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After Qeiaiantine .~

TiFIERE, A,RE two Gagc aspects yo, the Presideqt’s ac- tlon announcing a “quarantine” or li,mited b,logkade of Cuba. One has to do with the wisdmom of the decision itself, the other with the method and manner-the phrasing, staging and timing-of the dwision. ’

As to the decisioll itserf, any ‘commentator or for that matter, any citizen, is a t a d81stlnct disadvantage since -at least a t this’ juncture-only the Pcesideat and his advisers can see !‘the brg picture”; only they p,ossess the full avahble information, only they can see the ramlfl- cations and ~lltersela~lonships. o f the power ’ equation. But thls consideratron does ilot mean tha t comment should be withheld; it merely ,means tl?at I t has to be oF8fered wlth reservatllons and with a ‘stated willingness to modrfp conclusmns which later prove to have ,been based on faulty or inadequate information: Comment must also be made In full recognition and appreciation of the Pmresifdent’s abwesome responsibilities and in a spInt that does not at tnbute to h i m any motive other than 3 deteynination t o do 111s full duty under the Con- stltution So much is obvious.

As to the decision, a chief test of Its wisdom relates to the aim or purpose oE American policy to*ard Cuba. What is I t , precpely, that we seek t o ac8complw11,by% the present impresswe drsplay of power? Nowadays, when the p,ower at the disposal of the Unlt,ed States i s of such fnghtful magnltude, it 1s extremely important that the aims to be achleved by the application of ‘this power- even i n prelimmary and restricted forms-shovld be discreet, lmited and attainalble. To,day &e ‘magnitude o’f p,owcr i.s a factor lmitillg its appbicatioii. As the Pres- ]dent him,self polnted out in Seattle on”Novem,ber. 16, 1961, “‘There cannot b,e an American s,olution t o every world pro~blcm.” Even our power to destroy th’e world, or a lalge p a r t of lt, cannot accomphh all tha t we qiglzt want to see accomplished everywhere in the world.

What, then, do w e seek t o achieve by the ,quarantme’ ol Cmba? Hqs I t b,een imposed for the llmlted purpose of sccnring through pegotratlon the removal of ~ ~ i s s l l e sites of a cllayacter that might reasonably constitute a serious thseat to the security, of this country? Or ‘has it been imposed for larger, undpclosed ,or perhaps not yet clear-

ly defined purposes? The Presldat, In 111s statement to ,

t.he’nation, sought to’restlli,ct the ,quarantine to the at- tainment of ? limited purpose. Even ‘thus hmited,-the

+~+~rpose is broad epough t o include, and perhaps even ~mpl~es, the much 1n.m-e. serious step of invasioli or pin- pomt b,ombhgs. Moreover, i t 1s , di&fmdt to accept without c~haallenge the proposhon that it was to.secure the r<moval of the ‘c~ite~’’-what~ver their character ,

may be-that the . Pres,d,erx acted as he did. It is a , ’ matter uf com~n~,on, knowledge tha t 'sites of some ‘kin.d w.ere under construction 11;1 Cuba for some tIin,e and

. that the construct~on of additional, m,ore slgmf1,cant sltes was t o be antmpated (see: Aviation T@e& a?td ‘Space T e d m d o g y , Qctcbey 1; Avra<tio?t JVeek, Octob-er 3 ) . Even the so-called “hard” intelligence which th,e Presrdeqt. received on Tuesday morning, October 16, could hardly have come as a complete surprise, to him. Assummg that the character of the sites has been prop- erl,y dct‘ermmed-and waivit1,g &e qu,estlon of &at in today’s mad world constitutes an “offensive” weapon a n d what constitutes a “defensive” one-the intelligence whlch the President received was, as Tlze Wall St&$ J o z ~ r r 4 points oyt, 110, doubt “a !major 1~11ita1-y fact.’’. Yet 111 tlJe g~gantic arlnarn’ent picture, as the Jo,urnqL also notes, ‘‘this is considmered really no m,o,re than a detad: th~e Sovlet already has mlssiles on its oyn soil tvhich cou1,d do the job.” Nor would the quarantine as sucll undo what had already lb8eep dcqe To, b.e sure, in- stallat!on of the missile s1:e.s co1~stltuted grave provoca.: tion; lbut mutual provo,cation and halmsment are the. s tpf i 017, ~yhrch &e cold war feeds. By stresslqg the im- portance of the sltes, the President 111,as set tlle stagc either for an invaslon, A I € t’he sites cannot be removed by other means, or f o r pin-p.oint bombings.

