OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA William Todd Overcash, · PDF file12.06.2014 · IN THE...

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

William Todd Overcash, Petitioner,

V.

Lori A. Foultz, Respondent.

5th DCA CASE #: 5D-14-2079

Re: 5th Judicial Circuit, in and for Marion County, Case #:

2002-4655-DR-FJ

I

APPENDIX TO

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 9.100 (e), (f) and (h), and 9.300

Dated this 12th day of June, 2014.

William Todd Overcash, Petitioner, pro se 14311 SE 128th Street Ocklawaha, Florida 32179

T4Dr. william

lhne: 352-812-8812 -

Tod rcash

Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 28

AppendixIndex

FOURTH AMENDED ORDER SETTING TRIAL ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE . 9

Appendix A: The docket report for the (just under) 18 months from 1 January

2013 to Friday 6 June 2013 ……. Page 31

Appendix B: Judge Barbara Gurrola took over these proceedings after the

disqualification of Judge William Swigert on or about 23 July 2012…… Page 70

Appendix C: Writ of Prohibition filed on 10 December 2012 on his behalf by

Attorney Beth Gordon…….. Page 89

Appendix D: Letter of January 17th, 2014 written by Attorney Beth Gordon when

she no longer represented the Petitioner, a letter supporting William Todd

Overcash’s allegations and inferences of bias against Judge Gurrola… Page 150

Appendix E: Affidavit of Carolyn Torrey……. Page 153

Appendix F: Ex-parte Hearing Transcript of 2 April 2014 ….. Page 156

Appendix G: Hearing Transcripts October 30th

2013 …. Page 188

Appendix H: Motions to Recused / Amended Motion to Recused … Page 220

Appendix I: Affidavits William Todd Overcash on Motions to recuse ….. Page 271

Appendix J: Frengel v. Frengel, 880 S.2d at 764-5 …. Page 278

Appendix K: Motion to Recuse 17 January 2013, denied (“stricken”) 6 February

2013….. Page 281

Appendix L: 23 May 2013, Motion to recuse with request to transfer outside 5th

Circuit), denied 31 May 2013 ……. Page 284

Appendix M: Motion to Disqualify 4 November 2013, denied (“stricken”) 7

November 2013 …….. Page 287

Appendix Index continued

Appendix N: Motion to Recuse/Disqualify 31 January 2014, denied (“stricken”) 12

February 2014 ……….. Page 290

Appendix O: Motion to Recuse/Disqualify 20 February 2014, Emergency Petition

for Writ of Prohibition Fifth District Court of Appeal Filed and Denied Page 292

Appendix P: Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge 24 February 2014, Emergency

Motion for Reconsideration of Petition for Recusal of Judge Gurrola filed, stricken

25 February 2014…. Page 296

Appendix Q: 15 April 2014, Motion to Recuse Judge Gurrola and Marion

County5th Judicial Circuit, Denied 17 April 2014….. Page 299

Appendix R: 2 May 2014, Motion to Recuse Judge Gurrola and Marion County 5th

Judicial Circuit, Denied 9 May 2014……. 05

Appendix S: Supreme Court Justice Speaks to 5th

Circuit on Professional Ethics

following the filing of SC 14-242 …. Page 307

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO. 2002 3i.DFJ J rn

go C)

Ev _

Ifl

.,,, c_n CO

In re: The Former Marriage of:

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, Former Husband.

and

LORI ANN FOULTZ f/k/a LORI ANN OVERCASH,

Former Wife,

FOURTH AMENDED ORDER SETTING TRIAL ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon the Former Wife's Motion for Indirect

Criminal Contempt, and the Court having entered an Order to Show Cause, requiring the Former

Husband, WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, to appear before this Court, and the Court having granted

the Former Wife's Motion to Continue, and the Former Husband having previously entered a plea

of not guilty, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore,

ORDERED:

1. The Trial on the Order to Show Cause on the Former Wife's Motion for Indirect

Criminal Contempt, in the above-captioned matter is set for Friday, July 18, 2014, beginning at

10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Barbara Gurrola, Senior Circuit Judge, at the Marion County

Judicial Center, located at 110 NW 1St Avenue, Ocala, Florida 34475. Failure of the Former

Husband to appear at said Trial will result in an Arrest Warrant being issued.

DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of May, 2014, at Ocala, Marion County, Florida.

/ IBARBARA ~GGURROLA Senior Judge

Page 1 of 2


AppendixA

Thedocketreportforthe(justunder)18

monthsfrom1January2013toFriday6

June2013


OFFICEOF DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN TIME: 01:34:39 PM

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DATE: Jun 6, 2014

MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA PAGE: 1

42-2002-DR-004655-AXXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED

FILING DATE: 10-28-2002 CASE TYPE: DOM DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE DATE CASE ENTERED:

EVENT CATEGORY: PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014

DATE PARTY EVENT RECEIPT# AMOUNT

01-08-2013 ORDER FROM 5TH DCA

COPY OF ORDER

01-10-2013 PE I NOTICE OF PRODUCTION NON-PARTY

NOTICE OF PRODUCTION FROM NON-PARTY WITHOUT DEPOSITIONS

01-10-2013 PE 1 REQUEST TO PRODUCE

FORMER WIFE'S THIRD REQUEST TO PRODUCE

01-10-2013 RE I NOTICE OF PRODUCTION NON-PARTY


01-11-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $1.00

01-11-2013 RE I PAY: COPY FEE CA D 161894 $-1.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: COPY

01-14-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $8.00

01-14-2013 RE 1 ASM: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA $2.00

01-14-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $2.00


01-14-2013 RE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 161913 $-BOO Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: CERTIFIED COPY

01-14-2013 RE 1 PAY: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA D 161913 $-2.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA



OFFICE OF DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN TIME: 01:34:39 PM



42-2002-DR-004655-AXXJ(-XJ( OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED








01-16-2013 PE I REQUEST TO PRODUCE

WIFE'S FOURTH REQUEST TO PRODUCE

01-17-2013 RE 1 MTN FOR RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATN

FORMER HUSBAND'S REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GUROLLA AND TRANSFER OUTSIDE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

01-22-2013 REO: MOTION

MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT

01-22-2013 REO: CASE REOPENED NO DOC #

01-22-2013 MOTION

FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME TO FORMER HUSBAND

01-23-2013 CORRJMEMO TO JUDGES OFFICE

FROM ATTY BRIAN MOTRONI

01-24-2013 PE 1 MOTION

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

01-25-2013 COPY OF:(SEE TEXT DESCRIPTION)

COPY OF SHELTER ORDER

01-28-2013 SUBPOENA ISSUED

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION FOR NON-PARTY

02-06-2013 ORDER STRIKING









ORDER STRIKING PETITIONERS MOTION

02-13-2013 PEI NOTICE OF FILING

RETURN OF NON-SERVICE ON DR. BRADY ON 02/01/13

02-14-2013 DESIGNATION OF EMAIL ADDRESS

PRIMARY EMAIL ADDRESS: JANETBEHNKELAW.NET SECONDARY EMAIL ADDRESS: [email protected]

02-14-2013 PEI REO: MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST


02-14-2013 PEI AMENDED MOTION

AMENDED MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT

02-14-2013 PEI REQUEST

REQUEST FOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

02-14-2013 PEI MOTION

MOTION FOR PROSPECTIVE TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

02-14-2013 PEI REQUEST TO PRODUCE

FIFTH REQUEST

02-14-2013 PEI MOTION TO CONTINUE

MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME ON FORMER HUSBAND AND MOTION TO DEFER RULING ON FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME ON FORMER WIFE

02-14-2013 NOTICE OF HEARING

2/27/13AT2 PM








DATE PARTY EVENT RECEIPT# AMOUNT 02-15-2013 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR REIMBURSMENT FOR TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS FILED ON 2/14/13

02-15-2013 PE 1 NOTICE

NOTICE OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED

02-15-2013 RETURN OF SERVICE

NON SERVE RETURN ON KATE WILSON ON 2/11/13 WITH ATTACHED NOTICE OF FILING AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


02-20-2013 ATTORNEY COVER LETTER

FROM SHELNUTT TO GURROLA 2/11/13

02-20-2013 ORDER ON MOTION

ORDER ON MOTION FR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT

02-20-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME TO THE FORMER WIFE


ORDER ON MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

02-20-2013 NOTICE OF PRODUCTION NON-PARTY

NOTICE OF PRODUCTION FROM NON PARTY WITHOUT DEPOSITIONS

02-20-2013 CLS: REOPENED CASE CLOSED

02-21-2013 RE 1 ASM: NONCASE COPY FEE CA $18.60









02-21-2013 RE 1 PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 163772 $-18.60 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: PRINTOUT OF CASE HISTORY

03-05-2013 PE 1 NOTICE

OF ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION FOR NON-PARTY



03-06-2013 PE I REO: MOTION

APPELLEES MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD


03-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON PAYMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM


ATTORNEY COVER LETTER FROM MARK D. SHELNUTT


ATTORNEY COVER LETTER FROM MARK D. SHELNUTT REF ORDER AFFIRMING COURTS PREVIOUS ORDER FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF FORMER WIFE'S TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

03-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER AFFIRMING COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDER FOR REMIBURSEMENT OF WIFE'S TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

03-08-2013 PE I MOTION

MTN TO COMPEL, MTN FOR ATTYS FEES AND SANCTIONS

03-08-2013 PE 1 DIRECTIONS TO THE CLERK









03-13-2013 EVIDENCE RECORD FORM

03-13-2013 RE 1 REO: MOTION

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER


03-13-2013 PE 1 MOTION TO COMPEL

03-13-2013 PE 1 NOTICE OF FILING

RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIURETURN RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL

03-14-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $20.00

03-14-2013 RE I PAY: COPY FEE CA V 105571 $-20.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: COPIES OF CASE ON CD


BUSINESS RECORDS

03-15-2013 CORR/MEMO TO JUDGES OFFICE


ORDER ON FORMER WIFES MOTION FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTY FEES AND COSTS


ORDER ON MTN TO CONTINUE HRG ON FORMER WIFES MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME ON FORMER HUSBAND AND ORDER ON MTN TO DEFER RULING ON FORMER HUSBANDS MTN TO IMPUTE INCOME ON FORMER WIFE


OFFICE OF DAVID ft ELLSPERMANN TIME: 01:34:39 PM








ORDER ON MTN FOR CONTEMPT & ENFORCEMENT


03-15-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON ISSUE OF CONTINUED HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE MINOR CHILD


ORDER ON MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED AYFYS FEES AND COSTS

03-15-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON AMENDED MTN FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT

03-15-2013 INDEX TO RECORD ON APPEAL

VOL 1

03-18-2013 PE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $48.00

03-18-2013 PE I ASM: APPEAL INDEX PREP FEE CA $10.50

03-18-2013 PE 1 ASM: DOCUMENT ISSUE FEE CA $7.00

03-18-2013 PE 1 ASM:POSTAGE REIMBURSE CA & CP $1.84

03-18-2013 INVOICE-APPELLATE FEES

03-19-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $26.00










03-19-2013 RE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 164989 $-26.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: (9) CERTIFIED COPIES


Memo: (9) CERTIFIED COPIES

03-21-2013 PE 1 REO: MOTION

MTN TO APPOINT VOCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT EXPERT, AND MTN REQUESTING ORDER FROM COURT REQUIRING COOPERATION OF FORMER HUSBAND AS TO SAME


03-27-2013 RE 1 ASM: APPEAL FF TO DCA/SC CA $100.00

03-27-2013 RE I NOTICE OF APPEAL

03-27-2013 RE 1 PAY: APPEAL FF TO DCAJSC CA D 165265 $-100.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: APPEAL/REOPEN FEE

03-28-2013 RE I REO: EMERGENCY MOTION

MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY PENDING REVIEW PURSUANT TO FLORIDA RUL OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.310(A)

04-01-2013 RECEIPT

04-01-2013 RECEIPT-APPELLATE FEES PAID

04-01-2013 PE I PAY: COPY FEE CA D 165463 $-48.00 Received Of: SHELNUT MARK DE

Memo:









04-01-2013 PE 1 PAY: APPEAL INDEX PREP FEE CA D 165463 $-10.50 Received Of: SHELNUT MARK DE

Memo:

04-01-2013 PE I PAY: POSTAGE REIMBURSEMENT D 165463 $-1.84 Received Of: SHELNUT MARK DE

Memo:

04-01-2013 PE 1 PAY: DOCUMENT ISSUE FEE CA D 165463 $-7.00 Received Of: SHELNUT MARK DE

Memo:


MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES


MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SANCTIONS

04-04-2013 ORDER

ORDER AND NTC SETTING HRG ON RESPONDENT/FORMER HUSBANDS MTN FOR EMERGENCY STAY FRI, APRIL 2, 2013 @ 10 AM


MOTION REQUESTING ORDER FOR RECORDED LIEN


MOTION REQUESTING ORDER FOR RECORDED LIEN

04-11-2013 PE 1 RESPONSE TO MOTION

FORMER WIFE'S RESPONSE TO FORMER HUSBAND'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE STAY PENDING REVIEW PURSUANT TO FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

04-12-2013 PE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $21.00









04-12-2013 PE 1 ASM: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA $6.00


04-12-2013 AMENDED ORDER

ON FORMER WIFES MOTION FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTY FEES & COSTS


ORDER ON FORMER HUSBANDS MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY PENDING REVIEW

04-12-2013 RE 1 WRIT OF BODILY ATTACHMENT

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH PURGE AMOUNT $24,378.02


04-12-2013 LEGAL EXCERPTS/CASE LAW


04-12-2013 PE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 165960 $-21.00 Received Of: SHELNUTT MARK D

Memo:

04-12-2013 PE 1 PAY: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA D 165960 $-6.00 Received Of: SHELNUTT MARK D

Memo:

04-15-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA

$5.00











Memo: (2) CERTIFIED COPY


Memo: (2) CERTIFIED COPY

04-18-2013 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NEW CASE NO


REQUESTING AUTHORIZATION FOR OUT-OF-STATE TRAVEL

05-01-2013 PE 1 MOTION

FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS


05-02-2013 PE 1 REO: MOTION FOR CONTEMPT



TO JUDGE GURROLA FROM M SHELNUTT 4/26/13

05-02-2013 ORDER

ORDER MODIFYING ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM


MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

05-04-2013 RE 1 REO: EMERGENCY MOTION

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND ORDER TO REQUIRE SHERIFF TO ACCEPT PURGE AMOUNT









05-06-2013 PE 1 AFFIDAVIT

AFFIDAVIT OF RECEIPT OF ATTYS FEES AND FORMER HUSBANDS COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDER

05-07-2013 PE 1 REQUEST

FORMER WIFES REQUEST FOR CASE MGMNT CONFERENCE

05-07-2013 PE 1 MOTION FOR CONTEMPT


6/28/13© 10 AM

05-07-2013 ORDER RESCINDING

& RECALLING WRIT OF BODILY ATTACHMENT

05-08-2013 RE I WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT RECALLED

05-08-2013 SHERIFFS RETURN OF SERVICE

UNSIGNED; FORM NOT FILLED OUT

05-17-2013 PE 1 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

JUNE 28, 2013 AT 10 AM

05-23-2013 RE I REQUEST

FORMER HUSBAND'S REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GUROLLA AND TRANSFER OUTSIDE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

05-23-2013 RE I NOTICE OF REMOVAL

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ATTORNEYS


05-28-2013 ORDER GRANTING MOTION









CONSENT ORDER GRANTING OUT-OF-STATE TRAVEL


05-28-2013 CORRESPONDENCE OR MEMORANDUM


SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON JUNE 28, 2013 AT 10:00 AM


FORMER WIFE'S SIXTH REQUEST TO PRODUCE


PETITIONERS MOTION

06-07-2013 RE 1 MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY


HEARING DATE AND TIME 6-28-13 AT 10:00 BEFORE JUDGE GURROLA COURTROOM TO BE ANNOUNCED

06-12-2013 PEI NOTICE TO PRODUCE

DOCUMENTS AT HEARING/HEARING ON 6/28/2013 @ 10 AM


06-13-2013 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

JUNE 28, 2013 AT 10:00 AM,

06-13-2013 PEI REO: MOTION

FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND









06-20-2013 RE I MOTION

FORMER HUSBANDS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY FORMER WIFES COUNSEL

06-21-2013 REO: CASE REOPENED NO DOG #


MOTION FOR DIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

06-25-2013 RE I RESPONSE

06.26-2013 COPY OF MOTION SENT

FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY FORMER WIFE'S COUNSEL

06-27-2013 PE I NOTICE OF FILING

NOTICE OF FILING RECORDS

06-28-2013 ORDER ALLOWING TELEPHONIC HRG

JUNE 28, 2013 AT 10:00 A.M.


ORDER GRANTING ROBERT E. TAYLOR'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS LEGAL CO-COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR FORMER HUSBAND

07-01-2013 RE I MTN TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY

07-01-2013 CROSS NOTICE OF HEARING

6/28/13

07-02-2013 NOTICE OF RESCHEDULING HEARING

JULY 15, 2013 AND JULY 16, 2013 AT 9:30 A.M.


07/15/2013 AT 9:30AM




MARION COUNTY. FLORIDA PAGE: 15





07-09-2013 MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS FORMER HUSBANDS LEGAL COUNSEL

07-09-2013 MTN TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY

MOTION TO APPEAR VIA TELEPHONE AT THE JULY 15TH 2013 MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS FORMER HUSBANDS LEGAL COUNSEL


ORDER ON FORMER HUSBANDS MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME OF FORMER WIFE

07-11-2013 PE I OBJECTION TO

FORMER WIFE'S OBJECTION TO OPPOSING COUNSELS MOTION TO WITHDRAWL AS FORMER HUSBANDS LEGAL COUNSEL & FORMER'S OBJECTION OPPOSIING COUNSELS MOTION TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE AT 7/15/2013 MOTION TO WITHDRAWL AS FORMER HUSBANDS LEGAL COUNSEL



ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND FORMER WIFE'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGE MENT OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

07-11-2013 ORDER DENYING TELEPHONIC HRG

ORDER DENYING FORMER HUSBAND'S LEGAL COUNSEL'S MOTION TO APPEAR VIA TELEPHONE AT JULY 15TH HEARING


ORDER ON FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING SET FOR 07/15

07-16-2013 RE 1 REO: PETITION

TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION






42-2002-DR-004655-AxXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED




07-16-2013 RE 1 COPY OF:(SEE TEXT DESCRIPTION)

PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STAEPPARENT ADOPTION

07-16-2013 FINAL JUDGMENT

TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION

07-25-2013 ORDER

FOR PAYMENT TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM COSTS

08-01-2013 RE 1 MOTION

RENEWED MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS FORMER HUSBAND'S COUNSEL

08-01-2013 RE 1 MTN TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY

MOTION TO APPEAR VIA TELEPHONE AT MOTION TO WITHDRAW


MULTIPLE DOCUMENTS

08-13-2013 PE 1 OBJECTION TO

FORMER WIFE'S OBJECTION TO FORMER HUSBAND'S COUNSEL'S RENEWED MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS FORMER HUSBAND'S COUNSEL AND FORMER WIFE'S OBJECTION TO EMERGENCY MOTION TO CONTINUE AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE

08-13-2013 PE 1 REQUEST

FORMER WIFE'S REQUEST FOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

08-13-2013 PE 1 NOTICE OF HEARING

AUGUST 14, 2013 AT 10:00A.M.

08-13-2013 PE 1 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

NOTICE OF FILING WITH SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EXCERPT





42-2002-DR-004655-AX)O(-)O( OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED




08-13-2013 PE 1 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

NOTICE OF FILING PART 2 OF EXCERPT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

08-14-2013 PE 1 MOTION FOR DEFAULT


ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW

08-14-2013 ORDER

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT

08-14-2013 ORDER

ORDER ALLOWING RELOCATION OF MINOR CHILD


HEARING SET FOR 09/18/2013 AT 9:30AM


ORDER ALLOWING TELEPHONIC HEARING


ORDER GRANTING ROBERT E. TAYLOR'S MOTIONTO WITHDRAW AS LEGAL CO-COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR FATHER


ORDER ON EMERGENCY MOTION TO CONTINUE AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE


REPORT OF GENERAL MAGISTRATE UPON JUDICIAL REVIEW HEARING AND NOTICE OF HEARING






42-2002-DR-004655-AXXX-XJ( OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED



DATE PARTY EVENT RECEIPT # AMOUNT

ORDER UPON CONTINUED JUDICIAL REVIEW HEARING AND NOTICE OF HEARING

08-27-2013 PE 1 MOTION TO COMPEL


SET FOR 09/18/2013 AT 9:30AM

09-06-2013 NOTICE OF FILING



SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 AT 9:30 A.M.

09-10-2013 PE 1 NOTICE


09-10-2013 PE 1 AMENDED MOTION

AMENDED MOTION FOR PROSPECTIVE TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

09-10-2013 PE I REO: MOTION FOR CONTEMPT


09-18-2013 RE 1 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

09-18-2013 RE 1 CROSS NOTICE OF HEARING

FOR 09/18/13 @ 9:30 AM


FOR CONTINUANCE






42-2002-DR-004655-AXXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BC BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED





09-19-2013 RE 1 WRIT OF BODILY ATTACHMENT

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH $21466.29

09-19-2013 REO: ARREST AFFIDAVIT


09-19-2013 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

10/22/13@ 10 AM

10-03-2013 PE 1 RESPONSE TO MOTION

FORMER WIFE'S RESPONSE TO FORMER HUSBANDS MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTION AND RELEASE OF TRANSCRIPT


ORDER ON FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTION AND RELEASE OF TRANSCRIPT


10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER HUSBANDS MOTION TO CONTINUE

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON REMOVAL OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND PAYMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SANCTIONS, DATED MARCH 8, 2013


TIME: 01:34:39 PM OFFICE OF DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN DATE: Jun 6, 2014

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT PAGE: 20

MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

422002-DR-004655-AXXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH

PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED

FILING DATE: 10-28-2002 CASE TYPE: DOM DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

DATE CASE ENTERED: EVENT CATEGORY:

PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SANCTIONS, DATED MARCH 13,2013

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SANCTIONS, DATED APRIL 2, 2013

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SANCTIONS, DATED AUGUST 27,

2013

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION REQUESTING ORDER FOR

RECORDING LIEN

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S SECOND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT, DATED MAY 2, 2013

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND

COSTS

10-07-2013 ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR INTIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT, DATED SEPTEMBER 6, 2013




TIME: 01:34.39 PM OFFICE OF DAVID ft ELLSPERMANN DATE: Jun 6, 2014



42-2002-DR-004655-AXXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH




PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


10-08-2013 MOTION

MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTION AND RELEASE OF TRANSCRIPT

10-10-2013 PEI ASM: NONCASE COPY FEE CA $21.30

10-10-2013 PEI PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 172943 $-21.30

Received Of: OVERCASH LORI A Memo: PRINTOUT


10-22-2013 PEI REO: MOTION

MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

10-22-2013 PEI MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED TEMPORARY APPELATE ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS


10-28-2013 RE 1 PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 173446 $-21.75

Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: CASE HISTORY PRINTOUTS


12/12/13 @ 3 PM

10-29-2013 NOTICE OF PRODUCTION NON-PARTY

11-04-2013 RE I MTN FOR RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATN

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

11-05-2013 NOTICE OF LIMITED APPEARANCE



CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT PAGE: 22 MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA





PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014



NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVIT TO APPEND MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE BARBARA GURROLA


ORDER STRIKING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

11-12-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $2.00

11-12-2013 ORDER SETTING TRIAL

ON HEARING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 12/12/13 © 1:30 PM

11-12-2013 RE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 173917 $-2.00

Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: COPY OF MOTION


SUBPOENA SERVED ON MARION COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON

11/13/13

11-20-2013 PE I SUBPOENA ISSUED

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA

11-25-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $7.00



Memo: COPY


Memo: CERTIFIED


OFFICE OF DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN TIME: 01:34:39 PM DATE: Jun 6, 2014

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT PAGE: 23 MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA





PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06106/2014



11-26-2013 PE 1 NOTICE TO PRODUCE

NOTICE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT HEARING

11-26-2013 PE I RETURN OF SERVICE

RETURN OF SERVICE ON MARLA MCNEAL ON NOVEMBER 22, 2013 AT

12:43 P.M.


DECEMBER 12, 2013 AT 3:00 P.M.



11-27-2013 RE 1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE

FORMER HUSBANDS RESPONSE TO FORMER WIFE'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION

12-03-2013 PE 1 NTC OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUEST

12-04-2013 PE I ASM: COPY FEE CA $2.00

12-04-2013 PE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 174651 $-2.00

Received Of: OVERCASH LORI A Memo:

12-05-2013 PE 1 NOTICE TO PRODUCE

12-05-2013 PE 1 SUBPOENA ISSUED


12-10-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $3.00



DATE: Jun 6, 2014 CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

PAGE: 24 MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA





PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


12-10-2013 RE 1 MOTION TO DISMISS

FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO DISMISS

12-10-2013 CROSS NOTICE OF HEARING


Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: COPIES


12-13-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $1.00


12-13-2013 RE I REO: MOTION

MOTION TO/FOR STOP CHILD SUPPORT


12-13-2013 MANDATE FROM 5TH DCA

12-13-2013 RE I PAY: COPY FEE CA 0 174982 $-1.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: CERTIFIED COPIES


Memo: CERTIFIED COPIES

12-20-2013 COPY OF MOTION SENT





422002-DR.004655-AXXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH




PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


STOP CHILD SUPPORT PENALTY



MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

12-23-2013 PE 1 MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

12-23-2013 PE I MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE


AFFIDAVIT DATED 12/24/2013

12-27-2013 RE 1 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND JUDICIAL FILING OF BAR COMPLAINT

12-30-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $30.00


12-30-2013 RE 1 AMENDED MOTION

AMENDED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND JUDICIAL FILING OF BAR COMPLAINT


Memo: CERTIFIED COPIES (6)

12-30-2013 RE I PAY: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA D 175353 $-12.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: CERTIFIED COPIES (6)

12-31-2013 RE 1 CORRESPONDENCE OR MEMORANDUM


TIME: 01.34:39 PM OFFICE OF DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN DATE: Jun 6, 2014



422002.DR-004655-AXXX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH




PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


WITH ATTACHED DOCUMENTS



01-06-2014 RE I PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 175513 $-0.45

Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: 3 PAGE PRINTOUT

01-06-2014 RE 1 PAY: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA D 175514 $-2.00

Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: CERTIFICATION



SECOND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND JUDICIAL FILING OF BAR COMPLAINT


01-15-2014 RE I MOTION

MTN TO CEASE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS


01-23-2014 REO: MOTION

SECOND MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS LEGAL COUNSEL

01-30-2014 CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY

01-30-2014 MEMO FROM 5TH DCA



DATE: Jun 6, 2014 CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT PAGE: 27






PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014




RESPONDANT'S MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE GURROLA, JUDGE ROGERS AND ALL OF 5TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT JUDGES PURSUAN TO: RULE 2.31DESQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGES


NOTICE OF HEARING BEFORE CHILD SUPPORT HEARING OFFICER FEBRUARY 11, 2014 AT 8:00 A.M.


02-05-2014 RE 1 NOTICE OF HEARING

ON 02/24/14 @ 10 AM

02-06-2014 RE 1 MOTION

MTN FOR CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT HEARING TO BE TERMINATED AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXCESS CHILD SUPPORT



MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND REPORTING MARK SHELNUTT TO THE FLORIDA BAR FOR VIOLATING HIS OATH OF ADMISSION TO THE FLORIDA BAR WITH INTENTIONAL MALICE AND SUCCESS IN CREATING JUDICIAL BIAS AGAINST WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH

02-10-2014 RE 1 EMERGENCY MOTION

FOR CONTINUANCE HEARING

02-12-2014 ORDER DENYING MOTION

ORDER DENYING MTN TO RECUSE/DISQUALIFY










PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


02-13-2014 COPY OF MOTION SENT

MOTION FOR CHILD SUP ENF HEARING TO BE TERMINATED AND RE-IMBURSEMENT OF EXCESS CHILD SUPPORT

02-13-2014 RE 1 NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY

NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY - 02/14/14 THROUGH 02/28/14

AND 03/14/14 AT 03/24/14

02-14-2014 RE 1 DESIGNATION OF EMAIL ADDRESS


FROM SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA


EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING OF PETITION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GURROLA AND EMERGENCY REVERSAL OF ADOPTION BY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY HONORING THE ORDER


02-19-2014 ORDER TERMINATING CHILD SUPPRT

ORDER TERMINATING CHILD SUPPORT AND ESTABLISHING ARREARAGES


02-20-2014 RE 1 ASM: APPEAL FE TO DCA/SC CA $100.00

02-20-2014 NOTICE OF APPEAL

WITH THE 5TH DCA OF JUDGE GURROLAS DENIAL OF RECUSAL

02-20-2014 PETITION

EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION










PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2014 IS TREATED AS A

PLEADING

02-20-2014

02-20-2014 RE 1

ORDER FROM 5TH DCA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROBHIBITION IS DENIED AND MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE SAWAYA IS DENIED AS MOOT

PAY: APPEAL FF TO DCNSC CA D 177009 $-100.00

Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: NOTICE OF APPEAL

02-21-2014 RE 1 NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY

NOTIFICATION OF THE COURT OF WM. TODD OVERCASH'S UNAVAILABILITY AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS

02-21-2014 AMENDED MOTION

AMENDED SECOND MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR FORMER HUSBAND

02-24-2014 RE 1 MOTION

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING OF PETITION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GURROLA AND EMERGENCY REVERSAL OF ADOPTION BY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY HONORING THE ORDER: SHOULD ANY PART OF THE AGREEMENT FAIL, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL NOT OCCUR AND HONOR THE ORDER OF CHOOSING FROM 3 THERAPISTS SUBMITTED BY WM TODD OVERCASH AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY DR SUSAN CRUM & REMOVAL OF THE CHILD FROM THE MOTHERS CUSTODY AND REUNIFICATION DIRECTED BY DR CRUM IN CONSULTATION WITH DR RICHARD WARSHACK AND UTILIZATION OF FAMILY BRIDGES & BANNING DCF & MARION COUNTY THERAPISTS FROM ASSOCIATED WITH REUNIFICATION PROCESS














PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014



ORDER GRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL FOR FORMER HUSBAND

02-26-2014 RE I ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM TO THE INVOCATION OF WRIT OF ALL POWERS, WRIT OF CENTIORI, REQUEST THE ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS AND EMERGENCY WRIT OF PROHIBITION

02-27-2014 AMENDED NOTICE

TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT HEARING


NOTICE OF ISSUANCE

02-27-2014 NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION


SECOND


RETURN OF SERVICE OF THE RESPONDENTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL TO MIDDLE DISTRICT COURT


SUBPOENA SERVED BY SUBSTITUTE

03-10-2014 ORDER

FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION


AMENDED ORDER SETTING TRIAL ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SET FOR 04/02/2014 AT 10:00AM









PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014



03-12-2014 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $3.00

03-12-2014 RE 1 PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 177762 $-2.25




03-14-2014 REQUEST FOR HEARING

REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

EDDY RESPONDENTS MTN TO RECUSE JUDGE GURROLA AND ALL JUDGES OF MARION COUNTY SECTION OF THE 5TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT & CANCELLATION OF ALL HEARING AND DEPOSITIONS SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO: RULE 2.330 DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGES


NOTICE OF FILING RETURN OF SERVICE AND ORIGINAL SUBPOENA FOR DEPOSITION


ORDER STRIKING PETITIONER'S MOTION

03-24-2014 PE 1 AMENDED NOTICE

AMENDED NOTICE OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED


ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS MTN

03-26-2014 PE I NTC OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUEST

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTYS FEES AND COSTS AND NTC OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED



CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

PAGE: 32





PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


03-27-2014 PE 1 MOTION TO STRIKE

APPELLEES MTN TO STRIKE EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY ALL LOWER COURT ACTIVITY AS THE SUPREME COURT CASE IS PENDING PETITION-ALL WRITS AND MTN TO DISMISS APPEAL



FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO MODIFY PREPAID COLLEGE FOR THE BENEFIT OF MINOR CHILD


THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - APRIL 2, 2014 AT 10:00 AM

03-28-2014 RE 1 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

03-31-2014 PE I ASM: NONCASE COPY FEE CA $1.80

03-31-2014 PE I MOTION TO STRIKE

FORMER WIFES MTN TO STRIKE FORMER HUSBANDS MTN FOR CONTINUANCE FILED BY LETTER FROM NON-LAWYER

03-31-2014 PE 1 PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 178391 $-1.80 Received Of: OVERCASH LORI A

Memo:


COPY OF DOCUMENT FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

04-01-2014 RE I NOTICE TO COURT

NOTICE TO THE COURT THAT WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH HAS HAD TO UNDERGO SURGERY

04-01-2014 RE 1 NOTICE TO COURT

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH'S NOTICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL TO UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA









PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014



TO MARK SHELNUTTS FILINGS AND PROOF OF JUSTIFIED FEAR OF JUDGE GURROLA AS CONFIRMED BY MARK SESSUMS AND BETH GORDON AND REPORTED TO THE JOC

04-02-2014 ORDER

ORDER RESTRICTING AND ENJOINING FORMER HUSBAND FROM MODIFYING THE PREPAID COLLEGE PLAN UNTIL FURTHER HEARING BEFORE THE COURT

04-04-2014 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE

NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING - 04/25/14 AT 1:00 PM


SECOND AMENDED ORDER SETTING TRIAL ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SET FOR 04/25/2014 AT 10:00AM


FROM JIMMIE JACOBS

04-11-2014 PE 1 NOTICE


04-11-2014 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $937.00


Memo: COPIES

04-15-2014 RE I ASM: COPY FEE CA $229.00


EMERGENCY MOTION TO GRANT ACCESS TO THE DCF/ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS WHICH GRANTS WILLIAM TODD OVERCASHS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE ADOPTION AND RULINGS OF THE COURT PER FLORIDA LAW









PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014



04-15-2014 RE 1 EMERGENCY MOTION

TO UNSEAL CASE

04-15-2014 RE 1 MOTION

NOTIFICATION TO THE COURT AND MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE GURROLA AND MARION COUNTY 5TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


ORDER

04-15-2014 RE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 179015 $-229.00 Received Of OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: COPIES





ORDER STRIKING PETITIONER'S EMERGENCY MOTION



ORDER STRIKING PETITIONER'S EMERGENCY MOTION


THIRD AMENDED ORDER SETTING TRIAL ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 2014 AT 10:00A.M.









PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


04-17-2014 ORDER OF CONTINUANCE

ORDER CONTINUING SUBPOENAS FOR HEARING HEARING ON JUNE 19, 2014 AT 10:00 A.M.

04-21-2014 AMENDED NOTICE

AMENDED NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING JUNE 19, 2014 AT 1:00 P.M.

04-22-2014 PE 1 MOTION TO CONTINUE

04-23-2014 INV FOR FILING/SRVC FEES PAID

APPEAL FEES PAID

04-25-2014 PE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $2.00

04-25-2014 PE I ASM: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA $2.00

04-25-2014 PE 1 PAY: COPY FEE CA D 179389 $-2.00 Received Of: OVERCASH LORI A

Memo: certified copy

04-25-2014 PE I PAY: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA D 179389 $-2.00 Received Of: OVERCASH LORI A

Memo: certified copy

04-30-2014 MANDATE FROM 5TH DCA

04-30-2014 OPINION FROM CIRCUIT COURT

REVERSED AND REMANDED



EMERGENCY MOTION TO UNSEAL THE CASE








PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


05-01-2014 RE 1 REQUEST TO PRODUCE

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS BY LORI FOULTZ AND UPDATED FINANCIAL STATEMET AND PRODUCTION OF FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS OF NATASHA OVERCASH/PATON AND KENNETH (KENNY) PATON


ORDER ON MOTION TO CONTINUE


AMENDED ORDER ON AMENDED MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT


MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE GURROLA AND THE MARION COUNTY 5TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


05-02-2014 RE 1 AFFIDAVIT

05-02-2014 TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING



MOTION REQUESTING ALL FUTURE MOTIONS BE SIGNED BY A MEMBER OF THE FLORIDA BAR


NOTICE OF FILING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF MARLA MARIE MCNEAL

05-05-2014 RE 1 AFFIDAVIT









PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014



TO MARK SHELNUTT'S MOTION TO DENY WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO SELF REPRESENTATION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS FOR MARK SHELNUTT PRESENTING LYING TO THE COURT AND IMMEDIATE RECUSAL OF THE 5TH CIRCUIT AND JUDGE

GURROLA

05-06-2014 RE 1 ADDENDUM

TO RESPONSE TO MARK SHELNUTT AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS ON MARK SI-IELNUTT AND RECUSAL OF JUDGE GURROLA AND THE 5TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

05-06-2014 RE 1 COPY OF:(SEE TEXT DESCRIPTION)

DEPOSITION OF: MARLA MARIE MCNEAL ON 03/25/14

05-06-2014 TRANSCRIPT OF DEPOSITION

ON 01/08/13

05-07-2014 RE 1 AMENDED MOTION

FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GURROLA WITH SUPPLIMENTARY ADDENDUM OF FILING CASELAW DOCUMENTS SHOWING SUPPORTING GROUNDS FOR RECUSAL

05-09-2014 ORDER SETTING HEARING

ORDER SETTING HEARING ON FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO UNSEAL CASE, REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS BY LORI FOULTZ AND UPDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND PRODUCTION OF FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS OF NATASH OVERCASH/PATON AND KENNETH (KENNY) PATON AND FORMER WIFE'S MOTION REQUESTING ALL FUTURE MOTIONS BE SIGNED BY A MEMBER OF THE FLORIDA BAR

05-09-2014 ORDER SETTING TRIAL

FOURTH AMENDED ORDER SETTING TRIAL ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FRIDAY, JULY 18, 2014 AT 10:00 A.M.


ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO RECUSE



TIME: 01:34:39 PM OFFICE OF DAVID ft ELLSPERMANN DATE: Jun 6, 2014

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 38 MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

PAGE:




DATE CASE ENTERED; EVENT CATEGORY:

PERIOD: 01/01/2013 TO 06/06/2014


SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING SET FOR 07/18/2014 AT 11:00PM



AMENDED ORDER CONTINUING SUBPOENAS FOR HEARING JULY 18, 2014 AT 10:00A.M.

05-16-2014 RE I DEMAND FOR

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL FUTURE ACTIONS HEARING BEOFRE THE COURT INCLUDING HEARING SCHEDULED ON JUNE 13, 2014 AND JULY 18, 2014

05-19-2014 REDIRECT-DOR TO CUSTDL PARENT


ORDER DENYING DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

05-30-2014 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $14.00


Memo: COPIES


06-04-2014 AFFIDAVIT

AFFIDAVIT OF MS TORREY'S ON DIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGES


AppendixB

JudgeBarbaraGurrolatookoverthese

proceedingsafterthedisqualificationof

JudgeWilliamSwigertonorabout23

July2012


TIME: 02:33:49 PM OFFICE OF DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN

DATE: Feb 21, 2013 CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

PAGE: 112 MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA




PERIOD: TO


06-21-2012 TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO 5TH DCA

RE: RECORD ON APPEAL

06-21-2012 INDEX TO RECORD ON APPEAL

06-21-2012 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE

UNTIL 07/12/12 © 9 A

07-09-2012 RE 1 INVOICE

APPEAL FEES

07-09-2012 RE 1 PAY: DOCUMENT ISSUE FEE CA D 155434 $-7.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: PAYMENT OF APPEAL FEES

07-09-2012 RE 1 PAY: APPEAL INDEX PREP FEE CA D 155434 $-98.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA




07-09-2012 RE 1 PAY: POSTAGE REIMBURSEMENT 0 155434 $-11.60 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA




07-10-2012 NOTICE OF CANCELLATION

NOTICE OF CANCELLATION OF HEARING ON 07/12/12 AT 9 A

07-23-2012 ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT



CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DATE: Feb 21 2013






PERIOD: TO


ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT FROM JUDGE WILLIAM T. SWIGERT TO JUDGE BARBARA GURROLA

07-23-2012 JUDGE REASSIGNED

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT 07/23/12


ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT


-24-2012 RE 1 REO: MOTION

FORMER HUSBANDS SECOND MOTION TO REASSIGN CASE

' -201) REO: CASE REOPENED NODOC#

FORMER HUSBANDS SECOND MOTION TO REASSIGN CASE


ON 08/21/12 @2 PM

08-06-2012 RE 1 NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

FROMER HUSBAND'S NTC OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM

08-16-2012 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE ON LISA COLEMAN, MAGNET COORDINATOR HOWARD MIDDLE SCHOOL, MARION COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM AND RETURNED SERVED ON SAME ON 08/13/2012 AT 10:45 AM

08-24-2012 REQUEST TO PRODUCE

FORMER WIFE'S REQUEST TO PRODUCE UPDATED MANDATORY DISCLOSURE





CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DATE: Feb 21, 2013


42-2002-DR-004655-A)(XX-XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED


EVENT CATEGORY: PERIOD: TO


FORMER HUSBANDS NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM DEPOSITION OF LORI ANN FOULTZ 9/4/2012 9:00 AM AT W REPORTING


FORMER HUSBANDS NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM DEPOSITION OF JOHN MCCOLLUM (PRINCIPAL OF OSCEOLA MIDDLE) 9/19/2012 AT 9:00 AM AT MA REPORTING

08-29-2012 PE 1 NTC OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUEST


2o137 PE 1 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR TEMPORARY ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS FILED ON JUNE 4, 2012




HEARING DATE AND TIME: SEPTEMBER 10, 2012 AT 1:00 PM ON FORMER WIFE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT, MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND ENFORCEMENT, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

09-04-2012 PE 1 ASM: NONCASE COPY FEE CA $17.25


SEPT 10, 2012 AT 1:00 PM


DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM OVERCASH OCT 4, 2012 AT 1:30 PM AT CAB REPORTING

09-04-2012 PE 1 PAY: NONCASE COPY FEE CA D 157475 $-17.25 Received Of: SI-iELNUTT MARK D

Memo:










~0:90~6-2012 ~REI REO: MOTION

FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME TO FORMER WIFE


ON 09110/12 @ 1 PM

PE 1 MOTION TO STRIKE

CERTAIN PORTIONS OF NTC OF HEARING


MOTION FOR ORTHODONTIST TO APPEAR BY PHONE

09-07-2012 PE 1 MOTION TO STRIKE

NTC OF HEARING DATED 08/04/12


SECOND AMENDED NTC OF HEARING ON 09/10/12 @ 1 PM

09-07-2012 PE 1 FAMILY LAW FINANCIAL AFDVT

AMENDED




RE 1 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

FORMER HUSBANDS MTN FOR SANCTIONS TO COMPEL DEPOSITION, AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL MAGISTRATE FOR DISCOVERY









PURPOSES

09-18-2012 CORR/MEMO TO CLERKS OFFICE

PE 1 MOTIONFOR PROTECTIVE ORDER


ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

7 /09-24-2012 PE 1 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

FORMER WIFES MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FROM RESCHEDULING A SECOND DEPOSITION OF FORMER WIFE

0924204) PE 1 RESPONSE

FORMER WIFES RESPONSE TO FORMER HUSBANDS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, TO COMPEL DEPOSITION AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL MAGISTRATE FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES

10-02-2012 REQUEST

FOR REASSIGNMENT WITH ATTACHMENTS

10-03-2012 PEI OBJECTIONS

OBJECTIONS FROM THE GORDON LAW FIRM DAATED 10/03/2012

10-04-2012 NOTICE OF CANCELLATION

CANCELLATION OF DEPOSITION OF FORMER HUSBAND

ORDER

ORDER ON FORMER WIFES MTN FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

10-10 PEI REO: MOTION FOR CONTEMPT










PERIOD: TO


MOTION INDIRECT CONTEMPT

PE I MOTION TO COMPEL

MOTION TO COMPEL SETTING OF DEPOSITIONS REQUEST FOR CASE MGMNT, MTN FOR CONTEMPT, MTN FOR SANCTIONS, MTN FOR REASONABLE ATTYS FEES AND COSTS

10-11-2012 ) PE 1 MOTION TO COMPEL

MTN TO COMPEL MTN FOR ATTYS FEES AND SANCTIONS


ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT/FATHERS MOTION TO ENFORCE FINAL ORDER AND TO REQUIRE RECOMMENDED ORTHODONTIC TREATMENT FOR MINOR CHILD


ORDER STRIKING APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM KELLY THOMPSON, ESQ AS VOID AND REQUIRING FORMER HUSBAND TO PAY GUARDIANS BILL AT 100%


ORDER ON FORMER WIFES MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR TEMPORARY ATTYS FEES AND COSTS AND ORDER ON FORMER WIFES AMENDED MTN FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT

10-15-2012 PE I NOTICE OF HEARING

11/13/12 @1:30 PM

10-15-2012 RE 1 MOTION FOR REHEARING

FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION FOR REHEARING & FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST FORMER WIFE FOR INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTING A MATERIAL FACT TO THE COURT AT THE SEPTEMBER 10, 2012 HEARING

10-15-2012 RE 1 MTN FOR RECUSAUDISQUALIFICATN

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY TRIAL JUDGE


DOCUMENT TITLED - CORRUPTION OF OCALA'S 5TH CIRCUIT COURT









10-15-2012 RE 1 NOTICE OF FILING

TRANSCRIPT OF SEPTEMBER 10, 2012 HEARING

10-15-2012 RE 1 TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

SEPTEMBER 10, 2012

10-15-2012 RE 1 NOTICE OF FILING

TRANSCRIPT FORMER WIFE'S DEPOSITION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 2012

10-15-2012 RE 1 TRANSCRIPT OF DEPOSITION

OF LORI ANN FOULTZ ON 09/04/12

10-15-2012 RE I NOTICE OF HEARING

ON 11/13/12 @1:30 PM

10-17-2012 REQUEST

10-17-2012 CERTIFICATE

10-17-2012 CHILD SUPPORT VERIFICATION

10-22-2012 CORR/MEMO TO JUDGES OFFICE

10-22-2012 DIRECTIONS TO THE CLERK

ORDER ON MOTION

ORDER ON MTN TO DISQUALIFY TRIAL JUDGE IS DENIED

10-24-2012 NOTICE OF APPEAL TRANSMITTAL

10-24-2012 \ PE 1 RESPONSE



CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DATE: Feb 21 2013






FORMER WIFE'S RESPONSE TO FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION FOR REHEARING & FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST FROMER WIFE FOR INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTING A MATERIAL FACT TO THE COURT AT SEPTEMBER 10TH, 2012 HEARING

(H-2:4-2:012::~ PE 1 MOTION FOR REHEARING

ON THE ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AND ORDER ON FORMER WIFE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT

10-25-2012 RE 1 REQUEST

FORMER HUSBANDS REQUEST FOR UPDATED MANDATORY DISCLOSURE


TUES, NOV 13, 2012 @ 1:30 PM

PE 1 MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS


NOVEMBER 13, 2012 AT 1:30 PM

11-05-2012 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $10.00


11-05-2012 RE 1 ASM: APPEAL FF TO DCAISC CA $100.00

11-05-2012 RE 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL

FORMER HUSBANDS NOTICE OF APPEAL


Memo: APPEAL/CERT COPIES

11-05-2012 RE 1 PAY: CERTIFIED COPY FEE CA D 159653 $-8.00





42-2002-DR-004655-AXXX.XX OVERCASH V OVERCASH PARTY: JUDGE: BG BARBARA GURROLA STATUS: RE REOPENED




Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA Memo: APPEAL/CERT COPIES

11-05-2012 RE 1 PAY: APPEAL FF TO DCA/SC CA D 159653 $-100.00 Received Of: OVERCASH WILLIA

Memo: APPEAL/CERT COPIES

11-13-2012 RE 1 SUGGESTION OF

FORMER HUSBANDS LIST OF SUGGESTED GUARDIANS AD LITEM

11-13-2012 RE 1 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT

FORMER HUSBANDS NOTICE OF FILING UPDATED FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT

11-13-2 PE EVIDENCE

CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY MARKED AS FW EXHIBIT 1



TO WILLIAM T OVERCASH & ROBERT E TAYLOR, JR. JAN 3, 2013 @ 1:30 AT CAB REPORTING



ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NEW CASE DATED 11/15/2012


11-19-2012 RE 1 NOTICE

NOTICE OF LAW FIRM, ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER CHANGE NOITCE OF DESIGNATION OF PRIMARY AND SECOND EMAIL ADDRESSES IN COMPLIANCE WITH NEW MANDATORY EMAIL SERVICE RULES









PRIMARY EMAIL - Robert©rtaylorlaw.com SECONDARY EMAIL - [email protected]

112723) PE 1 RESPONSE

FORMER WIFE'S RESPONSE TO FORMER HUSBAND'S REQUEST FOR UPDATED MANDATORY DISCLOSURE

11-27-2012 PE 1 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT

SECOND AMENDED FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT


MON, DEC 10, 2012 @ 10:30 AM

12-07-2012 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $13.00



Memo: CERT COPIES OF PPWORK


Memo: CERT COPIES OF PPWORK

1 1201 ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN ADV

1211-2012) ORDER ON MOTION

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FROM RESCHEDULING A SECOND DEPOSITION OF FORMER WIFE AND ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL


12i12 ORDER ON MOTION









ORDER ON MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL COMTEMPT

2-11-2012

ORDER ON MOTION

ORDER FOR CONTEMPT AND ENFORCMENT

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONF

ORDE SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND ORDER SETTING NON-JURY TRAIL


12-17-2012 PE 1 MOTION FOR CONTEMPT


12-20-2012 ) RE 1 REO: MOTION

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO PAY GUARDIAN AD LITEM RETAINER AND TO PRO-RATE GUARDIAN FEES



HEARING DATE AND TIME: 01/14/2013 AT 10:00 AM FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR INDIRECT CIVIL CONTEMPT DATED 12/17/2012

12-26-2012 RE 1 NOTICE OF CANCELLATION

CANCELLATION OF HEARING 12/10/12 TO BE RESCHEDULED FOR A FUTURE DATE/TIME


SECOND NOTICE OF HEARING MON JAN 14,2013© 10:30 AM

ORDER FROM 5TH DCA

COPY OF ORDER

01-10-2013 PE 1 NOTICE OF PRODUCTION NON-PARTY










01-10-2013 PEI REQUEST TO PRODUCE

FORMER WIFE'S THIRD REQUEST TO PRODUCE

01-10-2013 RE 1 NOTICE OF PRODUCTION NON-PARTY


01-11-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $1.00


Memo: COPY

01-14-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $8.00


01-14-2013 RE 1 ASM: COPY FEE CA $2.00



















WIFE'S FOURTH REQUEST TO PRODUCE

J Ol172013)E I MTN FOR RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATN

FORMER HUSBANDS REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GUROLLA AND TRANSFER OUTSIDE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

-201 REO: MOTION


01-22-2013 REO: CASE REOPENED NO DOC#

MOTION

FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME TO FORMER HUSBAND

01-23-2013 CORRJMEMO TO JUDGES OFFICE

FROM ATTY BRIAN MOTRONI

PE1 MOTION

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS


COPY OF SHELTER ORDER


NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION FOR NON-PARTY

ORDER STRIKING











RETURN OF NON-SERVICE ON DR. BRADY ON 02/01/13


PRIMARY EMAIL ADDRESS: JANETBEHNKELAW.NET SECONDARY EMAIL ADDRESS: [email protected]

i1i201) PE 1 REO: MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT ORDERED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST


PE 1 AMENDED MOTION


02-14-2 PE 1 REQUEST

REQUEST FOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

02-14-2 PEI MOTION

MOTION FOR PROSPECTIVE TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

02-14-2 PE REQUEST TO PRODUCE

FIFTH REQUEST

PE 1 MOTION TO CONTINUE

MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING ON FORMER WIFE'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME ON FORMER HUSBAND AND MOTION TO DEFER RULING ON FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION TO IMPUTE INCOME ON FORMER WIFE


2/27/13 AT PM

02-15-201/ AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF FORMER WIFE'S MOTION FOR REIMBURSMENT FOR TEMPORARY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS FILED ON 2/14/13









02-15-2013 PE 1 NOTICE



NON SERVE RETURN ON KATE WILSON ON 2/11/13 WITH ATTACHED NOTICE OF FILING AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



AppendixC

WritofProhibitionfiledon10December

2012onhisbehalfbyAttorneyBeth

Gordon


E-Copy Received Dec 10, 2012 2:00 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLOM FIFTH DISTRICT

IN RE: The former marriage of:

CASE No. :5D12-4417 WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, L.T. NO 2002-4655-DR-FJ

Former Husband, and

LORI ANN OVERCASH, n/k/a LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

Dated this 10 th day of December, 2012

The Gordon Law Firm P.O. Box 734 Williston, Florida 32696 (352) 528-0111

- ----

Beth Gordon, Esq. FL Bar 876623


BASIS FOR JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO FRAP 9.100(g)(1)

While a petition for writ of prohibition is not the exclusive avenue for

pursuing relief from the denial of a motion for disqualification, and the order

on appeal can be reviewed on plenary appeal, a petition for writ of

prohibition is "an appropriate remedy to review the denial of a motion to

disqualify the judge." Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 28.3

at 690 n. 11; F.R.A.P. 9.100(e) D.H. v. Department of Children and

Families, 12 So.3d 266 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2009) This Court has jurisdiction to

review the October 17 th , 2012 order denying disqualification of the trial

judge pursuant to F.R.C.P. 9.100(e)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has de novo review of the order denying disqualification.

Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 41 (Fla.2005)

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Petitioner/ Former Husband would like simply to receive a fair trial by an

impartial judge assigned randomly, pursuant to the 5 th Circuit rules, and in

particular 5t1 Circuit Administrative Order no. A-2009-03,

applicable to judicial assignments and re-assignments and requiring all

assignments and reassignments to be made randomly and by computer.

2 Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 91

Petitioner/ Former Husband prays that this petition for writ of prohibition is

granted and that his case is reassigned to the next available Marion County

judge in the random computer generated sequence.

STAY REQUESTED

Petitioner would request a stay of further proceedings at this juncture in the

Trial Court pursuant to F. R. A. P. 9.100(h)

FACTS

The original Judge in this family law case, The Honorable William T

Swigert, was removed from this case by this Appellate Court following this

Court's opinion in Overcash v Overcash, case no. 5D11-3689, filed June

29, 2012. "A" As recounted in that appellate case, the Petitioner, William

Todd Overcash, " timely filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge on

August 19, 2011. The motion claimed judicial bias based upon several

comments and actions the trial judge made during a hearing held on August

9, 2011. The trial judge denied Petitioner's motion to disqualify on October

3, 2011, more than forty-five days after it had been filed." "A" This

Appellate Court ultimately held that the "motion to disqualify Judge

Swigert was deemed to have been granted because it was not ruled on within

30 days." "A." Before bringing the Petition for Writ of Prohibition which


resulted in the opinion of this Court attached as exhibit "A," Petitioner's

counsel, after thirty days had expired without the trial court having ruled on

the Motion to Disqualify, filed a motion with the trial court to reassign the

case, pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j) • This

motion filed with the trial court was denied by the Honorable Judge David

B. Eddy, Circuit and Administrative Judge for Marion County, by order

dated October 11, 2011. "B"

Following this Court's Appellate opinion which granted the Petition for

Writ of Prohibition on June 29, 2012„ the Trial Court did not act on the

original Motion to Reassign filed by Petitioner's counsel and denied by

order of Judge Eddy on October 11, 2012. Therefore, Petitioner was forced

to file "Former Husband's Second Motion to Reassign Case on July 23 rd ,

2012. "C"

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j) provides: The judge shall

rule on a motion to disqualify immediately, but no later than 30 days after

the service of the motion as set forth in subdivision (c). If not ruled on

within 30 days of service, the motion shall be deemed granted and the

moving party may seek an order from the court directing the clerk to

reassign the case.


The case was reassigned to a Citrus County judge, the Honorable Barbara

Gurrola. "D" (order of reassignment) The Order of Reassignment was

signed not by Marion County Administrative Judge Eddy, but by Judge

Daniel D. Merritt, Sr., Chief Judge of the 5 th Circuit, sitting in Hernando

County. Because of the odd nature of the out- of -county reassignment, and

in light of the fact that there are numerous family judges in Marion County,

the Petitioner himself did a freedom of information request both verbally and

in writing on September 14, 2012, requesting all correspondence

("Composite E") On October 3, 2012, a partial response was received from

the attorney for the 5 1h Circuit, Grace Ann Fagan, Esq. (the response was

actually sent to Mark Simpson, Esq., state attorney, whose help Petitioner

enlisted when his verbal and written request went unanswered.) ("Composite

E") In that response was contained an email from a Rosemary Spivey,

administrative assistant to the Marion County Circuit Senior Judges (as per

grace Fagan, Esq's October 3 letter, "Composite E"), to Chief Judge Daniel

Merritt's judicial assistant Patricia Kodetsky, specifically stating that

because of "local conflicts," Judge Eddy was specifically requesting that the

case be assigned to another senior judge, and also that Judge Eddy was

specifically requesting that Judge Gurrola be assigned the case. "F"


A motion to disqualify Trial Judge was made within ten days of learning

these circumstances on Monday, October 15, 2012 ("Composite E") By

way of affidavit in support of the motion to disqualify, the Petitioner voiced

his fear that due to the various irregularities in the way the new judge was

assigned, in violation of the administrative rule applicable to the case, and

from out of county and seemingly hand-picked when there existed many

available Marion County judges who had no known conflicts, he feared he

could not obtain a fair trial. "G"

On October 22, Petitioner's counsel again wrote to the court, the

Honorable Judge Eddy, requesting reassignment pursuant to the 5 1h Circuit

Administrative Order. "H" The administrative Order, A-2009-3 was

included and highlighted in this letter/ request for reassignment, pointing out

that the case should have been assigned randomly, first to other sitting

family judges, then to county judges before any out of county judge could be

assigned. This letter also pointed out that no request for out of county judge

form, which was attached to administrative Rule A-2009-3, had ever been

filed, which would have required any local conflicts to be spelled out. The

blank form along with the Administrative Order was attached to this letter.

"H" No response was ever received from Judge Eddy pursuant to this

request.


The Trial Court denied the Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge on October

17, 2012, and ruled that the motion itself was "legally insufficient." ("I")

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

The Petitioner in this case has suffered two material injuries to his ability to

get a fair trial in the Court Below, 1) being required to try an extremely

active family court case before a trial judge that had no jurisdiction because

he was effectively disqualified (this went on from September of 2011,

through June 29th of 2012, when this Appellate Court granted his writ of

prohibition), and 2) being denied the random reassignment of a judge

pursuant to administrative order and having to now try his case before what

for all purposes appears to be a hand-picked out-of town judge.

The 5 th Circuit Administrative order A-2009-3, to which both Chief

Judge Merritt and Marion County administrative Judge Eddy are both

signatories, makes it clear that both assignments and reassignments are to be

made by electronically generated random sequences of judges.

Administrative order A-2009-3, paragraph number 5. It is clear that

Petitioner was singled out for special treatment, and that he felt he was

singled out for special treatment.


In Jiminez v Rateni, 967 So.2d 1075 (Fla 2"d DCA 2007), the 2 DCA_

examined a case wherein the appel lam claimed that he was denied the proper

random reassignment pursuant to the 12 th circuit Administrative Order LC-

82-01 (providing that civil appeals from the County Court of Sarasota

County "be assigned by the random process to the various civil divisions of

the Circuit Court in Sarasota County"). "We have common law certiorari

jurisdiction to review the circuit court's order here because the utilization of

an improper process for the assignment of a judicial case causes "material

injury ... that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal." id. at 648

(emphasis supplied). The 2 nd DCA held that "the asserted injury consists in

the litigant's being required to proceed with the adjudication of an appeal

before a judicial officer who has been assigned unlawfully. This is akin to

the injury of being required to try a case berore a judge who has improperly

denied a motion for disqualification of the judge, an injury for which

interlocutory relief is available by way of prohibition. (Citing) Castro v

Luce, 650 So.2d 1067 (Fla 2'''` DCA 1995) It is also akin to the injury of

being required to try a case where the trial court has erred in its disposition

of a motion for disqualification of counsel, an injury for which certiorari

relief is available. See Gonzalez ex rel. Colonial Bank v. Chillura. 892 So.2d

1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)."


The 21 DCA concluded that the Sarasota clerk departed from the

essential requirements of the law when it did not randomly assign Jimenez a

judge: We conclude that the unambiguous provisions of rule i (e)(2) require

that the random assignment of civil appeals from the county court be made

to judges drawn from the pool of all the circuit judges in the Civil Division

of the Twelfth Circuit. The circuit court is precluded from following any

local administrative order or practice that is inconsistent with the provisions

of this rule. See Fla. R. jud. Admin. 2.120(c);citing McA levy v. State, 947

o.2d 525, 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Melkonian v. Goldman, 647 So.2d

1008, 1009-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State ex rel. Zuberi v. Brinker, 323

So.2d 623, 624-26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

Here, it is clear that the administrative judge has departed from the

essential requirements of law in failing to follow the random reassignment

provisions applicable to all cases in the 5 th Circuit. Petitioner cited his well-

founded fears of proceeding to trial in this manner where the new judge was

seemingly hand —picked from another county. Accordingly, the motion to

disqualify should have been granted.

Furthermore, the Trial Court ruled that the Motion to Disqualify was

"legally insufficient." Since the first Trial Court was not removed for

partiality or bias, but simply because of the technical grounds of having


impermissibly delayed ruling on the motion to disquality, the trial Court

below was limited to that inquiry alone. 2

A reasonably prudent person, having received the odd orders requiring

him to pay for all litigation costs and fees during the pendency of the appeal

wherein the Appellate Court granted his Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and

during which time he requested stays in both the Trial and Appellate Courts

which were not granted (see case number 5D12-1066), having the previous

Trial Court take forty- five days to rule on a motion to disqualify, and still

2 Section (g) of rule 2.160 deals with the filing of successive disqualification

motions so as to prevent the possibility of an abuse of the disqualification

rule, such as "judge-shopping." The rule provides that if an initial judge has

been disqualified on the ground of alleged prejudice or partiality, the

successor judge cannot be disqualified on a successive motion by the same

party "unless the successor judge rules that he or she is in fact not fair or

impartial in the case." Unlike the first judge, the successor judge is permitted

to pass on the truth of the facts alleged in support of the successive motion.

Quite correctly, the Trial Court below did not pass on the truth of the alleged

facts, as the precious judge was removed not due to prejudice or partiality,

but based upon the automatic reassignment provision of the rule.

1 0 Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 99

have the court refuse to reassign the case in violation of all applicable rules,

and then having found out that the Administrative Judge hand-picked an out-

of- county senior judge to preside over his case "due to local conflicts,"

would fear for his/ her ability to receive a fair trial in front of this Trial

Court. A reasonably prudent person would wonder why any other judge had

a conflict in the first place, since, as Petitioner stated in his affidavit in

support of disqualification, he didn't know these judges and had no idea why

or how they had a conflict. In paragraph eight of the same affidavit,

Petitioner cites as another source of concern that since the case has been

sealed, then how did the other judicial conflicts come about? And, if there

were conflicts, why were they hidden rather than voiced in orders of recusal

or in then form attached to the administrative order that is required to be

used for out-of-county re-assignments? These are all legitimate fears,

which a reasonably prudent person would have when faced with this

situation, which is made all the more sinister due to its secrecy. (The 5 th

Circuit attorney refused to comply with the freedom of information act

request until a state attorney asked for the information on Petitioner's

behalf.)

A motion is legally sufficient if it alleges facts that would create in a

reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and


impartial trial. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d

1332 (Fla.1990). "A verified motion for disqualification must contain an

actual factual foundation for the alleged fear of prejudice." Fischer v.

Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986). A mere "subjective fear[ ]" of bias

will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable.

Id. at 242. The burden is on the party seeking disqualification to show a

well-founded fear of not receiving a fair trial. See Adkins v. Winkler, 592

So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). I it is also well-settled that "adverse judicial

rulings do not constitute sufficient grounds to disqualify a judge." K.H. v.

Dept of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 527 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA

1988) (citations omitted). The facts supporting the Petition at bar have

nothing to do with rulings of the Trial Court.

Here, the legal sufficiency test isn't even close: for some reason, unknown

to Petitioner or the undersigned counsel, the Administrative Judge chose to

pick an out of county judge to preside over the case below when numerous

Marion County judges stood ready to accept the case assigned on a random

basis, had the normal procedure been followed. The normal procedure was

not followed, and the chief judge was contacted and did rule and reassigned

the case. Apparently there were "local conflicts" regarding this sealed case

of which Petitioner was unaware. The question is not one of mandamus,


involving the administrative judge, but of whether the motion to disqualify

was "legally sufficient," and whether a reasonably prudent person would,

given the strange, clandestine and unexplained facts, fear that they would be

unable to receive a fair trial in the Court below. All the facts, taken

separately, pass the reasonably prudent person test. But, even if they did not

separately do so, taken together, the reasonably prudent person test is clearly

satisfied. Zimmerman v State, Case No. 5D12-3198 (Fla. 5 th DCA August

29, 2012) (Although many of the allegations in Zimmerman's motion,

standing alone, do not meet the legal sufficiency test, and while this is

admittedly a close call, upon careful review we find that the allegations,

taken together, meet the threshold test of legal sufficiency.)


CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this petition has been typed in 14 point New Times

Roman Font.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing petition has

been served via U.S. mail thislth day of December, 2012, to the following

parties to this action: The Honorable Barbara Gurrola, Senior Circuit Court

Judge, Post Office Box 1030, Ocala, Florida 34478; Mark D. Shelnutt, PA,

1404 E Silver Springs Blvd Ocala FL 34470-6820; Janet Behnke, Esq.,

500 N.E. Eighth Avenue, P.O. Box 1237, Ocala, FL 34478-1237

The Gordon Law Firm P.O. Box 734 Williston, Florida 32696 (352) 5 0111 z,



E-Copy Received Dec 10, 2012 2:10 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORI FIFTH DISTRICT

IN RE: The former marriage of: CASE No. :5D12-4417

LORI ANN OVERCASH, L.T. NO 2002 4655-DR-FJ n/Ida LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife,

and

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH,

Former Husband

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

Dated this 10 th day of December, 2012.

The Gordon Law Firm P.O. Box 734 Williston, Florida 32696 (352) 528-0111

)



CONTENTS

A. 5 th DCA opinion on Overcash v Foultz, case no 5D11-3689

B. Order denying Former Husband's motion for Entry of Order reassigning

case

C. Former Husband's Second Motion to Reassign Case

D. Order of Reassignment

E. Composite, Motion to Disqualify and attachments

F. Email of July 19, 2012

G. Affidavit of Todd Overcash in Support of Motion to Disqualify

H. Letter to Judge Eddy, Administrative Judge

I. Order on Motion to Disqualify


WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, Petitioner, V .

LORI ANN OVERCASH, N/K/A LORI ANN FOULTZ, Respondent. Case No. 5D11-3689

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2012

Opinion filed June 29, 2012

Petition for Writ of Prohibition, William T. Swigert, Respondent Judge.

Beth Gordon of The Gordon Law Firm, Williston, for Petitioner.

Mark D. Shelnutt and Cheri A. Russell of Mark D. Shelnutt, P.A., Ocala, for Respondent.

GRIFFIN, J.,

Petitioner, William Todd Overcash ['Petitioner'], seeks a writ of prohibition from this Court to disqualify Senior Circuit Court Judge William T. Swigert from presiding over Marion County Case No. 2002-4655-DR-FJ, which involves a dispute with Petitioner's former wife, Lori Ann Overcash, now known as Lori Ann Foultz ['Respondent'] over the parties' shared parenting responsibilities of their daughter. Specifically, Petitioner argues that his motion should be deemed granted because the judge failed to issue its

Page 2

ruling within the thirty-day time limit pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j). We agree that because the trial court's order was untimely, the petition should be granted.

Petitioner timely filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge on August 19, 2011. The motion claimed judicial bias based upon several comments and actions the trial judge made during a hearing held on August 9, 2011. The trial judge denied Petitioner's motion to disqualify on October 3, 2011, more than forty-five days after it had been filed.

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j) provides that once a motion to

disqualify has been filed, the judge shall make its ruling immediately, but no later than thirty days.1 Tableau Fine Art Group, Inc. v. Jacoboni, 853 So. 2d 299, 302-03 (Fla. 2003). As rule 2.330(j) indicates, it must be read in conjunction with subsection (c) of the same rule, which provides that: "In addition to filing with the clerk, the movant shall immediately serve a copy of the motion on the subject judge as set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080." Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(c). Respondent argues that because the certificate of service on Petitioner's motion to disqualify does not show that the judge was served, the thirty-day window for the judge to rule was not triggered. We disagree. A certificate of service serves as prima facie evidence that service of

Page 3

pleadings is in compliance with the rules, but such evidence is neither conclusive nor exclusive. See e.g. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.080(f).

According to the filed affidavit of the Petitioner's process server, on August 19, the same day the motion was filed, Judge Swigert's copy of the motion to disqualify was hand delivered to the security officer on the fourth floor of the Marion County courthouse. Due to heightened security measures at the courthouse, documents being delivered to the judges were to be left with the security officer.

Respondent also objects that Petitioner did not file the affidavit of delivery by the process server until after the judge had ruled on the motion to disqualify, but that fact is of no significance. Service is the issue, not proof of service. See Tobkin v. State, 889 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (reference to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080 in Rule 2.330(c)

last Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 106

"requires service in a manner designed to notify the judge of the existence of the motion"); cf. Marquez v. State, 11 So. 3d 975, 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (denying writ of prohibition where the motion's certificate of service did not reflect service of the motion to the trial judge and there was no other proof of compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080). Here, although the certificate of service does not show service upon the judge, there appears to be no genuine dispute that the judge was promptly served. No evidence suggests he was not served and, in addition to the affidavit, there is corroborating evidence.

The record indicates that the judge was aware of Petitioner's motion soon after its filing because the disqualification motion was met with a motion to strike and reply, all of which were acknowledged in the judge's order denying Respondent's motion to strike on September 22, 2011. See Rosado v. State, 76 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA

Page 4

2012) (even if the trial judge had not received a copy of a motion to disqualify on the same date it had been filed, record evidence indicating that the judge had been aware of the motion during its pendency required that the motion to

disqualify be deemed granted pursuant to rule 2.330(j)).

Thus, under rule 2.330(j), Petitioner's motion to disqualify Judge Swigert was deemed to have been granted because it was not ruled on within 30 days. Petitioner's writ for prohibition is granted.

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

Notes:

' Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j) provides:

The judge shall rule on a motion to disqualify immediately, but no later than 30 days after the service of the motion as set forth in subdivision (c). If not ruled on within 30 days of service, the motion shall be deemed granted and the moving party may seek an order from the court directing the clerk to reassign the case.

last


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

IN RE: The Former Marriage of CASE NUMBER: 2002-4655-DR-FJ

Lori Arm Overcash, n/lc/a Lori Ann Foultz,

Former Wife/Mother, and

William Todd Overcash, Former Husband/Father.

ORDER DENYING FORMER HUSBAND'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER REASSIGNING CASE PURSUANT TO

FLORIDA RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.330(J)

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Former Husband's Motion for Entry of Order

Reassigning Case Pursuant to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.330(j). The Court having

considered the motion and the arguments contained therein, having reviewed the court file and being

otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Former Husband's Motion for Entry of Order

Reassigning Case Pursuant to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.330(j) is denied. An Order

Denying Former Husband's Motion to Disqualify Judge was previously entered in this cause on

October 3, 2011.

DONE AND ORDERED at Ocala, Marion County, Florida this 11th day of October, 2011.

4apitto'

David B. Eddy Circuit Judge


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by US Mail/hand

. .?'\/ (7,6

jelTif / .- Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 108

delivery/facsimile on this 11th day of October, 2011 to the following: Mr. J. Cheney Mason, 390 N. Orange Avenue, Suite 2100, Orlando, Florida 32801; Ms. Rose M. Marsh, 390 N. Orange Avenue, Suite 2100, Orlando, Florida 32801 and Mr. Mark D. Shelnutt, 1404 E. Silver Springs Blvd., Ocala, Florida 34470-6820.

- .

Mary Kisick . Judicial Assistant


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

IN RE: The former marriage of: LORI ANN OVERCASH, CASE NO 2002 4655-DR-FI n/k/a LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife,

and


Former Husband

FORMER HUSBAND'S SECOND MOTION TO REASSIGN CASE

COMES NOW the Former Husband, WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, by and

through his undersigned counsel, and files this Motion to Reassign case, and as grounds

therefore states as follows:

1. The attached 5 th DCA opinion grants the Petitioner / Husband's Petition for Writ of

Prohibition against the current Trial Judge, William T. Swigert.

2. Therefore, this case must be reassigned by the Chief Judge and or Clerk of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Respondent/ Former husband prays that this case is reassigned

forthwith.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served via US

Mail this 23 rd day of July 2012,to the following counsel of record: Mark D. Shelnutt,

PA, 1404 E Silver Springs Blvd Ocala FL 34470-6820 Robert Taylor, Esq.


McIntyre, Panzarella, Thanasides, Hoffman, Bringgold & Todd, P.L., 400 N. Ashley

Drive, Suite 1500, Tampa, Florida 33602

The Gordon Law Film P.O. Box 734 Williston, Florida 32696 (352) 528-0111

Beth Gordon, Esq.

Clerk of Court Marion County Post Office Box 1030 Ocala, Florida 34478


`4.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

Case No. 2002-4655-DR

In Re: The Former Marriage of


Former Husband,

and

LORI ANN OVERCASH n/k/a LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife.

ORDER OF RE-ASSIGNMENT

THIS CAUSE comes before the undersigned on the Disqualification of Senior JuddQ Wiiliarn .• • • • s „

T. Swigert and the Request for Reassignment by the Administrative 'Judge in and for Marion ;

; County, Florida, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case is hereby reassigned to the Honorable BARBAliA.G.URROLA,

Senior Judge, who shall preside in Marion County and hear all further matters herein: Said senior

judge having been given authority by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida to serve

as senior judge on a statewide basis and being duly assigned this case by the Chief Judge of Fifth

Judicial Circuit of Florida.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers of the Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, in

Brooksville, Hernando County, Florida, on this ,,,t^ay of July, 2012.

. . ,

S .fArE. Of FLONDA, C.C.',LVX OF MARION HFREW CERTF* tha I te foregoing i:. true and

correct copy 01 Foes 1 throi +, --jh_ _ of thon ;ostrumeni !fled .kn th is ofae.

Oe oqginal alstrurnet This copy Oas qo rodai.tn,•rs.

0 Ibis copy has bee, P, red,,,,c,tcd Nsuant + la DAVID liefliaiiiik'M iini,4A-: 6 LC— . , r...

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Y:::CeL=Ori :

Daniel B, Merritt, Sr. . r:. •

Chief Judge/Fifth judicial Circuit ;: :c) '•; ;•°,6-c.."( ..... •

• • ■



I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Re-Assignment in Marion County Case No. 2002-4655-DR has been furnished by US Mail on this ,240—day of July, 2012, to the following:

Beth M. Gordon, Esq. Post Office Box 734 Williston, FL 32696 Counsel for Former Husband

Robert E. Taylor, Jr., Esq. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 1500 Tampa, FL 33602 Co-Counsel for Former Husband

Mark D. Shelnutt, Esq. 1404 E. Silver Springs Boulevard Ocala, FL 34470 Counsel for Former Wife

Kelly A. Thompson, Esq. 618 SE 17 th Street Ocala, FL 34470 Guardian Ad Litem

Courtesy copy of this Order of Re-Assignment furnished by interoffice mail to: The Honorable Barbara Gurrola, Senior Judges' Office/Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida; and, the Honorable David B. Eddy, Administrative Judge/Marion County.

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STAT. OF FLORIDA. ciji.- -7-Y OF f',IAMON 1 HE-REF CERTIFY that 4 for errpf-r-{r 14.3fr J ,,?. ao'd correct copy of oFts,'ef;___ j___ th ougO„, , oI Olo instruirent Per in thIs effic.e.

ge, on?* to:Art:mud Ned cootaioal pages. ' This copy has no TilitactIorts. ian ben ii T4py te f (.1J3Ct'd 9c Ir tian to t '

DAVID r 0 oI',!, ,.._„,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

IN RE: The former marriage of: LORI ANN OVERCASH, n/k/a LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife, and


Former Husband

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY TRIAL JUDGE

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CASE NO 2002 4655-DR-FJ

Comes now the Former Husband and files this Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge, and

as grounds therefore states as follows:

1. This case has been reassigned by Daniel Merritt, Sr., to the Honorable Barbara

Gun-ola, senior judge from citrus County, Florida.

2. The choice seemed rather odd for re-assignment, because Judge Gurrola is

another senior judge, when there were at least five family court judges available

for random assignment, and no requests to re-assign out-of county had been

made.

3. Based upon the strangeness of there-assignment, the Former Husband made a

freedom of information act to the office of chief judge Daniel Merritt, 5 th Circuit,

for all documents that went between Judge Eddy, to whom the request for re-

assignment had been made, to Judge Merritt, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit,

from whom the re-assignment information was distributed to the parties. No

information was forthcoming for several months.


4. Again, the Former Husband made a freedom of information act request, this time

in writing. (see attached letter of September 14, 2012, which refers to the

previous verbal request.)

5. Still, no response was forthcoming.

6. The lack of response pursuant to two valid requests for information was brought

to the attention of the state attorney for Marion County. Thereafter, assistant

state attorney Don Simpson, Esq., made the request himself upon the office of

Chief Judge Daniel Merritt, Sr.

7. The response made to the state attorney's office dates October 3, 2012, contains a

letter dated July 19, 2012, at 2:14 PM, which makes clear that Judge Eddy

specifically requested that the case be reassigned to Judge Gurrola.

8. The letter of July 19 111 , which is an email from the Marion County Senior Judge's

judicial assistant, Rosemary Spivey, to the JA for Judge Merrit and the General

Counsel for the 5 111 Circuit, Grace Fagan, Esq., also specifically states that other

judges have conflicts. Specifically the email states that due to "local conflicts"

that Judge Eddy is specifically requesting that Judge Gurrola take the case.

9. This procedure is in direct contravention of the Fifth Judicial Circuit's standing

order on re-assignment, and specifically Administrative Order No. A-2009-03

Administrative Order Regarding Re-Assignment of Cases Out of County

Assignments and Rescinding Administrative Order A-92-7.

10. The aforementioned Administrative Order requires the re-assignment to be within

the county, and that Judge Eddy re-assign the case "utilizing the judicial

manpower of both circuit and county courts ..."


• 11. In other words, all judges of the county of Marion were to be assigned before any

out of county assignment should have been done.

12. Furthermore, the informal discussion of conflicts flies in the face of the Sunshine

laws and all known re-assignment rules, and if a particular judge has a conflict,

the sua sponte recusal method is available.

13. Most importantly, re-assignment is to be made "randomly," and Judge Eddy, as

administrator, was obligated to "electronically generate separate random rotation

sequence of both circuit and county court judges from which such re-

assignments may be made."

14. A random "next listed judge" ought to have been assigned this case as per the

Administrative Order A-2009-03.

15. Prior to hand-picking a Citrus County Judge, a random assignment ought to have

been made.

16. This case has not yet reached the point of even requiring a county court rotation

assignment. There are several family court judges that ought to have been on the

random rotation roster prior to any out of county judge being specially assigned.

17. Judges Pope, Robbins, and Scott were certainly available for this rotation and

random re-assignment. If there was a conflict, and it was not with the

undersigned nor her client l , the former husband, it should have been noted the

correct way- by way of disqualification.

The undersigned currently has had uneventful cases with Judges Robbins, Scott, and Ohlman, The Former Husband known none of these judges. It is therefore unclear as to what conflicts, if any, exist.


18. It is unfortunate to have to discover a complete lack of due process this way.

However, upon discovery, this motion for disqualification has been filed within

ten days of the state attorney receiving the requested correspondence. 1■1 0 riej,M as -1) 57,4S_ titc-0,A..2

A kid acr -

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

The undersigned counsel certifies that this motion, and the statements of the Former

husband as set forth in his attached affidavit, are made in good faith and not for purposes

of delay.

The Gordon Law Firm PO Box 734 Williston, FL 32696 (352) 528-0111 [email protected]

Beth Gordon, Esq.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice has been served

(emailed) this 15 th day of October, 2012, to the following counsel of record: Mark D.

Shelnutt, PA, 1404 E. Silver Springs Blvd Ocala FL 34470-6820; Robert Taylor,

Esq.McIntyre, Panzarella, Thanasides, Hoffman, Bringgold & Todd, P.L. 400 N. Ashley

Drive, Suite 1500, Tampa, Florida 33602; the Honorable Barbara Gurrola, hand

delivered, 4 th floor security station, Marion County Courthouse, 110 NW 1st Avenue

•


Ocala, Florida 34475

•

The Gordon Law Firm PO Box 734 Williston, FL 32696 (352) 528-0111 [email protected]

Beth Gordon, Esq.


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. A-2009-03

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REGARDING RE-ASSIGNMENT OF CASES AND OUT OF COUNTY ASSIGNMENTS

AND RESCINDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER A-92-7

WHEREAS, it has come to the attention of the Undersigned that there is a need for

uniformity throughout this Fifth Circuit regarding re-assignment and assistance of dockets

throughout the numerous counties herein; and the Undersigned having considered the matter of

the ever increasing number of judicial recusals, disqualifications, requests for cross jurisdictional

assignments; and requests for temporary judicial service in counties other than the home county

of the numerous judges throughout the Circuit; and the increasing difficulty of obtaining

voluntary assignments due to calendaring and scheduling restraints; and the need to establish

procedures to provide for the unbiased and equitable distribution of these cases that must be re-

assigned; and having considered Administrative Order Number A-1996-42 Appointing the

Honorable Patricia V. Thomas as Administrative Judge for Citrus County and appointing the

Honorable Don F. Briggs as Administrative Judge for Lake County; and Administrative Order

Number A-2005-23 Appointing the Honorable William H. Hallman as Administrative Judge for

Sumter County; and Administrative Order Number A-2005-24 Appointing the Undersigned as

Administrative Judge for Hernando County and Administrative Order Number A-2006-39

Appointing the Honorable David B. Eddy as Administrative Judge for Marion County; and

having considered the duties and responsibilities of the Administrative Judges as set forth by

Rule 2.215(5) Florida Rules of Judicial Administration and Administrative Order A-1996-42;

based on the foregoing it is:

ORDERED as follows:

1. All recusals, disqualifications and requests for temporary judicial service for both

the circuit and county courts shall be directed to the Administrative Judge of the

jurisdictional or "home"county of the judge making said request.

2. The Administrative Judge of the several counties of this circuit shall make

diligent effort to reassign such cases on an equitable basis and provide for the

dispatch of judicial business through temporary judicial service utilizing the

judicial manpower of both the circuit and county courts within his or her —

5i,,aem,__.111. As authorized by Administrative Order, the Administrative


Judges shall assign a county court judge to temporary service as a circuit court - - judge and a circuit judge as a county court judge _should the need arise and as _ necessary to efficiently administer justice and to comply with the provisions of

this order.

All requests to preside in a county other than a judge's "home" county shall be

directed to tb..e Administrative Judge of the requestor's county. After approval

from the "home" county Administrative judge, said request shall then be

forwarded to the Administrative Judge of the visiting county who shall either

approve or deny said request. If said request is granted by both the home county

and visiting county Administrative Judge, said request shall then be forwarded to

the Undersigned for fmal approval. All requests for judicial assignments directed

to the Undersigned shall be over the signature and approval of the Administrative

Judges in the respective counties as outlined herein. Such requests shall be made -- ,

using only the form attached hereto as ATTACHMENT A.

4. Due to the heavy case load of all the judges throughout this Fifth Circuit only in

exceptional circumstances shall service of a judge outside of one's home county

i 5.

be considered for temporary assignment.

In ordcrtoeTy_iitabl execute re-assignments authorized and approved by the

Undersigned and the Administrative Judges of their respective counties, the Court -------„,

— Administrator is hereby directed to lectronically generate)separate random T

rotation sequence of both circuit and county court judges from which such re-

assignments may be made. Upon approval of the re-assignment the Court (1

Administrator shall cause to be generated an order assigning the designated case

to the next listed judge. Multiple or companion cases may be assigned to the same

judge. This procedure does not apply to any out of county requests that have been

approved by the Undersigned as set forth in paragraph three (3) above.

6. Nothing herein shall preclude the Undersigned from entering Orders of

Assignment in conflict with the provisions set forth herein when such is deemed

necessary for the prompt and efficient administration of justice within the courts

of this circuit.

7. This Order may be amended periodically by the Undersigned upon the request and


recommendations of the Administrative Judges of this Circuit.

8. Nothing in this Order is intended to hamper the collegial relationships developed

between the numerous judges of the multiple counties in this circuit in assisting

with docket coverage in cases of extreme emergency.

9. Administrative Order numbered A92-7 entered on May 10, 1992, is hereby

rescinded.

IT IS SO DONE AND ORDERED, in Chambers, Hernando County, Florida, on this

rt, day of , 2010.

2' •

DANIEL B. MERRITY, SR., -VA CHIEF JUDGE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


ATTACHMENT A

REQUEST FOR OUT OF COUNTY ASSIGNMENT

TO: CHIEF JUDGE DANIEL B. MERRITT, SR.,

FROM: (Requesting Judge)

DATE:

RE:

VS.

Case Number: Present Presiding Judge:

PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER A-2009-03 THIS IS TO REQUEST: (Please Check One)

Re-assignment of the above styled cause due to the recusal or disqualification of the assigned Trial Judge. This matter cannot be re-assigned to a judge, either circuit or county, sitting in County because

The assignment of an out-of county judge to serve in Circuit/County Court in County on the following dates: through . Reason such service is necessary:

Requestor's Administrative Judge

Receiving County's Administrative Judge (please initial)

(please initial) Approved for re-assignment Approved for re-assignment Denied re-assignment Denied re-assignment

Please forward to Chief Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Sr., for final approval

Approved

Denied

DANIEL B. MERRITT, SR., Chief Judge Fifth Judicial Circuit


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

Effective: January 1, 2012 Administrative Order Number: M-2011-25

In Re: MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT JUDGES JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE YEAR 2012

Judge David B. Eddy: Juvenile Delinquency and CINS/FINS; all RVI and Sexual Violence cases (Designation FV); Detention and Shelter Hearings; all after hours injunctions; 1/4 Baker Act and 1/4 Substance Abuse (Marchman Act) cases (February, June, October); Administrative Judge for Marion County.

Judge Sandra Edwards-Stephens: 1/4 Felony (Designation X); 1/3 Jimmy Ryce cases; 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed beginning January 1, 2012.

Judge Robert W. Hodges: 1/4 Felony (Designation W) 1/3 Jimmy Ryce Cases; 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed beginning January 1, 2012.

Judge Frances S. King: 1/2 Civil (Designation B), and previous civil cases with designations of C and K; and pre-2009 Probate and Eminent Domain cases; 1/2 Forfeitures; 1/2 Bond Validations and Assessment Liens; 1/2 Eminent Domain; 1/2 Probate (cases filed before April 1,2011); 1/4 mortgage foreclosure cases filed through December 31, 2011.

Judge Brian D. Lambert: 1/4 Felony ((Designation Y); 1/3 Jimmy Ryce cases; 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed beginning January 1, 2012; Guardianship and Adult Protective Services cases filed beginning January 1, 2012; Circuit Appellate Panel.

Judge Jonathan D. Ohiman: 1/3 of all new Domestic Relations and Domestic Violence and Dating Violence DR cases assigned to FJ division; all previously assigned cases to the FJ division; Detention and Shelter hearings (as backup for Judge Eddy and Judge Robbins for the months of March, June, September, December ); 1/3 new Child Support Enforcement cases designated FJ; 1/4 Baker Act cases and 1/4 Substance Abuse (Marchman Act) cases (March, July and November); 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed with designation of N and cases previously reassigned from the senior judge docket.


Judge Willard Pope: 1/3 of all new Domestic Relations and Domestic Violence and Dating Violence DR cases assigned to FC division; all previously assigned cases to the PC division; Detention and Shelter hearings (as backup for Judge Eddy and Judge Robbins for the months of January, April, July, October); 1/3 of the new Child Support Enforcement cases designated HC; previous Child Support Enforcement cases designated HC; 1/4 Baker Act cases and 1/4 Substance Abuse (Marchrnan Act) cases (April, August, December); 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed with designation of P and cases previously reassigned from the senior judge docket.

Judge S. Sue Robbins: Juvenile Dependency; crossover Domestic Relations, Child Support Enforcement and Juvenile Delinquency cases (Designation FK); Detention and Shelter Hearings; Telmination of Parental Rights cases; Probate (cases filed beginning April 1, 2011); 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed with designation of 0 and cases previously reassigned from the senior judge docket; Fifth Circuit Family Law Administrative Judge.

Judge Edward L. Scott: 1/3 of all new Domestic Relations and Domestic Violence and Dating Violence DR cases assigned to FG division; all previously assigned cases to the FG division; Detention and Shelter hearings (as backup for Judge Eddy and Judge Robbins for the months of February, May, August, November); 1/3 of the new Child Support Enforcement cases designated HG; previous Child Support Enforcement cases designated HG; 1/4 Baker Act cases and 1/4 Substance Abuse (Marchman Act) cases (January, May, September); 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed with designation of M and cases previously reassigned from the senior judge docket.

Judge Jack Singbush: 1/2 Civil (Designation G) and previous civil cases with designations of A, D and E, and pre-2009 Probate and Eminent Domain cases; 1/2 Forfeitures, 1/2 Bond Validations and Assessment Liens, 1/2 Eminent Domain, 1/2 Probate (cases filed before April 1, 2011); 1/4 mortgage foreclosure cases filed through December 31, 2011.

Judge Hale R. Stancil: 1/4 Felony (Designation Z); Drug Court; 1/8 mortgage foreclosure cases filed beginning January 1, 2012.

Hearing Officer: Department of Revenue Child Support cases; and other duties to be determined.


General Magistrates: Hearings as designated by Administrative Order; Domestic Relations and other duties as assigned

POST CONVICTION MOTIONS WILL BE HEARD BY THE SENTENCING JUDGE

The Administrative Judge for Marion County will be chosen by the Chief Judge as he deems appropriate. The Administrative Judge for Marion County shall have administrative authority over all divisions.

CIVIL DESIGNATIONS are as follows:

G, and also A, 0 and E - Judge Jack Singbush B, and also C and K - Judge Frances S. King

FELONY DESIGNATIONS are as follows:

W - Judge Robert W. Hodges X - Judge Sandra Edwards-Stephens

- Judge Brian D. Lambert Z - Judge Hale R. Stanchl

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DESIGNATIONS are as follows:

FC - Judge Willard Pope FJ - Judge Jonathan D. OhLilian FG - Judge Edward L. Scott FK - Judge S. Sue Robbins FV - Judge David B. Eddy

Shelter hearings will be addressed by the five (5) family-law judges as set forth above. In the absence of such judges, the judge who is assigned to handle weekend and after-hours matters will hear the shelter hearings as required and necessary to comply with time restraints. In addition, all Marion County Circuit Judges will assist with the shelter hearings when necessary.

In any Domestic Violence and Repeat Violence cases where the parties have a pending domestic relations cases, such domestic/repeat violence case shall be assigned to the judge handling the domestic relations case. In any newly filed domestic relations cases where a Petition for Injunction for Protection has previously been filed, the domestic relations case shall be assigned to whichever judge handled the injunction.


Domestic Violence, Repeat Violence and other after-hours requests which require j udicial action on weekends, holidays and between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. on weekdays, will be reviewed and signed by all judges sitting in Marion County (Circuit Judges and County Judges) on a rotating basis. Such rotation shall be the same as the weekend and holiday assignments for First Appearances as set forth by separate Administrative Order. In each case where a County Judge has such an assignment, said judge is hereby appointed as an acting Circuit Judge for the duration of such assignment. Likewise, a Circuit Judge is hereby appointed as an acting County Judge in any instance where county court jurisdiction is required during such duty assignment.

Prior to noon on each Friday, the judge assigned to handle First Appearances that weekend will be delivered the duty judge telephone which he/she will retain on his/her person until the next Friday at noon, at which time the duty judge telephone will be delivered to the next assigned judge. Each judge so assigned (the "Duty Judge") will be responsible for ensuring that a judge is available during usual courthouse business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday), except lunch hour, to review and decide Domestic Violence, Repeat Violence and other matters which require immediate attention. The hearing dates and times required on Domestic Violence and Repeat Violence motions that are filed after hours and on weekends will be provided by judge Eddy.

David B. Eddy, Administrative Judee Dated: September 13, 2011


Oct-03•2012 11:32 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Hernand 352.754•4035

September 14, nu

At Judge pate] D. kb/Till. Sr,

Judge Merritt. Sr., 5th Circuit Administrative Judge,

I, Wm. Todd Overcash, MD, per Florida Statute 119 have contacted your administrative office and the Attorney that represents the judges of the Sth Circuit District Court on three occasions as documented by cell phone records. This form of contact meets state statute. I have requested release of all forms of communication and discussions between Marlon County Court Judges (Deyid P. Eddy and 5. Sualabbins) Judge Swigert, Judge Gurrola and your office and the 5th DCA in regards to the Overcash v Overeash Ma The 5th DCA required the removal of Judge Swigert from my ongoing family court case and the assignment of a new to the case 10 months after an appeal was flied and a request for a stay. In addition, I request a copy of all documents, all forms of communication and scheduled meetings that have occurred between Judge Swigert, Judge Gurrola, Judge Eddy, Judge Robbins and yourself in any format/combination of above named individuals or their assistants to discuss the ongoing litigation of Overcash v Foults (Overcash), all forms of communication between the 5th DCA and the Judges associate with the 5th Circuit in regards to the above named Judges and case. All forms of communication that has occurred between the above listed Judges and attorney Mark Shelnutt or his staff. The Communications that are requested should cover the time frame from July 1, 2011 to September 14, 2012. Please note that a follow-up request of additional communications will be made of any communications that occur between the above individuals from September 14, 2012 forward until compliance with statute 119 is met.

Per Florida, Public Records State Chapter 119 verbal request is adequate request I am now following with a written request. Per statute 119, these are not protected communications and I have beei specific in regards to the documents requested.

Sincerely,

4:410 d Overcash, 352412-8819 Fax: 352433-0220

September 14, 2012

As published in a citizen's rights pamphlet by the University of Florida:

If you are refused access to public records you should cite Chapter 119 of Florida Law, which states: it is the policy of this state that all state, county and municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal inspection by any person. Public records are defined as

4/9

Tot'A Wci 9g:Ø ZTOZ—t-T—d32


5/9 Oct-03•2012 11:33 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Hernand 352-754-4035

'ail documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received...in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.' Section 119.10 provides than Any person willfully and knowingly violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.'

I

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t'ucl:t-03-2012 11:31 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Hernand 352754-4035 1/9 s • •

1

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Hernando County Courthouse 20 North Main Street

Fourth Floor nrooltqville, FloriclA 38601

Phone: 352-754-4860 Fox: 352-754-4049

Gfeganraicirettit5.orf:

Grace Ann Fagan GENERAL COUNSEL

FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT STATE OF FLORIDA

DATE.- oJi

TO: --b:uaL 5ntpozr &di- OLL-k)IkL(4 15D- (447i 3

FROM.- Grace A. Fagan, .Esq.

NO. OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): q IN RE: F_eMid,5- &QUASI

MESSAGE:

PRIVILEGED AND CONTIDENTIAL IN/-01nIATION iztasred only for tha us: of ss..,..1dross.sc(2) 74 ■ 14:d rttipitnt of this fr.os7ra',:o, or or esent r.asporksib:: for do:ivorir,s i1¶o th: inthodoci rooipi you sro

:la.reoy thtst Loy c'isstrninafloo or copyinsrfds faosimilo is s:tictly pro"5i!:=Li. lf you hava roazivad this facsimil; n zaor, pl:F.53* by tt:tpb.:-.1t rt-Aurn to U.5 as ;:x;tho ,,r. ad:Toso via tlio U.S PJstz: S:rjoa. 7,,Lnk You)


Oct-03-2012 11:32 AM t)th Judicial Circuit Uerriand 362-754-4035

2/9

?HONF.. (352) 754'--: S60 FACSL\IILE (252) 754O4C

Orazz S. Sagan GENERAL COUNSEL

:NAND FOR THE FEPTII JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

OF FLORIDA

FERNANDO COURTHOUSE 20 N. ILLJN ST., RM. 200 3R0OKSVE-LE, FL 34021

October 1 , 2312

Mr. Wm.Todd Overearh at FAX: 352-433-0220

RE: Public Records Request

Dear Mr. Overcash:

This letter is a follow up to the public records request you made via facsimile to the Office of Chief Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Sr. (see attached). Pursuant to same, you have requested, " ...`rRle.lease of all forms of communication and discussions between Marion County Court Judges (David B. Eddy and S. Sue Robbins) Judge. Swigert, Judge Crurrola and your [the Chief Judge's] office and the 5 th DCA in regards to the Overcash v. Overcash ease." In response, after cursory investigation, please be advised that there is no written, verbal or email correspondence in existence to fulfill this request

Upon review of your written request, you have requested additional information. Specifically, you are including "all documents, all forms of communication and scheduled meetings that have occurred between Judge Swigert, Judge Gurrola, Judze Eddy, Judge Robbins and yourself in any farmaticombination of above named individuals or their assistants to discuss the ongoing litigation of Overcash v. Foults (Overeash)..." In response, after investigation, I can assure you there ware no scheduled meetings or other forms of communications in regards to the above refs;rencet: matter.

