October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10...

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULAtORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415 October 25, 2010 Mr. Thomas P. Joyce President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC N09 P.O. Box :236 Hancock'H Bridge, NJ 08038 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2010004 and 05000311/2010004 Dear Mr .•Joyce: On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on October 7, 2010, with Mr. Fricker and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, two violations that were determined to be of very low safety significance are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Secti()n 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violcltions and because they are entered into your corrective action program (CAP). If you contest NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A TIN: Document Control Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Directclr, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem Nuclear Station. In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," i3 copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronic8111y for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly

Transcript of October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10...

Page 1: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULAtORY COMMISSION

REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD

KING OF PRUSSIA PA 19406-1415

October 25 2010

Mr Thomas P Joyce President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC ~ N09 PO Box 236 HancockH Bridge NJ 08038

SUB~IECT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS 1 AND 2shyNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 050002722010004 and 050003112010004

Dear Mr bullJoyce

On September 302010 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on October 7 2010 with Mr Fricker and other members of your staff

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records observed activities and interviewed personnel

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified However two licensee~identified violations that were determined to be of very low safety significance are listed in this report The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Secti()n 232a of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violcltions and because they are entered into your corrective action program (CAP) If you contest thE~se NCVs you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report with the basis for your denial to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission A TIN Document Control De~sk Washington DC 20555-0001 with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I the Directclr Office of Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555-0001 and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem Nuclear Generatin~~ Station

In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice i3 copy of this letter its enclosure and your response (if any) will be available electronic8111y for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly

TJoyce 2

Available Hecords (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS) ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at httpwwwnrcgovreading-rmadamshtml(the PubliC Electronic Reading Room)

Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos 50-272 50-311 License Nos DPR-70 DPR-75

Enclosure Inspection Report 0500027212010004 and 050003112010004 wAttachment Supplemental Information

co wencl Distribution via ListServ

T Joyce 2

Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS) ADAMS is accessibh~ from the NRC Web site at httpwwwnrcgovlreading-rmadamshtml(the Public Electronic Reading Room)

Sincerely

IRAJ Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos 50-272 50-311 License Nos DPR-70 DPR-75

Enclosure Inspection Report 050002722010004 and 050003112010004 wAttachment Supplemental Information

CC wencl Distribution via ListServ

Distribution wencl

W Dean RA (R10RAMAIL Resource) A Turilin DRP M Dapas ORA (R10RAMAIL Resource) C Douglas DRP D Lew DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource) D Schroeder DRP SRI J Clifford DRP (R1 DRPMAIL Resource) P McKenna DRP RI D Roberts DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) K McKenzie DRP OA P Wilson DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) L Trocine RI OEDO A Burritt ORP RidsNrrPIVISalem Resource L Cline DHP ROPreportsResourcenrcgov

DOCUMENT NAME GDRPBRANCH3lnspectionReportslssuedSAL 1 004docx

SUNSI Review Complete ALB (Reviewers Initials) ML102980181

After declaring this document An Official Agency RecordH it will be released to the Public

To receive a co

OFFICE mmt RIIDRP RIDRP

NAME DSchroederALB for LeHneALB for ABurritt ALB DATE 102210 102210 102210

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

1

Docket Nos

License Nos

Report No

Licensee

Facility

Location

Dates

Inspectors

Approved By

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272 50-311

DPR-70 DPR-75

050002722010004 and 050003112010004

PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2

PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge NJ 08038

July 1 2010 through September 30 2010

D Schroeder Senior Resident Inspector S Ibarrola Acting Resident Inspector J Ayala Acting Resident Inspector E Torres Acting Resident Inspector E Burket Reactor Inspector J Furia Senior Health Physicist

Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3

REPORT DETAILS 4

1 REACTOR SAFETY 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment 5 1R05 Fire Protection 6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 7 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 8 1R15 Operability Evaluations 9 1R18 Plant Modifications 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing 10 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities 10 1R22 Surveillance Testing 11

2 RADIATION SAFETy 11 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls 11 2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls 12 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment 13

4 OTHER ACTIVITI ES 15 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification 15 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems 15 40A3 Event Follow-up 16 40A5 Other Activities 17 40A6 Meetings Including Exit 19 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations 19

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED A-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS A-10

Enclosure

3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004 050003112010004 07012010 - 09302010 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 Routine Integrated Inspection Report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREGshy1649 Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4 dated December 2006

No findings of significance were identified

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by PSEG have been reviewed by the inspectors Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into PSEGs CAP These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

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representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

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16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 2: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

