IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

-vs-

VELIMIR LUCIC

Defendant-Appellant

On Appeal from theCuyahoga County Courtof Appeals, EighthAppellate District

Court of AppealsCase No. CA 08 091069

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF APPELLANT, VELIMIR LUCIC

TERRY H. GILBERT (0021948)1370 Ontario Street, Suite 600Cleveland, OH 44113-1752(216) 241-1430

Attomey for Defendant-Appellant

WILLIAM D. MASON (0037540)Cuyahoga County ProsecutorJustice Center1200 Ontario StreetCleveland, OH 44113(216) 443-7747

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OFGREAT GENERAL AND PUBLIC INTEREST AND INVOLVESA SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

PROPOSITION OF LAW

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION BYIMPERMISSIBLY INFERRING THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE OF THEWEAPON BY FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S ARROGANT DEMEANOR"LEADS TO A NATURAL INFERENCE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THEGUN'S PRESENCE." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CONCLUSION ...................................................... 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

APPENDIX

Journal Entry and Opinion, State of Ohio v. Velimir Lucic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Journal Entry, State of Ohio v. Velimir Lucic, Denialof Motion for Reconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-9

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF GREAT GENERAL AND PUBLICINTEREST AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

The culpable mental state "knowingly" as defined in R.C. 2901.22 (B), while simple

in its language, is difficult to apply regarding a host of criminal offenses where knowledge

is a critical element. How this element is applied to the common offense of Carrying a

Concealed Weapon (R.C. 2923.12) - within a vehicle - is more problematic particularly

when the weapon is contained in an enclosed compartment.

In the context of this weapons offense, the trier of fact is faced with an unworkable

"knowingly" definition which speaks of the concept of being aware that certain conduct "is

likely to cause a certain result." When one is stopped in a vehicle, and a gun is found in

a glove compartment or center console, the idea of causing a result is not involved. While

in the same definition (second sentence), the evidence of knowledge is achieved with the

awareness that "such circumstances probably exist," this seems to suggest that evidence

less than beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to prove this necessary element. Such

ambiguity should be addressed by this Court.

As set forth in this Memorandum, there exists a dearth of appellate decisions which

clearly lay out what constitutes "knowingly" when a gun is found in an enclosed

compartment of a vehicle without an admission from the alleged offender, or other

evidence linking the gun to the offender. Can it be, as in the instant case, that one merely

operating a vehicle (with no evidence of ownership), and no evidence of connection to the

gun, be found to be knowingly concealing the gun? That appears to be the conclusion of

the Court of Appeals.

I

Because so many citizens own guns which are easily moved around, there is a

patent danger that innocent drivers - operating a vehicle in which others use or have

access to - may be stopped by law enforcement for a traffic offense, or have their vehicle

towed, and a gun is found. Practically speaking, the burden is on them to prove that they

had no knowledge that it was there because the assumption will be that if they are driving

the vehicle, they must have probably been aware of the gun's presence. In this case, the

Appellate Court rested their conclusion of sufficiency merely on the attitude and demeanor

of the Appellant when confronted about the manner in which he parked a vehicle.

From a constitutional standpoint, the legislative definition of "knowingly,"

incorporated into standard jury instructions, raises serious due process concerns. Under

the facts of this case, and in view of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the

Appellant and perhaps others could have been wrongly convicted by juries who are hard

pressed to reconcile the general concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and the concept

of being aware the circumstances "probably exist."

As noted, CCW is a common and frequent subject of prosecutions. There is a great

public and general interest to insure that the courts of Ohio fairly and justly apply this law

with clear and proper application of definitions for triers of fact. Moreover, the ambiguity

in the definition, especially when it refers to probability (similar to a preponderance of the

evidence standard), may have the effect of diminishing the state's long required and

sacrosanct burden of proof in criminal cases. Such concern poses a substantial

constitutional question.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant-Appellant, Velimir Lucic, was indicted in a one count indictment for

Carrying a Concealed Weapon in violation of Ohio Revised Code 2923.12, a felony of the

fourth degree.

The case proceeded to jurytrial before Judge Eileen T. Gallagher on November 20,

2007. At the close of the State's case, the Trial Court denied Defendant's Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure. On

November 21, 2007, the Trial Court denied the Defendant's renewed Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal. On November 21, 2007, a jury found Velimir Lucic guilty as charged of the

one-count of Carrying a Concealed Weapon.

