OKHRANA - The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police

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OKHRANA

The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police

Ben B. Fischer

History Staff Center for the Stuy

of Intelli!ence

Central Intelli!ence A!ency

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Table of Contents

Fore%or

Preface

From Paris to Palo AltoCIA Interest in the Okhrana FilesOrigins of the Okhrana and Its Paris OfficeForeign OperationsChange and Continuity DramatisPersonaeConclusions

Articles &y 'Rita T. Kronen&itter'

Paris Okhrana 1885-195!he Illustrious Career of Arkadiy "arting!he #herlock "olmes of the $e%olutionOkhrana Agent &olin!he Okhrana's Female Agents--Part I( $ussian )omen!he Okhrana's Female Agents--Part II( Indigenous $ecruits$e%ie* of +d*ard +llis #mith, The Young Stalin, y "arry .elmanCommentary y $ita !/ 0ronenitter



For%ar

Author/Compiler's Note: This is a first in a planned series of thematic collections of articles that

appeared previously in classified editions of the 0ntelligence $ommunity (ournal Studies in

Intelligence, ;hich is published at $03. 3s part of its <openness< policy, $03 has declassifiedmore than 4,+ articles from the first years of Studies. *e e!pect to compile and publish

more collections of this type that address single intelligence9related themes or topics. *e believe

readers ;ill find these articles interesting, informative, and colorful.

The author=compiler, >en >. ?ischer, ;ould li6e to than6 the follo;ing people for reading an

earlier draft to the 'reface, offering comments and criticisms, and identifying additional sources:

@ay #liver, Robert 'ringle, Aames >ruce, David Thomas, and Aohn DBia6. Than6s are also due tolena Danielson and $arole )eadenham of the Coover 0nstitution at Stanford University for

ta6ing an interest in this pro(ect and supporting it. Ric6 CernandeB of Stanford University did a

fine (ob ;ith research assistance.

http://www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/okhrana/#toc1




Preface

O(hrana) The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial

Police

From Paris to Palo Alto!he first si articles reprinted elo* *ere pulished in Studies in Intelligence et*een1925 and 1923/ !hey descrie foreign operations of the $ussian Imperial Police,commonly referred to as the Okhrana, in the late 19th and early 4th centuries/ (1) Alsoincluded are a letter from the author of these articles to Studies in Intelligence and the ook re%ie* that prompted the letter, oth of *hich discuss the still-deated issue of *hether osef #talin *as an Okhrana agent/

The 4118 opening of a 'aris office 6no;n as the Zagranichnaia okhranka or agentura *+, ;as a

sign of both success and failure on the part of the tsarist authorities. 0t reflected their success inhaving driven many revolutionaries, terrorists, and nationalists out of Russia it also underscored

their failure to stem an upsurge in Russian subversive activity based abroad. >y the 411s, the

Russian emigre community in ?rance had gro;n to some -, people, most of them in the 'arisarea. *-, The $ity of )ight had become the hub for Russian revolutionary groups operating in

much of urope.

The #6hrana' s initial assumption99that e!ile in urope rather than Siberia or some other remote

place ;ould act as a safety valve for such groups99proved erroneous. Russian emigrants did notassimilate quic6ly or easily, and some discovered that relatively greater freedom in the *est gave

them broad opportunities to engage in antiregime activities.

These essays portray not only the officials ;ho ran the #6hrana 's foreign bureau, but also the

colorful agents, double agents, and agents provocateurs ;ho ;or6ed for and against it99sometimes simultaneously. Eany of these characters could have stepped out of the pages of a

$onrad story or a le $arrF novel, but their deeds ;ere real and ;ere recorded in the 'aris offices

files, ;hich ;ere hidden a;ay for almost 8 years at the Coover 0nstitution on the campus ofStanford University.

The story of ho; these files made their ;ay from 'aris to 'alo 3lto is an intriguing tale. *hen

Russian revolutionaries overthre; the 89year9old Romanov dynasty in Earch 447, they

quic6ly turned their attention to their foes in the #6hrana. 3 multiparty committee ;as formed to

investigate tsarist secret police offices and practices inside the mpire in St. 'etersburg, Eosco;,and *arsa;99as ;ell as in 'aris99;ith a vie; to prosecuting police officials of the ousted regime.

The last imperial ambassador to ?rance, >asil Ea6la6ov, closed his mission in 'aris and sealed

its secret files, but he reopened them ;hen the official inquiry began. 3fter the short9lived'rovisional Government fell to )enin and the >olshevi6s in /ovember 447, Ea6la6ov resealed

the files and ;aited for further instructions.


http://www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/okhrana/#rft1










?rance refused to resume relations ;ith the radical ne; government in Eosco;. 0t ;ithheld

recognition until 4+, ;hen the USSR ;as formed. Ea6la6ov, mean;hile, ;as not idle. Ta6ing

advantage of the confusion in Eosco;, he placed the #6hrana files in si!teen -9pound pac6ing crates, ;hich ;ere then bound ;ith ;ire and sealed.

*hen the >olshevi6s finally got around to as6ing for <their< files in 4+-, Ea6la6ov99;ho hadcodenamed his concealment and removal operation <Tagil< after a Siberian village99s;ore he had

burned them. The files, ho;ever, remained intact and ;ere a;aiting shipment to the UnitesStates. The ambassador convinced $hristian Certer, then associated ;ith Cerbert Coovers

3merican Relief 3dministration and later Secretary of State under 'resident isenho;er, to help.

Certer had a house in 'aris, ;here the crates ;ere stashed, and he later helped get them through?rench and US customs99;ith seals intact. *,

0t too6 t;o more years to arrange for the files to be moved from the eastern United States to

$alifornia. Ea6la6ov signed an agreement ;ith the Coover 0nstitution stipulating that the crates

;ould remain sealed until his death and ;ould not be made public for another three months

thereafter. The e!9ambassador no doubt feared retaliation from the >olshevi6s dreadedintelligence service, the Cheka, ;hich presumably ;ould have sought to 6ill him if it had

discovered ;hat he had done ;ith the 'aris files.