TJoyce 2

Available Hecords (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS) ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at httpwwwnrcgovreading-rmadamshtml(the PubliC Electronic Reading Room)

Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos 50-272 50-311 License Nos DPR-70 DPR-75

Enclosure Inspection Report 0500027212010004 and 050003112010004 wAttachment Supplemental Information

co wencl Distribution via ListServ

T Joyce 2

Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS) ADAMS is accessibh~ from the NRC Web site at httpwwwnrcgovlreading-rmadamshtml(the Public Electronic Reading Room)

Sincerely

IRAJ Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos 50-272 50-311 License Nos DPR-70 DPR-75

Enclosure Inspection Report 050002722010004 and 050003112010004 wAttachment Supplemental Information

CC wencl Distribution via ListServ

Distribution wencl

W Dean RA (R10RAMAIL Resource) A Turilin DRP M Dapas ORA (R10RAMAIL Resource) C Douglas DRP D Lew DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource) D Schroeder DRP SRI J Clifford DRP (R1 DRPMAIL Resource) P McKenna DRP RI D Roberts DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) K McKenzie DRP OA P Wilson DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) L Trocine RI OEDO A Burritt ORP RidsNrrPIVISalem Resource L Cline DHP ROPreportsResourcenrcgov

DOCUMENT NAME GDRPBRANCH3lnspectionReportslssuedSAL 1 004docx

SUNSI Review Complete ALB (Reviewers Initials) ML102980181

After declaring this document An Official Agency RecordH it will be released to the Public

To receive a co

OFFICE mmt RIIDRP RIDRP

NAME DSchroederALB for LeHneALB for ABurritt ALB DATE 102210 102210 102210

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

1

Docket Nos

License Nos

Report No

Licensee

Facility

Location

Dates

Inspectors

Approved By

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272 50-311

DPR-70 DPR-75

050002722010004 and 050003112010004

PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2

PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge NJ 08038

July 1 2010 through September 30 2010

D Schroeder Senior Resident Inspector S Ibarrola Acting Resident Inspector J Ayala Acting Resident Inspector E Torres Acting Resident Inspector E Burket Reactor Inspector J Furia Senior Health Physicist

Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3

REPORT DETAILS 4

1 REACTOR SAFETY 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment 5 1R05 Fire Protection 6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 7 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 8 1R15 Operability Evaluations 9 1R18 Plant Modifications 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing 10 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities 10 1R22 Surveillance Testing 11

2 RADIATION SAFETy 11 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls 11 2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls 12 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment 13

4 OTHER ACTIVITI ES 15 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification 15 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems 15 40A3 Event Follow-up 16 40A5 Other Activities 17 40A6 Meetings Including Exit 19 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations 19

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED A-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS A-10

Enclosure

3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004 050003112010004 07012010 - 09302010 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 Routine Integrated Inspection Report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREGshy1649 Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4 dated December 2006

No findings of significance were identified

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by PSEG have been reviewed by the inspectors Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into PSEGs CAP These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 3: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

T Joyce 2

Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS) ADAMS is accessibh~ from the NRC Web site at httpwwwnrcgovlreading-rmadamshtml(the Public Electronic Reading Room)

Sincerely

IRAJ Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos 50-272 50-311 License Nos DPR-70 DPR-75

Enclosure Inspection Report 050002722010004 and 050003112010004 wAttachment Supplemental Information

CC wencl Distribution via ListServ

Distribution wencl

W Dean RA (R10RAMAIL Resource) A Turilin DRP M Dapas ORA (R10RAMAIL Resource) C Douglas DRP D Lew DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource) D Schroeder DRP SRI J Clifford DRP (R1 DRPMAIL Resource) P McKenna DRP RI D Roberts DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) K McKenzie DRP OA P Wilson DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) L Trocine RI OEDO A Burritt ORP RidsNrrPIVISalem Resource L Cline DHP ROPreportsResourcenrcgov

DOCUMENT NAME GDRPBRANCH3lnspectionReportslssuedSAL 1 004docx

SUNSI Review Complete ALB (Reviewers Initials) ML102980181

After declaring this document An Official Agency RecordH it will be released to the Public

To receive a co

OFFICE mmt RIIDRP RIDRP

NAME DSchroederALB for LeHneALB for ABurritt ALB DATE 102210 102210 102210

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

1

Docket Nos

License Nos

Report No

Licensee

Facility

Location

Dates

Inspectors

Approved By

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272 50-311

DPR-70 DPR-75

050002722010004 and 050003112010004

PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2

PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge NJ 08038

July 1 2010 through September 30 2010

D Schroeder Senior Resident Inspector S Ibarrola Acting Resident Inspector J Ayala Acting Resident Inspector E Torres Acting Resident Inspector E Burket Reactor Inspector J Furia Senior Health Physicist

Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3

REPORT DETAILS 4

1 REACTOR SAFETY 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment 5 1R05 Fire Protection 6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 7 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 8 1R15 Operability Evaluations 9 1R18 Plant Modifications 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing 10 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities 10 1R22 Surveillance Testing 11

2 RADIATION SAFETy 11 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls 11 2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls 12 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment 13

4 OTHER ACTIVITI ES 15 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification 15 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems 15 40A3 Event Follow-up 16 40A5 Other Activities 17 40A6 Meetings Including Exit 19 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations 19

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED A-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS A-10

Enclosure

3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004 050003112010004 07012010 - 09302010 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 Routine Integrated Inspection Report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREGshy1649 Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4 dated December 2006

No findings of significance were identified

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by PSEG have been reviewed by the inspectors Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into PSEGs CAP These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 4: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

1

Docket Nos

License Nos

Report No

Licensee

Facility

Location

Dates

Inspectors

Approved By

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272 50-311

DPR-70 DPR-75

050002722010004 and 050003112010004

PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2

PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge NJ 08038

July 1 2010 through September 30 2010

D Schroeder Senior Resident Inspector S Ibarrola Acting Resident Inspector J Ayala Acting Resident Inspector E Torres Acting Resident Inspector E Burket Reactor Inspector J Furia Senior Health Physicist

Arthur L Burritt Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3

REPORT DETAILS 4

1 REACTOR SAFETY 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment 5 1R05 Fire Protection 6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 7 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 8 1R15 Operability Evaluations 9 1R18 Plant Modifications 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing 10 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities 10 1R22 Surveillance Testing 11

2 RADIATION SAFETy 11 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls 11 2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls 12 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment 13

4 OTHER ACTIVITI ES 15 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification 15 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems 15 40A3 Event Follow-up 16 40A5 Other Activities 17 40A6 Meetings Including Exit 19 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations 19

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED A-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS A-10

Enclosure

3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004 050003112010004 07012010 - 09302010 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 Routine Integrated Inspection Report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREGshy1649 Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4 dated December 2006

No findings of significance were identified

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by PSEG have been reviewed by the inspectors Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into PSEGs CAP These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 5: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 3

REPORT DETAILS 4

1 REACTOR SAFETY 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment 5 1R05 Fire Protection 6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 7 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control 8 1R15 Operability Evaluations 9 1R18 Plant Modifications 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing 10 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities 10 1R22 Surveillance Testing 11

2 RADIATION SAFETy 11 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls 11 2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls 12 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment 13

4 OTHER ACTIVITI ES 15 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification 15 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems 15 40A3 Event Follow-up 16 40A5 Other Activities 17 40A6 Meetings Including Exit 19 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations 19

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED A-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS A-10

Enclosure

3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004 050003112010004 07012010 - 09302010 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 Routine Integrated Inspection Report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREGshy1649 Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4 dated December 2006

No findings of significance were identified

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by PSEG have been reviewed by the inspectors Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into PSEGs CAP These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 6: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004 050003112010004 07012010 - 09302010 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos 1 and 2 Routine Integrated Inspection Report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREGshy1649 Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4 dated December 2006

No findings of significance were identified

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by PSEG have been reviewed by the inspectors Corrective actions taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into PSEGs CAP These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 7: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary ()f Plant Status

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power On July 7 Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT) Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25 On September 17 after operators isolated bleed steam valve 12BS22 due to an internal steam leak operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity and Emergency PrE~paredness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (7111101 - 2 samples)

1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparation and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot weather conditions between July 6 and July 72010 The inspectors evaluated PSEGs implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures for extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84degF and ambient air temperatures above 100degF The inspectors walked down risk-significant strlJctures systems and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related conditions did not adversely impact sse operability In addition the inspectors assessed the condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level transients The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) intake emergency diesel generators (EOGs) vital switchgear rooms the gas turbine generator (GTG) main and unit auxiliary transformers component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers the main turbines and generators and the station air compressors The inspectors observed portions of GTG performance testing from the control room and GTG local control panel The inspectors also reviewed PSEG corrective action notifications to ensure that PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather related problems The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a Inspection Scope

Enclosure I

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 8: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

