XIII. Nesajjikaga sitters practice

Ud.7.8: Yassa siy sabbad sati,Satata kyagat upahit;No cassa no ca me siy,Na bhavissati na ca me bhavissati;Anupubbavihri tattha so,Kleneva tare visattikanti.

Parivara XV. Upali Pentads Section 6V v. 131, 193

-Re-reading the Nettipakarana. Kaccayana gives an intriguing treatment of the Mahaparinibbanasutta's four mahapadesas. Unlike all other interpreters, ancient and modern, he doesn't conceive them as having anything at all to do with appeals to textual authority. "Conformity to sutta" for Kaccayana is conformity to the Dhamma's general thread of meaning, which is the 4 ariyasacca.-And "vinaya" in "conformity to vinaya" is taken not in the sense of monastic discipline or Vinaya Pitaka, but in the most common sense that this term has in the Sutta Pitaka: raaga-vinaya dosa-vinaya moha-vinaya, "removal of attachment, aversion and delusion".-Then a third yardstick is given: "conformity to dhammataa", which Kaccayana identifies with paticcasamuppaada. This is not found in the Pali Mahaparinibbanasutta but is present in the Sanskrit version and (if I remember right) four parallel passages in the Chinese Agamas.-So, on this reading a putative buddhavacana may be accepted as such if it conforms to two points of principle: the four truths and paticcasamuppaada, and if it is effective in practice in bringing about the three removals.-I think, for many reasons, it is the reading most likely to be faithful to the Buddha's intent-The problem with all the textual authority interpretations is that in an age of oral transmission you simply couldn't put them into practice without violating a cardinal injunction of the whole mahapadesa procedure.-I mean the injunction not to play favourites..."don't rejoice in..." "don't reject..."-It also jives well with the Kalama Sutta-After Buddhaghosa there come two attempts to harmonize the Paleo-Orthodox take on the mahapadesas with the Sumangalavilasini's Neo-Orthodox interpretation (or rather the one of the six interpretations that Buddhaghosa himself approved of).-One attempt (the "Unified Interpretation", we might call it) combines them into a single rather unwieldy method.-And the other (the "Non-Overlapping Magisteria Interpretation") treats the Paleo-Orthodox Netti approach as concerned only with an individual's private verification, and the Neo-Orthodox with public demonstration.-By the time of the Sinhalese Renaissance and the sub-commentaries the Unified Interpretation has become the de facto official view-At least in theory. But in practice it is the Neo that is always applied in textual argument.-Note that the terms he uses for the yardsticks are sutta and vinaya, not dhamma and vinaya. And note the passage's fourth scenario - this is a great group of monks. - Dhammanando

The Mahacattarisaka Sutta is unique in the idea of mundane/supermundane right view.I should note that the designations 'mundane' and 'supramundane' for these two right view are actually from the Petakopadesa and Nettipakarana, two early treatises on hermeneutics. At MN. 117 the distinction is expressed with the words 'ssava' and 'ansava', "accompanied by cankers" and "free of cankers" respectively.

In the suttas, the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is in fact often absent from insight related contemplation of states of deep concentration(M I, 352 or M I, 436) and a discourse in the AN explicitly indicates the penetration to liberating knowledge is only possible as far as there is an attainment of perception, yavata sannasamapatti, tavata annapativedho (A, IV 426)

Dependent co-arising, the aggregates and not-self basically detail the process by which we construct our sense of self, i.e., our ego or identity, and, ultimately, how to utilize that process in more skillful ways.-The aggregates themselves, for example, aren't simply descriptions of what constitutes a human being as some people mistakenly thinkthey're one of the many ways of looking at and dividing up experience that we find throughout the Pali Canon (e.g., aggregates, elements, six sense-media, etc.). But more importantly, they represent the most discernible aspects of our experience on top of which we construct our sense of self in a process of, as the Buddha called it, "I-making" and "my-making" (e.g.,MN 109).-In addition, the Buddha says that the five clinging-aggregates are not-self. He calls them a burden, the taking up of which is "the craving that makes for further becoming" and the casting off of which is "the remainderless fading & cessation, renunciation, relinquishment, release, & letting go of that very craving" (SN 22.22). The way I understand it, becoming (bhava) is a mental process, which arises due to the presence of clinging (upadana) in the mind with regard to the five-clinging aggregates, and acts as a condition for the birth (jati) of the conceit 'I am,' the self-identification that designates a being (satta).-Looking at it from another angle, there's rarely a moment when the mind isn't clinging to this or that in one or more of the four ways (MN 11). Our identity jumps from one thing to another, wherever the clinging is strongest. Our sense of self is something that's always in flux, ever-changing from moment to moment in response to various internal and external stimuli, and yet at the same time, we tend to see it as a static thing. It's as if our sense of self desires permanence, but its very nature causes it to change every second. See SN 12.61-Change is, of course, a fact of nature. All things are in a perpetual state of change, but the problem is that our sense of self ignores this reality on a certain level. From birth to death, we have the tendency to think that this 'I' remains the same. Now, we might know that some things have changed (e.g., our likes and dislikes, our age, the amount of wrinkles we have, etc.), but we still feel as if we're still 'us.' We have the illusion (for lack of a better word) that our identity is who we are, a static entity named [fill in the blank], and we tend to perceive this as being the same throughout our lives.-That said, the conventional use of personality is a function of survival, as well as convenience. However, clinging to our personalities as 'me' or 'mine' is seen as giving continued fuel for becoming, i.e., a mental process of taking on a particular kind of identity that arises out of clinging. Our sense of self, the ephemeral 'I,' is merely a mental imputation the product of what the Buddha called a process of 'I-making' and 'my-making' and when we cling to our sense of self as being 'me' or 'mine' in some way, we're clinging to an impermanent representation of something that we've deluded ourselves into thinking is fixed and stable. It becomes a sort of false refuge that's none of these things.-These attachments, particularly our attachment to views and doctrines of self, keep us rooted in "perceptions and categories of objectification" that continually assail us and our mental well-being (MN 18). Thus, with the presence of clinging, the aggregates have the potential to become suffering (i.e., 'difficult to bear') when our sense of self encounters inconstancy. That's why the Buddha taught that whatever is inconstant is stressful, and whatever is stressful is not-self.-In order to break down the conceptual idea of a self (i.e., that which is satisfactory, permanent and completely subject to our control) in relation to the various aspects of our experience that we falsely cling to as 'me' or 'mine,' we must essentially take this [analytical] knowledge, along with a specific set of practices such as meditation, as a stepping stone to what I can only describe as a profound psychological event that radically changes the way the mind relates to experience.-This may be a bit of nonsense, but in one of the ways I like to look at it, the conventional viewpoint (sammuti sacca) explains things through subject, verb and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint (paramattha sacca) explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes. This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once self-identity view (sakkaya-ditthi) is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed, thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena, i.e., dependent co-arising in action.-This mental process is 'seen,' ignorance is replaced by knowledge and vision of things as they are (yatha-bhuta-nana-dassana), and nibbana, then, would be the 'letting go' of what isn't self through the dispassion (viraga) invoked in seeing the inconstant (anicca) and stressful (dukkha) nature of clinging to false refuges that are neither fixed nor stable (anatta). And without the presence of clinging in regard to the aggregates, they cease to be 'difficult to bear.'

Retro has a point. The text does not actually say "walking meditation". It simply says Pacime bhikkhave cakame nisas.Q: Does "cankama" really mean "walking meditation" or are various translators taking certain liberties here...?I sense they may be bending something quite straight-forward and literal as "walking" to conform to their own "meditation"-centric views on the Dhamma.A: (AN 5.29 A iii 29)The first translation [the composure attained by walking up & down is long-lasting] is therefore the most faithful and least "embellished". However, I don't think it's doctrinally incorrect to "embellish"cakamahere to refer to walking meditation, since mindfulness is recommended to be established in any of the 4iriypatha(postures of walking, standing, sitting, and lying down), eg MN 10's 2ndkynupassanafter mindfulness of breathing.As for thecakamdhigato samdhi, it's parsed ascakama+adhigatasamdhi.Adhigata= attained. Can't quite decide if thecakamdhigatois abahubbhicompound or a instrumentivetappurisa. Probably the former, since it seems to function as an adjective to qualify thesamdhi.

-MN 70 (M i 477) Kgiri Sutta and AN 9.44 (A iv 452) Pavimutta Sutta tell us that to be liberated through discernment one does so via at least the first jhna. Thus the arahant-s in SN 12.70 were able to attain at least the first jhna (in the suttantika sense of jhna).

-The Paisambhidmagga is an abhidhammika presentation, even if it is now included in the Khuddakanikya. It employs the thought-world and terminology of the abhidhamma. (For example, the author of the Vimuttimagga often refers to quotations from it as being from the abhidhamma.)

