National Nuclear Security Administration"The greatest threat before humanity today isthe possibility of a secret and sudden attackwith chemical or biological or radiological ornuclear weapons ... America, and the entirecivilized world, will face this threat fordecades to come."President George W. BushFebruary 2004"The continually shifting nature ofgeopolitics ... the ever-forwardadvancement of science and technology ...the hardened determination of terrorists tosow death and destruction all of thesedemand that we continually reassess thesituation, that we constantly revisit the topicat hand, and that we incessantly update ourdefenses and our plans to combatproliferation threats."Spencer AbrahamSecretary of EnergyMay 2004Strategic Plan1Message from the AdministratorPlanning has always been crucial in complex activities, butperhaps never more so than today, when major changesare in progress.As we move toward new approaches tocreating a responsive infrastructure, new opportunities toimprove oversight, new challenges in safety and security,new missions in nonproliferation, and the continued evolutionof the NNSA of the Future, a strategic plan can help usstay focused on a future worth creating and help motivateour efforts to make that future a reality.This plan remindsus why we are enduring the disruption of change.Weve just completed a comprehensive restructuring of theNNSA.Thiseffortinvolveddownsizingofstaffbyapproximately20%intwoyearsandaredeploymentofadditional staff to reflect our new management and operatingphilosophy.Our new approach challenges NNSA employeesto radically change the ways in which we operate.SiteOffice staff are empowered to accept risk for the Government,but are challenged to find less transactional ways to assurecontractor performance; Headquarters staff are challengedto clearly identify and define what the government wants,but discouraged from micromanaging our contractors; and,Service Center staff are challenged to support Site Offices and Headquarters by finding ways to solveproblems rather than simply identifying roadblocks.Settling into these new roles takes time and it isimportant to remember why we are making these changes.Our vision for the NNSA of the Future is taking shape.We want to move to a flexible workplace that will allowpeople to achieve their maximum potential and will cutthroughsomeofthebureaucracyandcumbersomeprocedurestraditionallyassociatedwithFederalpersonnel management.In this regard, we are workingwith the Office of Personnel Management and the privatePartnership for Public Service in a pilot program calledExtreme Makeover.We are one of three organizationsthroughout the Federal Government that will test thisprogram, which is designed to dramatically streamlinethehiringprocess.Theoutstanding,motivatedindividuals we need to bring into NNSA will not sit and wait during an interminable selection process.Extreme Makeover, if it lives up to our expectations, will allow us to recruit the best and the brightestand make the NNSA an employer of choice.One of the most difficult things for Government officials is to look beyond the immediate and considerthe future.The one thing we can be sure of is that the future will demand creative, committed people,both in Government, in the plants and laboratories, and in the intellectual community that supportsnational security programs.Over the next few years a large number of people now in NNSA will beeligible to retire.While I hope many of them will choose not to do so, it is clear we will be seeingsignificantly more turnover in the next decade than in the past.To mitigate this turnover in people,NNSAisestablishinganinternprogramtobringforththenextgenerationofleadersinsecurity,operations, business, weapons, and nonproliferation.Linton F. Brooks, AdministratorNational Nuclear Security AdministrationAll members of the NNSA teamshould understand that noresponsibility of a President is moreimportant than national security.Realizing the part each of us playsin this responsibility and inachieving our mission will helpcontinue to improve ourperformance.2National Nuclear Security AdministrationThis Strategic Plan, the second that has been developed by the NNSA, plays a key role in our continuingefforts to ensure a premier nuclear security enterprise.The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,gave a renewed sense of urgency to rapidly transforming the NNSA into an organization capable ofoperating at peak effectiveness under challenging and changing conditions.While we cannot predictwithcertaintytheevolutionofU.S.nationalsecuritystrategy,ourabilitytoperformNNSAscorefunctions depends on continuously renewing our internal capabilities, in terms of both people andplant.Something I read recently sums up the reason for the importance I place on strategic planning:The end state of national security still begins with basic building blocks: planning, training, education,and leadership.From the guidance of this strategic planning document cascade other planningdocuments and related business systems that enable us to plan and adapt to the range of unknowableand unpredictable world realities as they evolve.For example, since those September 11th attacks, NNSA has focused technical and scientific resourceson the international war against terrorism.Yet our overall purpose and nuclear security mission remainclear: Strengthen national security through the military application of nuclear energy and by reducingthe global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.In carrying out this mission, NNSA will continue to help lead the way to a safer world through the deepreductions in nuclear forces codified by the Treaty of Moscow, through Nunn-Lugar and other cooperativethreat reduction efforts.At the same time, we will maintain an effective, reliable, and capable thoughsmaller nuclear force as a hedge against a future that is uncertain and in a world in which substantialnuclear arsenals and the threat from weapons of mass destruction remain.Carrying out these activitiesshould enhance our ability to achieve critical U.S. nonproliferation objectives.AsbeneficiariesofaproudheritagedatingfromtheManhattan Project, NNSA is building upon an enduringlegacybyidentifyingandembracingitscorevalues:Excellence,Integrity,Respect,andTeamwork.Theplanning direction of this document lays the foundationfor achieving overall mission success and helps definethe NNSA structure of the future.No responsibility of theFederalGovernmentismoreimportantthannationalsecurity.Realizingtheparteachofusplaysinthisresponsibilityandinachievingourmissionwillhelpcontinue to improve our performance.I am confident that all of us in NNSA will continue to adopt the values, vision, goals, commitment toexcellence, and description of the future contained in this plan.Each of us should take pride in the factthat our work is indispensable to the national security of the United States.Linton F. Brooks, AdministratorNational Nuclear Security AdministrationAs beneficiaries of a proud heritagedating from the Manhattan Project,NNSA is building upon an enduringlegacy by identifying and embracingits core values:Excellence,Integrity, Respect, and Teamwork.Strategic Plan3MissionStrengthen national security through the military application of nuclear energy and byreducing the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.VisionTo be an integrated nuclear security enterprise operating an efficient and agile nuclearweapons complex that is recognized as preeminent in technical leadership and programmanagement.Our Core ValuesExcellenceWe strive for excellence in performing our critical national security missions: scientificexploration and technology development; laboratory and industrial operations; informationand materials security; environment, safety, and health activities; and, project andprogram management.IntegrityWe demand the highest standards of ethical behavior, for each of us is personallyentrusted with and accountable for protecting and defending our national security.Wemeetourcommitments.RespectWe treat our colleagues with dignity, value diversity, provide fair opportunity, and rewardachievement.TeamworkWe accomplish our mission by working cooperatively and respecting the roles of leadersand team members.4National Nuclear Security AdministrationWhat NNSAMaintaintheU.S.nucleardeterrentRespondtonuclearemergenciesworld-wideSupportthenuclearNavyProtectandrevitalizetheweaponscomplexStrategic Plan5Does WorldwideDevelopspace-andland-baseddetectionsystemsSecureandeliminatenuclearmaterialsStrengthenthenonproliferationregime6National Nuclear Security AdministrationA. NNSA Strategic SituationThe international community faces a variety of new andemerging threats.As the events of 9/11 made clear, newsub-nationalthreatsareemergingthatinvolvehostilegroupswillingtouseorsupporttheuseoflow-techweapons of great destructive capability.If these groupscome to possess nuclear weapons or other weapons ofmass destruction (WMD), U.S. nuclear forces might notdetertheiruse.Thus,diplomatic,political,andothermilitaryeffortstopreventtheacquisitionofnuclearweapons,weapons-usablematerials,orchemicalorbiological