NUCLEAR SECURITY ENGAGEMENT - sandia.gov · International Nuclear Security U.S. Department of...

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International Nuclear Security U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration [email protected] Pub. 03/23/2018 International N N Nu Nu Nu Nu N Nu Nu Nu uc cl cl cl clear Security U.S. Departm m m m m m me en en en en e e en n nt t t t t t t o of of o Energy National N N N N N N N N Nu u uc uc uc u u ucl le le l le le lear Security Admini i i i i i i i ist t st st st st st st st s r r r ra ra ra ra a at ti ti ti io on INSinf f fo@ o@ o@ o@ o@ o@ o@ o@ @ @n n n nn nn nn nnsa.doe.gov Pu Pu Pu Pu Pu u u P b b b b. b. b. b. . 0 0 0 0 3 / 3 2 / / 3 /2018 3 NUCLEAR SECURITY ENGAGEMENT Course Catalog 2018

Transcript of NUCLEAR SECURITY ENGAGEMENT - sandia.gov · International Nuclear Security U.S. Department of...

Page 1: NUCLEAR SECURITY ENGAGEMENT - sandia.gov · International Nuclear Security U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration ... INSIDER THREAT Insider Threat, v1.1

International Nuclear Security U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration [email protected] Pub. 03/23/2018

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NUCLEARSECURITY ENGAGEMENT

Course Catalog 2018

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PHYSICAL PROTECTION Days /

Class Size Audience Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment, v1.0 5 / 20 See above

Performance Testing, v1.0 5 / 20 CA, licensees, managers, measurement/NMAC personnel, PF/RP

Sabotage Protection, v1.0 3 / 20 CA, licensees, managers, NS personnel, PF/RP

Vulnerability to Instruction System Analysis (VISA), v1.0 5 / 20 CA, licensees, NS personnel, PF/RP

INSIDER THREAT

Insider Threat, v1.1 5 / 25 CA, licensees, managers, NS personnel

Mitigating Insider Threat with Behavioral Science, v1.0 1 ½ / 20 See above

CYBERSECURITY

Cyber Risk Management, v1.0 5 / 20 Licensees, managers

Introduction to Cybersecurity v2.0 5 / 20 Licensees, managers,

NS personnel INSTRUCTION

Basic Instructor Training, v1.0 4 ½ / 10-15 Instructors

Curriculum Development, v1.0 5 / 20 Instructors

Instructional Design & Technology, 1.0 5 / 15-20 Instructors, managers

PROTECTIVE FORCE Protective Force Management/Assessment 10 / 15 – 20 Licensees, managers,

NS personnel, PF/RP TRANSPORT Secure Transport Regulations and Planning 5 / 15 – 20 CA, licensees, managers,

NS personnel, PF/RP

Transportation Security Management 10 / 8 – 20 See above

PHPPP YSICAL PROTECTIONDays /

Class Size AudienceIntrodododododooducu tion to Vulnerabababababililiililililititi y y Assessment, v1.0 5 / 20 See above

Performance Testininininininggggggg, , ,,, v1.0 5 / 20CACC , licensees, managers,measurement/NMAC personnel, PF/RP

Sabotage Protection, v1.0 3 / 20 CACC , licensees, managers,NS personnel, PF/RP

VuVuVuVulnlnlnlnere ability to Instruction Systemememm AAAnalysis (VISA), v1.0 5 / 202020202000 CACC , licensees, NS personnel, PF/RP

ININSISIDEDER R THTHREREATAT

Insider Threat, v1.1 5 / 25 CACC , licensees, mannnagagagagerere s, NS personnel

Mitigating Insider Threat with Behavioral Science, v1.0 1 ½ / 20 See above

CYBEBEBEBERSRSECECURURITITYY

Cyber Riisksk MMManaa agement, v1.0 5 / 20 Licensees, managers

Introduction to CyCybebersrsrsecee urity v2.0 5 / 20 Licensees, managers,

NS personnel

INSTRUCTION

Basic Instructor Training, v1.0 4 ½ ½ // 10010--15 Instructors

Curriculum Development, v1.0 5 / 20 InInsttstruruructors

I i l D i & 5 / 15-20 Instructors, mmanananagers

PRPROTOTECECTITIVEVEVEEEVEE FFFFFOROOO CEProtective Force Management/Assessmennntttt 10 / 15 – 20 Licensees, mmmmmmmananananaanagers,

NS personnel, PPPPPF/F/F/F/F/F/F/RPR

TRTRANANSPSPORORTTSecure Transport Regulations and Planning 5 / 15 –––– 20202 CACC , licensees, managers,

NS personnel, PF/RP

Transportation Security Management 10 / 8 – 20 SeSeSeee ee e abababa ove

Instructional Design &Technology, 1.0

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CONTENTS PROGRAMMATIC.................................................................1

Contingency Planning ........................................................................ 1 Design Basis Threat Analysis and Development ................................ 1 Fundamentals of Inspections ............................................................ 2 Fundamentals of Nuclear Security .................................................... 2 Regulatory Development................................................................... 3 Security Plan Development ............................................................... 3

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE ......................................... 4 Fundamentals of Nuclear Security Culture ....................................... 4 Implementing a Systematic Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program ..................................................................... 4 Overview of Nuclear Security Culture ................................................ 5

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL ........ 6 Fundamentals of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes ............................................. 6 Fundamentals of Nondestructive Assay............................................ 6 Holdup Measurement Techniques ..................................................... 7 Measurement Control ........................................................................ 7 Overview of Nondestructive Assay .................................................... 8

PHYSICAL PROTECTION .................................................... 9 Fundamentals of Physical Protection ............................................... 9 Introduction to Vital Area Identification .......................................... 9 Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment ....................................... 10 Physical Protection Performance Testing ........................................ 10 Sabotage Protection ......................................................................... 11 Vulnerability to Intrusion System Analysis (VISA) ......................... 11

PROTECTIVE FORCE ......................................................... 12 Protective Force Management/Assessment ..................................... 12

CONTENTSPROGRAMMATIC.................................................................1

Contingency Planning ........................................................................ 1

Design Basis Threat Analysis and Development................................ 1

Fundamentals of Inspections............................................................ 2

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security.................................................... 2