Q: In the Bahiya Sutta, Ven. Bahiya went from ordinary good wordling on a wrong path, to an Arahant within a discource. He completed 4 maggaphalas and 37 factors of awakening within seconds. This example and others show us that the path can be momentary.A: Another sutta tells us that Ven. Bhiya had the capacity for sharp understanding (khippbhi). And as a dedicated ascetic, it is quite probable that Bhiya was already at a high level of development with regard to ethical conduct (sla) and concentration (samdhi). So I would suggest that Ven. Bhiya was already quite highly developed when he earnestly set out to find the Buddha after being rebuked by the deva.As I said, it is likely that he had a high level of development with regard to concentration (samdhi). What he lacked was right view (sammdihi). Therefore his way of practice (paipad) wasn't conducive as a path to arahantship (arahattamagga), and his samdhi wasn't sammsamdhi. The instruction he received from the Buddha enabled him to discern right view, and with that the other seven components of the noble eightfold path quickly aligned.

Q: I'm not sure exactly what you're trying to say by the quotes since Venerable's words read to me almost as pure abhidhamma - all the talk about illusion and mirage that sanna brings in - can this illusion be anything else than concepts, which are essentially 'supplied' by sanna in commentarial speak? Nor do I quite understand why do you bring in the two truths polemic.A: The two truth theory and the dhamma theory are relevant to this whole concept (paatti) vs. ultimate realities (paramattha dhamma-s) distinction. Contrary to Ven. Buddhaghosa, et al, Ven. ananda seems to be more than happy to treat all dhamma-s as concepts without recourse to these abhidhammika categories.Q: Thanks for explaining Geoff, I maybe see where you're coming from now - I guess you were simply trying to point out the specifics of Ven.Nyanananda's approach to the topic. That's cool, I guess we would agree that there are different descriptions out there regarding the cognitive process and how it's experienced in insight - there's the abhidhamma description, commentary, Ven.Buddhadasa, Ven.Nynanada, etc. Each of those might be using different terminology but my guess is they are all speaking about the same thing - the cognitive process, from their own experience (I'd assume).A: Unfortunately it isnt quite that simple. The concept (paatti) vs. ultimate realities (paramattha dhamma-s) differentiation is predicated on the notion that a paramattha dhamma is sabhva and therefore is a real object referent, whereas paatti is considered asabhva and is thus just a product of the mind without a real object referent. For example, the idea of house is considered paatti because what one designates as a house can be further reduced to the paramattha dhamma-s of (visible) form, the four mahbhta-s, etc..-Now at first sight that seems reasonable enough I guess. But there are problematic consequences of this whole sabhva business. Firstly, it imposes philosophical realism upon the Buddhadhamma. Secondly, because nibbna is considered to be sabhva, i.e. a real object referent, this results in numerous troublesome consequences, not the least of which is the implication that nibbna is some sort of metaphysical plane that truly exists out there. Moreover, it smuggles nibbna into the all and consequently imposes conditional, fabricated limitations (e.g. sabhva) onto nibbna.-This is why Ven. ananda has gone to such great lengths in all of his published teachings to demonstrate that all of the consequences of the paramattha/sabhva vs. paatti/asabhva differentiation are foreign to the sutta-s and are an intrusive conceptual filter which actually distorts what the sutta-s are teaching regarding the deeper aspects of dhamma soteriology. In short, the commentarial dhamma theory not only reroutes the path, it completely redraws the map.

A: There are numerous problems with the Visuddhimagga and Ahakath commentarial exegesis regarding jhna. The most obvious of which are that the notions of paatti vs. paramattha and the subsequent notion of a counterpart sign (paibhganimitta), as well as the notion that the counterpart sign is merely paatti, are all completely absent from the thought-world of the Pi Nikya-s.Also, the commentarial exegesis doesnt seem to be very clear on just what the actual referent is for some of the paibhganimitta-s. For example, in regard to npnasati the Visuddimagga 3.113 states: When a man extends the sign of in-breaths and out-breaths, only a quantity of wind is extended, and it has a definite location, [the nose-tip]. So it need not be extended because of the disadvantage and because of the definiteness of the location.-And Visuddhimagga 3.119: Mindfulness of breathing must be apprehended by touch.-This seems to indicate that the parikammanimitta, uggahanimitta as well as the paibhganimitta could be paramattha. But when we get to the descriptions of the paibhganimitta for npnasati we are told that:It appears to some like a star or a cluster of gems or a cluster of pearls, to others with a rough touch like that of silk-cotton seeds or a peg made of heartwood, to others like a long braid string or a wreath of flowers or a puff of smoke, to others like a stretched-out cobweb or a film of cloud or a lotus flower or a chariot wheel or the moon's disk or the sun's disk.-Here we have a laundry list of many possible paibhganimitta-s, most of which are mental images, but at least two of which are still within the tactile domain of experience.-Fortunately, in the sutta-s, all of the concomitant dhamma-s pertaining to jhna are definitely not paatti. Therefore one can develop both samatha and/or vipassan as the means to enter jhna, as well as develop vipassan while remaining in any of the four jhna-s. Thus the entire commentarial exegesis regarding jhna amounts to just another instance of a foreign, intrusive, and unnecessary conceptual filter superimposed over the sutta-s, resulting in a rerouting of the path into various paths, and thereby distorting the integral harmony of the noble eightfold path.

Q: I guess we'd agree there needs to be samma samadhi. So, if samma samadhi is there, that would mean that mindfulness, and in particular, wisdom (as in "non-ignorance" mentioned in the suttas, as opposed to ignorance) are operative. If wisdom is indeed operative, then my confusion is as follows: 1. Wisdom is essentially supposed to understand/see the anicca, anatta, etc, characteristics in anything that arises and falls. 2. Yet, the whole idea of one-pointedness in jhana is that attention is fixed on one object only for an extended period of time (irrespective whether that's 2 hours, or just 2 seconds before vipassana starts inside jhana as you say)3. So, if wisdom is present in jhana, and yet it doesn't understand/see that the object is in fact anicca (arising and falling on multiple occasions during those 2 seconds or 2 hours), how would you explain why it doesn't see anicca?A: Your 2nd and 3rd points don't necessarily follow from the 1st point. If that happens (i.e. #2 & #3), then the meditator has strayed into wrong samdhi. Certainly, jhna as sammsamdhi includes samatha, vipassan, and pa. This is not only stated in the sutta-s, it is also explicitly stated in the Dhammasagai. For example, in MN 111, anupadadhammavipassan is employed to develop pa while remaining in jhna: There was the case where Sariputta quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities entered & remained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. Whatever qualities there are in the first jhana directed thought, evaluation, rapture, pleasure, singleness of mind, contact, feeling, perception, intention, consciousness, desire, decision, persistence, mindfulness, equanimity, & attention he ferreted them out one after another. Known to him they arose, known to him they remained, known to him they subsided. He discerned, 'So this is how these qualities, not having been, come into play. Having been, they vanish. A2: For example, a beginning meditator should firstly dispel the five hindrances using satipahna, etc., employing whatever antidotes are effective. The abandoning of the hindrances is a necessary but not sufficient condition for entering the first jhna. Then, by practicing npnasati (for example), until the mind has settled and the body is at ease, the beginner can develop samatha without vipassan, by mindfully attending to the felt-sense of pleasure (sukha) when it arises. This need not be a profound feeling of ptisukha to begin with. Just remaining attentive to the felt-sense of pleasure is enough for starters. With constant practice aided by the five (or preferably eight) precepts, and much meditation retreat, this will eventually lead to a "true, refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion" (vivekajaptisukhasukhumasaccasa).-By the time that ptisukha has arisen, the mental factors of both samatha and vipassan should be developed enough that the meditator can remain simultaneously mindful and fully aware of both the apperception of ptisukha as well as the momentary flux of that very apperception of ptisukha. Thus samatha and vipassan are developed to the degree that they can be conjoined. At this point one has developed the necessary and sufficient conditions of the first jhna as sammsamdhi. Here all the mental factors (the dhamma-s of vitakka, vicra, pti, sukha, cittekaggat, phassa, vedan, sa, cetan, citta, chanda, adhimokkha, vriya, sati, upekkh, and manasikra) are working together in complete harmony.

Q: Does that mean the mind has two objects at the same time? Or perhaps these two are happening in quick succession? Or its more the case of the two combining into one object of sorts? Or how exactly?A: There is no fabricated mental phenomenon apart from the momentary flux of that mental phenomenon, and no characteristic of momentary flux apart from a fabricated mental phenomenon.Q: Or perhaps more fundamentally if you like - can I be aware of a sound and a sight at exactly the same time?A: In the long history of early sectarian Buddhism, there were basically three general views posited regarding the process of cognition: (1) every mind and mental factor have to arise consecutively and none can arise concurrently; (2) every mind can arise with a number of concomitant mental factors (cetasika-s), but no two types of consciousness can arise concurrently; (3) any number of the six consciousnesses can arise concomitantly (i.e. simultaneously) along with various concomitant mental factors.-The classical Theravda abhidhammikas accept the second view. But it's important to understand that the first two of these views were developed in an academic environment, and have little to do with the actual phenomenology of experience and more to do with the rhetoric of experience. They are largely based on the premise of the intentionality of all consciousness, as well as philosophical realism. None of this is found in the sutta-s, where the six consciousnesses are mere nominal designations. MN 38: Mahtahsakhaya Sutta: Just as fire is classified simply by the condition in dependence on which it burns a fire burning in dependence on logs is classified simply as a log fire... a fire burning in dependence on rubbish is classified simply as a rubbish fire; in the same way, consciousness is classified simply by the condition in dependence on which it arises.

