Oehler - Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952

7/26/2019 Oehler - Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952

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Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952Author(s): Klaus OehlerSource: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter, 1981), pp. 25-35Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319900.

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2/12

Notes

on the

Reception

f

American

ragmatism

n

Germany,899-1952*

Klaus Oehler

I.

Contact

quickly

arose

between

the

American

pragmatists

nd

German

scholars,

whether

by

correspondence

or

through

personal

encounter.

James,

or

example,

was in touch with Ernst

Mach,

Wilhelm

Wundt

and

Wilhelm

Jerusalem.

His

contact with

Jerusalem

was

to contribute

much

to thedissemination f pragmaticthought n Germany.

Jerusalem

was

born

in

1854

in Bohmen. After

studying

classical

philology

n

Prague

he

taught

at a

gymnasium.

In 1891 he

completed

his

habilitation

at

the

University

of

Vienna

and,

after

29

years

as

a

university

teacher

there,

was made associate

professor

of

philosophy

and

education

in

1920.

In his

autobiographical

Selbstdarstellung1

Jerusalem

roudlyneglects

to

mention he

political

circumstances

espon-

sible for

his belated

preferment.

His

philosophical

hinking

was

influenced

at an

early tage

by Spencer, eading

to

a

biological

conception

f

psychical

processes

nd in

particular

of

knowledge.

This

tendency

was

reinforced

through

he

influence f Ernst

Mach,

who

was

appointed

to the

chair in

Vienna in

1895,

and

integrated

with

genetical

and

sociological

elements

in

Jerusalem's

hinking.

In his

epistemology,

erusalem

ingled

mainly

phenomenalism

nd

apriorism

ut for attack.

He

saw

logic

as a

general

methodology

f

dunking,

the

purpose

of which

is

to discover a formal

description

f

thought

s it

actually

occurs in

scientific

nd

pre-scientific

experience.

He

termed his

project

empirical

ogic .

In

1905

his

book,

Der kritische dealismusuni die

reine

Logik

provided

subtle

ustification

for

Jerusalem's

rejection

of

critical idealism

and

pure logic.

In

Germany,whereuniversity hilosophywas dominatedby neo-Rantianism,

Jerusalem's

all went unheard. But not

in

England

and

America. In his

Selbstdarstellungy

erusalem

ells us

that

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3/12

26 Klaus Oehler

Prof. F. C.

S.

Schiller

published

an article

n the

International

Journal

of

Ethics,

in

which

he said

that

my

conception

of

the

process

of

knowing

and

of truth

was

closely

related

to

the

views

of

the

pragmatists.

And

when

William

James,

with

whom I

had

been

corresponding

or

a

long

time,

sent

me

his

book

on

pragmatism

in

April

1907

I

at once decided

to

translate t

myself

into

German,

a

plan

which

Ernst

Mach

encouraged

me

to

carry

out. The

translation

ppeared

in

the

same

year,

making

pragmatism

nownin

Germany.

Later,

in

1926,

similar

considerations

ad

led

Jerusalem

o

bring

out

a

German

edition of

Lvy-BruhPs

Les

Fonctions

Mentales

dans

les Socits

Infrieures.

Finally,

the

Selbstdarstellung

nforms

us,

he

was

planning

a

sociological

critique

of

human

reason

in which he

wanted

to

be

able

to

describe

the

complex

relationships

etween

knowledge

and

society .

He

died in

Vienna in

1923.

Wilhelm

Jerusalem

was

one of those

philosophers

who are

out

of

step

with the age in which they live. His criticismsof epistemological

idealism,

of

phenomenalism

nd

apriorism,

nd his

biological

and socio-

logical

approach

to

cognitive

processes

marked

him

off,

at least

within

the

German-

peaking

world,

as

one of

the

isolated

precursors

nd

path-

finders

f a

movement hat

would

be

able to

find

a

foothold

n German

philosophy

nly

decades

later. His translation f

James*

ragmatism:

A

New

Name

for

Some Old

Ways

of

Thinking

s one of

the

indispensable

tools

of

German

James

cholarship.

What

might

be

described

s

the official

tarting

point

of

pragmatism's

influence

n

Germany

was

the III

International

Congress

for

Philosophy

held from1 to 5 September,1908, in Heidelberg,with Windelbandas

president.