The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals, Eighth Judicial District, on

February 21, 2008. That Court heard oral argument on January 13, 2009 and announced

its opinion on February 12, 2009 affirming the conviction. After a Motion for

Reconsideration was denied, the final appealable order was issued on March 12, 2009.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The Appellant, for purposes of this

Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, is willing to stipulate to the recitation of the

evidence as presented by the prosecution at trial and adopted by the Court of Appeals in

its decision. (see Journal Entry and Opinion, pp. 1-3.)

The salient facts are fairly straightforward. On April 19, 2007, Appellant, Velimir

Lucic, was parking a vehicle on West Sixth Street in Downtown Cleveland. A police

officer, Perkins, working off-duty security for a bar, observed Lucic make two u-turns and

then back into a parking spot while his right tire went up on the curb.

Perkins attempted to inform Lucic concerning the manner in which the vehicle was

parked and Lucic ignored the gesture and got back into the car "put it in drive and started

moving toward Perkins."

Perkins decided to issue a parking ticket and ordered Lucic to stop. Rather than

issuing a parking ticket, Perkins asked for a driver's license, to which Lucic responded that

"he didn't have one with him." At that point, he was placed under arrest for driving without

a license.

Another off-duty officer working security, Officer Loomis, came over to the scene

and conducted an inventory search incident to the arrest. He opened the center console

and found a loaded gun, at which point Lucic seemed surprised.

There was no evidence who owned the vehicle. There were no fingerprints

indicating Lucic's connection to the gun. There was no check on the ownership of the

weapon. There were no papers in the vehicle or console indicating an association with the

vehicle.

4

However, the Court found sufficient circumstantial evidence of knowledge of the

existence of the weapon based on the "evidence" that Lucic acted in an uncooperative

manner when first approached by Officer Perkins in connection with the parking issue. It

is this finding which Appellant urges the Court to accept this case for review as it

constitutes mere speculation that his demeanor points to the requisite knowledge from

which a jury could find knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

5

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION

PROPOSITION OF LAW:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION BYIMPERMISSIBLY INFERRING THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE OF THEWEAPON BY FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S ARROGANT DEMEANOR"LEADS TO A NATURAL INFERENCE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THEGUN'S PRESENCE."

The decision in this case is deeply flawed and must be reviewed by this Court in the

interest of justice. Essentially, the Court of Appeals found that Appellant had knowledge

of the existence of this weapon simply because he was alone driving the vehicle, and that

he acted arrogantly toward an off-duty police officer over a possible parking ticket. Such

logic goes against historic notions of what constitutes reliable circumstantial evidence and

further constitutes a marked break in precedent, particularly in the Eighth District, as to

what evidence is sufficient to prove knowledge.

The Court states: "Lucic's demeanor leads to the natural inference that he was

aware of the gun's presence." (Decision at p. 5.) The Court goes on to make a dramatic

leap in suggesting a multiple piling on of inferences: that questioning authority over his

parking is a display of arrogance; that his arrogance infers he is invulnerable; and that his

sense of invulnerability is somehow related to his possession of a powerful weapon. This

circular and bizarre logic requires review. How does the fact that someone questioning the

authority of an off-duty police officer over a parking situation lead to a "natural inference"

sufficient to permit a jury to find evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew there

was a gun in the console - without more?

Even with the standard requirement that the evidence be viewed in a light most

favorable to the State, the inferences from such evidence must withstand the scrutiny of

6

logic and common sense. The Appellate Court acknowledged the requirement that the

circumstantial evidence must make a fact more probable than any other. But the Court

places more weight on the circumstance of the Appellant's demeanor over the earlier

parking "confrontation" than with respect to his demeanor at the moment the gun was

found. Why was so much emphasis placed on the earlier interaction with Perkins than the

later reaction with Loomis when Lucic "seemed surprised" at the moment the gun was

produced - a circumstance which leads to more temporal and immediate connection to the

issue of knowledge?

Circumstantial evidence requires a reasonable inference to prove an element. As

stated in the syllabus of State v. Jenks (1991) 61 Ohio St.3d 259:

An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidenceto support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trialto determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the averagemind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevantinquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to theprosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elementsof the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979],443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.)