Q: E.g. if he is really saying what you think hes saying, then to me that goes directly against that SN sutta where the Buddha quite clearly says that aggregates which are anicca, dukkha and anatta, are said to exist by the wise, which imo is the same thing that the commentaries are saying on their own terms.A: The sutta is SN 22.94 (S iii 138) Puppha Sutta. And the term translated as "it exists" is atthi, which doesn't have any realist connotations whatsoever. It could well be translated as "it is." It is very far from the ontological and realist implications of the commentarial "sabhva."

Q: This brings to a question of: why do you agree with one commentary over the other?A: It's quite simple. The criteria is explicitly stated in the Mahparinibbna Sutta. The four great references (mahpades) clearly explain that concerning issues regarding the clarification or authenticity of Dhammavinaya, the dhamma of the sutta-s and the rules of the vinaya are the sole authority. Any commentary or interpretation of dhamma needs to be verified by tracing it back to the sutta-s.-The Mahvihra claim that the dhamma referred to in the mahpades includes the Abhidhamma Piaka, and that the Abhidhamma Piaka was spoken by the Buddha (excepting the Kathvatthu), cannot be sustained because the Abhidhamma Piaka, as well as the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikya, are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions which couldn't have existed at the time of the Buddha's parinibbna.-If the compositions of the Abhidhamma Piaka, etc., were extant at that time, and were considered to have been spoken by the Buddha, then (1) all of the early Nikya sects would have very similar abhidhamma compositions (just as they have very similar sutta compositions); and (2) all of the early Nikya sects would have unquestionably considered their own abhidhamma collections to have been spoken by the Buddha. Neither of these are the case. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the Abhidhamma Piaka and the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikya are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions.

Q: would I be correct in understanding that the main difference would be that in the dry insight case (though obviously not quite so dry), the object of focus is not selected, so whatever arises at the instance is an object good enough, while in your case, you in fact remain focused on pitisukha, right?A: Right. But the preliminary mindful attention is directed towards the simple felt-sense of pleasantness/pleasure (sukha). Ptisukha of the first jhna is far, far more pleasurable, expansive, etc.Q: How exactly would you define the difference between the two cases - i.e. the difference between "mindfully attending" to pitisukha in case of samatha only, and "simultaneously mindful and fully aware of both the apperception of ptisukha as well as the momentary flux of that very apperception of ptisukha" in the case of samatha+vipassana? As I understand it, the main difference is that in the first case you are not aware of what you call "momentary flux", right? Would that flux be equivalent to the general characteristics maybe - like anicca or anatta?A: For a beginner practicing in order to develop samatha, it's usually better to start off with just mindfully attending to the simple felt-sense of pleasantness/pleasure (sukha) without attending to the characteristic of momentary flux. This specifically refers to the characteristic of alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta), which is an aspect of the impermanence of all fabrications (sakhra-s). BTW, in its sutta usage this should not be confused with the commentarial theory of radical momentariness (khaavda).Samatha at that preliminary stage of development is not yet sammsamdhi.Q: This is a bit confusing to me, I mean if something is not sammasamadhi, then it can only be micchasamadhi, no? Or is there a category in between, which is sort of neutral?A: Sammsamdhi is samatha and vipassan developed to the stage of the first jhna. This doesn't mean that the development of samatha and/or vipassan prior to the first jhna is wrong samdhi. They are just stages of preliminary development. For example, if one takes the following excerpt from DN 2 to refer to the stages of samatha development after the hindrances have been abandoned, yet prior to entering the first jhna where ptisukha is fully present, then it can be seen how samatha leads to jhna: Seeing that [the hindrances] have been abandoned within him, he becomes glad. Glad, he becomes joyous. Joyful, his body grows tranquil (ptimanassa kyo passambhati). His body tranquil, he is sensitive to pleasure (passaddhakyo sukha vedeti). Feeling pleasure, his mind becomes concentrated (sukhino citta samdhiyati).Q: Also, could you please say a bit more about the experience of the "characteristic of momentary flux"? I think i know what experience you're trying to convey, but it would be good to be sure. A: Prior to the arising of ptisukha, the inner felt-sense of the entire body is experienced as a continual flux of subtle vibrational energy-sensations flowing throughout the whole body. It's important for awareness to be expansive enough so that it can experience the entire body without it collapsing into attending to any specific tactile sensations. The body is calm and the mind is wide open and at ease. By remaining aware in this way, ptisukha eventually arises spontaneously as waves of universal bliss coursing throughout the body. It feels like passing through an invisible 'membrane' wherein all sense of constriction is simply gone and the felt-sense of the body vastly expands along with waves of universal bliss.-But no part of this experience is static. There is a vast, expansive flowing of waves of ptisukha (it's really beyond what can be described in words to anyone who hasn't experienced it). Anyway, that's what I call the characteristic of momentary flux of ptisukha.Q: I find the perception of flux interesting, because it always pertains to an object or point of reference.A: Indeed. Which is why it isn't the end of the path. One has to eventually see through all reference points.Q: In other words, if we were talking of one of the channels of consciousness, we could say "X is changing", where X is sound, or sight, or mind etc.If the bracketing of one's perception were relating to things of a smaller range, we would say "Y is arising, Y is passing away". What constitutes the X is a multiplicity of Y's.For example, "sound is changing" (an example of X), could consist of many examples of Y... "person talking is arising and passing away", "car sound is arising and passing away", "fan sound is arising and falling with great rapidity".A: To me this seems unnecessarily reductionist (if I'm reading what you're saying accurately). The alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta) of any sakhra (X) is what can be empirically experienced. Any further reduction of that sakhra into a multiplicity of Y's arising and passing away throughout the experiential contact (phassa) of X, can at best, only be designated based on inference. It can't be empirically discerned. (According to Karunadasa the commentaries also maintain that radical momentary arising (uppda), duration (hiti), and dissolution (bhaga) is only understood inferentially).Q: In a practical sense, which level of flux (e.g. sum of Xs, X, or Y.... or in other words loka, consciousness-channel, individual object of consciousness) is best to perceive if one wishes to uproot erroneous perceptions of self?A: All of them. With regard to sakhra-s, the relative alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta) during any sensory contact is the same for the momentary flux of the feeling, the apperception, and the sensory consciousness (even though this flux cannot be quantified, i.e. the immediate experiential present cannot be measured). If there is an abrupt change in feeling, for example, from pleasure to pain, even if we conventionally designate the sensory object as the same referent, something has occurred even at the level of sensory consciousness which would be most accurately designated as a passing away of one process of sensory cognition and the arising of another (which still doesn't entail radical momentariness).-This is why designation is such a slippery snake at any level of reference, no matter how reductionist we choose to be. What we designate as an object is just a phantom with no real referent that can ultimately be established. The same is true for all of the dhamma-s of each of the aggregates. And the same is true for any experiential measurement of duration. The closer we look, the more elusive the referent. Until eventually we see through the cruel game of tyrannical empiricism altogether....

Q: VISM XX,65 ... He considers thus: The elements and the kinds of derived materiality during the lifting up [of the foot] all ceased there without reaching the shifting forward: therefore they are impermanent, painful, not-self. ... [other stages of walking] .... Thus formations keep breaking up, like crackling sesanum seeds put into a hot pan; wherever they arise, there they cease stage by stage, section by section, term by term, each without reaching the next part: therefore they are impermanent, painful, not-self.A: I would consider this to be nothing more than conceptual proliferation. How is one to directly cognize or even infer the cessation of the four internal elements based on the movements of the body? It isn't empirically possible, nor is it inferentially valid. It is purely a conceptual filter which has no practical application.

A: When the mind has developed to the point of being fully present and silent there is no impediment of lapsing into memory -- but this doesn't mean that one has seen through all possible reference points. This is why samatha or samdhi isn't enough. One has to continually develop and refine vipassan from within samdhi. Hence, sammsamdhi.

Q: Of course, I'm not saying it is necessarily so, or that proliferation is a bad thing, just wondering what's your reasoning behind it. A: To approach this by way of experience: taste it yourself and see. Afterward you can superimpose whatever conceptual filters that you wish. Or you might even be able to drop the cruel game of tyrannical empiricism altogether. BTW, according to the discourses, mental proliferation is a bad thing.

A: It's not my intention to try to interpret your experience or tell you what you're experiencing. We each have to continually refine our attention and apperception by seeing through and letting go of even subtle interpretations of our experience which may no longer be relevant as the mind becomes increasingly present and silent.Q: What are "reference points" - maybe different sorts of direct experience?A: A reference point is an object support (rammaa). Part of the development of vipassan is to penetrate through and let go of the increasingly subtle reference points which keep us stuck in unsatisfactoriness (dukkha). The "momentary flux of ptisukha" is just another reference point.Q: This is because imo, focusing on something can only be accomplished in the realm of memory. I.e. only when direct experience is not payed attention (so there's no awareness of it either), only then can there be extended focus on something (like a memory of pitisukha), because direct experience (one of the six consciousness) is no doubt happening all the time, so it seems the only way to "ignore" it arising presently would be to focus on a memory of something.A: I would suggest that there are no "things," merely processes.