Ea6la6ovs contract ;ith the Coover 0nstitution and his longevity99he died in S;itBerland in4-7 at age 15996ept the archive under ;raps for more than three decades. The 0nstitution opened

the pac6ing crates at a gathering of reporters and photographers on +1 #ctober 4-7. */, 0t too6

the privately supported 0nstitution five more years to find funds and assemble a staff to organiBeand catalogue the files. 3 team headed by Dr. 3ndre; @obal and under the supervision of

Coover assistant director 'rofessor *.S. S;ora6o;s6i began ;or6ing in Aune 45+ and finished

in early 45. *0, The archive attracted international scholarly interest, and Life magaBine ran a

feature story about it.












Professor 1.S. S%ora(o%s(i and an unidentified assistant at the oover Institution check

unopened crates containing the !khrana files in "#$%& he shipping tag indicates that the crates(ere stored in )ashington, *C, +efore +eing shipped to California& Courtes of the oover

Institution&

3ccording to Coover records, the archive contains +5 bo!es, +5 scrapboo6s, 45, cards, andeight linear feet of photographs. The complete archive is available on - reels of microfilm. 0t is

a veritable ;hos ;ho of the Russian revolution and includes files on and photographs of Stalin,

Eolotov, and Trots6y.

CIA Interest in the O(hrana Files The author of the si! articles, ;ho used the pseudonym <Rita T. @ronenbitter,< ;rote them at the

request of the $03s $ounterintelligence Staff. <@ronenbitter< ;as among the first researchers to

display an interest in the #6hrana files. The articles originally ;ere classified <confidential,< presumably to avoid revelation of the $03s interest in the #6hrana records.



*hy ;as $03 counterintelligence interested in ;hat the Coover 0nstitutions press release hailed

as a <mother lode of 6no;ledge on crucial years leading to the overthro; of the Romanovs in

Earch 447<H The Coover archive ;as the only comprehensive collection of pre9447 Russian police and intelligence files in the *est. During the Soviet era, some specialists vie;ed these

unique files as being of more than historical interest. >ritish espionage historian Richard Deacon

suggested ;hy the #6hrana ;as of interest long after its demise ;hen he ;rote that the Russian police agency <;as, in fact, a comprehensive, coordinated espionage and counterespionage

organiBation, the most total form of espionage devised in the latter part of the 4th century and

still forming the +asis of Soviet espionage and counterespionage toda&< *$, Iemphasis addedJ

$03s $ounterintelligence Staff apparently believed these files ;ould yield data on Russiasintelligence <culture< and methods that could provide ne; insights into Eosco;s Soviet9era

operations. Some at $03 challenged this notion, claiming that the @G> ;as a qualitatively ne;

organiBation employing a different tradecraft. *2, Kears later, former @G> officers #legGordievs6y and #leg @alugin asserted that the @G> had used #6hrana manuals in training and

lecture courses ;hen they ;ere @G> trainees in the late 4-s and early 45s. @alugin claims

that use of #6hrana materials continued into the 41s. *#,

Ori!ins of the O(hrana an Its Paris Office

The #6hrana ;as created in 4114 in response to the assassination of 3le!ander 00. 0ts primary

mission ;as to protect the tsar, the royal family, and the Russian autocracy itself. *"3, #ver time

this evolved into an mpire9;ide campaign against revolutionaries, terrorists, and assortednational minority groups see6ing independence. Some revolutionaries ;anted the tsars head

others simply ;anted to be free of his iron hand.

The opening in 4118 of the #6hrana' s ?oreign >ureau, centered in 'aris, ;as prompted by the

shift of Russian revolutionary activity from the Russian mpire to *estern and $entral urope.

The ne; >ureau occupied t;o modest offices in the Russian 0mperial $onsulate at 7 -ue de.renelle. /ever very large "see the first reprinted article belo;, entitled, <'aris #6hrana 411-9

4-<&, the 'aris bureau nonetheless proved effective. 0t adopted and refined modern police anddetective methods9as ;ell as human intelligence agent operations9to achieve its ob(ectives. *"",

The #6hrana sa; 'aris as the most advantageous place to base its foreign operations. Russian

police officials admired the ?rench internal security service, the Sret0 .enerale99generally

regarded as among the best in the ;orld99and sought access to its files through both officialliaison and unofficial channels. The #6hrana even hired ?rench, >ritish, and other detectives to

help run its operations. ?rom 'aris, moreover, the #6hrana could monitor its agenturas in >erlin

and other uropean cities. Eost of the 6ey Russian revolutionaries in the ?rench capital had

contacts in other countries and cities. $onsequently, penetrations of revolutionary groups in 'arisoften yielded leads to Russian dissident organiBations and individuals outside ?rance.

The #6hrana' s relations ;ith the Sret0 ;ere symbiotic. The #6hrana reduced the Sret0 's

;or6load and provided employment for retired ?rench detectives. The ?rench police did not seethe 'aris bureau as a threat to ?rench national interests or to the Sret0's organiBational equities.