Regulatory Development................................................................... 3

Security Plan Development............................................................... 3

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE ......................................... 4FuFuFFF ndamentals of Nuclear Security Culture....................................... 4

Implplplplplplememememememmenting a Systematic Nuclear Security Culture Enhancememmmmmmeneeee t Program ..................................................................... 4

Overview of NuNuNuNuNuuuclclclclclclcleae r Security Culture................................................5

NUCLEAR MATERIALALALALALALAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL ........ 6Fundamentals of Nuclear MaMaMaMaMaMaMatetetttt rial Accounting andControl for Nuclear Security Purrrrrrpopopopopopoposes ............................................. 6

FuFuFuFundndndn amentals of Nondestructive Assayayayayayayy...... .......................................... 6

Holdupppp MMMMeae surement Techniques........................... .................................7

Measuremennntttt CoCCC ntrol ........................................................ ......................7

Overview of Nonddddesesesestrtrtt uctive Assay.................................................... ............ 8

PHYSICAL PROTECTIOIOIOONNNN .............................................................. 9Fundamentals of Physical Proootetetetectction ............................................... 9

Introduction to Vital Area Identificccatatatatioioii n .......................................... 9

Introduction to Vulnerability Assessmentntntt .............................................10

Physical Protection Performance Testing .................... ..... ......................10

Sabotage Protection .................................................................. ............... 11

Vulnerability to Intrusion System Analysis (VISA) ...................... ... ....... 11

PROTECTIVE FORCE ................................................................12121PrPP otective Force Management/Assessment.....................................1222

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Durations are for English-speaking audiences. For interpretation, additional time will be required.

CONTENTS (continued)

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY .......................................... 13 Secure Transportation Regulations and Planning ........................... 13 Transportation Security Management ............................................. 13

INSIDER THREAT .............................................................. 14 Insider Threat Identification and Mitigation ................................... 14 Mitigating the Insider Threat Using Behavioral Science ................. 14

CYBERSECURITY ............................................................... 15 Cyber Risk Management for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities ...................................................................... 15 Technical Introduction to Cybersecurity at Nuclear and Radiological Facilities .................................................. 15

INSTRUCTION ................................................................... 16 Basic Instructor Training ................................................................. 16 Curriculum Development ................................................................. 16 Instructional Systems Design and Technology Innovations............ 16

Overview ........................................................................... 17

Durations are for English-speaking audiences.For interpretation, additional time will be required.

CONTENTS (continued)

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY..........................................13SeSeSeSeSeSeecucuccc re Transportation Regulations and Planning...........................13

Transppppporororororoortat tion Security Management ............................................. 13

INSIDER THHHHREREREREREREREAT..............................................................14Insider Threat Identntntntntntntifififiififi ici ation and Mitigation...................................14

Mitigating the Insider Thrhrhrhrhrrreaeaeaeaee t Using Behavioral Science .................14

CYCYCYYBEBEBEB RSECURITY............................ .........................................15Cyber rr RiRiRiR skss Management for Nuclear anananananannd d dddRadiologicicicicalalalal Facilities .......................................... ... ................................ 15

Technical Intrododododucucucu tion to Cybersecurity at Nuclear and Radiololollogogogogici al Facilities......................................................... 15

INSTRUCTION ....................... ... .................................................... .....16Basic Instructor Training ....................... ...................................................1616161111

Curriculum Development.............................. ... .........................................16

Instructional Systems Design and Technolololologogogogy y Innovations............16

Overview ............................................................... ... ................. 17

CA - Comp. Authorities; NS - Nuclear Security; PF/RP - Protective Force/Response Personnel

PHYSICAL PROTECTION Fundamentals of Physical Protection, v1.2 5 / 20 CA, licensees, managers,

NS personnel, PF/RP

Introduction to Vital Area Identification, v1.0 5 / 20 See above

PROGRAMMATIC Days /

Class Size Audience

Contingency Planning, v1.2 4 / 20 – 30 CA, licensees, managers, NS personnel

Design Basis Threat, v1.0 5 / 15 – 20 CA, licensees, PF/RP

Fundamentals of Inspection, v1.0 5 / 20-30 CA, licensees

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, v1.0 3 / 25 All

Regulatory Development, v1.0 3 / 20 CA

Security Plan Development, v1.1 5 / 20 - 30 CA, licensees, managers,

NS personnel, PF/RP

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE Fundamentals of Nuclear Security Culture, v1.0 1 / 20 All

Implementing Systematic Nuclear Security Culture, v1.0 1 ½ / 20 See above

Overview of Nuclear Security Culture, V1.0

2 hours / any See above

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

Fundamentals of NMAC, v1.0 4 / 20 CA, licensees, managers, NS personnel

Fundamentals of Nondestructive Assay 4 ½ / 15 CA, licensees, managers,

measurement/NMAC personnel

Holdup Measurement Techniques 4 ½ / 15 CA, measurement/NMAC

personnel

Measurement Control, v1.0 5 / 20 Measurement/NMAC personnel

Overview of Nondestructive Assay 2 / 15 Licensees, managers,

measurement/NMAC personnel

CA - Comp. Authorities; NS - Nuclear Security; PF/RP - Protective Force/Response Personnel

PHPHYSYSICICALAL PPROROTETECTCTIOONNFundamentals of Physical Protection, v1.2 5 / 20202020 CACC , licensees, managers,

NSN perssono nel, PF/RP

Introduction to Vital Area Identification, v1.0 5 / 20 Seeeeee abababa ovove

PROGRAMMATIC Days /

Class Size Audience

Contingency Planning, v1.2 4 / 20 – 30 CACC , licensees, managers,NS personnel

Design Basis Threat, v1.0 5 / 15 – 20 CACC , licensees, PF/RP

Fundamentals of Inspection,v1.0 5 / 20-30 CACC , licensees

Fundamentals of NuclearSecurity, v1.0 3 / 25 All

Regulatory Development, v1.0 3 / 20 CACC

Security Plan Development, v1.1 5 / 20 - 30 CACC , licensees, managers,

NS personnel, PF/RP

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTUREFundamentals of NuclearSecurity Culture, v1.0 1 / 20 All

