NENA A. CARIO,G.R. No. 166036Petitioner,Present:PUNO,C.J., Chairperson,-versus-CARPIO,CORONA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBERSAMIN,JJ.ESTRELLA M. ESPINOZA,represented by her attorney-in-factMANUEL P. MEJIA, JR.,Promulgated:Respondent.June 19, 2009x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xR E S O L U T I O NCARPIO, J.:The CaseBefore the Court is a petition for review assailing the 30 October 2003[1]and 2 November 2004[2]Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73034.The Antecedent FactsThe case originated from an action for Legal Redemption and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Estrella M. Espinoza (respondent), represented by her attorney-in-fact Manuel P. Mejia, Jr., against Nena A. Cario (petitioner) and Modesto Penullar (Penullar).Respondent was the co-owner, to the extent of2/4 share, of a parcel of land, known as Lot 422 of the Mangaldan Cadastre, located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.Penullar was the owner of 1/4 share of the land.However, the land remained undivided.In 1988, respondent heard a rumor that Penullar was selling his share of the land.She inquired from both Penullar and petitioner if the rumor was true but they both denied it.On 25 July 1989, respondent learned that Penullar executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner.Penullar alleged that he informed respondent of his intention to sell the land.Petitioner also claimed that the land was first offered to respondent but she was not interested in buying it.The Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (trial court) ruled in favor of respondent.The trial court ruled that respondent was not notified of the sale of Penullars share of the land.The trial court found that upon learning of the sale, respondent promptly filed the complaint and deposited the amount of redemption price.The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of Estrella Mejia Espinoza and against defendants Nena Cario and Modesto Penullar, as follows:1.The defendants are ordered to allow the plaintiff to redeem the share/interest [that] defendant Modesto Penullar has over the land in question, Lot 422 of the Mangaldan Cadastre;2.The defendants are ordered to execute the corresponding deed of redemption in favor of the plaintiff; and3.The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay attorneys fee in the amount ofP15,000.00 plusP500.00 for each day of hearing and actual litigation expenses ofP5,000.00 plus costs of this suit.The writ of preliminary injunction which the Court issued on November 22, 1996 enjoining the defendants and/or their agents or any other person acting in their [behalf] from continuing with the construction going on in the premises in question, is hereby made permanent.Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Pedro M. Surdilla and Atty. Fernando P. Cabrera.SO ORDERED.[3]Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision.In its 30 October 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to file the appellants brief.The Court of Appeals deemed that petitioner abandoned the appeal.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.In its 2 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.Hence, the petition before this Court.The IssueThe sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the appeal for failure of petitioner to file the appellants brief.The Ruling of this CourtThe petition has no merit.Petitioner alleges that the failure to file appellants brief was not deliberate but was due to an exceptional reason, the illness of her counsel, which was supported by a medical certificate.Petitioner alleges that Section 1, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is merely directory and it is not the ministerial duty of the Court to dismiss the appeal.Petitioner alleges that the appellants brief was submittedprior to the issuance of the 30 October 2003 Resolution and hence, there was substantial compliance with the Rules.Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:SECTION 1.Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:x x x x(e)Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;In its Order dated 16 January 2003, the Court of Appeals granted petitioner another extension of forty five (45) days from January 15, 2003 or untilMarch 1, 2003 within which to file brief with stern warning that no further extension shall be entertained.[4]The Judicial Records Division submitted a report dated 8 September 2003 that no appellants brief was filed within the extended period granted by the Court.In a Manifestation with Motion[5]dated 11 September 2003, respondents counsel prayed that for failure to file the brief within the extended period, petitioner be deemed to have waived the right to submit the appellants brief.It was only on 15 October 2003, after receipt of respondents Manifestation and Motion, that petitioners counsel filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellants Brief and the appellants brief.The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.[6]There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality.[7]However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule.Petitioners counsel alleges that the cause of the delay in filing the appellants brief was his sickness.In hisUrgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellants Brief, petitioners counsel claimed that he suffered an attack of acute hypertension necessitating a day of close observation in a clinic for possible confinement, and close medical attention for about a month.[8]Petitioners counsel further claimed that by reason of said illness and upon strict advice of his attending physician to refrain from indulging in stressful activities, [he] was forced to lay aside all his pending assignments for about a month.[9]However, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellants Brief shows that the hypertension attack happened on 8 February 2003.The appellants brief was belatedly submitted only on 15 October 2003.The Court further notes that the medical certificate[10]was issued only on 13 October 2003.We find that petitioners reason did not fully justify the failure to comply with the Rules.Petitioners counsel did not act for seven months from the expiration of the time given him by the Court of Appeals within which to file the appellants brief.We cannot deem petitioners belated submission of the appellants brief, which was made only after respondents Manifestation and Motion to the Court of Appeals, as substantial compliance with the Rules.Rules of procedure must be used to facilitate, not to frustrate, justice.[11]However, the right to appeal is not a natural right but is a statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[12]WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition.WeAFFIRMthe30 October 2003 and 2 November 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73034.SO ORDERED