weapons, in conjunction with a robust counter-terrorismeffortanddefenses,maybetheonlymeansavailable to address this threat.In this new, broader threat environment, nuclear weaponswill play a critical but reduced role in the overall UnitedStates security posture.Nuclear forces linked with anadvanced conventional strike capability and integrated witha responsive infrastructure continue to be an essentialelement of national security by strengthening our overallability to reassure allies of U.S. commitments, dissuadearms competition from potential adversaries, and deterthreats to the U.S., its overseas forces, allies, and friends.Future Challenges and Planning AssumptionsBased on potential threats to the U.S. and its allies, NNSA faces several broad challengesin carrying out nuclear threat management and threat reduction.NNSA must: Sustain its nuclear weapons capabilities,and other contributions to deterrence,ina safe, secure, and reliable manner; Establ i shanucl earweaponsinfrastructurethatcanberesponsivetofuture needs; MaintainarobustandeffectiveNavalReactorsprogram;Electron-microscope image of bacillusanthracisspores.Strategic Plan7 Develop and implement innovative technical and policy approaches for detecting,preventing, and reversing or, failing that, managing the proliferation of WMD; and, Respond to nuclear and other emergencies worldwide.Hedging an Uncertain FutureKey elements of our nuclear posture involve hedges that is, strategies that enable theU.S. to quickly adapt and respond to unanticipated changes in the international securityenvironment or to unexpected problems or surprises in the status of our nuclear forces.In the near term, as the Nation draws down to levels established in the Treaty of Moscow between1,700-2,200operationallydeployednuclearwarheadstheU.S.willmaintaincapability to augment warhead levels on available delivery vehicles if circumstances require.A critical hedge a key leg in the Nuclear Posture Reviews New Triad is to establish aflexible and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.A responsive NNSA infrastructurepeopleandfacilitiesincludesinnovativescienceandtechnologyresearchanddevelopment at the National laboratories and agile production facilities that are able to meetidentified needs and capable of responding to surprises.It will provide enhanced surveillanceto better "know the stockpile," an improved understanding of nuclear weapons physics andengineering, and flexible production capacity.Responsive infrastructure will enable timelyreconstitution to larger force levels, if needed; field new or modified nuclear warheads eithertorespondtoastockpilesurpriseortomeetnewmilitaryrequirements;and,ensurereadiness to conduct an underground nuclear test, if necessary.8National Nuclear Security AdministrationB. The NNSA Strategic PlanIntheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)StrategicPlanissuedSeptember30,2003,theDepartmentidentifiedfourstrategicgoalsandsevenlong-termgeneralgoalstowardachieving its mission.The NNSA is charged with responsibility for the Defense StrategicGoal and its three associated long-term general goals.Strategic Plan9Goal 1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STEWARDSHIP:Ensure thatour nuclear weapons continue to serve their essential deterrencerolebymaintainingandenhancingthesafety,security,andreliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.1.1 State of the EnterpriseRegardingtheStockpileFollowing the end of the Cold War, the United Statesended production programs to develop and producenew nuclear warheads and began a moratorium onnucleartesting.Themainfocusofthenuclearweaponsprogramduringthe1990sshiftedtosustaining existing warheads for the indefinite future.Tothisend,theDepartmentofEnergyadoptedascience-based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)thatemphasizeddevelopmentandapplicationofgreatly improved technical capabilities to assess thesafety,security,andreliabilityofexistingnuclearwarheadswithouttheuseofnucleartesting. Asaresultofbreakthroughscienceandengineering,planned improvements in the Stockpile StewardshipProgram's technical capabilities are progressing well.This progress must be continued, both to maintain the evolving stockpile and to addressany new requirements that might arise.The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) articulated goals for a responsivenuclearweaponscomplexthatrequireanappropriatebalancebetweenresearchanddevelopment, and production capabilities to beable to meet a range of plausible contingencies.The NPR gives a responsive infrastructure equalpriority with offensive and defensive weaponsin the "New Triad" of strategic capabilities.Inaddition,theNPRendorsed:(1)anuclearwarhead Advanced Concepts Initiative after apost-Cold War decade in which little work wasdone in this area; (2) accelerated design workonaModernPitFacility;and,(3)enhancedunderground nuclear test readiness.Main electronic subassembly of the new W76Telemetry System.W87 PEACEKEEPER warheads.10National Nuclear Security AdministrationRegarding Facilities and InfrastructureThe size of today's nuclear weapons complex is almost 50% below its peak during the ColdWar.It now comprises approximately 38 million square feet of facilities at 10 sites (seeAppendix C).Many of the facilities are 40 years or older, and significant portions of theaging complex infrastructure are in need of renewal.Facilities in poor condition are costlyto maintain and secure, and are difficult to keep in regulatory compliance.TheNNSAconductsaneffectiveandintegratedprogramtorestore,revitalize,andrebuildthenuclearweaponscomplexinfrastructure.Twocomplementary programs, Readiness in TechnicalBase and Facilities (RTBF) and the Facilities andInfrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP), areessentialtotheoperations,maintenance,andrenewalofthephysicalinfrastructure.RTBFprovidesthefundingneededtooperateandmai ntai nthefaci l i ti esrequi redforannualassessmentsofthestockpileandwarheadcertification, thus ensuring the vitality of the nuclearweaponscomplexandmeetingitsgoalofaconsistent readiness level.FIRP is a capital renewalandsustainabilityprogramthatwasestablishedprincipally to reduce the large backlog of deferredmaintenance that had developed during the 1990sto an appropriate level consistent with industry bestpractices.FIRPalsodevelopscorporatefacilitymanagementpracticesrequiredtomaintainthecomplex into the future as well as eliminating excessreal property.1.2 Planning HorizonRegardingtheStockpileThe national security environment will continue to evolve and acts of terrorism will continueto be a major concern.Reducing the threat of proliferation and the threat of warhead andnuclearmaterialtheftwillcontinuetobeimportantstrategiesforourenterprise.Inthisenvironment, the President seeks the lowest number of nuclear warheads consistent withour Nation's security and has taken important steps to reduce the nuclear stockpile.At thesame time, U.S. nuclear weapons remain relevant in deterring hostile states from developinganddeployingweaponsofmassdestruction.Themaintenanceofaflexibleandreadynuclear capability will remain a significant deterrent to hostile states pursuing or contemplatingthe use of these weapons.FIRP is a capital renewal andsustainability program that wasestablished principally to reducethe large backlog of deferredmaintenance that had developedduring the 1990s to anappropriate level consistent withindustry best practices.RTBF provides the fundingneeded to operate and maintainthe facilities required for annualassessmentsofthestockpileand warhead certification, thusensuring the vitality of thenuclear weapons complex andmeeting its goal of a consistentreadiness level.Strategic Plan11The Treaty of Moscow established a goalofbetween1,700-2,200operationallydeployed strategic warheads by 2012.Duetoagi ngofweaponsandchangi ngrequirements,furthersignificantstockpilerestructuringisexpectedtocommencewithinthe2015-2020timeframe.Thefuture state (post-2030) projects a stockpilethat is both significantly smaller and betterable to hold 21st century targets at risk.For the foreseeable future, the U.S will notproduceanynewplutoniumorhighlyenriched uranium, but the nuclear weaponscomplexwillretaintheabilitytoprocessboth materials and will produce tritium as required.The complex will have the capability toproduce a limited number ofnew primary and secondary component designs in quantitiesnecessary to support a future weapons stockpile by recycling plutonium and highly enricheduranium from retired weapons.Ease of manufacturing and accelerated certification withoutunderground nuclear testing are major design goals for future systems.Also, to increaseflexiblemanufacturing,useofhazardousandspecialmaterialswillbeminimizedoreliminated.Finally, the nuclear weapons complex will have the capability to respond rapidlyto the Department of Defense requirements to counter a broad spectrum of emerging threats.The following assumptions define the characteristics of the stockpile in the long-term. The Nation will