Additionally, you have requested, forn4s of communication between the p t.' DCA :Ind the Judges associate :sic] with iht 5' Circuit irt regards to the above named judges and case." The Fifth District Court of A7pe.als does not have any ex z)arto coramtmication with the Fifth Circuit et):: any othe: regal- iing this or any ether case. Any communication that did exist would

in the faun of an Order, Opinion, or MantI.....te and co:It:tined within the court file, which may he open for ii.s:N-ection at t21,. Office o: the Clerk of Couft and ma..y also be available to view online, at the Clerk of Court's website (unless sealed).

Lastly, you have requested, "All forms of co=nunica'don that has occurred between the above listed j , .ir:„cs and attorney Mark She lnutt or his staff. The communications that are rt.:I:nested shotld cover Inc Ern e frame 4'rern July 1, 2011 to Se ; ,tember 14, 2012,"


Oct-03•,2012 11:32 AM 5th Judicial Circuit • Hernand 352•754-4035

A cursory review of e-mail correspondence has resulted in the attached email correspondence between Rosemary Spivey, Administrative Assistant in the Senior Judges' Office and Attorneys Gordon and Taylor dated September 13, 2012, September 14, 2012 7 While not specifically requested, as a courtesy I have also included related e-mail correspondence dated September 17, 2012, September 18, 2012, and September 19, 2012, concerning possible hearing dates.

I have also enclosed e-mail correspondence dated July 19, 2012, from Administrative Assistant, Rosemarie Spivey to me and the Chief Judge's Judicial Assistant, Patricia Kodetslcy, regarding reassignment of the action following Mandate in June 2012.

Please be advised that pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ch. 119, should you require a detailed search of certain individuals' e-mail accounts and correspondence such will require payment (yet to be determined) in advance. Such a request would require numerous technology and information employee resources as well as legal staff redaction costs, if necessary. Also, charges for any copies will be .15 cents per page. The attached correspondence is being sent at no charge.

As this correspondence shall serve of verification of the completion of your public records request, please advise if I can assist you further.

cc: Daniel B. Merritt, Sr. Chief Judge David M. Trammell, Trial Court Administrator

3/9


Oct-0372012 11:33 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Hernand 352-754-4035

'ail documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or recelved...in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.' Section 119.10 provides thati Any person willfully and knowingly violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.'

5/9

7 CI • —.1 1.1..1 JO! OE] Ca 4' —


°et-03-2012 11:31 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Mornand 352-7S4-4035 1/9 I I x s

ins

Hernando County Courthouse 20 North Main Street .

owth Floor Braoltsville, 51oricia 34601

Phone: 352-754-4860 Fax: 352-754-4049

Gingsnecireuic_5.orLY

Grace Ann Fagan GENERAL COUNSEL

FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT STATE OF FLORIDA

DATE: 101 -:5 12-

TO: ?kiwi, &ntpcom 5 ok.EitykLy (R-7 1 -5-113

FROM Grace A. Fagan, Esq.

NO. OF PAGES (TNCLUDING COVER SHEET):

IN RE:),Cg.cie_ F_ )/eA Q_CLQW3T

,vrEssAGE: O 14L-

PRIvILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION int:T.:Its:COly f07 usc tS,t st rpeit of eg:7it cl:.iirczin3 it to this. intcs1;ci

ht:t.Sy th7t Lr.y eissitminntion or zorying •,..)f this N:4imilci o stic-tly prz,!iibit.d. It' yoll hsvo r oivd this zsror, pLas oedioov u• by tt:epholt Ind re.urrt t vh.thc U.S


Oct-03-2012 11:32 AM 5th judicial Circuit - Hernand 352-754-4035

2/9

?HOE (352) 73."....2.560 FACSTIvIlLE. (352) 75.4-4O49

Ora.:e R. S- agart GENERAL COUNSEL

:NAND FOR THE =1-1 JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

OF FLORIDA

IERNANDO COUR0:JSF, 20 N. MAIN ST., RM. 20D 3ROOKSVLIE, FL 3 4521

October 3, 202

Mr. Wm_Todd OvercaFb at FAX: 352-433-0220

RE: Public Records Request

Dear Mr. Overeash:

This letter is a follow up to the public records request you made via facsimile to the Office of Chief Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Sr. (see attached). Pursuant to same, you have requested, " ...':R]clease of all forms of communication and discussions between Marion County Court Judges (David B. Eddy and S. Sue Robbins) Judge Swigert, Judge Crurrola and your [the Chief Judge's] office and the 5 th DCA in regards to the Overcash v. Overcash case." In response, after cursory investigation, please be advised that there is no written, verbal or email correspondence in existence to fulfill this request.

Upon review of your written request, you have requested additional information. Specifically, you are including "all documents, all forms of communication and scheduled meetings that have occurred between Judge Swigert, Judge Gur.:01a, Judge Eddy, Judge Robbins and yourself in any fe7maticombination• of above named individuals or their assistants to discuss the ongoing litigation of Overcash v. Faults (Overeash)..." In response, after investigation, I can assure you there were no scheduled mectirps or other forms of communications in regards to the above ic ferenced matter.

Additionally, you have requested. ? ...LAT.' fowls of communication b2,tween the 5 t''' DCA anl the Judges associ±':2 [sic] with ':.1-te 5 n Ch-cuitiu regards to the above named judges arid case," The Fifth District Court of Appeals does not have any ex parte communication with the Fifth Circuit

arry other cii'cni:.) regarding this or any other case. Any communication that cUci exist would 1, e in tho ITI.Dnit of an Order, Opinion, or M•uldate and contained within court -.file, which may

he open for insnection the Office of Clerk of Court and ;aay also be aval19.b:e to view °nine at the Clerk of Court's websitz (unless sea:s.xl)

Lastly, you have requested, "All forms of corninunication that has occur-red between the above

hs'eci ._;11s and. attorney Mark L11;.linutt or his Start o communications :nat are r-L..-cuesu should cov..;7.-±e time frame from lily 1, '0:1 to Se.) ....:nber :4, 2312,"


3/9 Oct-03-,2012 11:32 AM 5th Judicial Circuit • Hernand 352-754-4035

A cursory review of e-mail correspondence has resulted in the attached email correspondence between Rosemary Spivey, Administrative Assistant in the Senior Judges' Office and Attorneys Gordon and Taylor dated September 13, 2012, September 14, 2012, While not specifically requested, as a courtesy I have also included related e-renil correspondence dated September 17, 2012, September 18, 2012, and September 19, 2012, concerning possible hearing dates.

I have also enclosed e-mail correspondence dated July 19, 2012, from Administrative Assistant, Rosemarie Spivey to me and the Chief Judge's Judicial Assistant, Patricia Kodetsky, regarding reassignment of the action following Mandate in June 2012.

Please be advised that pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ch. 119, should you require a detailed search of certain individnels' e-mail account and correspondence such will require payment (yet to be determined) in advance. Such a request would require numerous technology and information employee resources as well as legal staff redaction costs, if necessary. Also, charges for any copies will be .15 cents per page. The attached correspondence is being sent at no charge.

As this correspondence shall serve of verification of the completion of your public records request, please advise if I can assist you further.

cc: Daniel B. Merritt, Sr. Chief Judge David M. Trammell, Trial Court Administrator


j3•2012 11:33 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - liernand 352-7544035

9/9

Fagan, Grace

From: Spivey, Rosemary Sent Wednesday, October 03, 2012 11:33 AM To: Fagan, Grace Subject FW: Reassignment - Overcash case Marion County #2002-4655-DR Attachments: Reassignment Order - Overcast: v Foul tz (Gurrola - Marlon) 7-12wpri

From: Spivey, Rosemary Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2012 2:14 PM To: Kodetsky, Patricia; Fagan, Grace Subject Reassignment - Overcash case Marion County #2002-4655-DR

Overcash v. Overcash/Foultz; Marion County Case No. 2002-4655-DR

This case has been assigned to and handled by Judge Swigert. Pursuant to a DCA Opinion filed 6/29/12 the motion for disqualify Judge Swlgert was granted. This DCA opinion was provided to Judge Eddy as administrative judge for reassignment. After review of the sealed file, and because of local conflicts, Judge Eddy has requested that the case be reassigned to another senior judge, specifically asked that I contact Judge Gurroia regarding same.

As requested by Judge Eddy, I contacted Judge Gurrola this afternoon; she does not know or have any personal

knowledge of the parties; and has agreed to accept reassignment.

Attached for Judge Merritt's consideration is proposed Order of Reassignment on the subject case.

Rosemary Spivey Senior Judges' Office Phone: 352-401-6770 Fax: 352-401-6772 rsolvevacircuit5.orq


J3 - 2012 11:33 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Hernand 352-754-4035 9/9

Lam Grace

From: Spivey, Rosemary Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2012 11:33 AM To; Fagan. Grace -

Subject FW: Reassignment - Overtash case Marion County #2002-4655-DR Attachments: Reassignment Order - Overcash v Fouitz (Gurrola - Marlon) 7-12.wpd

From: Spivey, Rosemary Sent: Thursday, )uly 19, 2012 2:14 PM To: Kodetsky, Patricia; Fagan, Grace Subject Reassignment - Overcash case Marion County #2002 -4655-DR

Overcash v. Overcash/Fouitz; Marion County Case No. 20024655-DR

This case has been assigned to and handled by Judge SwIgert. Pursuant to a DCA Opinion filed 6/29/12 the motion for

disqualify Judge Swigert was granted. This DCA opinion was provided to Judge Eddy as administrative judge for reassignment. After review of the sealed file, and because of local conflicts, Judge Eddy has requested that the case be reassigned to another senior judge, specifically asked that) contact Judge Gurrola regarding same.


knowledge of the parties; and has agreed to accept reassignment

Attached for Judge Merritt's consideration is proposed Order of Reassignment on the subject case.

Rosemary Spivey Senior Judges' Office Phone: 352401-6770 Fax: 352-401-6772 rsolvevOcircult5.orq


• IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY

IN RE: The former marriage of: LORI ANN OVERCASH, CASE NO 2002 4655-DR-FJ n/k/a LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife, and


Former Husband

AFFIDAVIT OF TODD OVERCASH, M.D., IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY TRIAL JUDGE

Comes now the Former Husband and files this Affidavit in Support of my Motion to

Disqualify Trial Judge, and as grounds therefore states as follows:

I. My name is William Todd Overcash, M. D.

2. I feel as if I have been deprived of due process of law, namely, a random re-

assignment of a judge as per Marion County Administrative Order.

3. I am not sure why my case was specifically re-assigned to an out of county judge,

when there exist several other currently sitting family judges in the Marion

County Circuit court, and other county judges that ought to have been re-assigned

first.

4. This case should have been randomly re-assigned just like any other case in the

county.

5. I am particularly concerned that the chief Judge of the 5 th Circuit, the Honorable

Judge Merrit, Sr., did not respond to my freedom of information act request until

made by the state attorney.


6. I know of no conflict that I have or could present to any of the other currently

sitting family judges in Marion County, or any of the county court judges.

Therefore, why there may have been "conflicts" as mentioned in the email of July

19, 2012, is unclear.

7. It concerns me that my case has not been handled properly as any other case

would have been pursuant to administrative order.

8. In particular, the "conflicts" mentioned by Rosemary Spivey in the same email

concern me- what are they, and how they came about is of interest and concern to

me. How could other judges have conflicts regarding this case, when the record is

sealed? I do not know these judges nor have I appeared before them to my

recollection.

9. Because of these irregularities and denial of due process rights, I fear that I cannot

get a fair trial at this time.

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of

the claims made in this petition and that the punishment for knowingly making a

false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated: ignature o Affiant

Printed Name: Address: ,'1 // xv City, State, Zip: .92' 3 /

Telephone Number: )...!"-D ryi?

Fax Number: STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION


• • Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me oniO4611,by

1 icw

tC or DEPUTY CLERK

A. C

//Personally known V Produced identification

Type of identification produced

Dated this 13th day of October. 2012

[Print, type, or stamp co'=. 4nrnissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.] .

-at.)


THE GORDON LAW FIRM 113 East Noble Avenue

P.O. Box 734* Williston, Florida 32696

(352)-528-0111

*mailing address October 22nd , 2012

Honorable Judge David Eddy (hand delivered) Administrative Judge, Marion County Marion County Courthouse 110 NW First Avenue Ocala, FL 34476

Re: Foultz v Overcash case no. 2002 4655-DR-FJ

Honorable Judge Eddy:

I am again requesting reassignment of this case following the 5 th DCA opinion granting a writ of prohibition and requiring reassignment. It has come to my attention that this matter was specifically given to a Judge Gurrola from Citrus County. No formal written request had been made by either party for an out of county judge, and no form entitled "Request for out of County Assignment" was ever done or filed (see attached). (This would have required the reasons for local conflicts.) I also attach an email that my client received pursuant to a freedom of information act request.

It is my opinion and understanding of the administrative rules that this case ought to have been reassigned as any other case, randomly, first to other sitting family judges, then to county court judges, before any out of county assignment would have been considered. Any potential conflicts ought to have been noted as such by judges, on the record. Therefore in accordance with Administrative Order No. A-2009-3, which I have attached, reassignment is requested to the next available circuit family judge that is generated on the random rotation sequence

Very truly yours,

Beth M. Gordon, Esq.

cc: Mark Shelnutt, Esq. Robert Taylor, Esq. Clerk of Court


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT • OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO_ A-2009-03

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REGARDING RE-ASSIGNMENT OF CASES AND OUT OF COUNTY ASSIGNMENTS

. AND RESCINDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER A-92-7

WHEREAS, it has come to the attention of the Undersigned that there is a need for

uniformity throughout this Fifth Circuit regarding re-assignment and assistance of dockets

throughout the numerous counties herein; and the Undersigned having considered the matter of

the ever increasing number of judicial recusals. disqualifications, requests for cross jurisdictional

assignments; and requests for temporary judicial service in counties other than the home county

of the numerous judges throughout the Circuit; and the increasing difficulty of obtaining

voluntary assignments due to calendaring and scheduling restraints; and the need to establish

procedures to provide for the unbiased and eiluitable distribution of these cases that must be re-

assigned; and having considered Administrative Order Number A-1996-42 Appointing the

Honorable Patricia V. Thomas as Administrative Judge for Citrus County and appointing the

Honorable Don F. Briggs as Administrative Judge for Lake County; and Administrative Order

Number A-2005-23 Appointing the Honorable William H. Hallman as Administrative Judge for

Sumter County; and Administrative Order Number A-2005-24 Appointing the Undersigned as

Administrative Judge for Hernando County and Administrative Order Number A-2006-39

Appointing the Honorable David B. Eddy as Administrative Judge for Marion County; and

having considered the duties and responsibilities of the Administrative Judges as set forth by

Rule 2.215(5) Florida Rules of Judicial Administration and Administrative Order A-1996-42;

based on the foregoing it is:

ORDERED as follows:

1. All recusals, disqualifications and requests for temporary judicial service for both

the circuit and county courts shall be directed to the Administrative Judge of the

jurisdictional or "home"county of the judge making said request.

2. The Administrative Judge of the several counties of this circuit shall make

diligent effort to reassign such cases on an equitable basis and provide for the

dispatch of judicial business through temporary judicial service utilizing the

judicial manpower of both the circuit and county courts within his or her

ctivoun. . As authorized by Administrative Order, the Administrative


Judges shall assign a county court judge to temporary service as a circuit court _ judge and a circuit judge as a county court judg,eshould the need arise and as

necessary to efficiently administer juitice and to comply with the provisions of

this order.

3. All requests to preside in a county other than a judge's "home" county shall be _

directed to_theAdministrative Judge of the requestor's county. After approval

from the "home" county Administrative judge, said request shall then be

forwarded to the Administrative Judge of the visiting county who shall either

approve or deny said request. If said request is granted by both the home county

and visiting county Administrative Judge, said request shall then be forwarded to

the Undersigned for final approval. All requests for judicial assignments directed

to the Undersigned shall be over the signature and approval of the Administrative

Judges in the respective counties as outlined herein. Such requests shall be made __—

using only the form attached hereto as ATTACHMENT A.

4. Due to the heavy case load of all the judges throughout this Fifth Circuit only in

exceptional circumstances shall service of a judge outside of one's home county

5.

be considered for temporary assignment.

In order to equitably execute re-assignments authorized and approved by the

Undersigned and the Administrative Judges of their respective counties, the Court

Administrator is herebicii_rectecIty_flectronically gener sep

rotation sequence of both circuit and county court judges from which such re- -_ assignments may be made. Upon approval of the re-assignment the Court

Administrator shall cause to be generated an order assigning the designated case

to the next listed judge. Multiple or companion cases may be assigned to the same

judge. This procedure does not apply to any out of county requests that have been

approved by the Undersigned as set forth in paragraph three (3) above.

6. Nothing herein shall preclude the Undersigned from entering Orders of

Assignment in conflict with the provisions set forth herein when such is deemed

necessary for the prompt and efficient administration of justice within the courts

of this circuit.

7. This Order may be amended periodically by the Undersigned upon the request and


recommendations of the Administrative Judges of this Circuit.

Nothing in this Order is intended to hamper the collegial relationships developed

between the numerous judges of the multiple counties in this circuit in assisting

with docket coverage in cases of extreme emergency.

9. Administrative Order numbered A92-7 entered on May 10, 1992, is hereby

rescinded.

IT IS SO DONE AND ORDERED, in Chambers, Hernando County, Florida, on this

rtk day of % , 2010.

AANIEL B. MERRITT, SR., CHIEF JUDGE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


ATTACHMENT A

REQUEST FOR OUT OF COUNTY ASSIGNMENT

TO: CHIEF JUDGE DANIEL B. MERRITT, SR.,

FROM: (Requesting Judge)

DATE:

RE:

VS.

Case Number: Preseni Presiding Judge:

PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER A-2009-03 THIS IS TO REQUEST: (Please Check One)

Re-assignment of the above styled cause due to the recusal or disqualification of the assigned Trial Judge. This matter cannot be re-assigned to a judge, either circuit or county, sitting in County because

[ ] The assignment of an out-of county judge to serve in Circuit/County Court in County on the following dates: through . Reason such service is necessary:

Requester's Administrative Judge (please initial) Approved for re-assignment Denied re-assignment

Receiving County's Administrative Judge (please initial) Approved for re-assignment Denied re-assignment

Please forward to Chief Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Sr., for final approval

Approved

Denied

DANIEL B. MERRITT, SR., Chief Judge Fifth Judicial Circuit


3 - 2012 11:33 AM 5th Judicial Circuit - Hernand 352-754-4035

9/9

s Pagan, Grace

From: Spivey, Rosemary Sent Wednesday, October 03, 2012 11:33 AM To: Fagan. Grace Subject FW: Reassignment - overcash case Mari. on County #2002-4655-DR Attachments: Reassignment Order - Overcash v Fouitz (Gurrola - Marion) 7-12.wpd

From: Spivey, Rosemary Sent: Thursday, lily 19, 2012 2:14 PM To: Kodebgcy, Patricia; Fagan/ Grace Subject Reassignment - Overcash case Marion County #2002-4655-DR

Overcash v. Overcash/Foultz; Marion County Case No. 20024655-DR

This case has been assigned to and handled byJudge Swigert. Pursuant to a DCA Opinion filed 6/29/12 the motion for disqualify Judge Swigert was granted. This DCA opinion was provided to Judge Eddy as administrative judge for

reassignment After review of the sealed file, and because of local conflicts, Judge Eddy has requested that the case be reassigned to another senior Judge, specifically asked that I contact Judge Gurrola regarding same.


knowledge of the parties; and has agreed to accept reassignment

Attached for Judge Merrites consideration is proposed Order of Reassignment on the subject case.

Rosemary Spivey Senior Judges' Office Phone: 352-401-8770 Fax 352-401-8772 rso1vevAcircult5.orq


• • IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

IN RE; The Former Marriage of:

LORI ANN OVERCASH, n/k/a LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Former Wife,

and CASE NO.: 2002-DR-4655

(-) • WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH,

7' _ (—) „

Former.Husband. ".

_ ril tf , c-)

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISQUALIFY TRIAL JUDGE —4 Z Zit 2r;

•-•C %C.) F- -

THIS COURT COURT having considered the Former Husband, William Todd 0a'sh'& -p

Motion to Disqualify the Trial Judge, having reviewed the record of this case and all documents

pertinent to the motion, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises finds as follows:

In the instant motion, William Todd Overcash requests that this Court be disqualified

from hearing any future proceedings in this case. Pursuant to Rule 2.330, Fla.R.Jud.Admin. and

Florida Statutes § 38.10, the Former Husband, William Todd Overcash's, Motion to Disqualify

the Trial Judge is legally insufficient. Based upon the foregoing, it is thereupon:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: _ _ •

The Former• Husband, William Todd Overcash's, Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Barbara

Gtirrola is DENIED.

r1 I) NE AND RDERED in Chambers, at Ocala, Marion County, Florida, this Liar ,..)

day u Lcerk , 2012. /1,17“4-141„.„4.• BARBARA GURROLA SENIOR JUDGE .

WAIF: Of P-)_CAInA, 1.0t1'.... • ,• ,' 31: ,,iiARICIN - HEREBY CIRTIR thatiorcg t e c* .,j . Vue. 7s M I

correct copy oi paiy.is_ : tt)ro , .3.h Tr,trumait 5.2 ,,1 0 this c -:,„

Xb

. onginal instrm:2 unt . 1!eJ,-;...„.oieins_ age,5.. Fhis copy has no re:NiLlic.Lt:.

.. This copy has been r-, dacif wa- soarlt c nw.\\'(5

DAVit) . , ' "'- 11:NN, ' •k f cr , ' .. e ( Jil Dated

. Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 148


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnisheq to the following by U.S. Mail, electronic mail, or hand delivery this day of azi9 .-C" , 2012.

Beth Gordon, Esquire, The Gordon Law Firm, P.O. Box 734, Williston, Florida 32696

Mark D. Shelnutt, Esquire, Mark D. Shelnutt, P.A., 1404 East Silver Spring Boulevard, Ocala, Florida 34470

Robert Taylor, Esquire, McIntyre, Panzarella, Thanasides, Hoffman, Bringgold & Toad, P.L., 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 1500, Tampa


AppendixD

LetterofJanuary17th,2014writtenby

AttorneyBethGordonwhensheno

longerrepresentedthePetitioner,she

wrotealettersupportingWilliamTodd

Overcash’sallegationsandinferencesof

biasagainstJudgeGurrola.


THE GORDON LAW FIRM 113 East Noble Avenue

P.O. Box 734* Williston, Florida 32696

(352)-528-0111 January 17, 2014

Florida Bar 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida

Re: In the matter of Todd Overcash, M.D.

To whom it may concern,

I represented Dr. Overcash in what should have been a simple custody matter, for roughly just under two years I have witnessed Mark Shelnutt, Esq, the opposing counsel in that case who represented the ex-wife, do the following:

1) Falsely represent that an orthodontist, Dr. Reed, did not recommend treatment for the minor child, when he had previously recommended the treatment in writing to Mr. Shelnutt's client This was a patent falsehood (A motion for rehearing and sanctions was filed, Judge Gurrola did not grant it- there were no repercussions at all)

2) Falsely represent to the Court that Dr. Overcash was in arrears on child support when I had just gone to the clerk and found he was up to date,

3) Ignore the rules of evidence and insist on refreshing his own client's recollection at deposition, although the client had not said she didn't remember anything, and I was taking the deposition. This made it impossible to properly proceed in any meaningful way.

Judge Gurrola was chosen specifically by Judge William Swigert to take over the case when he was removed by the 5th DCA. There is an email to that effect, that the Dr. obtained through a freedom of information act request. I found the hand picked out of county judge situation very strange as it was supposed to be random computer generated selection from first the circuit judges then the county judges, and only after each judge stated in writing that they couldn't serve, then the chief administrative judge could go out of county for an assigmnent. Judge Gurrola entered writs of bodily attachment for the payment of attorney's fees- for the ex-wife's lawyer. Although the Dr. made $12,000 roughly a month, one order had a purge amount of $24,000 and change. Judge Gurrola has refused to hear motions that we had set- and heard other motions before that had been set by the wife's attorney but filed after and set after. Judge Gurrola held the Dr. in contempt for an order that was not valid- it was signed by Judge Swigert after he was removed by the appellate court- it was an order requiring him to sign a waiver of extradiditon, something that the Bahamian embassy had no idea how to do uniress he was accused of some crime and was wanted. One motion in particular, the Husband's Motion to


Impute Income, was set I think on three separate occasions but not heard until the third time. It was very odd. I did not represent the client on that motion, another attorney, Robert Taylor, Esq., did. In any case, Judge Gurrola was rude to me, to the point of being abusive, for no reason. I was always respectful to the Court. At the end of my representation I filed a motion to withdraw in both the family and dependency cases. At that hearing, Judge Gurrola both raised her voice to me, inappropriately, and asked me "don't you know how to practice law?" She was yelling at me that I hadn't filed a motion to withdraw in both cases- I apologized said I was sorry, and said I would do so immediately. One of the lawyers in the room reminded me that I had in fact filed in both-and gave me the copy. I was so rattled by the judge yelling at me, for what reason I had no idea, I didn't realize I was correct. After that hearing, my last in the case, one of the attorneys for DCF called me to tell me that she believed that I did a good job and that I shouldn't feel badly. It was a nice gesture on her part- I hardly knew her and she was so appalled at the way Judge Gurrola spoke to me, that I suppose she was motivated to call me.

Based on what I saw and my experience with the client, it is my opinion that William Todd Overcash has developed a terrible fear of the court system in general. He became so nervous on one occasion that he fainted. He is terrified of Judge Gurrola in particular. I personally feel that he could not get a fair trial in front of Judge Gurrola, from what I have seen and experienced.

Please excuse the disjointed and run-on sound of this letter- it was written in haste because I was told I needed to get this in today. I would be happy to discuss this with the bar at any time.

Very truly your,

Beth Gordon, Esq.


AppendixE

AffidavitofCarolynTorrey


Affidavit of Carolyn Torrey

1. I Carolyn Torrey am over the age of 18. 2. I am a resident of Marion County, Florida. 3. I have witnessed William Todd Overcash fear because of the bias hearings and

rulings held by Judge Gurrola. 4. I have witnessed William Todd Overcash shake, sweat, and complaint of chest pain's

about upcoming hearings or even going into the courthouse. 5. I have witnessed when William Todd Overcash has been unlawfully placed in jail for

the wife's attorney Mark Shelnutt's fees. 6. I have witnessed when William Todd Overcash was taken to the hospital by EMS

because of severe chest pains during hearings whereby Judge Gurrola threaten him with criminal contempt when he can't pay for the wife's attorney as he fights for his daughter.

7. I have witnessed when Todd Overcash schedule his work and social life that is set only to the days to be with his daughter when it was his time for custody.

8. I know Todd Overcash has fought court battles for the daughter's health and schooling.

9. I have witnessed William Todd Overcash cry as he fears the courts and misses his only child the courts have taken from him.

10.1 have seen William Todd Overcash collapse and in pain from the mere frustration. 11.1 have witnessed William Todd Overcash under extreme duress ever since Judge

Gurrola has taken over in the case. 12.1 have witnessed William Todd Overcash in extreme duress when he told he had no

choice to sign the document on his daughter or face jail because he can't pay for the attorney's fees as Judge Gurrola had already done.

13.1 have witnessed in a hearing when Judge Gurrola admitted to exparte communication with Mark Shelnutt, admit to receiving and signing orders prior to the actual hearing happening, admitting to the act in court, and signing an order without even reading it or allowing for Dr. Overcash's attorney Beth Gordon, to have even seen the prior to her signing the order. When opposing counsel caught her on the act she refused to rescind the order she signed.

14.1 have witnessed Judge Gurrola demander in court as she is very condescending and expresses great amount of animosity toward William Todd Overcash.

15.1 have witnessed when Judge Gurrola has refused to allow William Todd Overcash testify. I have witnessed Judge Gurrola accept the testimony of Mark Shelnutt rather the William Todd Overcash.

Cai(r2oAo~rnmyy 0 1202 SE 10 Avenue Ocala, FL 34471

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF Marion County____________

Page 1 of 2 Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 154

me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Carolyn Torrey, who is personally known to

MY fiQjhe,seal of this Court this/ /day Of!

bIIc.St9 lad a

me 99

(Notary seal and or stamp)

MY Commission ON # EXPIRES:________________________________


AppendixF

Ex-parteHearingTranscriptof2April

2014


AppendixG

HearingTranscriptsOctober30th2013


Matter of Termination of Parental Rights/Adoption v. Overcash/Foultz October 30, 2013

www.cabreporting.com352-401-0080

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 2013-4392-DR-FK

IN RE: The Matter of the )Termination of Parental Rights )for the Proposed Adoption of )a Minor Child. )

PROCEEDINGS: Petition for Stepparent Adoption (Excerpt Part #2)

BEFORE: Honorable Barbara Gurrola Senior Judge

DATE: October 30, 2013

TIME: 1:40 p.m.

PLACE: Marion County Judicial Center 110 Northwest First Avenue Ocala, FL

REPORTED BY: Catherine J. Phillips, Registered Merit Reporter Certified Manager of Reporting Services Florida Professional Reporter Notary Public, State of Florida at Large.

CAB REPORTING, INC. Post Office Box 1684 Ocala, Florida 34478 352.401.0080




Page 2

APPEARANCES:

ANN MELINDA CRAGGS, ESQUIRE

OF: Bond, Arnett, Phelan,

Smith & Craggs, P.A.

Post Office Box 2405

Ocala, FL 34478

352.622.1188

Attorney for Petitioners

Kenneth Paton and Lori Ann Foultz

REBECCA GUTHRIE, ESQUIRE

OF: Mark D. Shelnutt, P.A.

1404 East Silver Springs Blvd.

Ocala, FL 34470

352.629.6203

Attorney for Lori Ann Foultz

ALSO PRESENT:

Kenneth Paton, Petitioner

Lori Ann Foultz, Petitioner




Page 3

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 THEREUPON,

3 * * * * * * *

4 (The following is the requested excerpt.)

5 THE COURT: Ms. Craggs, could you -- even

6 though he's not here, I would appreciate it if you

7 would...

8 MS. CRAGGS: Oh, yes, ma'am, I think it's

9 important to create a record.

10 But before I question my clients, and some of

11 these things are things that the Court touched on

12 already today, but for the record, Dr. Overcash

13 signed his consent on July 15th and he -- that

14 consent, an original of which is in the court file,

15 and I have duplicate originals, because three were

16 signed, includes the statutory required language

17 that he had a three-day -- a three business day

18 right of revocation because the child was over six

19 months of age.

20 And because that consent, that I did not

21 prepare, included that statutorily required

22 language, he was properly put on notice about that

23 right of revocation.

24 July 15th was a Monday. He did not, within

25 three business days or since, ever follow the




Page 4

1 statutes, which are 63.0824C, 63.0824E, and

2 63.077A, which tells him how to revoke that

3 properly.

4 Moving on. Dr. Overcash was served with my

5 clients' Petition for Stepparent Adoption on

6 September 18th. Twenty days from that would have

7 been October 8th. He did not at that time, nor

8 since, ever file an answer to that petition.

9 Section 63.076 talks about that that fact,

10 the fact that he did not file an answer, in and of

11 itself, may constitute grounds to terminate his

12 parental rights.

13 Something else that at least caused me a

14 little bit of pause, but I proceeded with very

15 conservative caution, the consent that Dr. Overcash

16 signed on July 15th included a waiver of any

17 further notice of the stepparent adoption

18 proceedings. But because it did not waive his

19 right to service of process, I believed and

20 recommended to my client that he be served.

21 If he had -- if it had said he waived service

22 of process, under Chapter 63 we would have never

23 even have had to have served him with this action.

24 But in any event...

25 Dr. Overcash is correct when he states that




Page 5

1 the only grounds to set aside a consent are fraud

2 or duress. And the law in our state and the case

3 is K.C. versus Adoption Services, Incorporated,

4 721 So.2d 811, Florida Fourth District Court of

5 Appeals, it is a December 1998 decision, provides

6 that it was -- it would be -- it is Dr. Overcash's

7 burden to proof, by clear and convincing evidence,

8 that he was under duress.