With all due respect, it is hard to fathom that Appellant's attitude about an off-duty

officer's request to move his car from a legitimate parking place leads an "average mind"

to find the essential element of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew there

was a gun in the vehicle he was driving. Even the fact that he was driving the vehicle

shortly before the search, or that he was the only one in the vehicle, doesn't change the

equation. The State never produced evidence as to the ownership of the vehicle or the

gun, or other evidence of knowledge. Yet, the Appellate Court simply made an assumption

based on speculation, and found that "reasonable minds could reach different

7

conclusions." State v. Dennis (1997) 79 Ohio St.3d 421. When the case law speaks of

circumstantial evidence as being no different than direct evidence in order to prove an

essential fact, the law never contemplated the availability of any and all possible inferences

within humankind's mental arsenal, but only reasonable ornatural inferences. There is a

limit as to how far the circumstances can go before the evidence is simply a reach. And

the Jenks decision does not prevent a reviewing court - in examining the record - to say the

evidence is fundamentally insufficient to support a conviction. It actually requires such an

analysis.

The key issue here is the culpable mental state "knowingly" as defined in Ohio

Revised Code 2901.22(B):

"A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware thathis conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certainnature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware thatsuch circumstances probably exist."

Itwould seem that the second sentence in the definition would be more appropriate

to the instant case to the extent that the State is able to prove that Lucic was aware that

the gun probably existed. Yet, the State only proved that he was the sole occupant driving

a car (of unknown ownership) with a weapon concealed in a console (of unknown origin),

and that he was uncooperative in connection with a parking issue, and that when the gun

was found, he acted surprised. The best inference that could be made under these

circumstances is that he might have known the gun was there. However, might have

known is quite different that probably aware. There are so many more likely scenarios: he

borrowed the vehicle momentarily to stop on West Sixth Street; someone else uses the

8

vehicle who put the gun in there; other people use the vehicle and forgot to tell him about

the gun; or someone set him up by planting the gun.

The danger here isthat.the evidence of knowledge as defined in Ohio Revised Code

2901.22(B) is so weak that the Appellate Court may be endorsing the conviction of a totally

innocent man.

The Court of Appeals opinion, as well as the Appellant, cited State v. Harris,

Cuyahoga App. No. 88765, 2007-Ohio-3916 as a guiding precedent. The Court suggests

that Harris is distinguishable because of Lucic's demeanor. But Harris makes a point of

raising circumstances not present which point to lack of knowledge. For example, Harris

"made no attempt to flee where guilty knowledge may be inferred, nor did he act nervous."

Id.

There was no evidence he "exercised dominion or control over the gun, and there

were no fingerprints or scientific evidence conducted that would have demonstrated

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly carried the gun." Id. The Court of Appeals

decision attempts to distinguish Harris by calling attention to Lucic's arrogance earlier on,

but not the later surprised reaction when the gun was found. The gun in Harris was much

closer and accessible ( leaning on its side against the passenger seat adjustment bar) than

in a console between the driver and passenger seats. And yet another panel of the Eighth

Districtfound insufficient evidence and discharged the Appellant in a similar case. In State

v. Duganitz, 601 N.E. 2d 642 (Ohio App. 8th Dist., 1991) the Court refused to make an

inference that Duganitz knew the gun was in the seat because he was out looking for crack

cocaine. But here, the Court made the adverse inference because Lucic was

uncooperative over a parking issue.

9

CONCLUSION

This case presents an opportunity for the Court to consider the application of the

mental state of "knowingly" as defined in the Ohio Revised Code, and particularly in the

context of the frequent encounters police have with operators and occupants of vehicles

which contain a concealed weapon. The tendency of some courts to find the evidence

sufficient simply because the gun may be in reach and the defendant is driving the vehicle

can result in wrongful convictions. Standards forthe application of the "knowingly" definition

need to be clarified by this Court. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant asks this Court to

accept jurisdiction in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

FRIEDMAN & GILBERT

TERRY H. GILBERT (0021948)1370 Ontario Street, Suite 600Cleveland, OH 44113-1752(216) 241-1430

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellant Velimir

Lucic has been sent by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 24" day of April, 2009, to

William D. Mason, Esq., Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, at his office, Justice Center, 1200

Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

11

APPENDIX

MAR 12 2009

C i1ltC# Af AppEE[la IIf C04iQ

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINIONNo. 91069

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

VELIMIR LUCIC

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT:AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from theCuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-495692

BEFORE: Rocco, P.J., Boyle, J., and Celebrezze, J.