Implementing SystematicNuNN clear Security Culture, v1.0 1 ½ / 20 See above

Overrrvivivivivivivieweee of Nuclear Security Culture, V1V1VV1V1V1V1.0.0

2 hours /any See above

NUCUCLEARR MAATETETETETEERIRRRR AL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

Fundamentals of NMAC, v1111111.000.0.0.0.0 4 / 20 CACC , licensees, managers, NS personnel

Fundamentals of Nondestructive Assay 4 ½ ½½½½½½ /////// 15 CACC , licensees, managers,

measurement/NMAC personnel

HoHoHoH ldl up Measurement Techchchchnininn quq es 4 ½ / 15 CCCCCCCAAAAAACCCCCC , , measurement/NMAC

perssssssonononononononnel

Measuremenenenent t tt CoC ntrol, v1.0 5 / 20 Measurementntnttntntnt///////NMNNN AC personnel

Overview of Nondestructive Assay 2 / 15 Licensees, managers,

measurement/NMAC persosososooosonnnnnnnnn el

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INSTRUCTION

Basic Instructor Training v1.0 Audience: Prospective instructors and course development personnel Days / Participants: 4 ½ / 10-15 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Basic Instructor Training establishes quality and consistency of instruction. It serves prospective instructors by helping them develop knowledge, skills, and abilities for standardized instructional methods and training techniques.

This foundational, performance-based course consists of lectures as well as participant activities and presentations. Course Prerequisite: None

Curriculum Development v1.0 Audience: Prospective instructors and course development personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

This one-week, performance-based course equips prospective curriculum developers with the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) for designing and developing training materials. It is also designed for current instructors.

Course content focuses on the quality and consistency of instructional materials. It consists of lectures as well as student activities and presentations Course Prerequisite: Basic Instructor Training

Instructional Systems Design and v1.0 Technology Innovations Audience: Training managers, course development personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 15-20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

This course offers advanced guidance for Instructional Systems Design (ISD), providing in-depth knowledge and practice with how we learn as well as approaches that optimize learning outcomes. In addition to ISD methodologies and practices, course content also focuses on best practices for classroom innovation, content management, and training program development. The course focuses on configuration management for content, versioning for both content and training programs, and designing learning paths. Course Prerequisite: Basic Instructor Training, Curriculum Development

INSTRUCTION

BaB sic Instructor Training v1.0Auuuuudididdidd ence: Prospective instructors and course development personnelDays /////// PPPPPPParara ticipants: 4 ½ / 10-15Modality: ClClClClClClC asasaaaa sroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Basic Instructorrrrrr TTTTTTTrar ining establishes quality and consistency of instruction. It servessssss pppppppror spective instructors by helping them develop knowledge, skilllllllllllls,s,s,s,s,s,s aand abilities for standardized inini structional methods and trrrraiaiaiaiaiaininnn ng techniques.

Thhhhisisisis ffffouo ndational, performance-bababababaasesesesesesesed d course consists of lectures as well as s papapapartr icipant activities and presentntntntntntntatataaaaa ions.Course Prereeeququququisite: None

Curriculum Devvvvelelelelopo ment v1.0Audience: Prospective inststststrururururur cttctororrssss anaand d d cococ ururrsesese dddevevelelelopopoppmememem ntntnt pppererersosos nnnnnnnnnnnnelelelelelelellelelDays / Participants: 5 / 20Modality: Classroom instruction annnd dd d smsmall/large group exercises

This one-week, performance-baseddd dd cococococ ururursesesee eeequququipipips s s prprprososospepepectctctiviviveeeecurriculum developers with the Systemamamamatitititt c c c ApApApA prprproaoaoachchch ttto o oo TrTrTrT aiaiaininin ngngng (SAT) for designing and developing traininininnggg g g g mamaamm tetetet riririialalals.s.s IIIIt t t isiss aaalslslsoodesigned for current instructors.

Course content focuses on the quality and consistencncnccyy y y ofoffoo instructional materials. It consists of lectures as well as stststtstududuuu enenenent t tactivities and presentationsCourse Prerequisite: Basic Instructor Training

InInInstructional Systems Design and v1.0TeTechchchnonn logy Innovations Audienncece::: TrTT aining managers, course development personnelDays / Partiticicicipapapants: 5 / 15-20Modality: Classrsrooooom mm instruction and small/large group exercises

This course offers aadvdvdvanaanced guidance for Instructional Systems Design (ISD), providinngg ininin-depth knowledge and practice with how we learn as well as approachchheseses that optimize learning outcomes. In addition to ISD methodologiieses ananand practices, course content also focuses on best practices for classrooom m m inii novation, contentmanagement, and training program devvelellopopopment. The course focuses on configuration management for conontetetentnn , versioning for both content and training programs, and designnining gg lell arning paths.

te: Basic Instructor Training,ment

both content and tCourse PrerequisitCuCC rriculum Developm

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PROGRAMMATIC

Contingency Planning v1.2 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel Days / Participants: 4 / 20-30 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

During the onset of abnormal events, personnel must determine whether the situation is safety or security related. They must also effectively manage nuclear security systems while the cause(s) are being determined, and they must be prepared to support first response emergency plans. A security contingency plan provides the set of responsive actions that counter unauthorized acts or attempts to remove materials or sabotage a nuclear facility.

This comprehensive course familiarizes participants with international guidance, recommended requirements, and elements and considerations for contingency planning. Participants draft and evaluate a contingency plan with scenario analysis. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection

Design Basis Threat Analysis and Development v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, protective force/response personnel (on-site and off-site) Days / Participants: 5 / 15-20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

A Design Basis Threat (DBT) is a comprehensive description of the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of potential adversaries against which protection systems are designed evaluated. A fundamental principle of the nuclear security is that it is based upon the State’s current evaluation of threats. The DBT is derived from the evaluation of said threats (e.g., threat assessment) and used as a metric within the regulatory process to ensure that appropriate resources are allocated for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities against malicious acts by potential adversaries.

This workshop introduces participants to the methodology used to establish, implement, and maintain a DBT. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

PROGRAMMATIC

Contingency Planning v1.2Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnelDays / Participants: 4 / 20-30Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

During the onset of abnormal events, personnel must determinewhether the situation is safety or security related. They must alsoeffectively manage nuclear security systems while the cause(s) are being determined, and they must be prepared to support first response emergency plans. A security contingency plan provides the set of responsive actions that counter unauthorized acts or attempts to remove materials or sabotage a nuclear facility.