9 The case actually goes on to say that simply

10 having a change of heart is not duress.

11 The definition provided by this case of

12 duress would be a condition of mind produced by an

13 improper external pressure or influence that

14 practically destroys the free agency of a party and

15 causes him to do an act or make a contract not of

16 his own volition.

17 And he, to prove that, Dr. Overcash would

18 have had to show that his act of signing the

19 consent was effected and voluntarily, and not as an

20 exercise of his free choice or will, and that his

21 condition of mind was caused by some improper and

22 coercive conduct of the opposite side.

23 It isn't the pressure of life. It isn't the

24 pressure of hard financial sometimes. It isn't the

25 pressure of being incarcerated or whatever other




Page 6

1 pressure you may find in your life. It would had

2 to have come from the other side, or in this case

3 my client, Lori Foultz and her husband.

4 The Court has already read into the

5 transcript -- today's transcript, and I won't

6 repeat it, all of the various recitations that

7 Dr. Overcash made. He was asked in different ways

8 by Mr. Shelnutt. He did have the advice of

9 counsel.

10 As an aside, I have never been contacted by

11 any of his lawyers to advise me that, you know,

12 upon further reflection they believed he wasn't of

13 his own mind or acting on his own free will.

14 The neuropsychological evaluation that

15 Dr. Overcash referenced a few times today, the

16 brief synopsis of overall findings, and that is the

17 heading, finds Dr. Overcash to be a well-adjusted,

18 responsible individual with superior intellectual

19 functioning who possesses the motivation to be a

20 good parent.

21 And so I don't know and never have spoken to

22 Dr. Crum, but that is her one sentence synopsis

23 that would indicate that Dr. Overcash was not, on

24 July 15th, beyond his ability to exercise his own

25 free will.




Page 7

1 I also would like to point out that

2 Dr. Overcash's decision to leave the hearing today,

3 before I was able to really provide anything of

4 substance, was of his own volition.

5 For the record, he indicated that he had

6 witnesses to testify and he was not prevented from

7 doing so today. He was not prevented from leaving.

8 And the other thing I would say, and

9 Mrs. Guthrie could refer to this better because I

10 was not there, but, you know, my understanding is

11 there was a hearing just last week on the post

12 dissolution matters, and that representations made

13 at those hearings about what Dr. Overcash was or

14 was not doing with regard to post dissolution

15 matters, you know, were contrary to perhaps what he

16 said today about his inability to effectuate all

17 agreements or all facets.

18 The reason for the time frames in Chapter 63

19 for revocations of consent, for answers, for timely

20 notice of objections to allow the Court to make

21 even a preliminary decision that there should be

22 evidence concerning fraud or duress, is to promote

23 the finality of a child's situation.

24 And I know that is what my clients' chief

25 concerns are, to promote finality for Natasha.




Page 8

1 I don't think there was anything said by

2 Dr. Overcash today that indicated he was prevented

3 from revoking his consent timely or filing an

4 answer timely. So I don't think that he was able

5 to put any sort of evidence before the Court to --

6 he didn't argue that he did timely try to answer or

7 revoke his consent. He argued that he didn't have

8 time.

9 But I don't believe he's met any sort of a

10 burden of proof that would be required for him to

11 prove that his decision wasn't of his own free

12 making, based upon his sworn testimony in open

13 court on July 15th.

14 And a last thing I would say, Your Honor, is

15 that although he signed his consent on the 15th, it

16 was the next day, on the 16th, that he signed a

17 separate document where he petitioned to terminate

18 his own parental rights.

19 THE COURT: That was the 16th, okay. I'm

20 sorry.

21 MS. CRAGGS: That he filed in the post

22 dissolution case and I filed a separate proceeding

23 so that we could do some of the other things that

24 we needed to do in compliance with Chapter 63.

25 And with that in mind, I believe my clients




Page 9

1 have been placed under oath and I would like to

2 elicit some testimony from them for Your Honor's

3 consideration.

4 THE COURT: I don't think -- I can't even

5 remember it's been a long hour so far.

6 Let me just say that, I don't remember, but I

7 don't think I swore them in.

8 MS. CRAGGS: Okay.

9 THE COURT: But anyway, let me just say this.

10 He did, Dr. Overcash, and he obviously didn't give

11 me an opportunity, he did make a phone call or left

12 something with the security guard today that he

13 wanted Dr. Crum -- I didn't know who Dr. Crum

14 was -- to call in. Which I would not --

15 MS. CRAGGS: We would have objected to that,

16 Your Honor. When he filed his first documents on

17 Friday, October 25th, he listed Dr. Crum as a

18 witness and said that she could appear

19 telephonically. He did not file a motion for her

20 to appear by phone.

21 I don't think her testimony would have been

22 such that it would have been appropriate, under the

23 Rules of Judicial Administration, for her to appear

24 by phone. My clients would have objected to that.

25 There was another witness that he listed that




Page 10

1 he also indicated he wanted to testify by phone,

2 and I don't know that he mentioned that today,

3 Linda Montalbono [phonetic], and I don't know who

4 that is.

5 THE COURT: I don't know. Evidently it

6 wasn't this lady here, because he didn't say.

7 MS. CRAGGS: No, that lady he referred to by

8 the name of Ann. I do not know her, but that's

9 what he called her.

10 THE COURT: Okay. If Ms. Foultz and Mr. --

11 is it Patton?

12 MS. CRAGGS: Paton.

13 THE COURT: Paton, I'm sorry.

14 MR. PATON: That's okay.

15 THE COURT: Would you raise your right hands,

16 please.

17 Do you solemn swear or affirm the testimony

18 you're about to give will be the truth, the whole

19 truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

20 MS. FOULTZ: Yes, ma'am.

21 MR. PATON: Yes, ma'am.

22 THE COURT: Thank you.

23 MS. CRAGGS: Lori, I'll begin with you. Are

24 married to Kenneth Paton?

25 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.




Page 11

1 MS. CRAGGS: And how long have you been

2 married to him?

3 MS. FOULTZ: Year and a half.

4 MS. CRAGGS: Has he served as a father figure

5 to Natasha since the two of you have been married?

6 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.

7 MS. CRAGGS: Has he provided for her material

8 needs?

9 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.

10 MS. CRAGGS: Her moral needs?

11 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.

12 MS. CRAGGS: Do you believe he has the

13 ability to provide for her in every way in the

14 future?

15 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.

16 MS. CRAGGS: You executed a consent stating

17 that you believed it was in Natasha's best interest

18 that Mr. Paton adopt her.

19 Is that still your belief and feeling today?

20 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.

21 MS. CRAGGS: Mr. Paton, you signed a petition

22 for a stepparent adoption asking this Court to,

23 based upon your wife's consent and Natasha's

24 biological and legal father's consent, to adopt

25 Natasha; correct?




Page 12

1 MR. PATON: Yes.

2 MS. CRAGGS: Do you understand that if Judge

3 Gurrola grants your petition, that you will step

4 into the shoes as Natasha's legal father?

5 MR. PATON: Yes.

6 MS. CRAGGS: And sometimes the way that I put

7 this is, if the Court grants your petition, that

8 you will be saddled with all of the burden and you

9 will be gifted all of the benefit of being

10 Natasha's father. Do you understand that?

11 MR. PATON: Yes, I do.

12 MS. CRAGGS: And are you willing to assume

13 that role with that understanding?

14 MR. PATON: Yes.

15 MS. CRAGGS: Do you have any questions or

16 concerns about this process that have not been

17 answered?

18 MR. PATON: My concerns are with

19 Mr. Overcash, that his repercussions are based upon

20 what he believes and doesn't believe, will then

21 keep haunting us down the road. I just want this

22 to go through correctly and legally.

23 MS. CRAGGS: All right. And with that

24 concern, do you have any other questions or

25 concerns?




Page 13

1 MR. PATON: No.

2 MS. CRAGGS: Okay. I know that she's not

3 present today.

4 Lori, perhaps you can tell the judge, why is

5 Natasha not here today?

6 MS. FOULTZ: Well, one, we didn't want her

7 witnessing that. She is here in Ocala. I did tell

8 her there would probably be some problems so...

9 MS. CRAGGS: And when you say witnessing

10 that, are you referring to Dr. Overcash coming to

11 today's hearing and attempting to derail it?

12 MS. FOULTZ: Yes.

13 MS. CRAGGS: Okay. Your Honor, just as a

14 reminder, we had filed a motion to excuse her --

15 THE COURT: Yes. I wasn't here to sign it,

16 but Judge Eddy -- I approved it --

17 MS. CRAGGS: He did.

18 THE COURT: -- and he signed it on my behalf.

19 I realize that that would be appropriate.

20 I would be very happy to have -- adoptions

21 are supposed to be, and I've loved to do them all

22 the years that I've done them, it's supposed to be

23 a very happy time. So it was not hard for me to

24 make the decision not to have Natasha here.

25 She's 12 years old. She needs to have a




Page 14

1 celebration with family members. And I recall

2 speaking with her prior to the summer vacation, how

3 excited she was for your family, Mr. Paton, her, I

4 guess she calls -- does she call your -- her

5 sister? She referred to as her sister --

6 MR. PATON: Yes.

7 THE COURT: -- and she was going to go see

8 the new baby for the summer. And I told her, don't

9 worry about anything, have a good time. So she

10 already had, at that time, you were your family or

11 your family was her family.

12 So I just want to let you know that. I don't

13 know if she ever mentioned that to you or not. And

14 maybe you shouldn't tell her that I told you.

15 MS. CRAGGS: Your Honor, I had --

16 THE COURT: But anyway, she was excited about

17 it.

18 MS. CRAGGS: -- I had the privilege of

19 meeting with Natasha twice. Once was I wanted to

20 talk to her to make sure that, because her consent

21 is required due to her age, that this is what she

22 wanted. And then I gave her a period of time to

23 think about that. And she came back at the time

24 that she executed the consent.

25 And the consent that she signed, which I




Page 15

1 edited to reflect a 12-year-old's sentiments, was

2 that she believed it was in her best interest that

3 she be adopted by her stepdad; that her mom married

4 Kenny when she was 11; that he has helped raise her

5 and support her since she met him about three years

6 ago; that she wanted him to adopt her; that she

7 loved him; and that she was signing the consent

8 voluntarily, that no one had forced her to sign the

9 consent; and that she was doing that of her own

10 free will; and that she understood the document.

11 And I met with her outside the presence of

12 her mom and stepdad. And I have a son her age that

13 she knew socially and we were able to hit it off.

14 Doesn't take much to hit it off with her, she's a

15 super, great girl.

16 And, you know, I made sure that, despite all

17 of the ruckus and the litigation and the upset and

18 all of that, did she really want to do this? And

19 because if it was granted, it would be forever.

20 And she absolutely wanted to do that. And so her

21 consent is in the file.

22 Your Honor, even though this is a stepparent

23 adoption, we're not excused from the requirement to

24 search the putative father registry. We did that

25 before we filed the petition and we did it again




Page 16

1 after we filed the petition to make sure that

2 nothing popped up. We didn't expect it, but I

3 wanted the Court to know that we did that.

4 Because it's a stepparent adoption, Lori and

5 Kenny did not have to have a preliminary home

6 study. We did not have to file an affidavit

7 outlining all of the expenditures and receipts as

8 we would in a nonrelative or nonstepparent

9 adoption. And that's where we are on all of those

10 requirements.

11 Although this is probably a little bit

12 unorthodox, Your Honor, because Dr. Overcash kept

13 talking about an agreement and all of those things,

14 and I will defer to Rebecca Guthrie as to the

15 details, but my understanding is that -- well, I

16 would say two things. One, it's not appropriate to

17 enter into an agreement if you have no intention to

18 comply with that agreement.

19 If Dr. Overcash had no intention of letting

20 the adoption go through, if he had no intention of

21 resolving his post dissolution matters with Lori

22 Foultz, you know, he shouldn't have entered into

23 that agreement.

24 So I don't think someone can argue that he

25 would not have clean hands to say I entered into




Page 17

1 this agreement to get myself out of a bind, but I

2 didn't really ever intend to comply with it and so

3 now I should be able to get relief from those

4 things.

5 I have no working knowledge of anything to do

6 with the post dissolution matters. My

7 understanding is at the hearing last week Mr. --

8 excuse me, Dr. Overcash's attorney, Mr. Taylor,

9 made representations that Dr. Overcash was taking

10 steps and moving forward to also comply with

11 whatever the post dissolution of marriage agreement

12 was.

13 Is that accurate?

14 MS. GUTHRIE: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Taylor

15 represented to Mr. Shelnutt and myself that he had

16 the funds available through Quicken Loans, I

17 believe he said, and more than enough funds of what

18 the contracted amount was.

19 But I would like to follow up with what

20 Ms. Craggs said, that Dr. Overcash had an implied

21 duty of good faith and fair dealings when he

22 entered into that contract. I have the case law

23 here to support that. I don't know if you're

24 interested in it.

25 THE COURT: Yes, I am.




Page 18

1 MS. GUTHRIE: Okay.

2 THE COURT: So if you would discuss it,

3 unless you have --

4 MS. GUTHRIE: Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc.,

5 it's found at 732 So.2d 1092. It's a First

6 District case from 1999. And it gets --

7 obviously it's very contract oriented, because

8 we're dealing with contracts here now.

9 But it basically is saying that, exactly what

10 Ms. Craggs represented, you can't enter a contract

11 without the good faith -- the implied good faith of

12 fair dealing duty that's put on you to enter into

13 an agreement to kind of subvert the outcome, and go

14 about it the other way.

15 I also have K.P. Meiring Construction versus

16 North Bay, which is found at 25 Florida Law

17 Weekly -- I'm sorry, I'll give you a different

18 cite. 761 So.2d 1221, it's a Second District case

19 from 2000. It's along the same lines exactly about

20 corporations that enter into contracts without the

21 ability to complete them.

22 The intent of the contract was withheld -- or

23 the intent of the contract was followed through and

24 enforced by the court.

25 I can give these to you. I didn't bring a




Page 19

1 ton of multiple copies. May I approach?

2 THE COURT: Um-hmm. Thank you.

3 Do you mind if I put them in the court file?

4 MS. CRAGGS: No, ma'am.

5 MS. GUTHRIE: I'd also like to point out that

6 Dr. Overcash has not mentioned, he's not

7 represented or not contacted this Court or our

8 office trying to or indicating that he is unable or

9 unwilling to move forward with the agreement that

10 he entered into on July 15th.

11 Again, Mr. Taylor, Dr. Overcash's attorney,

12 indicated that funds were available and he could

13 move forward with that, if we were still in

14 agreement on moving forward with it.

15 You know, Ms. Foultz relied on that agreement

16 in preparing her family for the adoption and hiring

17 an adoption law attorney to fulfill this agreement.

18 Has spent a considerable amount of money, I'm sure,

19 in moving this forward, at his request.

20 We have to keep in mind that he contacted us

21 to move forward with the termination of parental

22 rights. He filed his own petition to terminate his

23 parental rights. He brought his own consent

24 documents to court that day that were drafted by

25 either him or an assistant or Ms. Gordon or whoever




Page 20

1 was working for him at that time.

2 And she has -- if this agreement were not to

3 be enforced at this point, she has relied on the

4 agreement to her detriment.

5 So, you know, he certainly has that duty on

6 him. And the Court can uphold, I believe, the

7 agreement, because he's never indicated an

8 inclination to rescind the agreement.

9 THE COURT: Well, again, I did not see -- I

10 know he doesn't seem to believe that I did not see

11 this written agreement --

12 MS. GUTHRIE: And I'm not sure that the --

13 THE COURT: -- having to do with the money

14 and the equitable distribution of the house or the

15 $2,400 a month that he's supposed to pay. I just

16 did not feel --

17 MS. GUTHRIE: I don't believe that the

18 agreement was ever executed signature, signed by

19 him.

20 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

21 MS. GUTHRIE: We went -- tried to send some

22 copies back with his attorneys, but nothing ever

23 came back.

24 THE COURT: Okay.

25 MS. GUTHRIE: But I don't know --




Page 21

1 THE COURT: But he was represented by

2 Ms. Gordon at the time.

3 MS. GUTHRIE: He was represented by

4 Ms. Gordon at the time. And a written contract

5 isn't necessarily required when it's entered into

6 the record orally, which he did.

7 THE COURT: Right. Okay.

8 MS. GUTHRIE: There was, obviously, some

9 consideration for paying Ms. Foultz off the

10 equitable distribution in lump sum, and that was

11 the terms of the agreement.

12 But, again, he never provided to our office

13 any applications that were denied or that lead

14 anybody to believe that this agreement was doing

15 anything but going toward. He never gave us any

16 inclination that he couldn't get the funding that

17 he said he could. He never told us, I've contacted

18 four banks and all of them said no.

19 So Ms. Foultz has relied on this agreement in

20 moving forward, and we've gotten to this point,

21 which is the culmination of the adoption. And so I

22 would suggest that it be enforced.

23 MS. CRAGGS: And, Your Honor, and the only

24 other thing that I want to bring to the Court's

25 attention, just in an abundance of caution, I




Page 22

1 mentioned earlier that in and of itself

2 Dr. Overcash's failure to timely file an answer may

3 constitute grounds to terminate his parental

4 rights. Of course, we have his consent on top of

5 that.

6 You know, none -- Dr. Overcash's filing of

7 October 25th references so many things, some that

8 predate his consent, some that post date his

9 consent, some that, you know, have no relevance to

10 a stepparent adoption.

11 I don't know -- and I don't know that the

12 reason why is relevant. I know he says he can't

13 afford lawyers, but, apparently, he was

14 represented -- or is represented in the post

15 dissolution matter by Mr. Taylor.

16 THE COURT: Yes. Now he is. Yes.

17 MS. CRAGGS: I've never heard from

18 Mr. Taylor, on behalf of Dr. Overcash or otherwise.

19 And I just -- and I think it was important

20 that Dr. Overcash chose to leave the hearing today

21 rather than stay, because he did not request any

22 additional time. He did not request any additional

23 time to try to hire a lawyer. He didn't request

24 any additional time to make arrangements for

25 witnesses, so that they could appear in person or




Page 23

1 he could seek a proper telephonic appearance by

2 them.

3 And I think that is important for the record,

4 because, you know, had Dr. Overcash, perhaps,

5 handled things differently, he may have been

6 entitled to, you know, another extension to try to

7 get his ducks in a row, or something along those

8 lines.

9 But it's clear and uncontroverted that he did

10 not revoke his consent. He did not answer. And,

11 you know, I believe he has failed to meet a

12 burden -- his burden of proof that he was under

13 duress.

14 You know, not once today did he take any

15 responsibility for a request that he be jailed. I

16 mean, I've never, in my experience, in this entire

17 courthouse, seen a judge jail someone for no cause.

18 And he did not take responsibility for any of the

19 rulings that may have placed him in jeopardy of

20 being jailed or otherwise.

21 And there are plenty of biological parents

22 who execute consent to their child's adoption while

23 they're handcuffed to the hospital bed or

24 otherwise.

25 And so on those grounds my clients are asking




Page 24

1 the Court to finalize the adoption. And I would

2 like to have the opportunity to present a final

3 judgment to the Court. I have a draft of one, but

4 I wanted to -- you know, I couldn't quite predict

5 what would happen today.

6 THE COURT: No, one never can.

7 MS. CRAGGS: So I would like to take this

8 draft and complete it and provide it to the Court

9 by Friday.

10 THE COURT: All right. I was extremely

11 serious, when I said here in the courtroom,

12 referring to the day that Dr. Overcash was

13 questioned regarding his child and the termination

14 of his rights to his child. Now, I have probably,

15 as a senior judge, I think the first hearing we had

16 in this case was in September 2012, if I'm not

17 mistaken.

18 MS. GUTHRIE: Yes, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: I don't think I've ever had in

20 any one case ever as many hearings as I've had in

21 this case, under all sorts of different

22 circumstances. So I have seen -- and I have seen

23 Dr. Overcash bolt out of the table and, you know,

24 charge over towards his former wife. I have seen

25 him leave the courtroom time and time again, become




Page 25

1 angry. And usually it's directed towards the

2 Court, appears to be, or Mr. Shelnutt or the former

3 wife.

4 And I'm just going to say these things,

5 because they're on my mind and I think they should

6 be in the record.

7 We had a dependency case. At no time do I

8 recall him ever asking about his daughter, her

9 welfare, how she was doing. He did not do

10 anything -- he wanted to do things the way he

11 wanted to do them, and that's the only way he

12 wanted do them.

13 The very first hearing that we had, I ruled

14 in his favor on one of his motions regarding

15 removing the guardian ad litem. As much as I

16 didn't want to, I felt, well, we're going to have a

17 new start, you know.

18 But I'll tell you, that day that he answered

19 those questions I have never seen a more calm

20 William Todd Overcash than I did that day. And I

21 think, as you can see when he -- when there was

22 silence, I'm not going to go forward if someone

23 isn't going -- I mean, I have done enough

24 dependency cases for many years to know that unless

25 I'm assured that this is what they, you know, that




Page 26

1 this is what the person wants.

2 But I saw no -- I saw no duress. He was

3 extremely calm, the most I've ever -- the calmest

4 I've ever seen him.

5 And, again, he's -- obviously he's an

6 intelligent man, or at least this evaluation -- by

7 the way, he filed it in this adoption file. I

8 guess you know that, that evaluation.

9 But this child deserves, this child deserves

10 some -- she deserves a life free from this

11 animosity. And, I mean, Dr. Overcash showed

12 animosity in the courtroom consistently toward the

13 former wife, which there's no way that it

14 wouldn't -- it couldn't possibly affect a child.

15 And Judge Robbins, at the shelter hearing,

16 ruled that he was not to have any contact with the

17 child until, you know, he did the things that he

18 needed to do through the dependency case. Which he

19 did not. He didn't. He knew better than anyone

20 else, evidently, or thought he did, on what he

21 should do and he wasn't going to do that.

22 So I would have to say that in all these

23 hearings, and I am -- they've been stressful,

24 frustrating hearings, Dr. Overcash can only -- and

25 I think I said it to him when he was here -- well,




Page 27

1 maybe not today but hearings past, he's more

2 concerned with himself than with his child.

3 So I am happy to grant the stepparent

4 adoption for Mr. Paton to become Natasha's legal

5 father. I'd be very happy to have a do-it-again

6 ceremony, then you can bring the -- well, you want

7 to have the order signed as soon as possible, I'm

8 sure.

9 MS. CRAGGS: Yes, ma'am.

10 THE COURT: I don't know that I'm going to be

11 back here next week -- or this week. Friday I have

12 to be in Inverness.

13 MS. CRAGGS: Your Honor, I'm certainly happy

14 to contact Casey Garrito [phonetic] and find out,

15 you know, when it would be a good time --

16 MS. GUTHRIE: Your Honor, is it possible to

17 do it later today before Ms. Foultz's parents leave

18 town? I don't know if that fits in your schedule.

19 MS. CRAGGS: The only thing --

20 THE COURT: You mean the ceremony or the

21 order?

22 MS. GUTHRIE: Yes, the ceremony.

23 MS. CRAGGS: The ceremony?

24 Natasha is in town. I have a 3:00 hearing

25 with Judge Robbins, another adoption. But other




Page 28

1 than that --

2 THE COURT: Well, you were brave.

3 MS. CRAGGS: I've been watching my watch and

4 then I was going to start going psst, psst. I was

5 going to start talking to your bailiff to say can

6 you please tell them where I am.

7 THE COURT: Okay. So you mean to have a

8 ceremony -- did you move? Did you all move to --

9 MS. FOULTZ: We did move, yes.

10 THE COURT: What?

11 MS. FOULTZ: We did move.

12 THE COURT: You did move.

13 MS. FOULTZ: Um-hmm.

14 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

15 MS. FOULTZ: My parents came down for this

16 from North Carolina, but they're leaving tomorrow

17 morning to go back so...

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 MS. FOULTZ: It just put a kink in

20 everybody's visit.

21 THE COURT: Well, I'm here. How long is your

22 hearing?

23 MS. CRAGGS: My next hearing should be a

24 traditional joy-filled hearing. Unless Judge

25 Robbins is running behind, I could be back here at




Page 29

1 3:20 -- or 3:15 or 3:20.

2 THE COURT: Well, I have some other things to

3 do here while I'm here, so I'm happy to --

4 MS. CRAGGS: To stay.

5 THE COURT: -- to stay and come back, or

6 y'all come back and bring Natasha and we'll, if you

7 would like --

8 MS. FOULTZ: This may sound silly, but is

9 there any way to find out if he's lurking around

10 still somewhere that we could --

11 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Right.

12 MS. FOULTZ: Or is there a side door that

13 maybe we could come up?

14 THE COURT: We could -- I don't know.

15 Everybody knows him. Can you call around and see

16 if anybody -- well, I'm sorry. It's true.

17 Linda, is there any way you can radio

18 somebody and see if he's left?

19 MS. FOULTZ: Or if maybe when we get here, if

20 someone can walk up with us.

21 MS. CRAGGS: Your Honor, would it be

22 okay if -- I think if we're done with today's

23 hearing, and then our court reporter could wrap up

24 and we could go off the record?

25 THE COURT: Yes, fine. Thank you.




Page 30

1 MS. CRAGGS: Thank you, Your Honor.

2 MS. GUTHRIE: Thank you, Your Honor.

3 (Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at

4 2:57 p.m.)

5

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8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

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Page 31

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF FLORIDA )

COUNTY OF MARION )

I, CATHERINE J. PHILLIPS, Registered Merit

Reporter, Certified Manager of Reporting Services,

Florida Professional Reporter, certify that I was

authorized to and did report stenographically the

foregoing proceedings and that pages 1 through 30,

inclusive are a true record of the requested excerpt.

Dated this 13th day of November, 2013, at Ocala,

Marion County, Florida.

Catherine J. Phillips,

RMR, CMRS, FPR


AppendixH

MotionstoRecused/AmendedMotion

toRecused


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 5 TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR


LORI FOULTZ, PLAINTIFF CASE NO.: 2002-4655-DR-FJ

VS

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH RESPONDENT

MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE GURROLA AND THE MARION COUNTY s b

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH now comes to the court to notify the court that

Wm. Todd Overcash has had to undergo right shoulder surgery due to injury

exacerbated by his unwarranted arrest and injury inflicted by the arresting officer

and Judge Gurrola's refusal to follow the Law of the State of Florida.

1. Please note the ruling of the 5 th DCA on April 11, 2014.

2. Judge Gurrola proceeds to change order on May 1, 2014 without re-

hearing and does not correct the financial and emotional damages

inflicted upon Wm. Todd Overcash and is in direct violation of the order

for re-hearing. Judge Gurrola proceeds to make false statements:

3. Statements in line A and B are inaccurate and Wm. Todd Overcash

would overpay the amount when funds were available and had only been

behind during the time of his craniotomy.

4. Statement in line E is clearly false and confirms judicial bias: Judge

Gurrola sites Wm. Todd Overcash as being the cause of the litigious

nature of the case:


Overcash. The property payment had already been executed and delayed

due to Mark Shelnutt's hostility. The original amount of the Judgment

was made to ensure Wm. Todd Overcash's inability to pay to ensure his

imprisonment and to "humiliate" Wm. Todd Overcash. Clear Judicial

attack based on bias and unfounded facts of the case requires immediate

recusal.

9. Wm. Todd Overcash has suffered complications associated that was

ultimately forced into having to be committed to due to Judge Gurrola's

continued actions that led to false imprisonment and further damage to

Wm. Todd Overcash. The surgery resulted in large blood loss and has

led to Wm. Todd Overcash developing extreme hypertension in the

documented range of 200/117. The extreme hypertension is clearly

secondary to injury and PTSD/Legal Abuse Syndrome.

lOJudge Gurrola's failure to recognize and follow the Laws as defined by

the Florida Constitution further confirms Judicial Bias and absolute

disregard or lack of knowledge of Florida Law and evidenced by the

above noted ruling by the 5th DCA.

1 1.Judge Gurrola has jeopardized Wm. Todd Overcash's right to legal

representation as noted by her statement in February 2013 that Wm. Todd

Overcash's first obligation was to pay opposing counsel prior to paying

his own counsel, paying property taxes, paying fines levied by the State

of Florida and now clearly failure to follow the rule of Law and infliction

of further Legal Abuse/Distress by illegal imprisonment.

12.Judge Gurrola had ex-parte communications with Mark Shelnutt via a

"hearing" where, Wm. Todd Overcash's legal representatives were

present and denied their right to be present which is a violation of both

State and Federal Law. Attorneys are prepared to testify, that Carolyn


Torrey's possession of Power of Attorney gave her the right to be

present.

13 -Judge Gurrola has ordered prior "child support" bearing conducted in a

public venue to be sealed and has refused Wm. Todd Overcash the blue

man from the "public hearing" which shows further disregard for the law.

14.Judge Gurrola has violated the stated agreement that was detailed on the

record by Beth Gordon whereby if any of 5 agreements were not

achieved, then the full extent of the agreement which included

termination of parental rights and adoption would be null and void. All

actions were not achievable and Judge Gurrola refuses to enforce the

agreement clearly stated on the record by Beth Gordon and agreed to by

Mark Shelnutt and confirmed by Judge (3urrola.

I 5.Judge has refused to review the psychological report that reflects that the

child has been subjected to parental alienation and needs to be

immediately removed from the mother despite Wm. Todd Overcash

following the agreed to order and undergoing evaluation by one of 3

names that he would provide the court.

16.Judge Gurrola continued to hear motions, conduct trial, and pass

judgments while a pending 5th DCA Appeal had been filed. The ruling

was not issued until 2014.

17.Judge Gurrola's actions inflicted further emotional, financial, and

professional damage to Wm. Todd Overcash and clearly failed to honor

the Law.

18.On review of the transcript from hearing dated April 2, 2014 (attached)

further judicial bias and "breaking the rules of court and Florida Law" are

clearly displayed and has been reported to the Florida JQC as an

addendum complaint that has been accepted.


a. Refused to accept financials and documents that were to be produced to

Mark Shelnutt

b. Refused to accept the Power of Attorney and Ordered Carolyn Torrey to

exit the court.

c. Judge Gurrola refused to accept my notice of surgery due to failure to

attach notice of service, however, please note that Judge Gurrola and the

5th Circuit Court were served notice and Mark Shelnutt was served

electronically. Per Florida Supreme Court Rules, a pro se litigant must

be held to the "same" standards as an attorney.

d. Judge Gurrola then on page 7, lines 1-9, Judge Gurrola asks Mark

Shelnutt if my failure to appear is criminal contempt and Mark Shelnutt

directs an affirmative response.

Judge Gurrola should fully be aware of the law, and once again displays

lack of knowledge and seeks guidance from opposing counsel which has

been documented by prior attorneys Beth Gordon and Robert Taylor.

e. Judge Gurrola on page 7, lines 10-25 and page 8, lines 1-25, Judge

Gurrola accepts Mark Shelnutt's repeated lies to the court where he states

that I have sued Brad King (I have not) and suggests that the Judge reach

out to Mr. Servone of the 8th district and Judge Gurrola agrees.


f. Page 10, lines 15-25. Mark Shelnutt raises an issue of a hearing on

another case. The hearing actually before Judge Gurrola and Robert

Taylor and I appeared by phone, and I stated at that time that 1 had to

have surgical intervention on my shoulder and my back and that I was

awaiting notification of the Date.

g. Page 11, lines 9-22. Judge Gurrola states "sarcastically" that it is her

fault and then Mark Shelnutt "sarcastically" takes the blame.

h. Page 11, lines 18-25, Judge Gurrola is having free conversation with

Mark Shelnutt and raises the issue of a newspaper publication that had no

relevance to the issues at hand and again reflects clear judicial bias.

i. Page 12, lines 1-25. Mark Shelnutt raises the issue of a deposition that

occurred prior to my surgery and Judge Gurrola was fully aware of who

the deposition involved and what the issues were in regards to

"picketing" at Mark Shelnutt's office which clearly confirms EX-PARTE

COMMUNICATION and BIAS.

j. Page 12, lines 15-25 Mark Shelnutt states that he has to call 9-1-1 for his

safety which is a false statement to the court to further bias Judge Gurrola

and the transcripts and the 9-1-1 transcription is attached.

k. Page 13, lines 8-18 Mark Shelnutt directs the Judge that she should act

and Judge Gurrola then agrees to seek state prosecution.