maintain a deterrent posture second to none. Beginninginthe2015-2020timeframe,weshould expect that the stockpile transformationwill result in a smaller stockpile but one morecapable of addressing 21st century threats. Any new or modified warheads will include newtechnol ogi esandwi l l bedesi gnedformanufacturabilityandincreasedperformancemargins, and will minimize the use of difficult-to-handle materials and processes that threatenthe environment. Better warhead command, control, and suretywillbeintegratedintolifeextensionandnewdesigns to reduce risk from either accidents ormalevolent actions.TRIDENT missile test launch.A technician uses a solid-phase microextractor tocollect samples of gases produced by organicmaterials in a weapon.12National Nuclear Security AdministrationTo achieve these characteristics of the long-termstockpile, NNSA will ensure the following: Anappropriatereadinesspostureforunderground testing will be maintained. Development, certification, and productiontools will be in place to implement stockpileimprovements. Inertial Confinement Fusion and ScienceCampaignswilldeveloptheknowledgeandtechniquesrequiredtosupportstockpile assessment and certification. Certification capabilities will be establishedfor refurbished and new warheads with thegoal of seeking certification without nucleartesting. Renewal of skilled technical personnel asworkers with nuclear testing and warheaddevelopmentandproductionexperienceapproach retirement.In order to accomplish this vision, the nuclear weapons complex will: Have the capability to produce all nuclear components in a weapon. Assurearesponsivesupply-chainandcapableindustrialbasetomeetfuturehigh-reliability nonnuclear component needs. Have a responsive infrastructure to provide more predictive physics and engineeringassessmentsofstockpilewarheadsandrapiddeploymentofmodifiedornewwarheads to meet emerging threats. Operateasa"virtualcorporation"(multi-site/complex-wide)withinformationaccessible to authorized users without regard to location. Use a workforce that is highly trained, flexible, mobile, and smaller, consisting ofFederal and contractor employees whose mix may change significantly, over time. Create and leverage enhanced relationships with other scientific organizations andinstitutions to ensure scientific and technical excellence in the NNSA workforce andfoster long-term, synergistic ventures.Scientist performs surface inspection usingDiffuse Reflectance Infrared FourierTransform (DRIFT) spectroscopy.Strategic Plan13RegardingFacilitiesandInfrastructureTheNNSAhasestablishedcorporateperformancegoals for deferred maintenance reduction that, whenaccomplished, will restore the condition of the nuclearweapons complex.Attainment of these goals involvesa joint effort, separate but complementary, betweenthe RTBF and FIRP programs. By the end of FY 2009, NNSA will:1. Aggressi vel yreducedeferredmaintenance to industry standards.2. Returnfacilityconditions,formission-essential facilities and infrastructure, to anassessment level of good to excellent.3. Haveinstitutionalizedresponsibleandaccountabl efaci l i tymanagementprocesses, including budgetary ones, sothattheconditionofNNSAfacilitiesandinfrastructureisequaltoorbetterthanindustry standards. For the future, RTBF will make the necessarycapi tal i nvestmentsforthel ong-termstewardship of the complex.1.3 External FactorsThefollowingexternalfactorscouldaffectourabilitytoachievetheNuclearWeaponsStewardship goal: Technology: Technological surprises occur.The discovery of an insurmountablescientificorengineeringobstacleinastockpileweaponcouldnecessitatearecommendation to the President that nuclear testing be resumed. Geopolitical Environment:Changes in the nuclear threats or other WMD threatscould require changes to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Funding:A significant reduction or realignment of funding below that provided inour current multi-year plans would adversely affect our ability to achieve this goal.Example of FIRP roof replacement at thePantexPlant.14National Nuclear Security AdministrationGoal 2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: Provide technicalleadership to limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology,and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction; advancethe technologies to detect the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction worldwide; and eliminate or secure inventories ofsurplus materials and infrastructure usable for nuclear weapons.2.1 State of the EnterpriseOver the course of the last three decades, NNSA and its predecessor organizations haveplayed a prominent role in combating the nuclear and radiological proliferation threat. Whilewe have made impressive accomplishmentsover this period of time, particularly throughour work with the Russian Federation sincetheendoftheColdWar,werealizeournonproliferation programs must address andadapt to evolving security threats continually.The rapid evolution of the proliferation threatin the context of a globalizing world economyrequiresNNSAsprogramstobeflexible,creative, and responsive to emerging threatsaround the world.NNSAcontinuestoprovidetechnicalandpolicyleadershiptoreducetheglobalproliferation threat.NNSAs nonproliferationworkstartedwellbefore9/11,andourprograms are becoming increasingly globalinscopeastheystrengthenandexpandnonproliferation activities outside the territoryof the Former Soviet Union (FSU).NNSA works in over 60 countries with internationalpartners and allies to prevent the spread of WMD through a wide range of bilateral andmultilateral arrangements.NNSA will continue to focus on broadening the internationalscope of its nonproliferation efforts.2.2 Planning HorizonRegardingInternationalCooperativeThreatReductionProgramsNNSA cooperative threat reduction programs are active in Russia and other FSU states,and they are becoming increasingly global in scope.NNSA will continue to work with otherHighly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is down-blendedwith other forms of uranium to produce LowEnriched Uranium (LEU), suitable forcommercial, civilian purposes.Strategic Plan15elements of the Federal Government to develop anoverarchingframeworkandstrategythatintegratesthe entire suite of U.S. threat reduction programs andguidesfurtherengagementwithRussiaandothercountries on nonproliferation and nuclear security.Toimplementitsmissionmosteffectivelyandaddresstodays evolving threat environment, NNSA seeks to: Securenuclearweaponsandnuclearandradiologicalmaterialsatvulnerablesitesaround the world; Reduce quantities of nuclear and radiologicalmaterials; Bolster border security, including seaports; Conductcutting-edgenonproliferationandnational security research and development; Strengthen international nonproliferation andexport control regimes; and, Downsize the nuclear weapons infrastructureof the FSU and engage WMD scientists andtechnicians in peaceful work.Regarding Further Internationalization ofNonproliferationProgramsNNSAwillcontinuetobearolemodelwithintheU.S.Government,andworldwide,foreffective and productive engagement with other countries and international organizationsin achieving nonproliferation objectives.Most important, support to the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) will continue to play a prominent role in NNSAs nonproliferationefforts.To this end, NNSA will promote smooth DOE-IAEA interactions at DOE facilitiesandensurethatadequateresourcesareidentifiedinprogramrequeststomeetDOEcommitments to the IAEA.NNSA will also ensure that DOE Headquarters componentsand contractors are informed about, and then carry out, their respective obligations in meetingU.S. commitments to the IAEA.NNSA will provide technical and policy support to the implementation of existing arms controltreaties, nonproliferation agreements, unilateral initiatives, and other efforts to limit the spreador use of nuclear weapons.NNSA will examine, explore, and develop novel approaches,including confidence-building arrangements and other cooperative measures, to strengthentransparency in the international security arena.NNSA provides operational support forspace-basedandground-basednuclearexplosion monitoring systems.16National Nuclear Security Administration2.3 External FactorsThe following external factors could affectour ability to achieve this goal: CooperationwithRussia:Unprecedentedl evel sofcooperation between the U.S. andRussiahavemadeitpossibletomake great strides in eliminatingandsecuri ngi nventori esofsurplus materials.A close workingrelationshipisnecessaryforprogress to continue. InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency:The IAEA is essential tothesuccessofeffortstocontrolnuclear proliferation.It is vital that the IAEA receive the funding it needs and that itdemonstrate courageous leadership to member countries to accomplish its mission. Technology:Technological progress is uncertain and unpredictable.Our ability todevelop advanced detection technologies will play an important role in the Nation'sability to successfully prevent proliferation. Funding:A