#n the eve of *orld *ar 0 the ?rench security service declared: <0t is impossible, on any

ob(ective assessment, to deny the usefulness of having a Russian police IforceJ operating in
















'aris, ;hether officially or not, ;hose presence is to 6eep under surveillance the activities of

Russian revolutionaries.< *"+, 3t the same time, socialist and radical deputies in the ?rench

3ssembly, ;ho ;ere more sympathetic to the Russian revolutionaries than to the police, pressedthe ?rench and Russian Governments to shut do;n the #6hrana office. 0n 448 the Russian

regime formally complied by announcing the offices closure. >ut this ;as a subterfuge the

Russian police continued operating under the cover of the Agence 1int et Sam+ain, a privatedetective agency. #ne of the t;o proprietors, Cenri >int, ;as a former employee of both the

Sret0 and the #6hrana. *"-,

Forei!n Operations

The ?oreign >ureaus operational methods evolved through three distinct phases. 0nitially, the#6hrana men believed they could 6eep tabs on Russian revolutionaries by hiring local

surveillance teams and e!amining Sret0 files. This <e4ternal' sur5eillance "in Russian:

naru2hnoe na+ludenie& proved inadequate. ?rench officials ;ere reluctant to share their files, and?rench detectives hired by the Russians sometimes proved to be more loyal to their former

employer "the Sret0& than to their ne; paymaster. ven more important, ?rench operatives

could not penetrate the inner cores of Russian revolutionary and terrorist groups. #nly Russianrevolutionaries could.

0n the second phase, the use of <internal< surveillance99penetration of subversive groups by

recruiting agents from among their ran6s or by sending in double agents99mar6ed the #6hrana's

transition from police methods to classic intelligence operations. "The Russians used the termvnutrenniaia agentura, or <internal agency,< to refer collectively to the agents and double agents

controlled by #6hrana units.&

The #6hrana succeeded in penetrating many anti9tsarist organiBations. 0t acquired agents

throughout Russia and urope. Some of these people spied because they ;ere monarchists

others did so because they ;ere romantic adventurers or simply mercenaries. The mostinteresting ;ere the agents ;ho began as real revolutionaries, ;ere arrested, and then ;ere

<doubled< or <turned< by the #6hrana. Some responded to #6hrana blandishments because theyfeared (ail or e!ile in Siberia99or ;orse99but for others it ;as simply a ne; career opportunity.

Eany ;ho completed their undercover assignments <retired< and then ;ere given good civilian

(obs.

The third method of operation99the use of agents provocateurs--;as the most controversial. Thesub(ect ;as so sensitive that the #6hrana officially denied it had run agents ;ho organiBed and

participated in sanctioned revolutionary acts. "This type of activity ;as the focus of the

'rovisional Governments 447 inquiry into the #6hrana.&

0n its 89year e!istence, the #6hrana' s 'aris office had only four chiefs, giving it greater stabilityand continuity than its headquarters organiBation in St. 'etersburg. 3s a result, the 'aris bureau

also en(oyed considerable autonomy in running its affairs, ;hich included planning and

e!ecuting operations, liaison ;ith local and foreign police departments, agent recruitment andhandling, and evaluation and reporting of information to the #6hrana' s elite Special Section "see

belo;&. *",










The 'aris operatives developed rudimentary tradecraft for meeting and debriefing their agents99

called sekretne sotrudniki "secret collaborators& or seksoti for short99in safehouses. 3t its pea6

the 'aris bureau had about detectives on its payroll and some 8 agents in 'aris and else;herein urope. The #6hrana ran a ma(or mail intercept program at home and abroad that yielded

substantial information. /ot for nothing ;as Russia 6no;n as the <gendarme of urope.<

>et;een 45 and 44 the police succeeded in crushing popular opposition and penetrating99and in some cases even controlling99opposition political parties at home and abroad. *"/,

3ccording to one historian, <virtually nothing that related to these parties remained a secret from

the government.< *"0, @ey targets of surveillance and agent operations included:

• 6migr7 and re%olutionary groups aroad/• $e%olutionaries arri%ing from $ussia/• 0no*n centers of conspiratorial acti%ity/• nderground pulishers and forgers of passports, false identities, and so forth:/• ;om-manufacturing <factories/<• )eapons and eplosi%es smugglers/•

$ussians *ith ties to +uropean socialists and socialist organi=ations/The #6hrana also provided 20' security for the royal family, other influential persons, and senior officials traveling abroad. *"$,

The #6hrana' s Special Section ;as an elite unit. 0t recruited e!clusively from the Russian army.

Successful candidates ;ere assigned to the armys <Separate $orps of Gendarmes.< *"2,

'rospective candidates ;ere carefully screened and ;ell trained. Tradecraft instruction includedagent recruitment and agent handling secret ;riting <flaps and seals< "surreptitious reading of

correspondence& reports ;riting civil and criminal la; surveillance and investigative

techniques and the history of the Russian revolutionary movement. 3ssisting the officers ;ere

the filier33detectives or surveillance men, most of ;hom ;ere former army /$#s. *"#,

The #6hrana also ;as capable of devastating blunders. The most notorious e!ample ;as

<>loody Sunday< of ++ Aanuary 4-. *hen ?ather George Gapon, an #6hrana agent ;ho had

organiBed a police9sponsored ;or6ers group, led a demonstration of peasants and ;or6ers to the*inter 'alace in St. 'etersburg, the .endarmerie, ;ithout the tsars authoriBation or advance

6no;ledge, charged the cro;d, 6illing or ;ounding at least 4 persons. This ;as a seminal

event in the eventual demise of the Romanov dynasty and Russian autocracy it set in motion the

first revolution of 4- and ultimately led to the events of 447. *+3,

Chan!e an Continuity

!amination of the #6hrana invites comparison ;ith its Soviet successors from )enins Cheka toStalins /@2D to the @G>. There are common threads as ;ell as important differences. The#6hrana, li6e the Cheka, ;as an internal security and counterintelligence agency par e4cellence&0ts foreign operations ;ere essentially an e!tension of its domestic security mission. The Soviet

services before *orld *ar 00 focused heavily on actual and putative threats emanating from

FmigrF groups, and ;ell into the $old *ar the @G> and its ast uropean satellite servicescontinued devoting considerable resources to the same target, even though they had other

priorities.