Pragmatism

was

the

main

object

of

discussion,

unning

ike

a

red thread

through

all

sections,

as is

shown

by

the

proceedings

f

the

congress,

which

were

published

n 1909.2

After Windelband's

address,

Josiah

Royce,

from

Harvard,

who

had been

strongly

influenced

by

Peirce,

gave

the

opening

paper

on

the

subject

of The Problem

of

Truth

in

the

Light

of

Recent

Discussion . In

spite

of the fact that

Royce's

paper

mentionsPeirce

several

times,

and

names

him

as the

founder of

pragmatism,

t

was not

Peirce's

pragmatism

hat

was

discussed,

but that

of

James,

Schiller

and

Dewey

-

Jamesattracting

the

most

attention.

In

his

paper,

Royce

describeshis

philosophy

s

absolute

pragmatism by

which

he means

-

so

Jerusalem

ays

in his

remarks n

Royce's

paper

-



4/12

Notes on ReceptionofAmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 27

a

voluntaristically

nterpreted oncept

of truth. As we leaf

through

the

pages

of

the

congress

report,

we

find

contributions

rom

Baldwin,

Ladd

Franklin, Lask,

Schiller,

Armstrong

and

Jerusalem.

Paul

Cams,

editor

of the Monist is

also

represented

with a

paper

in which

he makes

a

sharp

division

between

Peirce and the other

pragmatists.

As

a

result

of the 1908

Heidelberg

philosophy

ongress,

pragmatism

became known within

German

philosophy

and stimulated

lively

dis-

cussion.

Among

the

firsttreatmentswere

Ludwig

Stein's

essay

Prag-

matism 3 nd Gnther

Jacoby's

Der

Pragmatismus.

Neue Bahnen in der

Wissenscbaftslehre

es Auslands.

Eine

Wrdigung*

Jacoby,

at the

time

a

young

teacher

of

philosophy

t

the

University

of

Greifswald,

wrote

in the

foreword f his

book:

For

years

pragmatism,

with its unusual

concept

of

truth

has

been the source

of

controversy

n

Anglo-American

philosophy,

and more

recently

also in

Germany. Ultimately

the

debate

resolves

nto

a

disagreement

bout

words. It is

essentially

matter of indifferencewhetherwe associate one opinion or

another with

the word

truth . On the other

hand,

it is

not

a

matter

of

indifference hich criteria we

adopt

for

making

assertions:

we

can

judge

them

to

be

true or false. This holds

especially

for scientific

ropositions.

Pragmatism

s

by

nature

a

theory

of science. The aim

of

this

work is

to transform

the

dispute

over the

pragmatic concept

of

truth

into

a dis-

cussion

of

the

pragmatic

conception

of

science. It

is

an

expression

of

the

conviction

that

the

pragmatic

theory

of

science s

meaningful

nd

fruitful:

though

admittedly

ts

scope

can onlybe estimated fter t has been tested n practice.

The

outbreak of World War I

abruptly

broke

off the

development

of

the

pragmatism

ebate

that

had

begun

to

spread

through

Germany

n

the

pre-war

years.

The fact that

it was not

resumed

fter

the war

is

one of

the

most

significant

acunae in the

history

of

German

philosophy.

Instead

of a

productive exchange

of ideas

there

arose

a

long

chain of

misunderstandings

nd

misconceptions

f

American

pragmatism,

rigi-

nating

from

some of

the most

eminentGerman

philosophers,

nd

passed

on with

an

amazingly

uncritical

self-assurance

o

others.

The most fateful role was

perhaps

that

played

by

Max

Sender's

influential

reatise Erkenntnis

und

Arbeit.

Eine

Studie ber

Wert

und



5/12

28 Klaus Oehler

Grenzendes

pragmatischen

otivs n der Erkcnntnis

er

Welt .5

Although

Scheler

discusses

Peirce's

pragmatic

maxim,

there

is

every

reason

to

suppose

that

he knew

only

the

Jamesian

version

and

had not

actually

read

Peirce.

But

even

Scheler's

critique

of

James

s now

desperately

n

need

of

revision,

and

his assessment

f

pragmatism

n

general

betray

prejudices

against

American

culture that were

typical

of

cultivated

Europeans

n

the

twenties,

igns

of a resistance owards

the

strange

and

the

unfamiliar

n

as far

as

it

threatened o

expose

the

presuppositions

n

which theirown

position

rested. This remained

typical

of the German

attitude

to

pragmatism

between the wars.