significant reduction or realignmentof funding below that provided in our currentmulti-year plans, including contributions frominternationalandindustrypartners,wouldadversely affect our ability to achieve this goal.Security upgrades at a nuclear facility inCentral Asia.NNSA will work with major international seaports todetect and deter illicit trafficking in nuclear andradioactivematerials.NNSA continues to providetechnical and policy leadershipto reduce the global proliferationthreat.Strategic Plan17Goal 3. NAVALREACTORS:ProvidetheNavywithsafe,militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensure theircontinued safe and reliable operation.3.1 State of the EnterpriseThe NNSA, through the Naval Reactors Program, is responsible for providing the U.S. Navywith safe, militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants, beginning with reactor technologydevelopment,continuingthroughreactoroperation,andendingwithreactor plant disposal.Nuclear powerenhanceswarshipcapabilityandcreates the flexibility needed to sprintanywhere in the world and arrive readyforcombatoperations.Sustained,high-speedcapabilityenablesrapidresponsetochangi ngworl dcircumstancesandhelpstheNavystretchavai l abl eassetstomeettodaysworldwidenationalsecuritycommitments.TheProgramensuresthesafeoperation of reactor plants in operatingnuclear-poweredsubmarinesandaircraft carriers, and fulfills the Navysrequirement for new reactors to meetevolving national defense demands.The Programs long-term development work ensuresthatnuclearpropulsiontechnologyprovidesoptionstomaintainandupgradecurrentcapabilities, as well as meet future threats to U.S. security.The presence of radiation dictates a careful, measured approach to developing and verifyingnucleartechnology,evolvingneededcomponents,systems,andprocesses,andimplementing them into existing or future plant designs.Intricate engineering challengesand long lead times to fabricate the massive, complex components require many years ofeffort before technological advances can be introduced into the fleet.As advances in variousfunctional disciplines coalesce, work is integrated into the technology applicable to a navalnuclearpropulsion plant.3.2 Planning HorizonWith 105 operating naval reactor plants in warships comprising 40% of the Navys principlecombatants, our primary emphasis and most intense effort will continue to be placed onThe nuclear-powered submarine, VIRGINIA, returning toport following her highly successful sea trials.18National Nuclear Security Administrationensuringthesafetyandreliabilityoftheseplants.In addition, NNSA has embarked on along-termefforttodevelopanddeploynewreactordesignsforthefuture.TheCVN21reactordesigniswellunderway.Thisnewhigh-energy design represents a critical leapincapabilityasitwillhaveincreasedcoreenergy nearly three times the electrical plantgenerating capability and will require half thenumber of the reactor department sailors whencomparedtotoday'soperationalaircraftcarriers.TheCVN21-classleadshipisexpected to go to sea in 2014.NNSAi sal soworki ngonanewTransformational Technology Core (TTC) thatwill provide an energy increase to VIRGINIA-class ships with minimal impact to overall shipdesign.TTC will use advanced reactor corematerials to achieve a significant increase tothe core energy density more energy withoutincreasing size, weight, or space while stillat a reasonable cost. Development plans callfor the delivery of the first TTC core in 2014.3.3 External FactorsThe NNSA does not believe there are majorrisks currently identified that could affect our ability to achieve this goal. However, given theuniquenatureoftheProgramsresponsibilities,commitmentstoboththeDOEandtheU.S. Navy must be considered at all times. Therefore, any external factor seriously affectingeither organizations policies may have an impact on the Naval Reactors Program.The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USSRONALD REAGAN(CVN 76), being welcomedfor the first time in her new homeport,San Diego, California.Strategic Plan19C. Administrator's Areas of Special EmphasisIn Section B, NNSA programs were discussed in the context of the Defense Strategic Goaland its three long-term general goals and their linkage to the DOE Strategic Plan.SectionCdiscussesselectedactivitiesthattheAdministratorhighlightsfor"specialemphasis" in this strategic plan and for the "NNSA of the Future." CreatingaResponsiveInfrastructure MeetingSafeguardsandSecurityChallenges Changing the Safety Culture in NNSA Improving NNSA's Response to Nuclear Emergencies CoordinatingDOE'sRoleinCounterterrorismEfforts Providing Secure Transportation of NNSA and DOE Materials20National Nuclear Security AdministrationCreating a Responsive InfrastructureThe21stcenturypresentsanationalsecurityenvironmentinwhichthreatsmayevolvemorequickly,bemorevariableinnature,andbelesspredictablethaninthepast. Anoverarching theme for the nuclear weapons enterprise, therefore, must be the developmentof a flexible capability to respond to a range of plausible contingencies in a timely manner.In August 2003, at the Stockpile Confidence Conference at U.S. Strategic Command, theAdministrator articulated a vision for a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure as akey element in the NPRs New Triad of strategic capabilities.By responsive we refer tothe ability of the nuclear weapons enterprise to anticipate innovations by an adversary andto counter them before our deterrent, and its resilience to unanticipated events or emergingthreats, is degraded, all the while continuing to carry out the day-to-day activities in supportof the stockpile.Right now, Responsive Infrastructure is only a strategy that is evolving, buta truly Responsive Infrastructure would let us do the following: Anticipate issues: Our goal is to continually improve our understanding of weaponperformance to have better predictive assessment capabilities and avoid technicalsurprise. Fix stockpile problems: Our goal is to be able to deploy warheads modified to fixa relatively minor problem within one year. Adapt weapons: Our goal is to achieve a capability to modify or repackage existingwarheads within 18 months of a decision to enter engineering development. Design, develop, and produce a new warhead: Our goal is to be able to design,develop, and begin production of a new warhead within 3-4 years of a decision to doso. While there are no current plans to develop and produce new weapons, regainingthe capability is an important prerequisite for additional reductions in the nuclearstockpile. Produce new warheads in quantity: Our goal is to restore sufficient productioncapacity to produce new warheads in sufficient quantities to respond to defenseneeds that arise without disrupting ongoing refurbishments. Assuresupportforforceaugmentation:Ourgoalistoassurethatservicessuch as warhead transportation and tritium support are capable of being carried outin time consistent with the Department of Defenses ability to deploy weapons. Readiness to conduct underground nuclear tests: We have no plan to resumetesting; however, our efforts to improve test readiness are a prudent hedge againstthe possibility of an issue arising in the stockpile whose impact cannot be understood,or a fix that cannot be certified, without a nuclear test. Our goal of an 18-month testStrategic Plan21readiness posture is appropriate because that is a typical time to diagnose a problemand design a test to confirm the problem or certify the fix.IftheU.S.istohaveaflexibledeterrent,itmustbeabletoadaptitsnuclearforcestochangingstrategicconditions.Adaptationandmodernizationofforces,includingimplementation of new technologies, will enable achievement of deterrence objectives moreefficiently even as we move to significantly lower force-levels.A Responsive Infrastructureis necessary to meet the Presidents commitment to seek the lowest number of nuclearweapons consistent with U.S. national security.If we are responsive, stockpile numberscanbereducedbyeliminatingsomeweaponscurrentlykeptforuseasreliabilityreplacements to hedge against a technical problem in one or more types of warheads in thestockpile.NNSA will undertake a complex-wide strategic study of the infrastructure needs for NNSA'sfuturemissions.ThisstudyisendorsedbytheCongress,andwillbeconductedinthecontext of NPR guidance to provide a robust and Responsive Infrastructure as a key elementof U.S. national security.Responsive Infrastructure.22National Nuclear Security AdministrationMeeting Safeguards and Security ChallengesAdministratorBrooksemphasizedthatthetighteningofsecuritythatbeganwiththeestablishment of NNSA in 2000 and accelerated in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,has resulted in a strong, effective security posture at all nuclear weapons research andproduction facilities. Our mission is vitallyimportant to the national security of thisgreatNation.The Americanpeoplearecounting on us and we are not going to letthemdown.Theseattackshavedramatically changed the way in which welookatthreatstoourfacilities,toourinformation, to the U.S. nuclear weaponsstockpile, special