IN BRIEPINGS held ‘111 Washington during the *ek begmning Octolber 8, goverunent spokesmen ruled, out ,blo&ad,e or invasion, since either ,would b e an! act of war and might well play into Rushan hands by encour- aging a squeeze 011 Berlin. Sevellon Brown, of The Pr&dmce Jozm1,d, repsrts that, a t the briefings, it was stated that ”ule the military buald-up, in Cuba, as 06

that date, “would add several ]lours to the time neces- sary for a successful U. S. invasion,” i t was stdl regarded as strictly defeqsive in character. As to nuclear war:

‘ heads,’it was stated that i.f the Russians would’not give them to the Chinese, it was hardly likely that they would

’ give them to the Cubans. Measures which were sug- ’ gested a t this briefing session were, limited to strict sur-

’ veillance of, all Communist-Castro operations; careful quarantine, in cooperation with the OAS, of the island as a source of subversion; encouragement of existing tensions by way of making Soviet aid as expensive and as ineffectiye as possible.

Against this background, i t is difficult to understand how the acquisitiol; ,of %ard” ‘intelligence on Tuesday, October 16, would; in’ and of itself, have prohuced the sudden,. drastic and dramatically bulilt-up action that followed. The springs, of tlie President’s ,action musr, dierefore, have been in large part related to matters that hat.e.not been disclodtd. Perhaps Mr. Kennedy was con- cerned -about the impact that the new intelligence might have-on American opinion; perhaps he felt that a sh’ow of swift, dramatic accioh in a theatre in which American pbwer was concentrated might discourage aggressive Sqviet action’ elsewhere. Wshatever the reasons, his ac- tibn seems out of rel-ation to the provocation or the oc- casion-and noticeably so in the way in which, through skilllful planning, strict security and artfuI pwbIic rela- tions the stage was set, tlie interest built’ up and ‘the decisisn annmri,ced,-

’ Did the President, for whatever re,asons, want to make themmost dramatic possi;l)le demonstration’ that he-and through him, we, the Almericah people-was prepared td go to any lengtlhs to resist “blackmail” or attempted intirnidation?”Did h’e want to demonstrate that we were not too “soft” to fight? (It was ,once possible to use ’

ordinary diplomatic chanile1,s to convey ~ a determina- tion of this ’ character;’ today such determination, ap- pirenmtly, must be orc-hhkstrated on the world stage wits6 deafening din.) Did he keel, a, I&. Stevenson does, “,that the only way to reinfio& those a n the other side who a m f w rnodtration ,and @e”$ceful cbmpetition is to make i t absolutely cltar; that aigrission will be met with re- sistance, and ,force VigI-i f , d k e ” j ~ Pedhaps. But rhis, and other ,possilble reasons &ich ~ i g h t be suggested, are no’t those which the Presidelit cited to justify his actsion. His justification, we:silbmit, was not convincing.

, IT WAS not convincirig becadse,,in important respects, i t was ovkrstated and ,did .nti\rfeflec,t a fair assessment of ’ the facts. It iS ‘pbs‘sibit‘; :&.be”surk, to detect didfer- ences in .the circuftistanciis whikll prombted us to ring the USSR with missil~’b~sks~ihthk purpose of which we regard, o f Course, ’ as purely t‘mdefensivk,’’8 but which in ali fairness the RvsrsiaDb can hai-dly be expected to re- gard- in the-same lighk-bitt the distinctionk are not &eat.-The Iact that ,“dur?’ mlissilks we,re installed “open-

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ly” and theirs “clandestinely” is- hardly as significant.as the President implled. The Russian,s are well aware of our skdl iq aerial supeiljqnce; yet no attemp;, appq- ently, was made t o camouflage tk.e Cuban is’&$l&ozls. Moreover, it IS important to note, one could read tbe President’s sratement without any awareness thqt the Culbans might have had good reason for the “rapid” way in which the sites were being readied and military assistance rushed in. A very powerful skc&n of Con- gressional opinion, Democratic and Republican, has been bellowing for an invasion or blockade,. and the Cutbans have ears. Then there have ,been the numerous “raids,” acts of sa’botage, bombings, constand surveil- lance, etc.-not t o mention the Bay of Pigs. Against this background, the President’s stated case: .we repeat, was not convincing.

