נר לאפרים בס"ד

Ki seitzei כי תצא

www.parshapages.com

For subscription to weekly emails send note to info@parshapages.com

Collection compiled hopefully for the elucidation of Torah

CONTENTS

Newlyweds for One Year

What is Nesuim

Joke Kiddushin in Halacha

Chalitzah

Why Does the First-Born Receive Double

Judgement of Death

Forty Lashes

Shulach haKein

Three Mixtures

Ox and Donkey

Reivis - Interest

Prohibition Against Delaying

Mitzvah of Returning a Lost Item

Ma’akeh

Meicher Keilev Questions

Destroying Amalek

Coinage

Selections from Rabbi Baruch Epstein

Selections from Baal haTurim

Selections from Ohr haChaim

Understanding the Parsha according to the Rebbe

NEWLYWEDS FOR ONE YEAR

כי יקח איש אשה חדשה לא יצא בצבא ולא יעבר עליו לכל דבר נקי יהיה לביתו שנה אחת ושמח את אשתו אשר לקח

)דברים כד, ה(

When a man takes a wife who is new (to him), he must no go out (to war) in the army, and no (military) duty

may be imposed upon him; he must remain free for his (own) house for one year and make happy his wife who

he has taken.

In Parshas Shoftim, the Chumash lists many that are exempt from going out to war (one who builds a new home,

or a new garden, or becomes engaged to marry, etc.). These types are exempt from the army but are required

to help fix the roads and provide supplies for the army.

In contrast, the newlywed is completely exempt for the entire first year from any such obligations. The newlywed

must engage for the first year in making his new wife happy.

What is the reason behind this mitzvah of making the newlywed wife happy?

The Chinuch: The main purpose of this mitzvah is to develop love and harmony to his new wife and prevent the

man from desiring other women. This complements the mitzvah in the Ten Commandments not to desire the

wife of another (and is not applicable to the other category of exemptions for the army).

Chasam Sofer: During the first year, a newlywed is so drawn after his new wife that he would be completely

distracted if involved in a war that he would only be a detriment to the army. To a lesser degree, a person with

a new house or a field also is distracted and thus exempt.

Rabbenu Bachya: All Jewish marriages are a reflection of the wedding bond between HaShem and the Jewish

people that was forged at Har Sinai, where the “groom” and “bride” remained together for a year.

Taamei Mitzvos: A newlywed needs the first year to accustom himself to the ways of a wedded couple, the ways

of tahara and kedusha that is obligatory for a wedded couple. Similarly the other category also needs time to

understand and practice the laws of a new house (mezuzah, maakeh, etc.) and a new field (maaser, kelayim,

etc.).

Rabbi Shimon Raphael Hirsch: A state of communal peace and lack of animosity is a development from the

richness of peace and prosperity of individuals of the community. Thus, a peaceful and contented individual

is dependent on the establishment of a successful and prosperous family unit, and to a lesser degree on the

success and prosperity of the individual’s material belongings (house and property). Community abilities to

establish a just society (court systems, helping the poor, etc.) are dependent on the success and prosperity of

the majority of the individuals within the society. Thus, a person with a newlywed wife or a new house or

field, needs the extra concentration during the first year to establish these basic units as successful.

How many Mitzvos in the above verse?

One Mitzvah (Sefer Mitzvos Katan): Positive Mitzvah to rejoice together for one year.

Two Mitzvos (Saadyah Goan, Chinuch, Rambam): Positive Mitzvah and one negative mitzvah not to go out to

war.

Three Mitzvos (Ramban): Positive Mitzvah and two negative Mitzvos of not going out to war and not leaving

one’s spouse for any reason

Allusion: (Rabbenu Gershon) נקי יהיה לביתו שנה final letters the four-letter name of HaShem

The verse continues that one should rejoice with one’s spouse. This teaches that the Divine Presence only dwells

in the midst of happiness and contentment that results from actions that are for the sake of Heaven.

What is Nessuin (a Marriage)?

The Rogatchover Gaon provided multiple sources that displayed two different approaches to the question of how

a chasunah (a one-time event) has effect during the subsequent marriage life.

1. Standard - A one-time action creating a binding contract that acquires and establishes an ongoing

obligation (Raavad)

2. Gaon’s innovation: A continuous action that is renewed each and every moment (Rambam)

(A story is told that Rabbi Chaim Brisker once gave mazel tov to the Gaon since each moment was like a new

marriage. The Gaon provided a sharp retort that he did not need a new mazel tov since the one provided at the

wedding also continued each moment to be new.)

Law: If a wife breaks dishes during the normal course of kitchen activities she is exempt from payment to her

husband for the damages to his property.

Rambam: She is exempt due to a decree in order to promote Shalom Bayis. A constant new state of marriage

exists each moment (able to divorce at any time and end the relationship). Thus, two different events

(acquisition and the destruction) occur for which she is only exempt due to the decree.

Raavad: She is exempt by the law since the wife is constantly within the protection of the husband who is

“rewarding” her all the time by letting her acquire the dish. Continuing state of obligation and reward

exempts the wife from the damages.

Law: If the wife becomes “insane”, what is the status of the husband’s marital obligations?

Rambam: No obligation upon the husband to pay for medical expenses to heal the wife. Every moment is a

new marital connection which results in marital obligations. However, when they can not live together,

then no obligation occurs.

Raavad: Obligation to pay medical expenses remains from the initial marriage as long as they are not

divorced.

Law: If the husband passes away then the estate is obligated to provide the physical needs (food, shelter, etc.) to

the widow. What if more than one wife exists, is the apportionment of expenses adjusted according to

the wife married first?

Rambam: The law does not recognize any historical priority; all wives are treated equally for this matter.

Since each marriage is constantly new, all are on equal basis.

Raavad: All are treated equally but for a different reason. Since the obligation to support the wives occurs

after death, they all acquire the obligation at the same time (but not due to the time of the marriage).

Law: In general, one makes a blessing immediately prior to an act, and not afterwards.

Rambam: If one fails to make the blessing on betrothal )ארוסין(, then one can not say the blessing afterwards.

However, the blessing on the marriage )נישואין( can be said even after many days. The Gaon understands

this seemingly contradiction in terms that betrothal is a one-time event whereas marriage is constantly

new.

Law: A nursing mother should not remarry within the first 24 months of the new baby’s life.

Mechaber (and Rambam): If one transgresses and becomes married, they must divorce even if he is a

Cohen. However, if they only become betrothed, then they can wait till the end of the 24 months and

then marry. Marriage is different since every moment is a new (and thus, a transgression).

Rema: No distinction exists whether marriage or betrothal; both are prohibited.

Joke Kiddushin by R. Gidon Rothstein

The pomp with which Jews marry today mean we can be confident the couple involved truly intended to be

married. Halachically, however, a kiddushin can occur any time a man gives a woman an item of value and says

the required formula in front of two witnesses. Shu”t Chatam Sofer 3; Even Ha-Ezer 1;80, dated 14 Tammuz

5579 (1819), teases out factors which could make such a ceremony valid or invalid.

Stringing Together Words

To marry, the man generally says “harei at mekkudeshet li, behold, you are betrothed (or set aside) for me.”

(Halachah does accept other formulations, a fact which does not come up in this case.) Here, a young man had

said the first three words, harei at mekkudeshet, and an uncle of his had warned him not to say li, to me, to avoid

having enacted kiddushin, which makes the woman married to him

In Yiddish, the uncle said three words, “don’t say li,” and the nephew responded either with three or four words,

to the effect of, “I will too say li.” One question was whether the pause between his first words, harei at

mekkudeshet, and the necessary li, to me, broke up the two, sparing us a valid kiddushin.

In witness testimony, continuous conversation avoids the problem of a break—even if a litigant or judge interrupts

the witness, as long as there is no silent break, we view the testimony as one whole (this comes up, for example,

where a litigant objects to something the witness said, and the witness explains his words more fully; we do not

see the witness as attempting to retract or alter his testimony if it’s all part of one thread of conversation).

Were that true here, the nephew’s later word li would still be connected to the original statement,

and kiddushin would seem to have occurred.

Testimony Isn’t Ordinary Speech

Chatam Sofer first says the rule applies only to testimony; elsewhere, a toch kedei dibbur (a very brief amount of

time,) separates two parts of a statement even if there was back and forth the whole time. More, even witnesses’

statements are only seen as linked when the witnesses are part of the same testimony.

But were witnesses to say they did not know any testimony (even if they were lying), they have declared

themselves separate from each other, since by their claim they have no connection, and they would have no more

than a toch kedei dibbur to change it. Many authorities take that view, as codified in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen

Mishpat 80;7.

For our case, more than a toch kedei dibbur in the back and forth between uncle and nephew would invalidate

the kiddushin, since the nephew’s li came too far after the original harei at. (Chatam Sofer is assuming li is

necessary for valid kiddushin, which he’ll question below).

Construing Speech, Timing and Intent

Toch kedei dibbur is no more than four words (the amount of time it takes to respond to a teacher’s greeting by

saying, shalom alecha rabbi u-mori, peace be unto you, my teacher and master, four words). Our case had six or

seven words—the uncle said “don’t say li,” and the nephew said “I will say li,” freeing us from worry about the

one opinion which allowed space for one more word in the time of toch kedei dibbur, to allow the new speaker

to start.

Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 10;29 gives a way to see the nephew’s li as connected back to his original

phrase. Where a witness seemed to have finished his testimony and a litigant made a comment or counterclaim,

the witness can say, “I wasn’t finished, I meant to say x.”

The additional material cannot contradict his prior testimony (he cannot say, “I meant to add, ‘just joking, never

happened’”), but if it elaborates the testimony, adds nuances which might have been intended before he was

interrupted, we accept it as part of the original testimony.

For our case, were we to believe the nephew had been about to continue, the uncle’s interruption would not help;

it seems to have been clear, however, the nephew in fact meant to stop without saying li. Some of the witnesses

claimed he said “I’m going to say li just to annoy you,” which would make clear he did not originally intend to

say it.

More, both the nephew and putative bride agree they never meant to marry. Were the ceremony to have happened

with no reason to question it—a man/boy said the full formula and gave a woman/girl a ring—we would have to

ignore their claim it was a joke, because devarim shebalev einam devarim, claims about intent cannot legally

contradict what we see in front of our eyes. In our case, Chatam Sofer says we can take their insistence it was a

joke seriously enough to avoid looking for reasons to think his later li was still within the time frame of the

original statement.

The Lack of Li

The requirement of li in kiddushin sparks more halachic discussion than we might have assumed. Shulchan

Aruch Even Ha-Ezer 27 declares a kiddushin lacking li invalid, because the ceremony itself needs to define the

man to whom she is being asked to commit (the man presenting the ring could be an agent of another man).

However, Rema notes some who are stringent on the issue, which sends Chatam Sofer on a long discussion of

the needed level of clarity for different kinds of legal statements (committing to a voluntary personal fast, deciding

to be a nazir, and more). He mentions the idea of a yad, an allusion, which might be considered mochiach, clear

enough to define its referent, or eino mochiach, not clear to that level. Harei at mekkudeshet might be a yad ha-

mochiach, or we might hold yadayim she-einam mochichot, allusions which do not clinch their case, can still

effect kiddushin.

Engagements and Context

The couple’s never having been engaged might help. Even those who think a non-specific yad can

create kiddushin, such as Maharit, relied on some other context to support the interpretation, like an engagement.

Still, Rema did not require an engagement (some authorities called for censuring a man who marries without first

becoming engaged, Rema disagreed), but Chatam Sofer thinks the common custom of his time and place, to have

an engagement and then a formal wedding, in a hall, etc., all mean we need not pay attention to what happened

here.

He draws added support for his perspective from the witnesses’ certainty the two were not serious. While we

cannot trust the “groom” as to his intent (the idea of devarim she-ba-lev, people’s claims about their intent are

not part of our halachic read of an event), the witnesses’ perspective establishes the context of an interaction,

which halachah does recognize.

(Chatam Sofer adds more evidence they were joking around, such as the nephew’s calling for all the assembled

to recite the formula with him, one of the witnesses having said, “if that ring were valuable enough, you’d be

married to her,” which shows they didn’t think they were marrying. He concedes he is treading new ground in

accepting evidence the couple was not serious—usually, we assume the act itself creates marriage-- tells us he is

adding it only to support the other avenues of leniency, such as the missing li making the harei at not specific

enough to create the connection between them).

I am skipping more analysis of which incomplete formulas might be enough (Rivash thought “hareini noten lach

le-kiddushin, I am giving this to you for kiddushin” might identify him as the groom, for example),

because Chatam Sofer concludes — and thinks it is the accepted view — the identifier of the groom, li, must be

there for kiddushin to occur.

Care In Forming an Opinion

Chatam Sofer begins to discuss another way to say no marriage occurred, the unclear ownership of the ring. The

“groom” had grabbed it from a girl standing there, saying he would give it back, and then did (a story the owner

of the ring confirms). Depending on how we construe their interaction, he may not have been enough of the owner

for kiddushin purposes.

Chatam Sofer at first steps back from this aspect of the discussion, because his correspondent knew of

a sefer which discussed the issue, a sefer unavailable to him right then. He says he can rule the marriage is invalid

because of the lack of li, of the clear identifier of the man to whom she was being asked to commit.

The good enough reason to invalidate the marriage frees him to think about who owned the ring as well, as perhaps

another reason to feel comfortable ignoring this supposed kiddushin.

When Grabbing Isn’t Stealing

He notes halachah’s presumption, chazakah, people own what’s in their possession, as well as a chazakah people

do not steal. This event gave more reason to assume he had not stolen the ring, having occurred at a party on Chol

Ha-Mo’ed of a holiday, where people grabbing from each other was part of the festivities. (Tosafot Sukkah 45a

knew social circles which accepted people grabbing items from each other and throwing them around, all part of

the celebration; not a celebration I would have enjoyed, but to each his/her own).

Of course, the ones taking the items would have to intend to return the item. Once we have two options as to how

to interpret an act, either as jocular grabbing with intent to return or theft, we believe the person who says he was

doing it in the non-prohibited way. There’s therefore no reason to think the original owner had yeush, despaired

of getting it back, and no reason to assume the item had become the property of the supposed groom.

Chatam Sofer refers to a monograph where he demonstrated (at length he says, which means it was pretty long)

the error which led people to assume the existence of such a chazakah.

There is an halachic presumption of stability of ownership, objects owned by so and so continue to be owned by

so and so until we know of a transfer of property, as long as a state of ownership has been established.

As part of proving his point (and I am skipping much), he notes the Talmudic principle of ha-motzi me-chaveiro

‘alav ha-re’aya, one who wishes to extract an item (or money) from another bears the burden of proof. The

principle decidedly does not say, however, the person who has the item is assumed to be the owner, it says the

one who wants to change the status quo must prove the point. Similarly, the discovery of a corpse wearing clothing

we know belonged to a certain man did not allow the man’s wife to consider herself a widow, because Chazal felt

people lend or sell their clothing to others often enough for possession there to be insufficient proof of the identity

of the deceased. Possession does not establish ownership.

The bystander girl in our case was the owner of the ring, and the “groom’s” claims about how he took it from her

do not make him the owner in a way which could produce kiddushin.

He is not satisfied he has completed the necessary analysis of the topic (which I note because I have left out much

of his discussion, yet Chatam Sofer feels he’s not delved deeply enough; it’s a salutary reminder of the continuing

question of how fully to cover questions, for halachic devisors and for those who summarize their findings). Still,

he thinks he has gathered enough evidence to disregard this kiddushin.

When Heaven Signals Otherwise

In a remarkable coda, Chatam Sofer tells his correspondent the above has all been how he saw the issue when

first presented to him. Since then, “Heaven prevented me” from writing this answer for more than ten weeks.

Every time he would start, some pressing matter drew him away, for ten days at a time, more than once.

It dragged on enough to convince him he was being told he was not the right person to rule on his question. He’s

sharing his thoughts because he thinks they have value as words of Torah, but leaves the decision up to them,

whether to accept his reasoning as persuasive or to use some other standard.