This comprehensive course familiarizes participants with international guidance, recommended requirements, and elements and considerations for contingency planning. Participants draft and evaluate a contingency plan with scenario analysis.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security,Fundamentals of Physical Protection

Design Basis Threat Analysis and Development v1.0AuAuAAAAA dience: Competent Authorities, licensees, protective force/response personnel(o(o(onn---sisisisisisisisiss tettt and off-ff site) Days / PPPPPPPararaaaaa ticipants: 5 / 15-20Modality: ClClClClClCllasasasasasasa srs oom instruction, small/large group exercises

A A A DeDeDeD sisisis gngnngn BBBasasasisisis TTTTTTTThrhrhrhrhrhrhrhrhh eae t (DBT) is a comprehensive description of themomomotititivavavatititit ononons,s,s,, iiiintntnn enenenntititiononononononnonns,s,s,s,sssss and capabilities of potential adversaries agagagaiaia nsnsnsst t t whwhwhhicicicch h hh prprprototototececctitit ononon sssssssysysysysysysysyysy tems are designed evaluated. A fufufundndndamamama enenentatatal l l prprprrininincicic plplplle e e ofofoo ttthehehehe nnnnnnnnnnucucuucuuuuuuu lear security is that it is based upon thththe e e StStStatatate’e’e ss cucuurrrrrrrenenent t t eveveve alalaluauauatititiononon ooof f f thththththhthht rerererererererer ats. The DBT is derived fromththhththt e e e evevvalalaluauaatititiononon ooof f f sasasaididd ttthrhrhreaeaeatststs (((e.e.e g.g.g., , thththhrererereeeer atatataatataa assessment) and used as a meeeetrtrtrtrtricicicii wwwititithihihin n n n thththe e e rererer gugugulalalatototoryryryy ppprororocececesssss ttto o o enenensusususususuuuusurererrerrrrr that appropriate resourrrcecececees ss s ararare e e alalallolol cacaateteted d d fofoor r thththe e e prprprotototecece titit ononon ooofff nunuunun clclclclclclclleaeeeeeee r material and nuclear facicicicicilililililitititit eseses aaagagagainininstst mmmalallicici ioiooususus aaactctcts s s bybyby pppotototenenentititialalalalallla aaaaaaaaaadvddd ersaries.

This workshop inininintrtrtrtrt odododucucu eseses pppararartititicicic papapantntnts s tototot ttthehehe mmmetethohohodododololologygygygygyyygygyy uuuuuuused to establish, implementntntnt,,, ananana d d d mamamaininntatataininin aa DDDBTBTBT..Course Prerequisite: Fundddamamammenene tals of Nuclear Security

1

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Fundamentals of Inspections v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees Days / Participants: 5 / 20-30 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

States are responsible for establishing and maintaining processes and approaches to assess and measure their effectiveness of their nuclear security programs both at the state and licensee level.

Course content familiarizes participants with development, implementation, and assessment of assessment approaches and methodologies. It covers both compliance and performance-based methods. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Security Plan Development, Regulatory Development, Performance Testing

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security v1.0 Audience: All Days / Participants: 3 / 25 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

This workshop introduces participants to the IAEA's nuclear security guidance for protection of nuclear material, associated facilities, and associated activities.

Course content focuses on the relationship between the Nuclear Security Series guide (NSS- 13) on physical protection and its integration with a facility's NMAC system. The workshop also stresses the importance of nuclear security culture and the impact of the human factor on nuclear security effectiveness. Participants categorize legal and regulatory elements with organizations, examine roles and responsibilities, recommendations for theft and sabotage at facilities and during transport. Course Prerequisite: None

Fundamentals of Inspections v1.0AuAuAuAuAuAuudiddddd ence: Competent Authorities, licenseesDays ////// PPPPPara ticipants: 5 / 20-30Modality: ClClClClCClClasa sroom instruction, small/large group exercises

States are respoooooonsnsnnnnn ible for establishing and maintaining processes and approaches to asasasasasasssesess ss and measure their effectiveness of their nuclear security programmmmmmms s sss both at the state and licensee level.

CoCoCC urse content familiarizes paaaaaaartrtrtrtrtrrtici ipants with development, immmmplplplplemeee entation, and assessment ooooooffff fff asa sessment approaches andmethhhododododololoo ogies. It covers both compliaiaiaiaiaancncncncncncn e and performance-based methods. Course Prerequuisisisisitititi ee: Fundamentals of Nuclear Securitytytyyy, SeSeSSSSS curity PlanDevelopment, Regulatttorororory y yy Development, Performance Testing

Fundamentals of Nuclclclcleaeaeae r Security v1.0Audience: AllDays / Participants: 3 / 25Modality: Classroom instruction, small/larrrgegegege gggroup exercises

This workshop introduces participants tooo ttttheheheh IAEA's nuclear security guidance for protection of nuclear mamamaateteteterir al, associated facilities, and associated activities.

Course content focuses on the relationship between thehehee NNNNucu lear Security Series guide (NSS- 13) on physical protection andddd iiiitstststs integration with a facility's NMAC system. The workshop also stresses the importance of nuclear security culture and the impacttt ooooff f f thththe human factor on nuclear security effectiveness. Participants caateteegogogorize legal and regulatory elements with organizations, examminine e e rorr les and responsibilities, recommendations for theft and sabotage aat t fafafacilities and during transport.Course Prerequuisisitititeee: None

2

CYBERSECURITY

Cyber Risk Management for v1.0 Nuclear and Radiological Facilities Audience: Licensees, managers Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Participants learn about cyber penetration and how to defend against it. The goal is for participants to know how to identify, assess, and control cyber risks so that they may develop a risk management plan for their facility and explain how the plan applies to their facility’s system.

Participants apply course concepts to a hypothetical facility through comprehensive exercises that focus on site characterization, Industrial Control Systems, asset identification and consequence assessment, open source reconnaissance, threat analysis, kill chain and vulnerabilities, attack trees, risk assessment, and other factors of Cybersecurity Plan development.

