O AK R IDGE N ATIONAL L ABORATORY U. S. D EPARTMENT OF E NERGY 1.

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OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORYU. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

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• Objectives° Predict the Response of a

Facility to Attack by Military or Terrorist Weapons

° Develop Response Models for use as Targeting Aids

Facility Vulnerability Analysis

• Program Started in 1995

• Primary Sponsor DTRA

• Other Current Sponsors:

• DIA

• NRC

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• Facility Kill Probability• Facility Core Melt Probability• Facility Downtime Estimates • Facility Model Editor • Event/Fault Tree Editor

Visual Interactive Site Analysis Code

VISAC Integrates the Following Functions in one Code

Provides: • Facility Damage/Consequence Contour Maps• VERY FAST “what if”Analysis for Various

Accident/Incident Scenarios

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VISAC – Truck Bomb

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Aerial Attack

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Terrorist Attacks Against American Targets Using Car-Bomb Technology

Date Target/Location Delivery/Material TNT equiv (lbs)

Apr 1983 US Embassy Beirut, Lebanon

van

2000

Oct 1983 US Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon

truck, TNT with gas enhancement

12000

Feb 1993 World Trade Center New York, USA

van, urea nitrate and hydrogen gas

2000

Apr 1995 Murrah Federal Bldg Oklahoma City, USA

truck, ammonium nitrate fuel oil

5000

Jun 1996 Khobar Towers Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

tanker truck, plastic explosive

20000

Aug 1998 US Embassy Nairobi, Kenya

truck, TNT, possibly Semtex

1000

Aug 1998 US Embassy Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

truck 1000

Oct 2000 Destroyer USS Cole Aden Harbor, Yemen

small watercraft, possibly C-4

440

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Visual Interactive Site Analysis Code

for Facility Vulnerability Analysis

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User Describes Attack (Incidents)

Defined Accident – specific systems fail

Component Damage – individual components fail with specified probabilities

Region Damage – all components in an area fail

Quick Blast – place any size charge, weapon, truck bomb, etc. inside or outside of a building using TNT, C4,, etc.

Multiple incidents can be specified with any combination or timing

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Facility Models – Basic and Detailed

Geometry Based on BRL-CAD format Facilities consist of buildings made of concrete

walls Critical components inside or outside buildings

Logic Critical components grouped together into fault

trees for each system Event trees group together the systems and

evaluate consequences Multiple aspects can be examined at once (facility

kill, core damage, fire, etc)

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Current Facilities – Basic Modelsname MWe # Vendor Type Class

p08 786 single Babcock and Wilcox PWRp07 1070 twin Combustion Engineering PWRp05 870 single Combustion Engineering PWRp04 835 twin Combustion Engineering PWRp14 1180 single General Electric BWR Mark 3p12 1110 twin General Electric BWR Mark 2p03 1100 twin General Electric BWR Mark 1p11 772 twin General Electric BWR Mark 1p09 1251 twin Westinghouse PWR 4-loopp06 1137 single Westinghouse PWR 4-loopp10 1117 twin Westinghouse PWR 4-loopp15 1040 twin Westinghouse PWR 4-loopp02 965 single Westinghouse PWR 4-loopp01 950 single Westinghouse PWR 4-loopp13 800 twin Westinghouse PWR 3-loopswest560 560 single Westinghouse PWR 2-loop

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Current Facilities – Detailed Models

name MWe Description

rbmk 1500 Soviet pressurized channel reactorwest560 560 Westinghouse 2-loop PWRmagnox 42 gas cooled production reactorpurex Hanford Purex reprocessing plantreprocfac Consolidated Fuels Reprocessing Facility Inc.

p03 1100 General Electric twin BWR Mark1p13 800 Westinghouse twin 3-loop PWR

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Midsize Pressurized Water Reactor(PWR)

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Reprocessing Plant

MBLM Code

Aerosol Release

Resulting Temperatures and Pressures

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Russian Designed

Power Reactor

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A Detailed Facility

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VISAC Output

Consequence probabilities for each event tree Failure probabilities for each fault tree system Facility downtime estimate Release information (for HPAC) Lists of walls broken and hole size estimates

An Example

3500 lbs TNT truck bomb outside of control room 97.7% probability of a large early release Facility would be unable to operate for 4 months

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Graphical Presentation of VISAC Output

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Grids of Blast Points – Threat Contours