It’s a paragraph at the end of a long legal responsum, but inserts a note of faith and belief I think serves an

interesting counterweight to the legal process he had been taking his reader through until that point. Confident in

his knowledge and reasoning, Chatam Sofer was aware his views might not be the ones Heaven wanted applied

to a situation, and was open to being told to back away from ruling.

CHALITZAH Removing the Shoe and Spitting in Front of the Yibam

Devarim 25,10

Part of the procedure for the release of the widowed wife (without children) from her status of connection to her

brother-in-law involves the removal of his shoe and then spitting before the brother-in-law in front of the Bais

Din. The commentators provide many reasons for these actions:

Chinuch

The widow was prepared to wed her brother-in-law and serve him as her husband in

order to attempt to continue her deceased’s husband name. The brother-in-law does

not wish to marry her. Therefore, she first performs a marriage-service to the

brother-in-law of removal of his shoe to show the Bais Din that she is willing to

marry him. Then she performs a disgusting act of spitting in front of him to show

that her possible connection to the brother-in-law is completely severed.

Pane’ach Raza

At first the widow bows down to her brother-in-law requesting that he marry her, and

she would serve him even to the level of removal of his shoes. And after he refuses

to marry her, she spits in front of him to express that he should be considered as

disgusting as spit.

Mincha Belulah

The brother-in-law’s refusal to marry the widow prevents the building of the house of

his brother. Thus, the widow takes off his shoe expressing that she was willing to

serve him like a maid servant. However, as a result of the refusal to marry her, she

spits in front of him to show that she is not concerned about herself, rather about

her dead husband, and his brother should now be treated as if he was dead.

R’ Bachaye (1)

As long as the brother-in-law wishes to marry the widow, it is as if the brother is still

alive (due to possible future offspring). When the brother-in-law refuses, then it is

as if the brother is finally dead and his brother refused to mourn him. Therefore,

the widow removes the shoe to express that the brother-in-law should be in

mourning (and not acting like he has forgotten and buried his brother). The spitting

in front of the brother-in-law is to publicly shame him for his refusal.

R’ Bachaye (2)

The brother-in-law that refuses is like a brazen person since he doesn’t wish to help

the soul of his brother. Removal of his shoe expresses his disdain for his brother

that he has been removed from his “brotherhood.” He has removed )חלץ( himself

and closed )נעל( the door on the soul of his deceased brother. And the shoe is

removed from his foot to indicate that he is the cause of the movement )רגל( of his

brother’s soul from his family. And she spits to allude to his lack of commitment to

use his fluids to help his brother.

Baha”g

The brother-in-law who refuses to perform his mitzvah is as if he is rebelling against

the concept of Mitzvos from Sinai. He is to be treated as someone who is in cherem,

removed from society and not allowed to wear shoes.

Malbim

The main concept that differentiates between humans and animals is freedom of

choice. Humans choose to wear shoes (made from animal skin) that show that

humans select where they go. The Torah commands this mitzvah of Yibum which

is counter to normal thought, and the brother-in-law refuses to use his free choice

and follows his natural tendencies. Thus, he is no longer different than the animals

(who follow their nature) and does not need to wear shoes.

Tzror HaMor

The deceased’s soul remains connected to the widow and is not able to be released

from this world unless she has a child from the brother-in-law, or the procedure of

Chalitzah removes him from this world. The removal of the shoe from the brother-

in-law releases the spirit from the wanderings in this world; and the spit from the

widow releases the final connection of the soul to her, enabling the soul’s release

and departure to other places.

CHALITZA (from Meorot.co.il)

We present here a general overview of the practical laws of chalitza. There are many details involved. For this reason, in addition to the

laws of chalitza in Shulchan Aruch, the Beis Yosef found it necessary to write a “Seder Chalitza B'Ktzara - Concise Order of

Chalitza." Even this “concise" version includes 57 paragraphs.

Preparing the location: The day before the chalitza takes place, a location must be arranged. Three judges tell two other people,

“Tomorrow we will go to sit in that place, to oversee a chalitza" (Seder Chalitza, 67). We learn this obligation from the possuk, “His

yavama must ascend to the gate [of Beis Din]" (Devarim 25:7). “The gate" imply a known and prearranged place (Rashi 101b).

The yavama must fast: The day before the chalitza, Beis Din sends messengers to the yavama, informing her that she must not eat on

the day of the chalitza before the chalitza takes place. The morning of the chalitza, they return to remind her. This is because when she

spits on the floor at the yavam's feet, she must spit voluntarily, and not as a reaction to a sharp taste in her mouth (see 106a). Theoretically,

it would be enough to refrain from eating spicy foods. However, the custom developed to refrain from eating entirely.

The yavam must wash his foot: The day before the chalitza, it is customary for the yavam to wash his foot, in order to make it easier

for him to wash again before the chalitza. The foot from which the shoe is removed must be perfectly clean, in order that there be no

chatzitza between it and the shoe.

Reciting the pesukim: The day before the chalitza, Beis Din must ascertain that both the yavam and the yavama are old enough and

halachically eligible for chalitza. They are taught the pesukim that they must recite during the chalitza. The yavama recites, “My yavam

has refused to establish for his brother a name in Israel. He does not wish (lo ava) to do yibum with me." The words lo ava must be

recited in one breath. Otherwise, the yavama's proclamation might be misinterpreted to mean, “My yavam has refused to establish for

his brother a name in Israel. He does not," – meaning he does not refuse, but rather “he wishes to do yibum with me" (Beis Shmuel,

Shulchan Aruch E.H. 169:29, s.k. 27; based on Yevamos 106b, Rashi).

Publicizing the chalitza: Present at the chalitza, there must be three judges, the two others mentioned above, and at least another five

people, to complete a minyan. From the group of people present, Beis Din chooses two kosher witnesses, who must verify that the

husband died without children, that this woman is his widow, that the man is his brother, and other similar questions. It is then announced

before the entire congregation that the age and eligibility of the yavam and yavama have already been established. All this information

was already known to Beis Din, but it must be announced again before all those assembled, to publicize and give credence to the chalitza.

Purchasing the shoe: The yavam then washes his foot, acquires the shoe through a legally valid purchase, and places it on his right

foot. A left footed yavam must wear two shoes, to perform chalitza with them both (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 169:25). Beis Din explains to

the yavam and yavama the significance of the chalitza, and then they both recite their pesukim.

Untying the shoe: The yavama unties the shoe, removes it (with no one helping her), and then spits on the floor at the feet of the yavam.

She then recites the possuk, “So shall be done to the man who does not build his brother's house. His name in Israel shall be called, ‘The

House of the Removed Shoe.'" All those present respond three times, “Removed shoe" (ibid, 42).

The beracha for chalitza: After the chalitza is completed, Beis Din offers a short prayer, “May it be Your will that the daughters of

Israel never require chalitza or yibum" (Seder Chalitza, 56). The Beis Yosef concludes his Kuntrus HaChalitza by stating that he found

in an Ashkenazic siddurim a beracha for chalitza, “Blessed are You HaShem… Who has sanctified us with His commandments and

commanded us in the mitzvos and statues of Avraham Avinu." This refers to the Midrash that Avraham Avinu was given the mitzva of

chalitza, which involves untying a shoe, as reward for refusing to take any reward for his war against the four kings: “From string to

shoe strap, I will not take anything that is yours. You will not say, ‘I have made Avraham rich'" (Bereishis 14:23). Rashi explains that

Avraham wanted everyone to know that it was HaShem alone who had granted him wealth.

Not going near water: The Sdei Chemed (V, 125) cites an interesting Ashkenazic custom to impose a cheirum forbidding the yavam

and yavama from going near a source of water from the time of the chalitza until the end of the day. The Sdei Chemed investigated the

source of this custom, and discovered that people once entertained the false notion that chalitza is dangerous for the yavam and yavama.

Whichever of them would reach water first would live, and the other would die. (A similar thing is said of the arad snake. After it bites

its victim, it rushes to water. If it reaches water first, the victim dies. If the victim reaches first, the snake dies.) As a result of this notion,

the yavam and yavama would endanger each other’s lives, in their mad rush to reach water first. Therefore, the custom developed to

forbid them both from going near water.

Why Does the First-Born Receive Double?

י את יז כר-כ נואה -בן הב יר, הש יככל אשר ם, ב ני י ש - לתת לו פ

מצא, לו: י י ית אנו, -כ הוא ראשכרה. פט הב ש לו מ

Devarim 21,17: but he shall acknowledge the first-born, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he hath; for he is the first-fruits of his strength, the right of the first-born is his.

What makes the firstborn so special that he receives a double portion? Many commentaries have offered

explanations, but ultimately the halachah is derived from the verse itself. (As you’ll see below, some of the

reasons would apply equally to firstborn daughters, or to the mother’s firstborn. Yet the halachic firstborn is the

father’s oldest son.)

Beloved by G-d

“All firsts are beloved by G-d.” Just as there is the mitzvah that the first fruits are brought as an offering to

G-d (bikkurim), as is the first of the flock (bechor beheimah), so does G-d have a special love for the firstborns,

and they are given a double portion. (Abarbanel, Devarim 21,15)

In the Father’s Stead

It is the firstborn who stands in the father’s stead, perpetuating his continued memory. It was his birth that made

the father into a father, revealing his latent power of parenthood. Abarbanel, ibid.

Although further elaboration is beyond the scope of this article, this is one of the reasons given as to why it was

generally only the sons who inherited, as in ancient times it was the sons who would carry on the family name.

Property ownership was generally passed down through the males, and they in turn were obligated to support

their unmarried sisters (that is, unless there were no sons, in which case the daughters inherited, as in the

fascinating incident of the five righteous daughters of Tzelafchad). However, as we’ll discuss later, there is a way

to include the daughters in the inheritance as well.

In the Levites’ Stead

Originally, the firstborns were supposed to dedicate their lives to the Divine service in the Temple. Due to their

part in the sin of the Golden Calf, the Temple service was taken away from them and given to the Levites, who

don’t get a portion in the land. In their stead, the firstborns get a double portion, theirs and the Levites. Had the

firstborn remained obligated in the Temple, they too would not have been granted an inheritance. Now however,

that they were replaced, they not only receive their own portion of their father’s estate, but they receive an extra

one – in place of the one lost by Levi. (Chizkuni, Bemidbar 3,12)

Paving the Way

The first child born from the mother’s womb paves the way for all subsequent children. The double portion is an

expression of gratitude. Midrash Talpiot, s.v. Bechor.

Takes over the Family’s Affairs

The oldest son would naturally take over the family’s affairs with the father’s passing. It was thus natural to

give him a larger portion of the family estate. The firstborn is also credited with making his father into a father;

thus, he has a special role in the family (R. Samson Raphael Hirsh Devarim 21,17).

Example of the double portion for the First-Born:

If the Father leaves behind four sons, the inheritance is divided into five portions.

Reuven (2 portions) Shimon (1) Levi (1) Yehudah (1)

כי תצא

JUDGEMENT OF DEATH

תנו רבנן ארבעה מתו בעטיו של נחש ואלו הן בבא בתרא דף יז/א מסכת

וכלאב בן דוד וישי אבי דוד משה אביועמרם בנימין בן יעקב

Four righteous individuals in history died not as a result of their sins (since they did not sin), but only

due to the fallout from the advice of the snake (in Gan Eiden)

ט- וכי פרק כא כב דברים פ ל מות והו מת ותלית אתו -יהיה באיש חטא מש עץ: -ע

ט-וכי אריז"ל מספיד רמ"ק " משפט מות כי לא מות, פי' שיחסר )חטא מלשון חסרון( טעם -יהיה באיש חטא משפ

ל אתו פעל רע ולמה ימות, ותלית עץ מחמת עץ הדעת שגזר מיתה, בשביל כך מת" -ע

The Ari z”l delivered a eulogy for the Ramak that he lacked sin and did not do evil, so that he did not

deserve the judgment of death. Thus, one must attribute his death to the tree of knowledge.

TWO LEVELS OF TZADIKIM (and of Tzidkus by individuals)

THE FOUR TZADIKIM

Death due to Zuhamah from

the Snake

External

חיצוניות הנשמה

External connection to evil

in the world

Sense of Self

גוף

נגלה שבתורה

RAMAK

Death due to Tree of Knowledge

Internal

פנימיות הנשמה

Reveals G-d’s plan for death in the

world

Sense of G-d

נשמה

תורת חסידות

All Jews have a portion of the soul which is not affected by the world

Chassidus can reveal that “hidden” part ()לקוטי שיחות חלק כד

FORTY LASHES פרק כה דברים

ר: - והיה אם ב מספ עתו ב די רש הו לפניו כ פט והכ ש ילו ה ע והפ ות הרש כ ן ה ב

עים ג רב ו א נ ן יסיף לא יכ תו יסיף-פ כ ל לה ה-ע ה אל כ ה מ ב :לעיניך אחיך ונקלה רMakkos 22a: (Mishnah): One who is lashed receives 39 lashes. "B'Mispar Arba'im" means the number followed

by 40; R. Yehudah says, he receives a full 40 lashes; (The Mishnah on 22B teaches that the lashes are evenly

divided among three places.) The extra (40th) lash is between his shoulders. We estimate (how many lashes

he can survive) only a number divisible by three.

If we estimated that he can survive 40 (really, 39) and after he was lashed some of them we estimate that he cannot bear

them, he is exempt (for he was already humiliated). If we estimated that he can survive 18, and after he was lashed 18 we estimate that he can bear 40, he is exempt.

Even though the verse says the Bais Din administers 40 lashes, nevertheless our tradition is

that Bais Din only administers 39 lashes. Why?

Rashi

Written ר מספ ר and not) ב by the number) thus to be read “with number ב מספ

forty” but not the whole forty; rather the number which faces (is matched in

counting with) and completes to forty, i.e. forty less one (thirty-nine).

Rivan

The two words together (from the end of verse two and beginning of verse three)

read ר מספ עים ב רב and not reversed; this implies that the verse refers to a count א

whose number completes the number forty, which means thirty-nine.

Rambam

The Torah limits to 40 lashes. However, since the counter of the lashes can easily

make a mistake of one, limit of lashes is 39 so if made a mistake would not

violate the Torah limit of 40.

Malbim

The standard method of the count is to make a lash, count the number and pause.

Thus, the Torah is emphasizing that the number of lashes is the pause prior to

the number 40 that would have been counted.

Rosh

The method of Torah is to round off upon reaching within one of a “tenth” sum,

and not to be concerned about the missing one item (like the matter of 50 days

to counting the omer, 70 souls that went to Egypt and these forty lashes.)

Targum

Yonasan

Forty times one raises the arm to strike, but only 39 blows are delivered. Raising

the arm is as if delivered the fortieth blow.

What is special about 39 and why didn’t the Torah write 39 lashes?

Medrash

Tanchuma

Why 40? One that transgresses the Torah which was given in forty days, one should

be punished with an increment of forty. Similar to the first sin, in which Adam

was punished with 10, Chava with 10, the snake with 10 and the earth with 10.

Also, the punishment involving the spies was 40 years in the desert. Plus the

formation of a child takes forty days. Then, why only 39 lashes? HaShem does

not allow His entire wrath ל חמתוולא יעיר כ .

Maharal Neshamah enters the embryo on the fortieth day. Thus, the set of 39 lashes atones

for the 39 days that the body existed without the soul.

Chasam

Sofer

It is proper that a person should receive 40 lashes since the Torah that was violated

was given in 40 days. However, by the 39th lash a person would submit to the

Divine Will, and that would be considered like the additional lash. Or with the 40

lash hanging over a person that leaves a person with a continuing effort to not sin

again (something like “V’chatosi negdi samid”).

R’ Bachaye

Lashes are given to a person alleviate the obligation of death (Kores) in order to

continue with life. One that is cursed is considered ל"ט. The 39 lashes act to turn

the person into טל, water the source of life.

Kli Yakar One atones with (13) אחד, one atones with the 13 Midos HaRachamim, and the

Yetzer Tov (good inclination) enters a person at 13 years (3 times 13 =39).