The #6hrana pioneered many methods that the Soviet successor organs adapted and perfected.

Systematic registration of politically suspect persons ;as accomplished in Eosco; by the turn

of the century and in St. 'etersburg bet;een 45 and 41. *+", Use of internal passports andmandatory registration of residences started ;ith the #6hrana, not the Soviet intelligence and

security agencies. The #6hrana99li6e its Soviet and /aBi counterparts99relied heavily on agents,

co9optees, and busybodies in the general population to 6eep an eye on things. The organiBationof rural communities and urban apartment d;ellers by city bloc6s ;as the same in Russia as in

the Soviet Union99(ust more efficient in the latter.

0n addition, the #6hrana33li6e the @G>, the .estapo, and the ast German Stasi33used its

sources to monitor privately e!pressed vie;s and popular moods and to prepare classified studiesof latent popular attitudes that could not be freely voiced. The utiliBation of <blac6 chambers< "an

internationally used term that refers to facilities, often located in post offices, for mail and

message interception, decoding, and decryption& began in Russia and reached its apogee in astGermany, ;here the Stasi read virtually all international correspondence and much of the

domestic variety.

>ut the differences bet;een the #6hrana and the later organiBations are stri6ing. 3s one

authority notes, <;hat seems clear it that an unbro6en patrimony bet;een tsarist repression andSoviet terror cannot be claimed.< *++, *hile secret police organiBations served under tsars and

commissars ali6e as the state security apparatus of the e!ecutive branch99and of the personal ;ill

of the Russian leader of the time99in the tsarist era there ;ere substantial legal, political, andeven ethical constraints. The #6hrana could order summary e!ecutions by hanging or firing

squad, but only in e!traordinary situations such as peasant uprisings and then only after Eosco;

had declared martial la;. 3lthough the #6hrana could deport political prisoners to Siberia, these

and other administrative decisions ;ere sub(ect to (udicial revie;. During the reign of 3le6sandr00 "41--914& some , people ;ere detained and interrogated in connection ;ith political

crimes, but fe; ;ere e!ecuted. *+-, ?rom the mid9415s to the mid941s, in fact, only e!ecutions too6 place in Russia, and all ;ere prompted by assassinations or assassinationattempts against members of the royal family or government officials.

>y contrast, on the day after )enin launched the Red Terror in September 441, the Cheka

e!ecuted - people. *+, During Stalins rule, the murderous /@2D acted as (udge, (ury, and

e!ecutioner. The Red Terror under Stalin became the Great Terror bet;een 48- and 44 some4 million people disappeared into the Gulag and three million ;ere e!ecuted. *+/,

Richard 'ipes noted three restraints on the #6hrana: private property, inefficiency, and the

imperial political elites desire to be seen as culturally <*estern.< *+0, Under the >olshevi6s

these restraints vanished.

The #6hrana never aspired to the territorial and economic empire and e!tensive military and

paramilitary forces commanded by the /@2D. ven the @G>99supposedly a 6inder, gentler

version of the /@2D operating under <socialist legality<99;as more ruthless than its Russianantecedent. 3 comparison of 3le6sandr 000s treatment of )eo Tolstoy and >reBhnevs handling of

dissidents such as 3le6sandr SolBhenitsyn illustrates the point. /ovelist Tolstoy ;as the best9

6no;n dissident of his day, and the police 6ept him under surveillance and censored his ;or6.




















>ut they did not imprison him or prevent him from traveling and publishing abroad. During

Stalins reign, by contrast, SolBhenitsyn, li6e other dissidents, simply disappeared into the harsh

internal e!ile system that he later dubbed the Gulag 3rchipelago. ven under Stalins successors,intellectuals and political activists ;ho dissented99including SolBhenitsyn and 3ndrei Sa6harov99

;ere sub(ected to inhumane treatment considered unacceptable by *estern standards. *+$,

3lthough the #6hrana ;as not as ruthless as the Cheka or the /@2D, in an ironic ;ay it

inspired them. )enin and Stalin seemed to have concluded from their underground years that thetsarist police ;ere too lenient. *+2, 3fter all, for all its success until 44, the #6hrana had not

been able to prevent a small group of radicals from seiBing po;er three years later.

The >olshevi6s also learned ho; easy it had been for the #6hrana to plant agents ;ithin theirinner circle. Dr. Aacob Lhitomirs6y ;as a leading >olshevi6 and )enin confidant before he ;as

discovered. *+#, 3n even more dramatic e!ample ;as the tsarist agent Roman Ealinovs6y99

leader of the >olshevi6 deputies in the fourth state *uma, a central committee member, and

)enins chief lieutenant ;hile the latter ;as still in e!ile. *-3, *hen 2ladimir >urtsev finally

convinced )enin that Lhitomirs6y might be a double agent, the >olshevi6 leader orderedEalinovs6y to conduct an investigation. *-", Such e!periences ;ere, perhaps, at the root of

>olshevi6 paranoia99the urge to see enemies every;here and eliminate them99that reached its bloody apogee under Stalin.

The #6hrana' s penetration of the >olshevi6 party ;as so e!tensive and so thorough that the

police files constitute the most complete "and only reliable& record of the conspiratorial partys

early history, internal organiBation, membership, and deliberations99an unintentional contributionto future historians. *-+, This ;as not the only unintended consequence. >y penetrating the

radical groups, the tsarist police ;ere using a classic divide9and9conquer tactic to prevent

formation of a unified opposition. 0ronically, this tactic ;as most successful in preventing the

emergence of an open opposition party ;ith a mass base, and thus it helped to create anenvironment in ;hich )enins small monolithic party of professional revolutionaries could

flourish.