1

5

The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23 2010 The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of PSEGs preparations Specifically the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safetyrelated components and systems were reported in the CAP Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the SWIS was not impacted For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (7111104 - 4 samples 7111104S - 1 sample)

Partial Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures walked down control systems components and verified that selected breakers valves and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 SW system with 13 SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 bull Unit 2 21 and 22 CCW pumps with 23 CCW pump OOS on August 11 and August

12 Unit 228 and 2C EDG with 2A EDG ODS on July 29 bull Unit 2 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosure

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 9: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

6

2 Complete Walkdown

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of AFW motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power labeling hangers and supports and associated support systems The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition oil reservoir levels were nermal pump rIOems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated system parameters were within established ranges and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

NIt) findings were identified

1 R05 Fire Protection (71111050 - 6 samples)

1 Fire Pretectien - Tours

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and that compensatory measures for out of service degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms 64 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps area 84 elevation bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW intake structure 92 amp 112 elevations and bull Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area 64 elevation

b Findings

No findings were identified

I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (7111106 - 2 samples)

1 Internal Flooding

Enclosure

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 10: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

1

7

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample The inspectors eVilluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components These features included plant drains watertight doors sump pumps and wall penetration seals The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections operator logs abnormal procedures and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 Underground BunkersManholes Subiect to Flooding

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault MH-SWI-1 The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not SUbmerged in water the integrity of the cables the condition of cable support structures and the ability to dewater these structures The inspectors noted that PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (7111111 Q - 1 sample)

Re~qualification Activities Review by Resident Staff

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample Specifically the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14 2010 The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of coolant accident The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities the Emergency Plan previous lessons learned items and the correct use and implementation of procedures The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified discussed and entered into the CAP as appropriate Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 11: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

8

b Findings

No findings were identified

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (7111112Q - 3 samples)

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for three componentssystems listed below The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was) corrective action notifications and preventive maintenance tasks The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment

bull 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps bull Unit 1 AFW pumps bull Unit 3 GTG

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7111113 - 6 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10 CFR 5065(a(4) prior to removing equipment for work The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations work schedules and control room logs for these configurations PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings control room tours and plant walkdowns The inspectors also used PSEGs online risk monitor (Equipment OOS workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Unit 1 13 AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 bull Unit 2 2A EDG OOS on July 29 bull Unit 2 2A EDG 008 on August 23

Enclosure

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 12: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

1

9

bull Unit 1 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September 3

bull Unit 2 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance on September 7

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (7111115 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with

bull Unit 1 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld

bull Unit 2 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with 22 SW inlet valve (22SW153) failed in open position

bull Unit 2 2A EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance bull Unit 2 22BF22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 CAV isolation damper degraded seals

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations Additionally the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

No findings were identified

1 R18 Plant Modifications (7111118 - 2 samples)

Temporary Modifications

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below Thlaquo9 inspectors verified that the design bases licensing bases and performance capability of the affectedsystems were not degraded by the temporary modifications The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment

Enclosure

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 13: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

10

bull Unit 1 11 amp 12 AFW pumps lifted leads bull Unit 2 2C battery temporary installation

b Findings

A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 19 - 7 samples)

a InslDection Scope

The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples ThE inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance activities listed below The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel testing was adequate for the maintenance performed acceptance criteria were clear demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull WOs 60091111 and 60091124 13 turbine-driven AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

bull WO 60090467 23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement bull WO 60091466 2A EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement bull WO 60081294 2SJ2 charging pump suction valve thermal overload replacement bull WO 60092089 22 control area chiller compressor replacement bull WO 60087957 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery bull WO 3019759813 AFW pump following head lever maintenance

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (7111120 - 1 sample)

a Inspection Scope

Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7 2010 Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the MPT PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 72010 through July 242010 to repair the MPT replace the 1CV284 and perform additional maintenance activities During the outage the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes bull Outage risk management bull Decay heat removal operations

Enclosure

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 14: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

11

bull Configuration management including maintenance of defense in depth bull Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSswere met bull Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other

(liscrepant conditions bull Personnel fatigue management controls

b Findings

No findings were identified

1 R22 Surveillance Testing (7111122 - 5 samples)

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples The inspectors observed portions of andor reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify as appropriate whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements the TS requirements the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI for pump and valve testing Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

bull S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test bull S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump bull S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV

Functional Test bull S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 RHR Pump bull S20P-STRHR-0002 RHR Discharge Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse

Flow Test

b Findings

No findings were identified

2 RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (7112401)

a Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (eg PSEGs quality assurance audits or other independent audits)