SHILUACH HAKEIN – SENDING AWAY THE MOTHER BIRD

: אפרחים או ביצים והאם רבצת על האפרחים או על הביצים לא תקח האם על הבניםכי יקרא קן צפור לפניך בדרך בכל עץ או על הארץ

ז(-)דברים כב: ו שלח תשלח את האם ואת הבנים תקח לך למען ייטב לך והארכת ימים

Sending a mother bird away from her nest contains two Mitzvos (separate but related), a negative command not to take the

mother bird while it is hovering over its nest, and a positive command to send the mother away.

The Commentators discuss if the mitzvah of sending away the mother bird only applies when a person wants to take the

chicks or eggs, the contents of the nest. Perhaps the mitzvah is that before taking the chicks a person must send away

the mother, but if one has no interest in using the eggs or chicks he has no mitzvah to send the mother away. Or, perhaps

the mitzvah applies even where a person has no interest to take the mother or the chicks.

The understanding of this Mitzvah has implications in other areas of Torah:

Is there an obligation to pursue other mitzvos, or are we expected to fulfill mitzvos only when they come our way?

Chullin 139 questions: “Should one search through the hills and valleys to find a nest?”

Chidushei R’ Yehuda b. R’ Binyamin HaRofeh notes that this Gemara begins with the assumption that one should have to

trek through hills and valleys in order to fulfill this mitzvah. It is only a special phrase in the verse (כי יקרא) that limits

our obligation specifically in this case and teaches that this mitzvah of “sending away the mother” only applies when

the mitzvah comes our way. We see, therefore, that the general approach to mitzvos is that one must assert himself and

find opportunities to fulfill them.

Maharsham (1:209) infers the opposite conclusion from this Gemara. It opens with its suggestion, Rashi explains, “The

Gemara notes that the verse here states, שלח תשלח you shall certainly send away the mother. This double expression

suggests that one must pursue this mitzvah until it comes into his hands.” Maharsham notes that without a double

expression, there was no expectation to pursue this mitzvah, and this seems to be the impression of the Gemara regarding

all mitzvos.

Understanding Strange Statements in the Gemara

A Karaite once debated a great sage who was also learned in non-Jewish literature. The Karaite chose a strange sounding

statement from the mitzvah of Shiluach HaKein to demonstrate what he thought was the obviously ridiculous nature of

Talmudic discourse.

“In Chullin 139 the Talmud wonders about the halachah of a bird nesting on a human’s head. Have you ever heard of

anything more ridiculous in your life? What human would ever allow a bird to nest on his head?”

The chacham did not hesitate for a moment. “In earlier works in Greek we find that there were monks who worked hard to

nullify their material selves. They were willing to do any self-mortification to attain this goal. One of the ways they

worked to completely divest themselves from their physical senses was to stand for long periods without any motion

whatever. They would choose a deserted place, like a desert or field, thinking as deeply as they could, while carefully

standing absolutely inert. These works record that the monks were so still that birds thought they were statues and nested

on their heads. Of course, this is a very specialized kind of physical torture, but these monks accepted this on themselves

to help them come to this state.

After showing the Karaite this in the Greek work, the chacham concluded, “Since there were such monks in the times of the

sages of the Talmud as well, is it any wonder that they discuss the halachic ramifications of one who finds a bird nesting

on someone’s head?”

Tefilas haDerech

One that travels a Parsah beyond the city’s limits, must pray to complete the trip in safety, by reciting the prayer of Tefilas

haDerech. The distance of a parsah is equivalent to 8000 amos (4 mil) which in our terms range from 3.840 km. / 2.385

miles (per Rav Noah) to 4.640 km. / 2.9 miles (According to the Chazon Ish) to 4.800 km./3 miles.

The Rogatchover wonders if one who flies in an airplane can, in fact, be compared to a road traveler to recite the brachah.

Interestingly, the Rogatchover quotes the Gemara in Chulin 139, which discusses the mitzvah of shiluach hakein

(sending away the mother bird). The Gemara asks if one who finds a nest at sea must do shiluach hakan, and the Gemara

responds, “He is obligated because it says, ‘He Who made a way (derech) in the sea.’ (Yeshaya 43:16)” And,

when discussing shiluach hakein, the Torah says, “If a bird's nest chances before you on the road

“derech” (Devarim 22:6).

The Gemara then asks if one must fulfill the mitzvah if the nest is found in the air, because it says,

“The way (derech) of an eagle in the heavens.” (Mishlei 30:19) But the Gemara responds, “The

way of an eagle is called; an unspecified way is not called.” In other words, the air cannot be

referred to as a “derech”. Hence, the Rogatchover holds that tefillat haderech (the traveler’s

prayer) should not be recited in an airplane but said while the plane is moving on the runway.

THREE MIXTURES

Not Plowing Together

Reason for the Commandment

Torah Speaks in Common Language

Mitzvah in Context Inner Reason of Separation of this Issur

Rosh Any two, differing species

Leads to cross breading of

species

Learn to all particulars

of the general

Action is important, synonymous to other laws of

forbidden mixtures

Level of gevurah (ox)

from chasadim (donkey)

Rambam

Only a mixing of a tahor and a

tameh animal

Leads to cruelty to animals

Apply only to the

general category

Outcome is the main point, which is

differing from other similar forbidden

mixtures

Separate holy (ox) from kelipa

(donkey)

לקוטי שיחות חלק כד

Shatnez – Wool & Linen Understanding the Concept

Rashi Need all 3 activities of

combing, spinning and weaving

One category of joining 2 entities to become a new single entity (totally mixed)

Similar to the vineyard

Rabeinu Tam

Issur only if woven together as one (regardless if combed or spun)

Each item not mixed in its essence External combination – similar to plowing

Rambam Any one of 3 actions

Combed or spun or woven Even if not combined into one entity

Intermediate comparison: similar to mixing species; requires joining but not to

the extent of becoming one entity לקוטי שיחות חלק לד

Three Mixtures When Combined Result

Shatnez Clothes צומח וחי

Remains distinct items Min b’aino mino

Mitzvah & holiness Leading to peace

Vineyard Plant Produces a strange result צומח

outside normal order & opposite to G-d’s will

Mixture of opposites Leads to disagreement and

arguments Not Plowing

(cross-breeding) Animal

חי לקוטי שיחות חלק כט

The Ox and the Donkey

Avodah Zara 5b: (Tana d'Vei Eliyahu): One should bear the yoke of Torah

like an ox, and make himself like a donkey to bear the burden.

Why the simile to an ox and to a donkey?

Maharal

When an ox engaged in the work of pulling a plow or a donkey carrying a load,

the exertion weakens their entire body. Also, one that is fully involved in

Torah study invoking their intellect (perhaps missing meals) weakens the

body.

Iyun Yaacov An ox and donkey do their work for their master without thought a reward, so

too should one study Torah and do Mitzvos without thought of reward.

Aderes Eliyahu An ox bearing a yoke is symbolism for Torah study; a donkey carrying a

burden symbolizing the performance of Mitzvos.

Gr”a (Mishlei)

One who provides services for those that learn Torah is like the donkey carries

the burden; on that provide financially for a Talmid Chachum so he and his

family do not lack, is like the ox within the yoke.

Gr”a (2nd)

Two levels of learning: those that learn the basic, pshat level are like the

donkeys that able to carry great burdens; the other level delves into the Torah

through pilpul who are similar to oxen that gore.

Shem MiShmuel

An ox and donkey have two distinctly different traits. Although an ox appears to be a proud

animal and is adorned with horns, it still accepts a yoke upon itself and goes to work. A

donkey is a lowly animal, but it, too, accepts its work happily. Similarly, a person should

realize that he must have these two traits when he learns Torah. These animals are examples

of the work ethic which a person should apply to his learning.

Chasam Sofer

Those that delve deeply into a Torah matter are like oxen that plow a field and

then plow the row again. The field is prepared but the produce is not ready

to be eaten. Others that learn broadly and apply the subjects to daily life are

like the donkeys that carry a finished product.

Avodas Avodah

Learning Torah directs a person into the purpose of life and away from death,

just like the ox plows a field a line at a time, concentrating on what lies in

front and not worrying about what is over the next hill. However, the Torah

learner (like the ox) does receive benefit from the work, pride of

accomplishment. Therefore, the Torah learner also needs the experience of

the donkey that carries the load without any benefits.

Chafetz Chaim

An ox is used in the production of crops (plowing); a donkey is used in

transporting the harvested produce. Both labors are necessary for Torah.

One must first labor to “produce” the Torah, to understand its complexities.

Then, one needs to “carry” the Torah (constant review and application) to

others to acquire this “produce”.

אשריכם זרעי על כל מים משלחי רדל השור וחמור )ישיעהו לב, כ(

Fortunate are you who sow upon all waters, who send forth the feet of the ox and the donkey

Fortunate is Israel for when they engage in studying Torah and bestowing kindness their evil inclination is

delivered into their hands, and they are not delivered into the hands of their evil inclination.

The Jews chase away the evil inclination which comes, as if on its own feet, to corrupt man (Rashi)

Maharal: the ox symbolizes the evil inclination toward idolatry (as manifest by the Golden Calf). The donkey symbolizes

the inclination towards illicit relationships. Sewing is a metaphor for charity, while water represents Torah study.

Thus, the two meritorious acts of kindness and Torah study are protection against the two main actions of the evil

inclination.

Do not thresh with an ox and donkey together

לא תחרוש בשור ובחמור יחדיודברים כב, י

Bava Kama 54b Applies to any set of two different species; the Torah only speaks of what is

common at that time.

Sifrei Why did the Torah specify two animals? The prohibition is to have two different

species plow together, but an animal and a person is permitted.

Rambam Prohibition from the Torah is only a case of a combination of a tahor animal with

a tamei animal (such as an ox with a donkey).

Rosh Prohibition from the Torah is any type of two different species even a tahor animal

with a tahor animal.

Lekutei Sichos 24

Chasidus brings two reasons for this prohibition:

1) In order that the kelipah (chamor) should not nurse from holiness.

2) In order not to mix gevurah (shor) with chasadim (chamor).

Rambam decides according to the first opinion since he decides that the

prohibition of not plowing together only applies to mixing a tahor animal with a

tahor animal. The Rosh who decides the prohibition applies to any two types of

animals decides according to the second reason.

Ramban Reason not to put two animals together to plow in order not to lead to the mating

of two separate species.

Tosfos

Another reason for the prohibition is cruelty to animals. The ox regurgitates its

food and to the donkey it appears the ox is eating again while the donkey does

not have any food.

Ibn Ezra

Another reason for the prohibition is that HaShem has mercy on his creations. The

strength of the ox far exceeds the strength of the donkey and thus, the donkey

would be under duress to keep up with the ox.

Chinuch

The reason for the prohibition is discomfort to the animals. In general animals

associate within their own group and do not wish to be close with another

species. Forcing two different species to work together is a pain and bother to

each. This is an important lesson to be very careful when grouping people since

they have intellectual and physical differences; they have heightened sensitivity

to others. Two people with opposite tendencies should not be charged with a

common task.

Meor V’Shemesh

Allusion to two different parts of a person. Shor alludes to the heightened

spirituality of a person (Yosef is called a Shor). Donkey refers to the physical

coarseness of a person. They cannot work together until the physical is broken.

Bachaye )פשט(

The prohibition of “mixtures” is based on the creation of each species as separate

with their own abilities and mazal. Mixing two different species denies the

purpose of Creation.

Bachaye )דרוש( No real reason is possible; these Mitzvos are given for increase in Torah learning.

Bachaye )סוד( The word כלאים (mixtures) is the concept of holding back. These chukim are only

given to the Jews to bring completeness below and in the Heavens.

Shach

Allusion to the future two Moshiachs. The initial Moshiach from Yosef is called

The second Moshiach is from Dovid as it says, “poor and riding on a .בכור שורו

donkey.” Be silent )חרישה( regarding Moshiach and do not look for the signs and

appointed times since it will happen quickly. Nevertheless, one always has to

believe Moshiach may arrive any moment.

Interest - Gain/Loss – It’s not about the Money

The prohibition of taking interest is discussed in several locations throughout the Torah, including in

Parashas Ki Seitzei: “You may not cause your brother to pay interest- interest on money, interest on food or

interest on any other item for which interest may be taken.” (Devarim 23,20)

The Gemara (Bava Metzia 75b) relays the severity of this prohibition by stating Rabi Shimon’s opinion

that those who lend with interest are indirectly ridiculing Moshe Rabbeinu and saying: “Ilu Hayah Yodei’a Moshe

Rabbeinu SheYihyeh Revach BaDavar, Lo Hayah Kotevo,” “If Moshe Rabbeinu would have known that there is

profit in the matter of lending interest, he never would have written that it is forbidden.” Rabi Shimon makes

another statement about those who lend with interest: “Malvei Ribbit ,Yoseir MiMah SheMarvichim, Mafsidim,”

“Those who lend with interest lose more than they gain.”

Rashi explains what the word “Mafsifdim” means based on the Gemara earlier (71a). The Gemara quotes

a Pasuk from Tehillim (15:5) praising one who lends money without taking interest and stating that such a person

shall not falter forever - “Kaspo Lo Nasan BeNeshech... Oseih Eileh Lo Yimos LeOlam.” The Gemara then infers:

“Ha Lamadta SheKol HaMalveh BeRibbis Nechasav Mitmotetin,” “Anyone who lends with interest will have his

possessions eventually falter.” Those who do not comply with this injunction will suffer a permanent downfall,

and that, writes Rashi, is what “Mafsidim” means.

Ben Yehoyada questions Rashi’s interpretation of “Yoseir MiMah SheMarvichin Mafsidim” – “They lose

more than they gain.” The Gemara on 71a does not might that one will lose the interest he has gained, but rather

that one may profit in this endeavor but will surely lose in another business venture. “More than what they stand

to gain here, they will lose elsewhere.” Additionally, the language of the other Gemara of “Mitmotetin” connotes

that gradually his profits will falter and be lost. This may happen throughout the generations, even if the original

sinner profited. It is thus difficult to assume that our Gemara’s statement that the one who lends with interest loses

more than he gains refers to such a person. He indeed gains more than he loses, at least during his own lifetime.

How could it be that such a person who takes interest can prosper, and only generations later have his family be

punished for his actions?

Therefore, Ben Yehoyada offers a different interpretation of the phrase, “Malvei BeRibbis, Yoseir MiMah

SheMarvichin, Mafsidin.” It indeed refers to the lender himself, and it also refers to the specific endeavor,

business transaction, loan, etc. in which the interest is taken. He explains by relating a story of an exchange

between two Jews: Reuven tells Shimon how profitable his carpentry business has been: “It’s due, by and large,

to my ambitious, compulsive work ethic as I have a ‘no rest for the weary’ business philosophy. ‘MiMizrach

Shemesh Ad Mevo’o’ I am working. I work through the night on various projects, not allowing myself to fall

asleep, and I am even working with my hands as I chew my food during meals.” His friend Shimon responds: “I

am also unceasingly profiting from my business but I have plenty of leisure time to sleep and to relax for

recreation. I even have extra time to pray and study Torah. You can’t profit on Shabbos and Yom Tov or when

you are in the bathroom, but I profit even at these times. In fact, when we are all beating our chests on Yom

Kippur and confessing ‘Al Cheit SheChatanu Lefanecha BeNeshech UVeMarbis,’ I am still making money. My

business is more profitable and affords me plenty of leisure time since I lend money on interest. No time is ever

lost.”

The Midrash on the Pasuk in Tehilim (55,24), “Anshei Damim UMirmah, Lo Yechetzu Yemeihem,” “Men

of blood and deceit will not live out even half of their lives,” remarks, “Eilu HaMalvim BeRibbis” – this Pasuk,

which discusses the men who will live short lives, refers to those that lend with interest. How are we to understand

this Midrash? After all, plenty of Jews who are charging interest from other Jews are living out their full life.

Ben Yehoyada quotes the Gemara in Shabbat (89b) where Rav Shmuel Bar Nachmeiny, in the name of

Rabi Yonasan, expounds upon a Pasuk in Yeshayahu (63,16). This Gemara tells us that in the future, HaShem

will tell Avraham, “your children have sinned,” to which Avraham will respond, “let them be wiped out for Your

name.” Unsatisfied with this reply, HaShem will say to Himself, “now I will ask Yaacov, who had great Tza’ar

Gidul Banim (pain raising children), the same question. But Yaacov will respond the same way as Avraham.