1. Page 15, lines 17-25 Judge Gurrola proceeds to have free communication

with Lori Foultz in violation of the Rules of Court.

m. Page 16, lines 1-13 Judge Gurrola admits receiving gifts and letter from

Natasha Overcash and to interactions with Mark Shelnutt's wife at an

event, followed by Mark Shelnutt stating that we "are all like family".

n. Page 16, lines 20-24, Judge Gurrola had already contacted the State's

Attorney Office to pursue Wm. Todd Overcash.

o. Judge Gurrola in summer of 2013 refused to accept the testimony

presented by Dr. Pinder about Lori's ability to have fulltime employment

and that there would be no differential in income ability and Judge

Gurrola ruled against assigning income. However on page 17, lines 12-

15 Lori Foults admits to having returned to full time employment,

however, had stated in court that she did not intend to work full time.

Once again Lori Foultz has lied to the court and Judge Gurrola has shown

both "female" preference/Judicial Bias against fathers.

p. Page 18, lines 6-25, Judge Gurrola proceeds to have a hearing on a

college fund upon which she had already ruled and proceeds to accept

that the funds will not grow in value and the funds are for Mark

Shelnutt's fees and the not the child's education. Once again Judge

Gurrola shows bias and will not even enforce her own rulings and


merely accepts Mark Shelnutt's words as fact. The focus of the

discussion on pages 18-21 is on obtaining money for Mark Shelnutt and

not the well being of the child.

q. Judge Gurrola refused to follow Florida Law that was repeatedly raised

to her by Beth Gordon that all orders issued by Judge Swigert while his

refusal to recuse was before the 5th DCA became null and void upon his

recusal and demonstrated disregard for the law and utter contempt of

Win. Todd Overcash due to his sex which she has clearly demonstrated

in cases in Citrus County, Lake County, and Marion County.

r. The mere fact that Judge Gurrola will order the sealing of a proceeding

that was held in a public hearing with multiple witnesses on the claim

that the "family case" was sealed is clear evidence of disregard for the

law.

s. Lori Foultz testified January 14, 2013 after Dr. Pinder's testimony to

earning capacity that "it was in the best interest of Natasha that she not

work full time" and that Wm. Todd Overcash had agreed to this

arrangement. Wm. Todd Overcash testified that this was not the

agreement. Judge Gurrola showed bias in her rulings to objections. She

always ruled in Mark Shelnutt's favor and always against Beth Gordon

and Robert Taylor. Lori Foultz stated that she had no intent to work full


time and could not afford an attorney, however, Lori Foultz Testified

April 2014 that she has returned to full time work. Clearly, Judge.

Gurrola showed bias against Wm. Todd Overcash and accepted that the

"lathe?" despite disability must work full time and that the "mother" has

the right to work part time and has the "right" to assume all household

expenses and that the new husband does not have to accept any

household expenses.

t. The above action shows clear judicial bias against Wm. Todd Overcash,

Men, and Disabled Individuals and is a violation of Florida Statute:

Disability income benefits under any disability insurance policy are

exempt from legal process in Florida under a specific Florida Statute. The

exemption includes health, life, and accident disability insurance. Federal

law protects Social Security Disability benefits from judgment creditors.

Florida Statute: 222.18 Exempting disability income benefits from legal

processes.—Disability income benefits under any policy or contract of

life, health, accident, or other insurance of whatever form, shall not in

any case be liable to attachment, garnishment, or legal process in the

state, in favor of any creditor or creditors of the recipient of such

disability income benefits, unless such policy or contract of insurance

was effected for the benefit of such creditor or creditors.


Family Law does allow collection of "child support" and "alimony" from

disability income, however, Judge Gurrola is again violating state law

purely in effort to assure that Win. Todd Overcash does not have the

ability to defend himself, maintain his health and well being, and to

inflict emotional duress to assure that Wm. Todd Overcash is left

homeless and jailed, by creating a debtor prison for the payment and

enrichment of Mark Shelnutt without disregard for the absolute best

welfare of the child.

Judge Gurrola's refusal to follow the law null and voids her "judicial immunity"

and warrants immediate arrest by the State of Florida and subjects her to formal

civil litigation by Wm. Todd Overcash.

Judge Gurrola should immediately issue recusal of her and issue an apology for

false arrest.

Wm. Todd Overcash has been attacked, harassed, embarrassed, professionally and

personally disgraced for his honoring his requirement under Florida Law to Report

Judge's for illegal actions.

Wm. Todd Overcash was interviewed by the private investigator that reviewed

Judge Singbush on direction by the Florida Supreme Court.


Wm. Todd Overcash was required by law to report Mary Sawaya (sister of 5th

DCA Judge Sawaya) for practicing medicine on a false license.

Wm. Todd Overcash was required to report Judge Swigert's behavior in court after

learning that Judge Swigert was "doctor shopping" with Dr. Kito's and Dr.

Reynolds for excessive dosage and quantity of Class II medications.

Wm. Todd Overcash is fearful of his life, safety, and further false imprisonment by

the court and financial assault and bankruptcy.

Judge Gurrola has failed to report Mark Shelnutt to the Florida Bar as requested by

both Wm. Todd Overcash and Beth Gordon per the requirement of Judicial

Reporting as outlined by the Florida Supreme Court.

Judge Gurrola's failure is either based on a combination of personal bias against

Wm. Todd Overcash due to ex-parte communications with opposing parties or

Wm. Todd Overcash's actions in regards to "deceased" Judge Swigert and Bias

against men or lack of knowledge of the law and refusal to honor the law due to

Bias. In either case, immediate recusal is required of the judge under Florida Law.

Due to all other Judges in the 5 " Circuit having been conflicted out by their own

actions upon recusal of Judge Swigert by the 5th DCA, immediate recusal outside

of the 5th Circuit is justified request.


Please note, that the Supreme Court Chief Judge was recently in Ocala, FL and

specifically addressed the requirement of Ethics and Integrity. It is clear to

regional attorneys; this lecture was a direction by the Florida Supreme Court to

"clean up the 5 h Judicial Circuit".

' MIN

14311 SE 128th Street Ocklawaha, FL 32811


William Todd Overcash, MD has served an original to the clerk's office copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Administrative Judge Gurrola and Judge Eddy via Hand delivery to Marion County Courthouse 110 NW First Ave. Ocala, FL, Honorable Chief Judge.Don Briggs 550 W. Main Street, Tavares, FL 32778-7800, Mark Shelnutt via Email [email protected] on this May 1, 2014.


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,


IN RE: The Former Marriage of: CASE NO.: 2002-4655-DR-FJ

C -'J - < '1

C-. -'--' r 0

r= R

William T. Overcash,

Former Husband,

And

Lori A. Foultz,

Former Wife.

AMENDED MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE GURROLA WITH

SUPPLIMENTARY ADDENDUM OF FILING CASELAW DOCUMENTS

SHOWING SUPPORTING GROUNDS FOR RECUSAL

COMES NOW, William Todd Overcash gives notice of filing the following cases

In support of prior filed motions.

a. Frengel v. Frengel 880 So. 2d 763 Fla 2 nd DCA 2004

b. Edwards-Freeman v. State No. 4D14-431

c. Barber V. MacKenzie 562 So. 2d 755 (1990)

d. Hayslip v. Douglas 400 So. 2d 553 (1981)

e. Livingston v. State 441 So. 2d 1083 (1983)

f. Fischer v. Knuck 497 Sold 240 (1986)

William Todd Overcash submits these cases in support of the clear evidence

presented by William Todd Overcash that includes recent ruling by the 5th DCA in

regards to Judge Gurrola's arrest of Wm. Todd Overcash and the letters from Beth


Gordon along with Transcripts whereby Judge Gurrola has developed an Ex-Parte

relationship with the former wife and child. Please note that Frengel v. Frengel

clearly applies to this case as it is clear that Judge Gurrola is having ex-parte

communications with the former wife and their Child.

Therefore, clear grounds for fear of the court and fear of bias and further

violation of the law, rises to the level of justified fear of the court and meets

criteria for Judicial Recusal per Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330 and Fla Stat. 38.10.

Recusal of Judge Gurrola is requested with recent discovery as provided by Mark

Shelnutt

Sincerely,

Wm. Todd Overcash, MD

May 7, 2014


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the below named individuals on the 7th day of May, 2014.

Mark Sheilnut, Es. 1404 B. Silver Springs, Blvd, Ocala, FL 34470 and Judge Gurrola, 2 Floor Marion County Court House, Senior Judges Chambers, Judge Eddy, Security Office 4th Floor of Marion County Court House, Florida Supreme Court, USDOJ.


FRENGEL v. FRENGELNO. 2D04-1 845.

880 Sold 763 (2004)

Carolyn R. FRENGEL, Petitioner, V.

Daniel W FRENGEL, Respondent. C - -- rn

District Court ofAppeal ofFlorida, Second DistricL C)

C)

June 9, 2004. C-n) C)

R. Ray Brooks, Tampa, for Petitioner. - C_s

Philip S. Wartenberg, Tampa, for Responden1

PER CIJRIAM.

Petitioner Carolyn R. Frengel (the mother) seeks a writ of prohibition against Circuit Judge Monica L. Sierra to disqualify her from presiding over any further proceedings in a dissolution action. We conclude that one of the facts alleged in the mother's motion to disqualify was legally sufficient, and the motion should have been granted. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue the writ of prohibition.

The mother and her husband, Daniel W. Frengel, (the father) have two children together: a daughter who is fifteen and a son who is thirteen. The father filed a motion to permit the children to testify in camera pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.407 on the ground that "[i]ssues have been fairly raised by the pleadings of the parties relative to the children's primary residence." The court conducted a hearing on this motion on March 8, 2004, but decided to reserve ruling until after the completion of an evidentiary

[880 So.2d 7641 hearing already scheduled for March 19, 2004, on the parties' respective requests for temporary custody of the children. At that hearing, the judge concluded that she would conduct in camera interviews with the children in order to rule on the parents' requests for temporary custody. Although she gave both parties the opportunity to have a court reporter present to transcribe the interviews, both declined.


The mother filed her motion to disqualify Judge Sierra when she discovered that during the March 19 in camera interviews with the children, the judge had given the children her telephone number and email address and invited the children to communicate with her. The mother alleges this occurred without her knowledge. This apparently came to light when the mother found emails on her home computer that the children had sent to the judge during the first three weeks of April. The emails detailed the children's negative feelings toward their mother .2 They also referenced the children's attempts to contact the judge by telephone. There is also some indication in one of the emails that Judge Sierra had responded to an email from one of the children. The wife argues that because of these events, she fears that she cannot receive "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." See State ex reL Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939).

In determining whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient, we review the motion's allegations under a de novo standard. As the Fourth District explained in Hayes v. State, 686 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 4thDCA 1996), "[o]ur task on appeal is to determine the legal sufficiency of the motion based on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." We conclude that the wife's motion meets this standard and therefore the trial court should have granted her motion.

In this case, the appearance of impartiality was destroyed by the alleged surreptitious nature of the trial judge's communications with the children. If the facts alleged by the wife are taken as true , 3 the surreptitious nature of the communications together with the conspiratorial tone used by the children in those communications would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that the judge was no longer neutral because she had entered into a confidential relationship with the children, both of whom expressed very negative feelings toward the mother. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue the writ of prohibition disqualifying

[880 Sold 7651 Judge Sierra from further participation in this matter.

Petition granted; writ issued.

WHATLEY, STRINGER, and KELLY, JJ., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1. We note that rule 12.407 addresses an entirely different situation than the one


presented in this case. We do not intend to suggest by this opinion that a judge hearing a custody or visitation matter may only conduct an interview with the parties' children if a motion is filed under this rule. We simply are relating the course of the proceedings below. 2. The content of the emails in question has been disclosed to both parties and was made a part of the record by the mother. If the parties were not already aware of the contents of the emails sent by the children, we do not believe it would be appropriate for us to disclose the contents of those communications to the parties through this opinion because the children clearly intended them to be private. 3. In reaching our conclusion in this case, we have not overlooked the father's response to the mother's petition. His response is largely devoted to contesting the facts alleged by the mother. Our task, however, is not to determine whose version is correct. Our task is to determine whether the motion presented to Judge Sierra was legally sufficient. In considering a motion to disqualify, a trial judge cannot pass on the truth of the facts alleged and must view those facts from the perspective of the moving party. Thus, the contrary factual allegations by the father are of no import to our analysis of the correctness of the ruling on the motion to disqualify. See City of Hollywood v. Witt, 868 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).


JOHNATHAN EDWARDS-FREEMAN, JOSEPH BALDINO, DOREEN BALDINO, FRANCHILOR DEVALON, THOMAS BARNARD, ASHLEY N. MINTON, JASPER DEMPSEY, and ARMANDO CUEVAS, Petitioners,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA and THE HONORABLE ROBERT BELANGER, Circuit Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Lucie

County, Florida, Respondents.

No. 4D14-431. - :0

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.2 - : Of -

April 29, 2014.

Ashley N. Minton of Minton Law, P.A., Fort Pierce, for petitioners.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melvin G. Mosier, Assistant Attorney

General, West Palm Beach, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Seven defendants with pending felony cases and their defense counsel petition for a writ of

prohibition seeking a blanket disqualification of Judge Belanger from all cases involving

defense counsel. We grant the petition as to the motions for disqualification filed by these

petitioners. But we deny the request for a blanket disqualification of the judge.

In October 2010, defense counsel filed a complaint against Judge Belanger with the Judicial

Qualifications Commission ("JQC") regarding events in different cases that occurred over a

few years. After filing the complaint, defense counsel moved to disqualify the judge in all

cases that she had before him. He granted motions to disqualify in seven cases between

October 2009 and June 2013. He then sua sponterecused himself in four additional cases

between September 24, 2013 and January 2, 2014 where defense counsel noticed her

appearance.

On January 13, 2014, the judge was reassigned to another criminal division that handles a

large volume of felony cases. On January 21, 2014, the judge's judicial assistant informed

defense counsel that the judge would no longer automatically recuse himself, and that

defense counsel needed to move for disqualification of the judge.


Defense counsel filed motions for the seven petitioners in this case on the same basis as

the motions the judge had previously granted. He denied the current motions stating "a trial

judge's comments of mere frustration, admonishment, or annoyance with counsel's

mannerisms, tactics, or abilities is usually not sufficient to infer or impute prejudice toward

the defendant or a party" and that "adverse rulings are not grounds for recusal"

We agree with petitioners that the motions for disqualification were not based on adverse

rulings and that the judge's comments were not mere frustration or admonishment of

counsel. Among other grounds, the motions referred to comments the judge made about defense counsel to a pro se litigant in an unrelated case on September 24, 2010, after

defense counsel had not appeared before the judge for some time.

A judge reporting an attorney to the Bar or an attorney reporting a judge to the JQC alone is insufficient to require disqualification. 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244, 248 (Fla.

1997). But, a judge's animosity towards counsel may require disqualification. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983). "[A] judge may be disqualified due to prejudice

towards an attorney where the prejudice 'is of such degree that it adversely affects the client." Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1956)). Disqualification may

also be required where the judge has previously granted disqualification on the same grounds. State v. Cam Voong Leng,987 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Walls V. State, 910 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

The judge's comments about defense counsel to a pro se defendant were inappropriate and gave the petitioners and defense counsel reason to fear that the judge was biased. The

remarks appear to comment on defense counsel's character and were not related to any

action that could reasonably have provoked the judge or warranted admonishment.

"Whether disqualification is required depends on the nature of the dispute and the length of

time which has transpired since the dispute." Jarp v. Jarp, 919 So. 2d 614, 61 5-16 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

A judge's gratuitous remarks about counsel or her character undermine respect for the

judiciary and the proceedings and leave an impression that the judge is not fair and

impartial. The motions contained allegations sufficient for disqualification. The trial judge

attempted to characterize these as simply an expression of annoyance at counsel, but such

a characterization in effect challenges the facts as set forth in the sworn motion, which a

trial judge may not do. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f).


This petition demonstrated a preliminary basis for relief, and we issued an order to show

cause why it should not be granted. The attorney general's response indicated that the state

contacted the judge for comment on this petition. The judge informed the state that he was

granting the motions before January 2014 when he was handling only violation of probation

cases, but he denied them after he was reassigned to a felony division because he was

concerned that a blanket recusal would affect the other judges in the division and lead to forum shopping.

Petitioners reply that the state's recent ex parte communication with the judge and his

explanation for why he denied these motions are not a proper basis to deny this petition. In

fact, they provide an additional reason to fear the judge is prejudiced against defense

counsel. The petitioners stress that the judge, until recently, found the motions for

disqualification facially sufficient. They seek blanket disqualification of the judge, a remedy that is disfavored. R.M.C. v. D. C., 77 So. 3d 234, 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing Ginsberg, 86 So. 2d at 651-52).

We agree with petitioners that the state should not rely on ex parte communication with the judge to try to refute the motions. See Valitos v. State, 707 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). As the Second District warned in J & J Industries, Inc. v. Carpet Showcase of Tampa Bay, Inc., 723 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998):

Trial judges should exercise extreme caution attempting to defend their actions in

prohibition actions such as this, either pro Se, through the offices of the attorney general, or

through counsel of their own choosing. . . . A response filed on behalf of the trial judge may

create an intolerable adversary atmosphere between the trial judge and the litigant which

itself may serve as the basis for disqualification.

Id. at 283. It is safer for the judge to remain silent and let the opposing party respond to the petition. Ellis V. Henning, 678 So. 2d 825, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

We therefore grant the petition in part and quash the orders denying the motions for

disqualification as to these petitioners only.

Petition granted in part.

WARNER, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.


BARBER v. MACKENZIErjo. 89-2771,

562 So.2d 755 (1990)

Charles L. BARBER, Petitioner, V.

Honorable Mary Ann MacKENZIE, Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in andfor Dade County, Florida, RespondeiafDogc

Barber, Intervenor. C;

District Court ofAppeal ofFlorida, Third District g c Li

MayJ5,1990

Rehearing Denied July 10, 1990.

William F. Murphy, Tampa, for petitioner.

ao" rn' ci

RobertA. Ginsburg, County Atty., and Roy Wood, Asst. CounlyAtty., for respondent.

Karlan & Gerson and Charlotte E. Karlan, Miami, for intervenor.

Before FERGUSON, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.

COPE, Judge.

Charles L. Barber has petitioned for a writ of prohibition, asserting that the trial

1562 So.2d 7561 judge erred by denying a motion for disqualification. We grant partial relief by certiorari.

The threshold issue is whether this matter is moot. Subsequent to the filing of the petition for prohibition and response thereto, this court was informed that the trial judge has transferred to another division of the circuit court, and no longer has responsibility for the matrimonial action


pending below. The respondent trial judge and the respondent wife in the matrimonial action contend that the petition is now moot, and their point is well taken insofar as the petition sought to substitute a new trial judge in place of the respondent judge.

The husband contends, however, that the petition is not moot with respect to orders already entered by the trial court. He argues that under section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1989) and Rule 1.432, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, entry of an order of disqualification by the trial court permits him to move for reconsideration of the orders previously entered by the disqualified judge. Since the trial judge took evidence and, sitting as trier of fact, entered an interim support award and an interlocutory order determining certain property rights, the husband contends that failure to reach the merits of the petition will foreclose an opportunity to move for reconsideration to which he is otherwise entitled.

The theory of petitioner's motions for disqualification was that the trial judge should be disqualified on account of prejudice, the grounds for which are set forth in section 38.10, Florida Statutes. Neither section 3 8. 10 nor Rule 1.432, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, explicitly provides for moving for reconsideration of interlocutory orders upon entry of an order of disqualification. Florida practice treatises have stated that there is a right to move for reconsideration, citing as authority section 38.07, Florida Statutes (1989).1 While section 38.07 does provide for such a motion to be made, it is by its terms confined to disqualification for consanguinity under sections 38.02 and 38.05, Florida Statutes.

The Florida Supreme Court has said that, "Under the common law, the acts of a disqualified judge were subject to vacation or reversal, were generally held to be voidable rather than void, and were not subject to collateral attack. It was also required that they be moved against promptly, otherwise the right would be lost." Dickinson v. Raichi, 120 Fla. 907, 912, 163 So. 217, 219 (1935).2 Common law principles remain in force in Florida except to the extent modified or repealed by statute.


See § 2.01, Fla. Stat. (1989); Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Major Realty Co., 161 So.2d 837, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). Section 3 8. 10 provides that when the trial judge is disqualified, "the judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of this state for the substitution ofjudges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified." Section 3 8. 10 thus specifies that the ordinary procedure for substitution of judges in cases of disqualification will be followed, and does not address, much less negate, the common law right to move for reconsideration.

This interpretation is reinforced by examination of the other disqualification statutes. Section 38.01, Florida Statutes (1989), provides for disqualification where a judge is a party to the pending action. There, the statute has modified the common law rule by providing that all of the judge's acts are void, not merely voidable. Since the successor judge must consider the entire action de novo, a motion for reconsideration would be irrelevant. Section 38.07, Florida Statutes, enacted after section 38.10, see Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 561 So.2d 253, 256 n. 4, (1990) in essence codifies the common law rule and

[562 So.2d 7571 provides specific time frames rather than applying the rule of laches. Finally, as the decision in Dickinson v. Raichi indicates, in the rare case of a common law, rather than statutory, disqualification reconsideration is also available. See also Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Thorn, 319 So.2d 82, 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (successor judge had authority to grant relief from judgment). In sum, section 3 8. 10 contains no indication that there was an intention to modify common law practice, and Florida law provides in all other contexts either that reconsideration is available by motion, § 38.07, Fla. Stat.; Dickinson v. Raichi, or that the acts of the disqualified judge are void. § 38.01, Fla. Stat.

We conclude, therefore, that the premise of petitioner's argument is correct: had the motion for disqualification been granted, he could have


moved for reconsideration of the trial court's orders. The matter is not entirely moot. Under English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296-97 (Fla. 1977), however, it appears that prohibition is not an available remedy, and the petition will instead be treated as one for writ of certiorari.

We next turn to the merits of the petition. Insofar as is pertinent here, the husband moved to disqualify the judge on the ground that the two opposing counsel, who represent the wife in the matrimonial action, are members of the Committee to Re-elect Judge Mary Ann MacKenzie. The re-election campaign is under way and the trial judge has drawn announced opposition. The Committee is actively conducting direct mail solicitation, requesting contributions and endorsements. The Committee's solicitation letter sets forth the reasons for the Committee's support, and concludes, "That is why we are helping Judge MacKenzie in her re-election campaign, and ask that you join us in these efforts." Beneath the text of the letter are the names of all members of the campaign committee, including the two attorneys representing the wife in the matrimonial action now pending before the trial judge.

The standards applicable here have been often stated:

Legal sufficiency is governed by a reasonable person standard. The affidavit must recite "facts and circumstances that would lead any normal human being in the position of [the movant] to 'fear' that he would not receive a fair trial... ." Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. [577] at 5827 140 So. [459] at 462 [(1932)]; accord Fischer v. Knucic, 497 So.2d 240 at 242 [(Fla. 1986)]; Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083 at 1087 [(Fla. 1983)]. "If the attested facts supporting the suggestion are reasonably sufficient to create such a fear, it is not for the trial judge to say that it is not there." Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d at 1087 (quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 518, 194 So. 613, 614 (1939)). So long as the allegations "are not frivolous or fanciful, they are sufficient to support a motion to disqualify... ." Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 Sold 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (quoting State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (1938)).


Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So.2d 1164,1167-1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (en bane); see also Ed., 561 So.2d at 1173-1174 (Ferguson, J., concurring); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980).

In the present case the legal standard is met. The Committee was formed at least one year prior to the election, and plainly contemplates a course of activity on behalf of the judge during the year leading up to the election. There is a substantial and continuing relationship between the Committee and the trial judge, in a matter of great and immediate importance to the judge. In Breakstone we held that the legal standard for disqualification was met where an attorney had given a $500 contribution. A fortiori, disqualification is called for here, where there is a continuing affiliation in a joint project lasting a considerable period of time. It is the nature of the relationship which compels this result. We conclude that a reasonable litigant in the position of movant would fear that the trial court will be aware of the membership and

L562 So.2d 7581 activities of her own contemporaneously active campaign committee, and will entertain a bias in favor of the side represented by her Committee members. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983); Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); see also Roudner v. MacKenzie, 536 So.2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Overton, Trial Judges & Political Elections: A Time for Re-examination, 2 U.Fla.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 10 (1988-89) ('[W]ould not a lawyer coming before a recently elected judge be concerned if opposing counsel had been on his campaign committee... .").

We do not say that a member of a campaign committee is perpetually barred from appearing before the trial judge. An appropriate approach to the problem is suggested by an opinion of the Committee on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges. In response to an inquiry the Committee advised that a judge should disqualify himself in cases involving the


attorney who was his reelection opponent. The Committee recommended disqualification "for a period of time, perhaps two years, until ... considering all the circumstances ..., your impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned." Fla. Sup. Ct Comm. on Stds. of Conduct Concerning ng Judges, Op. 84-23 (Oct. 26, 1984). The question of post-election disqualification is not before us, but the Committee's opinion sets forth an appropriate framework for analysis.

In the present case the campaign committee is currently active. Disqualification is required. As has often been said:

Prejudice of a judge is a delicate question to raise but when raised as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a modicum of reason, the judge against whom raised, should be prompt to recuse himself No judge under any circumstances is warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is shadowed or even questioned .... .... It is a matter of no concern what judge presides in a particular cause, but it is a matter of grave concern that justice be administered with dispatch, without fear or favor or the suspicion of such attributes. The outstanding big factor in every lawsuit is the truth of the controversy. Judges, counsel, and rules of procedure are secondary factors designed by the law as instrumentalities to work out and arrive at the truth of the controversy.The judiciary cannot be too circumspect, neither should it be reluctant to retire from a cause under circumstances that would shake the confidence of litigants in a fair and impartial adjudication of the issues raised-Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 582-84, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932).

Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083-86. See generally Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 561 So.2d at 253-257.

[562 So.2d 7591 We grant certiorari and quash the orders denying the motions for disqualification. Petitioner may move for reconsideration in the trial court. We certify that we have passed upon the following question of great public importance:


Is the trial judge required to disqualify herself on motion, where the attorneys for one of the parties are members of the judge's contemporaneously active campaign committee in a contested election?

See Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), 9.120.

FERGUSON, J., concurs.

GERS TEN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I respectfully do not agree with the majority. Yes, two attorneys for the wife are members of respondent judge's re-election campaign. This fact alone is not sufficient legal grounds for recusal (or disqualification) of the judge.

The record only shows that the wife's attorneys permitted their names to appear with more than one hundred other attorneys on a letter. This letter, sent to other attorneys, endorsed the re-election of the judge, and, suggested a financial contribution to the judge's campaign.

I do not find this fact reasonably sufficient to create a well founded fear in the husband's mind, that he would not receive a fair trial. See State ex reL Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 5161 194 So. 613 (1939); State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695 (1938).

To support this position, I need only look to the cogent reasoning of Judge Nesbitt's dissenting opinion in Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In Breakstone, opposing counsel made a $500 contribution to the election campaign of a judge's spouse. A majority of this court, sitting en bane, concluded that the motions for disqualification should have been granted. The majority held that a $500 contribution to a judge's spouse, by opposing counsel, would "cause a reasonable person to fear a bias by the trial judge in favor of the opposing side." Breakstone, 561 So.2d at 1166. Judge Nesbitt, in dissent, asserted that the motions should be denied, stating in part:


[T]he en bane court's opinion judicially limits litigants' and their attorneys' freedom of political association far beyond that limitation already imposed by the legislature.

Breakstone, 561 So.2dat 1175.

I believe that Breakstone is analogous to this case. Here, as in Breakstone, the impact of the majority opinion will be to limit attorneys' freedom of political association in an area that has not been restricted by the legislature. Moreover, to carry the majority opinion to its logical conclusion, the respondent judge will now have to recuse herself, upon a motion for disqualification, every single time any one of the over one hundred attorneys, whose names appeared in the letter, have a case before her.

Based on the foregoing, I believe the petition should be denied and I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. I concur in the majority opinion, however, insofar as it certifies the question to the Florida Supreme Court.


400 So.2d 553 (1981)

Dr. Gordon HAYSLIP, Petitioner, V.

The Honorable Paul T. DOUGLAS, Circuit Court Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Pa/in Beach County, Respondent

District Court ofAppeal ofFlorida, Fourth District E2

July l,1981.

4 C) L. Martin Flanagan ofJones & Foster, P.A., West Palm Beach, for petitiner.S?

aD

Jim Smith, Atty. Gem, Tallahassee, and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gem, Wst Palm Beach, for respondent

HURLEY, Judge.

FT I pøT

By petition for writ of prohibition we are asked to determine the propriety of an order denying a motion to disqualify a judge. We conclude that the motion and its supporting documents were legally sufficient and, consequently, the trial judge erred in failing to disqualify himself We grant and issue the writ of prohibition.

Dr. Gordon Hayslip, a defendant in a medical malpractice action pending before the respondent judge, filed a verified motion for disqualification pursuant to Rule 1.432, Fla.R.Civ.P. Dr. Hayslip averred that he feared he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial due to prejudice or bias on the part of the trial judge against his defense attorney. The motion recited that Hayslip's counsel had moved to disqualify the same judge in two earlier cases and that

[400 So.2d 555] in response to one of those motions, the trial judge had stated, "I'm going to review the file a little more before I rule, but it appears to me that this is a frivolous and perhaps almost champertous motion for me to recuse myself" Given this history of prior conflict, Dr. Hayslip further averred that a pre-trial hearing had been held in his case to permit the court to consider and rule on plaintiffs counsel's motion to withdraw. The motion was uncontested and at some point in the proceeding, the court pointed at Dr. Hayslip's attorney and said: There is another lawyer whose name I would like to add to this motion to withdraw. He should not be in this case.


Shortly thereafter, Dr. Hayslip filed a verified motion to disqualify the trial judge. Included in the motion was a verified certificate by defense counsel that the motion and affidavit were made in good faith. Attached to the motion were two sworn depositions from attorneys who represented other codefendants in Dr. Hayslip's case and who had been present at the pre-trial hearing on the motion to withdraw. Each deposition substantiated the statement of facts regarding the trial court's remarks to Dr. Hayslip's attorney.

A hearing was held on the motion for disqualification and at its conclusion the trial judge announced that the motion was denied. Unfortunately, neither at the hearing nor in its order, did the court set forth the rationale for its decision. Thereupon, Dr. Hayslip filed a petition for writ of prohibition and we issued an order to show cause.

Preliminarily, we note that a petition for writ of prohibition is the appropriate procedural device to test the validity of a denial of a motion to disqualify filed pursuant to Rule 1.432, Fla.R.Civ.P. Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); Brewton v. Kelly, 166 So.2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); State ex rel. Jensen v. Cannon, 163 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3dDCA 1964).

In approaching the issue ofjudicial disqualification courts must be ever mindful of the fundamental principles which govern the resolution of these questions. In Dickenson v. Parks, supra 140 So. at 462, the court held:

Prejudice of a judge is a delicate question to raise, but when raised as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a modicum of reason, the judge against whom raised should be prompt to recuse himself No judge under any circumstances is warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is shadowed or even questioned.* * * * * *The outstanding big factor in every lawsuit is the truth of the controversy. Judges, counsel, and rules of procedure are secondary factors designed by the law as instrumentalities to work out and arrive at the truth of the controversy. The judiciary cannot be too circumspect, neither should it be reluctant to retire from a cause under circumstances that would shake the confidence of litigants in a fair and impartial adjudication of the issues raised.

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to Rule 1.432, Fla.R. Civ.P. which delimits the narrow responsibility of a judge presented with a motion for disqualification. In particular, subsection "d" of the rule specifies:

The judge against whom the motion is directed shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion. The judge shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged.


If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall enter an order of disqualification and proceed no further in the action.

To determine whether the motion and its supporting documents are legally sufficient, the court must first turn to the literal requirements of Rule 1.432, Fla.R. Civ.P. and Section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1979). First, the motion must be made by a party; it must be verified, and it must allege the facts relied upon to show the grounds for disqualification. Second, there must be a certificate by counsel of record indicating that the affidavit and application are made in good faith. Third, the operative facts in the party's motion must be

[400 So.2d 5561 substantiated by at least two affidavits from reputable citizens of the county who are not related to the defendant or his attorney.

The term "legal sufficiency" encompasses more than mere technical compliance with the rule and the statute; the court must also determine if the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial. Brewton v. Kelly, supra. As indicated by the court in State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (1938):

The test of the sufficiency of the affidavit is whether or not its content shows that the party making it has a wellgrounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind, and the basis for such feeling... . [The trial judge] cannot pass on the truth of the allegations of fact. If they are not frivolous or fanciful, they are sufficient to support a motion to disqualify on the ground of prejudice.