Course content focuses on good practices for identifying facility assets and asset vulnerability as well as assessing cybersecurity effectiveness. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) methods support the structure of the course. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Technical Introduction to Cybersecurity v2.0 at Nuclear and Radiological Facilities Audience: Licensees, managers, technical personnel with minimal cyber background Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Cybersecurity plays an increasingly vital role in implementing a successful nuclear security regimen as well as addressing and eliminating both today's and tomorrow's cyber threats. This course gives participants an overview of basic cybersecurity concepts for nuclear and radiological facilities.

Course content examines: cybersecurity guidance, policy, programs, and plans; differences between nuclear cybersecurity and traditional information technology security; components of industrial control systems; cybersecurity threats and risks; employee roles and training; and methods to mitigate risk. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

CYBERSECURITY

Cyber Risk Management for v1.0Nuclear and Radiological Facilities Audience: Licensees, managersDays / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Participants learn about cyber penetration and how to defendagainst it. The goal is for participants to know how to identify, assess, and control cyber risks so that they may develop a risk management plan for their facility and explain how the plan appliesto their facility’s system.

Participants apply course concepts to a hypothetical facility throughcomprehensive exercises that focus on site characterization, Industrial Control Systems, asset identification and consequence assessment, open source reconnaissance, threat analysis, kill chain and vulnerabilities, attack trees, risk assessment, and other factorsof Cybersecurity Plan development.

Course content focuses on good practices for identifying facility assets and asset vulnerability as well as assessing cybersecurity efeeeeee fectiveness. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NNNNNNNISISISISISISIST)T and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) methods supportrtrtrtrtrtrt tttttttheh structure of the course.Course Prerequququququququuisi ite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Technical Introddddddducucucucucuuction to Cybersecurity v2.0at Nuclear and Radiiiiiiololololololologogoooo ical Facilities Audience: Licensees, managers, teccccccchnhnhnhhnhnh ical personnel with minimal cyber backgroundDays / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and smalllllll/l/l/l/l/l/l/lalalalalal rgr e group exercises

CCCybybybybereree security plays an increasingly vital rrololololololole eeee in implementing a succesesssfsfsfsfuluu nuclear security regimen as well as aaaaaaadddddddddd ressing and eliminatinininng gg g bobob th today's and tomorrow's cyber threeeeeeeatatataaaa s. This course gives participanananantststt an overview of basic cybersecurity cooooooncncncncncncncepts fornuclear and radiololollogogogogicical facilities.

Course content examinnneseseses::: cycybersecurity guidance, policy, programsmsmsmsmsmsms,,,,,,,and plans; differences betweweweeenenene nnuclear cybersecurity and traditional information technology securittty;y;y;y; cccomo ponents of industrial controlsystems; cybersecurity threats anddd rrrrisisisisksks; eme plloyee roles and training; and methods to mitigate riskkk.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Seecucucuuriririr tyty

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INSIDER THREAT

Insider Threat Identification and Mitigation v1.1 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 25 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The workshop presents a systematic, analytical approach for nuclear security system evaluations that can mitigate insider risk (based on the capabilities and attributes of a defined insider threat). Workshop materials adhere to three IAEA implementation guides: "Preventive and Protective Measures Against Insider Threats" (NSS-8); "Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (NSS-13); and "Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities" (NSS- 25G).

Course content consists of historical case studies, elements of trustworthiness programs, target/facility characterization, insider characterization, and system effectiveness analysis. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Mitigating the Insider Threat Using v1.0 Behavioral Science Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel Days / Participants: 1 ½ / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Physical protection and nuclear material control and accounting systems in the nuclear industry have been used by many for detecting and deterring acts of sabotage and potential insiders from theft of radioactive and nuclear material. Despite these endeavors, material may be stolen by industry personnel who may offer it to those who would use it for malicious purposes.

Course content identifies significant behavioral science contributions to mitigating the insider threat to radioactive and nuclear material, including: identifying abnormal personality traits during the prescreening process to avoid hiring potential malicious insiders, identifying stressors affecting current employees that if left unmitigated could drive the employee to malicious behavior, and identifying abnormal behaviors that could be indicative of someone who has become a malicious insider. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

INSIDER THREAT

Insider Threat Identification and Mitigation v1.1AuAuAuuudididddd ence: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnelDays ////// PPPPPPPara ticipants: 5 / 25Modality: ClClClClClCClasaa sroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The workshop pppppprerererrreresents a systematic, analytical approach for nuclearsecurity system evalalalalalaluauauauauuu tions that can mitigate insider risk (based on the capabilities and attriririririiibubububububb tes of a defined insider threat). WoWW rkshop materials adhere totototototoo tthree IAEA implementation guides: "P"P"P"Prererer vev ntive and Protective Measususuusuuurererrr s Against Insider Threats" (NSS-8); "N"N"NNucucucu lel ar Security Recommendatititititiononononononons s on Physical Protection of Nuclear MaMaMaMatet rial and Nuclear Facilities" (((((((NSNSNNNNN S-13); and "Use of Nuclear Mateteteeririririala Accountn ing and Control for NuNuNuNuNuNNuclear Security Purposes at Faciiililililititititiesee " (NSS- 25G).

Course content consiststststs oooof historical case studies, elementntntntntntnts sss of trustworthiness programs, tatatatargrget/facility characterization, ininininnnsisisisisisisided r characterization, and system eeeffffffffececece tiveness analysis.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of ff NuNuNuNuclclc ear Security

Mitigating the Insider Threat Using gg v1.0Behavioral ScienceAudience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclclclcleaeaeaearr security personnelDays / Participants: 1 ½ / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Physical protection and nuclear material control and accountininininggggsystems in the nuclear industry have been used by many for dedd tecting and deterring acts of sabotage and potential insiders from ththefefeftt t of radioactive and nuclear material. Despite these endeavors, mateeririialalal mmmay be stolen by industry personnel who may offer it to those whho o wowowould use it for malicious purposes.