The #6hrana targeted liberals and revolutionaries ali6e, seeing both groups as threats to theRussian autocracy. >ut the t;o groups dre; different lessons from their persecution at the hands

of the tsarist police. *hen the 'rovisional Government came to po;er, it convened a special

commission to investigate the organiBation, operations, and methods of the tsarist police99not toemulate them, but to correct past abuses and prevent their repetition. *--, )enin and the

>olshevi6s also studied the #6hrana, and so did @G> recruits decades later, to learn from and

improve on the tsarist polices repressive methods.

Dramatis Personae

Agent provocateur is a ?rench term, but the Russians perfected the art. 0n fact, the primary

purpose of the ?oreign >ureaus provocations ;as to scare the ?rench into ta6ing action against

Russian radicals and cooperating ;ith the #6hrana. The most notorious provocation occurred in'aris in 41, ;hen 3r6adiy Carting "a.6.a. 3braham Ge6elman or )andeBen& organiBed a ;ell9

armed team of bombthro;ers and then betrayed them to the 'aris police. These heavily

publiciBed arrests helped persuade the ?rench public of the dangers posed by Russian




















revolutionaries in ?rance. The episode also convinced officials in St. 'etersburg that republican

?rance could get tough on Russian radicals and ma6e a good ally. To some e!tent, at least, this

helped diminish mutual suspicions and created an atmosphere on both sides conducive tonegotiation of the ?ranco9Russian alliance of 414.

6laimir Burtse57 leading counterespionage specialist in the -ussian revolutionar opposition

to the tsarist government& Courtes of the oover Institution&

Carting may be the most interesting character in the essays "see the second reprinted article belo;, entitled <The 0llustrious $areer of 3r6adiy Carting<&. Ce rose from informer to master

spy to spymaster, eventually becoming chief of the 'aris office. 3s noted above, his top agent,Lhitomirs6y, penetrated )enins inner circle during the >olshevi6 partys underground days.>efore he quit the espionage business in 4 follo;ing his e!posure by the ?rench press as a

Russian spy, Carting had served tsarist Russia, imperial Germany, and republican ?rance,

receiving decorations from all three.

Carting met his match in 2ladimir >urtsev "see the third reprinted article, entitled <The Sherloc6Colmes of the Revolution<&. >urtsev ;as a revolutionary by profession but a counterespionage



e!pert by talent. Ce organiBed ;hat in effect ;as a highly professional counterespionage bureau

for Russian radicals. 0n 4 >urtsev personally unmas6ed a ma(or #6hrana agent, vno 3Bef.

3lso in 4, after years of relentless effort, >urtsev succeeded in proving that a terrorist 6no;nas <)andesen<, ;ho had escaped from the ?rench police in 41, actually ;as Carting. This ;as

lea6ed to the press, prompting Carting to flee to >russels, ;here he ;ent into hiding and ;as

never heard from again. *-,

Cartings case officer ;as 'yotr Rach6ovs6y, probably the ablest head of the #6hranas ?oreign>ureau. Rach6ovs6y ;as a pioneer. Ce refined the art of ;hat ;e today call active measures or

perceptions management techniques. Ce paid subsidies to (ournalists ;illing to ;rite articles

favorable to Russian interests, and he purchased or subsidiBed such periodicals as -evue -usse and Le Courier 5ranco3-usse. During his tenure "41194+&, (ournalists on the #6hrana payroll

began planting articles in the ?rench press that ;ere favorable to Russian interests. Rach6ovs6y

also created the Ligue pour le Salut de la 6atrie -usse, ;hich promoted positive vie;s to;ardRussia among ?rench citiBens this group ;as a forerunner of Soviet front organiBations and

<friendship societies.<

3ccording to one authority, Rach6ovs6y ;as a <born intriguer< ;ho <delighted< in forging

documents. Ce allegedly ;as among those responsible for the anti9Semitic 6rotocols of the 7lders of Zion, perhaps the most infamous political forgery of the +th century. *-/,

Rach6ovs6ys tactic of e!ploiting anti9Semitism for political purposes ;as used repeatedly

during the Soviet era99for e!ample, in Cungary in 4-5, in $Bechoslova6ia in 451, and in'oland in the 41s. Such scapegoating also ;as evident in the so9called <Doctors 'lot< in the

early 4-s, ;hen a group of Ae;ish doctors ;as accused of plotting to 6ill Stalin and other

Soviet leaders.

Rach6ovs6y ;as a model for subsequent Soviet practice in another regard. Ce ;as an advocate

of ?ranco9Russian rapprochement and served as the tsars personal emissary in secretnegotiations leading to the Dual 3lliance of 4149 and its modification in 41.

The practice of using foreign intelligence officers on sensitive international assignments,

bypassing the foreign ministry and regular diplomatic channels, ;as a standard Soviet modusoperandi. Stalin used his head of foreign intelligence, 2ladimir De6anoBov, to set the stage for

his pre9*orld *ar 00 alliance ;ith Citler. )ater, @hrushchev relied on a @G> officer under

(ournalistic cover to establish a direct lin6 to the @ennedy *hite Couse. 3fter this emissarydiscredited himself by lying to the @ennedy brothers about the presence of Soviet missiles in

$uba, @hrushchev turned to the @G> resident to open another channel to the *hite Couse

through 3>$ ne;sman Aohn Scali proposals that ;ere floated through this channel eventually

resolved the #ctober 45+ missile crisis. 0n 45 >reBhnev and 3ndropov assigned t;o senior@G> German e!perts to open a bac6 channel to the ne; Social Democratic9led coalition

government in >onn. *-0, The result ;as secret negotiation of a series of bilateral and

multilateral agreements that transformed Soviet relations ;ith *est Germany and the rest ofurope.