Q: So, what you think happens between the direct experience of something and our perception of itA: As long as there is contact, feeling and apperception arise together with consciousness. One can refine apperception and eventually discern the empty, mirage-like nature of apperception and thereby realize dispassion towards empirical cognition and liberation from the entire game of empirical cognition; but until one has done so all experiences are filtered through apperception and there is no possibility of "direct experience" unmediated by apperception.

Q: On differentiating perversions from non-perversions with right view, might you be saying that this is done initially on an inferential basis, rather than an experiential one?A: Inference is employed to discern the impermanence, etc., of whatever is not present. Whatever is present is discerned as either arising, altering while persisting, or passing away. AN 3.47Here we have dhamma-s being born acquiring individuation, then aging, and finally ceasing. All in light-speed succession. The entire formulation of what is supposedly ultimately real has no reality other than mere conceptual designation (paatti). It references no ultimate location or basis of designation. This proposition of radical momentary individuation is no more real than a unicorn. Sn 3.12: Dvayatnupassan Sutta:Entrenched in name and form, They conceive that This is true.In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,It turns out other than that.For that is what is false about it.Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.But nibbna does not have a false nature.That the noble ones truly know.Through fully comprehending the truth,They are without hunger, quenched.In short, no dhamma can be individuated without two key links of dependent arising: consciousness, and name (i.e. intention, attention, contact, feeling, apperception) & form. And these two links are what enable one to fabricate a world of ongoing dissatisfaction. SN 35.116: Lokantagamana Sutta.

Q: What is the problem with that? How can mental event be unknowable?...Also the mental states can be distinguished from each other. Like is different from dislike. Merit is different from demerit. One of them always beneficial and another is always wrong. Is that so unbelievable? I find it harder to believe in some sort of nothingness without any distinction between A and not-A, A and B, etc.A: This is precisely the point. The individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (sa) and conceptual designation (paatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is relational and conventional and therefore phenomena cannot be ultimately established as truly existing things (sabhvasiddh), or the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence independent of the cognitive process.

Q: The conceiving [in Sn 3.12] is either about philosophical theories, self view or jhanasA: The excerpt from that discourse has much broader implications. Ud 3.10 (Ud 32) Loka Sutta:This anguished world, Afflicted by contact,Speaks of a disease as self.By whatever terms it conceives of (anything),It turns out other than that.Although becoming otherwise, the world is held by existence,Afflicted by existence, yet delights in that very existence.Where there is delight, there is fear.What it fears is unsatisfactory.This holy life is lived for the abandoning of that existence.-Whatever ascetics or brahmans say that emancipation from existence is by means of existence, all of them are not liberated from existence, I say.-And whatever ascetics or brahmans say that escape from existence is by means of non-existence, all of them have not escaped from existence, I say.-When one relinquishes infatuation with all apperceptions and conceptual designations regarding both existence and non-existence then it is possible to find peace.

Q: They do. Mind doesn't need to remain in "frozen" state for a long time. It is the fastest thing that changes with no simile as to how fast it can change. The present moment ceases every moment and with more attention and the closer you look, the shorter it really is.A: Present moment is another completely conceptual designation with no locatable referent whatsoever. When you look close enough it vanishes.

Ven. Sujato, The Mystique of the Abhidhamma:-In the later abhidhamma, the treatment of time is dominated by a radical new theory, totally unlike anything in the suttas or even the canonical abhidhamma, the theory of moments (khaavda). This postulates that time is constituted of a series of discrete, indivisible units, rather like a series of billiard balls lined up on a table. Each unit, or moment, is infinitesimally small, such that billions pass by in a lightning-flash. So while the suttas emphasize the length of time, the abhidhamma emphasizes the shortness. This theory shapes the abhidhamma conception of a whole range of central doctrines. Thus impermanence becomes, not simply being subject to birth and death, rise and fall, but the momentary dissolution of phenomena one dhamma rises and ceases in an instant, leaving no trace of residue in the next. Samadhi becomes, not an exalted, stable coalescence of mind, but a momentary samadhi running after the fluctuations of phenomena. The path becomes, not a gradual program of spiritual development, but a path-moment, gone in a flash. And the mind itself becomes just a series of mind-moments.-Now it is quite possible to take this theory, compare it with the suttas, and refute it point by point. But here I would simply like to point out what an implausible and useless idea it is. Quite obviously, time may be analyzed as finely as we wish, its divisibility determined only by the sharpness of our analytical razor. Any unit of time has a beginning, a middle, and an end. That beginning, too, has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and so on ad infinitum. There is simply no good reason to postulate an ultimate substratum of time to which other strata can be reduced. This idea seems to derive some of its impressiveness from its air of acrid, pessimistic, reductionist severity, which is often mistaken as a sign of really uncompromising wisdom.-The guiding objective for the formulation of the mind-moment theory would seem to be for exactitude of definition. So while the Buddha spoke of the mind changing while it stands, the abhidhamma just speaks of standing. It is much easier to define a static entity than a process evolving over time. This is why a butterfly collector wants to have his butterflies dead, with a pin stuck through their heart and a little label underneath, not madly meandering about in the woods. The dead mind. But the Buddha was not a butterfly collector, he was an observer of nature. He wanted us to watch the flight and flitter of the butterfly, to understand how it behaves in its natural environment, and to follow it gently, delicately, quietly until it settles down to rest and be still according to its nature which he called samadhi....-Just what is going on here? Why postulate such an odd theory, raising so many pseudo-problems, and so contrary to the suttas, to common sense, and to experience? What is occurring, I suggest, is that the domain of discourse has been shifted from the empirical to the metaphysical. The suttas treat time in a straightforward, pragmatic, empirical terms birth, ageing, and death, the changing states of the mind, the progressive development of spiritual qualities. The purpose, the sole purpose, is to empower the practitioner to get a handle on this stuff of life, directing attention to the seat of the problem how our attachments cause suffering, and how to find peace by letting go. But the abhidhamma aims to describe, not just the spiritual problem and its solution, but the totality of existence. Inevitably, the subjective stance of the suttas becomes objectified, and as the focus moves from meditation to study, the concepts in the books become imposed on reality; in fact, they become reality itself. The quest for truth becomes a quest for definition, and reality becomes as neatly departmentalized as a mathematical table. Ultimate reality becomes, not what you are experiencing now, but what you read about in abhidhamma books. -Find this hard to swallow? You might be interested to know that in contemporary abhidhamma circles it is, apparently, the orthodox position that the series of mind-moments can only be directly seen by Buddhas, and perhaps chief disciples. This is, admittedly, challenged by some, who claim it can be seen in meditation. In just the same way, a Christian meditator will claim to see God, or a Hindu to see the universal Self. Seek and ye shall find. The very fact that such a controversy could possibly arise is a sign how far we have drifted from the Buddhas pragmatic empiricism. This is bad enough; but even worse when we realize that the theory in question made its appearance a millennium after the Buddhas time. This, for me, is as good as an admission that the whole thing is mere metaphysical speculation. No wonder the abhidhammikas have been so keen to father the canonical abhidhamma (and sometimes even the commentaries!) on the Buddha himself, despite massive evidence to the contrary.

Q: My [possibly arbitrary] interpretation of the word "paramattha" with relation to dhammas is that it means that nothing within the limitations of our experience (nama-rupa) can be simplified into anything beyond citta, cetasika, rupa and nibbana. This seems like a phenomenological idea to me, as opposed to an ontological reification.A: There is no soteriological reason for categorizing any dhamma-s as paramattha, except in reference to nibbna as the highest goal or the highest good.

A: I have also read suttas which seem to suggest that we shouldn't conceptualize dhammas as if they are real, discrete entities: Kalaka Sutta AN 4.24:"When cognizing what is to be cognized, he doesn't construe an [object as] cognized. He doesn't construe an uncognized. He doesn't construe an [object] to-be-cognized. He doesn't construe a cognizer.Mulapariyaya Sutta MN1: The Blessed One said: "There is the case, monks, where an uninstructed run-of-the-mill person who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma perceives earth as earth. Perceiving earth as earth, he conceives [things] about earth, he conceives [things] in earth, he conceives [things] coming out of earth, he conceives earth as 'mine,' he delights in earth. Why is that? Because he has not comprehended it, I tell you.

Q: One shouldn't cling to even ultimates. But this doesn't mean that they don't exist.A: How do they exist? Do they exist as truly existing things (sabhvasiddh) as the commentaries maintain? Do they exist as the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence independent of the cognitive process, as professor Karunadasa suggests?Q: Again, the problem is with clinging, not with external things in and of themselves.A: Which is why the Buddha had no concern with the ontological status of any possible external things in and of themselves.Q: Since it is the only moment that exists [the present], without it you wouldn't be able to read this or any other sentence.A: What is the temporal duration of the present moment? If it exists, surely it must have a quantifiable duration which can be measurable?