Course contentnt iiidededentifies significant behavioral science contributions to mmititigigigataa ing the insider threat to radioactive andnuclear material, includudinining:g:g: identifying abnormal personality traits during the prescreening prrococcesesess to avoid hiring potential malicious insiders, identifying stressors afafffefefectcc ing current employees that if left unmitigated could drive the employoyeeeeee ttto malicious behavior, and identifying abnormal behaviors that cooullulddd bebb indicative of someone who has become a malicious insider.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Securiityty Course Prerequisit

14

Regulatory Development v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities Days / Participants: 3 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

States are responsible for establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework for physical protection of nuclear materials.

Course content familiarizes participants with development, implementation, and assessment of regulatory approaches and models. It covers international binding and non-binding instruments for nuclear security concepts based on the CPPNM, UNSCR 1540, and related IAEA material (NSS-20, NSS-13, NST023, NSS-25G). Course Prerequisite: Security Plan Development

Security Plan Development v1.1 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel (on-site and off-site) Days / Participants: 5 / 20-30 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises In NSS-13, the IAEA recommends facilities to develop an approved security plan that defines their security programs. Moreover, the NSS-13 guide recommends that the State or Competent Authorities use this plan and its implementation as a basis for licensing the facility for operation and for annual inspections.

This course follows the format of security plans as defined in NSS-13 and the Implementing Guide NST023. The workshop consists of lectures and discussions based on a mock facility and mock security plan. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection, Fundamentals of NMAC

Regulatory Development v1.0Audience: Competent AuthoritiesDays / Participants: 3 / 20Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

States are responsible for establishing and maintaining a legislativeand regulatory framework for physical protection of nuclear materials.

Course content familiarizes participants with development, implementation, and assessment of regulatory approaches and models. It covers international binding and non-bindinginstruments for nuclear security concepts based on the CPPNM,UNSCR 1540, and related IAEA material (NSS-20, NSS-13, NST023,NSS-25G).Course Prerequisite: Security Plan Development

Security Plan Development v1.1Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel (on-site and off-ff site)Days / Participants: 5 / 20-30Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

In NNNNNNNSSSSSSSS -13, the IAEA recommends facilities to develop an approvedsecuritytytyyyyy ppppppplal n that defines their security programs. Moreover, the NSS-13 guiiiiidedededededede rrecommends that the State or Competent AuthoritiesAAuse this plan anddddd dd ititiiiii s implementation as a basis for licensing the facility for operation aaaaaaandnnnnn for annual inspections.

This course follows the formmmmmmmataaaa of security plans as defined in NSS-13 and the Implementing Guide NNNNNNNSTSTSTSTSTSTST023. The workshop consists of lectures and discussions based on a aaaa mommmmmm ck facility and mock security plplplplananaa .Coursesesee PPPrerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Secuuuuuririririririr tytyty,Fundamennntatatatalsls of Physical Protection, Fundamentals of NMMMMMMMACACACAAAA

3

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NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security Culture v1.0 Audience: All Days / Participants: 1 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The foundation of a strong nuclear security culture is based on the beliefs that there is a credible threat, nuclear security is important, and everyone is responsible for nuclear security effectiveness.

Course content summarizes: threats and consequences facing nuclear security stakeholders, the impact of the human factor on nuclear security, the concepts, beliefs and best practices associated with a strong nuclear security culture, the key elements of a systematic nuclear security culture enhancement program, and suggested approaches to implementing such a program to support nuclear security effectiveness and enhanced performance within the organization. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Implementing a Systematic Nuclear Security v1.0 Culture Enhancement Program Audience: All Days / Participants: 1 ½ / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

A systematic approach to enhance nuclear security culture increases a nuclear security regime’s effectiveness. The goal of this workshop is to familiarize participants with options for implementing elements of a systematic nuclear security culture enhancement program.

This course focuses on the key elements and sample actions that stakeholders may take within such a program. The course complements the IAEA’s draft "Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture in Organizations Associated with Nuclear and/or Radioactive Material". Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

FuF ndamentals of Nuclear Security Culture v1.0Auuuuudididididdd ene ce: AllDays ///// PPPPPPPararaaa ticipants: 1 / 20Modality: ClClClClClClC asasaaaa sroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The foundation ooooooof f ffff a strong nuclear security culture is based on thebeliefs that there is aaaaaaa crcrcrcccc edible threat, nuclear security is important, and everyone is responsisisisisiiblblblblblblblee for nuclear security effectiveness.

CoCoCoC uru se content summarizes: tttttthrhrhrhhrhrhreae ts and consequences facing nuclclclcleaeaeae r security stakeholders, the imimimimimmmpapappppp ct of the human factor onnuclear rr sesesesecuc rity, the concepts, beliefs annnnnnndddddd best practices associated with a stronnnngg g g nun clear security culture, the kekekekekekekey y yy y y y ele ements of a systematic nucccleleleleararaa security culture enhancemennnntttt tt prprppppp ogram, and suggested approachchchcheseseses to implementing such a prograaaaaammmmmmm to support nuclear security effectititivevevevenenenn ss and enhanced performanceeeeee wiwwwww thin the organization.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentalslsls oooof f f f NuN clear Security

Implementing a Systematic Nuclclclleaeaeaear r Security v1.0Culture Enhancement Program Audience: AllDays / Participants: 1 ½ / 20Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exerciseeessss

A systematic approach to enhance nuclear security culture ee innininincrcrcrcc eaeaeaseseses s sa nuclear security regime’s effectiveness. The goal of this workkkkshhhshshshopopopopo is to familiarize participants with options for implementing elelelements of a systematic nuclear security culture enhancementprogoggrararam.

This couursrsse ee focuses on the key elements and sample actions thatstakeholderss mmmayaa take within such a program. The coursecomplements thhe e IAIAIAEA’s draft "Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture in Organizations Asssococociaii ted with Nuclear and/or Radioactive Material".Course Prerequisite: Fundamenentaatalslsls of Nuclear Security

4

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Secure Transportation Regulations and Planning – Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel who manage security transportation programs Days / Participants: 5 / 15-20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

This workshop gives participants a detailed overview of the components and considerations they need for supporting a materials transport mission. This interactive workshop also gives participants opportunities to test their knowledge through progressive tabletop exercises that build from base-case through upgrade-case scenarios.

Course content focuses on: IAEA requirements; target and threat identification; convoy design and capabilities; route and scenario planning; and options analysis. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Security Plan Development, Contingency Planning

Transportation Security Management – Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel who manage security transportation programs Days / Participants: 10 / 8-20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises This comprehensive course explores and examines best practices and methodologies for transportation security organizations and operations, supporting participants who manage transportation security and operations.