nuclear materials, highexpl osi ves,andotherhazardousmaterials. We are hard at work to sustainthatimprovementinthesecurityofthecomplex over the long-term.WithintheNNSAorganization,theSafeguardsandSecurityfunctionwilltransition to more of a complementary roleto other NNSA programs and operations.Customers (internal and external) will be shownthat better protection of the U.S. nuclear deterrent provides satisfaction that our nuclearcapability is effectively protected.Employees will take pride in understanding that effectiveprotection of the Nations nuclear arsenal is provided through their individual and collectiveefforts.NNSA assets will be protected by flexible and continuously improving programs, focusingontheuseoftechnologycomplementedbyawell-trainedandwell-staffedprofessionalwork force to drive operational excellenceandcost-effectiveness.EssentialtothecontinuedsuccessandeffectivenessoftheSafeguardsandSecurityprogramisintegrationwithotherprogramsandproductionmissionsofNNSA. Integration is necessary to ensurewe build security in and not have to add iton.ThisisparticularlyimportantastheSafeguardsandSecuri typrogramundertakes a multi-year effort to implementthe DOE Design Basis Threat, and for thefuture,toaddresscontinuallyevolvingthreats.Monitoring security points around the NNSA Complex.PIDAS (Perimeter Intrusion Detection AccessSystem).Strategic Plan23NNSA will focus on three primary strategiesin the future: Useani ntegratedprogrammanagement approach, with formalproceduresandprocesses,todefineournear-andlong-termoperati onal andperformanceobj ecti vesandpri ori ti es,andmanage, oversee, and evaluate theSafeguardsandSecuri typerformanceofourcontractorsconsistent with the overall nationalsecurity mission of the Departmentand the NNSA. Implement a corporate-wide human capital management plan to improve and sustainthequalityandtrainingofNNSASafeguardsandSecurityprofessionals.Thecornerstone of this program will be an intern program to attract high quality recentcollege graduates to be trained and developed as the next generation of safeguardsand security leaders. Focusontheuseoftechnologytooffsettherelianceoncostlyandmanpower-intensive physical protection strategies.NNSA will continue to utilize both internal and independent reviews and assessments tovalidate program effectiveness and identify additional areas for improvement, as we strivefor a more cost-effective and efficient operation.NNSAiscommittedtoensuringallemployeesunderstandthewhyofsecurity,takeownership of security, and integrate security into their day-to-day operational responsibilitiesaswellasintheirplanningforfutureoperationsandprojects.NNSAwillimplementSafeguards and Security programs that add value and make sense to the NNSA community.They will also ensure that environment, safety, and health objectives are considered as partof our day-to-day planning and performance of operations.Protective barriers.24National Nuclear Security AdministrationChanging the Safety Culture in NNSAThe NNSA Administrator assembled a team to review the Space Shuttle Columbia AccidentInvestigation Board (CAIB) Report and identify lessons learned from the National Aeronauticand Space Administrations (NASA) experience relevant to NNSA.The NNSA team reviewedthe areas of safety culture, organizational structure, and resources.The NNSA LessonsLearned team observed that there are many similarities in operations and culture betweenNNSA and NASA, and that many of the CAIB recommendations were applicable to NNSA.Both organizations were built on the Cold War rivalry with the former Soviet Union, and bothexperienced discontinuities in their missions with the collapse of the Soviet Union.ThepoliticalunderpinningofNASAsHumanSpaceFlightProgram(U.S.-Sovietspacecompetition) was lost, with no equally strong political objective to replace it.Similarly, NNSAscore mission, nuclear weapons design and production, experienced a comparable changein national priority.Both NASA and NNSA have subsequently pursued similar paths, namelydownsizingpersonnel,consolidatingoperations,andrelyingheavilyoncontractors.Bothorganizations have a proud tradition of managing potential high consequence operationswhile achieving scientific and technical excellence.This has led to over-dependency onpastsuccessesandlossofabilitytoacceptcriticismfromoutsideorganizations.Oneclear message that resulted from the review was that NNSA must change its safety cultureto improve safety of its operations, to protect the health and safety of its employees and thepublic, and successfully execute NNSAs mission.Safety is embedded in NNSAs core values.NNSAmust actively encourage a diversity of views, acceptoutsidecriticism,andavoidover-simplificationoftechni cal i nformati on.Addi ti onal l y,NNSAmanagementmusttakestepstoensurethattheorganizationdoesnotfallintothetrapofbeingconditioned by past successes.As the CAIB Reportstates,Organizationsthatdealwithhigh-riskoperationsmustalwayshaveahealthyfearoffailure operations must be proved safe, rather thanthe other way around.NNSA will change its safety culture to be more opento alternate views and minority opinions, challenging technical positions in the interest oftechnical integrity.NNSA will consider differing professional opinions when developing andimplementingsite-specificandkeyorganizationalprocedures.ItisalsoclearfromtheNASA experience thatNNSA must establish a climate of healthy professional discourse bydeveloping and implementing the mechanisms and opportunities that support and encouragefree flowing discussion and innovation.NNSAhasestablishedanewposition,ChiefforDefenseNuclearSafety,whowillberesponsible for developing, maintaining and overseeing nuclear safety policies and standardsNNSA must actively encouragea diversity of views, acceptoutside criticism, and avoidover-simplification of technicalinformation.Additionally, NNSAmanagement must take steps toensure that the organizationdoes not fall into the trap ofbeing conditioned by pastsuccesses.Strategic Plan25forNNSAandforassuringthatthesestandardsareenforcedacross NNSA.This individual willbe responsible for monitoring thehealthofNNSAsnuclearsafetyprogram and will have unfetteredaccesstoallNNSAsitesandfacilitiestoidentifysafetyissuesthatneedtoberesolved.TheChief for Defense Nuclear SafetywillserveasaseniortechnicaladvisortotheAdministratorandcommunicatesafetyconcernsandminorityopinionsthatmayhave been overlooked or rejectedin other parts of the organization.This individual will be instrumentalin championing the change in thesafety culture within NNSA.A culture change cannot take place without the complete support and active leadership oftop management.NNSA senior managers will develop, own, and establish clear performanceexpectations for safety as an organizational value that is part of mission accomplishment.An attitude or value is intangible.However, an intangible attitude or value should lead totangible manifestations that can act as indicators of that value.It is important to be able tojudge the status or effectiveness of safety culture as an attitude within the NNSA.DOE inspectors perform a safety inspection of G-tunnel at theNevada Test Site. G-tunnel is used for the disposition ofdamaged weapons and devices.26National Nuclear Security AdministrationImproving NNSA's Response to Nuclear EmergenciesThe NNSA represents a key component of theNations ability to address the threat of nuclearandradiologicalterrorismthroughdirect,tailored emergency response and consequencemanagement.Perhapsthemosttangibleassets to the Nation, as demonstrated after the9/11terroristattacks,areNNSAsfirst-responderteams/assetsthatprovidehighlyspecialized technical expertise to the Federalresponseinresolvingpotentialnuclear/radiologicalterroristincidentsandaccidents.TheseteamsworkinclosecoordinationwiththeNation'sinteragencycommunityandarecapable of responding at all times to nuclear/radiological events in the U.S. and around theworld.Theseteamsadapttochangingtechnol ogi esandevol vi ngchal l engesassociatedwithcombatingterrorismandaccident/incidentscenariosintodaysworld.Outstanding performance in training, exercises,andreal-worldeventssupportsNNSAsreputation as one of the worlds premier nuclear/radiologicaltechnicalemergencyresponsecapabilities.These dedicated NNSA personneldirectly support the Nations last line of defense against nuclear and radiological terrorism,as well as the last line of defense for emergencies involving or affecting DOE and NNSAsites and facilities.As the NNSA prepares for the future, its vision remains focused but flexible.Preparednessand responsiveness to current and emerging threats drive the evolution and future growthof the following areas: Better and faster analysis of real-time data; Enhanced response time of the assets through regionalizing assets and partnerships; Greater efficiency in the use of the assets; Cutting-edge application of advances in technology, encompassing both improveddetection and analysis; and, An ever-evolving state-of-the-art communication system.Radiological Assistance Program team memberin New York City working at Ground Zero.Strategic