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BUT THERE are other aspects of the decision ‘ tha t also need close attenxion. Is our real ’ olbjectiye-qur “operational” *policy-to bring down the Castrb ;&me on no graver provocation than it has offered :to ,date? Is the “quarantine” merely designed to test. Suviet in- tentions as a preliminary, step to an actual invabidn? Even if our policy still-excludes invasion, is the present policy likely to lead to invasion? If the Presidenlt’s dangerous gambit “works” in ,the sense th,at the. SO- viets do’not put Nit. to the- ultimate test, will this fact stimulate those elements in this country“c6rtainly not a majority .now, but still a. vefy significant section :of opinion-who are spoiling for a fight? “Appeasement” can apply to domestic poliiics as well as ,foreign’ policy. If, as .Mr. Stevenson says, t h e ” only way to reinfckce those “on the other side who are $or mod,eration’ and peacefd competition is to make it absolutely clear that aggression will be ,met with resistance,” etc., then it is also true that the only way to encourage ,those a t horile who are ‘for: peace and moderation is not to appease the warmongers, the *invasion-mongers, the, hooters, howlers and screamers, As the President spoke! to the nation; he was jeered as an appeaser by a genteel mob of :‘conservatives” who had assedbled in Madison Square Garden to scream “Why Blockmade? Invade!’’ As we said in these columns l a s t week, a ,foreign (policy can be formed through a series of acts or decisions taken on a more or less ad hoc basis; the ulticmate goal and

’purpose bf a, policy so formed may be. implicit in the chain of decisions and this purpose may not be th‘at which those who took the decisions originally intended.

On the recora, then, we do not think rhat the Presi- dent justified his dwision. But the record, we concede, may conceal as much as it discloses. We can only hope that the President will clearly ahd precisely define his objectiSes and adhere to them, and that he ,will’ not permit these objectives to be “Ibroadened’f by, forces :in this country that have unquestionaibly .been eheodrkgkd, even momentarily “appeased,” by hlis decision. ’ There

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, - ' -~ i1e dangers implicit in .the notion of ' shifting to t h e "offensive"'in policy matters, not least of which is the dangerthat each success stimulates still -more hazardous risks aqd pdertaking?. The ,President should act, +th thk ' Ltqost dlligenc,e, to secure bbjemives consistent with his stated purpose-for example, the possible "de- rnilitaikkion" of CGba under gllarantees of its terri- torial "integrity. ' 'He +should also initiate" actions aimed a t removihg' missile 'installations elsewh.ere that are as tlireatqning and as int'imdating to others as txhose in Cuba' are t o .us.' What he does in the wake of his diam'atlc actlon will provide the test of the 'real thrust qnd purpose of American policy toward Cuba. If this policy i s really aimed a t knocksing over the Csaqtr$ re- me^ i€ t h e q u a r a n h e IS a prelude to invasion, then- in .the absence pf graver provocation than' Cuba- has offered t o ' date-it hould be borh a disaster and a c;ime.'The B?y of Pigs w p a fiascp because the opera- tion faded; an invasion ' would be a &aster because i t 'would "succeed."

But there is still another perspective from which to judgc the ,decision taken by the President and its possi- lble consequences. I f , , as Mr, Lippmann points out, we are in the process of adius'ting to the new realities that have arisen in the 1950s-the principal one of which-is 'that -the-Ibalance of -power' has shifted in the world (and not necessarily t o our long-term d'isad- yantage)-then.it well may be that the old framewqrk IvIthln which the cold I war was conhne:d mu,st now be . stretched t o - take into 'consideration' t'hese new realities. It goes without saying that both sides in the coId war must adjust to these new realities. I n this perspective, the President's decision, despite the in- adequate justification which he has ofifered for it, may set IIi motion a process of readjusbment which will re- dL!ce tensions. Foremost among tshe hard realiti,es- one, ,which has now been Ibreathtaklmglg demonstrated -is the I fact that ,tIherqpnuclear war is llpt, as the WQrld! has, been saying, Lln~thinlcable; quite the contrary, I t is perfectly thinkable. Le; no one .mistake the fmact.