Course content focuses on regulatory frameworks; communications; personnel selection; and facilities, equipment, documentation, and transportation operations. This interactive course emphasizes practical exercises to help managers develop a secure transportation program. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Secure Transportation Regulations and Planning –Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel who manage security transportation programsDays / Participants: 5 / 15-20Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

This workshop gives participants a detailed overview of the components and considerations they need for supporting amaterials transport mission. This interactive workshop also gives participants opportunities to test their knowledge through progressive tabletop exercises that build from basea -case through upgrade-case scenarios.

Course content focuses on: IAEA requirements; target and threat identification; convoy design and capabilities; route and scenario planning; and options analysis.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Security Plan Development, Contingency Planning

Transportation Security Management –AuA dience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security pepeeeeersrsrsrsrsrsrsonnel, protective force/response personnel who manage security transpppppporororororoo tat tion programsDays / Parararrarrtititttt cipants: 10 / 8-20Modality: Classssssrsrsrsrsrsrsrs ooo m instruction, small/large group exercises

This comprehensiiiiiiveveveveveveve ccourse explores and examines best practices and methodologies for rrr trtrtrtrtrtrtranaa sportation security organizations and operations, supporting parrtititititititicicicciccc pap nts who manage transportationsecurity and operations.

CCourse content focuses on regulatory frfrfrfrfrfrframaa eworks; communications; peeeersrsrsrsononnel selection; and facilities, equipmemememememementnnnnn , documentation, and transppporororortat tion operations. This interactive couuuuuuursrsrsrsrsrsrse emphasizes practical ll exexexexereree cises to help managers develop a secururururururure eeeee transportation program.Course Prerequisittteee:::: FuFuFF ndamentals of Nuclear Security,Fundamentals of Physicalll PPPProroror tet ction

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PROTECTIVE FORCE

Protective Force Management/Assessment – Audience: Licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 10 / 15-20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises This comprehensive course focuses on the components and principles that comprise the proper functioning of a successful protective force. It also emphasizes the process required to assess/inspect the protective force and its functions.

Course content examines: regulatory frameworks; principles of physical protection; management and supervision; training/certification requirements; plans and orders; assessment principles; data collection; evaluating protective force functions; assessment planning; report writing; and corrective actions. This interactive course includes multiple tabletop and analytical exercises. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

PROTECTIVE FORCE

PrP otective Force Management/Assessment –Auuuuudidididdid ene ce: Licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel,protectitititititiivevevevevve force/response personnelDays / Partrtrtrtrtrtticiciciciicipi ants: 10 / 15-20Modality: Classrsrsrsrsrrrooooooo m instruction, small/large group exercises

This comprehensiveeeeee cccccccouo rse focuses on the components and principles that compriseeeeee ttttttthehh proper functioning of a successful prppp otective force. It also emphphphphphphasasaaa izes the process required to asasasasseseses sss /inspect the protective forccccccce e e eeee ana d its functions.

Courseeee cccconoo tent examines: regulatory frfrfrfrfrfrf amamamamamama eworks; principles of physical pprororootetett ction; management and supeeeeervrvrvrvrvrvrvisi ion; training/certiiifififificacacacatit on requirements; plans anddddd ooooooordrdrdrdrr ers; assessmentprinciples; data colololollelelelectc ion; evaluating protective forrrrrrcececececece functions;assessment planning; rrrrepepepeport writing; and corrective actitititititiononononononons.s This interactive course includes ss mumumm ltiple tabletop and analytical exercises.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of fff NuNuNuNuclclc eae r Security

12

Overview of Nuclear Security Culture v1.0 Audience: All Days / Participants: 2 hours / any Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises A robust nuclear security culture mitigates potential threats to nuclear and radioactive material by fostering beliefs and behaviors that result in personnel who integrate and maintain a more rigorous approach to their nuclear security responsibilities. The goal of this session is to introduce nuclear security culture as a means for support and improvement of nuclear security and human performance.

This short course consists of an overview of the basic concepts of nuclear security culture and its impact on the effectiveness of nuclear security. It includes example activities that stakeholders can take to increase nuclear security effectiveness. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Overview of Nuclear Security Culture v1.0Audience: AllDays / Participants: 2 hours / anyModality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

A robust nuclear security culture mitigates potential threats to nuclear and radioactive material by fostering beliefs and behaviorsthat result in personnel who integrate and maintain a more rigorousapproach to their nuclear security responsibilities. The goal of thissession is to introduce nuclear security culture as a means forsupport and improvement of nuclear security and human performance.

This short course consists of an overview of the basic concepts of nuclear security culture and its impact on the effectiveness of nuclear security. It includes example activities that stakeholders can take to increase nuclear security effectiveness. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

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NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

Fundamentals of Nuclear Material v1.0 Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel responsible for regulating and implementing nuclear material accounting and control programs for power reactors, research reactors, or test reactors Days / Participants: 4 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Accounting for and controlling the use of nuclear materials (NMAC) at reactor facilities is key to both meeting international reporting requirements and supporting an effective nuclear security program. The elements of an NMAC system trace nuclear materials as they arrive, are used, and shipped, the goal being to appropriately protect material as well as detect and deter the theft of nuclear materials during basic facility processes.

The elements of NMAC are: program management, records, physical inventory, measurements and measurement control, material control, material movements, detection, assessments, performance testing, and investigation and resolution of irregularities.

This workshop introduces the basic elements that support an effective NMAC program for non-fuel cycle facilities. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Fundamentals of Nondestructive Assay – Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, measurement/NMAC personnel Days / Participants: 4 ½ / 15 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The primary objective of this training course is to provide participants with knowledge and experience in the fundamentals of nondestructive assay of nuclear materials including gamma and neutron measurement techniques.