A: Ascertaining right view is essential to practice as it relates directly to the development of vipassan. Firstly, according to the suttantika stages of gradual training, the development of vipassan has to eventually be conjoined with samatha in jhna. This includes empirically and directly experiencing the momentary flux of ptisukha while remaining in jhna. Specifically, this momentary flux is the characteristic of alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta). As such it is an aspect of anicca. And so after emerging from the first or second jhna one can be confident that even this incredible, expansive, even euphoric experience of non-sensual ptisukha is incapable of ever providing permanent happiness. It is impermanent, and therefore unsatisfactory (dukkha) and not-self (anatt). It should be developed but not be clung to.-Eventually, as the gradual training progresses, and along with it the development of vipassan and pa, one will have renounced and relinquished enough acquisitions that they are able to drop all reference points and object-supports no matter how refined and taste liberation. This is designated as a measureless mind (appamacetasa) which is unestablished (appatiha), featureless (anidassana), independent (anissita), etc.. In short, it has no object-support (rammaa).-In sharp contrast to this suttantika development of gradual training, the Mahvihra commentarial tradition maintains that the refinement and mastery of the non-sensual rapture, pleasure, equanimity, etc. of jhna isnt necessary. One can proceed by engaging in vipassan as a self-sufficient alternative practice of right samdhi.-Now this is where the commentarial view of paramattha vs. paatti has practical implications on how one develops along the course of gradual training. In the context of npnasati, for example, according to the paramattha/paatti distinction, the object of consciousness during jhna is the counterpart nimitta. This is considered to be paatti and therefore one cannot develop actual vipassan while remaining in jhna. So jhna is, in this sense, marginalized. -Also very relevant to how ones view has practical implications concerning the development of vipassan is the commentarial theory of radical momentariness (khaavda). Instead of attending to the empirical alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta) of the actual, refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion (vivekajaptisukhasukhumasaccasa) while remaining in the first jhna; the very adherence to the view of the theory of momentariness superimposes a conceptual filter upon ones empirical experience, which in the context of vipassan is now interpreted as a momentary samdhi. Here, instead of the empirical experience of alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta), one interprets their experience in terms of rapid momentary arising (uppda), duration (hiti), and dissolution (bhaga). -Moreover, by combining the theory of radical momentariness with the stages of insight gnosis found in the Paisambhidmagga, the commentarial tradition has embedded this theory into the very structure of the development of vipassana, as well as the noble path and fruition.-And so as a result of ~600+ years of historical accretion (~2200 years of accretion if the modernist Burmese vipassan interpretation of vipassana differs in any way from the Visuddhimagga), we now find well intentioned practitioners working themselves into something of an existential tizzy by interpreting their experience of the contemplation of dissolution (bhangnupassana) in terms of radical, momentary dissolution and cessation (this being just one example).-Add to this that the Mahvihra commentarial tradition has no way of accurately accounting for the liberated mind of an arahant, because for abhidhammika-s consciousness is always intentional it always has to have an object support. Therefore nibbna was smuggled into the dhammyatana and dhammadhtu as the object of a supramundane, yet still fabricated, mental consciousness. And the cognition of this ultimately existent unconditioned element must necessarily be devoid of all other ultimately existent fabricated phenomena.-None of the above mentioned Mahvihra commentarial developments can be supported by a careful and objective reading of the Pi sutta-s. If one is sensitive to the historical development of the Pi tradition, and investigates these issues objectively with an open-minded and unbiased approach, they should be able to see this for themselves. The commentaries have not only rerouted the development of right meditation, they have completely redrawn the entire map. This has very significant and practical implications for anyone practicing the dhamma. As Retro said on another thread:-I accept there's something admirable about trying to find common ground, but from my perspective it's not just a case of "rivaling terminology" but "rivaling views". That is, specific aspects of each set of views which are either explicitly or implicitly incompatible. -Earlier, Geoff quoted this, from Ven. ananda's Concept and Reality In Early Buddhist Thought, p. 87: Lists of phenomena, both mental and material, are linked together with the term "paccay" or any of its equivalents, and the fact of their conditionality and non-substantiality is emphasized with the help of analysis and synthesis. Apart from serving the immediate purpose of their specific application, these formulas help us to attune our minds in order to gain pa. Neither the words in these formulas, nor the formulas as such, are to be regarded as ultimate categories. We have to look not so much at them as through them. We must not miss the wood for the trees by dogmatically clinging to the words in the formulas as being ultimate categories. As concepts, they are merely the modes in which the flux of material and mental life has been arrested and split up in the realm of ideation....-Now, what he is saying here, isn't just a question of terminology... it's a radically different concept of what a "dhamma" is. (If accepted) it effectively renders the entire objective/standardised foundation upon which the Abhidhamma is built, obsolete. It says that a dhamma is that which is "arrested and split up", formed (sankhata), conditioned by ignorance, by the individual. It does not unconditionally exist, nor is it "ultimate", nor is it an objectively existing object which innocently presents itself to the citta for investigation by panna... rather it is just that which the individual has ignorantly bracketed and falsely attributed "thingness" to - no more, no less. In other words, dhammas are the product of ignorance. All those carefully tabulated lists of dhammas are just mental constructions, conditioned by ignorance.

Q: Now for intellectual theorizers, where they use logic, concepts and convincing wordplay, of course all require recognition & definition. But experience is one thing, and how we call it is another. Unfortunately a lot of logic (which may be convincing!) is the latter, play with words.A: As Ven. Bodhi, Ven. ananda, and others have pointed out, the commentarial authors are agile wordsmiths who have seen fit to contrive fanciful etymologies and interpretations which stretch the limits of language to something of an extreme. On the other hand, the few suttantika-s who Im familiar with are quite straightforward for the most part.

Q: The sort of analysis that you seem to find useful appears to me to be just dragging in philosophical baggage. I see writings such as the Visuddhimagga extract I quoted above as practical advice, based on experience, not philosophical positions.A: To the contrary, the Visuddhimagga and the rest of the Mahvihra commentaries are steeped in philosophical baggage which has nothing whatsoever to do with practical advice and serves no useful soteriological purpose. I personally wish this weren't the case, but it is. How could this have happened? In Nibbna Sermon 01, Ven. ananda offers some historical developments pertaining to this question. The sutta-s, on the other hand, display an elegance and internal consistency which is sadly lacking in the commentaries.

Q: The first description of mind-moments I know is given in Vimuttimagga (1st century CE). And the major Abhidhammika works are medieval.A: There are a few short references to the theory of momentariness in the main commentaries. Spk ii 266: Hence the Ancients said: Arising was called birth and dissolution referred to passing away. Change referred to aging and endurance to maintenance.Thus each khandha has three characteristic marks called arising, aging and dissolution, of which it is said in the passage (A I 152): These are, monks, the three conditioned characteristic marks of the conditioned [khandha].Tenhu por uppdo jti akkhto bhago vutto vayoti ca aathatta jar vutt hit ca anuplan ti eva ekekassa khandhassa uppdajarbhagasakhtni ti lakkhan ti.And Mp ii 252:Origination is said to appear at the origination moments, aging at the subsistence moments and dissolution at the destruction moments.Uppdo ti jti vayo ti bhedo hitassa aathatta nma jar uppddayo sakhatalakkha nma tesu uppdakkae uppdo thnakkae jar bhedakkhae vayo.-Also, cariya nanda (medieval period VbhAA.) cites the Abhidhamma Yamaka as canonical support for his understanding of radical momentariness. The Yamaka does use the terms arising moment (uppdakkhaa) and dissolution moment (bhagakkhaa), even if these terms do not necessarily entail interpreting khaa as radical momentariness in the Yamaka itself.

A: No doubt, the abbhidhamma project was well-intentioned, but I would suggest that the entire enterprise was also ill-conceived. The very notion that all of the corners of samsaric cognition can be squared is to miss the point that samsaric consciousness is deluded from the get-go, and therefore cant be unequivocally validated in terms of the individuation of empirical particulars (whether as things or event-processes). This very process is itself part of the problem, not the solution.-Moreover, attempts to account for liberated cognition in terms of the fabricated aggregates misses the point stated in many sutta-s that such cannot be done. For example, the mind liberated through discernment is designated as measureless mind (appamacetasa) in a number of discourses (S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, MN 38). Elsewhere it is designated as unestablished (appatiha), and featureless (anidassana), and one thus liberated is said to be independent (anissita), etc.-One of the most elegant and subtle aspects of the dhamma of the sutta portion of the Nikya-s is that it doesnt impose any sort of fabricated view regarding the nature of the liberated mind. This is clear in the sense of measureless mind appamacetasa, being free from any sort of measurement pama.-Once all mental designations (pannatti; also sakh, samann, etc.) are done away with, there is no way (and no need) for defining liberation in any way at all. This is a freedom of absence. It is also non-proliferation (nippapanca: Dhammo nippapancaratino, nya dhammo papancrmassa papancaratino.), etc.-This is what distinguishes the exquisite dhamma of the sutta-s from everything that came before the Buddha or after the sutta corpus. Its unfortunate that virtually all commentators early abhidhamma, classical, and modern commentators and all Buddhist doctrinal schools havent seen fit to follow the Buddhas wisdom on these points.