Enclosure

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 15: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

12

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection

The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report - Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarmmiddot Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16 2010 during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room During this activity a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation) PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator

The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-202010 and verified that PSEG had implemented corrective actions from the June 16 2010 event and that these corrective actions were effective

Risk-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls

The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection

The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs and areas with the potential to become a VHRA ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the VHRA

Radiation Worker Performance

During job performance observations the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace radiation work permit controlslimits were in place and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present

The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found thE~ cause ofthe event to be human performance errors The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems The inspectors discussed with the RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken

b Findings

No findings were identified

2RS2 Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (7112402)

Enclosure

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 16: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

13

a Inspection Scope

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems

The inspectors selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome

The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that PSEG had established measures to track trend and if necessary to reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews andor additional ALARA planning and controls The inspectors reviewed PSEGs collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 (I RF20) Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method of adjusting exposure estimates or reshyplanning work when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process

No findings were identified

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (7112404)

a Inspection Scope

sectQecial Bioassay

The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides including collection and storage of samples

The inspectors determined that PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis nor verifying the labs participation in an analYSis cross-check pmgram

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs program for dose assessments based on airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that flow rates andor collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel apply protection factors The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborneDAC monitoring The inspectors verified that PSEGs DAC calculations were

Enclosure

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 17: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

14

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture including hard-to-detect nuclides

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with PSEG procedures

Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External ~posures

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented

The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)

The inspectors review SDE dose assessments for adequacy The inspectors evaluated PSEGs method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors evaluated PSEGs neutron dosimetry program including dosimeter types andor survey instrumentation

The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry andor instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose andor dose rate measurement and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events as applicable

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section the inspectors determined how PSEG aSSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent SDE and lens dose equivalent

b Findings

No findings were identified

Enclosuremiddot

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 18: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

15

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 ~ 6 samples)

a InsRection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone PIs listed below To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 5

Cornerstone Mitigating Systems

bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW systems bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR systems and bull Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to CAP records control room operators logs the site operating history database and key PI summary records

b Findings

No findings were identified

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample)

1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEGs CAP This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

2 Review of Operator Workaround Program

a Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program The inspectors reviewed PSEGs control room distraction report operator burden list and operator burden self-assessment The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures The review included interviews with licensed opE~rators and walkdowns of main control room panels Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings and Observations

No findings were identified

Enclosure

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 19: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

1

16

PSEG identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2 but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102shy103 OperatorWorkaround Program and OP-AA-1 02-1 03w1001 UOperator Burdens Programraquo for PSEG program requirements and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits

40A3 Event Followwup (71153 - 3 samples)

iQosed) Licensee Event Report 050002722010-001-00 Automatic Start of the 1C EDG

On April 16 2010 at 1641 hours the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source The 1 C EDG automatically started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design Abnormal operating procedure S10P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended

Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C EDG was the result of the failure of the 13CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch) The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap Corrective actions consist of replacement of the 13CSD 52STA switch proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

2 (Closed) lER 05000272-2010-002-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure

On July 7 2010 at approximately 1118 an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50 reactor power The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B C differential relays in the main generator protection scheme which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer bushing after an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot sprinkler heads that had mEllted due to the unusually high ambient temperatures combined with the transformers heat direct sunlight and restricted ventilation caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer B phase Mist from the deluge system actuation driven by the transformer cooling fans the heat rising from the transformer and the close proximity of the concrete wall enclosure rose above the main power transformer B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint The

Enclosure

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 20: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

1

17

inspectors completed a review of this LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements This lER is closed

3 (Closed) LER 050002722010-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304

On July 25 2010 at 0940 a PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) At the time of discovery Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic start circuitry is required by TS 3321 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 PSEG re-established the automatic start of the AFW pumps on a trip of both SGFPs at 1557 on July 25 2010

The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven AFW pumps on a trip of the SGFPs was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension Corrective actions consisted of training procedure revisions and personnel accountability The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by TS 3321 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by TS 304 The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7 This LER is closed

40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (TO 2515177 - Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Sgray Systems

a Inspection Scope

ThE~ NRC staff developed TI 2515177 to support the NRCs confirmatory review of licensee responses to NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Based on the review of PSEGs GL 2008-01 response letters the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments modifications and programmatically controlled actions described in their GL 2008-01 response The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that PSEG submitted to the NRC in response to GL 2008-01

The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that PSEGs drawings reflected the subject system configurations and UFSAR descriptions Specifically the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the CVCS RHR safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) systems

bull High pOint vents were identified bull High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to

their potential for gas accumulation

Enclosure

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 21: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