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Operation Morningstar Wlth the I eyes of 'the world riveted on Cuba and

Berliil, the spotlight has' shifted from South Vietnam a t a mon~entwhen the s ta te of affairs in:,that unhappy land should be engaging a measure of OUT: attenZion. A &ar ago, General Maxwell Taylor conducted a survey-

' i&clepth in South Vletllam, reported his findings t o the President, .and the flow of supplies and matemel was stepped u ~ . Later, the Secretary of Defenselpaid a visit t o South VipJnam and, in an'exclusive internew in the Zp; A?@eleJ Tiqites QJuly 22), said, that .whlle-.the war would-drag on for some tune, i t should be over by 1968 ol-'"sqoner: Throbihoat the suinmer months; 'repcrts of c&tlous optimism" -were released from timfeu't'o time: c r

' M o x recently, Washingtop and Saigqn were notice- ably "bu'111sh'' about a grandiose military action labeled "Operatlon Morningstar." T h e 'operation, of ~ coprse, turned out to be a dlsmal failure. I n eight days of "fight- ing," 6,000 government troops, aided by hundreds of American military advisers, with American-furnished helicopters, managed to kill forty Red guerrillas and to c q p e only two. An American military adviser .is quoted In the' Nat ional Observer as sayillg that ('the thigg was doomed to fallure from the start. You can't fight the Vlet~con; vvltll corps and divisions." .The rea- son for the South Vletnamese reluctance to engage'in guerpilla warfare has been 'franlqly acknowledged by General Tran Van Don of, the ,Sou*h Vietnamese First Corps. On October 4, the AIP *quoted the General as saying that in order to prqctice. guerrilla warfare SL+

cessfully, it is necessary to have the confiience ,oi:the peasants; the !Gen,eraI made it qui,te -clear that Die4m's forces do not enjoy this confidence. And there,are othey reasons. Napoleon is supposed' to have said&that ' "an army marches on its stomach"; in South Vietnam, rhe Army w11; only march on a full stomach. A dispatch to TlzeNew Yo& Times (October 13) notes tha,t the South Vietnamese soldier is add,icted to three-hour lunch'es with -sielstas-a har~qlesq- ,enough cuqtom? but militarily somewhLat enervating. The fact is that the' South Viet- nam Army does not want to move against the guerrillas unless i t cqn move with overwhel'qing superiopity.

The Amencan press has noticed the failure of Opera- tion Morningstar, hiit the editorial comiment has been bland and irrelevant. A familiar complaint, for example, is based on the increase in American casualties; 'so -far this year, forty-flve America;: advisers have been kilfed. Another complaint is directed at the yexatious c~risor- ship; a mysterious alr strip near Saigqn, ,from which Amelkan fighter planes take off on combat missions, 1s shlyouded UII d,eep secrecy. Criticism, of thi,?. type ,is thoroughly justified, b,ut i t is wide of the mark. For ,by now I t should'be perfectly clear . that American forces ,in South Vietnam are engaged, not In protecting !'freedom;?' (but in the essentially ugly busiiess of 'suppressing a massive peasant insurrection against the Die.m regime.'

0. E. Clulbb, Jr., in a perceptiie recent stfidy, 'f'The Ullited States and the SdndSoviet Bloc in. Southeast Asia," makes it quite clear that, as an Occidental coyer, t,he Unlted States "can influence, but not deten&e, Southeast Asia's destiny." This is one of today's un-

' pleasant realities. I n tihe meantime, of course, this coun- try's .position in South Vietnam is dangerously exposed.

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Should MOSCQW Censor Us?. ,.

'Warren 'Rogers, Jr., Washington correspondent lo€. the New York Hekcrld Tribzsne, reviewe'd Fait-Safe for"th,at p'aper's;Sunday '(,Oct. 21) book-section. Rmogtrs' then took the hnusual cburde of appending to his review an editofi-

a1 deploring the publication of that book and of S e v m Days i ?~ May. (See page 291 for The Natiom’s revien of both novels.)

Mr. Rogers’ thesis is that the books are not in the ‘‘,public interest.” This charge one would normally scorn as the mouthing of a political censor; but the case is rather special, for both books were explicitly motivated by a desire to serve the public interest. If they do the reverse, i t co,uld well be argued that publi- cation was unwise.