AA: All feeling (vedan) is designated as mental (cetasika; cf. MN 44). But the sutta-s differentiate between pleasure & pain (sukha & dukkha) born of body-contact (kyasamphassaja) on the one hand (cf. SN 48.37), and happiness & unhappiness (somanassa & domanassa) born of mind-contact (manosamphassaja) on the other (cf. SN 48.37). A noble disciple still experiences bodily pain but no mental distress because of it (cf. SN 36.6: "He feels one feeling -- a bodily one, not a mental one.").Translating dukkha exclusively as either "pain" or "suffering" in the context of dukkha ariyasacca isn't very accurate. A better translation is "unsatisfactoriness." This unsatisfactoriness is to be fully understood (dukkha parieyya), and consists of:In the context of the first noble truth, dukkha encompasses the following:The unsatisfactoriness of pain (dukkhadukkhat):birth (jti), aging (jar), illness (bydhi), death (maraa), sorrow (soka), lamentation (parideva), pain (dukkha), unhappiness (domanassa), despair (upys)The unsatisfactoriness of change (viparimadukkhat):-association with what is unpleasant (appiyehi sampayogo)-separation from what is pleasant (piyehi vippayogo)-not getting what is wanted (yampiccha na labhati)The unsatisfactoriness of fabrications (sakhradukkhat):-the five clinging-aggregates (pacupdnakkhandh)-Relevant to the discussion at hand is understanding that dukkha is not just "pain." Translating dukkha exclusively as either "pain" or "suffering" in the context of dukkha ariyasacca isn't very accurate. A better translation is "unsatisfactoriness." This unsatisfactoriness is to be fully understood (dukkha parieyya). From the above it is sakhradukkhat -- the unsatisfactoriness of fabrications -- which is dukkha in an all pervasive sense. All fabrications are unsatisfactory because they are impermanent. They are always becoming "otherwise." Dukkhadukkhat and viparimadukkhat, on the other hand, are only experienced on certain occasions.

Also the Nettippakaraa: Herein, the world is, at one time or another, somewhat free from to the unsatisfactoriness of pain as well as the unsatisfactoriness of change. Why is that? Because there are those in the world who have little sickness and are long-lived. But only the nibbna component with no fuel remaining (anupdisesa nibbnadhtu) liberates from the unsatisfactoriness of fabrications.-Contemplating sasra as an ongoing series of futile, hollow, and unsatisfactory repetitions of birth, sickness, pain, and death motivates one to practice with diligence to a degree that a limited view directed toward merely ending the unsatisfactoriness of this life cannot. The atheistic view that there is nothing after this present life entails the consequence that everyone reaches a cessation of dukkha (of sorts) upon death. If everyone were to attain the fruition effortlessly, merely by dying, then there would be no compelling motivation to fully engage in the integral practice of the dhammavinaya.-The dhamma certainly includes rational thought, but goes well beyond any consensual egocentric rationality (whether atheistic or theistic). The first steps to transcending the conventional rational mind appear when one develops samatha sufficiently to be able to experience the rapture (pti), pleasure (sukha), and expansive mind (mahaggat citta) of jhna. This opens up a whole new vista of experience not previously available, and displays the limitations of any previously held conceptual views based on conventional rationality or normative empiricism.-Beyond these refined meditative states, for the noble disciple who has attained any of the first three fruitions, there is no more adherence to egocentric rationality, and for the arahant no adherence to the limitations of the rational mind at all.-We all come to the dhamma with our unique life experiences and worldview. I acknowledge and respect that. I'm just suggesting that it is prudent to keep an open mind regarding those aspects of the dhamma which may not resonate with our present life experience or worldview. The path is a process of development and refinement of discernment, and what seems quite coherent to the worldling may very well be seen as delusional when that same individual attains the fruition of stream entry, etc.

And if we ever need a bit of help motivating us to get to the cushion and remain there, the sutta-s offer us some skillful contemplations and themes for reflection: [AN 5.57], [AN 6.19], [AN 8.30]

Q: 1. Does a stream-enterer "experience" nibbana, of just "glimpse" it? 2. Is nibbana an object of consciousness (as in the Abhidhamma) or is it an absence of objects? 3. Does an arahant "experience" nibbana for a short time (like jhana etc) and then return to a more-or-less normal experience (this would be the Abhidhamma view), or does he/she "remain in nibbana"?A: Nettippakaraa 4.42, which is the first of nine examples of the mode of conveying ways of entry to the truths, explains guidelines for how to comment upon the fruition attainments. A careful reading provides us with at least a conceptual map of the four fruition attainments, and some appropriate designations to use to describe them. First, the Netti cites the verse from Ud 7.1 Pahamalakuakabhaddiya Sutta, and then explains how this verse pertains to a non-learners liberation (asekhvimutti), i.e. the arahant's fruition attainment, and then a learners liberation (sekhvimutti), i.e. the first three fruition attainments, but specifically in terms of the fruition of stream entry.A: There are numerous Theravda teachers and practitioners who don't subscribe to the (rather late) commentarial interpretation of the paths and fruitions which rests on the theory of momentariness and the reification of nibbna as a vacuum state (i.e. such as the attainment of cessation of apperception and feeling). I think you're probably already aware of this, but for the sake of presenting an alternate perspective there's the following.... See Itivuttaka 43 (Iti 37).-This fruitional liberation is realized through discernment of dependent arising in reverse sequence giving rise to dispassion, etc., eventually culminating in gnosis of the complete elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion (i.e. nibbnaa) . See: Nettippakaraa 4.42.-Which for the non-learner (i.e. arahant) is experienced as unestablished consciousness (appatiha via), as in SN 12.38 (S ii 65): Cetansutta:[W]hen one doesn't intend, arrange, or obsess [about anything], there is no support for the stationing of consciousness. There being no support, there is no establishing of consciousness. When that consciousness doesn't land & grow, there is no production of renewed becoming in the future. When there is no production of renewed becoming in the future, there is no future birth, aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, or despair. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of suffering & stress.-Which elsewhere is designated as a "measureless mind" (appamacetasa, cf. S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, & M I 270), or "featureless consciousness" (anidassana via), etc. DN 11 (D i 211) Kevahasutta:Consciousness without feature,Without end, luminous all around: Here water, earth, fire, And wind have no footing. Here long & short Coarse & fine fair & foul Name & form Are all brought to an end. With the cessation of consciousness Each is here brought to an end.-That is, viassa nirodhena etth'eta uparujjhati: With the cessation of the stationing of consciousness [i.e. viassa hitiy nirodhena] each is here brought to an end. Or as Ven. ananda says: The vacant gaze [of an arahant] is, in fact, not established anywhere (appatiham). It has no existence (appavatta) and it is objectless (anrammaa).

Q: Footnotes 9 and 10 refer to a particular "very unusual kind of 'jhaana' or 'samaadhi'", which implies that it is not the "normal state of the Arahant", but happens only during the awakening experience (though it can be re-entered later). Am I interpreting this correctly?A: I can't speak for Ven. ananda, but yes, that is how I understand what he is saying. We can also look at what else he says on the subject. In Concept and Reality he equates the experience of featureless/non-manifestative consciousness (anidassana via) with the fruition-gnosis samdhi (aphala samdhi) of an arahant, which after first attainment can be re-entered later as the arahant's meditation. AN 9.37 describes this samdhi as follows: Sister, the concentration whereby -- neither pressed down nor forced back, nor with fabrication kept blocked or suppressed -- still as a result of release, contented as a result of standing still, and as a result of contentment one is not agitated: This concentration is said by the Blessed One to be the fruit of gnosis.

Q: So would it be correct to say that you (and presumably Ven Nanananda, judging from those passages) see the fruition attainments as somewhat similar to the commentary versions (as far as that they are particular meditative states that are attained at fruition and can be revisited), but you would differ on some of the details of the fruition itself?A: I would not agree that the path of stream entry is one mind moment in duration. Ven. Kheminda has offered a detailed survey of the relevant canonical sources on the subject in Path, Fruit and Nibbna. As for the first three fruition attainments being meditative states that one can re-enter, as the thirty-seven factors of awakening are all supramundane (cf. Paisambhidmagga), then whenever one who has attained the fruit of stream entry, etc., develops satipahna or any of the other factors of awakening, they are engaging in their respective fruition attainment.

Q: So, correct me if I am wrong, there is said to be cessation of the sense-spheres because what is called contact is dependent upon the duality of the sense-faculty and it's object, a duality which is, though useful, ultimately papaca and conceptualization.A: Dependent arising in its forward sequence is always a description of deluded cognition. When rooted in ignorance and craving, any experience automatically includes all of the first eleven links. That is, for the worldling there is always ignorance, contact, craving, grasping, becoming, and birth, which is the birth of a "being" (satta). This sets up the problem of separation and alienation -- i.e. the struggle for ego survival -- of "my being" in "the world." Whenever there is "a being" in "the world" there is going to arise circumstances of "my being" vs. "the world". Thus the inevitability of dissatisfaction (dukkhadukkhat: the unsatisfactoriness of pain; viparimadukkhat: the unsatisfactoriness of change; sakhradukkhat: the unsatisfactoriness of fabrications), as well as pursuit of the eight worldly dhammas, etc., etc....