Of

course,

there

were

ex-

ceptions.

Gustav

Mllcr's

account

of Peirce's

thought

n the

Archiv

fr

Geschichteder

Philosophies

93

1,8

shows

not

only

insight

nto

the

struc-

ture of

Peirce's

logic

and

metaphysics,

but

also discovers

links

with

German

thought,

n

particular

with

Hegel, Schelling

and

the

romantics,

which

might

have done

much

to clear

the

way

for

a more

sympathetic

Peirce

reception.

In

practice,

exceptions

such as this

had little

effect

on

the main

development.

Not even the comparativelybundantsupplyof translations f works

by pragmatists

was

sufficient

o induce a

change.

James'

The Will

to

Believe

and

Other

Essays

in

Popular

Philosophy

had

appeared

as

early

as

1899 in a

translation

by

Thomas Lorenz. In

1907 there

followed

the

translation

nto

German

of

James'

Varieties

of Religious

Experience

by

Georg

Wobbermin and

in

1914

A

Pluralistic Universe.

F. C. S.

Schiller's

Studies in

Humanism

appeared

n

translation

by

Rudolf

Eisler

as

Humanismus:

Beitrdge

zu

einer

pragmatischenPhilosophie.

Several

works

by

John

Dewey

were

also

translated

nto German

immediately

after

their

appearance

in

the

United

States.

Although

pragmatism

became betterknown as a resultof these efforts t was not destinedto

take

root

at

that

point

in

German

history.

The

most

prominent

victim

of

Scheler's

misguided

nterpretation

f

pragmatism

was Max

Horkheimer,

whose

critique

of

pragmatism

was

directly

nfluenced

y

Scheler.7

Like

Scheler,

Horkheimerhad

probably

read

nothing

by

Peirce.

The

impression

hat

Horkheimer

gave

when

teaching

was that

-

even

as

an

emigr

n

the

United

States

he had not

taken

American

philosophy

eriously.

That

this

was

a

characteristic

f

members

of

the

Frankfurt

School has

been

confirmed

y

Martin

Jay's

The

Dialectical

Imagination.0

In New

York

the

Institu

pursued

a

policy

of

separatism,

motivated

by

a

need

to

maintain

ts

own

identity

and

survive as a

consciously

German

entity.



6/12

Notes on ReceptionofAmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 29

The Institutes utsider

tatus,

despite

ts

connectionswith such

prestigious

enefactors

s Columbia

University

nd the

Ameri-

can

Jewish

Committee,

was thus secure.

The costs this entailed

were obvious.

Although

often n some

contact

with

the

regular

faculty

at

Columbia,

the FrankfurtSchool remained

generally

outside the

mainstream of American academic

life.

This

allowed it to

make

assumptions,

uch

as

the

equation

of

prag-

matism with positivism,that lacked complete validity. It

also cut

the Institut off from

potential

allies

in

the

American

intellectual

tradition,

uch as

George

Herbert Mead.9

As

though by way

of

compensation,pragmatism

particularly

as

taught

by

James

and

Dewey

-

found

an echo

which has

gone

almost

unnoticed until the

present day,

but

which was nonetheless

mportant,

in

Arnold Gehlen's Der

Menscb. Seine

Natur

uni

seine

Stellung

in

der

Welt.10 Two

years

previously

there

had

appeared

E.

Baumgarten's

Der Pragmatismus. . W. Emerson,W. James, . Dewey (1938), a

comprehensive

nd

informative

tudy

on which Gehlen

was able

to draw.

Gehlen was induced

to

look

upon

pragmatism

s

an

ally by

the

fact

that

t attributed central

philosophical

mportance

o action.

The idea of

pragmatism

was to be conceived

ater

on,

by

Mach

and Sorel for

example,

independently

f the

American

move-

ment

beginning

with

Peirce

in

1878;

in

fact there s

a

strong

basis

for

t in Aristotle

nd above

all in

Hobbes.