2entsion Eoiseev9Eosh6ov Dolin ;as a classic double agent. "Running double agents has long

been a quintessentially Russian s6ill, practiced before, during, and after the Soviet period.& Dolin











began his career as an #6hrana penetration of anarcho9communist groups "see the fourth

reprinted article, <#6hrana 3gent Dolin<&. #n the eve of *orld *ar 0 he began ;or6ing for

German military intelligence99or so the Germans thought. Ce ;as in fact a double agent ;ho hadremained loyal to Russia. *ith help from the #6hrana, Dolin organiBed <successful< sabotage

operations inside Russian ;eapons and munitions factories99operations that ;ere <documented<

in press articles.

The Germans ;ere so pleased ;ith Dolin that they as6ed him to conduct psychological ;arfareoperations aimed at stirring up Russian ;or6ers to overthro; the monarchy and ta6e Russia out

of the ;ar. <@ronenbitter< neglects to mention that ;hen Dolins efforts fell short of

e!pectations, the Germans turned to another Russian agent on their payroll by the name of2ladimir )enin. Ce ;as more successful, and the rest, as they say, is history.

The #6hrana ;as, in a limited sense, ahead of its time as an equal opportunity employer. 0t

recruited people of all nationalities9and especially ;omen9as agents. *-$, *omen, in fact, ;ere

crucial to its operations and ;ere paid as ;ell or better than their male counterparts "see the fifth

and si!th reprinted articles99<The #6hrana' s ?emale 3gents,< 'arts 0 and 00&. *omen, ho;ever,;ere not permitted to become staff officers or managers9only agents.

The ;omen ;ere at least as colorful as the men99maybe more so. #ne e!ample ;as <?rancesco,<

the ;ife of a respected Eosco; physician. *hile a student at Eosco; University, she madethree vo;s: to love her husband, to help 6ill the tsar, and to ;or6 for the #6hrana. #nly the last

promise ;as 6ept.

3nother interesting female operative ;as 6no;n only as La 6etite. 3s a 489year9old mil6maid,she spied for 'olish nationalists ;hile delivering mil6 to the #6hrana office in *arsa;. Cer

target: office trash cans that sometimes contained copies of secret messages and names of

informants in 'oland. During *orld *ar 0 she ;or6ed for the Russians against the 3ustro9Cungarian mpire, posing as an 3ustrian citiBen. 3fter the ;ar she retired to Eonte $arlo, ;hereshe ;as 6no;n as L' 3utrichienne.

Conclusions

The @ronenbitter collection reveals the #6hrana' s foreign operations through anecdote, not

analysis. The articles are entertaining and yet still inform in a loosely structured ;ay. ?orhistorians they suggest possibilities for more in9depth studies of Russian intelligence and

counterintelligence operations in their formative period. *-2, ?or observers of the contemporary

scene they give insight into the apparent parado! of the <ne;< Russia, ;hich, recent events havedemonstrated, still gives high priority to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

The Soviet Union and the $ommunist 'arty and even the @G> are gone, but Russia <retains a

strong intelligence profile and a traditional intelligence culture that are distinct from and even

alien to our o;n.< *-#, Ea(or9po;er espionage and counterespionage today have a lessideological rationale than during the $old *ar, but the Russians do set forth a (ustification,

couched in terms of vital national interests and security. The #6hrana story illustrates ;hat

history, even narrative history that is not primarily analytical, can offer99namely, events andinsights from the past that have implications for the present and the future.












The vie;s e!pressed in this 'reface are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the

vie;s of the $entral 0ntelligence 3gency or any other US Government entity.

*", Russian contemporaries as ;ell as present9day historians have used the term #6hranato refergenerically to the Einistry of 0nteriors Department of State 'olice, ;hich ;as created in 411and renamed Department of 'olice in 4118. Strictly spea6ing, ho;ever, the term referred

specifically to the security detail assigned to the tsar and the royal family.

The Department of 'olice included a unit 6no;n as the Special Section "!so+ !tdel or ##&,

;hich dealt ;ith political crimes and sensitive investigations. The ## ;as a clandestine service,organiBationally and physically separate from the regular police apparatus, but located on the

fifth floor of the police headquarters at 45 ?ontan6a Muai, St. 'etersburg. The ## formally

commanded so9called okhranoe otdelenie or security sections from ;hich the colloquial term#6hrana;as derived, although in practice the subordinate units ;ere more or less independent.

"?ull title: otdelenie po okhraneniiu o+shchestvennoi +e2opastnosti i poriadka, or section formaintaining public security and order.& The first three security sections ;ere created in St.'etersburg, Eosco;, and *arsa;. >y 444 there ;ere 7- sections at the provincial, city, and

oblast levels. See llis Tennant Ipseudonym of d;ard llis SmithJ, comp. and ed., <The

Department of 'olice 4449448 from the Recollections of /i6olai 2ladimirovich 2eselago,< ind;ard llis Smith $ollection, bo! 4, Coover 0nstitution 3rchives passim ?rederic S.

Luc6erman, <2ladimir >urtsev and the Tsarist 'olitical 'olice,< 8ournal of Contemporar

istor, 2ol. 4+ "Aanuary 477&, p. +4-n44 and he sarist Secret 6olice in -ussian Societ,

"993"#"% "/e; Kor6 University 'ress, /e; Kor6, 45&, p. !iv George )eggett, he Cheka: Lenin's 6olitical 6olice "/e; Kor6: #!ford University 'ress, 414&, p. !!iii $hristopher

3ndre; and #leg Gordievs6y, ;.1: he Inside Stor of Its 5oreign !perations from Lenin to

.or+achev "/e; Kor6: Carper9$ollins 6u+lishers, 4&, pp. + ff and Richard 'ipes, -ussia<nder the !ld -egime "/e; Kor6: $ollier >oo6s=Eacmillan 'ublishing $ompany, 4&, p.

84.