Turning now to the verified motion and the supporting documents in the case at bar, we hold that they satisfy the technical requirements of Rule 1.432, Fla.R.Civ.P. and Section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1979). It is of no consequence that Dr. Hayslip was absent from the pre-trial hearing at which the trial judge allegedly made the comments in question. His verified motion contains a detailed statement of facts which led him to believe that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial before the respondent judge. In our view, this satisfies the requirements of subsection "b" of Rule 1.432, Fla.R.Civ.P. To require that the moving party have personal knowledge of the underlying facts would be to impose an unrealistic and unnecessarily constricted limitation. It would ignore the


safeguards embodied in the statute's requirements for two supporting affidavits plus a certificate of good faith. Moreover, such a narrow construction would put relief beyond the reach of all but a minute group of litigants. Such a result would be at odds with the clear intent of the statute. Section 3 8. 10 was crafted to insure confidence in the integrity of our system ofjustice. The availability of its remedy is an indispensable right of all litigants. Thus, we hold that a party need not have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in his motion. However, all of the requirements of the rule and the statute must be met and the supporting affidavits must be fully credible. City ofPalatka v. Frederick, 128 Fla. 366, 174 So. 826 (1937).

Counsel for Dr. Hayslip complied with the requirements of Section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1979), by filing a certificate of good faith. Additionally, counsel's certificate was verified. Next, the supporting affidavits or sworn depositions unquestionably substantiate the operative facts set forth in Dr. Hayslip's motion. Both attorneys were present at the pre-trial hearing on the motion to withdraw and both confirmed, practically verbatim, Dr. Hayslip's account of the judge's remarks. The fact that the supporting affidavits were provided by attorneys for co-defendants of Dr. Hayslip, is, in our view, of no account. Neither attorney is related to Dr. Hayslip or his attorney and that is all that the statute requires. We perceive no reason nor authority to accede to respondent's suggestion on appeal that we impose a more stringent requirement.

The only remaining question is whether the alleged remarks, which were directed at defense counsel rather than his client, could reasonably justify the client's fear that he would not receive a fair trial at the hands of the respondent judge. It is well to remember that Section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1979), refers to "prejudice of the judge... against the applicant, or in favor of the adverse party... ."(Emphasis supplied). This issue was addressed by the court in State ex rel. Jensen v. Cannon, supra:

[400 So.2d 5571 [A judge] is disqualified where his prejudice against the attorney is of such a degree that it adversely affects the client, in which instance the trial judge should disqualify and recuse himself See Ginsberg v. Holt, Fla. 1956, 86 So.2d 650; State ex rel. Fuente v. Himes, 160 Fla. 757, 36 So.2d 433; State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613. -1d at 537.

We agree with the court's observation in Brewton v. Kelly, supra at 836, that "[i]t is not always possible with exact particularity in a matter of this kind to set forth facts


as to the process of the human mind... ." Nonetheless, we feel certain that under the facts as alleged in Dr. Hayslip's motion, his fear was reasonable and not frivolous nor fanciful. Though a client and his counsel are separate entities, they share a common bond forged by the attorney-client relationship and tempered in the rigors of litigation. Most clients find the courtroom to be an unfamiliar and, in some instances, uncomfortable atmosphere and so it is not unusual that they entrust themselves into their counsel's care and view their interests as one. Thus, it is understandable that a client would become concerned and fearful upon learning that the trial judge has an antipathy toward his lawyer and has expressed the opinion that the client's counsel "should not be in this case.

Ultimately, questions of judicial disqualification, must be viewed in the context of those principles which were eloquently set forth by Justice Terrell in State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939):

[B]very litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of Courts to scrupulously guard this right and to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his qualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration ofjustice.It is not enough for a judge to assert that he is free from prejudice. His mien and the reflex from his court room speak louder than he can declaim on this point. If he fails through these avenues to reflect justice and square dealing, his usefulness is destroyed. The attitude of the judge and the atmosphere of the court room should indeed be such that no matter what charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to litigate, he can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where the judicial ermine is everything that it typifies, purity and justice. The guaranty of a fair and impartial trial can mean nothing less than this

Since we have concluded that Dr. Hayslip's verified motion and supporting documents meet the test of legal sufficiency, we grant and issue the writ of prohibition. We declare the respondent judge disqualified in this matter and prohibit him from taking any further action. We further instruct the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, through the normal random assignment process, to cause the case to be reassigned for trial.

The writ of prohibition is granted.

DOWNEY, J., concurs.

LETTS, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.


LETTS, Chief Judge, specially concurring.

I agree with the majority opinion as it applies to the individual facts of this case, but it should not be used prospectively as a vehicle to seek removal of a presiding jurist every time an attorney makes a judge angry, which anger may well be justified and actually in furtherance of the cause ofjustice rather than prejudicial to it.

Notwithstanding, without any apparent basis whatsoever in this particular case, Judge Douglas delivered a totally gratuitous pronouncement which undeniably revealed his personal distaste for Dr. Hayslip's lawyer. Maybe Judge Douglas honestly felt he had good cause for this distaste, but that is not apparent from the record and therefore of no consequence here. If such is Judge Douglas' conclusion to the point where he is compelled to express it in

[400 Sold 558] such a partial manner, he has no option but to withdraw, if the gauntlet is laid down before him in conformity with the statute and the rules. He who chooses to sit on the bench must forego the pleasures of oral condemnations therefrom which are unrelated to the furtherance of the cause at hand. Such exasperated declarations as: "Let the damn appellate court read it for themselves" may be emotionally satisfying and identifiable with such dashing heroes as Rhett Butler; however the declaration would be just as apropos without the "damn" and certainly more judicious.


441 So.2d 1083 (1983)

Connie Moore LIVINGSTON, Appellant, V.

SL4TE of Florida, Appellee

Supreme Court ofFlorida.

October27, 1983

CID

Fri

RehearingDemedJanuaiy Ii, 1984.

Melanie Ann Hines, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tcillhasse, r

for appellant.

Jim Smith Atty. Geri., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Connie Moore Livingston, appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and the imposition of the death sentence. We have jurisdiction. Art. V. § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We conclude that under the special circumstances of this case the trial judge should have disqualified himself from presiding in appellanVs trial and, consequently, we must reverse appellant!s conviction and sentence and remand this case for a new trial. It should be understood that the trial judge's action in denying the motion for disqualification was influenced by a decision of this Court which rejected a request by the same attorney who now represents appellant to disqualify the same judge in all cases in which the attorney served as counsel or was a party. As we have explained in this opinion, that prior action does not control this case. To aid in appellant's retrial, we have addressed the question submitted concerning the use of a prior criminal offense to establish identity and find that this evidence is admissible in the retrial.

The appellant, who is retarded, was charged with a brutal first-degree murder and sexual battery. The appellant's mother retained Charles A. Wade to represent her son. Prior to his arraignment, appellant filed a motion, verified by him, for the disqualification of Judge Erwin Fleet In this motion, which was filed under section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1979), appellant set forth specific conflicts between his attorney and the trial judge, concluding that " Judge Fleet is so biased and prejudiced and has so much animosity against his counsel, Charles A. Wade, that


he, Connie Livingston, would be unable to get a fair and impartial trial in this case...

Wade filed a supporting affidavit which described several incidents establishing this alleged animosity between himself and Judge Fleet. As alleged, these incidents, which occurred over a period of twenty-five years, were: (1) that in 1958, Fleet, who had been appointed to a circuit judgeship in 1957, was defeated by Wade in an election for that position; (2) that during Wade's service as a circuit judge, Fleet appeared before him as a lawyer and angry words exchanged between them, resulting in Fleet's threat to petition for Wade's disqualification in future cases; (3) that after Fleet was elected to another circuit judgeship and Wade, who was still a circuit judge, became the administrative judge for the county, there were numerous crossings between the judges; (4) that after Wade retired from his circuit judge position and began his private law practice he was held in contempt of court by Judge Fleet in Wade's first contested hearing before him; and (5) that Judge Fleet had directed a grand jury to investigate a criminal matter

[441 Sold 1085] involving Wade which had been nol-prossed by the state attorney and had appointed as grand jury foreman a man whom Fleet had unsuccessfully represented before Wade when he was a circuit judge. This latter incident concerning the grand jury investigation occurred in 1979, approximately five months prior to the commencement of appellant's trial, and, as indicated in the record in this case, received local newspaper publicity.

The appellant's motion for disqualification also contained two affidavits from individuals who stated that they were not related to the parties or the attorneys and that to the best of their knowledge it would be virtually impossible for Wade or any of his clients to get a fair and impartial hearing before Judge Fleet. On April 16, 1980, Judge Fleet denied the motion for disqualification, finding that the motion and accompanying affidavits were legally insufficient under the requirements of section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1979). Wade renewed the motion for disqualification twice during subsequent pre-trial hearings and again at the commencement of the trial. Each renewal was denied. The denial of the motion was also used as a ground for a motion for new trial, which was also denied.

First, we address the previous action in which Wade sought to disqualify Judge Fleet in all cases. In December, 1979, Wade filed a suggestion for writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Florida, seeking to have Fleet disqualified from hearing any case or matter involving Wade either as an individual or as an


attorney. This Court, without opinion, denied the suggestion for the writ on February 14, 1980, approximately two months before the commencement of appellant's trial. See Wade v. Fleet, 383 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 1980).

The state contends that this Court's denial of the writ without opinion is controlling in this case. We realize that the allegations made by the appellant in his motion for disqualification in this case are basically the same as those made by Wade in his previously denied petition for writ of prohibition. It is important to note, however, that the relief sought by Wade in his prior petition was a general prohibition against Judge Fleet's hearing any of Wade's cases. That petition was not by a litigant seeking disqualification of the judge in any particular case, as appellant's motion does in the instant case.

This Court has clearly held that a lawyer's request for a general disqualification of a judge will not be granted. In Ginsberg v. Holt 86 So.2d 650, 651-52 (Fla. 1956), we said that

[t]here is no provision in the statutes or the decisionsfor a blanket decree restraining a particular judge from hearing all cases in which a particular attorney may appear in his professional capacity as an officer of the court and we unreservedly decline to introduce such a novel and revolutionary procedure.

(Emphasis added.) Because our denial of the writ of prohibition in Wade v. Fleet was not accompanied by an opinion, we recognize that Judge Fleet, as well as the prosecution, could have construed the denial to mean that the allegations in the affidavit were insufficient to require the disqualification of Judge Fleet in any particular case arising in the future. Our prior decision in Wade v. Fleet however, is not controlling and appellant's motion for disqualification must be considered on the basis of whether, under the circumstances, he has a reasonable fear that he would not receive a fair trial in this case.

This Court has recognized the sensitivity and seriousness involved whenever the issue ofjudicial prejudice is raised. We have stated that:

Prejudice of a judge is a delicate question to raise but when raised as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a modicum of reason, the judge against whom raised, should be prompt to recuse himself. No judge under any circumstances is warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is shadowed or even questioned.....

[441 So.2d 1086]


It is a matter of no concern what judge presides in a particular cause, but it is a matter of grave concern that justice be administered with dispatch, without fear or favor or the suspicion of such attributes. The outstanding big factor in every lawsuit is the truth of the controversy. Judges, counsel, and rules of procedure are secondary factors designed by the law as instrumentalities to work out and arrive at the truth of the controversy. The judiciary cannot be too circumspect, neither should it be reluctant to retire from a cause under circumstances that would shake the confidence of litigants in a fair and impartial adjudication of the issues raised.

Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 582-84, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932). This Court has also expressed the view that:

"Every litigant, including the State in criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." It is the duty of courts to scrupulously guard this right of the litigant and to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his qualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit and place the judiciary in a compromising attitude which is bad for the administration ofjustice.

State ex rel. Mickle v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 1385, 131 So. 331, 332 (1930).

In Florida, there are four separate expressions concerning the disqualification of trial judges, which are set forth in: (1) The Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3-C; (2) section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1981); (3) Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230, which was adopted verbatim by this Court from a former statute, section 911.01, Florida Statutes (1967); and (4) Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.432.

The Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth basic principles of howjudges should conduct themselves in carrying out their judicial duties. Canon 3-C(1) states that "[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned... ." This is totally consistent with the case law of this Court, which holds that a party seeking to disqualify a judge need only show "a well grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affi ant's mind and the basis for such feeling." State ex rd. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (1938). See also Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So.2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The question of disqualification focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially.


When a party believes he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial before the assigned trial judge, he must present the issue of disqualification to the court in accordance with the process designed to resolve this sensitive issue. The requirements set forth in section 38. 10, Florida Statutes (1981), Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.432 were established to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system as well as to prevent the disqualification process from being abused for the purposes of judge-shopping, delay, or some other reason not related to providing for the fairness and impartiality of the proceeding. The same basic requirements are contained in each of these three processes. First, there must be a verified statement of the specific facts which indicate a bias or prejudice requiring disqualification. Second, the application must be timely made. Third, the judge with respect to whom the motion is made may only determine whether the motion is legally sufficient and is not allowed to pass on the truth of the allegations. Section 3 8. 10 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230 also require two affidavits stating that the party making the motion for disqualification will not be able to receive a fair trial before the judge with respect to whom the motion is made, as well as a certificate of good faith signed by counsel for the party making the motion.

[441 So.2d 1087] Section 3 8. 10 requires that these affidavits be from persons unrelated to the parties or counsel. No affidavits are required under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1-432.

Section 3 8. 10 gives to litigants a substantive right to seek the disqualification of a trial judge. Because, however, the actual process of the disqualification of a judge is procedural, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230, rather than the statute, controls the disqualification process. See Jackson v. Korda, 402 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), State ex rel. Aguiarv. Chappell, 344 So.2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Benyard v. Wainwright 322 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1975); In re Clarification ofFlorida Rules ofPractice & Procedure, 281 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1973). We reject the state's contention that appellant's motion is invalid because it was filed pursuant to section 38.10 rather than under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230. The substance of the procedural requirements of rule 3.230 is contained in the appellant's motion. In considering the sufficiency of the allegations to meet the requirements of our procedural process, the technical requirements of the contents of the affidavits need not be strictly applied but, rather, they will be deemed sufficient "[i]f taken as a whole, the suggestion and supporting affidavits are sufficient to warrant fear on the part of' a party that he will not receive a fair trial by the assigned judge. Parks, 141 Fla. at 519, 194 So. at 614-15.


I therefore conclude that by failing to seek appellate court prohibition of the judge's presiding over his trial, appellant has waived the right to have his motion evaluated under the standards set out in Rule 3.230. Lest I be misunderstood, I reiterate

[441 So.2d 10901 that I am not saying he waived the right to be tried before an impartial judge. The record of the trial is before us. If appellant could demonstrate from that record that during his trial the presiding judge deviated for a single instant from that cold neutrality that is demanded of a judge, then appellant would be entitled to a new trial. Moreover, in my view, if the circuit judge who presided at trial could be shown to have in fact allowed his unfavorable relationship with appellant's lawyer to affect him and his actions in his official capacity as judge to appellant's detriment, the result should be not only a new trial for appellant but a complaint from the justices of this Court to the Judicial Qualifications Commission concerning the conduct of the trial court judge.

I have carefully reviewed the entire record of appellant's trial. I conclude that the alleged mutual dislike of Judge Fleet and attorney Wade had no substantial effect on the conduct of the trial; the alleged prejudice of the judge against the lawyer was not visited upon the client in any significant manner discernible from the record. On the basis of this review of what actually happened I would reject appellant's demand for a new trial for violation of Rule 3.230.

The evidence showed that the victim was bludgeoned to death with a glass soft-drink bottle. Her sexual organs were violently molested. There was competent, substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that appellant was the perpetrator of these acts. The defendant's lawyer was allowed fair and ample opportunity to contest the state's interpretation of the evidence and to develop his theory of defense.

Appellant was properly found competent to stand trial and the procedure by which this issue was determined was fair and proper. The psychiatrists' written reports were a proper basis for the judge's determination. Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1971). The psychiatrists found appellant to be mentally slow but competent to understand the proceedings.

There was evidence of an unrelated criminal attack committed by appellant. This evidence was properly admitted under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4L.Ed.2d 86(1960).


The facts alleged in the motion need only show that "the party making it has a well grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge." Dewell, 131 Fla. at 573, 179 So. at 697. "If the attested facts supporting the suggestion are reasonably sufficient to create such a fear, it is not for the trial judge to say that it is not there." Parks, 141 Fla. at 518, 194 So. at 614. Further, "it is a question of what feeling resides in the affi ant's mind and the basis for such feeling." Dewell, 131 Fla. at 573, 179 So. at 697-98.

The state argues that the allegations made in appellant's motion for disqualification fail to show prejudice towards counsel to the degree that it is likely to prejudice appellant. This Court has expressly held that ajudge may be disqualified due to prejudice towards an attorney where the prejudice "is of such degree that it adversely affects the client." Ginsberg v. Ho14 86 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1956). See also State ex rel. Fuente v. Himes, 160 Fla. 757, 36 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1948); Parks. Prejudice against a party's attorney can be as detrimental to the interests of that party as prejudice against the party himself. What is important is the party's reasonable belief concerning his or her ability to obtain a fair trial. A determination must be made as to whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. As noted, the last incident involving Judge Fleet and Mr. Wade occurred just five months prior to the commencement of appellant's trial. Given the record in this case identifying the disputes which have arisen between the judge and the lawyer over a substantial period of time, we must conclude that the appellant could have a reasonable fear that he could not receive a fair trial. This is especially true in this prosecution for first-degree murder in which appellant's life is at stake and in which the circuit judge's sentencing decision is so important.

We have concluded that Livingston's verified motion and supporting documents were sufficient under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230 to require the trial judge to disqualify himself We must vacate the judgment and sentence and remand with directions to proceed with a new trial. Further hearings at the trial court level on the issue of disqualification would not, in our view, be beneficial. We therefore direct that the chief judge of the circuit assign another judge for the retrial of this case.

To aid in the retrial of this case, we address the question of the admissibility of testimony concerning an offense committed by appellant on March 29, 1980, in Pensacola, Florida. Appellant asserts that the testimony

[441 So.2d 10881


concerning the Pensacola offense does not qualify as similar fact evidence under the guidelines of Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.) cert denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.IEd.2d 86(1959). We find that there was a uniqueness about the appellant's modus operandi which, in our view, made the evidence clearly admissible on the issue of identity.

We find it inappropriate to discuss any of the other issues raised in the case. For the reasons expressed we reverse appellant's conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, OVFRTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ALDERMAN, C.J., concurs.

BOYD, Justice, dissenting.

I dissent to the judgment of the Court that a new trial is required because of appellant's pre-trial perception of prejudice against his lawyer on the part of the trial judge. I believe that a trial judge's denial of a motion for disqualification pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230 must be evaluated differently after there has been a trial and conviction than when such a motion is reviewed by way of a petition for a writ of prohibition prior to trial.

I agree with the majority's statement that Rule 3.230 provides a procedure for effectuating substantive rights bestowed by section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1981). Former section 911. 01, Florida Statutes (1969), pertained to the same subject but was a statute dealing with criminal procedure and was therefore superseded by Rule 3.230 and was accordingly later repealed. Ch. 70-339, § 180, Laws of Fla. Section 3 8. 10 remains as a substantive provision regarding the rights of litigants to receive justice at the hands of impartial judges. Only the procedural elements of section 38.10 have been superseded in criminal cases by Rule 3.230.

I also agree that by judicial interpretation the references in both the statute and the rule to prejudice in favor of or against a party have been expanded to encompass also prejudice in favor of or against an attorney for a party. State ex reL Fuente v. Himes, 160 Fla. 757, 36 So. 2d 433 (1948); State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939). When this Court denied Charles Wade's petition to prohibit Judge Fleet from sitting on any case in which Wade might appear as an attorney, Wade v. Fleet, 383 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 1980), we were following a long-


standing precedent rejecting such a "blanket decree" as a "novel and revolutionary procedure." Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So.2d 650, 651-52 (Fla. 1956). Recognition of animosity toward a lawyer as a cause of prejudice against the lawyer's client does carry with it the danger, however, that although the lawyer may not be able to get a "blanket decree" of disqualification, he may be able to achieve the same result one case at a time. From the perspective of concern for the sound and efficient administration of justice, it may be far more reasonable, in the case of a lawyer who is going to transfer a well-grounded fear of prejudice to all of his clients, to require him to remove his practice to another circuit than to require the judge to recuse himself every time the lawyer appears in his courtroom.

Rule 3.230 provides that when a motion for disqualification of the judge is filed in a criminal case, the judge shall consider the motion only to determine its legal sufficiency and "shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification." When a trial judge denies a motion for disqualification either by improperly passing on the truth of the allegations or adjudicating the question of disqualification, or by erroneously finding a legally sufficient motion to be insufficient, the moving party has one further remedy to exhaust before proceeding to trial before the judge in question. Although such a pre-judgment order is not appealable, the moving party can seek review by petitioning the court with appellate jurisdiction for a writ of prohibition. See, e.g., Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1978); Wilson v.

[441 So2d 1089] Renfroe, 91 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1956); State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); State ex rel. Zacke v. Woodson, 399 So.2d 7(Fla. 5th ]DCA 1981). The writ of prohibition affords a means of reviewing the trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the motion, or a remedy for its passing on the truth of the allegations, before the expenditure of judicial time and labor on the conduct of a trial.

Rule 3.230 provides an extraordinary protection for the right of an accused to a fair trial in that well-grounded allegations of subjective fear that the judge is prejudiced are sufficient to require recusal. The judge is not permitted to evaluate the merits of a legally sufficient motion. The reason for this procedure is to secure inviolate the appearance and perception of complete impartiality and to avoid the creation of "an intolerable adversary atmosphere" in the proceedings. Bundy v. Rudd 366 So.2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978) (quoting Department ofRevenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1975) (on reconsideration)). This valuable procedural right, together with the writ of prohibition as a means of review, protect the accused from having to go to


trial before a certain judge when the accused has a well-grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial. If the accused fails to seek review of the judge's denial of the disqualification motion, however, and proceeds to trial, he should be deemed to have waived the extraordinary procedural right provided for by Rule 3.230.

I do not say that by not seeking prohibition the accused waives the right to be tried before an impartial judge. Such right is substantive and fundamental and abides with the accused throughout the proceedings. But the procedural right afforded by Rule 3.230, which almost gives the accused a unilateral "peremptory challenge" to the first judge assigned to his case, should not be evaluated on appeal after trial and judgment under the same standards as would have applied if the accused had sought review by writ of prohibition before the commencement of the trial. After the trial has already been held, the appellate court can examine the record of the proceedings and treat the question as one of impartiality versus prejudice in fact. If an atmosphere of partiality did in fact develop at the trial then a new trial should be ordered. But the expenditure of substantial time and labor by the court, jury, and lawyers should not be held for naught because of an erroneous ruling under Rule 3.230 when the appellant could have sought review before trial by means of a petition for writ of prohibition.

It is interesting to note that something like the approach I am proposing has been widely utilized by the appellate courts of Florida in dealing with the issue of disqualification of trial judges for prejudice. When a trial judge's denial of a motion for disqualification is brought before the appellate court for review by means of a pre-trial petition for writ of prohibition, the courts tend to apply the rule strictly and inquire only into the sufficiency of the motion and supporting affidavits to state a well-grounded fear of partiality. See, e.g., Bundy v. Rudd; Dickenson v. Parks; State ex rel. Allen v. Testa, 414 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Jackson v. Korda, 402 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State ex rel. Zacke v. Woodson, 399 So.2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State ex rel. Aguiar v. Chappell, 344 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). On the other hand, when defendants wait until after their trials to seek review of the orders of denial in conjunction with their appeals, the appellate courts tend to evaluate the claims of prejudice on the merits. See, e.g., Jonesv. State, 411 So.2d 165 (Fla.), cert. denied, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 189, 74 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982); Tafero v. State, 403 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982); Mikenas v. State, 367 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1978); Dempsey v. State, 415 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denie4 424 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1982); Van Fripp v. State, 412 So.2d 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Yesbick v. State, 408 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed 417 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1982).


I therefore conclude that by failing to seek appellate court prohibition of the judge's presiding over his trial, appellant has waived the right to have his motion evaluated under the standards set out in Rule 3.230. Lest I be misunderstood, I reiterate

[441 So.2d 1090] that I am not saying he waived the right to be tried before an impartial judge. The record of the trial is before us. If appellant could demonstrate from that record that during his trial the presiding judge deviated for a single instant from that cold neutrality that is demanded of a judge, then appellant would be entitled to a new trial. Moreover, in my view, if the circuit judge who presided at trial could be shown to have in fact allowed his unfavorable relationship with appellant's lawyer to affect him and his actions in his official capacity as judge to appellant's detriment, the result should be not only a new trial for appellant but a complaint from the justices of this Court to the Judicial Qualifications Commission concerning the conduct of the trial court judge.

I have carefully reviewed the entire record of appellant's trial. I conclude that the alleged mutual dislike of Judge Fleet and attorney Wade had no substantial effect on the conduct of the trial; the alleged prejudice of the judge against the lawyer was not visited upon the client in any significant manner discernible from the record. On the basis of this review of what actually happened I would reject appellant's demand for a new trial for violation of Rule 3.230.

The evidence showed that the victim was bludgeoned to death with a glass soft-drink bottle. Her sexual organs were violently molested. There was competent, substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that appellant was the perpetrator of these acts. The defendant's lawyer was allowed fair and ample opportunity to contest the state's interpretation of the evidence and to develop his theory of defense.

Appellant was properly found competent to stand trial and the procedure by which this issue was determined was fair and proper. The psychiatrists' written reports were a proper basis for the judge's determination. Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1971). The psychiatrists found appellant to be mentally slow but competent to understand the proceedings.

There was evidence of an unrelated criminal attack committed by appellant. This evidence was properly admitted under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1960).


The appellant's confession was found through proper procedures to have been voluntarily given and was therefore properly admitted into evidence. All of appellant's other arguments on the admissibility of particular items of evidence and the fairness of the trial procedure are without merit.

My review of the sentencing proceeding reveals that it too was conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. As aggravating circumstances the court found that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. These findings were supported by the evidence.

The court found one mitigating circumstance as follows:

FINDING: From the evidence, the defendant, CONNIE LIVINGSTON, was under the influence of emotional disturbance when he committed the murder and sexual battery of which he was convicted. Previous psychological examinations showed evidence of diminished capacity of the defendant, but not to the extreme that it deprived him of the ability to form the intent to commit a premeditated homicide.

The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the single mitigating circumstance found. This conclusion was reasonable and proper under the evidence.

I would affirm the convictions of first-degree murder and sexual battery and the sentence of death. I dissent to the order granting a new trial.

ALDERMAN, C.J., concurs.


497 So.2d 240 (1986)

Anne Marie FISCHER, Petitioner1 V.

Honorable Francis X KNUGK, Respondent.

Supreme Court ofFlorida. FT I

November 6, 1986

Frumkes and Greene, P.A., Miami, and Patrice A. Talisman of Daniels J-ick CD

P.A., Miami, for petitioner.

Jim Smith Atty. Gen. and Charles IvL Fahlbusclz Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.

Bonnie Blaire ofBlaire & Cole, Coral Gables, for Gary Fischer, intervenor.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review an order of the Third District Court of Appeal which denied a writ of prohibition seeking to preclude a trial judge from entering a final judgment in a dissolution proceeding, 474 So.2d 225. The question concerns the trial judge's authority to enter a written judgment on a matter tried and orally ruled upon prior to the filing of a motion for disqualification. We find conflict with

Wishoffv. Polen, 468 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4thDCA 1985),* and approve the district

court decision.

The respondent, Circuit Judge Francis X. Knuck, presided over a dissolution proceeding involving the petitioner, Anne Marie Fischer. Evidence was taken over a two-day period, and final arguments were heard on a third day. Five days after the judge announced his decision on the merits, and twelve days after the testimony ended, Fischer filed a motion for disqualification of the judge. As grounds for disqualification, the motion asserted that (1) the judge refused to admit certain testimony believed by the petitioner to be material to the case; (2) the judge's behavior was unusual in that he refused to look at the petitioner or her attorney, and kept his eyes averted from all persons in the courtroom who appeared on the petitioner's behalf; (3) the case proceeded on three different days rather than the original two days set for trial; and (4) Judge Knuck remarked that the case was affecting his health and that he had rescheduled final arguments because of that


fact. Additionally, petitioner's supporting affidavit contained descriptions of the judge's facial expressions and "non-verbal behavior" during the trial. For example:

Judge Knuck, over a three-day period of time, refused to look at me. He refused to meet the eyes of my witnesses and stared at the floor during my testimony. I am unable to verbally describe Judge Knuck's demeanor throughout the trial other than to say that he was visibly uncomfortable, ill at ease, uninterested in my testimony or that of my witnesses.

Counsel filed with the motion a certificate of good faith. After the motion was filed, Judge Knuck questioned its legal sufficiency and the good faith of Fischer's attorney in filing it. Fischer's attorney responded by making an ore tenus motion for disqualification. The judge refused to rule on either motion, but announced he would voluntarily recuse himself, and did so, after signing the final judgment in accordance with his previously announced judgment in the case. Petitioner filed her petition for writ of prohibition in the Third District Court of Appeal, which denied the writ on the authority ofAtrio Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Southeast Bank, 434 So.2d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3dDCA 1983). The district court noted apparent conflict with Wishoffv. Polen, 468 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4thDCA 1985).

Petitioner contends in these proceedings that the motion was legally sufficient and respondent was required to disqualify himself immediately without regard to the fact

[497 So.2d 242] that he had previously announced his judgment after hearing all the evidence in the case. Furthermore, petitioner claims that, even if the motion was legally insufficient, the judge, by questioning the factual allegations in the affidavit and the good faith actions of petitioner's attorney in filing the motion, provided additional grounds requiring his immediate disqualification. Petitioner argues that Wishoff controls. In Wishoff, the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted a petition for writ of prohibition, finding that "[s]ince the final judgment was entered after petitioner filed her motion for disqualification, it must be vacated." 468 So.2d at 1035. We note that the opinion does not reflect whether the trial judge had previously announced his judgment on the merits. Similar holdings appear in Weiner v. Weiner, 416 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 4thDCA 1982), and Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).


We find it appropriate to restate the principles governing disqualification of judges,

as set forth in Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086-87 (Fla. 1983):

In Florida, there are four separate expressions concerning the disqualification of trial judges, which are set forth in: (1) The Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3-C; (2) section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1981); (3) Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230, which was adopted verbatim by this Court from a former statute, section 911.01, Florida Statutes (1967); and (4) Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1 .432.The Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth basic principles of how judges should conduct themselves in carrying out their judicial duties. Canon 3-C(1) states that "[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned... . This is totally consistent with the case law of this Court ... .... The requirements set forth in section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1981), Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.432 were established to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system as well as to prevent the disqualification process from being abused for the purposes of judge-shopping, delay, or some other reason not related to providing for the fairness and impartiality of the proceeding. The same basic requirements are contained in each of these three processes. First, there must be a verified statement of the specific facts which indicate a bias of prejudice requiring disqualification. Second, the application must be timely made. Third, the judge with respect to whom the motion is made may only determine whether the motion is legally sufficient and is not allowed to pass on the truth of the allegations. Section 3 8. 10 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.230 also require two affidavits stating that the party making the motion for disqualification will not be able to receive a fair trial before the judge with respect to whom the motion is made, as well as a certificate of good faith signed by counsel for the party making the motion.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.432, rather than the statute, controls the disqualification process, see Livingston, and we find that petitioner's motion and affidavit fulfill the procedural requirements of rule 1.432. With regard to the merits of petitioner's motion, the law is well established that the asserted facts must be "reasonably sufficient" to create a "well-founded fear" in the mind of a party that he or she will not receive a fair trial. See State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939); State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695 (1938). A verified motion for disqualification must contain an actual factual foundation for the alleged fear of prejudice. Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 So.2d 857 (Fla.

1956); Wyman v. Reasbeck, 436 So.2d ii 12(Fla. 4thIDCA 1983). We find that petitioner's subjective fears, as alleged, are not "reasonably sufficient" to justify a


"well-founded fear" of prejudice. To the contrary, the allegations are frivolous and appear designed to frustrate the process by which petitioner suffered an adverse ruling.