ERWIN H. REYES,Petitioner,-versus-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. and/or ROTAIDA TAGUIBAO,Respondents.G.R. No. 180551Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,Chairperson,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,*CHICO-NAZARIO, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:February 10, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Before this Court is a Special Civil Action forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Erwin H. Reyes, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated10 November 2006[1]and9 November 2007[2]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 96343.In its assailed Resolutions, the appellate court dismissed petitioners Petition forCertioraritherein for failure to give an explanation why copy of the said Petition was not personally served upon the counsel of the respondents.The present Petition arose from a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees filed by petitioner against respondents Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines (CCBP) and Rotaida Taguibao (Taguibao) before the Labor Arbiter on14 June 2004.Respondent CCBP is a corporation engaged in the business of production and distribution of carbonated drinks, and Taguibao is its Human Resource Manager.In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he was first employed by respondent CCBP, through Interserve Manpower Agency (Interserve), as a Leadman in February 1988.Petitioner was initially assigned to the Mendiola Sales Office of respondent CCBP.Petitioners employment contract was renewed every five months and he was assigned a different task every time.Such an arrangement continued until petitioner was directly hired by respondent CCBP as a Route Salesman on15 September 2000.Exactly one year from the time of petitioners employment as a Route Salesman, respondent CCBP, thru Taguibao, terminated his services on15 September 2001.Since he already acquired the status of a regular employee, petitioner asserted that his dismissal from employment without the benefit of due process was unlawful.In opposing the Complaint, respondent CCBP refuted petitioners allegation that he was a regular employee.Petitioners employment was for a fixed period of three months, which was subsequently extended[3]with petitioners consent.Petitioner was employed pursuant to the mini-bodegaproject of respondent CCBP wherein respondent CCBP sought to extend its market to areas that cannot be serviced by its regular salesmen.After the viability of this marketing scheme was found to be unsuccessful, respondent CCBP was constrained to discontinue petitioners fixed-term employment.In addition, respondent Taguibao had no liability for terminating petitioners employment when it was not effected in bad faith.On30 April 2005, the Labor Arbiter promulgated his Decision,[4]favoring petitioner, since there was insufficient evidence to sustain the averment of respondents CCBP and Taguibao that petitioners employment was for a fixed period.The Labor Arbiter noted that respondents CCBP and Taguibao failed to present a copy of petitioners purported Contract of Employment.The only evidence adduced by respondents CCBP and Taguibao to buttress their contention of petitioners fixed-period employment was the Affidavit of respondent Taguibao herself, which could not be afforded any evidentiary weight in the absence of independent corroborating evidence.The Labor Arbiter thus decreed:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [herein respondents CCBP and Taguibao] as follows:(1) To reinstate [herein petitioner] to his former position as route salesman, or to any substantially equivalent position with all the rights, privileges, and benefits appertaining thereto including seniority rights;(2) To pay [petitioner] his full backwages which as of August 30, 2005 already amount toP565,500.00 subject to re-computation to include salary increases granted during the intervening period and during the pendency of the instant case, as well as benefits and privileges due a regular employee; and(3) To pay [petitioner] the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total judgment sum.In compliance with the directive of the Labor Arbiter, respondents CCBP and Taguibao immediately reinstated petitioner to his former position as Route Salesman on1 March 2006.[5]However, respondents CCBP and Taguibao, by filing a Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and posting the corresponding Supersedeas Bond, sought the stay of the execution of the monetary awards made by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision.Respondents CCBP and Taguibao asserted in their appeal that petitioner was merely employed for a particular project which turned out to be not viable.Petitioner was subsequently terminated from work on account of the expiration of his employment contract.Petitioners claim of illegal dismissal was, therefore, tenuous.On31 May 2006, the NLRC promulgated its Decision[6]dismissing the appeal of respondents CCBP and Taguibao and affirming with modification the30 April 2005Decision of the Labor Arbiter.The NLRC reduced the amount of backwages awarded to petitioner underscoring the latters unexplained delay (more than three years) in filing his Complaint for illegal dismissal.Instead, the NLRC reckoned the computation of backwages only from the time petitioner filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.[7]The NLRC further modified the Labor Arbiters Decision by deleting the order reinstating petitioner to his former position in view of the confidential nature of the latters employment as a salesman, which exposed him to voluminous financial transactions involving the property of respondent CCBP.The NLRC likewise deleted the Labor Arbiters award for attorneys fees.Thefalloof the NLRC Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the decision dated30 April 2005is MODIFIED. The order reinstating [herein petitioner] is deleted.[Respondents CCBP and Taguibao] are hereby ordered to pay [petitioner] the following:1.Backwages:24 October 2004to30 April 2005Salary P13,000 x 6.2 months=P80,200.0013thmonth pay P80,600=6,716.6712P87,316.672.Separation Pay1 September 2000to30 April 2005P13,000 x 5 years=P65,000.00P152, 316. 67The award of 10% attorneys fees is deleted.All the parties, namely petitioner and respondents CCBP and Taguibao, moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing NLRC Decision.Petitioner, on one hand, maintained that the reckoning point for the computation of his backwages must be from the time his employment was unlawfully terminated, and not from the institution of his Complaint for illegal dismissal.Respondents CCBP and Taguibao, on the other hand, reiterated their previous position that petitioners employment was terminated only after the expiration of the fixed period for the same; and prayed that the NLRC vacate its previous finding of illegal dismissal.In a Resolution dated13 July 2006, the NLRC denied theMotionsfor Reconsideration of all the parties for lack of a valid reason to disturb its earlier disposition.From the13 July 2006Resolution of the NLRC, only petitioner elevated his case before the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition forCertiorari,which was docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 96343.Petitioneraverred in his Petition that the NLRC abused its discretion in ignoring the established facts and legal principles when it modified the award for his backwages and deleted the order for his reinstatement.The Court of Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated10 November 2006, dismissed petitioners Petition forCertiorarifor his failure to give any explanation why a copy of the said Petition was not personally served upon the counsel of the adverse parties.Since petitioner failed to timely file a Motion for Reconsideration, the Resolution dated10 November 2006of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, and an Entry of Judgmentwas made in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 96343 on2 December 2006.On19 July 2007, petitioners new counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.Petitioner, through his new counsel, sought for the liberality of the Court of Appeals, faulting his former counsel for the procedural defects of his Petition and for his failure to seasonably seek reconsideration of the10 November 2006Resolution of the appellate court.Also, this time, it would appear that petitioner provided the explanation required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court.In a Resolution dated9 November 2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time.Hence, petitioner comes before this Courtviathe instant Special Civil Action forCertiorariassailing the Resolutions dated10 November 2006and9 November 2007of the Court of Appeals.Petitioner raises the following issues in the Petition at bar:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT EXCUSING PETITIONERS PROCEDURAL LAPSES.II.WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF BACKWAGES AWARDED COMPUTED FROM THE TIME THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL WAS FILED.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT.IV.WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DELETING THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEYS FEE.The Court first disposes the procedural issues involved in the present case.It is evident from a perusal of the records that petitioner indeed failed to provide the Court of Appeals a written explanation as to why he did not personally serve a copy of his Petition therein upon the adverse parties, as required by Section 11, Rule 13[8]of the Revised Rules of Court.The records also readily reveal that petitioner did not file a timely Motion for Reconsideration of the10 November 2006Resolution of the Court of Appeals.Petitioner, however, submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his Petition beforethe Court of Appeals,and the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the greater interest of substantial justice.Petitioner attributes the technical flaws committed before the appellate court to his former counsel, and urges the Court to excuse him therefrom since compliance with the procedural rules calls for the application of legal knowledge and expertise which he, as a layman, cannot be expected to know.Petitioner, thus, prays that this Court give his Petition due course and set aside the Resolutions dated10 November 2006and9 November 2007of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. SP No. 96343.For their part, respondents CCBP and Taguibao had long conceded in this battle when they no longer appealed the 31 May 2006 Decision of the NLRC, therefore, rendering the same final and executory with respect to them.Yet, respondents CCBP and Taguibao still insist before this Court that petitioner was not illegally dismissed, since he was employed for a fixed-term only, and his services were terminated upon the expiration thereof.Respondents CCBP and Taguibao also argue that petitionersprocedural faux pascannot be excused by merely attributing the same to his former counsel, in view of the doctrinal rule that negligence of the counsel binds his client.The Court rules in favor of petitioner.It is true that for petitioners failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, his petition should be expunged from the records.In the case ofSolar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,[9]the Court stressed the mandatory character of Section 11, Rule 13,viz:We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with.In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and theprima faciemerit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.Nevertheless, the Rules of Court itself calls for its liberal construction, with the view of promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[10]The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard.[11]In numerous cases,[12]the Court has allowed liberal construction of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court when doing so would be in the service of the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of the equity jurisdiction of this Court.In one such case,Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13]this Court provided the following justification for its non-insistence on a written explanation as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court:The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice.Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.The call for a liberal interpretation of the Rules is even more strident in the instant case which petitioners former counsel was obviously negligent in handling his case before the Court of Appeals.It was petitioners former counsel who failed to attach the required explanation to the Petition inCA-G.R. SP No. 96343.Said counsel did not bother to inform petitioner, his client, of the10 November 2006Resolution of the appellate court dismissing the Petition for lack of the required explanation.Worse, said counsel totally abandoned petitioners case by merely allowing the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration to lapse without taking any remedial steps; thus, the10 November 2006Resolution became final and executory.The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client.Hence, if counsel commits a mistake in the course of litigation, thereby resulting in his losing the case, his client must perforce suffer the consequences of the mistake.The reason for the rule is to avoid the possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence of his or her counsel to escape an adverse decision of the court, to the detriment of our justice system, as no party would ever accept a losing verdict.This general rule, however, pertains only to simple negligence of the lawyer.Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since, in such a case, the client is effectively deprived of his or her day in court.[14]The circumstances of this case qualify it under the exception, rather than the general rule.The negligence of petitioners former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably resulted to the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available to the petitioner.Not only was petitioner deprived of the opportunity to bring his case before the Court of Appeals with the outright dismissal of his Petition on a technicality, but he was also robbed of the chance to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition.What further impel this Court to heed the call for substantial justice are the pressing merits of this case which, if left overshadowed by technicalities, could result in flagrant violations of the provisions of the Labor Code and of the categorical mandate of the Constitution affording protection to labor.Higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner should not be denied his day in court and made him to suffer for his counsels indiscretions.To cling to the general rule in this case would only to condone, rather than rectify, a serious injustice to a party -- whose only fault was to repose his faith and trust in his previous counsel -- and close our eyes to the glaring grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC.This Court is aware that in the instant case, since petitioners appeal before the Court of Appeals is to be given due course, the normal procedure is for us to remand the case to the appellate court for further proceedings.The Court, however, dispensed with this time-consuming procedure, since there is enough basis on which proper evaluation of the merits of the case may be had.Remand of this case would serve no purpose save to further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.[15]Having thus settled the procedural matters in the instant case, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues.The Court is convinced beyond cavil that the NLRC committed grave abuse of its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in modifying the 30 April 2005 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, for in so doing, the NLRC not only disregarded the elementary statutory and jurisprudential principles,but also violated the basic principles of social justice and protection to labor enshrined in the Constitution.Explicit is Art. 279 of the Labor Code which states:Art. 279. Security of Tenure. -- In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.Applying the above-quoted statutory provision, this Court decreed inPheschem Industrial Corporation v. Moldez[16]:Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an illegally dismissed employee shall be entitled,inter alia,to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalentcomputed from the time that his compensation was withheld from him,i.e.,from the time of his illegal dismissal, up to the time of his actual reinstatement.Thus, where reinstatement is adjudged, the award of backwages and other benefits continues beyond the date of the Labor Arbiters Decision ordering reinstatement and extends up to the time said order of reinstatement is actually carried out. (Emphasis supplied.)The Court was more emphatic inPhilippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation v. Dapiton,[17]when it ruled that backwages had to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he had to pay for illegally dismissing his employee.It was to be computed from the time of the employees illegal dismissal (or from the time his compensation was withheld from him) up to the time of his reinstatement.One of the natural consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed is the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement.The statutory intent of this matter is clearly discernible.The payment of backwages allows the employee to recover from the employer that which he has lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal.[18]Logically, it must be computed from the date of petitioners illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement.There can be no gap or interruption, lest we defeat the very reason of the law in granting the same.That petitioner did not immediately file his Complaint should not affect or diminish his right to backwages, for it is a right clearly granted to him by law -- should he be found to have been illegally dismissed -- and for as long as his cause of action has not been barred by prescription.The law fixes the period of time within which petitioner could seek remedy for his illegal dismissal and for as long as he filed his Complaint within the prescriptive period, he shall be entitled to the full protection of his right to backwages.In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of his illegal dismissal within which to institute the complaint.This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years.[19]The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker.[20]Here, petitioner was dismissed from service on15 September 2001.He filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on14 June 2004.Clearly, then, the instant case was filed within the prescriptive period.The Labor Arbiter, in his computation of the award for backwages to petitioner, had followed the long-settled rule[21]that full backwages should be awarded, to be reckoned from the time of illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.The NLRC, however, modified the Labor Arbiters award for backwages by computing the same only from the time petitioner filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter,i.e., on24 October 2004, up to the day when the Labor Arbiter promulgated his judgment,i.e.,30 April 2005.The NLRC provided no other explanation for its modification except that it was just and equitable to reduce the amount of backwages given to petitioner since, having been dismissed on15 September 2001, it took him more than three years to file his Complaint against respondents CCBP and Taguibao.We find no justice or rationality in the distinction created by the NLRC; and when there is neither justice or rationality, the distinction transgresses the elementary principle of equal protection and must be stricken out.Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, as to both rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[22]There is no sufficient basis why petitioner should not be placed in the same plane with other illegally dismissed employees who were awarded backwages without qualification.Herein petitioner, having been unjustly dismissed from work, is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalents computedfrom the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.[23]Accordingly, backwages must be awarded to petitioner in the amount to be computed from the time his employment was unlawfully terminated by respondents CCBP and Taguibao on15 September 2001up to the time he was actually reinstated on1 March 2006.We also do not agree with the NLRC in deleting the directive of the Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position, on the flimsy excuse that the petitioners position as Route Salesman was confidential in nature and that the relationship between petitioner and respondents CCBP and Taguibao was already strained.To protect the employees security of tenure, the Court has emphasized that the doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement.Every labor dispute almost always results in strained relations, and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation; otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated.[24]The assumption of strained relations was already debunked by the fact that as early as March 2006 petitioner returned to work for respondent CCBP, without any antagonism having been reported thus far by any of the parties.Neither can we sustain the NLRCs conclusion that petitioners position is confidential in nature.Receipt of proceeds from sales of respondent CCBPs products does not make petitioner a confidential employee. A confidential employee is one who (1) assists or acts in a confidential capacity, in regard to (2) persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies specifically in the field of labor relations.[25]Verily, petitioners job as a salesman does not fall under this qualification.Finally, the Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor Arbiters award for attorneys fees to petitioner.Petitioner is evidently entitled to attorneys fees, since he was compelled to litigate[26]to protect his interest by reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of his employment by respondents CCBP and Taguibao.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition isGRANTED.The Resolutions dated10 November 2006and9 November 2007of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 96343and the Decision dated31 May 2006of the NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 044658-05 areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-07161-14 is herebyREINSTATED.Let the records of this case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for implementation of this Decision, and he shall report his compliance herewith within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS,Petitioners,- versus -NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G. GARCIA,Respondents.G.R. No. 176530Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:June 16, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xRESOLUTIONNACHURA,J.:This petition for review oncertiorariseeks the review of the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.The case stems from the following antecedents:On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.On the day set for the presentation of the respondents (plaintiffs) evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had no tenancy relationship.In an Order[2]dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there wasprima facieshowing of tenancy.[3]Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the motion.[4]Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal[5]with the RTC, which gave due course to the same.[6]The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was still inAmerica.[7]On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSEDandSETASIDE.Accordingly,thesubjectcomplaintis

reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.[8]The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties.Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents knowledge and consent;2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitangs appellants brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an appellants brief; and3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents complaint.[9]The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive grounds.A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:SEC. 22.Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appearsde partein a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers first appearance and validates the action taken by him.[10]Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by silenceor acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.[11]Respondents silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence.[12]Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.[13]In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable.The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.For theDARAB to have jurisdictionover a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[14]Basic is the rule that jurisdictionis determined by theallegations in the complaint.[15]Respondents complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA by the respondents,suffice it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.[16]WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition isDENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 6, 2007 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.CONRADO QUESADA, ANGELITA QUESADA EJERCITO, HECTOR A. QUESADA, AUGUST QUESADA, ENGRACIA A. QUESADA, and GAVINA ASUNCION,Petitioners,- versus -HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ILDEFONSO DEREQUITO and AGUSTIN D. DEREQUITO, represented by EUGENIO DEREQUITO and FOR HIMSELF,Respondents.G.R. No.177516Present:QUISUMBING,J.,*Chairperson,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA,VELASCO, JR., andBRION,JJ.Promulgated:March 13, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Epitacio Asuncion, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners Conrado Quesada, et al., was the owner of Lot No. 225-B (the lot) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. F-24467 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo and containing about 3.4 hectares.[1]One-and-a-half (1 ) hectaresof the lot were leased to one Claro San Luis (San Luis).The lot is separated from the land occupied by Querubin Derequito (Querubin), predecessor-in-interest of respondents, by theBalabagRiver.Querubin converted a portion of theBalabagRiverinto a fish pond and occupied a portion of the lot leased to San Luis.Querubin later filed a complaintfor forcible entry against San Luis, docketed as Civil Case No. 8863.Branch I of theIloilothen Court of First Instance rendered a decision datedAugust 25, 1975in favor of the therein defendant San Luis,[2]disposing as follows:FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered:a.orderingplaintiff[Querubin]torenounce possession of the little over one hectareindicated as Exhibit A-2 and Exhibit A-3 on Exhibit A for plaintiff and Exhibit 5 for defendant;b.orderingplaintiff to limit his fishpond operationon the area North and Northeast of the original bank (before encroachment) of theBalabagRiverin Dumangas,Iloilo;c.ordering defendant to limit his fishpond operation along the curb line indicated in red pencil from point x to y on the sketch plan, Exhibit B for the plaintiff, of the area South and southeast of the original bank of theBalabagRiver.No pronouncement as to cost.Let copy of this decision be furnished the Regional Director of the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication with offices inIloiloCity.SO ORDERED.(Underscoring supplied)[3]The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was denied by Order ofSeptember 15, 1976.The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court but it appears that it was not implemented.[4]In 1977, San Luis contract of lease expired.After Querubin died, respondents succeeded in the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the questioned portion of the lot.OnAugust 26, 1985, San Luis, together with petitioners, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a complaintto revive the judgmentin Civil Case No. 8863 (for forcible entry, which was decided in favor of the therein defendant San Luis) and to recover possession and damages.[5]The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 16681, was later amended to implead respondents Agustin Derequito and Eugenio Derequito (Eugenio) as defendants and to drop San Luis as a plaintiff.[6]Branch 32 of the Iloilo City RTC, by Decision ofJuly 8, 2002,rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 16681 in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:1.The Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8863 be revived in favor of the plaintiffs[-herein petitioners]Quesadas, Ejercito, and Asuncion after they have acquired the rights and interest of Claro San Luis by subrogation upon the termination of the lease contract of Claro San Luis in 1977 in the Decision Dated August 25, 1975 which reads as follows:a.ordering plaintiff to renounce possession of the little over one hectare indicated as Exhibit A-2 and Exhibit A-3 on Exhibit A for plaintiff and Exhibit 5 for defendant;b.ordering plaintiff to limit his fishpond operation on the area North and Northeast of the original bank (before encroachment) of theBalabagRiverin Dumangas,Iloilo;c.ordering defendant to limit his fishpond operation along the curb line indicated in red pencil from point x to y on the sketch plan, Exhibit B for the plaintiff, of the area South and southeast of the original bank of theBalabagRiver.No pronouncement as to cost.Let copy of this decision be furnished the Regional Director of the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication with offices inIloiloCity.SO ORDERED.IloiloCity,August 25, 1975.2.The defendants-[herein respondents]are hereby ordered jointly and severally topay plaintiffs the sum of no less than Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos a year for damagesfrom 1977 until plaintiffs are restored to the possessionof that 1-1/2 hectares more or less ofLot225-B;3.Defendants are ordered jointly and severally topay plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos asattorneys feesand Two Thousand (P2,000.00) aslitigation expensesevery time case is called for trial;4.Defendants are orderedto pay the costsof the suit; and5.Defendants are ordered jointly and severally to return that portion ofLot225-B covered by Original Certificate of Title No. F-24467 in the name of Epitacio Asuncion, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, Quesadas, Ejercito andAsuncion.SO ORDERED.[7](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Respondents filed aNotice of Appeal[8]of the trial courts decision which was denied due course as it was filed beyond the reglementary period.[9]A Writ of Execution was thereupon issued.