*+, The term #6hran6a, ;hich ;as sometimes used interchangeably ;ith #6hrana, ;as

frequently used to refer to the 'aris office. The term agentura means agency or bureau, but italso referred to an agent net;or6. Zagranichnaia means <foreign.< See d;ard llis Smith ;ith

Rudolf )ednic6y, =he !khrana=: he -ussian *epartment of 6olice: A 1i+liograph "Stanford,

$3: The Coover 0nstitution on *ar, Revolution and 'eace, 457&, p. +54. There ;ere t;oforeign bureaus99the other one ;as in >ucharest99and both had satellite offices. The 'aris office,

for e!ample, oversa; a subordinate unit in >erlin. Together the 'aris and >ucharest offices ran

all tsarist police and intelligence operations ;orld;ide.

*-, Ronald Cingley, he -ussian Secret 6olice: >uscovite, Imperial, and Soviet 6oliticalSecurit !perations "/e; Kor6: Simon N Schuster, 47&, p. 7+.

*, Certers role is being divulged here for the first time. 0n 4-7 Certer ;as 3cting Secretary of

State, and the Coover 0nstitution thought it best not to reveal his role.

http://www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/okhrana/#ft1










*/, Stanford University /e;s Service, #ctober 8, 4-7 in Coover 0nstitution Records, bo!

473 3rchives Sub(ect ?ile 34, folder: #6hrana 'ro(ect 45+. See also <$Barist Dossiers on

Reds #pened,< Ne( ?ork imes, #ctober 8, 4-7, p. 4.

*0, Draft press release in Coover 0nstitution Records, bo! 473, 3rchives Sub(ect ?ile 34,

folder: #6hrana 'ro(ect 45+.

*$, Richard Deacon, A istor of the -ussian Secret Service ")ondon: ?rederic6 Euller )td.,

47+&, p. 15.

*2, During Aames Aesus 3ngletons tenure from 4- to 47-, the $03s $ounterintelligence Staff regularly studied historical cases of Soviet intelligence operations, loo6ing for insights into

contemporary operations and methods. $ritics complained that 3ngletons staff ;asted time and

resources ree!amining cases such as the rest "Trust& deception operation of the 4+s and the -ote ;apelle "Red #rchestra& espionage net;or6 of the *orld *ar 00 era. They argued that the

@G>99created in 4-99;as an entirely ne; organiBation ;ith ne; missions and tradecraft. See

Tom Eangold, Cold )arrior: 8ames 8esus Angleton: he CIA's >aster Sp unter "/e; Kor6:Simon N Schuster, 44&, pp. 5954, 8+98+-, 88 passim. The same critics presumably ;ould

have been even more critical of studies of the pre9Soviet #6hrana. 0n fact, ho;ever, the historical

literature on Russian and Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence is not particularly rich and

in some cases is not reliable, so even <historical< studies ;ere ;elcome to the counterintelligencespecialists.

*#, See 3ndre; and Gordievs6y, ;.1, p. ++ and #leg @alugin, @id s Lu+ianki: =*elo= 1vshego

.enerala ;.1 "Eosco;: /eBavisimoe 0Bdatelstvo, 4&, p. 8-, as cited in #rlando ?iges, A

6eople's raged: A istor of the -ussian -evolution "/e; Kor6: 2i6ing, 45&, p. 5-n. 0n an

nglish9language memoir, #leg @alugin notes that his training class read a detailed account of

agent recruitment methods prepared by /icholas 00s chief of counterintelligence. See #leg@alugin ;ith ?en Eontaigne, he 5irst *irectorate: > B ?ears in Intelligence and Counterintelligence Against the )est "/e; Kor6: St. Eartins 'ress, 4&, p. 47.

*"3, $reation of the #6hrana mar6ed the emergence of the modern secret or political police

apparatus. 0ts predecessor, the Third Section, ;as more in the tradition of a praetorian or palace

guard aimed at th;arting plots and intrigues against the tsars by Russian aristocrats and nobles,especially at court and in the military. The #6hrana's main mission ;as dealing ;ith the rise of

the revolutionary intelligentsia in the latter part of the 4th century. See Richard A. Aohnson,

=Zagranichnaia Agentura: The Tsarist 'olitical 'olice in urope,< in Contemporar istor, 2ol.7 "Aanuary93pril 47+&, p. +++.

*"", There is no comprehensive history of the #6hrana's foreign operations. ?or a list of boo6s

and articles that describe its organiBation and methods, see Smith, = The #6hrana= , pp. 5-957 and

+89++.

*"+, $ited in 3ndre; and Gordievs6y, ;.1, pp. +89+.

*"-, I+id ., p. +.





















*", Aohnson, < Zagranichaia Agentura,< p. ++5.

*"/, D.$. >. )ieven, <The Security 'olice, $ivil Rights, and the ?ate of the Russian mpire,

41--9447,< in #lga $risp and )inda dmondson, eds., Civil -ights in Imperial -ussia "$larendon 'ress: #!ford, 41&, p. +5. Cingley claims that by 4 the #6hranahad 4-

agents inside the Socialist Revolutionary, >olshevi6, and Eenshevi6 socialist parties and even inthe less9threatening liberal @adet party. Cingley, he -ussian Secret 6olice, p. 4.

*"0, )ieven, <The Security 'olice, $ivil Rights, and the ?ate of the Russian mpire, 41--9447,< p. +7.

*"$, Aohnson, < Zagranichaia Agentura,< p. +8+.

*"2, Soldiers ;ere considered reliable because they had s;orn allegiance to the tsar.

*"#, Tennant, <The Department of 'olice 4449448 from the Recollections of /i6olai

2alidimirovich 2eselago,< p. 41.