18

bull Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability such as orifices in horizontal pipes isolated branch lines heat exchangers improperly sloped piping and under closed valves were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation and

bull For piping segments reviewed branch lines and fittings were clearly shown

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of PSEGs drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01 The inspectors verified that PSEG conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation vents instructions and procedures tests and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability The inspectors reviewed PSEGs methodology used to determine system piping high pOints identification of negative sloped piping and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable

The inspectors verified that PSEG included all emergency core COOling systems along with supporting systems within scope of the GL In addition the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of RHR suction lines when initiating RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for ltis-found voids which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps The inspectors coordinated this review with NRR who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection

The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5EGs procedures used for filling and venting the associated GL 2008~01 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redlIcing voiding to acceptable levels The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge piping as committed to in P5EGs GL response A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011 The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit) The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453)

The inspectors verified that PSEGs surveillance frequencies were consistent with the UFSAR T5s and associated bases The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP as necessary In addition on August 4 2010 the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5EGs nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions The inspectors also verified that NRC commitments in PSEGs submittals were included in the CAP Additionally the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01

Enclosure

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 22: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

19

review The inspectors performed this review to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of ope~rability for gas voids discovered in the field Finally the inspectors reviewed PSEGs training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

b Findings

No findings were identified

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from PSEG Because of this the TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from NRR

40A6 Meetings Including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr C Fricker and other members of PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7 2010 The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary No proprietary information was identified

40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations

The following violations of NRC requirements were identified by PSEG They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 23 of the NRC Enforcement Policy NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs

bull TS 681 Procedures and Programs states in part that written procedures shall be established implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 133 Revision 2 February 1978 Regulatory Guide 133 Section IX includes written procedures for performing maintenance which can affect the performance of safety related equipment Contrary to the above PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure Specifically the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for 4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521STA auxiliary switch operating mechanism This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16 2010

This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory it did not affect PSEGs ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory and it did not degrade PSEGs ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost PSEG entered this violation in their CAP as notification 20459055

bull TS 3211 function 8f requires that both motor-driven AFVV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2 Contrary to this requirement from 2132 hours on July 222010 to 1557 hours on July 252010

Enclosure

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 23: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

20

lhis auto start function was disabled Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2

This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic flooding or severe weather initiating event PSEG entered this TS violation in their CAP as notification 20471722

AITACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 24: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel C Fricker Site Vice President E Eilola Plant Manager L Rajkowski Engineering Director R DeSanctis Maintenance Director J Garecht Operations Director J Higgins System Engineer F Hummel System Engineer R Gary Radiation Protection Manager S Bowers System Engineer E Villar Licensing Engineer M Wolk Senior Reactor Operator

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

050002722010-001-00 LER Automatic Start of the 1 C EDG (Section 40A31)

050002722010-002-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A32)

0500027212010-003-00 LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 304 (Section 40A33)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records

Section 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures SCOP-ABZZ-0001 Adverse Environmental Conditions Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines Revision 5

Orders 70111536 70049239

Attachment

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Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

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Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

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Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

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Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

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Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 25: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-2

Section 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

Procedure~ S10P-ST-SW-0013 Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4 Revision 1 S 1 OP-SOAF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S10P-STAF-0008 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3 Revision 4 SeMD-PMZZ-0005 Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance Revision 8

Drawings 205331 222508 205236

Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722

Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793

Other Documents VTD 174547 Terry Turbine Inspection Manual Revision 21

Section 11~05 Fire Protection

Procedures FRS-II-421 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan 4160V Switchgear Rooms amp Battery Rooms

Elevation 64 Revision 6 FRS-II-433 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation

84 Revision 6 FRS-II-9111 Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan Service Water Intake Structure Elevation 92

amp 112 Revision 2 FRS-II-424 Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation 64 Revision 2

Drawings FA-01 Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision 0 FP-01 Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No2 Elev 64 Revision A FP-12B No1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux Feedwater Pump Area Elev

84 Revision 2

Notifications 20429890 20472945

Orders 70044438

Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591 S2 C02 Replacement 64 78 and 84 Elevations NCDE-PSzZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis

Revision 6 IS-2-FP-FEE-1987 Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation - 2FA-AB-64A

Revision 0 I

Attachment

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Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 26: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-3

Section 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures

Proceduresect S20P-ABSWmiddot0001 Loss of Service Water Header Pressure Revision 16 S20P-ABSW-0003 Service Water Bay Leak Revision 7 S20P-ABZZ-0002 Flooding Revision 3 S20P-SOSW-0005 Service Water System Operation Revision 40 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection Revision 3