Once again, HaShem will be unhappy with this response, so He will say to Himself, “The older one lacks

reasoning, and the younger one lacks good counsel; I will ask Yitzchak.” Yitzchak will reply to HaShem, “Why

do You refer to them as my children, when they’re Your children as well. In fact, you call them ‘Beni Bechori

Yisrael!’ Besides, how much could they really have sinned? How many are a man’s years? Seventy. Take away

the first twenty since the Heavenly court does not punish one for sins committed before age twenty. So, there are

fifty years left. Take away half (twenty-five) of that during which the time is spent sleeping and resting. Take

away half again (twelve and a half) for time Davening, eating, and being in the bathroom. Therefore, there a

maximum of twelve and a half years in which there is potential to sin. If You will shoulder all of that time, good;

and if not, we will split it, and at the very worst, I will bear it myself.”

Ben Yehoyada now explains: All of the years that have been subtracted, which formed the basis of

Yitzchak’s vindication, resurface for the one who lends with interest. About him it cannot be said that his time in

the bathroom, davening, and sleeping are not potential targets for the Satan to be used in his arsenal of evidence

for prosecution of the Jew in the Heavenly court. The Malveh BeRibbis is proud of the fortune he has built with

little effort on his part and unfortunately, his prohibited practices are accelerated and propagated by his success.

The amenities afforded by his successful business, the affluence it brings, and the self-image buttressed by it

create an allure for the youth who, when confronted with a conflict between Jewish law and the temporal bliss of

material gratification, will fall prey to these formidable dangers, enticed by the materialism, reinforced by the

acclaim afforded to the wealthy regardless of how it was earned and eviscerate Judaism from one of its

fundamental precepts.

This is what the Gemara in Bava Metzia is teaching: Those who lend with Ribbis lose more than they

gain. They are under the impression that they profit more than others as they physically gain money even during

down time eating, sleeping, etc. But it is precisely for this reason that they lose. This becomes the basis of the

prosecution when one enters the Olam HaEmes, and this person who lends with interest is asked, “Nasata

VeNatata BeEmuna,” “Did you conduct your business faithfully and truthfully?” His exploitative efforts and

determination will be his ultimate downfall.

Prohibition Against Delaying Rosh HaShana 4a-6b, Nedarim 3 discusses the commandment of bal te’acher “not to delay.” The Gemara derives

that the Torah specifies that it is prohibited to delay fulfillment of one’s vow beyond a certain period. This

prohibition applies not only to vowed sacrificial offerings, but also to several other obligations.

What is the source from Torah?

י ר-כ ד רנ ת יך' לה ד י לשלמו תאחר לא אלק ש-כ נו דר דרש מך יךק אל' ה י (כב , כג דברים) :חטא בך והיה מע“When you make a vow to HaShem, your G-d, you should not delay in paying it since HaShem, your G-d will be

sure to exact it from you, and you will have sinned.”

This verse teaches that a person who accepts upon himself to bring a sacrifice cannot postpone fulfilling his

promise. This mitzvah, referred to by the Sages as bal te’acher - "do not be late [in bringing your sacrifice]" - is

followed by another pasuk (Devarim 23,24), that emphasizes the need for one to fulfill all promises that one

makes as a positive commandment, including - according to Chaza”l - promises made to charity.

A Nedar (a vowed offering) and a Nedavah (donated offering) are

subject to the prohibition against delaying. י ר-כ ד ר ת נ ד

The following are included since they are given completely to

HaShem with no part given even to the Kohanim: Value vows,

erech vows, cherem vows and consecrations. יך ' לה אלק

Liable for delaying these items and not for delaying its substitute. לשלמו תאחר לא There words refer to obligatory offerings which HaShem

“demands of you” such as: chatos, ashamos, olos, shelamim. י ש-כ נו דר דרש י

Words are extra, thus, available to include commitments that the

Torah mentions elsewhere with the Divine name, such as:

Tzedakah, maaser, and bechor offering. יך ' ה אלק

Since referred to elsewhere with the same word with respect to

the poor, also included are: Leket, Peah and Shichchah. מך מע

The sin will be only in the person if delayed and not in the

offering (which does not become invalid). חטא בך והיה

How long does a person have to carry out his/her obligations before being held liable for bal te’acher?

Regarding sacrifices, the generally accepted position is that a person has a full cycle of holidays – Pesach,

Shavuos, and Sukkos - to bring the commitments that were made to the Bais haMikdash. Regarding charity,

however, Rava teaches that it must be given immediately after the commitment is made. He explains that, unlike

a sacrifice that must be brought to the Temple, poor people are always accessible.

Several positions exist in understanding Rava's teaching.

• According to the Ri”f, the Ritva and others, Rava's halacha only applies when there are, in fact, poor people

located in the vicinity. If no poor people were immediately available, the person would not have to

search for a poor person until three festivals had passed.

• The Rashba argues that there is no difference whether a deserving poor person is available or not. In either

case there is an immediate mitzvas aseh - a positive commandment - to find a poor person who will

accept the charity. Nevertheless, no transgression of bal te’acher, the negative commandment, will take

place until after the cycle of holidays has passed. Rava's statement that poor people are readily available

merely explains why the mitzvas aseh is immediately incumbent upon him.

• The Ran explains that the year-long extension allowed to the person who takes upon himself the obligation

of a korban only makes sense in the context of sacrifices that will be brought to the Temple, usually

during one of the pilgrimage holidays. Rava teaches that this concept has no place in a discussion about

charity; therefore, Tzedakah must be given immediately, and someone who does not do so both misses

his opportunity to fulfill the positive command and also transgresses bal te’acher.

Concept of Three Festivals

ים שלוש ה בשנה ׀ פעמ ת־פני כל־זכורך ירא יך יהוה ׀ א רא במקום אלה בחר ש ה ולא הסכות ובחג השבעות ובחג המצות בחג י ירא

ת־פני ( טז, טז דברים: )ריקם יהוה א

Since the Torah just discussed each of the three festivals, this verse only needed to state שלש פעמים three times,

and the meaning would have been understood. Why did the Torah spell out the name of each festival? The

apparent redundant mention of each festival’s name is teaching that one is liable for delaying fulfilling his

“vows” (offerings and monetary) only after all three festivals have passed.

Halacha – bal te’acher

Rambam (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashim 14:13): It is a Mitzvas Aseh to fulfill Nedarim, Nedavos and other

obligations to pay Erchin, Damim, Ma'aseros and Matanos Aniyim at the first Regel. We learn from "U'Vosa

Shamah; Va'Haveisem Shamah". When you come to Yerushalayim for the Regel, you must bring all your

obligations. If he did not bring his obligation at the time of the Regel, he was Mevatel the Aseh. If three Regalim

passed and he did not offer the Korbanos or pay the money he transgressed "Lo Se'acher Leshalmo". There are

no lashed for this for there is no action.

Vows of charity

“With your mouth,” refers to tzedaka. Rava said: Regarding Tzedakah one is liable [for delaying the

fulfillment of a vow] immediately. Why? Because poor people are present [who need the money.]

Based on this Gemara, Rambam writes: A Tzedakah pledge is a form of a vow, therefore if one vows to give a

selah to Tzedakah or if he commits to give a particular coin to Tzedakah he is obligated to give the pledged money

to the poor immediately. If he delays giving the money he violates the prohibition of בל תאחר since he has the

ability to give the money and poor people are present. If, however, poor people are not present one should set

aside the money until a poor person is available. This ruling is cited by Shulchan Aruch.

Rav Betzalel Stern questions whether one violates בל תאחר every day he does not fulfill his pledge or whether he

violates the prohibition only once and the violation is ongoing. His conclusion is that once a poor person comes

to collect the money and the donor does not fulfill his vow, he violates the prohibition and that violation continues

until he fulfills his vow. There is a dispute whether the new refusal constitutes a new violation or a continuation

of the original violation if, after refusing to give Tzedakah to the first poor person, he subsequently refuses to

fulfill his vow when a second and third poor person asks for the money.

Rav Moshe Isserles, the Rema, qualifies this ruling and states that it applies only when the donor is going to

distribute the money to the poor himself. If, however, the pledge was made to a shul or other charitable

organization, one does not violate בל תאחר, even if poor people are present, until the Gabbai Tzedakah claims the

money. Only when the Gabbai Tzedakah claims the money and the donor refuses to fulfill his vow is the

prohibition violated. Furthermore, if the Gabbai Tzedakah is unaware of the pledge the donor is obligated to

inform him that a pledge was made so that he will be able to claim the money.

Seudas Shabbos

Chofetz Chaim states that if one has a poor guest to his home for the Shabbos meal, one is obligated to eat

immediately upon returning from shuel to avoid bal te’acher. One should not delay by saying Shalom Aleichem

or singing since the meal given to the poor is Tzedakah. Thus, one cannot tarry or stall at all. The Chofetz Chaim

himself was accustomed when he had poor guests, to say Shalom Aleichem during the meal. Further, he would

not stay longer in shuel, even to engage in Divrei Torah.

“With your mouth” (Devarim 23,24) refers to Tzedakah

Apparently upon death one cannot take anything with him except acts of Mitzvos, good deeds and Tzedakah. A

parable of understanding: When one wishes to move across a border, one does not have permission to take any

wealth or property. Thus, a person would transfer the value to a precious stone and swallow it. After crossing the

border, the person would spit up the stone. So, a person crosses the border of death one can only take acts that

can be swallowed. Thus, Lavan checked the mouth of Yaacov. (Orach Yesharim)

AGADAH (Rosh HaShana 6b): One’s wife will not die for the sin of "BAL TE'ACHER" (dafyomi.co.il)

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that the verse, "v'Hayah Becha Chet" -- "It shall be a sin for you" (Devarim

23:22), teaches that the prohibition of Bal Te'acher (delaying the fulfillment of a Neder) affects only the

transgressor and not his wife.

TOSFOS (DH Ela Im Ken) adds that when the Gemara in Shabbos (32b) says that one's wife may be punished if

he fails to fulfill his Neder, it refers only to a situation in which the husband never fulfills his Neder. If he

eventually fulfills it, his wife will not be punished for his delay.

The Midrash relates that Rachel Imenu died on the way to Eretz Yisrael because Yaacov Avinu delayed the

fulfillment of his pledge to bring a libation of oil (Nisuch Shemen) to the Mizbe'ach in Beis-El. Many years

earlier, when he left Eretz Yisrael to travel to the house of Lavan, he vowed to offer a libation on the Mizbe'ach

upon his return (Bereishis Rabah 81:2; see also Rashi to Bereishis 35:1). Yaacov Avinu eventually fulfilled his

Neder (before Rachel died), as the Torah relates (Bereishis 35:6-7).

The Midrash clearly implies that Yaacov Avinu's wife died as a result of his transgression of Bal Te'acher, even

though he eventually fulfilled his Neder. How is the Midrash to be reconciled with the Gemara here? (KOHELES

YAACOV (Rav Algazi); CHIDA in NITZOTZEI OROS to the Zohar loc cit.)

ANSWERS:

(a) The PERASHAS DERACHIM (Derush #3, DH uva'Zeh Yuvan) explains that the Midrash indeed argues

with the Gemara (see TOSFOS DH mid'Ben, and SEFAS EMES here). The Tana'im of the Midrash maintain

that transgressing the prohibition of Bal Te'acher does affect one's wife, as the Midrash states explicitly (in

Vayikra Rabah loc cit.): "One who vows and delays his vow buries his wife."

(b) The KLI CHEMDAH (beginning of VaYishlach) suggests that the Midrash does not argue with the Gemara.

Rather, Rachel Imenu died during childbirth, a life-threatening condition (as the Gemara mentions in Shabbos

32a). Since the attribute of strict justice is manifest at life-threatening moments, Rachel was unprotected from the

ramifications of her husband's transgression of Bal Te'acher. Under normal circumstances, however, one's wife

is not punished for her husband's sin of Bal Te'acher alone. (The Kli Chemdah offers another, intricate answer

"Pilpul".)

(c) An original solution may be suggested based on the words of the MESHECH CHOCHMAH (VaYetzei

31:13; see also Meshech Chochmah to Vayishlach 35:8). In his Neder (Bereishis 28:22), Yaacov Avinu promised

that upon his safe return he would offer Nesachim on the same "Matzeivah" that he had set up on his way to

Lavan. When he finally returned, however, HaShem told him to erect a new "Mizbe'ach" and not to use the

original Matzeivah (Bereishis 35:1 and 7).

The Torah forbids making a Matzeivah today because it is something which HaShem "has come to despise"

(Devarim 16:22). Rashi explains that although the Avos built Matzeivos and brought offerings upon them, the

practice became despicable to HaShem when the idol-worshippers imitated the practice and adopted it for the

service of their idols. Consequently, one may make only a Mizbe'ach and not a Matzeivah. A Mizbe'ach is

comprised of several stones, while a Matzeivah is comprised of a single stone.

Perhaps the idolaters adopted the practice of building a Matzeivah after they saw Yaacov build his Matzeivah for

HaShem when he was on his way to the house of Lavan. This explains why Yaacov Avinu was permitted to make

a Matzeivah when he left Eretz Yisrael but he was not permitted to use it upon his return. By the time he returned

22 years later, the building of Matzeivos had become a common practice among idolaters. (The verse which

mentions the building of a Matzeivah in the context of Yaacov's return is merely a flashback to Yaacov's initial

journey to Lavan; see Ramban and Seforno there.)

According to this explanation, one may propose that had Yaacov Avinu returned earlier to fulfill his Neder he

might have been able to pour oil on the Matzeivah, because the idolaters had not yet adopted the practice. In the

time that he delayed, the idolaters began to use Matzeivos in their idol-worship, and, as a result, he was unable to

fulfill his Neder in its entirety (since he could not make a Matzeivah). His wife was punished not because he

delayed his Neder, but because he was unable to fulfill it in its entirety.

כי תצא

MITZVOS OF LOST ITEMS

לא תראה את שור אחיך או את שיו נדחים והתעלמת מהם השב תשיבם לאחיך

עמך עד דרש אחיך עתו ואספתו אל תוך ביתך והיה ואם לא קרוב אחיך אליך ולא יד

והשבתו לו אתו

וכן תעשה לחמרו וכן תעשה לשמלתו וכן תעשה לכל אבדת אחיך אשר תאבד ממנו

ומצאתה לא תוכל להתעלם

ג -דברים כב, א

בכולןרבא ראה סלע שנפלה נטלה לפני יאוש על מנת לגוזלה עובר אמר בבא מציעא דף כו/ב מסכת

"ג דחזרה לאחר יאוש מתנה הוא ומשום השב תשיבם ומשום לא תוכל להתעלם ואע א תגזולמשום ל

ליה ואיסורא דעבד עבד נטלה לפני יאוש על מנת להחזירה ולאחר יאוש נתכוין לגוזלה עובר דיהיב

המתין לה עד שנתיאשו הבעלים ונטלה אינו עובר אלא משום לא תוכל להתעלם תשיבםמשום השב

בלבד

MITZVOS OF LOST ITEMS

(1) Do not steal (1 לא תגזול ) )ויקרא יט,יג(

(2) Certainly return the lost item (2 השב תשיבם ))דברים כב,א(

(3) Do not hide from responsibility

to return the lost item )דברים כב,א( ( לא תוכל להתעלם 3)

Keeping a fallen item prior to the owner giving up hope )יאוש( – transgresses all 3 Mitzvos

Take a fallen item prior to owner giving up hope )יאוש( in order to return it, but after the owner

gives up hope, he keeps the item - transgresses only #(2)

Leave the fallen item until the owner gives up hope and then takes it - transgresses only #(3)

Where in the Chumash is an allusion that in order to return a lost item to someone that provides signs?

The Torah states that one returns a lost item to: יך אתועד דרש אח , which teaches us:

1) From the word דרש one must search out one’s brother that lost the item by that person providing signs.