[10]Respondents subsequently filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction[11]before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction inx x xMODIFYING the original judgment [in the forcible entry case] which has long become final and executory, rendered by Hon. Judge Sancho Y. Inserto, by requiring the defendants-petitioner[s] to pay monetary damages which was not awarded on the original judgment,x x xreviving the original judgment which has long PRESCRIBE[D];x x x xx x xgranting the ex-parte motion to serve the Writ of Execution of the revived judgment here in Digos City upon he defendant-petitioner, Eugenio Derequito[;][12](Emphasis and underscoring in the original; CAPITALIZATION supplied);and that the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff and Clerk of Court of the Iloilo City RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Execution.[13]By Decision[14]ofMay 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, finding that prescription had set in as 30 years had already passed from the time the decision in the forcible entry case became final and executory in 1975, and that the said decision may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its enforcement, found merit in respondents petition.Thus it ratiocinated:It must be stressed that Article 1444 (3) of the New Civil Code provides that actions upon a judgment must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.In other words, the action to revive a judgment prescribes in ten (10) years counted from the date said judgment became final or from the date of its entry.Additionally, after the lapse of five (5) years from the date ofentry of judgment or the date said judgment became final and executory, and before the expiration of ten (10) years from such date, the judgment may be enforced by instituting an ordinary action alleging said judgment as the cause of action.Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.After the lapse of such time and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.The records of the case at bar reveal that prescription had already set in against the original judgment because it became final and executory in 1975 andmore than 30 years have already passed, thus the judgment can no longer be enforced.x x x xx x x The petitioners are therefore correct in assailing the court a quos decision since it is already unalterable and may not be modified in any respect.Moreover, the rule is well-settled thatthe judgment sought to be enforced may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its enforcement, an action the purpose of which is not tore-examine and re-try the issues already decidedbut to revive the judgment.x x xx x x xWHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.Consequently, the Decision and Order datedJuly 8, 2002andJanuary 9, 2006of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,IloiloCity, are vacated and set aside.IT IS SO ORDERED.[15](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution ofApril 12, 2007,[16]the present petition[17]was filed, faulting the appellate court(a)x x x IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 01489ON THE GROUND THAT IT SUFFERED FROM BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES.(b)x x x IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE LOWER COURT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN MODIFYING THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT, WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BY REQUIRIING THE PETITIONERS TO PAY MONETARY DAMAGES NOT AWARDED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.(c)x x x IN UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT PRESCRIPTION HAD ALREADY SET IN AGAINST THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY IN 1975 AND MORE THAN 30 YEARS HAVE ALREADY PASSED, THUS THE JUDGMENT CAN NO LONGER BE ENFORCED.[18]The petition is impressed with merit on procedural and substantive grounds.One of the requirements for certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[19]Respondents had the remedy of appeal when the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.Respondents did in fact file a Notice of Appeal, which was denied due course, however, because it wasfiled beyond the reglementary period.Having lost the remedy of appeal, they should not have been allowed by the Court of Appeals to avail of the remedy of certiorari.Respondents nevertheless argue that respondent Eugenio learned of Civil Case No. 16681-action for revival of judgment only when the writ of execution was served on him; and that Eugenio, who has been living in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur since 1960, has not been served with copies of the orders, notices, and other court processes issued in said case.[20]The Court is not impressed.Respondent Eugenio, together with the other respondents, participated in the proceedings of the case through their counsel Atty. Teofilo G. Leonidas, Jr. (Atty. Leonidas) who received the court processes in their behalf.It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client.[21]Respondents argue, however, that there is no proof that Atty. Leonidas had been given the authority to represent them.[22]Again, the Court is not impressed.The presumption in favor of a counsels authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one, and a lawyer is not required to present a written authorization from his client.[23]Respecting the issue of prescription, contrary to respondents contention, the action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry case had not prescribed.The judgment sought to be revived was rendered onAugust 25, 1975and the motion for reconsideration of the said judgment was denied onSeptember 15,1976.[24]A writ of execution was in fact issued.The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within five years or up to or on or aboutSeptember 15, 1981.Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 16681 the action for revival of judgment onAugust 26,1985, was well within the 10-year prescriptive period.[25]STRANGELY, the appellate court,in its challenged decision ofMay 31, 2006, appears to have reckoned the10-year prescriptive period from the finality of the trial courts decisionupto the promulgation of its (the appellate courts)decision onMay 31, 2006,hence, its ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial courts decision.As for respondents claim that the trial court erred in modifying the revived judgment by awarding damages, the same fails.The damages awarded represented those suffered by petitioners on account of respondents withholding possession of the lot since 1977 (when San Luis lease contract expired and petitioners took over his rights and interests over the questioned portion of the lot) and attorneys fees and litigation expenses.It need not be underlined that the relief to which the judgment creditor-plaintiff in a complaint for revival of a judgment depends upon the contents of the judgment in said complaint, and not on what was granted in the judgment sought to be revived.Thus, petitioners complaint for revival of judgment and recovery of possession and damages had two causes of action.The first sought the revival of judgment in the case for forcible entry, which was in favor of former lessee San Luis.The second sought the recovery of possession and damages against respondents for violation of petitioners right to the possession and fruits of the lot since 1977.WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED.The Court of Appeals Decision datedMay 31, 2006and Resolution datedApril 12, 2007areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The July 8, 2002 Decision of Branch 32 of the Iloilo City Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 16681 isREINSTATED.SO ORDERED.