*+3, 3s a result of >loody Sunday, the tsar did not appear in public again until 448, thetercentenary of the Romanov dynasty. 0n the months follo;ing the incident in St. 'etersburg, the

entire country, already suffering the strains of a losing ;ar ;ith Aapan, e!perienced uprisings and

revolts by ;or6ers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors. #ne result ;as the creation of the State Duma,;hich convened in 45, but by and large political and social reforms ;ere too little and too late.

ven though /icholas 00 did not authoriBe the police crac6do;n, >loody Sunday helped destroy

the centuries9old peasant image of the tsar as the godfather and savior of Russia. Gaponsdemonstrators had gathered for the time9honored tradition of petitioning the tsar for relief from

their manifold problems. See ?iges, A 6eople's raged, pp. 894-.

*+", )ieven, <The Security 'olice, $ivil Rights, and the ?ate of the Russian mpire, 41--9447,<

p. +7.

*++, Aohn A. DBia6, Chekist: A istor of the ;.1 ")e!ington, E3: )e!ington >oo6s=D.$.Ceath and $ompany, 411&, p. 84.

*+-, 'ipes, -ussia under the !ld -egime, p. 84-.

*+, I+id ., p. 847.

*+/, Aohn $hannon ;ith Rob Cudson, he 6enguin Atlas of -ussia ")ondon: 'enguin, 4-&, p.448.

*+0, 'ipes, -ussia under the !ld -egime, p. 84+.

*+$, During the late 45s and 47s the Soviet politburo and the @G>, led by Kuri 3ndropov,

;aged a campaign of terror, repression, and disinformation against SolBhenitsyn. #ne e!ample:

the @G> detained and so brutally interrogated one of the authors typists, liBaveta































2oronyans6aya, that she bro6e do;n and divulged ;here a copy of he .ulag Archipelago ;as

hidden. 0n despair, she committed suicide. She ;as secretly buried to cover up the @G>s crime.

DoBens of official documents on the anti9SolBhenitsyn campaign ;ere translated and edited inEichael Scammell, ed., he Sol2henitsn 5iles: Secret Soviet *ocuments -eveal !ne >an's

5ight Against the >onolith "$hicago: edition q, inc., 4-&.

*+2, ?iges argues that the #6hrana' s mistreatment of imprisoned revolutionaries brutaliBed them

and ;hetted their appetite for revenge once the political tables ;ere turned. <#ne can dra; astraight line from the penal rigors of the tsarist regime to the terrorism of the revolutionaries and

indeed to the police state of the >olshevi6s.< A 6eople's raged, p. 4+. There may be some

truth to this, but the >olshevi6s, in quic6ly creating a police apparatus of their o;n, seemedmotivated more by a desire to maintain po;er than by any quest for revenge against their former

tormentors.

*+#, Cistorian >ertram D. *olfe claims that Carting and Lhitomirs6y ;ere one and the same, but

the latter ;as actually the formers agent. >ertram D. *olfe, hree )ho >ade a -evolution: A

1iographical istor ">oston: >eacon Cill 'ress, 4--&, p. -85.

*-3, 0bid., pp -8-9--7

*-", DBia6, Chekist, p. -.

*-+, )eggett ;rites: <The e!tent of the #6hrana ' s penetration of the >olshevi6 'arty ;as such

that not only ;as it minutely informed about the membership, structure, and activities of the party "one of the best sources of the pre9447 >olshevi6 'arty history is a collection of Eosco;

#6hrana documents&, but it ;as also in a position to influence >olshevi6 tactics.< "he Cheka, p.

!!iv.&

*--, Tennant, <The Department of 'olice 444 9 448 from <Recollections of /i6olai2ladimirovich 2eselago,< p. 1.

*-, ?or more on >urtsevs e!ploits against the #6hrana, ;hich for a time almost leveled the

playing field for the revolutionaries, see Luc6erman, <2ladimir >urtsev and the Tsarist 'olitical'olice,< pp. 489+4.

*-/, /orman $ohn, )arrant for .enocide: he >th of the 8e(ish )orld Conspirac and the

6rotocols of the 7lders of Zion "/e; Kor6: Carper and Ro;, 457&, pp. 1914.

*-0, See 2yacheslav @evor6ov, he Secret Channel: >osco(, the ;.1 and 1onn's 7astern 6olic Iin GermanJ ">erlin: Ro;ohlt, 4-&.

*-$, 3nna Geifman notes that as the turn of the century approached, ;omen, especially those

from upper9 and middle9class bac6grounds, became involved in underground politics and even in

e!tremist acts: <3s a result of rapidly changing family relations and the spread of literacy, self9

assertive girls and young ;omen could no longer be confined to the home. 3t the same time,ho;ever, they ;ere denied higher education, along ;ith any role in the political process, and in























general ;ere offered little opportunity to realiBe their intellectual ambitions. This drove a number

of them into the ran6s of the radical outcasts, ;here their male comrades ;ere ;illing to give

them greater recognition than could reasonably be e!pected ;ithin the traditional establishment. .. .To a large e!tent, this accounts for the fact that ;omen comprised nearly one9third of the SR

ISocialist RevolutionaryJ $ombat #rganiBation, and appro4imatel one3fourth of all -ussian

terrorists at the +eginning of the centur.< Iemphasis addedJ 3nna Geifman, hou Shalt ;ill: -evolutionar errorism in -ussia, "9#3"#"% "'rinceton: 'rinceton University 'ress, 45&, p.

4+. This involvement also made ;omen natural targets of police surveillance and recruitment.

*-2, ?or an e!ample of solid scholarship based in part on the #6hrana $ollection at the Coover

0nstitution, see Geifmans boo6 cited in the previous footnote.

*-#, Aames Sherr, <$ultures of Spying,< he National Interest , /o. 81 "*inter 4=-&, p. 5.





OKHRANA - The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police

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