Each library facility has 3 pre-calculated grids User can search grids for specific outcomes User can generate new grids for his own plants Grid points can be used as incidents (attack points) VISAC has automated grid creation for new plants

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Three Ways To Use VISAC

View library facilities and their pre-calculated grids of blast points use viewers to explore the geometry and logic search grids for specific outcomes

Run “what-if” scenarios using different attacks on the library facilities accidents, component damage, bomb blasts find release probabilities, facility kill & downtime

Create a new facility based on the library model and add new buildings model any aspect of facility operation calculate grids of blast points use just like a library facility

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Bob MorrisOak Ridge National LaboratoryP.O. Box 2008 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6363Phone: 865-576-5878Fax: [email protected]

Facility Vulnerability Program

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BACK UP Slides

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Model Fidelity Effect on Facility Vulnerability Results

Building Level vs. Component Level Models

Building Level Component Level

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P W R F ac i l i t yK i l l

S c r e e n h o u s eP u m p s

L o w P r e s s u r eTu r b i n e s

C RM A

P W R F acility K ill F au lt T ree for E V A -3 D

C o n t r o lP an e l s

S W P sC W P s

C o n t r o lR o o m P an e l s

L P T2

C RM C

C RM B

S W P1 B 2

S W P1 B 1

C W P1 B

C W P1 A

R e l ay R o o mP an e l s

R R PB

R R PA

R xV e s s e l

H PTu r b i n e

G e n -e r a t o r

M ai nTr an s fo r m e r s

S t e amG e n e r at o r s

S W P1 A 1

S W P1 A 2

L P T1

S G1 A

S G1 B

C RE A

Tr n s1 B

Tr n s1 C

Tr n s1 A

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PWR Transient Event Tree

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PWR LOCA Event Tree

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PWR LOOP Event Tree

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PWR LPLA Event Tree

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N o A F WS ys t e m

S t e am R e l i e fM o t o r - D r i ve n

P u m p s

P m p1 B

P m p1 A

L o ss o f A u x ilia ry F eed w ater S y stem

W at e r

Tr a i n BTr a i n AO n s i t eW at e r

S W S

Tr a i n BP o w e r

Tr a i n AS t e am R e l i e f

Tr a i n AP o w e r

Tr a i n BS t e am R e l i e f

C S TsS G1 A

S G1 B

C S T1 B

C S T1 A

S GR 1 B

A t mV 1 B

S GR 1 A

A t mV 1 A

R M W S Ts

Tan k1 B

Tan k1 A

Tr a i n BP u m p

Tr a i n AP u m p

S W S

Fault Trees for Calculating Core Melt Probabilities

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L o ss o f S erv ice W ater S y stem

N o S e r v i c e W at e rS ys t e m

S c r e e n sS W S

P u m p s /S t r a i n e r sIA S

C o m p r e s s o r s W at e r

1 B 1 1 B 2

P m p s /S t r n s1 A 1 /1 A 2

P m p s /S t r n s1 A 1 /1 B 1

P m p s /S t r n s1 A 1 /1 B 2

P m p s /S t r n s1 A 2 /1 B 1

P m p s /S t r n s1 A 2 /1 B 2

P m p s /S t r n s1 B 1 /1 B 2

1 A 1 1 A 2

1 A 1 1 B 1 1 A 1 1 B 2 1 A 2 1 B 1 1 A 2 1 B 2

1 B 1 1 B 2

1 A 1 1 A 2

Tr a i n AP o w e r

Tr a i n BP o w e r

Tr a i n AP o w e r

Tr a i n BP o w e r

Tr a i n AP m p s /S t r n s

Tr a i n s A /BP m p s /S t r n s

Tr a i n BP m p s /S t r n s

P m p s /S t r n s1 A /1 B

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N o O n - s i t eP o w e r

C o n t r o l B at t e r i e s

L o ss o f O n -site P o w er

D i e s e lG e n e r a t o r s

Tr a i n 1 Tr a i n 2

D i e s e l1

D i e s e l2

G e n1 A

B t t r y1

G e n1 B

G e n2 A

G e n2 B

B t t r y2

O AK R IDGE N ATIONAL L ABORATORY U. S. D EPARTMENT OF E NERGY 1.

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Transcript of O AK R IDGE N ATIONAL L ABORATORY U. S. D EPARTMENT OF E NERGY 1.