objec-

tives of Mehmed were not known, the destination of the helps wassometimes hazy too: the captains of the ships sent to Kaffa in 1455were ordered to stop rather in Chios, to protect the island, provided

that the Maonese paid all the expenses(l7). The lack of a real plan

of operations from the Geneose and the indefference of the Western

powers made useless the few successes againts Mehmed: in 1456,the failure of Turks in Belgrade made the Christiendom very entho-

usiastic, but without meant a furter political intervention in the East

and the Genoese Government decided not to renew the salary of the

crossbowmen se nt to Lesbos, 'since there was no risk anymore (18);

in 1459 the Pontifical fleet made the islands of Lemnos, Tasos andSamotracia free from the Turks, but the Protectors of San Giorgio

refused to protect them, because they were afraid of the possible re-

(15) A.S.G.,Archiviodi SanGiorgio(S.G.),Primi Conce/ie..ri, busta88,cc.702-703(February6, 1455),705(March5, 1455),72i(September26, 1455).

(16) A.S.G.,A.S., Dil'ersorum Registri 564,cc. 13v.-14r.(February26, 1459).(17) A.S.G.,A.S.,Frommemi di Dil'ersorum 712A(March5,1455).

(18) A.S.G:,A.S.,Frommemi di Dil'ersorum 712A(August18,1456.)

388


9/9

taliations from Mehmed against Kaffa(19). In 1474-1475, the newsconceming the new ruggings of Turks led Genoese Govemment

and the Maonese to intensify the defence of Chios(20). However,

Mehmed fleet entered in the Black Sea, ending the independence ofKaffa, tearing off in that way' the last base of the Genoese in theBlack Sea.

Chios was now the last surviving base of Genoa in the East,

and could survive thanks to the profits that Genoa and the Turks

could draw from il. That did not mean it was free from dangers. In

1475, after the conquest of Kaffa, the Sultan wanted to control the,Port of Chios: the only way to escape for the Maonese was to dec-

lare to be citizens of Venice, raising the insignia of San Marco(21).

That event, that didn't have any political consequence, induced Ge-

noeses to write a waming letter to the Maonese: but, cQoosing the

solutions of a compromise and coaborating with both Genoa and

the Turks, Chios found a clever way to survive, in spite of manydifficulties, until 1566.

(19) A. VIGNA,cit.,n. CCCCLIII,pp.937.938(June12,1459).(20) A.S.G.,S.G.,Primi Cacelliel'i, busta89,cc.252-285.(21) A.S.G.,A.S., Dil'l'rsorm Regis'ri 597.cc.9r.-lOr.(August30-SeptemberI.

1475).

389

Olgiati G., The Genoese Colonies in Front of the Turkish Advance (1453-1475)

Documents

Transcript of Olgiati G., The Genoese Colonies in Front of the Turkish Advance (1453-1475)