GLEN PASCUAL Y MALUMAYaliasYEYEandPAULITO PASCUAL Y JUDALENAaliasBOYET,Petitioners,-versus-PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.G.R. No. 162286Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,*CORONA,**NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:June 5, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Before this Court is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in connection with Section 2, Rule 125 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking to set aside the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 26329 and to reinstate the appeal of herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals (CA).The instant petition is brought about by the following factual and procedural antecedents:OnJuly 25, 1996, Criminal Case No. 96-151438 for homicide was filed against petitioners with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofManila, Branch 6, the Information on which reads:That on or about June 30, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with two others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of TEOFILO CORNEL Y DACASIN, by then and there kicking, boxing the latter on the different parts of his body and, thereafter, striking him in the head with a stone, thereby inflicting upon him mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]During their arraignment onJanuary 31, 1997, petitioners, with the assistance of their counselde parte,pleaded not guilty.At the trial, the RTC found the following facts based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Rodolfo C. Cortez (Cortez), an eyewitness to the mauling incident which led to the killing of the victim; Edgardo Ko (Ko), the police investigator of the case; Flora Cornel (Flora), who testified as to the civil liability of the case, she, being the mother of the victim; and the testimony of petitioner Paulito Pascual, for the defense:OnJune 30, 1996, at about12:30in the morning, Rodolfo Cortez was on his way to buyliempoat Andok's Litson Manok (Andok's) located at the corner ofPalawanand Rosalito Streets, along G. Tuazon, Sampaloc,Manila. Cortez was approaching Andok's when he saw a male person sporting long hair being kicked, mauled and ganged up on by six persons in front of the same store. Cortez recognized two of the six persons as petitioners Glen Pascual alias Yeye and Paulito Pascual alias Boyet, as the former sometimes played basketball with Cortez and the latter lived in Masbate Street, the next street from Leo Street, where Cortez lived.Petitioner Glen Pascual hit the head of the victim with a knapsack, which caused the victim to fall with his face down. While the victim was lying prostrate on the ground, petitioners Glen Pascual and Paulito Pascual continuously kicked the said victim. Cortez next saw petitioner Glen Pascual with a shiny instrument, which the latter struck on the neck area (the lower earlobe) of the victim. After that, Cortez heard somebody shout the name Yeye, which made petitioner Glen Pascual turn around, prompting both of them to have an eye to eye contact.[2]The following day, after the mauling incident, while Cortez was on his way home from work, he passed by thebarangayhall and noticed that somebody was lying in state. Cortez entered thebarangayhall and recognized the corpse inside the coffin as the same victim who was mauled the night before. Cortez informed somebody, who turned out to be the brother of the victim, about the mauling incident which led to the killing of the victim and told the latter that he was willing to testify as to the incident he witnessed.[3]Thus, onJuly 2, 1996, Cortez executed an Affidavit[4]stating what he witnessed during the mauling.Edgardo Ko testified that on June 30, 1996, at 10:00 in the morning, while he was in his office at the Western Police District, Homicide Section, he received a telephone call from Senior Police Officer (SPO4) Domingo Almeda of the Balic-Balic Police Station informing him that a victim of a mauling incident was admitted dead on arrival at theOspital ng Sampaloc.Hearing said information, he and PO3 Diomedes Labarda then proceeded to the said hospital and traced the victim's body inside the emergency room.Upon seeing the victims body, Ko examined it.It showed lacerated wounds at the back of his head, busted lips and a puncture wound on the chin.He also came to know the name of the victim as Teofilo Cornel y Dacasin (Teofilo).Afterwards, Ko and his companion proceeded to the scene of the mauling incident. They conducted an ocular inspection and found splashes of blood along the gutter of the road. They also found the bloodstained, gray and aquamarine colored knapsack containing assorted technician's tools and clothing which allegedly belonged to the victim.They recovered said bag at the Pascual compound at1024 Rosalito Street, Sampaloc,Manila.[5]The autopsy conducted by Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), upon a letter-request of the victim's brother, indicated the following: (1) the victim suffered fractures, linear, on the right and left fronto-temporo-parietal bones; (2) as a result of the said injuries, the victim suffered hematoma on the scalp, generalized, and hemorrhages, subdural, on the right and left cerebral- hemisphere; (3) the injuries could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a lead pipe or a 2x2 piece of wood; (4) considering that the victim suffered fractures on both sides of his head, the blunt instrument could have been used twice in inflicting the wounds; (5) that the person who inflicted the blunt instrument could have been one arm's length from the victim, and that if the blunt instrument was placed inside a bag and that bag was used to hit the head of the victim, the same would still be a blunt instrument and could have produced the same injuries; (6) that the external injuries like lacerated wounds, hematoma, and contusions were also caused by a blunt instrument; (7) that these wounds could have been sustained also if the victim was boxed and kicked, because a closed fist is a blunt object; and (8) that in view of the location of the external injuries in the anterior position of the body of the victim, the assailant and the victim could have been facing each other about an arms length from each other.[6]