As

pragmatism

is the only philosophyto date that fundamentally ees man

as a

being

that

acts,

its

standpoint

is,

at least

at

present,

preferable

o

any

other.11

Correspondingly,

ehlen sees

a

major

step

forward

n

the

basic

prag-

mtist thesis

that

all

psychical

processes,

ncluding

the

pre-linguistic

ones,

are

communicative

n nature.

James9

dentification f

mental

processes

with action

involving

the

anticipation

of ends

and

means

is

extended

by

Dewey,

in

as

far

as

he shows

that

this

anticipation

s not

an

isolated

process,

but

that the basic structure

f

all mental

phenomena

is

action directed

towards another.*'12

A reference

o Mead would have

been

appropriate

here.

There is no doubt

that

Gehlens

Der Mensch is



7/12

30 Klaus Oehler

the

first

large-scale

application

of

pragmatic

principles

in German

thought.

It

is

genuinely

pragmatic;

it

was born from

the

spirit

of

pragmatism.

In the

thirties here

were

already

isolated

signs

of the

beginning

of

a

new

phase

in

the

reception

of

pragmatism

n

Germany

which

has

continued

until

the

present

day.

Its

main

discovery

has been

that

Charles

Sanders

Peirce

was

the true

father of

American

pragmatism.

At

the

beginning

of

this

new

development

we find Heinrich Scholz's

review

of the firstfive volumes of Peirce's Collected

Papers

in the Deutsche

Literaturzeitung 1934,

1936).

There

followed

n 1937

a short

article

in the

Deutsches

Aielsblatt.

The

author was

Jrgen

von

Kempski,

and

the

appearance

in

1952 of his

book

Charles

S.

Peirce

uni der

Prag-

matistnus13

arks

the real

beginning

f the modern

phase

n the

reception

of

pragmatism

n

Germany.

Since

then,

James,

Dewey

and

Schiller

have

come

to

be

judged

increasingly

n relation to

Peirce.

II.

That the receptionof pragmatism, nd particularly eirce's thinking,

should

-

with

the above

noted

exceptions

-

have

proved

such

a

laborious

process

in

Germany

is

not without

irony.

Some

years

ago,

Heidegger's

Sein uni Xeit

(1927)

was

translated nto

English,14

making

his

existential

ontology

accessible to American

philosophers

s

a whole

for the

first

ime.

Since then it has

been

interesting

o note

that

many

of

them

have

reacted

by

pointing

out

the similarities

etween

this

form

of

existential

philosophy

nd

pragmatism

s

it

arose

and

developed

in

America.

This

is

not

the

result

of

a

misconception

n

the

part

of

the

Americans. Over

forty years

ago, qualified opinion

-

particularly

among emigrantGerman philosophers had drawn attentionto this

parallelism,

nd

many today

still believe that

the sensational

reception

accorded to

Heidegger's

book

by

the

German

philosophical

world

n 1927

would have

been

tempered

-

without

detracting

from

Heidegger's

achievement had

Germans

been more familiar with

the

pragmatist

tradition. The

material ink

between

Peirce's

pragmatism

nd

the more

recent existentialist

movement,

founded in

Heidegger's

existential

ontology,

is

the central

importance

attached to the

analysis

of

pre-

scientific

xperience.

Both

Peirce and

Heidegger

view

subjectivity

not

through

he

mirror f

epistemological

eflection,

ut as

-

in a

Heideg-

gerian

German - Dasein in

language

and

history.

This means that

Peirce,

like

Heidegger

after

him,

can be found

posing

the

question

of



8/12

Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 31

the

meaning

of

existence,

nd that Peirce sees

reality

not

as

the

anti-

thesisof

subjectivity,

ut

as

something

hat is

always

already

mediated

by

the

sign

process

(semiosis).

The hermeneutic

language

in

which

Heidegger expresses

himself

should not

be allowed to

disguise congruence

with

pragmatist

hinking

at

many points.

Heidegger's

ntention

n Sein und

TLeitwas to renew

the

question

of the

meaning

of

existence,

question

that is

already

somehow

understood

whenever

t

becomes

a

topic

of conversation.

There is

always

an

average

understanding

hat dominates he

question,

nd the

problem

is

to

recognize

this,

and see

through

t. Existence must

be

questioned

with

regard

to

its self

evidence,

the

multiplicity

f

meanings

through

which

existence

perceives

entities must be

made

explicit.