2) From the word אותו the original owner must provide signs )אות( that one owns that property

When a person abandons hope of finding the property, the property becomes ownerless and the finder may

keep the lost property. This is call יאוש

A person that declares “woe I have lost my money” indicates that they have given up hope. Why is the remembering

the lost item an indicator that the owner gave up hope on the lost object? The acknowledgement of the missing

item is an indicator that the owner is aware of the loss and now wishes to replace the lost item.

Abaye and Rava (Bava Metziah 21b) disagree regarding the status of an unknown loss item יאוש שלו מדעת.

ABAYE AND RAVA Of all the amora'im, Abaye and Rava are presented as epitomizing the style of discussions that take place in the

Gemara. They are mentioned thousands of times in the Gemara.

The disagreements between Abaye and Rava are amongst the most important in the Gemara, to the extent that

deep, significant Talmudic discussions are called havayos d'Abaye ve-Rava. The Gemara (Sukkos 28a) calls

the inquiries of Abaye and Rava “a small matter” in comparison to the Maaseh Merkavah (Workings of the

Chariot – Ezekiel’s vision of the Heavenly realms) “a great matter.”

The tradition is that they have 428 arguments in the Gemara. The halakhah always follows Rava's opinion,

with only six exceptions, where the halakhah follows Abaye’s opinion. Those six are referred to by the

Gemara by the acronym – YA”L KG”M : )יע"ל קג"ם(

When a person does not realize that he has lost an object until

after it is picked up by someone else, and he gives up

ownership when he realizes it, can we apply it

retroactively?

א עבבא מצי

כא.ת ע ד א מ ל ש ש ואי י

When witnesses are found to be unreliable, does their status

change as of that time or from the time that their false

testimony was made? מיםזומ יםד ע סדהדרין כז. ע

When a pole is standing on its own (it was not placed there by

a person), can it be used as part of the structure that will

create a legal private domain on Shabbat for the purpose of

carrying?

Does the days of the tumah period following childbirth count

towards the seven clean days for a zivah?

When a person is not able to prevent benefit from a prohibited

item, is it permitted when one does not intend to benefit?

ערובין טו.

.נידה לז

פסחים כה:

(Rashi):

חי העומד מאליו ל (Tosefos):

ידה סותרת לאין

בזיבה (Chamei Narbona):

א אפשר ולא ל

מתכוין

ל

If a couple gets married, but will be unable to consummate

their marriage, does it have legal significance? קדושין נא.

ושין של א נמסר דוק

לביאה ק

If a person makes a statement that can be understood as

affecting the divorce that has been sent to his wife, must we

take it into consideration when ruling on the validity of the

divorce?

עתא בג ולג גיטן לד. יטאי ד ג

Can a person who commits sins be trusted to testify in court? .סדהדרין כז מר אוכל נבלות ומ

כעיס לה מ

Although it is difficult to discern clear distinctive approaches, some opinions are provided:

Abaye was more formalistic relaying on the text, while Rava was based more on logical thinking.

Abaye was on a level of מקיף הרחוק; Rava was on a level of מקיף הקרוב

Abaye’s soul was related to Kayin; Rava’s soul was related to Hevel

Abaye (Little Father) was an orphan who never saw his father or his mother (hinted to in the

verse, "Asher bicha yerucham yatom אביי - for it is with You that an orphan finds mercy" (Hosea

14,4). He was raised by his uncle, Rabbah bar Nachmani, and his wife. He studied at the Yeshiva

(Torah Academy) of Pumbedisa, near the Euphrates. There his good friend and study-partner was

Rava (not to be confused with Rabbah, the Head of the Academy), with whom he often engaged

in debates on various aspects of Torah Law. Great as Abaye was in Torah, Rava was even greater,

and over the course of time, hundreds of their disputes are recorded in the Talmud.

Abaye (a Cohen) was a descendent of the family of Eli. The family was cursed not to live full

limes, and Abaye’s righteousness pushed off the curse until the early age of 60.

Rava established an advanced Torah Academy in Machoza. After the death of Abaye, many of

his students moved from Pumbedisa to Machoza.

Contemporary Mechir Kelev Questions

Article from Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question #1: Practical applications of Mechir Kelev (exchange of a dog)

“Are there any practical applications of the mitzvos of esnan zonah and mechir kelev that apply before the Beis

Hamikdash is rebuilt?”

Question #2: Unusual Rashi

Stew Dent asked me the following question:

“Someone told me that there is a comment of Rashi in this week’s parshah that does not

follow the accepted halachah. Is this true? Why would Rashi explain a pasuk not

according to the accepted halachah?”

Question #3: Doug from the Outback

Doug, originally from the Outback, asked a most unusual question:

“Rabbi, I am a recent baal teshuvah, and I discovered that the Torah prohibits offering a korban of an animal that

was once exchanged for a dog. Although this problem should not be germane when we have no Beis Hamikdash,

I believe I created such a problem, and I want to rectify the situation. I grew up in a rural area, where my folks

still live. They own sheep and other livestock. My folks, like all their neighbors, own watchdogs, sheep dogs, and

a few pet dogs, one of which, Charlie, was always regarded as mine. A neighbor’s child had taken a liking to

Charlie, and, before I left home for yeshivah in Israel, I wanted to give Charlie to the neighbor, figuring that this

child would provide Charlie with a good, loving home, and plenty of attention. My neighbor insisted on giving

us something in return for Charlie – a yearling lamb — which I accepted.

“Although I understand that I did nothing wrong in exchanging Charlie for a lamb, I also understand that this

lamb is no longer kosher for a korban. I am concerned that this lamb may get confused with the other lambs and

sheep on Dad’s ranch, and then none of them will be usable for korbanos. May I have them brand the lamb, so

that it does not get confused with the other lambs on the ranch? After all, it would be nice to be a purveyor of

animals for korbanos in the rebuilt Beis Hamikdash!”

Answers:

The mitzvah of mechir kelev: (Devarim 23:19)

Lo savi esnan zonah umechir kelev beis HaShem Elokecha lechol neder, ki so’avas HaShem Elokecha gam

sheneihem, “You shall not bring the gift of a harlot or something exchanged for a dog to the house of HaShem

your G-d as a donation, for both of them are despicable to HaShem, your G-d. The animal, or item, bartered for a

dog is called mechir kelev, and this term is also used to describe the prohibition. Before answering the above

questions, we need to discuss the basic laws of this mitzvah.

If someone exchanged a dog for a lamb, a calf, or some doves, none of these animals may be used any longer as

korbanos; and the same is true if he exchanged a dog for flour, wine or oil: they may no longer be used for

korbanos (Temurah 30b).

However, the prohibition applies only to the actual item that was exchanged for a dog. If someone sold a dog, and

then used the cash to purchase a lamb, this lamb may see service as a korban (see Temurah 30b; Aruch Hashulchan

He’asid 56:18).

Shinuy – the item changed

What if the original exchanged item has undergone major modification? Is there still a prohibition of mechir

kelev?

The Gemara (Temurah 30b) records a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel whether an esnan zonah or

a mechir kelev that underwent a permanent physical change is still prohibited to be used as a korban. According

to Beis Hillel, only an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev that appears as it originally did, or could be converted back

to its original appearance, is prohibited, but not if it has been processed into a different form (see Minchas Chinuch

571; Aruch Hashulchan He’asid 56:23). Thus, for example, if grain, grapes or olives were used either as an esnan

zonah or as a mechir kelev, and then the grain was ground into flour, the grapes were pressed into wine or the

olives were crushed into oil, the resultant flour, wine and oil may be used for korbanos, since they have undergone

a permanent transformation. This change is called a shinuy.

Beis Shammai disagrees, contending that a transformation, even a permanent one, does not remove the stigma of

the item being an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev. This approach contends that grain, grapes or olives used as an

esnan zonah or a mechir kelev remain prohibited forever as korbanos, even after they have been processed into

flour, wine or oil.

What is the basis of the dispute between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai? It is based on a dispute regarding how

one understands the end of our verse: Lo savi esnan zonah umechir kelev beis HaShem Elokecha lechol neder, ki

so’avas HaShem Elokecha gam sheneihem. The Gemara (Temurah 30b) notes that the words gam sheneihem,

literally, “for both of them,” appear to be redundant, which provides basis for deriving halachos from the

seemingly extra words of the Torah. Both Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel interpret the word them in the verse to

mean that the offspring of a ewe or cow that became an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev may be offered as a korban

– the stigma of esnan zonah or mechir kelev is restricted to the animal that was, itself, presented as a gift or

exchanged, not to its offspring. The offspring is permitted, unless the original “business deal” of esnan zonah or

mechir kelev specified that the unborn offspring was included in the transaction of the esnan zonah or the mechir

kelev (Minchas Chinuch 571; Aruch Hashulchan He’asid 56:23).

Beis Shammai explains that the additional word gam, “for,” expands the items included in the prohibition of

esnan zonah and mechir kelev to teach that even if the original esnan zonah or mechir kelev became transformed

permanently, it remains prohibited. Thus, Beis Shammai derives from the word gam that the grain, grapes or

olives used as an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev remain prohibited as korbanos, even after they have been

processed into flour, wine or oil.

Beis Hillel, on the other hand, holds that the word them in the verse teaches both that the offspring of an esnan

zonah or mechir kelev mother may be used as a korban and that an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev that underwent

a change become permitted as a korban. Thus, Beis Hillel derives two laws from one extra word of the verse, and

no law from the other extra word, which is unusual. The Gemara notes this difficulty with Beis Hillel’s approach,

but does not resolve it. Nevertheless, the authorities assume that the halachah is in accordance with the opinion

of Beis Hillel, as it usually is (Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Mizbeiach 4:18).

An obscure Rashi

Rashi explains that the word gam teaches that if someone gave wheat as an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev and it

was then processed into flour, the prohibition remains intact, and the flour cannot be offered as a korban. Thus,

Rashi explains the verse in a way that follows Beis Shammai’s opinion. The Ramban questions how Rashi can

explain the verse in accordance with Beis Shammai, when the halachic conclusion follows Beis Hillel.

One of the answers provided to explain Rashi’s opinion allows much food for thought. The Mizrachi contends

that Rashi follows Beis Shammai’s opinion since the Gemara raises a question on Beis Hillel’s opinion that it

does not resolve. Thus, Beis Shammai’s ruling is the approach that fits the verse with more clarity. According to

the Mizrachi, this means that, in this instance, Rashi disputed the halachic conclusion of the other authorities and

ruled according to Beis Shammai. Alternatively, Rashi felt it more important to explain the Chumash in a clearer

way, regardless of the halachic ramifications (Sifsei Chachamim).

Which of the nineteen?

The Gemara discusses the following case: Reuven owned ten lambs, whereas Shimon owned a dog and nine

lambs that were smaller or otherwise less valuable than Reuven’s ten lambs. The two of them agreed to trade

Reuven’s ten lambs in exchange for Shimon’s dog and nine scrawny lambs. The Gemara asks whether any or all

of these lambs are now prohibited as mechir kelev.

The Gemara concludes as follows: The nine scrawny lambs that were swapped along with the dog may be used

for korbanos, whereas the ten lambs that were received in exchange all qualify now as mechir kelev and are

therefore prohibited as korbanos.

Why is this so? The answer is that, since the dog is clearly worth more than any of the lambs, part of the value of

the dog was included in the exchange differential when ten more expensive lambs were traded for nine of lesser

value. Therefore, each of the ten is considered to have been exchanged, albeit only partially, for a dog, and this is

sufficient to confer on them the status of mechir kelev (Temurah 30a). However, the nine scrawnier lambs were

never exchanged for a dog – they were on the same side of the deal as the dog.

Similarly, in a case where two brothers divided an estate in such a way that one received a lamb while his brother

received a dog, the lamb is now considered a mechir kelev, prohibited for a korban (Temurah 30a).

What is prohibited?

Someone who shechted (slaughtered) either an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev as a korban, or performed zerikah

or haktarah, putting parts of these animals on the mizbeiach, the altar, is subject to the punishment of malkus for

violating the Torah’s prohibition (Minchas Chinuch 571).

It is curious to note that, although one may not offer an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev as a korban, someone who

declares them to be a korban does not violate any technical prohibition of the Torah. Furthermore, it is permitted

to declare these animals as property of the Beis Hamikdash (bedek habayis), in which case, the treasurers of the

Beis Hamikdash sell the esnan zonah or the mechir kelev and use the money for repairs in the Beis Hamikdash.

This is permitted, since the esnan zonah or the mechir kelev will not be used for a korban.

One prohibition or two?

Are esnan zonah and mechir kelev two different prohibitions, lo saaseh commandments, of the 613 mitzvos of the

Torah, or are they counted together as one lo saaseh commandment?

This matter is the subject of a dispute between rishonim. The Rambam contends that esnan zonah and mechir

kelev are counted together as one of the 613 mitzvos of the Torah, whereas the Ramban contends that they are

counted as two different mitzvos. The practical dispute between them is whether someone who offered both an

esnan zonah and a mechir kelev at the same time receives punishment for violating two different offenses of the

Torah, which means that he incurs two sets of malkus, or whether he is punished with malkus only once.

Mitzvos other than korbanos

“Are there any practical applications of the mitzvos of esnan zonah and mechir kelev that apply before the Beis

Hamikdash is rebuilt?” Do the mitzvos of esnan zonah and mechir kelev apply to any laws other than korbanos?

The answer is that the prohibitions of esnan zonah and mechir kelev are not restricted to the korbanos offered on

the mizbeiach in the Beis Hamikdash but extend to several other mitzvos of the Torah. For example, one may not

bring bikkurim, brought of the seven types of produce for which Eretz Yisroel is celebrated, from produce that

has the status of esnan zonah (Yerushalmi, Bikkurim 1:6; Aruch Hashulchan He’asid 56:22). This is because

bikkurim are also brought to the Beis Hamikdash, and the Torah states: “You shall not bring the gift of a harlot or

something exchanged for a dog to the house of HaShem, your G-d.”

The prohibition applies also to items used to decorate the Beis Hamikdash itself, such as the gold plate applied to

its walls (Temurah 30b). Some authorities contend that a parah adumah may also not be from either an esnan

zonah or a mechir kelev, since the Torah calls parah adumah a chatas, a sin offering (Minchas Chinuch 571).

There is also discussion about whether an eglah arufah may be from either an esnan zonah or a mechir kelev,

since the Torah says that its purpose is to atone, similar to a korban. However, the halachic conclusion is that an

esnan zonah or a mechir kelev calf may be used for the mitzvah of eglah arufah (Minchas Chinuch #571).

A shul donation

Do the mitzvos of esnan zonah and mechir kelev have any practical application today? In actuality, there is a

halachic ramification of these two mitzvos that is applicable today. The halachah is that the prohibitions of esnan

zonah and mechir kelev both apply to an item donated for use in a shul (Rema, Orach Chayim 153:21). This is

understood to mean that the Torah’s prohibition “You shall not bring the gift of a harlot or something exchanged

for a dog to the house of HaShem, your G-d, as a donation” should be applied to any house of G-d, even a shul or

a Beis Medrash. Therefore, a candelabrum or other item that was once exchanged for a dog, cannot be used in a

shul or as building material for a shul (Minchas Chinuch 571:2). However, if someone sold a dog for money, the

money received may be donated to the shul, since the money itself is not being used.

We are now ready to analyze Doug’s question. Doug correctly noted one of the interesting aspects of mechir

kelev: It is permitted to trade something for a dog, yet the item received in exchange becomes prohibited as a

korban. This juxtaposes to esnan zonah, which is banned only when the gift was in exchange for an illicit

relationship (Temurah 30a).

Korbanos from outside Eretz Yisroel

Doug is also correct that korbanos may be brought from animals from outside of Eretz Yisroel (Parah 2:1;

Temurah 21a; Rambam, Hilchos Maasei Hakorbanos 18:1). Therefore, any sheep in Dad’s flock that are

unblemished are all valid for korbanos, at least until the introduction of a mechir kelev into their midst.

Went along with the herd

Doug is also correct that if one animal that is a mechir kelev was in a large herd of cattle, and one does not know

which one is the mechir kelev, none of the animals in that herd may be offered as korbanos (Mishnah, Temurah

28a). Thus, there is a basis for his concern that the introduction of one mechir kelev could invalidate his father’s

entire flock from use for korbanos.