Q: This proliferation and conceptualization ends simultaneously with the culmination of the understanding of impermanence, at which point the mind ceases to get caught up with or grasp onto anything, that is, becomes unestablished and non-manifestive/non-proliferating, including the proliferation of self-identification and volitions of clinging and aversion (which might all be summed up under "non-fashioning). When the duality which supports the notion of contact is gone, there cannot really said to be contact, nor consciousness or the "loka" of the six sense spheres, though it isn't that they've literally vanished.A: I agree. When the four noble truths are fully penetrated, the entire deluded cognitive and conflicted affective edifice of the forward sequence of dependent arising immediately falls like a house of cards.

-avra may have been a bit off on a few details in some of his writings, but it's quite amazing how deeply he penetrated the dhamma.

Q: So it is fetters which give rise to phenomena at the 6 sense basesWhen fetters are broken/severely weakened sense impressions stop arising momentarily due to power of a special type of samadhi (anantarika samadhi). This is the culmination point of saddha, viriya, sati, samadhi, panna.A: I respectfully disagree with your realist interpretation. Sense impressions aren't the problem per se -- desire and passion (i.e. craving) arising dependent upon contact -- is what binds the "internal" sensory sphere and the "external" sensory sphere together. Thus, the solution is to relinquish all acquisitions and eliminate craving (third noble truth); then the very notions of "internal" vs. "external" and "contact" are rendered void.

Q: To see and understand the four noble truths in completion, to see the third noble truth, the truth of cessation (nirodha sacca) I think this must be perceived.A: That which is the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion is nibbana. -- S.N. IV 251 and IV 321

That which is the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion is asankhata. -- S.N. IV 359 and S.N. 362

Q: To what extent is non-attention to "signs", as seems to be explained the passages by ven. ananda you've quoted, necessary for total dukkhanirodha, for the fruition of arahantship? I can understand how such a thing might occur, but it also seems to me that there is no harm in sa continuing to do it's thing and perceive objects, though the individual would know that such perceptions are impermanent and selfless and so be liberated from any potential dukkha in regards to perception, and yet it does not necessarily need to switched off into animitta-mode.A: The "sign" that must be abandoned with regard to any phenomenon is the sign of permanence (cf. Paisambhidmagga). The apperception of impermanence and signs of permanence are mutually exclusive. They cannot occur together.

Q: In defence of void...AN 9.34 PTS: A iv 414A: Not all arahants are liberated both ways. SN 12.70 and AN 4.87 tell us of arahants liberated through discernment who don't have any of the formless attainments. Without mastery of the formless attainments one cannot attain the cessation of apperception and feeling. Moreover, the attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling (or any other vacuum state "attainment" of any duration that one might posit as asakhata) cannot be synonymous with nibbna because these states are impermanent. One enters them and one exits them. On the other hand, the complete elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion -- i.e. nibbna -- is a not-conditioned (asakhata) attainment which is irreversible. The other three fruitions are irreversible also, each with their respective degree of liberation.

Q: Note how Ven sariputta says that even the slightest sanna, the slightest arising is dukkha.A: There can be no gnosis (a) without sa.Q: While I agree that person may experience magga- phala citta and progress up the path without fruition absorptions....A: This is all commentarial jargon. The only fruitional samdhi mentioned in the sutta-s is the aphala samdhi of an arahant.Q: Absence cannot be impermanent, except conceptually.A: Even the commentaries admit that cessation of apperception and feeling is not asakhata (cf. Kathvatthu).

Q: Does the attainment of right view without effluents occur in the moment of Nibbana (or some other ariyan att/ainment)? Is it simultaneously the cause of unbinding and a result? (in that one is "nibbanized" through right view and fully possessed of right view in Nibbana) [MN117]A: Whenever one is engaged in supramundane right view there is no generation of mental effluents at that time. "Super mundane right view" means that this view is not associated with effluents and a mind that recognizes the supermundane right view has no tendency to develop mental effluents.That doesn't necessarily mean that the person has attained Nibbana and destroyed all tendencies of mental effluents once and for all. A person's mind which recognized with the super mundane right view is noble as such views do not promote effluents (asava) as long as mind is attended to this view.Q: On the other hand, the view with effluents is still the right view but it encourages asava. Views that "there is something offered", "there is a mother and a father", "there is this and the other worlds" are all right views as they direct the mind towards moral conduct, direct the mind towards sila and dhana, well being of society, human value systems etc. but they are not associated with "letting go of the self view". They entertain the self view thus, while being right view, are not factors of the path to Nibbana.A: One who has attained the fruition of stream entry has abandoned identity view (sakkyadihi), i.e. self-view (attnudihi), but still hasn't abandoned craving for existence (bhavatah), which includes craving for a high birth, i.e. desire for form existence (rparga). [AN 10.13] [MN 118]Q: The suttas support the commentarial (visuddhimagga/mahasi sayadaw) understanding of the sotapanna state for example (and the path to get there). See below how a sotapanna perceives insight knowledges in line with the purifcations and the insight knowledges.A: According to the Mahvihra tradition standardized by Ven. Buddhaghoa the path of stream entry is merely one mind moment in duration, followed by two or three fruition mind moments. This doesn't accord with the sutta-s or the Abhidhammapiaka.A: This sustaining in my opinion is made more difficult by the institutional descent of what is a state of freedom into categorisation and signs indicating status. Stream winner and once returner etc language represents the institutionalisation of the Buddha Dhamma. Its essential radical liberation is rendered less scary by imagined classifications..like prize winning marrows at the local county show.

A: The Kathvatthu and the Visuddhimagga maintain that the cessation of apperception and feeling (savedayitanirodha), which is also called cessation attainment (nirodhasampatti) is neither supramundane nor not-conditioned (asakhata). Cf. Visuddhimagga 23.52:As to the question: Is the attainment of cessation formed or unformed, etc.? It is not classifiable as formed or unformed, mundane or supramundane. Why? Because it has no individual essence. But since it comes to be attained by one who attains it, it is therefore permissible to say that it is produced, not unproduced.-The cessation attainment (nirodhasampatti) is neither fabricated (sakhata) nor not-fabricated (asakhata), but it is produced (nipphanna) and not unproduced (anipphanna). Therefore it has no correspondence with the asakhat dhtu. Moreover, there is no occurrence of consciousness during the cessation attainment, therefore no perception or knowledge. This is why the cessation attainment plays no direct role in the attainment of the supramundane paths and fruitions.-It also can't be designated as the same as nibbna because, as the Visuddhimagga points out, the cessation attainment requires mastery of the four formless attainments before it can be entered. Since there are arahants who haven't developed the formless attainments, they are incapable of attaining the cessation of apperception and feeling. Nevertheless, they are fully liberated through discernment.Q: And those arahats with 4 jhanas - I think they can see nibbana directly in "emptiness" or "signless" concentration (that is - they have it as an object of mind), but they don't "dwell in it", because in this last case there is no consciousness (in particular - perception) to observe, to look at, to cognize. Suttas support these both variants of "experiencing nibbana".A: The Nikya-s and the Abhidhammapiaka are both in agreement that there can be no gnosis (a) without simultaneous concomitant perception (sa).

A: All four main Nikya-s define right concentration (sammsamdhi) as the four jhna-s (D ii 313, M iii 252, S v 10, A ii 25). AN 3.88 (A i 235) lists the four jhna-s as the training of heightened mind (adhicittasikkh). SN 48.10 (S v 198) lists the four jhna-s as the faculty of concentration (samdhindriya) as practiced by a noble disciple (ariyasvaka). AN 5. 14 (A iii 11) lists the four jhna-s as the strength of concentration (samdhibala) as practiced by a noble disciple (ariyasvaka). Moreover, SN 12.70 (S ii 121) and AN 4.87 (A ii 87) both state that there are arahants who don't have the formless attainments. And of 500 arahants mentioned in SN 8.7 (S i 191), only 60 are said to be liberated both ways (i.e. have mastery of the formless attainments).-Also, in the Dhammasagai, where the distinction is made between mundane form sphere jhna (rpvacarajjhna) and formless sphere jhna (arpvacarajjhna) on the one hand, and supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna) needed for all four paths on the other hand, supramundane jhna is defined exclusively as the four jhna-s (or five by dividing the first jhna into two).-In none of these instances are the four formless attainments or the cessation attainment ever mentioned in the context of right concentration as a component of the noble eightfold path. Thus your equating nibbna with the cessation of apperception and feeling is unsustainable, since it is entirely possible to realize nibbna without ever experiencing the cessation attainment.