It is

through

the

manifold

significance

f entities

that

the

constitution

of

existence

becomes

xperience,

nd

hence

experience

ecomes

the

possibility

f

relat-

ing

to

the

world,

the

possibility

hat determines

he

perspective

under

which the

world

reveals tself

to

me.

Within

the

circle

of

this

question-

ing, knowledge

s

absorbed

as a

process

of

self-understanding

hrough

things. Knowledge occurs through nterpretation ithinsituations; t

does

not seek

itself,

t

is not for

its

own

sake;

its

concern

s

to act

ade-

quately

to

situations,

o

know

one's

business

where

he

business

s com-

mon

property.

Dasein can be

interpreted

nd

reinterpreted

ndefinitely.

The future reveals

a

new

reality,

nd

in the

light

of

a new

reality

the

past

also

takes on a new

appearance.

While

travelling

orward

nto

a new

reality

n the

future,

man is

at

the

same

time on

his

way

into

a new

past.

As existence s illuminated

n this

way,

truth

comes

into

being.

Not

just

the individual

s individual

s

involved,

but also

the other

as other.

It

is,

perhaps,

n the decisive

significance

ttached

to the

other

in

the

inter-

pretation f Ufethatpragmatismndexistentialismavemost n common.

Knowledge

is

always

situated

within

a horizon

that

is not

itself

determinable

n terms f

knowledge.

This

is

what

Heidegger

has

in

mind

when

he

says

that

knowledge

s

a founded

mode of

Being-in-

he-

world.

It

is

also

the

message

behind

pragmatic

relativism:

all

knowledge

is

relative to

a situation.

The truth value

of

knowledge

ies

in

the

clarifi-

cation of

situations,

n the fact

that

particular

operations

belong

to

particular

situations.

Pragmatism

has also

done

much

to

uncover

the

concealed

presuppositions

f

modern

science.

Long

before

Heidegger

it

had shown what sort of pre-scientificnd pre-philosophical xperience

of the world

must be

presupposed

f science

is

to

emerge.

This

level of

awareness

on

top

of

the

so-called

natural

standpoint

s

apriori,

but



9/12

32 Klaus Oehler

not

in the

way

assumed

by

classical transcendental

philosophy.

The

pragmatists

were

quick

to

see

that the

apriori

in

its full

scope

is not

simply

identical with

the conditions of

the

possibility

of

objective

knowledge

of

objects,

but that

this

also

implies

that

basic

understanding

which

life

has

prior

to

all

conceptual

determination

f

reality.

The

foundationof

existence occurs within the

sphere

of

this

understanding.

It

seems to me that

on this

basic

question

it

is indeed

justifiable

to

equate

the

teachings

of Peirce and

Heidegger.

It is thus not

surprising

hat an

important

ole is

played

in

pragmatic

idealism

by

the

interpretation

f

our

implicit

understanding

f

things.

For

Peirce this

applies

not

merely

o

the

critique

of

words

but to

trends

of

thought.

As his

paper

on

The Fixation of

Belief

shows,

the

historical

dimensionmust

be

absorbed within

philosophical

method.

In

Germany

this

method,

following Dilthey

and

Heidegger,

is

known

as

hermeneutics,

ut

its basic

characteristics ave

been

part

of

American

philosophical

thinking

for

at

least

a

century.

There is

even

a

case

to

be

made for

maintaining

that

the

historico-hermeneutical

mode

of

thoughthas been specificto Americanphilosophicalthinkingsince its

beginnings.

This

tendencymay

have

something

o do

with the

uniquely

American

synthesis

f

a

variety

f

European philosophical

nd

theological

traditions. t is

certain,

t

any

rate,

that

philosophical

hermeneutics

as

never been a German

monopoly,

and

it

can

be

argued

that

it

is

only

thanks

to

Peirce and

other

American

epistemologists

that

certain

anachronistic

figures

of

thought,

carried over from

Kantianism

into

Germanhermeneutic

hilosophy,eading

to

the

hypostatisation

f

language

as the

subject

of

history,

ave

been excised.

Language,

the structures

f

which are

continually

being

transformedn the course of

history,

must

also be seenas mediated. It was also Peirce who recognizedthe pressure

exerted

by

reality

n the

structure f

language:

the force or

resistance

f

external

nature,

and the

force

or

compulsion

of social

power

structures.