Conclusion

The Sefer Hachinuch explains that although we never know why HaShem commanded us to observe

specific mitzvos of the Torah, we can, nevertheless, derive a moral lesson, a taste, of what the mitzvah

teaches. The Ramban presents a very nice explanation why the animals acquired by way of esnan zonah

and mechir kelev may not be used as korbanos. Often, it happens that a person performs activities that are

unacceptable but feels that he can redeem himself by donating a percentage of his profits to a good,

charitable cause. In his mind, he has now justified his misdeeds, because of the mitzvah he performed

afterwards. By prohibiting esnan zonah, the Torah demonstrates that this is completely unacceptable. A

person must face the sinful nature of his actions and not try to create an excuse with which to cover them

up. Similarly, says the Ramban, those who use dogs for hunting and for other ill-advised activities may

want to donate their exchanged value as atonement for their own misdeeds. The Torah wants it to be

clearly understood that such donations are, themselves, misdeeds and are unacceptable; the perpetrator

cannot attempt to hide his sins behind his charitable activities.

GEOGRAPHY IN THE PARASHA - PARSHAS KI TETZE

“Alternate Weights, Larger or Smaller”

Based on article by Prof. Yoel Elitzur

The Gold and Silver Standard

Until the advent of the coinage system, all commerce in ancient times was based on the gold and silver

standard. In a normal transaction, the buyer would bring a gold or silver bar or jewelry and would then weigh

them on balance scales. Every instance of buying and selling in the Tanakh involved this weighing procedure:

“Abraham weighed out for Ephron the silver that he had named in the hearing of the Hittites” (Genesis 23:16);

“He must weigh out silver in accordance with the bride-price for virgins” (Exodus 22:16); “Even if a thousand

shekels were weighed out into my hands” (II Samuel 18:12); “Why do you spend money [lit. weigh out silver]

for what is not bread” (Isaiah 55:2); and finally, in Jeremiah’s description of his purchase of Hanamel’s field, he

says, “And I weighed out the silver on a balance” (Jeremiah 32:10).

In earlier periods, the more primitive barter method was used to carry out commercial transactions. In this

system, a person would offer his cow in exchange for a donkey or one hundred sheep in exchange for a plot of

land. From a linguistic perspective, it is worth noting that in the language of the Tanakh, the word mikneh is the

general term for sheep and cattle, undoubtedly because these livestock were used in order to acquire (liknot) other

items. The use of precious and semiprecious metals in place of livestock or grains was an early development that

allowed people to purchase goods without having to carry heavy or cumbersome items long distances. The

transition from cattle-based transactions to the first metal-based transactions can be seen in the archaeological

findings. A decorated bronze vessel from the mid-second century CE found in Cyprus integrated two figures, one

carrying a goat over his shoulder and a second figure a large copper bar. In the Aegean world, copper bars with

the figure of an ox imprinted upon them have been found. However, in every place where people had access to

gold and silver, they understandably preferred to carry a few ounces of these precious metals in their pockets

rather than numerous pounds of copper. One ancient and obscure means of payment was the kesitah. The kesitah,

whose etymological background is unknown, is mentioned in the story of Jacob’s purchase of the “parcel of land”

in Shechem (Genesis 33:19, Joshua 24:32) and in the description of Job’s restoration in Job 42:11. The prevailing

view among the ancient translations (i.e., the Septuagint, Onkelos, Jonathan, the Peshitta, the Vulgate, the Job

Targum) is that the word kesita refers to a ewe, and there is room to speculate that this interpretation is based on

an exegetical tradition rather than a mere guess. It is very likely that the word relates to the quantity of silver that

is equal in value to a ewe.

Items of jewelry were made intentionally so that their weights would be round numbers so that they could

be used as weights for commercial transactions. This is implied in the story of Rebekah and Abraham’s servant:

“The man took a gold nose-ring weighing a half-shekel (beka mishkalo), and two gold bands for her hands, ten

shekels in weight” (Genesis 24:22).

The use of the word beka (literally, “rift”) to refer to a half-shekel alludes to the fact that originally, a half-

shekel consisted of a piece of silver weighing one shekel that was actually split into two halves. Similarly, it

seems that the term betza kesef, which appears in the Song of Deborah (Judges 5:19), and its shortened version

betza (literally, “piece” or “slice”), which appears twenty-two times in the Tanakh, originated in the practice of

slicing pieces from gold and silver bars to be used as payment.1 Gold and silver bars that had been cut in two were

found at various archaeological

sites, as well as bars with a groove

in the middle indicating where to cut

in order to produce two equal

halves.

Bronze Age copper ingot found in Zakros, Crete (Wikimedia Commons – User “Chris 73”)

1 The verb livtzo’a appears in the Tanakh ten times, in the sense of robbery and theft.

The Invention of Coinage

Today’s coins are a form of fiat currency, possessing only symbolic value rather than actual intrinsic

value. This was a very late development, which began in Europe in the seventeenth century, while the Middle

East only completely converted to the system in the twentieth century. I would hazard a guess that over the course

of the twenty-first century, this system will fall by the wayside as well, as electronic payment or some other more

sophisticated system will supplant coins and paper bills entirely.

For more than two thousand years, the world was full of gold or silver coins whose value was assessed

based on their weight. It must be stated, though, that as early as the time of Chazal, the coin had symbolic value

to a certain extent; a coin maintained a fixed value even if it wore out and the quantity of metal it contained

decreased. Conversely, if a government declared a coin obsolete, it would lose all its value. The Talmud

distinguished between a money transaction and a barter transaction, and between tiv’a – the use of coinage

(matbe’a) as a method of acquisition – and peira – the use of objects or merchandise for acquisition (Bava Metzi’a

44a-47b).

The invention of coinage became possible the moment that people developed the technical ability to

imprint silver tokens with intricate designs, which a simple person without sophisticated tools would find difficult

to forge. The earliest coins in the world were minted in western Asia Minor during the end of the First Temple

period. The technique first spread through Greece and the surrounding areas, then throughout the civilized world.

The first coins mentioned in the Tanakh are darkemonim (Ezra 2:69; Nehemiah 7:66-71) and adarkhonim (Ezra

8:27; I Chronicles 29:7). Another version of adarkhonim found in other traditional texts is drakhonot2: “When

the Israelites came up out of the captivity they used to pay the Machatzit Ha-shekel in drakhonot” (Mishna

Shekalim 2:4).

The earliest coin discovered in the land of Israel was found accidentally by the great coin expert, my

teacher, Prof. Ya’akov Meshorer, z”l. Meshorer was a sort of coin hunter: He had a special knack for finding

coins, and would succeed in doing so almost every time he would visit an ancient site. In 1960, when he was a

25-year-old student, he was walking one morning in Jerusalem to the Givat Ram campus of the Hebrew

University. When he passed through the site of the Binyanei HaUma convention center (then under construction),

he suddenly noticed an ancient coin. Upon inspection, it became clear that this coin was an authentic tetradrachm

from the sixth century BCE, apparently imported to the land of Israel around the time of the Edict of Cyrus!3

Coins that were native to the land of Israel from their conception began to be minted about one hundred years

after the return to Zion, starting in Gaza (imitating the Athenian coins) and then in Ashkelon, Judah (in Jerusalem,

apparently) and in Samaria. The Judite coins are imprinted with the word yhd (pronounced yehud)4 and sometimes

(either in place of yehud or in addition to it) with a person’s name and title, such as “Johanan the Priest”; “Jaddua”;

“Judah”; and “Hezekiah the Governor.” In the Tanakh, even in the books set during the return to Zion, the verb

“weigh out” (the root Š-Q-L) still appears frequently, in every context of monetary payment: “So they weighed

out my wages, thirty shekels of silver” (Zechariah 11:12); “I will weigh out ten thousand talents of silver to the

stewards for deposit in the royal treasury” (Esther 3:9). Meshorer maintains that the values of coins during that

period were still not uniform or completely set. As a result, people would not rely on this coinage and continued

to weigh out their silver.

A YHD coin minted in Judea during the Persian period

2 The vowelization of the word as derakhon, rather than darkon, follows credible manuscripts of the Mishna. 3 The Greek drachma is equivalent to the dinar used by the Romans (as well as by Chazal); the tetradrachm is equivalent

to four dinars, a sela (representing the Biblical shekel) in the language of Chazal. 4 Compare to Ezra 5:8: yehud medinta – “the province of Judah.”

Stone Weights during the Biblical Period

From the Tanakh we are familiar with the shekel, the beka (or half-shekel), the “one-third of a shekel”

(Nehemiah 10:33) and the quarter-shekel (I Samuel 9:8). An example of a smaller unit is the gerah or agora

(“twenty gerahs to the shekel” [Exodus 30:13]), while larger units include the talent (kikar, equal to 3,000 shekels

according to Exodus 38:25-26) and the mina (maneh, appearing in the later parts of the Tanakh and in rabbinic

literature, equal to one hundred dinar or twenty-five sela’im.

The archaeological findings in the land of Israel contain numerous weight stones from the First Temple

period, each engraved with a notation indicating the weight of the stone. There were some rare weights, such as

one featuring the image of a turtle labeled peleg reva (“a part or half of one quarter”), along with another turtle

labeled chamesh (“five”). The most common symbol used to denote the shekel was 5,ע sometimes depicted

alongside digits (of the sort used at the time) indicating the number of shekels.6 Smaller stones were also found,

engraved with the words beka, pim, and nezeph. The shekel weighed, on average, about 0.4 ounce, the beka

weighed about 0.2 ounce, the pim weighed about 0.28 ounce and the nezeph weighed about 0.35 ounce. It seems,

then, that the pim was equal to about two-thirds of the value of the shekel, while the nezeph was about five-sixths

of its value. When the first pim was discovered in the City of David in the early twentieth century, a connection

to the following passage from I Samuel was immediately suggested:

No smith was to be found in all the land of Israel, for the Philistines were afraid that the Hebrews would

make swords or spears. So all the Israelites had to go down to the Philistines to have their plowshares,

their mattocks, axes and colters sharpened. And the sharpening was a pim for plowshares, mattocks, three-

pronged forks and axes, and for setting the goads. (I Samuel 13:19-21)

The commentators and the grammarians struggled to interpret the word pim here. In light of the finding, it was

suggested that the Philistines would charge the Israelites a pim for every sharpening. Some understood pim as a

shortened version of the expression pi shnayim. This expression is commonly thought to mean “double,” based

on a casual reading of the instances where it appears in the Tanakh. But the truth is that pi shnayim means two

parts out of three or more. For example, in our parasha the firstborn son inherits pi shnayim of his father’s estate,

meaning two parts out of all the parts into which the estate was divided. Similarly, Elisha asked of Elijah that he

be considered a “firstborn son” with respect to his spiritual inheritance, in relation to the other disciples of the

prophets: “Let two parts (pi shnayim) of your spirit pass on to me” (II Kings 2:9). Finally, see also Zechariah

13:8: “Two-thirds (pi shnayim) shall perish, shall die, and one-third of it shall survive.”7

Nezeph is a word that is not found in the Hebrew vocabulary. However, it is a word in Arabic that means

“half.” The finding demonstrates that in the Hebrew of the First Temple period, the word was used in the sense

of five-sixths.8

The sela that appears in rabbinic literature is the Tyrian tetradrachm, whose weight was about half an

ounce. It is interesting to note that all the Jewish coins from the Hasmonean period, and even from the time of

Herod, were cheap copper coins. On the other hand, numerous Tyrian tetradrachms have been found in Jerusalem

and in Judea, many more, in fact, than the number of such coins found in Tyre itself. Meshorer speculated that

because of the quality of the Tyrian sela’ and its importance for use in the Temple and for other halakhic purposes,

the Jews in Jerusalem would mint these Tyrian coins. The first Hebrew silver coins since the ancient yhd coins

were the beautiful and poignant coins that the Jewish rebels minted during the Great Revolt against Rome. These

coins were equal in value to the Tyrian sela’; they bore the inscription Shekel Yisrael on one side and

Yerushalayim Ha-kedosha (“the holy Jerusalem”) on the other.

Ramban, in a letter from the land of Israel (printed verbatim at the end of his commentary on the Torah in

the Chavel edition), describes this coin, using it as a basis for establishing the halakha regarding the precise weight

5 This symbol may have been a schematic illustration of a tied bundle in which one might keep his money. 6 According to Yohanan Aharoni, this practice was influenced by the Egyptian writing system. 7 A similar expression existed in ancient Egyptian: The consonant r is represented by the mouth hieroglyph, and thus rwy

means “two mouths,” or two-thirds. This is the linguistic equivalent of pi shnayim, as the Hebrew expression literally means “two mouths” as well.

8 Compare to Isaiah 44:16-19, where the word “half” refers to any fraction, and not necessarily fifty percent.

of the Biblical shekel.9 It seems that the increase in the weight of the shekel from the 0.4 ounce indicated by the

weights from the First Temple period to the half-ounce of the Tyrian shekel is about the same as the increase of

a sixth that the Sages defined as the upper limit of how much the measure of a coin may be increased.10 It is likely

that in ancient times each weight had various values, and it may be that Biblical phrases like “at the going

merchants’ rate,” “by the sanctuary weight” and “by the royal weight” referred to measures that were larger than

the standard shekel.

Weight stones from the First Temple period. Clockwise from top-left: beka, pim, two shekels and nezeph. (Z. Radovan)

“You Shall Not Have in Your Pouch Alternate Weights”

We can now return to this week’s parasha. It is well known that a small, imperceptible increase in an

object’s length, width or depth can have a significant impact on its volume. As a result, the degree of precision in

the dimensions of the weights in a person’s pouch could be an effective gauge of that person’s moral compass:

“Honest scales and balances are the Lord’s; all the weights in the bag11 are His work” (Proverbs 16:11). The

books in the Tanakh from the monarchy period include several references to “false balances” and “false weights”

(see Hosea 12:8; Amos 8:5; Micah 6:11; and Proverbs 11:1, 20:23). The Torah states:

You shall not have in your pouch alternate weights, larger and smaller. You shall not have in your house

alternate measures, a larger and a smaller. You must have completely honest weights and completely

honest measures, if you are to endure long on the soil that the Lord your G-d is giving to you. For everyone

who does those things, everyone who deals dishonestly, is abhorred to the Lord your G-d.

The measures here, like the weights, are identified by their set volume, and as a result they too are easy to

manipulate without causing a noticeable change. A dishonest person might prepare a “smaller weight” that he

would use when weighing out the amount of money he would need to pay when buying, as well a “larger weight”

that he would use when determining the amount of money he would receive when selling. The Torah teach that

even a small act of dishonesty, of which other people are not even aware, is an abhorrent injustice. The book of

Proverbs presents an abridged version of the passage in our parasha, converting the verses into a succinct adage:

“False scales are an abomination to the Lord; an honest weight pleases Him” (11:1); and “False weights and false

measures, both are an abomination to the Lord.”

For further study: Y. Aharoni, “The Use of Hieratic Numerals in Hebrew Ostraca and in the Shekel Weights,” BASOR 184 (1966), 13-19. R. Kletter, Economic Keystones: The Weight System of the Kingdom of Judah, JSOT Supplement 276, Sheffield 1998.

Y. Meshorer, Ancient Means of Exchange, Weights and Coins (ed. R. Reich), Haifa 1998, 15-18.

Y. Meshorer, “The Coins of Samaria in the Persian Period,” Michmanim 6 (1992), 7-13. Y. Meshorer, A Treasury of Jewish Coins, Jerusalem 2001, 1-17, 72-78.

Y. Meshorer, The Third Side of the Coin, Jerusalem 2006, 19-22 [Hebrew].

Y. Meshorer and S. Qedar, The Coinage of Samaria in the Fourth Century BCE, Jerusalem 1991, esp. 13-18. M. A. Powell, “Weights and Measures,” Anchor Bible Dictionary 6, 905-908.