Plan27Enhancing the efficiency and effectivenessofitsemergencyoperationscapabilitiesthroughstate-of-the-arttechnologiesiscri ti cal tosuccess.Toensurethatemergencyresponseteams/assetsareavailableatalltimeswiththeirhighlyspecialized skill sets, NNSA will continue tolook to research and development to providetechnical solutions that will enable the assetsto respond to and resolve potential nuclear/radiological terrorist incidents in the U.S. andaround the world.A set of competencies forms the cornerstoneof this vision.To employ the technical andreal-world capabilities for the NNSA, and achieve the vision, these competencies are vital. KnowledgeKnowledge of DOE/NNSAs comprehensive emergency management system,including expertise in emergency plans, procedures, and exercises. Technical and Analytical ExpertiseAbroadrangeofscientificandtechnicalexpertise,alongwithaccesstospecialized technologies for resolving radiological/nuclear/terrorist incidents.Thisis accomplished by leveraging the core competencies of the nuclear weaponscomplex. Operational ExpertiseOperational expertise in responding to incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons,radiological dispersal devices, and improvised nuclear devices; training and drills;explosiveordinancedisposalproceduresandtechniquesfordeviceaccess,render-safe capabilities, weapon recovery, final disposition and attribution; and,health, safety, including health and treatment capabilities, and environmentalexpertise. National Response Program ExpertiseExpert support to national-level operational responses by searching for, detecting,and rendering safe a terrorist radiological or nuclear device.Expertise in mitigatingtheconsequencesofaterroristradiologicalornucleardevice.Expertiseinresponding to and mitigating an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon.Exercising radiological emergency response assetsin a Consequence Management Capstone drill.28National Nuclear Security AdministrationCoordinating DOE's Role in Counterterrorism EffortsSince the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we have been at war with determined adversaries whoseek to kill our citizens, attack our friends and allies, and seriously damage our economy.We must now take into account both conventional terrorist threats and the possibility ofattackwithnuclear,radiological,orotherweaponsofmassdestruction.Ourresponsemust engage all of the capabilities of theDepartmentandworkwithabroaderrangeofFederal,state,andlocalgovernmentagencies,businesses,academicinstitutions,andindividualcitizens than ever before.AcrosstheNNSA,wehavebroadcapabilities to bring to this fight.Nearlyeveryofficehasprogramsthatcancontribute to homeland security and theglobal war against terrorism.We seektodrawonthescientificandtechnicalexpertise of our national laboratories andtofocustheeffortsofournationalsecurity and nonproliferation programstomakeAmeri casafer.NNSA' sStockpi l eStewardshi pProgram' sattention to the security of U.S. nuclearweapons,gl obal nonprol i ferati onprograms, and our emergency responseteams are all directly relevant to combating terrorism.Likewise, DOEs ongoing efforts toensure the Nations energy supply, protect critical energy infrastructure, support the U.S.intelligence community, and conduct broad-based scientific research can contribute to ourhomeland security as well.Becauseofthesecontributions,theOfficeoftheDeputyUnderSecretaryforCounterterrorism was created to facilitate coordination of activities within the NNSA whilesending a strong message that this position includes bringing resources to bear throughoutall of DOE.A priority for this Office is to promote communication between the various program elementsin the Department, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council, and theDepartment of Homeland Security.As the national counterterrorism and homeland securitystrategy develops, NNSA will facilitate application of the full capabilities of DOE to thesenew missions that closely align with our existing national security responsibilities.Aerial view of "Ground Zero" taken October 15, 2001.Strategic Plan29Providing Secure Transportation of NNSA and DOE MaterialsFornearly30years,theNationsnuclearweapons,components,andmaterialhavebeentransported across the United States by the Secure Transportation Asset (STA), a Departmentalresource that today consists of approximately 280 Federal Agents, a centralized command andcontrol center for tracking shipments, 82 specialized escort vehicles, seven aircraft, 51 armoredtractors,and51trailersthatareengineeredforsafetyandsecurity. TheSTAoperates81facilities across the United States, including a centralized training site at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.Federal Agents spend approximately 25% of theirtime in training training which enables them toprovide an array of responses to incidents derivedfromaccidents,naturalphenomena,orterroristattacks.SupportingtheStockpileStewardshipProgram remains the primary mission of the STA.Currently,theSTAconductsapproximately90major convoys each year.In order to meetfuturedemands, the STA will need to increase its missioncapacity to 150 major convoys a year.This capacitywill be attained over the next five years by increasingthe number of Federal Agents to 420, replacing anoutdatedairfleet,andbyreplacingoldertrailerswiththelargerandnewergenerationofSafeguards Transporters.This will also allow agent overtime to be reduced from 1,000 to 600hours per agent per year, providing a responsive capacity that can be available instantly byincreasing overtime on an as needed basis.Over the next 15 years, the new capacity will support an increased workload in the following areas: An accelerated materials disposition effort and construction of mixed-oxide facilities inthe U.S. and Russia in support of NNSA's Nuclear Nonproliferation program; Development of an advanced reactor core (TTC) and to accelerate remediation andupgrades at NNSA's Naval Reactor facilities; RelocationofmaterialsfromtheHanfordSiteinsupportofDOE'sEnvironmentalManagement program; Continued support for supplying reactor fuels for DOE's Nuclear Energy program; and, Support to the Department of Defense (DoD) to implement the NPR.Also over the next 15 years, new generations of escort vehicles, armored tractors, and securetrailers will be designed, tested, and deployed.Current and emerging threats will require theSTA to field new technologies and systems.These new technologies will emerge from anongoing research base that ensures the safety and security of the stockpile and other sensitivematerials.NNSA relies on the technology emerging from this research base.NNSA focuses itseffortsontestingandevaluatingfixedfacilitysafetyandsecuritytechnologicalsolutionstodetermine their applicability in a mobile environment.This established research base is essentialfor a responsive infrastructure.NNSA Safeguards Transporter.30National Nuclear Security AdministrationAppendicesIn support of the DOE Strategic Plan, with its Defense Strategic Goal and three long-termgeneral goals for the NNSA, twenty-four NNSA programs conduct their mission activities atten sites in the United States as well as other locations around the world.To ensure budget and performance integration, NNSA, through its Planning, Programming,Budgeting, and Evaluation process, aligns programs and resources with these NNSA goalsat various levels throughout the management chain.This cascade approach supports theGovernment Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the President's Management Agenda.Appendix AreflectstheperformancecascadeintotheNNSAprograms; AppendixBhighlights the twenty-four complementary NNSA programs with their unique goals and meansand strategies to achieve those goals; and, Appendix C highlights those domestic NNSAsites where the work gets done.Strategic Plan31Appendix A - NNSA Performance Cascade.32National Nuclear Security AdministrationDirectedStockpileWorkGoal:EnsurethatthenuclearwarheadsandbombsintheU.S.nuclearweaponsstockpilearesafe,secure,andreliable.MeansandStrategies:NNSA, in partnership with the Department of Defense, national laboratories, and productionplants,willconductroutinemaintenanceandrepair;dismantleretiredweapons;refurbishwarheadsthroughtheLifeExtensionProgram;and,maintainthecapabilitytodesign,manufacture,andcertifynewwarheads,fortheforeseeablefuture.ScienceCampaignGoal:Developimprovedcapabilitiestoassessthesafety,reliability,andperformanceofthenuclearpackageportionofweaponswithoutfurtherundergroundtesting;enhancereadinesstoconductundergroundnucleartestingasdirectedbythePresident;anddevelopessentialscientificcapabilitiesandinfrastructure.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratoriesandtheNevadaTestSite,willdeveloptheQuantification of Margins and Uncertainty (QMU) methodology coupled with advanced radiographycapabilitiesandimprovedunderstandingofdynamicmaterialpropertiestoassesswithcontinuallyimprovingconfidencethesafetyandreliabilityofthenuclearweaponsstockpile;and,achieve18-monthundergroundnucleartestreadiness,withinthenextdecade.EngineeringCampaignGoal:Providevalidatedmodelsandsimulationtoolstoimprovesuretytechnologies,radiationhardeningcapabilities,microsystemsandmicrotechnologiesproduction,componentandmateriallifetimeassessments,andpredictiveagingmodelsandsurveillancediagnostics.