RELEASED: February 12, 2009

JOURNALIZED: MAR 1 2 2009 CA08091069 56473691

11I^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ 111N

v00677 300615A-1

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Terry H. GilbertFriedman & Gilbert1370 Ontario Street, Suite 600Cleveland, Ohio 44113

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. MasonCuyahoga County Prosecutor

BY: Kevin R. FiliatrautAssistant Prosecuting AttorneyThe Justice Center1200 Ontario StreetCleveland, Ohio 44113

FII.EID AND JOURNALIZEDPER APP. B. 22(E)

MAR 12 2009GERALD E. FUE ST

BYERK OF 1^ Q T. - APPEALSa_s` 1^7^°_,_,(_' DEP.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISTONPSR APP. P. 22I<s, 22i3l nAND 261A1

Rxi+..e:.Y i'iL

F1t3 'I 2 zuUy

Gc.yAI.D E. fy ERSTCLERK CIrT E GAUAIT Cf APPEALSBY ^^r^C DEP.

CA08091069 55954705

1111111111111111111111111111111111111 INII11111111N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D)and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and will become thejudgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion forreconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days ofthe announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the SupremeCourt of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcementof decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct. Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1).

V6W 6 7 1 'PGO 6 15 A-2

-1-

KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Velimir Lucic appeals from his conviction after a jury

found him guilty of carrying a concealed weapon.

Lucic presents one assignment of error. He argues his conviction is not

supported by sufficient evidence, on the basis that the state failed to prove the

element of knowledge.

Viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, this court must disagree. Consequently, his conviction is affirmed.

The state presented the testimony of three Cleveland police officers at

Lucic's trial. Officer Carl Perkins stated that on the night of April 19, 2007, he

was working as security for a bar on West 6th Street.

As Perkins stood outside the entrance, he "observed a black Mercedes Benz

traveling northbound. The operator made a U-turn and attempted to park his

vehicle on the opposite side of the street, and he was unable to negotiate into the

parking space. He then made another U-turn, came around to [Perkins'S] side

of the street. There was a parking space right in front of where [Perkins] was

standing. However, there was another car that was preparing to park there. He

pulled in front of that car, and then he backed up and sped in real quick to get

into the parking spot. And in doing so, his***right rear tire went up on the curb

and ended up on the sidewalk."

yota 6 7 !0 6 17 A-3

-2-

The driver, appellant Lucic, exited his vehicle to walk across the street.

Perkiris indicated that, although U-turns were not permitted, he nevertheless

approached Lucic, identified himself as a Cleveland police officer, and merely

asked Lucic to move his vehicle off of the sidewalk. Lucic refused, asserting that

he was not required to comply because Perkins was "off duty."

Perkins repeated his request, and this time Lucic demanded to know why

he needed to move his car. Perkins moved toward the front of Lucic's vehicle,

offering to show him how far onto the sidewalk his tire encroached. Rather than

cooperating with Perkins's gesture, however, Lucic reentered his car, started it,

"put it in drive, and started moving toward [Perkins]."

Perkins had decided by then to issue a parking ticket to Lucic, thus, he

ordered Lucic to stop what he was doing and to produce his driver's license.

Lucic stated that he "didn't have one" with him. Perkins told Lucic to exit the

vehicle, and informed Lucic he was "under arrest for driving without a license."

Once again, Lucic refused to comply, stating Perkins was "off duty."

The situation taking place between Perkins and Lucic had attracted the

attention of Perkins's colleague, Det. Stephen Loomis, who also was working as

security for the bar that night. Loomis joined Perkins and added his order to

exit the vehicle; this time, Lucic did so.

As Perkins escorted Lucic to the other side of the vehicle to show him why

vM9 6 7 7 'Po 0 618 A-4

-3-

he was being cited for the initial parking violation as well as for driving without

a license, Loomis began "to inventory the vehicle in connection with the tow

incident to [Lucic's] arrest." When Loomis opened the center console, he found

a handgun.

Alarmed by the discovery, Loomis immediately rushed over to Lucic and

placed him in handcuffs. Loomis testified that, as he informed Perkins of the

find, in Loomis's opinion, Lucic "seemed surprised that it was in the car."

The gun, a Taurus nine millimeter semiautomatic, carried a full magazine

of seventeen hollow-point bullets. A police ballistics expert tested the weapon

and found it was fully operable.