N. Slouschz, Thesaurus of Phoenician Inscriptions, Tel-Aviv 1942, 116-118 [Hebrew].

E. Stern, “Midot U-mishkalot,” Encyclopaedia Biblica 4, 846-878 [Hebrew].

Y. Yadin, “Ancient Judaean Weights and the Date of the Samaria Ostraca,” Scripta Hierosolymitana 8 (1961), 9-25.

9 Ramban confirmed Rashi’s opinion on this matter, against the opinion of the Geonim: “And we weighed it at the money

changer’s tables and its weight was ten units of silver which are half an ounce, which Rashi has mentioned (see Rashi to Exodus 21:32).” This greatly supports Rashi’s opinion.

10 See Bava Batra 90a and Tosafot there; Menachot 77a; Bekhorot 5b. In the Torah, Onkelos translates the verse “twenty gerahs to the shekel” as “twenty ma’ahs to the sela”; the sela of the Second Temple period was equal to 24 ma’ahs, perhaps due to the influence of Mesopotamian measures.

11 The phrase even kis (“weight in the bag”) exists in Akkadian as well: aban kīsi.

MA’AKEH י פרק כב ח דברים ית תבנה כ ית חדש ב עקה ועש ך מ ג ים-ולא לג מים תש ד

ביתך י ב ל- כ פל יפ נ ו ה נ : ממ

Definition of Ma’akeh מעקה

Rashi Fence to a roof (physical structure)

Targum Protection תיק (function of structure)

Ibn Ezra put a peripheral around this area (place) – קום

protect against potential problems (oppression) – עקה

“he will surely fall” - future tense indicates predestined

Shabbos 32a

From the beginning of Creation this person was fated to fall. If so, why

is the homeowner blamed for the death? Meritorious acts come to

meritorious people, while unworthy acts come to unworthy people.

Rashi One who is destined to fall – due to sin.

Ibn Ezra Reference to what will occur when one falls, then you would know (in

hindsight) that he fell – a figure of speech.

Alshich One should protect others even if he is a sinner (one who is falling due

to his sins); if one falls off your roof then you are involved.

Abarbanel

Emphasis on the fallen one; this fortifies two basic concepts: Free will

yet G-d is fully aware.

Fence only benefits one who might accidently fall (by mistake); but does

not help one who is destined to fall, which can not be prevented.

Chinuch

HaShem in charge of generals and particulars; all occurs by Divine

degree resulting from one’s actions. Nevertheless, one must protect

against predictable incidents.

Spiritual Understanding of the Mitzvah

Shaloh

Roof alludes to conceit. Thus, one must put a fence around one’s

arrogance or else it would lead to one’s downfall

Blood in your house – always liable for one’s errors

Shach on Torah

New home – one is always in process of building a new home for the

next world

Blood (money) – do not define your home in terms of money

Bachaye (Decarte)

(Kabalistic) Roof indicates one in the highest level כתר, in building one’s

Divine dwelling, still need to build a fence (never safe); still

vulnerable to small mistakes which can have large negative effects

R’ Efraim Just as one makes a physical fence to one’s roof, so one needs to make a

fence to restraint one’s spirit "לגגך" גמטריא "בלבבך"

Maiyan Shel Torah מעקה ר"ת "הרהורי עבירה קשה מעבירה

Thoughts of sin are more difficult than sin; one must guard one’s mind

Lubavitcher Rebbe

זי"ע

Mitzvah – 2 parts – (negative) make sure no one gets hurt; (positive) put

up a fence (even if no chance of getting hurt)

Roof protecting against light (don’t wish to go higher); fence on top of

roof allows possibility can obtain greater light in the future

Spiritual Home: Roof-limits: Wall-limits but lets some in:

Fence-vehicle to receive more light

Lekutei Torah Need a fence in order not to fall back when making spiritual ascensions

Destroying Amaleik: The Ethical Quandry by Rabbi Chaim Jachter

Three times a day we recite the Pasuk composed by David HaMelech which states that HaShem extends His

mercy to all. We also declare that Tzaddik HaShem BeChol Derachav, that HaShem acts only with justice and

fairness. Accordingly, some find it difficult that HaShem commands us to utterly destroy the people of Amaleik

(Devarim 25:19 and Shmuel I 15:2), including their women and children. They ask, as did Avraham Avinu,

“HaShofeit Kol HaAretz Lo Ya’aseh Mishpat,” “The judge of the entire world, should not act justly?!”

(BeReishis 18:25).

The First Steps in Resolving the Quandary

The first step to understanding this obligation is noting that the Brisker Rav argues that the Mitzvah to destroy

Amaleik is limited to a situation where one receives a specific command from HaShem, through a Navi of well-

established credibility, to do so. His proof is from the fact that Sha’ul attacked Amaleik only after HaShem

specifically ordered Sha’ul to attack through Shmuel. If the command to destroy Amaleik applies in all

situations, then HaShem would not have ordered Shmuel to tell Sha’ul to destroy Amaleik. HaShem never

issued a command to Shmuel to tell Sha’ul to respect his parents or place Mezuzot on his doorposts. This is

because these Mitzvot apply at all times. The Mitzvah to destroy Amaleik, conversely, is of extremely limited

application.

Moreover, the Kesef Mishneh (to Rambam Hilchos Melachim 6:4) specifically writes that a member of the

people of Amaleik is no longer defined as “Amaleik” in regards to the Mitzvah of elimination, if that individual

accepted upon himself the seven Mitzvot of Bnei Noach. In other words, one is not considered Amaleik if he

accepts upon himself the very basic rules of humanity such as refraining from murder, adultery, and idolatry.

Amaleik Contrasted with Other Nations - Ramban

Although we have severely limited the application of destroying Amaleik, one wonders how HaShem could

issue such a command in any circumstance. In order to answer this question, we must first resolve another

question - why is HaShem more disturbed with Amaleik than any other nation? After all, even regarding

Mitzrayim who tortured and enslaved us for many decades, HaShem commands us to not hate them since they

served as our hosts for many years (Devarim 23:8).

Ramban (at the conclusion to his commentary to Parashat BeShalach) offers two answers. The first answer is

based on the timing of Amaleik’s attack. Amaleik was the first nation to attack us in the wake of Keri’at Yam

Suf. Keri’at Yam Suf (as noted in Shirat HaYam) made an extraordinary impression on the nations of the world.

The nations were in awe of us. Amaleik attacked us at that point even though we were not even remotely close

to their area, as the Torah (BeMidbar 13:29) records that Amaleik resides in the Negev, and Bnei Yisrael were

much further south, in the middle of the Sinai. Ramban explains that they attacked us since they sought to battle

HaShem and His reputation.

This idea is expressed in the well-known Mashal (parable) presented by Rashi (to Devarim 25:18). Rashi

compares Amaleik’s attack to one who enters a burning hot bath that everyone feared entering lest he be scalded

by the searing heat. This bold individual brazenly jumped in the scorching bath and although he was burned he

set a precedent for others to not fear entering the exceedingly hot bath. Amaleik was upset at the enhancement

of HaShem’s reputation as a result of Keri’at Yam Suf. Amaleik waged war simply to moderate the great

impression that was created. Amaleik’s actions to deliberately thwart the enhancement of HaShem’s name and

reputation are utterly abominable and deserving of the most severe punishment.

Ramban’s second answer is that HaShem regards Amaleik’s attack as repulsive since Amaleik, unlike

Mitzrayim, is our relative (Amaleik is the grandson of Eisav, BeReishis 36:12). The Torah expects relatives to

take responsibility for their kin (VaYikra 25:49) and views with utmost gravity the attack of a relative on his

vulnerable kin. Interestingly, Ramban (Devarim 23:5) offers a similar explanation as to why HaShem regards

Amon and Moav with such disdain. They hired Bil’am and refused us bread and water despite the fact that our

ancestor Avraham placed his life in great danger to save their ancestor Lot.

Rav Moshe Soloveitchik’s Approach to Amaleik

Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik cites from his father (although this idea is commonly attributed to Rav Chaim

Soloveithcik, the Rav’s grandfather, the Rav specifically told me that the idea originates with his father Rav

Moshe) that Amaleik is more a concept than a nation. He cites as proof the contrasting manner in which

Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 5:4-5) presents the Mitzvot to destroy Amaleik on the one hand and the seven

nations of Kena’an on the other hand.

Regarding the nations of Kena’an, Rambam writes that they have ceased to exist. Radbaz (commenting ad loc.)

explains that this is because of the Assyrian emperor Sancheirev’s policy of population transfer of the nations

he conquered dissolving the national identities of these nations (Berachos 28a). Curiously, Rambam does not

make such a statement regarding Amaleik even though their national identity should have been upset by

Sancheirev, just as happened to the seven Kena’ani nations. Rav Moshe Soloveitchik explains that this is

because one is defined as an Amalekite even if one is not a descendant of the Biblical nation of Amaleik. Rav

Soloveitchik argues that any individual or nation who expresses baseless hatred for the Jewish people is defined

as an Amaleikite. Indeed, Rav Soloveitchik regarded the Nazis as members of Amaleik, a concept that has been

widely accepted amongst our people.

Evidence to Rav Soloveitchik’s Approach to Amaleik

Chazal (e.g. Megilah 29a, with Rashi s.v. UMafsikim) seem to agree with this idea, as they regard Haman as

an Amalekite despite his living long after the demise of Sancheirev and the Assyrian Empire. Chazal base this

assertion on the fact that Megilat Esther repeatedly refers to Haman as “Agagi.” The only other time the name

Agag appears in Tanach is the king of Amaleik upon whom Sha’ul HaMelech waged war (Shmuel I 15), clearly

linking Haman with Amaleik (perhaps Haman had specific knowledge of his biological descent from Agag).

Indeed, the fact that HaShem states at the end of Parashat BeShalach that the war against Amaleik is eternal

(“MiDor Dor”) is another obvious proof to Rav Soloveichik’s definition of Amaleik. HaShem knew in advance

that Sancheirev would come and disrupt national identities, yet He describes the war on Amaleik as eternal. If

the war on Amaleik were to be solely based on lineage, it would be impossible to pursue post-Sancheirev.

One other proof is a strange phenomenon occurring in Sefer Shemuel I. In Perek 15 we find Amaleik nearly

annihilated and yet in Perek 30 of the same Sefer, after the passing of only a few years, reconstituted as a nation

and attacking David HaMelech’s camp. We must conclude that Amaleik does not refer to the descendants of

the people whose attack on us is recorded at the end of Parashat BeShalach. Rather, Amaleik is a code word

for any individual or nation who acts with complete disregard of morality, similar to the nation that launched

an unprovoked attack against us after Keri’at Yam Suf

Solving the Moral Difficulty

Rav Soloveitchik’s concept resolves our question as to why Amaleik differs from any other nation. The answer

is that the command to eradicate Amaleik transcends the concept of national identity. Any individual or nation

has the potential to deteriorate into Amaleik.

The concept of eradicating Amaleik, in part, is the elimination of any hint of Amaleik behavior and even thought

from our personalities and our societies. Amaleik teaches us that man can descend into the moral abyss if he

does not exercise proper care and caution.

In regard to HaShem commanding us to wage a war of complete annihilation against Amaleik, we assert that it

is sometimes an act of kindness to destroy a thoroughly evil nation. Of course, only HaShem can determine

when a nation has reached such a nadir and deserves to be utterly destroyed. Nonetheless, there are times when

humans must decide whether in the course of eliminating a thoroughly evil individual it is acceptable to also

kill his wife and children if there is no other option to eliminate that evil individual. For example, in the Israel-

Gaza War of 2008-2009, an arch Hamas terrorist who organized and encouraged unprovoked attacks on

innocent Israelis realized that the Israelis had finally located him standing alone and were about to kill him. He

immediately retreated into his home where his wife and children were located at the time, thinking that the

Israelis would not kill him in such a circumstance. However, the Israeli military command determined that

since the terrorist was so dangerous and thoroughly committed to continuing to inflict great harm upon Israelis,

that it would obliterate his house, thereby not only killing the arch-terrorist but his wife and children as well.

SIGNS NEEDED FOR RETURN OF A LOST ITEM

ד ב , בכפרק דברים רש אחיך אתו ע ד

אלא דרשהו אם רמאי הוא או אינו רמאי לאו שידרשנועלה על דעתך שיתננו קודם וכי ת ב"מ כ"ח ב'

דאורייתאבסימנין שמע מינה סימנין

T.T. It is not clear how the Gemara derives from this verse that signs are needed and not witnesses. Baal

HaTurim says the word אתו implies אות, a sign, like the verse regarding Tefillin, “it should be a sign for

you”. Thus, the explanation of the verse is that the lost item should stay by the finder until the owner

requests the lost item with “signs.” So explains the Zohar.

MITZVAH OF MAAKEH (Guard rail)

ך ולא ח , פרק כב דברים ג עקה לג ית מ ית חדש ועש י תבנה ב ב - כ מים ב ים ד יתך תש

זו מצוה לא תעשה –זו מצוה עשה, ולא תשים דמים בביתך –ועשית ספרי

Rambam says that one makes a blessing “asher kideshanu…” when making a Maakeh. This seems to contradict

what he states elsewhere, that one does not make a blessing on washing one’s fingers after the meal, since

one does not make a blessing on a matter which is done to prevent danger. And a Maakeh seems to exist to

prevent a danger of falling off an elevated place. And it is not reasonable to say that washing one’s hands is

to prevent a danger to oneself and a Maakeh is to prevent a danger for others, since what is the difference?

T.T. answers that the main point of this Mitzvah is in the land of Israel, where the roof tops are flat and people

frequent the rooftops, like the inside of the house and not a normal place of danger. Thus, since they

frequently use the roof tops, a logical concern exists that someone might fall off the roof, and thus, a

Maakeh is required. This is much different than “our” homes, where the rooftops are infrequently used, and

at those times when one does go onto the roof, one would be very careful to prevent falling off. Therefore,

our roofs would not be obligated with Maakeh.

THE WORD SHATNEZ

שעטנז )כ"ב, יא( עד שיהיה שוע טוי ונוז

The Gemara learns this word as a נוטריקון (contraction of multiple words into one word).

T.T. To explain, in the holy language words have no more than a three-letter basic form. Thus, when a word

appears with four or more basic letters, our Rabbis use the word for a derivation. Examples:

'( עזאזל )יומא ס"ו ב'(תלפיות )ברכות ל"א א'(, תלתלים )ערובין כ"א ב'(, חשמל )חגיגה י"ב א'(, מלקוש )תענית ו' א

ITEMS FOR FURTHER STUDY:

כא, טז חידוש בבכורות

כב, ג אבידת עכו"ם

שלוח הקן כב, ז

כב, ח כלב רע

כב, יא צורה כללית של שעטנז

כג, ג גרים לא נקרא קהל

כג, יט פסול של חליפי כלב

קדושין ע"י קנין א כד,

כד, ה קדושין י"ב חודש כה, ב מכות

כלית מלאכך ביום השביעי, אהבת אותנו ורצית בנו )בתפילת מוסף לשבת ראש השנה(

An explanation is needed for the connection between the end of the creative process on the Seventh Day of

Creation with the love of G-d towards us (the Jewish people).

It is possible to say that the end of Creation coincided with a painful experience (as if we could say such) for

G-d when Adam transgressed the command not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge. One might have

thought that at that time G-d would distance Himself from the human race (like He declared at the

time of the Flood), and even more, His Love for us would not be strong.

Therefore, G-d made known that His Love remained strong. (Parshas Ki Seitzei) “That G-d your G-d Loves

you”; (Malachi 1) “I love you, G-d said”. Plus He still wants us, (Tehillim 145) “That G-d wants

His people”. All these verses are said after the sin of Adam, and express the concept that even after

the sin, the Love still remains.

רצה והחליצנו )בברכת המזון(

When Yom Tov falls on Shabbos, the mentioning of Shabbos in the Amidah is included in the midst of the

prayer of Yom Tov, with only a relatively brief mention of Shabbos with an elaborate mentioning of

Yom Tov. Whereas in the Birchas HaMazon, each subject has its unique section (Shabbos – רצה

?Why the difference .(יעלה ויבא – and Yom Tov והחליצנו

Possibly, this difference can be explained according to the Gemara (Berachos 39a) the Amidah of Shabbos

was established to have seven blessings (seven kolos mentioned by Dovid in Tehillim 29, which is

also the source of 18 blessings in the weekday Amidah) and if one would separate the blessings of

Shabbos and Yom Tov, then those Shabbos’ Amidah would have eight blessings. Such a limitation

does not exist by Bircas HaMazon, and thus, each has its own unique section.