But Mr. Rogers’ reasons for coming to this decision are, to put it as politely as pcrssJbl.e, baffling. The theme of S e v e n Dnyr i.12 M a y is a hypothetical military coup d’ktat in the United States; the the,me of Fail-safe is a hypothetical, accidental US. air attack upon Moscow. We should not discuss such possibilities publicly, says the:Herald ,Tribune’s Washington expert, b’ecause i t is part of Russian propaganda that the United States is increasingly dominated ‘by its military and that nuclear wari might, come lby accident. He does not deny the t ru th- of the first proposition; as to the second, he

produces only an Air Force assert,ion that the cntastro- phe is “not a calculable possibility.” Other forecasten, less personally concerned, have managed to give more precise odds.

The Russians also criticize our treatment of Negroes, have spoken in disparagement of our public education and may one day have something rude to say of the congestion on our highways and the stridency of our broadcast commercials. Ate we t o cease discussion among ourselves of any weakness, the Kremlin may

, have d1iscover;ed in our society or conduct? Tshe akkml- ity of this positibn can be seen when one realizes that, , in That case, the Russians could paralyze any move for ~mprovement in America by publishing to the world a list of our weaknesses. Because - as Mr. Rogers, a newspaper man, should kn,ow - no c o u n t v improves itself by nervously shoveling its problems under the

- carpet. If, for example, the mlilitary ever seizes power in this cbuntry, it wiIl not be because of what the Rus- sians have sai,d, but because of what we have not had the wisdom to say,

THE BACKDR,OP for next week’s elections is an outgoing Congress consisting of 64 Democrats and 36 Republicans in the [Senate (with only 19 of the former and 15 of the latter up for re-election), and 261 Demo- crats, 174 ,Repulblicans and two va- cancies in the House. (,House re- placements will number only 435 because of th’e reduction fin seats fol- lowing the 1960 reapportionment.) On’ the state side, there are 12 in- mmbent Democratic governors and 13, -’ R,epublicans up for re-election, plus six races in which ngither com- petitur is an incum’bent an,d three non-contested Democratic slates.

Although a landslide victory for either party does not appear likely, none the less any sizable sweep would have a certain psychological impbrtance in ‘foreshadowing the 1964, Presidential race. -In terms of

,the special arithlmetic of Presidential politics, however, only the gwberna-

BLANCHE D. BLANK teaches po- lit&al ,sciewe at Hunter College and i: presmtly mgaged, with two col- leaggztes, on. a m l d y of flew York City politics. 2 80

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tzorial contests (and just certain ones at that) are really critlical. I n a nut- shell, should R,epublicans make in- roads here (or even should strong Republican incumbents like ,Rocke- feller be returned with a heavy hand), the increased prestige and patronage possibiliti,es open to these men could swing EIectoral College votes two years hence (Kcennedy’s 1960 Electoral !College margin was a precarious 35 votes). This means a careful eye )must be kept on cer- tain close races. These are -(#naming the Democratic candidate first) : Brown-Nixon in ,California (with 40 electoral votes), Dilworth-Scranton in Pennsylvania. (32), Swainson- Romney lin IMichigan (21) and Di- Salle-Rhodes in &io (26). Even Texas’ 25 votes are slightly unset- tled by the ConnallyACox contest. Among the states with less substan- tial ’ Electoral College lsigni’fican,ce, the Republicans might take Colo- rado, Nebraslka, Wisconsin and Wyo- ming. The Democrats, on the other hand, are ofrfering real threats to only three RepBublica,n incumbents: in Minnesota (,Rolvaag-Andersen), New Mexico (Mechem-Campbell)

and tin Hawaii (Burns-Quinn). There is, of course, special signilficance in these elections to those candidates whose victory ‘might spelI a strong boost’ to the Republican Presidential nominatlion itself.

T I E gulbernatorial races, moreover, fulfill our criteria for significance by offering the vofters a reasonable per- centage of vialble contests. Only Ala- bama, Georgia and Souuh (Carolina will go to the Democrats by default, and atbout one-third of the other ,elections are at least somewhat rnar- ginal. This ‘more competitive quality in the state-hlouse ra.ces is due .in part to the ,fact that they cannot be af- fected by the reapportionment or redistrictmg that afflicts legislative contests. There is also more rnean- ingfulness in these races because we are living in a world of continuous crises that force us increasingly to rely on the speedier, better-serviced, more coherent and [more visilble ex- ecatiwe ]branches in our government. In short, the calculus of genuine competitiveness, executive .domina- tion and Presidential politics aPi com- bine to bring to these elec’tions a

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