Q: Stream entry is not an attainment; it a letting go arising out of insight, vipassana. From that there is no need to add the real potential of the corruption of credentials to ones practice, which is very much in keeping with the Buddhas teachings.A: Indeed, the point of stream entry is to let go of identity view.A: The other issue is, of course, that self-assessment of ones progress and self-proclamation of ones attainment are all too easily corrupted by subtle, unrecognized defilements as well as simply misunderstanding what one has experienced, and certitude is no guarantee that the experience - with which one is identifying - is what one might imagine that it is. We humans have the greatest capacity for self-deception. There is a radical reason why the Buddha taught us to let go, not to add on.AA: 'Empty village' (sua gma) stands for the six internal sense media. If a wise, competent, intelligent person examines them from the point of view of the eye, they appear abandoned, void, & empty. If he examines them from the point of view of the ear... the nose... the tongue... the body... the intellect, they appear abandoned, void, & empty. [SN 35.197 (CDB SN 35.238)]-The dhamma is a way, a path coursing away from dissatisfaction and toward authentic liberation. Thus there's always a question of the skillfulness of a presentation, which is informed by the speaker's and the listener's view, and offers the possibility of further informing the listener's view. When we move away from the noble eightfold path embedded in the canon in search of understanding, the possibility arises of encountering self-limiting interpretations either rooted in a desire to set boundaries of orthodox definition not evident in the canon itself, or the opposite desire to discard much if not everything that's not explicitly stated in the suttas (or beyond this, discarding whatever we deem unacceptable in the suttas as well). Either of these moves, if accepted uncritically, can impose conceptual filters upon what we acknowledge as the possible interpretation of our own experience (i.e. view) as well as the path components to be implemented in our practice.-We only need to look at the widespread contemporary emphasis on a path of training and development which doesn't fully embrace the integration of non-carnal joy and pleasure (nirmis pti and sukha), which the discourses tell us are integral sweet fruits of the ascetic life, or alternatively, the uncritical rejection of everything not supposedly uttered by the Buddha, to begin to recognize some of the consequences of accepting self-limiting interpretations of what the noble path "should be.

-There is no need to accept the theory of radical momentariness to clearly see for oneself the alteration while persisting (hitassa aathatta) of mental fabrications.-And by extension, specifically regarding physical processes, if there is no alteration in the circulatory system or the central nervous system of the body (for example) then you are very likely either (i) dead, or (ii) soon to be dead. And even a dead body undergoes a process of decomposition.-Alteration or change orfluxis common to all physical things on both micro and macro levels.-I mean that the entire notion of inherently existent things is rooted in ignorance. This is why one has to penetrate conditioned arising in reverse sequence in order to eliminate the view that things have inherent existence. And an arahant has done just that. Therefore an arahant can use conventional language without forgetting that s/he is merely employing nominal designations.-Notions of truly existent things are nothing more the ignorant reification of designations with no ultimately established referents.-The entire path is just the skillful employment of practice injunctions in order to eliminate craving and ignorance. There is no ontology to be established. In fact, conceiving in terms of existence and non-existence is a significant part of the problem, and not the solution.

-And on a related note, I quit thinking in terms of vdas and ynas a long time ago. I consider everything other than the suttas of the Nikyas and gamas to be a series of endnotes to the teachings of the ascetic Gotama. Some of these endnotes are more informative than others. Many just wander off into thickets of views.-Ven. avra was one of the first people in a very long time to question the authority and validity of the received commentarial tradition. IMO this was intellectually honest and necessary. He offered much in order to begin to clear the path. But it was just a beginning. He wasn't always 100% correct and his approach and writing style are not straightforward. A diligent, disinterested practitioner can accept Ven. avra's pioneering contributions while also seeing that it's now possible to approach the dhamma even more directly.

There is no need to suggest that feelings, perceptions, or thoughts "endureunchangedfor at least a certain interval." AN 3.47: Monks, these three are fabricated characteristics of what is fabricated. Which three? Arising is discernible, passing away is discernible,alteration (literally, other-ness) while staying is discernible. Also SN 35.93-There also is no reason to read the commentarial theory of radical momentariness into these passages either.

-But a pleasant feeling (sukha vedan) or a painful feeling (dukkha vedan) alters even while it is being experienced. It doesn't remain static. And also the thought, "This is painful." There is no stasis that can be experientially discerned when these phenomena are occurring. And when one refines one's perception (sa) to where one is aware of this alteration, then the alteration of perception is also discernible.-The point of anicca is to say that all experiences are comprised of all three aspects, not that all three aspects are experienced at the same time.

-The dhamma is concerned with soteriology not ontology. All of the practice injunctions included in the three aggregations of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment have the four noble truths as their underlying thematic structure. In MN 28 (M i 184) Mahhatthipadopama Sutta we find Venerable Sriputta comparing the four noble truths to an elephants footprint.-Specifically, all practices lead towards and culminate in the full realization of the third noble truth: the cessation of unsatisfactoriness. As SN 45.91 (S v 38) Pcnaninna Sutta.-Moreover, these noble truths are epistemic. They are the undeceptive knowledge of unmistaken cognitions. They are not ontological realities. There is no need for ontological commitments, i.e. there is no need to establish phenomena as truly existing. All such proofs and refutations are quite irrelevant and are rooted in unskillful adherence to views.-I've already addressed the inappropriateness of applying realist ontology to the Buddha's dhamma a number of times on this thread and elsewhere. There is no need whatsoever to impute substantial existence onto phenomena as they are experienced. It's a complete sidetrack; an infatuation with views.- I think that if we are to draw any comparisons between the dhamma and western philosophy the most appropriate comparison might be with some aspects of first-person phenomenological description. That is, Husserl's method of phenomenological description where one attends to the contents of one's conscious experience while setting aside (i.e. bracketing) the question of the ontological existence of the contents of this experience altogether. Of course, there's no need for any further comparison beyond this general methodological framework. I'mnotsuggesting that we attempt to read Husserl or Merleau-Ponty into the dhamma....

-Impermanence has no soteriological utility except as this concept relates to impermanent phenomena (as phenomena are experienced). Apperception/recognition of impermanence (aniccasa) involves attending to an appearance of impermanence (anicckra). This appearance of impermanence is recognized via a sign/representation (nimitta).-Phenomena arise according to specifically assignable conditionality (idappaccayat):When this is, that is.From the arising of this comes the arising of that.Therefore, phenomena aren't utterly non-existent.Phenomena cease according to specifically assignable conditionality (idappaccayat):When this isn't, that isn't.From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that.-Therefore, phenomena aren't ultimately existent.-Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (sa) and conceptual designation (paatti) for differentiation. (Magic of the Mind 63)-And how are you going to establish the objective validity your momentary thing "that maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change"? If you rely on any criterion or measurement (pama) based on deluded worldly cognitions, then all you will ever "prove" is that deluded worldly cognitions are deluded. Not a valid source for establishing the unerring validity of any supposed objective truth-claims. Sn 3.12 Dvayatnupassan Sutta:Entrenched in name and form,They conceive that This is true.In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,It turns out other than that.For that is what is false about it.Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.-If, on the other hand, you attempt to employ any criterion or measurement (pama) in order to try to establish liberated cognitons, then you will also be at a loss because there are no means of measurement which can be used as reference points to validate a measureless cognition (appamacetasa). SN 6.7 (S i 148) Koklika Sutta.-Better to practice satipahna and begin to relinquish notions of objective truth-claims about theories of radical momentariness.Q: My impression from listening to Ven Nananada's Nibbana Sermons is that, though his angle is certainly conceptual proliferation, being fooled by the movie or the magic show, he seems careful not to fall into nihilism by specifically denying the existence of anything in particular. It seems to me that to say that there isonlyproliferation would be nihilism. Am I misreading Ven Nananada's message?A: I think you're reading him accurately. It's not that there isonlyproliferation (papaca); it's that phenomena (dhamma-s) do not need to be (and indeed cannot be) established as ultimately existent ontological realities.-The individuation of particular dhamma-s requires theconcomitantengagement of consciousness (via)andname (nma: vedan, sa, phassa, cetan, manasikra) specific to whatever dhamma is being cognitively individuated. Thus, all such individuation of particulars is fabricated, relational, and conventional.-A thorough understanding of this process of individuation exposes theproblemof deluded cognition, and when the problem is thoroughly discerned one can then begin to abandon unskillful processes and develop skillful mental factors such as saddh, pmojja, pti, passaddhi, sukha, samdhi. Beyond this, one begins to clearly see the futility of fabricated processes altogether. As this clear seeing (vipassan) develops, disenchantment (nibbid) arises. Then dispassion (virga) arises. Then as these qualities continue to develop, eventually the path results in liberation through discernment (pavimutti) and one realizes the gnosis of elimination (khayea) of the influxes (sava-s), also referred to as the elimination of craving (tahakkhaya) as a shorthand expression.-All of this is developmental and soteriological. The path doesn't require establishing philosophical theories and proofs of valid cognition (pama) or ultimately existent objects. From the perspective of the early Pi dhamma all of this sort of theorizing is just more proliferation (papaca). Nothing needs to be philosophically established beyond the status of mere designation (paattimatta). This in no way entails nihilism becau