The reason that when Yom Tov and Shabbos coincide, Yom Tov has the main content (and Shabbos the

minor part) is due to the concept (Eruvin 40b) that Yom Tov is more beloved to G-d since it occurs

less frequently.

The verb והחליצינו() חלץ can have many meanings:

Removing an item from its place (Parsha Ki Seitzei וחלצו נעלו מעל רגלו(

A temporary revealing of a hidden matter (Eichah 4)

Pushing off a matter with strength (Tehillim 7)

Being saved from an accident or a difficulty (Mishlei 11)

Being removed or hidden from someone (Hoshea 5)

Going in front of an army (Parshas Mattos)

Removal from one’s set place to join an army (Parshas Mattos)

Physical strength (Yeshayahu 58)

Chazal taught us that this word must be understood in each place according to its context.

In this prayer on Shabbos, the intention of this word is that one should prepare oneself to be strong in

fulfilling the commands of G-d and His commands of the Shabbos day (and not translate the word as

to be saved on this Shabbos).

PARSHAS KI SEITZEI צא כי ת SELECTIONS

Double Portion

נים :יז , כא דברים י ש (To give to him a double portion)לתת לו פ

Baal HaTurim states that each letter of the letters in the word בכור alludes to the concept of doubling. The letter

י is double of the value of (value 20) כ the preceding letter. Also, the letter ,א is double the value of (value 2) ב

(10), its preceding letter. Plus the letter ר (value 200) is double its preceding letter (100 ק). Even the letter Vav

contains a double ו"ו (the name of the letter).

Simanim

ו אל -ואם :ב, כב דברים פת אס ו ו עת ך -לא קרוב אחיך אליך ולא יד יתך והיה עמ וך ב רש א ת ד ד חיך ע

בתו לו: אתו הש ו

Baal HaTurim cites the Gemara in Bava Metzia that by translating "oso" as 'its sign' (of identification), one can

switch the phrase to the finder. In that case, what the Pasuk is now saying is that someone who finds a lost

object may not return it to anybody before cross-examining him. How? One must demand that the “owner”

provides him with the object's double identification marks.

The term “double identification marks” is unclear. The Maggid Mishneh distinguishes between three classes of

simanim (identification marks). The best are called “extremely clear simanim” such as a hole next to a particular

letter. Torah law requires that such a found article is returned to the claimant on the basis of such a siman. This

may be the type of siman described as doubled, since it clearest of the clearest.

The next class is “worthy simanim” such as the dimensions of an object. In this case the article also must be

returned (but maybe only according to the Rabbis).

Finally the weakest type of siman such as “it’s long” or “it’s heavy” is not an acceptable proof of ownership.

Bin with a Chirik

ע- והיה אם :ב, כה דברים ות הרש כ ן ה And it will be if he is a son of (deserving) flogging ב

Baal HaTurim comments on why is the word "bin" vowelized with a "chirik" rather than with a "segol." This

teaches us that we must use "binoh" wisdom when administering flogging. Firstly, even if a person transgressed

a prohibition, there are six types of sins that do not carry the flogging penalty. Secondly, even if the sinner is

to be flogged, it must be done with great calculation. We do not automatically give him the full 39 floggings.

He might be too weak to receive them all. Also, when the court administers less then 39, they must be in

multiples of three.

According to Onkelos, the word בן of our verse is a form of the word בן, which usually means “son of”, but also

can mean “student of”. The form of the word בן appears more than 1500 times in Tanach. However the form

of the word בן appears only 33 times (28 times it is used in reference to Yehoshua).

Baal HaTurim cites another example אגור בן יקח, which is a name used by King Shlomo in reference to himself

(Mishlei 30,1). Baal HaTurim suggests that the word בן is connected to בינה (understanding), as is Yehoshua,

a person of understanding.

The Ohr Hachaim haKodesh

The Beautiful Captive Soul

“If you see among the captives a woman who has a beautiful appearance” (21:11).

The Ohr HaChaim HaKodosh asks the obvious question: How can HaShem give us a mitzva to

defile ourselves with a non-Jewish captive? How could it be that the same Torah, whose

commandments are to subjugate our evil passions, would here give in to those very same desires

and give its consent to them? Especially during a miraculous victory, where we witness HaShem’s

victorious hand in battle – at such a high point how can it be that we should sink so low? During

such a time we would expect a mitzva that adds sanctity and holiness and engenders greater

attachment to HaShem, not an ugly act that surely defiles us, thereby distancing us from HaShem.

Whereas an argument could be made that on the battlefront one should permit consumption of

non-kosher food to prevent starvation (see Rambam Chapter 8 of Hilchos Melochim), regarding

this mitzva our sages say in Kiddushin 21b that the Torah spoke here regarding the yetzer hora,

and so, says the Ohr HaChaim HaKodosh, wouldn’t we expect the Torah instead to command us

to subdue the yetzer and conquer it at a time when our King is waging war for us?

He answers that the appellation Eishes yefas to’ar is a term that means much more than just “a

beautiful captive woman”. She is literally described as a woman with a beautiful appearance, this

beautiful appearance being much more than just skin deep. In fact, the Ohr HaChaim reveals to

us that this yefas to’ar– this beautiful appearance – is the rays of holiness of a hidden neshoma, a

pure soul held captive within the body of this prisoner of war.

The Ohr HaChaim begins by revealing to us that HaShem has hidden ways in which He runs the

world. One of these secrets is that He plants souls within bodies. Citing the Zohar Chodosh in

Parshas Bolok, the Ohr HaChaim teaches us that when Odom sinned, some of the many holy,

pure souls he contained were taken captive by the forces of evil and the “Other Side”. These are

the souls of geirim (converts) who return to the fold of Klal Yisrael from among the nations of

the world. There were great Tzaddikim and Gedolei Yisrael whose souls came from geirim such

as Rus the Moabite, Shmaya, Avtalyon and Onkelos. These are just a few examples of righteous

converts with lofty souls who became Gedolim.

Another secret that the Ohr HaChaim reveals to us is that some holy and pure souls are held

captive in impure bodies until they are released by being pulled free from their prison. They can

only be freed by attraction to high levels of purity and kedusha. Like a magnet’s forces of

attraction draws metals that share its affinity, so too does kedusha attract kedusha, removing it

from its impure host. This was the deeper secret behind the story of Dina and Shechem the son

of Chamor and why he was so attracted to her, for he contained within himself the soul of Rav

Chanina ben Tradyon as explained in the writings of the Arizal (Likkutei Torah Vayishlach). That

holy soul was attached to Dina and was then drawn from him.

There are other holy souls held captive among the klippos, those husks and shells of impurity that

can guide and focus the intentions and actions of their hosts, and these are the souls of the geirim

who, of their own volition, convert to Yiddishkeit from among the nations, such as Rus the

Moabite and, as the Ohr HaChaim testifies about himself, “We ourselves have witnessed with our

own eyes such geirim who come of their own free will to convert.”

The Ohr HaChaim explains that when we perform mitzvos the divine light of the Shechina clothes

us and chases away all evil and darkness, as it says in Koheles 8: shomer mitzva lo yeida dovor

ra – “he who performs the commandments shall know no evil”. Especially shluchim (agents) who

are sent to perform mitzvos on behalf of others, as explained in Parshas Shelach, such shluchim

are even protected from the evil yetzer when they are in the midst of performing their shlichus.

After understanding all this, says the Ohr HaChaim, we can perceive this mitzva as clearly as the

midday sun. The pasuk says, “When you go out to war,” referring to a war that is a mitzva, setting

the stage for us to be actively engaged in performing our holy duty. At this moment, therefore,

when we take captives, we are again actively engaged in a mitzva (see Rambam Chapter 8 Hilchos

Melochim).We are thus shluchim and protected from evil, so when we encounter among the

captives a non-Jewish woman and we see that she is a yefas to’ar–that she has a radiant and

beautiful appearance – we can surmise that it is not her external, physical beauty that we are

seeing; rather, because we are actively engaged in a mitzva it must be the holy soul captive within

her that we are seeing, that beautiful lofty soul is peeking out and displaying its radiance and

beauty. This is the yefas to’ar that we see.

The very fact that at the moment you are engaged in a mitzva and surrounded by the Shechina’s

light and radiance, you desire this beautiful woman proves that it is the captive soul’s beauty and

not her physicality that you desire, because you are engaged in the shlichus of a mitzva and it

must therefore be a positive desire that you feel. That is why the pasuk says, “You desired boh –

“in her”– and not osah – “her”. It is the soul within her that you desire, the yefas to’ar, the goodly

portion of the pure soul captive within her.

As we explained, the holy soul, when freed from the clutches of the klippos, attaches herself to

holiness in one of two ways: either it is freed and then it leaves its host, like in the story of Dina

and Shechem, or, if the holy soul remains, she converts and the host becomes a Ger Tzedek like

Rus the Moabite. The litmus test the Torah gives us now is to bring her home and shave her hair

and fingernails. You must remove all exterior facades of physical beauty and see if she converts

and if you still desire and love her. If she does convert, you may marry her, for her soul remains

and she is a truly righteous convert. If not, that soul has left her. This will prevent you from

desiring her for unholy purposes, for once you are no longer actively engaged in the mitzva of

war, perhaps your yetzer will desire a non-Jewish wife. Once she is no longer physically attractive

we will see if you are still attracted to her. If she converts and you wish to marry her, it proves

that the attraction is toward the holy soul within her, which has made her a righteous convert.

MESCHECH CHOCHMAH

You should not bring an (animal used to) pay a harlot, (even if) it was exchanged for a dog, to the

House of G-d, to fulfill any (sacrificial) vow (Devarim 23,19)

"L'chol neder" - For any vow - The Sifri derives from this that the prohibition of offering a sacrifice

of an animal that was either payment for the services of a prostitute or the proceeds of the sale of a

dog apply to a "bomoh" altar as well. Toldos Adom says that it is simply derived from the inclusive

connotation of the word l'CHOL.

However, the Meshech Chochmah has a most innovative explanation. He notes that the syntax of our

verse is difficult. The verse should have either said "Lo sovi esnan zonoh umchir kelev l'chol neder

beis Hashem Elokecho," or "Lo sovi beis HaShem Elokecho esnan .." "L'chol neder" seems to be in

the wrong place, as it is surely attached to the item brought as a "neder." Why is it dangling at the

end? This teaches us that the prohibition applies even to a "bomoh." "Beis Hashem Elokecho l'chol

neder" means a house of Hashem for "n'dorim," sacrifices that are voluntarily donated. "Bomoh"

altars only accept personal donation sacrifices and not obligatory sacrifices such as a "chatos." This

seems to be a brilliant deduction.

There is more to this than the dvar Torah itself, as is found in our sefer Meshech Chochmah. Rabbi

Yoseif Adler was the Rov of a town named Turda. The Meshech Chochmah's fame as a child prodigy

genius was known far and wide. The Rov had the opportunity to meet Rabbi Meir Simchah was he

was but eleven years old. Young Meir Simchoh already knew all the sefer Urim v'Tumim on Ch.M.

The Rov tested him on this and saw that he indeed knew it all. During their conversation the Rov

became aware of young Meir Simchah's lack of knowledge of Rashi on the Torah.

When asked about the disparity, he answered that since he was a young boy he acted accordingly,

and although aware that one should have a solid grounding in Chumash and Rashi he found that one

page of Urim v'Tumim had more sharpness and insightfulness than all the comments of Rashi on

Chumash combined. (Remember, he was only eleven years old at the time.) The Rov was taken aback

and told the youngster, "I plan to be back in about a year. At that time, I expect you to know Chumash

and Rashi well, all of it!"

A year later the Rov came and tested Meir Simchah, and was quite satisfied with his knowledge of

Chumash and Rashi. Meir Simchoh now told the Rov, "Contrary to what I told you last year, I now

realize that there is more wisdom in one explanation of Rashi on chumash than in all the sefer Urim

v'Tumim. Take this Rashi, which explains that 'l'chol dovor' teaches us that the prohibition applies

even to 'bomoh.' (Note that we do not have this Rashi in our text, but it appears in some older

editions.) The 'dibur hamas'chil,' words of the text upon which Rashi comments, is quite lengthy,

'beis Hashem Elokecho l'chol dovor.' Why doesn't Rashi just bring 'l'chol dovor'?"

Meir Simchah answered as above, that the derivation is from the seeming misplacement of "l'chol

dovor," and the insight of "beis Hashem Elokecho l'chol dovor" being one continuous phrase,

meaning "bomoh."

May this most interesting story and accompanying dvar Torah serve as a springboard to have

us appreciate the depth and profundity of the commentary of Rashi on Chumash.

Understanding the Parsha according to the Rebbe ממ"ש

QUESTION: What is the Chassidic understanding of the first verse in this Parsha regarding the purpose of the

soul’s descent into this world?

ANSWER: The purpose of the soul is not to destroy the body, but to subdue and rectify it to service of G-d. Thus,

according to Chassidus, one would “translate” as follows:

”Go out to war” Soul has to battle, not to destroy but to refine

“Your enemies” one’s body and animal soul

“G-d will deliver them into your hands” assist you to prevail (when one makes the effort to battle)

“Capture one’s captives” the sparks inherent in physical matter will be transformed by the soul’s efforts

)לקוטי שיחות כרך ב, עמ' 384(

QUESTION: Within the allusion that the HaShem and the Jewish people are married, how can one speak of

separation from HaShem?

ANSWER: A Get (divorce document) is principally a matter of separation ()כריתות , but also contains the concept

of unity ()ספר , revealing the essence of the prior connection that exists. Thus, the appearance of separation

between HaShem and the Jewish people provides an opportunity for a greater connection that can result

from the subsequent Teshuvah of the Jews. )143 'לקוטי שיחות כרך ט, עמ(

QUESTION: How do we reconcile the mitzvah to wipe out the memory of Amalek, yet we must also remember

what Amalek did to us in the desert?

ANSWER: The two directives do not contradict each other. We do have a mitzvah to wipe out all items in the

world which carry forth the name of Amalek (people, animals, etc.). However, one must remember the deeds

of Amalek so we can use that knowledge to grow in our service to HaShem. In terms of our avodah, the

concept of Amalek is “coldness”. Thus, we need to remove all the places that this “coldness” can take hold.

Using Kabolas Ol, we use this experience to grow. )86 'לקוטי שיחות כרך יד , עמ(

QUESTION: Why is there a difference between issur of Shatnez (which is permitted in the Mikdash and in

Tzitzis) and the other prohibited mixtures (which are never permitted)?

ANSWER: Forbidden to mix together different groups of animals or growth of the ground since such a mixture

attempts to cross the boundaries established by G-d. Whereas, the mixture of wool and linen (Shatnez) does

not change the essence of each item, which remains as is. )122 'לקוטי שיחות כרך כט, עמ(

QUESTION: What are the three explanations of how one makes Shatnez and how to understand each concept?

ANSWER: )123 'לקוטי שיחות כרך ל ד, עמ(

Rashi Need all 3 activities of

combing, spinning and weaving

One category of joining 2 entities to

become a new single entity (totally mixed)

Similar to the vineyard

Rabeinu

Tam

Issur only if woven together as one

(regardless if combed or spun)

Each item not mixed in its essence

External combination – similar to plowing

Rambam Any one of 3 actions

Combed or spun or woven

Even if not combined into one entity

Intermediate comparison: similar to

mixing species; requires joining but not to

the extent of becoming one entity

BEN CHAMESH L’MIKRA בס"ד - ועוד לקו"ש השבועימהענינים -

לע"נ ר' אפרים ב"ר אברהם ע"ה האפמאן נשמת אפרים ▪ Resource to encourage the study of the Rebbe’s sichos ▪

Designed for use in the classroom or at the Shabbos Table