On the other hand, petitioner Paulito Pascual, in his testimony, narrated that onJune 30, 1996, he went to sleep at around11:30in the evening and woke up at about12:30 to 1:00in the morning because his housemaid arrived and informed him that there was a commotion outside his house.He went outside the house but did not see any commotion; instead, he saw a lone person lying prostrate alongG. Tuazon Street. He returned to the house and asked the housemaid as to the identity of the person lying prostrate on the ground. While he was inside his house, three policemen entered and invited him for investigation while four other policemen remained outside the compound where the house was located and held his relatives,i.e.,Balam Pascual, Eddie Mamaril and Tiyo Van Pascual for questioning. They all boarded an owner-type jeepney and the policemen brought them to the police headquarters at Police Station 5. The policemen did not show him any warrant for his arrest or for the arrest of his other relatives. They were detained at the police station for one week. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Manila City Jail. He did not know the victim or the name and identity of the person he saw lying prostrate outside his house.[7]After trial, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision[8]datedSeptember 7, 2001reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the afore-going, the Court finds accused GLEN PASCUAL Y MALUMAY alias YEYE and PAULITO PASCUAL Y JUDALENA alias BOYET GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE. The Court hereby sentences them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS and to jointly and severally pay the mother of the victim, Mrs. Flora Cornel the following amounts:a.P50,000.00 for the death of Teofilo Cornel y Dacasin;b.P50,000.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses; andc.P50,000.00 as moral damages.SO ORDERED.[9]Due to the conviction, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[10]datedSeptember 25, 2001, which was denied by the trial court.[11]Consequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Notice of Appeal[12]onOctober 17, 2001and, onJuly 9, 2002, the CA issued a notice[13]to petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Edilberto R. Balce, requiring petitioners to file their brief within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said notice. OnAugust 13, 2002, petitioners filed through their new counsel, Atty. Humberto B. Basco, an UrgentEx-ParteMotion for Extension of Time to Submit Appeal Brief,[14]which was granted by the CA in a Resolution[15]datedOctober 15, 2002.However, no brief was filed by petitioners.For failure of petitioners to file the required brief, their appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, by the CA onFebruary 13, 2003.[16]And, as a consequence thereof, an Entry of Judgment was made onMarch 8, 2003.Subsequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion[17]datedSeptember 10, 2003with the CA alleging that the dismissal of the appeal amounted to punishing them for something which they did not do or in which they had no participation whatsoever. They also argued that the dismissal of the appeal and the entry of judgment did not preclude the CA from reinstating the appeal, as there were instances when the same court had set aside entries of judgments and reinstated appeals due to the failure of counsels to file appellants' briefs.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment[18]dated January 28, 2004, argued that the claim of the petitioners that they were not informed by their counsel of the filing of the motion for extension of the period for the filing of their brief and the dismissal of the appeal on account of the non-filing of the said required pleading, was devoid of any merit.The OSG pointed out that the petitioners were aware of the notice to file brief, since what they disclaimed knowledge of were merely the motion for extension filed by their counsel and the resolution dismissing the appeal. It was also observed by the OSG that the lack of coordination by the petitioners with their counsel respecting the appeal may be attributed to the possibility that petitioners were confused as to who their counsel was, as shown in their Omnibus Motion, wherein they referred to their counsel as Atty. Humberto Basco on page 1 and as Atty. Edilberto R. Balce on page 3, which indicate that the petitioners did not even bother to know who their counsel was.It was also claimed by the OSG that petitioners omitted to state in their Motion the date when they discovered the dismissal of their appeal and, thereby, hiding the unreasonable delay orlacheson their part with regard to their Urgent Motion, which was filed more than 11 months since the Resolution dismissing the appeal was promulgated.In sum, the OSG, citing jurisprudence,[19]contended that a client is bound by the actions of his counsel, as well as by his mistake or negligence, and that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself is guilty of neglect.In their Reply (to Comment)[20]datedFebruary 10, 2004, petitioners argued that they relied on the supposed professionalism of every member of the Bar.They also claimed that no amount of prodding would guarantee that the brief would be prepared and filed on time, as the lawyer concerned was negligent.According to them, if they made any mistake, it was their act of trusting their lawyer and not their failure to follow up the status of the case.It was also their contention that they should not be blamed for the fact that they had not secured the services of a counsel because they tried hard to convince lawyers to handle their case, but they seemed to believe that their case was hopeless.Finally, citing jurisprudence,[21]they state that procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.In its Resolution[22]datedFebruary 18, 2004, the CA denied the Urgent Omnibus Motion datedSeptember 10, 2003of petitioners by agreeing with the OSG that petitioners were aware of the notice to file brief, and that they themselves were guilty of neglect for failing to monitor the status of their appeal.The CA also ruled that petitioners did not state when they discovered the dismissal of their appeal, the omission of which appears to hide their own delay in filing the motion, which was one for reconsideration of a final resolution and, hence, subject to a reglementary period.On March 11, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review onCertiorari,[23]which was denied by this Courtin a Resolution[24]dated April 12, 2004 for petitioners' failure to show that they had not lost the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which to appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in view of the lack of statement of the date of receipt of the assailed judgment of the CA.The present petition was filed onApril 6, 2004.OnMay 18, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution datedApril 12, 2004on the ground of negligence of their counsel.They claimed that they could not comply with the requirement to indicate in their petition the date when they received the Resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal, because they never received a copy of the Resolution of the CA; and that their counsel was so grossly negligent that he did not even bother to inform petitioners of the developments in their appeal. In its Resolution datedMay 24, 2004, this Court required the OSG to file a comment on the petition and on the motion for reconsideration.In its Comment on the petition datedSeptember 2, 2004, the OSG argued that the petitioners were likewise at fault for the dismissal of their appeal because they failed to diligently monitor the status of their appeal.The OSG reiterated the arguments it raised in its Comment datedJanuary 28, 2004.Anent the petitionersmotion for reconsideration, the OSG countered that despite the provisions of Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the said procedural rules, as a general rule, are liberally construed, periods for filing an appeal or a motion for reconsideration are strictly enforced.Thus, according to the OSG, having had actual notice of the issuance of the Resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal, petitioners should have indicated the date of such notice in their petition with this Court, which inclusion is necessary to establish compliance with Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.OnOctober 13, 2004, the Court granted petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of its Resolution datedApril 12, 2004denying petitioners' Motion for Extension to File Petition datedMarch 11, 2004.In the same Resolution, this Court gave due course to the instant petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice.OnNovember 30, 2004, petitioners submitted their Memorandum, and onFebruary 4, 2005, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that it be allowed to adopt its Comment datedSeptember 2, 2004as its Memorandum, which the Court granted onMarch 16, 2005.The issues raised in this petition are:ATHE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS APPEAL AMOUNTED TO PENALIZING THEM FOR SOMETHING OVER WHICH THEY HAD NO CONTROL WHATSOEVER.BTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RIGIDLY APPLYING THE RULES RATHER THAN THE SPIRIT BEHIND THEM.The petition has no merit.Petitioners insist that they relied on the supposed professionalism of their counsel.According to them, having received the notice from the Court of Appeals to file a brief, their counsel was supposed to know his duty, not only as their counsel but also as an officer of the court; and they conclude that they should not be blamed and penalized if the conduct of their counsel fell way short of what was expected of him.This reasoning of petitioners merits no consideration.It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.[25]InPeople of the Philippines and Bricio Ygana v. Rafael Bitanga,[26]an exception to the foregoing rule is enunciated, and that is when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court.For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of counsel should not be accompanied by his client's own negligence or malice.[27]Clients have the duty to be vigilant of their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their case.[28]Failing in this duty, they suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against them.The CA is correct in its finding that petitioners were aware of the notice to file brief, since what the petitioners disclaimed knowledge of was only their counsel's motion for extension to file the brief.The previous pleadings, as well as the petition itself, are without any claim by petitioners that they had no knowledge of the notice to file brief with the CA. No allegation was even made that after the discovery of the dismissal of their case by the CA, petitioners asked or confronted their lawyer for the latter's failure to file the brief. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.[29]All of the above would lead anyone to conclude that petitioners were not vigilant.Although there is no doubt that petitioners' counsel was negligent, such negligence was not so gross because it still afforded petitioners the necessary remedy, provided that they themselves were not negligent. Hence, the negligence of their counsel binds them.A contrary view would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice.For all that a losing party would need to do is invoke the mistake ornegligence of hiscounsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation. To allow this obnoxious practice would be to put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by accused persons and theircounsel, with a view to securing favorable rulings in cases of conviction.[30]Petitioners likewise argue that the CA rigidly applied the rules rather than the spirit behind them.They proceeded to cite a case wherein the rules were relaxed and the relief sought, which was the cancellation of the entry of judgment by the CA, was ordered upon the finding of negligence on the part of the counsel.However, the cited case bears scant resemblance to the instant case.As discussed earlier, petitioners' counsel may have committed negligence, but such was not so gross as to deprive them of their right to due process. On the contrary,Mario S.Mariveles v. Court of Appeals,[31]which petitioners cited, the negligence committed by the counsel was so great that the rights of the accused were prejudiced.Thus:It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof.However, where the negligence of the counsel is so great that the rights of the accused are prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting his defense, especially where appellant raises issues which place in serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a miscarriage of justice.These teachings of jurisprudence are present in the case at bar.Hence, the above case is inapplicable to the instant case.WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED,and the Resolution datedFebruary 18, 2004of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26329 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