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratories,willadvancematerialsciencestodetectprecursorstoage-relatedweaponsproblems;and,developnewtechnologies,models,andradiationhardeningapproachesandcomponentstoimprovethesafety,security,andcontrolofournuclearweapons,includingtheconstructionofthenewMicrosystemsandEngineeringSciencesApplicationfacility,withinthenextdecade.Inertial Confinement Fusion and High YieldCampaignGoal:Developlaboratorycapabilitiestocreateandmeasureextremeconditionsoftemperature,pressure,andradiationapproachingthoseinanuclearexplosion,andconductweapons-relatedresearchintheseenvironments.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratories,theNavalResearchLaboratory,GeneralAtomics,Inc.,theUniversityofRochester,andotheruniversities,willconducthigh energy density physics experiments necessary to support the SSP.A major goal ofthisprogramisthedemonstrationofignitionattheNationalIgnitionFacilityin2010.Appendix B - NNSA ProgramsStrategic Plan33Advanced Simulation and Computing CampaignGoal:Provide leading edge, high-end computer simulation capabilities to meet weapons assessment and certificationrequirements,includingweaponcodes,weaponscience,platforms,andcomputerfacilities.MeansandStrategies:NNSA, in partnership with the national laboratories and leading U.S. supercomputer manufacturers, universitiesandotherFederalagencies,willexecutemulti-yearmodeling,computerscienceandengineering-basedactivitiestoprovidethehigh-endsimulationcapabilitiesandsupportinginfrastructureneededtomeetweaponsassessmentandcertificationrequirementswithinthenextdecade.Pit Certification and Manufacturing CampaignGoal:Restorethecapabilityandsomelimitedcapacitytomanufacturepitsofalltypesrequiredforthenuclearweaponsstockpileandplanforalong-termpitmanufacturingfacilitytosupporttheenduringstockpile.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratoriesandproductionplants,willrestorearesponsivecapabilitytomanufactureandcertifyreplacementplutoniumpitsforasmallernuclearweaponsstockpileofthefuture.Thisincludesestablishingalimited,interimcapacitytomanufacturepitsatanationallaboratoryandplanningforalong-term,responsiveinfrastructure(e.g.,ModernPitFacility)requiredinthenexttwodecades.ReadinessCampaignGoal:Develop or reestablish new manufacturing processes and technologies for qualifyingweaponcomponentsforreuse.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththeproductionplantsandtheprivatesector,willimprovetheresponsivenessofthenuclearweaponmanufacturinginfrastructureanditstechnologybasetomeetemergingthreatstonationalsecuritythroughcontinuinginvestmentsinstate-of-the-artequipmentcombinedwithcutting-edgeapplicationsoftechnology.Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities(Operations)Goal:OperateandmaintainNNSAprogramfacilitiesinasafe,secure,efficient,reliable,andcompliantcondition.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratoriesandproductionplants,willoperateprogramfacilitiesincludingcostsforutilities,equipment,facilitypersonnel,trainingandsalaries;conductarobustmaintenanceprogramincludingstaff,tools,andreplacementparts;allwhileensuringstrictadherencetoenvironment,health,andsafetyregulationstoensurethatfacilitiesareoperationallyreadytoperformwork.34National Nuclear Security AdministrationSecureTransportationAssetGoal:Safely and securely transport nuclear weapons, weapons components, and special nuclear materialstomeetprojectedDOE,DoD,andothercustomerrequirements.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillprovideFederalagents,specializedvehicles,acommunicationsinfrastructure,andrigoroustrainingtoconductthesafeandsecuretransportationofnuclearweapons,components,andothermaterialofnationalsecurityinterestinsupportofNNSAandDOEactivities.NuclearWeaponsIncidentResponseGoal:Respondtoandmitigatenuclearandradiologicalincidentsworldwide.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,workinginpartnershipwithnationallaboratories,otherFederalagencies,andinternationalpartners,willexecutemulti-yearCampaignstoaccess,train,anddrillanyspecializedtechnologiesformitigatingradiological/nuclearterroristeventsatanytime.Facilities and Infrastructure RecapitalizationProgramGoal:Restore, rebuild, and revitalize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear weaponscomplex.MeansandStrategies:TheNNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratoriesandproductionplants,willmeetthisgoalbyeffectivelyexecutingprojectsthatreduceNNSA'sdeferredmaintenancetoindustrystandardsandaggressivelydisposeof3milliongrosssquare feet of facilities that are excess to NNSA's needs by FY 2009 and concludetheprogrambyFY2011.Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities(Construction)Goal:Plan,prioritize,andconstructstate-of-the-artfacilities,infrastructure,andscientifictools(thatarenotdirectlyattributabletoDirectedStockpileWorkoraCampaign)withinapprovedbaselinecostandschedule.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,inpartnershipwiththenationallaboratoriesandproductionplants,willplananddeveloplineitemconstructionprojectsasnecessaryandwithinapprovedguidelinesandmanagetheseprojectswithintheapprovedbaselineandschedule.Strategic Plan35SafeguardsandSecurityGoal:ProtectNNSApersonnel,facilities,nuclearweapons,andinformationfromafullspectrumofthreats,mostnotablyfromterrorism,whichhasbecomeofparamountconcernpostSeptember11,2001.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillemploythreeprimarystrategies:utilizeanintegratedprogrammanagementapproachtodefineprioritiesandperformanceobjectivesandevaluatecontractorperformance;implementahumancapitalmanagementplantoimproveandsustainthequalityandtrainingofsafeguardsandsecurityprofessionalswiththecornerstonebeinganinternprogramtoattracthigh-qualitycollegegraduates;and,focusontechnology to offset the reliance on costly and manpower-intensive protection strategies.NonproliferationandVerificationR&DGoal:DevelopnewtechnologiestoimproveU.S.capabilitiestodetectandmonitornuclearweaponsproduction,proliferation,andtestingworldwide.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillpartnerwithitsnationallaboratories,industry,andacademiainresearchanddevelopmenteffortstosustainU.S.technicalleadershipinthedetectionandmonitoringofnuclearprogramsandexplosions.Environmental Projects and Operations*Goal:AccelerateriskreductionandcleanupoftheenvironmentallegacyatNNSAsitesinaccordancewithapplicableenvironmentallawsandregulations,andinconsultationwithaffectedstakeholdersandtribalgovernments.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,workinginconcertwithotherFederalagencies,states,andaffectedcitizens,willexecuteitscleanupandwastedispositionprojectsinacost-effective,compliantand safe manner consistent with end states that support the nuclear weapons complexmission.*As of Fall 2004, the DOE is proposing to transfer a number of environmental activities from the Office of EnvironmentalManagement (EM) to the NNSA beginning in FY 2006.Nonproliferation and International SecurityGoal:Strengthentheglobalnonproliferationregimeby(1)limitingsensitiveexports;(2)supportinginternationalsafeguards;and(3)providingpolicyrecommendationsandpolicy and technical advice to develop and implement U.S. policy (treaties, agreements,andmutualinspections).MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillpartnerwithU.S.Governmentagencies,nationallaboratories,andinternationalpartnerstostrengthenexportcontrolregimes,supporttheIAEAandthesystemofnuclearsafeguards,conducttechnologyexchangeswithRussiaandothercountries,strengthenemergencymanagementsystems,andreduceincentivesforWMDproliferationworldwide.36National Nuclear Security AdministrationRussian Transition InitiativesGoal:PreventadversemigrationofWMDexpertisebyengagingweaponsexpertsinpeacefuleffortsandbyhelpingtodownsizetheRussiannuclearweaponscomplex.MeansandStrategies:Inpartnershipwithnationallaboratories,theprivatesector,andRussianministriesandnuclearinstitutes,NNSAwillengageformerweaponsscientistsintechnologycommercializationanddownsizeworkforceandfacilitiesatRussianWMDsites.International Materials Protection and CooperationGoal:WorkwithRussiaandotherregionsofconcernto(1)secureandeliminatevulnerablenuclearweaponsandweapons-usablematerial;and(2)installdetectionequipmentatbordercrossingsandMegaportstopreventanddetectillicittransferofnuclearmaterial.