Lucic subsequently was indicted on one count of carrying a concealed

weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12. His case proceeded to a jury trial. After the

state presented the testimony of the police officers, the trial court denied Lucic's

motion for acquittal. Lucic elected to present no evidence and renewed his

motion for acquittal, which again was denied. The jury ultimately found Lucic

guilty of the offense.

Lucic appeals from his conviction with the following assignment of error.

"I. The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for

judgment of acquittal for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of

R.C. 2923.12."

voLJ6 77 Po 0 6 I9 A-5

-4-

Lucic argues that since the state presented no proof either that he owned

the vehicle or that his fingerprints were on the gun, it failed to prove an

essential element of the offense, i.e., that he "knowingly" possessed a weapon;

therefore, the trial court should have granted his motions for acquittal. As

authority for his argument, he cites State v. Duganitz (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d

363. This court cannot agree.

A defendant's motion for acquittal should be denied if the evidence is such

that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to whether each

material element of the crimes has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 1997-Ohio- 372; State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio

St.3d 259; State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261. The trial court is

required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. State v.

Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172.

Thus, circumstantial evidence alone may be used to support a conviction.

Jenks, supra. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of certain facts from which

a jury may infer other connected facts that usually and reasonably follow

according to the common experience of mankind. Duganitz, supra at 367. "[T]he

circumstances, to have the effect of establishing an allegation of fact, must be

such as to make the fact alleged appear more probable than anyother; the fact

in issue must be the most natural inference from the facts proved." Id.

veLO677 R00620 A-6

-5-

Lucic was charged with violating R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), which states in

pertinent part that, "No person shall knowingly carry or have***concealed ready

at hand***a handgun***." This court has held that the state can establish this

offense by presenting evidence of constructive possession. State v. Tisdel,

Cuyahoga App. No. 87516, 2006-Ohio-6763, ¶26. Moreover, pursuant to R.C.

2901.22(B), a person acts "knowingly" when he is aware that his conduct will

probably be of a certain nature. In re: D.S., Cuyahoga App. No. 88709, 2007-

Ohio-3911, 114.

The state's evidence demonstrated that Lucic was alone in the vehicle,

thus, no one else had access to it. State v. Herring (May 14, 1992), Cuyahoga

App. No. 60460; cf, State v. Harris, Cuyahoga App. No. 88765, 2007-Ohio-3916.

Furthermore, according to Perkins, from the time he first observed Lucic, Lucic

conducted himself with an arrogant attitude. Lucic's comments indicated not

only that he considered an "off-duty" police officer as impotent, but that he

considered himself invulnerable.

Unlike the defendant in Harris, Lucic's demeanor leads to the natural

inference that he was aware of the gun's presence. Rather than conducting

himself in a cooperative manner, his knowledge that he had a powerful weapon

nearby allowed him to act arrogantly toward an "off-duty" police officer. This,

together with the fact that the gun was found to be within his easy reach as he

1'&O 677 P:On6Z 1 A-7

-6-

was driving, alone in the car, distinguishes this case from the facts presented in

both Harris and Duganitz.

When the. evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

this court cannot find that the trial court erred in denying Lucic's motions for

acquittal. Accordingly, his assignment of error is overruled.

Lucic's conviction is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KENNETH A. ROCC"Ch, PRESIDING JUDGE

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS;MARY JANE BOYLE, J., CONCURS INJUDGMENT ONLY

VRLG 6 7 7 PaO 6 2 2 A 8

(fnurf nf Appettls af @4tu, +.EYq4fi4 :45tstrtctCounty of Cuyahoga

Gerald E. Fuerst, Clerk of Courts

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee COA NO. LOWER COURT NO.91069 CP CR-495692

COMMON PLEAS COURT-vs-

VELIMIR LUCIC

Appellant MOTION NO. 418834

Date 03/12/2009

Journal Entry

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO EITHER

POINT OUT AN OBVIOUS ERROR IN THIS COURT'S DECISION OR RAISE AN ISSUE NOT FULLY

CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT. REASONABLE AND NATURAL INFERENCES FROM THE

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE CASE WERE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE

APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

RECEIVED FOR FILING

MAR 122009GERALD E. FUERST

CLERK OF OURT OF APPEALSBYm®°_ j^^-.m,._._.® D E P.

Judge MARY J. BOYLE, Concurs

Judge FRANK D. CELEBREZZE JR., ConcursPresiding Judge KEI4NETH A. ROCCO