With

uncanny

insight

he describes in The

Fixation

of

Belief

the

methods

f total domination n a

way

that freeshim of

any suspicion

of

having

failed to

recognize

the

objective

frameworkwithin

which social

behaviour must

be understood

-

or of

sublimating

t to

a

politico-*

socially

neutral evel. The

American

pragmatists

were

always

well

aware

that

the

objective

framework n the basis of which

alone social

action

can

be understood

s constituted

by language,

work

and

power.

The

names of

Peirce,

James,

Dewey

and Mead

have

long

since

become

symbols

f

this

knowledgethroughout

he world. If

there eems

to

be

a



10/12

Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 33

need

today

to

bring

home to

German

philosophical

hermeneutics

hat

tradition s not an

absolute

power,

and

that

the real

problem

s to

make

tradition

omprehensible

ithin the

structure

f social

life,

so

that

we

can

give

conditions

outside tradition

ccording

to

which transcendental

rules

governing

the world view and action

vary empirically ,16

hen

it

only

serves s a reminder

f

how much German

philosophical

hermeneu-

tics could

long ago

have

learnt from the American

pragmatists.

nstead

their heories

ave

for

decades been

gnorantly

efamed

s

Americanism .

Just

how stubborn his

prejudice

s,

and how

deeply-rooted

n German

thinking,

n

example

will show. In

1966,

a

conversation

took

place

between Martin

Heidegger

and

the editor

of the German

weekly maga-

zine,

Der

Spiegel,

Rudolf

Augstein.

Heidegger

requested

that

the con-

versation hould not

be

published

during

his lifetime.

He saw

it as

an

opportunity

o answer criticisms

that

had

been made

of

his attitude

during

the Third

Reich

and to offer n

explanation

of his

behaviour.

The conversationwas

published

after his death

in 1976 under

the

title:

Nur noch ein Gott

kann

uns retten .18

Even

in this

final

statement,

made at the end of a long life, Heidegger was unable to resistde-

nouncing

the

Americans'

pragmatism ,

which he

identifies

with

posi-

tivism:

They [the Americans]

are still

caught up

in a

type

of

thinking

that,

as

pragmatism,

romotes

echnical

operation

nd

manipulation,

ut

at the same time bars the

way

to

an awareness

of the

specific

character

of modern

technology.

There

are,

nevertheless,

here

and

there in

America

attempts

being

made to break

away

from

pragmatic-positivist

thinking. 17

When he was in

Hamburg

in

1967

Heidegger

told

me

that

pragmatism

was

nothing

but

a

Weltanschauung

for

engineers

nd

not

for human

beings

n the full sense of

the word .

The

alignment

f

prag-

matismwithpositivisms typicalof the superficial iew of pragmatism

held

by

the German

middle-class

during

the

first

half this

century.

Hitler's hatred

of

Americanism

was a

perverted

form of

this

Anti-

americanism,

hich he

gave

vent

to in one

of his

monologues

n 1942

at

the

Fhrerhauptquartier :

I

have

a hatred and

an aversion of

the

deepest

sort

against

Americanism.

There

is not

a

single

European

state

with which one feels

ess

sympathy .18

Although

a new

picture

of

the

philosophy

f

American

pragmatism

has

developed

mong

informedGerman

philosophers

ince

the renaissance

of interestn Peirce, t would be unrealistic o assertthat for the mass

of

public

opinion

in

Germany

and

Europe

as a whole

the word

prag-

matism is

free of

prejudices.

To

the

average,

uninformed

mind,

it

is



11/12

34 Klaus Oehler

today

still

vaguely

associated with the

conception,

which

Heidegger

so

clearly

but

erroneously

ut

into

words,

of

something

hat

promotes

technical

operation

nd

manipulation,

ut

at

the

same time

bars

the

way

to

an

awareness

f the

specific

haracter

f modern

technology .

Anyone

who

knows

the

history

f

American

pragmatism

from Peirce

to

Dewey

will

realise that

just

the

opposite

s the

case.