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillworkwithnationallaboratories,Russianministriesandnuclearinstitutes,theprivatesector, and international partners to secure Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket Forces warhead sitesand600metrictonsofweapons-usablenuclearmaterial.NNSAwillconvert17metrictonsofHEUtoLEUandinstallradiationdetectionequipmentat293bordercrossingsitesand20Megaportswithinthenextdecade.EliminationofWeapons-GradePlutoniumProductionGoal:Facilitatetheshutdownofthethreeremainingweapons-gradeplutoniumproductionreactorsintheRussianFederation.MeansandStrategies:NNSAisworkingwiththeRussianFederalAtomicEnergyAgencytopermanentlyshutdownthreeplutoniumproductionreactorsinSeverskandZheleznogorsk,andreplacethem with new and refurbished fossil-fuel power plants that will supply the necessary heatandelectricitytothetwocities.NNSAisseekinginternationalcontributionsfortheconstructionofthefossilplantatZheleznogorsk.HEUTransparencyImplementationGoal:DevelopandimplementtransparencymeasureswhichincreaseourconfidencethatLEUpurchasedunderthe1993U.S./RussianHEUPurchase AgreementisderivedfromHEUextractedfromdismantledRussiannuclearweaponsandeliminatedfromRussianstockpiles.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillworkwiththeDepartmentofStatetogatherdataonRussianmaterialprocessinginplantstorageandprocessareas,andcompareitwithRussiandeclaredprocessingrates,inventories,andHEUaccountabilityrecordstoensurethat500metrictonsofHEUiseliminatedfromtheRussianstockpile.Strategic Plan37Global Threat Reduction InitiativeGoal:Remove and/or secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and equipmentaroundtheworldthatposeapotentialthreattotheU.S.andtheinternationalcommunity.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwillpartnerwithnationallaboratories,Federalagencies,internationalpartnersandtheprivatesectortosecure,recover,remove,andeliminatehigh-risknuclearmaterialandrelatedequipment,andradiologicalsourcesworldwide.Naval ReactorsGoal:ProvidetheNavywithsafe,militarilyeffectivenuclearpropulsionplantsandensuretheircontinuedsafeandreliableoperation.MeansandStrategies:NNSA,throughtheNavalReactorsProgram,willprovidetheNavywithsafe,militarilyeffectivenuclearpropulsionplantsandensuretheircontinuedsafeandreliableoperation,toincludedesignofthenext-generationnuclearpropulsionplantsforfutureaircraftcarriersandsubmarines.Officeofthe AdministratorGoal:Createawell-managed,inclusive,responsive,andaccountableorganizationthroughthestrategicmanagementofhumancapital;enhancedcost-effectiveutilizationofinformationtechnology;andgreaterintegrationofbudgetandperformancedata.MeansandStrategies:NNSAoperatesaPlanning,Programming,BudgetingandEvaluationprocessasthecorebusinesspracticeforprogram,organizational,andbudgetintegration;continuestoreengineerFederalstaffingtoaddressskillmixdeficienciesandtorecruitnew,younger talent into the organizations; and, pursues the latest approaches in InformationTechnologytoensureimprovedefficiencyandeconomyofoperations.FissileMaterialsDispositionGoal:EliminatesurplusRussianplutoniumandsurplusU.S.plutoniumandHEU.MeansandStrategies:NNSAwilldesign,buildandoperatefacilitiestodisposeof34metrictonsofsurplusU.S.weapons-gradeplutoniumandworkwithRussiatodisposeofsimilarquantitiesofsurplusRussianplutonium.TheRussianprogramisbeingfundedbytheU.S.,Russia,France,theUnitedKingdom,Italy,andCanada.TheNNSAisalsooverseeingthedispositionof174metrictonsofsurplushighlyenricheduranium.38National Nuclear Security AdministrationPantex PlantMission:Fabrication ofchemical explosives,development work insupport of the designlaboratories, pitstorage, and nuclearweapons assembly,disassembly, testing,quality assurance,repair, retirement, andfinal disposition.Location:Amarillo, TexasContractor:BWXT Pantex, LLCNNSA ContractorEmployment:~3,200Web Address:www.pantex.comY-12 NationalSecurity ComplexMission:Fabrication of precisionparts and componentsfrom special nuclearmaterials for nuclearweapons.Location:Oak Ridge, TennesseeContractor:BWXT Y-12, LLCNNSA ContractorEmployment:~4,000Web Address:www.y12.doe.govSavannah River SiteMission:Loads tritium andnontritium reservoirs tomeet requirements ofthe Nuclear WeaponsStockpile Plan;conducts reservoirsurveillance operationsand gas transfersystem testing; and,manages tritiuminventories andfacilities.SupportsU.S. SurplusPlutonium Dispositionactivities for the mixed-oxide fuel fabricationeffort.Location:Aiken, South CarolinaContractor:WestinghouseSavannah RiverCompany, LLCNNSA ContractorEmployment:~1,700Web Address:www.srs.govSandia NationalLaboratoriesMission:Responsible forthe nonnuclearcomponents andsystems engineeringfor all nuclearweapons.Alsoprovides technicalsupport to prevent anddetect WMDproliferation.Location:Albuquerque, NewMexicoLivermore, CaliforniaKauai, HawaiiTonopah, NevadaContractor:Lockheed MartinCorporationNNSA ContractorEmployment:~5,100Web Address:www.sandia.govKansas City PlantMission:Manufacture andprocurement ofnonnuclearcomponents fornuclear weapons.Thisincludes electrical,electronic,electromechanical,mechanical, plastic,and nonfissionablemetal components.The broad range ofcomponents anddevices procured fromU.S. industry issupported by anextensive system toqualify suppliers andaccept products.Location:Kansas City, MissouriContractor:Honeywell CorporationNNSA ContractorEmployment:~2,900Web Address:www.kcp.comAppendix C - NNSA SitesStrategic Plan39Lawrence LivermoreNational LaboratoryMission:Design laboratory thatsupports, with LosAlamos NationalLaboratory,NNSA'sintegrated program ofsurveillance,assessment, andrefurbishment ofstockpile weapons.LLNL possessesunique high-energydensity physicscapabilities andsignificant scientificcomputing assets.LLNL also providestechnical support toprevent and detectWMD proliferation.Location:Livermore, CaliforniaContractor:University of CaliforniaNNSA ContractorEmployment:~5,100Web Address:www.llnl.govLos AlamosNational LaboratoryMission:Design laboratory thatshares responsibilitywith LLNL for thesafety and reliabilityof the nuclearexplosives package inthe nuclear weapons.LANL possessesunique capabilities inneutron scattering,enhanced surveillance,and plutonium scienceand engineering.LANL also providestechnical support toprevent and detectWMD proliferation.Location:Los Alamos, NewMexicoContractor:University of CaliforniaNNSA ContractorEmployment:~5,900Web Address:www.lanl.govNevada Test SiteMission:A unique nationalasset for safelyconducting high-hazardoperations, testing,and training in supportof NNSA, DoD, andother Federalagencies.The NTS isan integral part of theStockpile StewardshipProgram and providesthe U.S. Governmentwith the capability toreturn to undergroundnuclear testing shouldthe President deem itnecessary.Location:Las Vegas, NevadaContractor:Bechtel NevadaCorporationNNSA ContractorEmployment:~2,200Web Address:www.nv.doe.govKnolls AtomicPower LaboratoryMission:Supports the U.S.Naval NuclearPropulsion Programthrough the design,development andoperational follow ofnuclear propulsionplants for navalvessels.Location:Schenectady, NewYorkContractor:Lockheed MartinCorporationNNSA ContractorEmployment:~2,600Web Address:www.kapl.govBettis AtomicPower LaboratoryMission:Supports the U.S.Naval NuclearPropulsion Programthrough the design,development andoperational follow ofnuclear propulsionplants for navalvessels.Location:West Mifflin,PennsylvaniaContractor:Bechtel Bettis, Inc.NNSA ContractorEmployment:~3,200Web Address:www.bettis.gov40National Nuclear Security AdministrationStrategic PlanLinks to Additional InformationThis Strategic Plan lays the foundation for achieving overall mission success and helpsdefine the NNSA structure of the future.In addition to this document, there are many otherplanning documents that help us adapt as the national security environment continues toevolve.The following links will provide more current and detailed information about thestructure and intermediate goals of the various program elements of the NNSA.Department of Energy www.doe.govDepartment of Energy Strategic Plan strategicplan.doe.govDefense Programs www.nnsa.doe.gov/about_dp.aspDefense Nuclear Nonproliferation www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/Naval Reactors www.nnsa.doe.gov/about_nr.aspEmergency Operations www.nnsa.doe.gov/about_eo.aspInfrastructure and Environment www.nnsa.doe.gov/about_ie.aspNNSA Organizational Structure www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/NNSAOrgCharts.pdfNNSA Site Offices and Plants www.nnsa.doe.gov/map.htmNNSA Budget www.nnsa.doe.gov/budgetinfo.aspDOE Job Opportunities chris.inel.gov/jobs/Additional Information www.nnsa.doe.govEditor's Notes:In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established as a semi-autonomousagency within the DOE in response to a Congressional mandate to reinvigorate the security posturethroughout the nuclear weapons program and to reaffirm the Nations commitment to maintaining thenuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States.NNSA was chartered as a distinct organizationwithintheDepartmenttobetterfocusmanagementattentiononenhancedsecurity,proactivemanagement practices, and mission focus within the Departments defense programs.The Departmentperforms its national security missions through NNSA.The development of this Strategic Plan was the work of only Federal employees and was guided bymajor policy documents and program evaluations.The point of contact for this document is KathleenY. Foley, Director, Office of Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation who can be reached at301-903-3334 or by e-mail to Kathleen.Foley@nnsa.doe.gov.42National Nuclear Security Administration