Drawings 205342 212805

Notifications (NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545 20474629 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450

Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents SCDE-TSZZ-2034 Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation Salem

Generating Station Revision 5 SCFP-SVFBR-0026 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection dated April 23 2010 SCOP-DLZZ-0008 CirculatingService Water Logs dated July 262010 and August 2 2010 ER-AA-3003 Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable

Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients dated 272007 PSEG Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0 Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use

at Salem amp Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1 5KVto 15KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5 Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments NRC Information Notice 2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables NRC Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 050004162009006 Engineering Evaluation Number S-C-4KV-EEE-1751 Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable

Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2

Seabrook Issue Summary Condition Report No 211208357 Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables dated 11192009

Section 1 R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

Procedures TO-AA-301 Simulator Configuration Management Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Revision 27

Attachment

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 27: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-4

Section 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633

Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log from 9282008 - 9282010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for CVC)

Section 1 Ri3 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work control

Procedures ER~AA-600 Risk Management Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002 On-Line Risk Management Revision 5 WC-AA-101 On-Line Work Management Process Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

Notifications 20476129

Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834

Other Documents SGS Unit 2 PRA Risk Assessment for Work Week 037

Section iRiS Operability Evaluations

Procedures S20P-PTSW-0005 Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers Revision 8 S20P-SOSW-0008 Inservice Room Cooler Flushes Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Drawings 205228 205342 205337

Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841

Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466

Other Documents SER OTDM Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284 Revision 6

Attachment

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 28: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

Section 1 R18 Plant Modifications

Proceduresect S10P-IOZZ-0002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Revision 56 S1OP-IOZZ-01 03 Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements Revision 6 S10P-SORPS-0009 InstallRemoval of AFW Start Function from SGFP Trips Revision 5 S10P-SOPC-0001 SWitchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation Revision 20

Design Changes TCCP No 2SnO-006 2C 125VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications 20471722 20477280

Orders 70104212

Other Documents Letter from the NRC to PSEG Subj Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No2 Issuance of

Amendment Re One-time On-line Battery Replacement daled 9112010 Control Room Logs

Section 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures S10P-SOAF-0001(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation Revision 27 S20P-STCC-0003(Q) Inservice Testing 23 Component Cooling Pump Revision 25 SCMD-PMAF-0007(Q) 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and

Lubrication Revision 0 S20P-STCH-0004 Chilled Water System - Chillers Revision 17 S20P-ST125-0001 Electrical Power Systems 125VDC Distribution Revision 11 S20P-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Revision 12 S2RA-STSJ-0003 Inservice Testing Safety Injection Valves Modes 1 - 6 Acceptance

Criteria Revision 14 S10PmiddotPTAF-0003 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run Revision 0 S20P-STDG-0001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46

Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141

Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466

Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log dated 91242010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report No 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 922010 Root Cause Investigation Report 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious

Trips dated 9202010 MA~AA-7716-004 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3) Revision 10

Attachment

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 29: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-6

Section 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures OP-AA-10B-108 Unit Restart Review Revision 9

Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651

Orders 60091125

Other Documents S10P-SOAF-0001 Attachment 2 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of 4)

Revision 27 OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001 Attachment 1 Trip Report Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001 Attachment 2 Post Reactor TripECCS Actuation Review Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report B Phase Main Power TransformerHigh Voltage Bushing Failure

dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer amp Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 14 Four Hour Report - NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide Attachment 29 Twenty-four Hour Report North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE of Events Review Report

Section 1R22 Surveillance Testing

Procedures S1IC-FTRCP-0023 1PT-474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel IV Revision 16 S20P-STDG-001 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Revision 46 S20P-STSJ-0001 Inservice Testing - 21 Safety Injection Pump Revision 19 S20P-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing - 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Revision 28 S2RA-STRHR-0002 Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria

Revision 8 S20P-PTRHR-0002 22 RHR Pump Flow Data Revision 4

Drawings 223678

Notifications (NRC identified) 20153697 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159 20474660 20474496 20472575

Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347

Section 2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Notifications 20467421

Attachment

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 30: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-7

Other Documents Prompt Investiga1ion Report Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography shy

20467421

Section 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Notifications 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 20457207

Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59

Section 2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program Revision 6 I RP-AA-21 Dosimetry Issue Usage and Control Revision 10 i