[497 So.2d 2431 In addition, the motion was not timely. Rule 1.432 requires that a motion to disqualify be made within a reasonable time after discovering the facts upon which the motion is based. The instant motion was filed eleven days after all the testimony had been taken and five days after the judge had announced his ruling. One of the purposes of the timeliness requirement is to avoid the adverse effect on the other party to the proceeding and the problems of a retrial with its resulting costs and delay. A motion for recusal is considered untimely when delayed until after the moving party has suffered an adverse ruling unless good cause for delay is shown. Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 325 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). When a judge has heard the testimony and arguments and rendered an oral ruling in a proceeding, the judge retains the authority to perform the ministerial act of reducing that ruling to writing. A trio; Schwartz; Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 378 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1St DCA), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 635 (1980). However, any substantive change in the trial judge's ruling would not be a ministerial act. In the instant case, despite the fact that virtually every incident contained in the motion occurred during the evidentiary portion of the proceeding, which concluded on April 4, no mention was made of these concerns at final arguments on April 11, at which time the judge announced his ruling. Further, the asserted bias and prejudice did not "dawn on" petitioner until she suffered the adverse ruling by the judge. In these circumstances, the motion was not timely filed and the judge clearly had the authority to reduce his ruling to writing subsequent to the filing of the motion for disqualification. To the extent Wishoff, Weiner, and Gilmer would forbid the trial judge's action in this circumstance, we overrule those decisions.

For the reasons expressed, we approve the district court's order denying the petition for writ of prohibition. We find the motion for disqualification legally insufficient, frivolous, and untimely. It would appear that the motion for disqualification was being used to frustrate a final decision in this dissolution of marriage action.

It is so ordered.

McDONALD, C.J., and ADKTNS, BOYD, EI]IRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.


Appendix I:

Affidavits William Todd Overcash on

Motions to recuse


AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH

1. I, William Todd Overcash am over the age of 18. 2. Iama resident of Marion County. 3 I have been subjected to Legal Abuse causing the development of Pjp/Lal

Abuse Syndrome C) 4. I have clear justified fear of the 5th Judicial Circuit and Judge Gurroh

5. I have had the 5th Judicial Circuit not honor the Rules of Court, whicbia led tocD added court costs due to 5 th DCA filings that were clearly not warranted ie-to the Judge Gurrola's refusal to follow the law. -

6. Judge Gurrola has created further fear in my, due to her ex-parte communications with Mark Shelnutt and attending an event with Mark Shelnutt's wife, Lori Foultz, and Natasha Overcash/Sands and having ex-parte gift and letter exchanges with Natasha.

7. Judge Gurrola has conspired with Mark Shelnutt to reach out to the 8th Circuit to pursue criminal charges and clearly evident after Mark Shelnutt raises the issue and proceeds to make false statements about the Marion County DA vs the Gainesville DA.

8. I have been advised by attorneys in Lake, Orange, Alachua Counties that the Marion County Courts are corrupt and that based on the rulings, that I have clearly created a scenario where the intent is to "punish" Wm. Todd Overcash for exposing the courts actions and that they have seen this before.

9. Judge Gurrola is clearly biased and has clearly violated rules of law, falsely imprisoned me and inflicted emotional and physical abuse upon me.

10. Judge Gurrola is clearly biased against men and I have been advised of cases in Lake and Citrus County.

11. Attorney Beth Gordon has cited Judge Gurrola in hearing for violating Florida Law and Mark Shelnutt for sanctions.

12. I have legitimate grounds for recusal and I am afraid of Judge Gurrola and the courts.

13. I request immediate sanctions of Mark Shelnutt for violating his oath to uphold the Constitution of Florida and the United States of America by seeking denial of my Constitutional Rights per the 6 th Amendment.

14. Mark Shelnuu has now confirmed my fear of the 5 6' Judicial Circuit by stating that I have stated offensive statements about attorneys and judges in the 5th Judicial Circuit and that I cannot achieve fair hearing.

15. Mark Shelnutt has demanded denial of my constitutional rights.


16. Mark Shelnutt has falsely presented a ruling by the 5 th DCA in regards to denying a citizen the right to act as a pro se litigant

17. Mark Shelnutt is taking this action knowing my financial status and seeks to further inflict harm and false imprisonment again.

18. Mark Shelnutt is fully aware that I have proven that his client has lied to the court, filed false allegations against me and has full financial ability to handle her legal expenses and now seeks to inflict further emotional, physical and financial harm upon me to avoid truth.

Pursuant to 92. 525 Florida Statues, under penalties of Perjury, I declare I have read the forgoing documents and that the facts stated therein are the truth.

May 2, 2014

vercash, MD

14311 SE 128 th ST.

Ocklawaha, FL 32179


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the below named individuals on the 1st day of May, 2014.

Mark Shelinut, Es. 1404 E. Silver Springs, Blvd, Ocala, FL 34470 and Judge Gurrola, 2' Floor Marion County Court House, Senior Judges Chambers, Judge Eddy, Security Office 4 th Floor of Marion County Court House, Florida Supreme Court, USDOJ.


Notary of Public

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF MAo,J

Sworn to and subscribed before me this Sday oif )d.I'(year), by (&IeiJJ4e rNJ6J.J1 who signed with a mark in the presence of these witnesses:

(Signature

(Print, Typtmp =issioned Name of Notaiy Public ___________________

Personally Known Produced Identification

Type of Identification Produced

CHRISTh,E SHUGAR)

wIRES: February 5. 2017 MYCOMMJSSION. EE 871862


AFFIDAViT OF WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH

1. I, William Todd Overcash am over the age of 18. 2. I am a resident of Marion County. 3. I have been subjected to Legal Abuse causing the development of PTSDILega1

Abuse Syndrome 4. I have clear justified fear of the 5 " Judicial Circuit and Judge Gurrola 5. I have had the 5th Judicial Circuit not honor the Rules of Court, which has led to

added court costs due to 5th DCA filings that were clearly not warranted due to the Judge Gurrola's refusal to follow the law.

6. Judge Gurrola has created further fear in my, due to her ex-parte communications with Mark Shelnutt and attending an event with Mark - Shelnutt's wife, Lon Foultz, and Natasha Overcash/Sands and havmgx-paffe - gift and letter exchanges with Natasha

7. Judge Gurrola has conspired with Mark Sbelnutt to reach out to the Sthçircuit to pursue criminal charges and clearly evident after Mark Shelnutt rais the issue and proceeds to make false statements about the Marion County 4iA vs the Gainesville DA.

8. 1 have been advised by attorneys in Lake, Orange, Alachua Counties that ihe Marion County Courts are corrupt and that based on the rulings, that I have clearly, created a scenario where the intent is to "punish" Wm. Todd Overcash for exposing the courts actions and that they have seen this before.

9. Judge Gurrola is clearly biased and has clearly violated rules of law, falsely imprisoned me and inflicted emotional and physical abuse upon me.

lO.Judge Gurrola is clearly biased against men and I have been advised of cases in Lake and Citrus County.

11 .Attorney Beth Gordon has cited Judge Gurrola in hearing for violating Florida Law and Mark Shelnutt for sanctions.

12.1 have legitimate grounds for recusal and I am afraid of Judge Gurrola and the courts.

13.Judge Gurrola has now modified her 2013 Order that the 5 " DCA just ordered a re-hearing without notice and without hearing. This action further supports Intent by the court to inflict duress upon Wm. Todd Overcash.

14.Judge Gurrola false imprisonment, refusal to note Lori Foultz deposition in January 2013 where she stated that I was a good parent, where she "admitted" creating inappropriate restrictions upon Natasha to lead to PAS, and has falsely filed DCF reports, DCF failed to interview any of the parties that were prepared to testify to the false reports. Rather, Judge Gurrola in conjunction with Mark Shelnutt and the assistance of Judge Singbush, repeatedly falsely imprisoned Wm. Todd Overcash, financially "broke" Wm, Todd Overcash to the point that

4


I could not defend myself at any level, Emotionally inflicted Duress and PTSD, and even ordered me arrested prior to a hearing in 2013 when no standing arrest warrants existed and led to DURESS to the point that Wm. Todd Overcash was financially and emotionally unable to take further abuse by the courts and forfeited my right s to my daughter and Mark Shelnutt and Judge Gurrola stated that their attacks would stop. However, the attacks and ex-parte communications have continued. Clear judicial bias and failure of DCF to investigate and failure to prosecute the mother for false reports to the DCF, failure to interview and verify any facts of the case. Wm. Todd Orercash was judged as a horrible father and person without any factual evidence and to the contrary, clear evidence of Lori's to oppose the best interest of the child and to cause conflict and lead to PAS.

15.The mere fact that DCF and the child advocates state that if Natasha does not want braces that is all that matters is in direct conflict with the standards for raising a child and experts from Harvard University, Washington University, UNC Chapel Hill, Dr. Kirkpatrick of North Carolina, Dr. Crum are prepared to testify to the absolute disregard of standards for raising children.

16.This fear of the court and fear of the corruption of the court in conjunction with DCF and several other divisions of the State of Florida has been supported by the following attorneys who clearly have stated that the Marion County 5 th Circuit Court is corrupt and what is being done to me is retribution for demanding my parental rights and reporting illegal actions within central Florida:

Attorney Robert Rush

Attorney Beth Gordon

Attorney Robert Taylor

Attorney A. J. Rohe

Attorney Paul Linder

Attorney Portwood

Florida bar Investigator Walt Tuller

Attorney Richard Levenstien

Attorney Alexander Sessums

I request immediate recusal of Judge Gurrola and the 5 1h Judicial Circuit.


Pursuant to 92.525 Florida Statues, under penalties of Perjury, I declare I have read the forgoing documents and that the facts stated therein are the truth.

May 2, 2014

Wm. d Qvercash, MD

14311 SE 128' ST.

Ocklawaha, FL 32179

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MARION

The forego ' ore me this < dtAozaf

of. 20(, by Known

Produced Identification produced Florida Driver's License

tate of Florida

(Notary Seal) 111NI

MY COMMMM # E $41713 .: h,

EXPIRES: ockbW L 2015


AppendixJ:

Frengelv.Frengel,880S.2dat764-5


29 Fla. L. Weekly 01384

880 S0.2d 763 District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

Carolyn R. FRENGEL, Petitioner,

V.

Daniel W. FRENGEL, Respondent.

No. 2D04-1845. I June 9, 2004.

Synopsis Background: In proceedings for dissolution of marriage, wife moved to disqualify judge from presiding over any further proceedings. The Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Monica L. Sierra, J., denied motion, and wife sought writ of prohibition.

[Holding:] The District Court of Appeal held that disqualification of trial judge was appropriate.


West Headnotes (2)

[1] Judges ' Bias and Prejudice

Disqualification of trial judge was appropriate, in proceedings for dissolution of marriage, where trial judge. gave parties' children her home telephone number and e-mail address during in camera interview, and children contacted judge by either or both methods and wpresscd veTY negative ièelings toward wiJè

surreptitious nature of co.mmun.icalions,together with conspiratorial tone used by children, would have prompted reasonably prudent person to fear that judge was no longer neutral by reason of her entering into confidential relationship with ehitdrex.

Determination of Objections

In considering a motion to disqualify, a trial judge cannot pass on the truth of the facts alleged and must view those facts from the perspective of the moving party.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*763 R. Ray Brooks, Tampa, for Petitioner.

Philip S. Wartenberg, Tampa, for Respondent.

Opinion

PER CIJRIAM.

Petitioner Carolyn R. Frengel (the mother) seeks a writ of prohibition against Circuit Judge Monica L. Sierra to disqualify her from presiding over any further proceedings in a dissolution action. We conclude that one of the facts alleged in the mother's motion to disqualify was legally sufficient, and the motion should have been granted. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue the writ of prohibition.

The mother and her husband, Daniel W. Frengel, (the father) have two children together a daughter who is fifteen and a son who is thirteen. The father filed a motion to permit the children to testify in camera pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.407 on the ground that "[i]ssues have been fairly raised by the pleadings of the parties relative

to the children's primary residence." 1 The court conducted a hearing on this motion on March 8, 2004, but decided to reserve ruling until after the completion of an evidentiary *764 hearing already scheduled for March 19, 2004, on

the parties' respective requests for temporary custody of the children. At that hearing, the judge concluded that she would conduct in camera interviews with the children in order b rule on the parents' requests for temporary custody. Although she gave both parties the opportunity to have a court reporter present to transcribe the interviews, both declined.

The mother filed her motion, to disqualify. Judge Sierra when-she discovered that during the March 19 in camera interviews with the children, the judge had given the children her telephone number and email address and invited the children to communicate with her. The mother alleges this occurred

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[21 Judges


29 Fla. L. Weekly D1384

without her knowledge. This apparently came to light when the mother found emails on her home computer that the children had sent to the judge during the first three weeks of April. The emails detailed the children's negative feelings

toward their mother. 2 They also referenced the children's attempts to contact the judge by telephone. There is also some indication in one of the emails that Judge Sierra had responded to an email from one of the children. The wife argues that because of these events, she fears that she cannot receive "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." See State

ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Ha. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939).

[1] In determining whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient, we review the motion's allegations under a de iwvo standard. As the Fourth District explained in Hayes v. State,

686 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), "[o]ur task on appeal is to determine the legal sufficiency of the motion based on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not. receiving a fair and impartial trial." We conclude that the wife's motion meets this standard and therefore the trial court should have granted her motion.

[2] In this case, the appearance of impartiality was destroyed by the alleged surreptitious nature of the trial judge's communications with the children. If the facts alleged by

the wife are taken as true, 3 the surreptitious nature of the communications together with the conspiratorial tone used by the children in those communications would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that the judge was no longer neutral because she had entered into a confidential relationship with the children, both of whom expressed very negative feelings toward the mother. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue the writ of prohibition disqualifying *765 Judge Sierra from further participation in this matter.


WHATLEY, STRINGER, and KELLY, JJ., concur.

Parallel Citations

29F1a. I_ Weekly D1384

Footnotes 1 We note that rule 12.407 addresses an entirely different situation than the one presented in this case. We do not intend to suggest by

this opinion that a judge hearing a custody or visitation matter may only conduct an interview with the parties' children if a motion is filed under this rule. We simply are relating the course of the proceedings below.

2 The content of the emails in question has been disclosed to both parties and was made a part of the record by the mother. If the parties were not already aware of the contents of the emails sent by the children, we do not believe it would be appropriate for us to disclose the contents of those communications to the parties through this opinion because the children clearly intended them to be private.

3 In reaching our conclusion in this case, we have not overlooked the father's response to the mother's petition. His response is largely devoted to contesting the facts alleged by the mother. Our task, however, is not to determine whose version is correct Our task is to determine whether the motion presented to Judge Sierra was legally sufficient In considering a motion to disqualify, a trial judge cannot pass on the truth of the facts alleged and must view those facts from the perspective of the moving party. Thus, the contrary factual allegations by the father are of no import to our analysis of the correctness of the ruling on the motion to disqualify. See City of Hollywood v. Wilt, 868 So.2d 1214 (Ha. 4th DCA 2004).

End of Document © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.


AppendixK

17January2013,Motiontorecuse

denied(“stricken”)6February2013


AppendixL

23May2013,Motiontorecusewith

requesttotransferoutside5thCircuit),

denied31May2013


AppendixM

MotiontoDisqualify4November2013,

denied(“stricken”)7November2013



7•

IN RE: The Former Marriage of:

WILLIAM T. OVERCASH,

Former Husband,

and

LORI A. FOULTZ,

Former Wife.

IN THE INTEREST OF:

OVERCASH, NATASHA (F) D013: 05-15-2001 Minor Child..

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTION OF A MINOR CHILD

NATASHA ELLANA PATON.

CASE NO.: 2002-DR-4655-FJ

_L -

• )

CASE NO.: 2013DP001 '- £- -J

C'r ),- _-,- - z

- r -,--

CASE NO.: 2013-DR-4392-FK

ORDER STRIKING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on WILLIAM T. OVERCASH's Motion to

Disqualify, filed November 4, 2013, and Notice of Filing Affidavit to Append the Motion for

Disqualification, filed November 5, 2013. The Court, having reviewed the file, the Motion

and Affidavit, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises

ORDERS AND ADJUDGES:

1. As to case 2002-DR-4655-FJ, Mr. Overcash is represented by counsel. Every

pleading and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 1

attorney of record. Rule 2.515(a), Fla. R. Jud. Admin. If a pleading is not signed it may be

stricken and the action may proceed as though the pleading or other paper had not been


served. Id. The instant motion is not signed by Mr. Overcash's attorney, therefore it is

STRICKEN.

2. As to case 2013-DP-0019, the case was closed on September 18, 2013 and this

court relinquished jurisdiction. The instant motion is therefore a nullity and is

STRICKEN.

3. As to case 2013-DR-4392, the final judgment was entered on November 1,

2013 and the case was subsequently closed. The instant motion is therefore a nullity and is

STRICKEN.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Marion County Judicial Center, Ocala,

Florida this ..7 day of November, 2013.

/&h 1AA Barbara Gurrola Circuit Judge


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail this :i,.. day of November, 2013 to:

Ann Melinda Craggs, Esq. P.O. Box 2405 Ocala, Florida 34478-2405

Mark Shelinut, Esq. 1404 E. Silver Springs Blvd. Ocala, FL 34470

Robert E. Taylor, Esq. 10014 N Dale Mabry Hwy Ste. 101 Tampa, Florida 33618-4426

William T. Overcash 14311 SE 128th St. Ocklawaha, FL 32179 C'

Kasey Garrido Judicial Assistant


AppendixN

MotiontoRecuse/Disqualify31January

2014,denied(“stricken”)12February

2014


.


Petitioner,

AND

LORI A. FOULTZ,

Respondent.


CASE NO.: 2002-DR-4,- :9 .

r\) ! -

p.

: -C-

C..) cr

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECUSEIDISQUA-LIFY

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Petitioner WILLIAM T. OVERCASH's

Motion to RecusefDisqualiy, filed January 31, 2014. The Court has reviewed the motion

and finds that it is legally insufficient and untimely. See 2.330(e), Fla. R. Jud. Admin.

Accordingly, the motion to recuse/disqualify is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Ocala, Marion County, Florida, this /0

day of February, 2014.

/A - J4~~r'v~ -- Barbara Gurrola Circuit Judge


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and c2rrect copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the below named individuals on the Ij day of February, 2014:

Robert Taylor, Esq. 10014 N. Dale Mabry Hwy., Ste. 101 Tampa, FL 33618

Mark Shelnutt, Esq. 1404 E. Silver Springs Blvd. Ocala, FL 34470

William T. Overcash 14311 SE 128th St. 0 ka ha, FL 32811

(_ Judicial Asistant

3-1q Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 291

AppendixO

MotiontoRecuse/Disqualify20February

2014,EmergencyPetitionforWritof

ProhibitionFifthDistrictCourtofAppeal

FiledandDenied


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

VV1LLIAM TODD OVERCASH,

Petitioner,

V.

LORI ANN OVERCASH N/K/A LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Respondent. I

DATE: February 24, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

CASE NO. 5014-0564

ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Prohibition, filed February 20, 2014,

is denied. Additionally upon consideration that Judge Sawaya is not currently assigned

any matter involving Petitioner that is pending before this Court, it is

ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Recuse Honorable Thomas D.

Sawaya, filed February 20, 2014, is denied as moot.

/ hereby certify that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the original Court order.

?aVVV-

4_F

PAMELA R. MASTERS, CLERK

cc:

Mark D.Shelnutt William Todd Overcash Hon.Barbara Gurrola


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

VV1LLIAM TODD OVERCASH,

Petitioner,

V.

LORI ANN OVERCASH N/K/A LORI ANN FOULTZ,

Respondent. /

DATE: February 24, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

CASE NO. 5D14-0564

ORDERED that the February 19, 2014 Notice of Appeal is treated as a

pleading in Case No. 5D14-564 and is stricken as duplicative.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the original Court order.

uOO ,..,',.

PAMELA R. MASTERS, CLERK

cc:

Mark D.Shelnutt William Todd Overcash Clerk Marion (2002-4655-DR-FJ)


Docket rage 1 01 1

Case Rejected Case Docket Logo ff

Help List Document Profile Support

Case No: 5D I I Search

14-0564

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH vs

LORI ANN OVERCASH N/K/A LORI ANN FOULTZ

View Date Type Pleading 03/13/201 Mandate - Disp. w/o Mandate

- 03/13/2011 Brief Returned Records 02/24/201 Disposition Denied

O2/24/201 Order Order Denying Original Petition

02/24/201 Order ORD-STRICKEN

02/ 21/ 2014 j Event Miscellaneous Docket Entry

! 02/20/2011 Notice Notice of Appeal Filed

02/20/2011 Motion Miscellaneous Motion

02/20/201 Letter jAcknowledgement Letter 1

O2/20/201 Petition Petition Filed

- 02/2O/2O1 Receipt ICase Filing Fee

http://edca.5dca.org/Docket.aspx?CaselD=19695 6/9/2014


AppendixP

MotiontoDisqualifyTrialJudge24

February2014,EmergencyMotionfor

ReconsiderationofPetitionforRecusalof

JudgeGurrolafiled,stricken

25February2014




Petitioner,

AND

LORI A. FOULTZ,

Respondent. /

CASE NO.: 2002-DR-4655

ORDER STRIKING PETITIONER'S MOTION

This cause comes before the Court on the Petitioner's motion, titled "Emergency

Motion for Reconsideration of Rehearing of Petition for Recusal of Judge Gurrola and

Emergency Reversal of Adoption by the Court Immediately Honoring the Order: Should

Any Part of the Agreement Fail, the Termination of Parental Rights Will Not Occur and

Honor the Order of Choosing from 3 Therapists of the Report Submitted by Dr. Susan Crum

and Removal of the Child from the Mothers Custody and Re-Unification Directed by Dr.

Crum in Consultation with Dr. Richard A. Warshack and Utilization of Family Bridges

Program and Banning DCF and Marion County Therapists from Being Associated with the

Reunification Process" filed February 19, 2014. This Court, having reviewed the file, the

Motion, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises hereby finds as follows:

A motion for rehearing is not the proper avenue for immediate review of whether a

motion to disqualify a trial judge has been correctly denied. See Sutton v. State, 975 So. 2d

1073, 1076 (Fla. 2008).

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, it is

Page lof2


ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

The Petitioner's motion is an improper motion and is STRICKEN as a nullity.

DONE AND ORDERED this .9day of February, 2014, Ocala, Marion County,

Florida.

Barbara Gurrola Circuit Judge


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the below named individuals on the '-1 day of February, 2014:

William Todd Overcash 14311 SE 128th St. Ocklawaha, FL 32179

Robert E. Taylor, Jr., Esq. 10014 North Dale Mabry Hwy. Suite 101 Tampa, FL 33618

Mark Shelnutt, Esq. 1404 E. Silver Springs Blvd. Ocala, FL 34470

lz~~' , !!=3 C' Judicial Assistant

Page 2 of 2


AppendixQ

15April2014,MotiontoRecuseJudge

GurrolaandMarionCounty

5thJudicialCircuit,Denied17April2014




Petitioner,

AND

CASE NO.: 2002-DR-4655

LORI A. FOULTZ,

Respondent.

ORDER STRIKING PETITIONER'S MOTION '

O -

This cause is before the Court on the Petitioner's Notification to tht aI 2

Motion to Recuse Judge Gurrola and the Marion County 5th Judicial Circuit, filei 1

2014 (see attached copy). This Notification/Motion does not contain a Certificate ofê4 ,e.

This ex parte communication is a violation of Rule 1.080(a), Fla. R. Civ. P., Rule 12.080;

Fla. Fam. L. R. P.; Form 12.914, Fla. Fam. L. R. P. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: The Petitioner's Notification to the Court and

Motion to Recuse Judge Gurrola and the Marion County 5th Judicial Circuit is STRICKEN.

DONE AND ORDERED this day of April, 2014, Ocala, Marion County,

Florida.

A4:t1A94.. Barbara Gurrola, Circuit Judge


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the below named individuals on the (P day of April, 2014:

Mark Shelnutt, Esq. William T. Overcash 1404 E. Silver Springs Blvd. 14311 SE 128th St. Ocala, FL 34470 Ocklawaha, FL 32179

C Judicial Assistant

Page 1 ofi \t30 Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 300

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,


IN RE: The Former Marriage of: CASE NO.: 2002-4655-DR-FJ

William T. Overcash,

Former Husband,

And

Lori A. Foultz,

Former Wife.

NOTIFICATION TO THE COURT AND MOTION TO RECUSE JUD GE

GURROLA AND THE MARION COUNTY 5 JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

WILLIAM TObD OVERCASH now comes to the court to notify the court

that Wm. Todd Overcash has had to undergo right shoulder surgery due

to injury exacerbated by his unwarranted arrest and injury inflicted by

the arresting officer and Judge Gurrola's refusal to follow the Law of

the State of Florida.

Please note the ruling of the 51h DCA on April 11, 2014.

Wm. Todd Overcash has suffered complications associated with the

surgery that resulted in large blood loss and has now developed


extreme hypertension in the documented range of 200/117 that is

secondary to injury and PTSD/Legal Abuse Syndrome.

Judge Gurróla's failure to recognize and follow the Laws as defined by

the Florida Constitution further confirms Judicial Bias and absolute

disregard or lack of knowledge of Florida Law.

This action and ruling clearly justifies immediate recusal of Judge

Gurrola and allows for either state or personal litigation of Judge

Gurrola for false imprisonment and for inflicting physical and emotional

damage to Wm. Todd Overcash.

Judge Gurrola had ex-parte communications with Mark Shelnutt via a

"hearing" where, Wm. Todd Overcash's legal representatives were

present and denied their right to be present which is a violation of both

State and Federal Law.

Judge Gurrola has ordered the "child support" hearing that was

conducted in a public venue as a sealed case and has refused Wm. Todd

Overcash the blue man from the "public hearing" which shows further

disregard for the law.

Judge Gurrola has violated the stated agreement that was detailed on

the record by Beth Gordon and has refused to review the psychological

report that reflects that the child has been subjected to parental

alienation and needs to be immediately removed from the mother.

Judge Gurrola's refusal to follow the law null and voids her "judicial

immunity" and warrants immediate arrest by the State of Florida and

subjects her to formal civil litigation.


Judge Gurrola should immediately issue recusal of her and issue an

apology for false arrest.

Wm. Todd Overcash has been attacked, harassed, embarrassed,

professionally and personally disgraced for his honoring his

requirement under Florida Law to Report Judge's for illegal. actions.

Wm. Todd Overcash was interviewed by the private investigator that

reviewed Judge Singbush on directionby the Florida Supreme Court.

Wm. Todd Overcash was required by law to report Mary Sawaya (sister

of 5th DCA Judge Sawaya) for practicing medicine on a false license.

Wm. Todd Overcash was required to report Judge Swigert's behavior in

court after learning that Judge Swigert was "doctor shopping" with Dr.

Kito's and Dr. Reynolds for excessive dosage and quantity of Class II

medications.

Wm. Todd Overcash is fearful of his life, safety, and further false

imprisonment by the court and financial assault and bankruptcy.

Judge Gurrola has failed to report Mark Shelnutt to the Florida Bar as

requested by both Wm. Todd Overcash and Beth Gordon per the

requirement of Judicial Reporting as outlined by the Florida Supreme

Court. Judge Gurrola's failure is either based on bias or lack of

knowledge of the law or refusal to honor the law. In either case,

immediate recusal is required of the judge under Florida Law.

Please note, that the Supreme Court Chief Judge was recently in Ocala,

FL and specifically addressed the requirement of Ethics and Integrity. It

is clear to regional attorneys; this lecture was a direction by the Florida

Supreme Court to "clean up the 5th Judicial Circuit".


Sincerely,

Wm. Todd Overcash, MD


AppendixR

2May2014,MotiontoRecuseJudge

GurrolaandMarionCounty

5thJudicialCircuit,Denied9May

2014



In re: The Former Marriage of

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, Former Husband,

and CASE NO.: 2002-DR-4655

LORI ANN FOULTZ f/k/a LORI ANN Ei xm OVERCASH, m

Former Wife. e oCr I ___

M ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO RECUSE o

., cJ1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the pro se Former Husband T19AA1 T.

OVERCASIFs Motion to Recuse Judge Gurrola and the Marion County 5th Judicial Circuit

filed May 1, 2014 and Amended Motion for Recusal of Judge Gurrola with Supplimentary

[sic] Addendum of Filing Caselaw Documents Showing Supporting Grounds for Recusal,

flied May 7, 2014. The Court has reviewed the motions and finds that they are legally

insufficient and untimely. See 2.330(e), FZcL R. Jud. Admin. Accordingly, both motions to

recuse are DENIED;

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Ocala, Marion County, Florida, this

day of May, 2014.

Barbara Gurrola Circuit Judge


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the below named individuals on the _9 day of May, 2014:

Mark Shelnutt, Req. William T. Overcash 1404 E. Silver Springs Blv 14311 SE 128th St. Ocala, FL 34470 Ocklawaha, FL 32811

JudicQAAsistant


AppendixS:

SupremeCourtJusticeSpeaksto5th

CircuitonProfessionalEthicsfollowing

thefilingofSC14-242


I

.-.)uprente Court of itoriba Office of the Clerk

500 South Duval Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927

JOHN A. TOMASINO CLERK

MARK CLAYTON CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

KAYS GODWIN STAFF ATTORNEY

PHONE NUMBER: (850)488-0125

www.floridasupremecourt.org

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NEW CASE

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2014

RE: WILLIAM TODD vs. LORI FOULTZ, ET AL. OVERCASH, ET AL.

CASE NUMBER: SC 14-242 Lower Tribunal Case No(s): 2002-4655-DRFJ; 2008-6397-CAG

The Florida Supreme Court has received the following documents reflecting a filing date of 2/4/2014.

Petition-All Writs

The Florida Supreme Court's case number must be utilized on all pleadings and correspondence filed in this cause. Moreover, ALL PLEADINGS SIGNED BY AN ATTORNEY MUST INCLUDE THE ATTORNEY'S FLORIDA BAR NUMBER.

tg cc: WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH CAROLYN TORREY

HON. DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN, CLERK HON. DAVID BRENT EDDY, JUDGE HON. DON F. BRIGGS, CHIEF JUDGE HON. BARBARA GURROLA, JUDGE

HON. VICTORIA VICTORIA L. ROGERS

D> Er,I ---,--) ..,_ --- • .

---"C) '-- .Ti .r...-,

=

-Ti

_ .....

..

4""

6()


:uprenie Court offlortba WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2014

CASE NO.: SC14-242 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2002-4655-DRFJ;

2008-6397-CAG

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, vs. LORI FOULTZ, ET AL. ET AL.

Petitioner(s)

Respondent(s)

Petitioner's petition for all writs jurisdiction was filed with this Court on February 4, 2014; however, said petition is not signed and is returned herewith for signature. Petitioner is allowed to and including February 25, 2014, in which to serve the signed petition to this Court.

All pleadings filed in this Court must contain a Certificate of Service stating the names and addresses of those served and, if served on an attorney, the name of the party that attorney represents. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.420. Your petition will not be submitted to the Court until you have filed a signed original and have served all respondents with a copy of the signed original and provided this Court with a proper Certificate of Service.

Failure to file the above referenced documents with this Court within the allotted time could result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the petition or striking of the petition.

Please understand that once this case is dismissed, it may not be subject to reinstatement.

A True Copy Test:

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-0 = .. .r.'

es__ r---

John A. Tomasino Clerk, Supreme Court

tg Served:

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH HON. DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN, CLERK HON. DON F. BRIGGS HON. VICTORIA L. ROGERS

CAROLYN TORREY HON. DAVID BRENT EDDY HON. BARBARA GURROLA Appendix William Todd Overcash’ Emergency Motion for Order to Show CausePage 311

z";)ttprt 4.e if ourt of WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2014

CASE NO.: 5C14-242 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2002-4655-DRFJ;

2008-6397-CAG

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH, vs. LORI FOULTZ, ET AL. ET AL.

Petitioner(s)

Respondent(s)

The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by the filing of a Petition for All Writs; however, said petition was not accompanied by the $300.00 filing fee or a proper motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis as required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(b). The filing fee is due and payable at the time of filing the petition. Petitioner is allowed to and including March 7, 2014 in which to submit the filing fee or a proper motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The petition will not be submitted to the Court until receipt of the above. Failure to submit the above referenced documents to this Court could result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the petition.

Please understand that once this case is dismissed, it is not subject to reinstatement.

A True Copy Test:

John A. Tomasino Clerk, Supreme Court

tg Served:

WILLIAM TODD OVERCASH CAROLYN TORREY HON. DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN, CLERK HON. DAVID BRENT EDDY, JUDGE HON. DON F. BRIGGS, CHIEF JUDGE HON. BARBARA GURROLA, JUDGE HON. VICTORIA L. ROGERS

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OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA William Todd Overcash, · PDF file12.06.2014 · IN THE...

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Transcript of OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA William Todd Overcash, · PDF file12.06.2014 · IN THE...