Universitat

amburg

NOTES

*

Translator's

ote: This is

an

authorized ranslation f

a

text

based

on Klaus

Oehler's

ntroductions

o

the

Jerusalem

ranslation f

James'

Pragmatism

W. James,

Der

Pragmatismo:

Ein

Neuer

Name

fur

alte

Denkmetboden,

elix

Meiner

Verlag,

Hamburg

1977)

and to his

own translation f Peirce's

How to

Make Our

Ideas

Clear

(Charles

S.

Peirce,

Ueber

die

Klarbeitunserer

Gedanken,

ittorio

Klostermann

Frankfurtm

Main,

1968)

-

John

topford,

niversity

f

Hamburg,

xford

University.

1. WilhelmJerusalem,McincWege und Ziclc in RaymundSchmidt d., Die

Pbilosopbie

er

Gegenwart

n

Selbstdarstellungen,

II

(Leipzig:

Felix

Meiner

erlag, 922)

S3-9S.

2.

Bericht

ber

den

III.

Internationalen

ongress

r

Philosophic

u

Heidelberg

1.

bis

5.

September

908,

Th.

Elsenhans

d.,

(Heidelberg,

909).

3.

Ludwig

Stein,

Pragmatism

n Archiv

fur

Gescbicbte

der

Pbilosopbie,

XI,

1909

(Berlin:

Carl

HaymannsVerlag).

4.

Gnther

acoby,

er

Pragmatismo.

Neue Babncn n

der

Wissenscbaftslebre

es

AusUnds.

Eine

WrdigungLeipzig:

Drr,

1909).

5.

Max

Schei

r,

Erkenntnis nd

Arbeit. Eine

Studie

ber Wert

und

Grenzen

e*

pragmatischen

otivs in

der

Erkenntnis er Welt

in Die

Wissens

ormen

und

die

Gesellscbaft,Leipzig:Der Neue-Geist erlag,1926), 231-486.

6.

Gustar

Mller,

Charles

Peirce n

Archiv

fr

Gescbicbte

er

Pbilosopbie,

L,

1931

(Berlin:

Carl

Hermanns

Verlag),

227-238.

See also

E.

Waibel,

Der

Pragmatismo

hi

der

Gescbicbte

er

Pbilosopbie

Bonn,

19H)>

and Klaus

Oehler,

Ein in

Vergessenheit

geratener

eichen-theoretiker

es Deutschen dealismus:

Johann

Gottlieb

Fie

h

e

in

Zeicbenkonstitution.

kten

des

2.

Semiotiscben

olloquiums egens

urg,

A.

Lange-Seidl

ed.,

(Berlin:

De

Gruyter, 980), pp.

63-75.

7.

Cf.,

Max

Horkheimer,

Zum

Problem der

Vahrheit

(1935)

in Kritiscbe

Tbeorie,

(Frankfurt-am-Main:

.

Fischer,

968)

228-76 and

Zur Kritikder instru-

mentellen

ernunft

1947) (Frankfurt

m

Main:

S.

Fischer,

967).

8.

Martin

Jay,

The

Dialectical

magination:

A

History

of

the

Frankfurt

chool

and

the nstitute

f

Social

Research 923-1950

Boston:

Little,

Brown

nd

Co.,

1973).

9. Ibid.,p. 289.

10.

Arnold

Gehlen,

er

Menscb.

SeineNatur

und

seine

tellung

n

der

Welt

(Berlin:

Junker

nd

Dnnhaupt,

940).



12/12

NotesonReceptionfAmericanragmatismnGermany,899-1952 35

11.

Ibid.,

pp.

326f.

12.

Ibid., p.

18*.

13.

Jrgcn

on

Kempski,

harles

Sanders

Prirce

nnd der

Pragmatismus

Stuttgart:

Kohlhammer,

952).

14. Martin

Heidegger,

eing

and

Time,

tr.

John

Macquarrie

nd

Edward

Robinson

(Oxford:

Basil

Blackwell,

9*2).

If.

Jrgcn

Habermas,

Zur

Logik

der Sozialwissenschaften

n

Pb'tlosopbiscbe

Rundschau,

eiheft

,

1967,

179.

16. Der

Spiegel,

976,

No.

23,

pp.

193-219.

17. Ibid.,p. 214.

18.

Adolf

Hitler.

Monologe

m

FMbrerbauptquartier,

941-1944.

Albrecht

Knauer

Vcrlag,

Hamburg,

980,

tub 7.1. 1942.

Oehler - Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952

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