Section 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 20472916 20477296

Other Documents Salem 1 SW Narrative Lag from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative Log from 712009 - 712010 Salem 1 AF Narrative Lag from 7112009 - 712010 Salem 2 SW Narrative Log from 6302009 - 6302010 Salem 2 RHR Narrative Log from 6302009 - 63012010 Salem 2 AF Narrative Lag from 6302009 - 6302010

Section 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952

Orders 70092096

Other Documents OP-AA-102-103-1001 Operator Burdens Program Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103 Operator Work-Around Program Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 1 - Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment Salem Unit 2 - Second Quarter

Attachment

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 31: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-8

Section 4()A3 Event Follow-up

Procedures SCOP-SOAKV-0001 4KV Breaker Operation Revision 23 SCMD-PRAKV-0002 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification Revision 9

Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352

Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345

Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 1112 SGFP Trips disabled when

required by Technical SpeCifications 4160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift) dated 4162010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift) dated 41712010

Section 40A5 Other Activities

Procedure~ S10P-ABLOCA-0001 Shutdown LOCA Revision 6 S10P-SOCVC-0007 Fill and Vent of the cves Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0001 Initiating RHR Revision 23 S10P-SORHR-0002 Terminating RHR Revision 16 S10P-SORHR-0003 Filling and Venting the RHR System Revision 19 S10P-SOSJ-0001 Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation Revision 14 S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350degF Revision 14 S20P-SOeS-0001 Preparation of the CS System for Normal Operation Revision 15 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg 2 350F Revision 17

Drawings 205228 205232 205234 205235 CVC-1-2B CVC-1-2C RH-1-1A RH-1-1B RH-1-2B

Notifications (NRC identified) 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385058 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408074 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 20472366 20472575

Orders 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 80097737 80099683

Calculations and Evaluations 11050-740-02 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 eve System Revision 0 11050-740-03 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 amp 2 RHR System Revision 0 11050-740-04 Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 amp 251 System Revision 0

Attachment

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 32: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

A-9

80097737 Adding Vent Valves on SIRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between RHR Pumps (5059 Review) Revision 0

80099810 Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 2123SJ43 and 2224SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request) Revision 0

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050~705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 12202008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 1 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 1212012008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation dated 102712008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation dated 10272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation dated 1 0272008

Sargent amp Lundy LLC Project 11050-705 Salem Unit 2 GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation dated 10272008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0 Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893 Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in RHR Recirculation Crossshy

Connect Piping Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation NEI System Gas Accumulation Management

Workshop dated 1212010 VTD 431261 Industry Guidance - Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems Revision 1 WCAP-16631-NP TestingEvaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of ECCS Pumps Revision 0

Completed Tests S10P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg lti 350F performed 4172009 8132009

121120091162010211212010311201042520410 and 5142010 S20P-STSJ-0009 ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ~ 350D F performed 792009 87i2009

182010262010362010492010552010 and 6152010

Other Documents NRC GL 2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling Decay Heat

Removal and Containment Spray Systems dated 1112008 LR N08-0234 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to NRC GL 2008-01

dated 10132008 LR N09-0028 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 1 Supplementa1 (Post-Outage) Response 10 NRC GL

2008-01 dated 21102009 LR N10-0014 PSEG to NRC Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC GL

2008-01 dated 282010 LR N10-0075 PSEG to NRC Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding GL 2008-01 dated 3111f2010 S-C-RHR-MEE-1055 Shutdown LOCA Design Basis Salem Units 1 and 2 Revision 0 Engineering Support Training Gas Intrusion Revision 3 Long Ran~~e Training Plan 0910 licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 1 System Health Reports Unit 1 and 2 CVC SI RHR and CS Systems 3rd Otr 2009 through 2nd

Qtr 2010

Attachment

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment

Page 33: October 25, 2010 · NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt! ALB DATE . 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 . OFFICIAL RECORD COPY . 1 . ... 1 R05 Fire Protection ... was synchronized

ADAMS AFW ALARA CAP CCW CFR CS CVCS DAC EDG GL GTG HRA HX LER MPT NCV NEI NRC NRR OOS PARS PI PMT PSEG RCS RHR RPM SDE SGFP SI SSC SW SWIS TI TS TSAS UT VHRA WO

A-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation Containment Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration Emergency Diesel Generator Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator High Radiation Area Heat Exchanger Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer Non-cited Violation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Out-of -Service Publicly Available Records Performance Indicator Post-Maintenance Testing Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation Protection Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Safety Injection Structures Systems and Components Service Water Service Water Intake Structure Temporary Instruction TechnicalmiddotSpecifications Technical Specification Action Statement Ultrasonic Test Very High Radiation Area Work Order

Attachment