DOMINGA RUIZ, APOLONIA RUIZ,G.R. No. 166386

FLORENCIO RUIZ, CORNELIA

RUIZ, OLIMPIO RUIZ, and HEIRSPresent:

OF TOMASA RUIZ,

Petitioners,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

Acting Chairperson,

TINGA,*

- versus -CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA,and

DE CASTRO,*JJ.

CIRILADELOSSANTOS,Promulgated:

Respondent.*January 27, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariandmandamusseeking that the Resolutions dated September 21, 2004[1]and December 21, 2004[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85872 be reversed and set aside; and that the CA be directed to give due course to the petition forcertiorari, prohibition andmandamusfiled before it by herein petitioners.A brief factual background is necessary for a proper perspective in the resolution of herein petition.Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio, Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio, all surnamed Ruiz (petitioners), were the original owners of seven parcels of land with a total area of194,284 square meters located inBarangayKaytinga, Alfonso, Cavite, covered by OCT No. P-4017 in the name of Tomasa, covering 46,235 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4018 in the name of Cornelia, 49,803 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4288 in the name of Dominga, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4289 in the name of Apolonia, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4290 in the name of Olimpio, 19,650 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4291 in the name of Florencio, 19,650 sq. meters; and OCT No. P-4292 in the name of Cornelia, 19,648 sq. meters (collectively referred to as subject property).Cirila delosSantos(respondent) is a duly licensed real estate broker.Sometime in 1995, Olimpio gave respondent the plan of the subject property and verbally authorized her to sell the same. Thereafter, respondent referred in writing the subject property to Odessa Antiporda (Antiporda), a realtor and a fellow estate broker, who had earlier informed respondent that she had a prospective buyer interested to buy a land with an area of about 15 to 20 hectares to be used as a retirement village.Antiporda in turn referred the subject property to one Alfred Tantiansu (Tantiansu).Olimpio then gave respondent a written authority to sell the same.[3]In May 1996, respondent introduced Olimpio to Tantiansu and they all went together to the location of the properties.Tantiansu showed interest in the properties and asked for the lowering of price, which Olimpio pegged atP315.00 per square meter.Respondent asked Olimpio for the renewal of her authority, to sell to which the former obliged.In the authority to sell, it was specified that she would still be paid her commission even after the said authority expired, provided she registered in writing her prospective buyer with whom she negotiated during the period of authority. Accordingly, respondent notified petitioners in writing that Tantiansu was her buyer.[4]A meeting was subsequently held among Olimpio, respondent and Tantiansu in Tantiansu's office where the prospective buyer showed interest in buying the properties.A few weeks later, a meeting was held between Olimpio and Tantiansu only, without respondent.Olimpio asked respondent to lower her commission from 5% to 2.5%; otherwise, the sale would not push through.But respondent, through a letter sent to Olimpio, answered that she was amenable to a commission of 4%.[5]Respondent later learned that the properties were sold to different corporations atP60.00 per square meter, as indicated in the deeds of sale.Upon her verification of the articles of incorporation of the corporation-buyers with the Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that the corporations were owned by Tantiansu.Respondent then demanded the payment of her broker's commission, but was unheeded.Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Pias City, a complaint[6]for collection of sum of money and damages against all petitioners, alleging that it was through her effort as a real estate broker that she was able to bring about the consummation of the sale of the subject property, to petitioners' immense gain and benefits; that despite the sale and her repeated demands, petitioners refused to pay her broker's fee.Petitioners Domingo Ruiz, et al. filed their Answer with counterclaim and alleged as affirmative defense that at the time of the consummation of the sale of the subject properties, there was no longer any existingbroker's agreement between them; that respondent had no more authority from them to sell the properties or,assuming there was such authority, the same had already lapsed or expired; that it was petitioners' understanding at the time of the sale of the subject properties that Tantiansu, the buyer, would be responsible for the payment of the broker's commission, whoever the broker may be; that petitioners knew that respondent had initially claimed her broker's commission from Tantiansu; but after Tantiansu's death, and failing to collect any broker's commission from said buyer, respondent commenced the present action against them.Issues having been joined, a full-blown trial on the merits ensued.OnSeptember 22, 2003, the RTC[7]rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff [respondent] and against the defendants [petitioners], ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum ofP2,447,524.80 plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint and moral damages ofP500,000.00 as well as exemplary damages ofP200,000.00 and attorney's fees ofP100,000.00 andP2,000.00 per court appearance and to pay the cost.[8]Petitioners filed their notice of appeal.[9]OnNovember 6, 2003, respondent filed her Comment and/or opposition thereto, alleging that the appeal was not perfected for failure of petitioners to file the docket/appeal fee within the reglementary period to appeal.In an Order[10]datedJanuary 16, 2004, the RTC denied petitioners' appeal and considered the appeal barred for failure of petitioners to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.It ruled that the decision had already become final and executory, and there was nothing more to be appealed to the CA.With the denial of their appeal, petitioners filed a petition for relief[11]alleging that they were prevented from awaiting themselves of an appeal due to mistake and excusable negligence of their counsel on record, and that they had a good and substantial defense.Attached to the petition was the Affidavit of Merit of Atty. Mark Edsel Ang (Atty. Ang), petitioners' former counsel, wherein he stated thatwhen he received the decision on September 30, 2003, he immediately sent copies thereofto petitioners by registered mail, as four of the six petitioners live abroad while the other two live in Cavite; that he communicated with the RTC Clerk of Court the fact that a notice of appeal was already filed and the fees would be paid as soon as he got the confirmation of petitioners' desire to appeal, to which the clerk of court gave her assurance on the acceptance of the late payment of docket fees; that he received a long distance call from petitioner Cornelia on October 15, 2003 confirming petitioners' desire to appeal the decision; thus, he paid the appellate fees on October 24, 2003.Atty. Ang admitted that it was through his negligence that the appeal was belatedly filed.In its Decision[12]datedJune 18, 2004, the RTC denied the petition for relief for lack of merit.The RTC found no merit in petitioners' contention that the error of counsel to pay the appellate fees in due time was a mistake constituting excusable negligence and ruled that the mistake of counsel binds his client.The RTC held that petitioners' claim of a good and valid defense was belied by the court's findings and conclusions contained in its Decision datedSeptember 22, 2003.In an Order[13]datedJune 24, 2004, the RTC granted the motion for execution filed by respondent on the ground that the decision datedSeptember 22, 2003had already become final and executory.OnJuly 5, 2004, notices of garnishment[14]were issued to the different banks by sheriff Josefino Ortiz.Notice[15]of sale on execution of the subject property was scheduled onSeptember 3, 2004.Petitioners filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibition, andmandamuswith prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction with the CA, verified and certified by Dominga, seeking to set aside the following: (1)Order dated January 16, 2004, which denied petitioners' notice of appeal; (2) Decision dated June 18, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for relief; (3) Order dated June 24, 2004 declaring the Decision as final and executory and granting the motion for execution filed by respondent; (4)notice of garnishment issued on July 5, 2004; and notice of sale.OnSeptember 21, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, for being procedurally flawed, at the very least, this petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and consequently DISMISSED. And since the temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is merely an adjunct to the main case, the same must be pro tanto denied.[16]The reasons given by the CA dismissing the petition outright are as follows:(1)No motion for reconsideration was filed against the challenged Order issued by the respondent judge onJanuary 16, 2004. Well settled is the rule that a filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari.(2)The names of the heirs of the petitioner Tomasa Ruiz are not indicated, in violation of the first par. Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules, which requires that thepetition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all petitionersand respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.(3)There is no special power of attorney executed by the said heirs authorizing Dominga to sign the verification and certification in their own behalf.[17]Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution datedDecember 21, 2004, as the CA found that the arguments put forward in the motion were a virtual rehash of those alleged in support of the petition.Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:1.WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE THE CA;2.WHETHER THE NAMES OFTHE HEIRS OF THE PETITIONER TOMASA RUIZ ARE INDICATED IN THE PETITION;3.WHETHER THERE IS NO SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED BY SAID HEIRS AUTHORIZING PETITIONER TO SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN BEHALF.4.WHETHER THE CA ACTED WITH HASTE ON ITS BASESLESS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A VIRTUAL REHASH OF THOSE ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF ITS PETITION.[18]The parties filed their respective memoranda.Anent the first issue, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the institution of a special civil action forcertiorari.Und