Introductory lectures are combined with hands-on experience to reinforce concepts and provide students with practical experience in operating equipment and software. Expert instructors and a low student-to-instructor ratio provide opportunities for tailored examples to be used and some application-specific questions to be addressed. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of NMAC

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

FuF ndamentals of Nuclear Material v1.0AcAcAAcAcAcAccocococcocc unting and Control for Nuclear Security PurposesAudiennnnncececececcece:: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel responsible fofofofofofof r r rrrr regulating and implementing nuclear material accounting and control programs sssss fofofofoffor r power reactors, research reactors, or test reactorsDays / Participantsssss::::::: 4 4 4444 // 20Modality: Classroom instttttrurururururuructc ion and small/large group exercises

AcA counting for and controllllllllililillillingngngngngng the use of nuclear materials (NMAC) atatatat rrreae ctor facilities is key to bothththththhh mmmmmmmeeting international reporting requuuiriririrememements and supporting an effffffffffececececececectitittttt ve nuclear security program. The elemmmmenenene ts of an NMAC system trace nnnnnnnucucuuuuu lear materials as they arrive, are ususussededede ,, and shippped, the goal being totototototoo aappropriately protect material as welllllll aaaass ss ded tect and deter the theft of nucucucucucucuclelell ar materials during basic facility yy prprprproco esses.

The elements of NMAC arererere:::: prpp ogram management, records,s ppppppphyh sicalinventory, measurements andndndd mmmmeasurement control, material control, material movements, dettttecececectitit on, assessments, performancetesting, and investigation and resolutitititionononon of irregularities.

This workshop introduces the basic elementntntntssss tht at support an effective NMAC program for non-fuel cycle faccililililititititiei s.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Fundamentals of Nondestructive Assay –Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers,measurement/NMAC personnelDaDD ys / Participants: 4 ½ / 15MoMoModadd lity: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The prprimimimary objective of this training course is to provideparticipanantststs wwwith knowledge and experience in the fundamentals of nondestructitiveve aaassss ay of nuclear materials including gamma and neutron measurememenenent techniques.

Introductory lectures arare e e cococombined with hands-on experience to reinforce concepts and prooviviidedede students with practical experience in operating equipment and softwawarerere. .. Expert instructors and a low student-to-instructor ratio providede oopppppportunities for tailored examples to be used and some applicatitiononon-specific questions to be addressed.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of NMACCourse Prerequisit

6

Sabotage Protection v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 3 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

Protection against sabotage at nuclear and radiological facilities encompasses the following nuclear security disciplines: Design Basis Threat, explosive/blast analysis, dose assessment, dispersion modeling, Design Basis Accident and Beyond Design Basis, fault trees analysis, and Vital Area Identification. Course content examines these disciplines and prepares partner States to enhance facilities’ abilities to protect against sabotage attacks; reviews relevant international legal and guidance documents; and examines levels of threat, vulnerability, physical protection, and consequence for sabotage at nuclear power plants, research reactors, and for spent nuclear fuel. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection

Vulnerability to Intrusion System Analysis (VISA) v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

The VISA process is a scenario-based, vulnerability assessment tool to analyze the effectiveness of nuclear security systems in preventing, detecting, delaying, and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving radioactive and nuclear material and associated facilities. VISA employs a group of experts from different disciplines (e.g. physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, response force) to logically develop and evaluate scenarios involving attacks by adversaries. The objective of the course is to provide participants with a working knowledge of how to use the VISA process to estimate the level of system effectiveness for a nuclear security system. Through lectures and exercises, the course will focus on developing and analyzing scenarios to determine system effectiveness for a mock facility, and developing and analyzing the effectiveness of upgrades to address identified weaknesses. Course Prerequisite: Introduction of Vulnerability Assessment, Fundamentals of Physical Protection

Sabotage Protection v1.0Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnelDays / Participants: 3 / 20Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

Protection against sabotage at nuclear and radiological facilitiesencompasses the following nuclear security disciplines: Design Basis Threat, explosive/blast analysis, dose assessment, dispersion modeling, Design Basis Accident and Beyond Design Basis, fault trees analysis, and Vital Area Identification. ffCourse content examines these disciplines and prepares partner States to enhance facilities’ abilities to protect against sabotage attacks; reviews relevant international legal and guidance documents; and examines levels of threat, vulnerability, physicalprotection, and consequence for sabotage at nuclear power plants,research reactors, and for spent nuclear fuel. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection

Vulnerability to Intrusion System Analysis (VISA) v1.0AuAuAuuAuuudididdddd ence: Competent Authorities, licensees, nuclear security personnel, protectitititititiivevevevvvv force/response personnelDays / Parrrrrrtitititititiicicc pants: 5 / 20Modality: Classrsrsrsrrsrroooooooo m instruction, small/large group exercises

The VISA process iiiiiiisssssss a a aaaaa scenario-based, vulnerability assessment tool to analyze the effectivenenenenenenenessss of nuclear security systems inpreventing, detecting, delayiyiyiyiyiyiyingngngngngngng, and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal trannnnnnsfsfsfsfsfsfsfereee , or other malicious acts ini volving radioactive and nuclear maaaaaaateteteteteteterial and associated facilities. VIVIVIVISASASS employs a group of experts from ddddddifififififififfefefefefefeferent disciplines (e.g. physsicicicicalalaa pprotection, nuclear material accountititittititingngngngngngng and control,responseee ffffororoo cec ) to logically develop and evaluate scscscscscscsceneeneeee arios involving attacks by advdvdvdvererere sas riess.The objective of thehehehe ccccouo rse is to provide participants with a wowowowowowoworking knowledge of how to ususussee ee tht e VISA process to estimate the level ooooooofffff ffsystem effectiveness for a nnnnucucucu lear security system. Through lectures and exercises, the course willll ffffococococusu on developing and analyyzing scenarios to determine system effffefefef ctctctctivivi eneness for a mock facility, and developing and analyzing the effectiveeenenenenessss of upgr des to addresidentified weaknesses.Course Prerequisite: Introduction of Vulnerability AsAsAssesesesessssFundamentals of Physical Protection

radades to address s

sssmement,

11

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Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises Vulnerability Assessment analyzes prevention, detection, delay, and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts with radioactive and nuclear material and associated facilities. Participants learn basic steps for vulnerability assessment (VA); identify the strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches to VA; and evaluate upgrades that address deficiencies and increase physical protection effectiveness.

Individual and small group exercises analyze facility characterization, Design Basis Threat development, outsider/insider threat ranking, Adversary Sequence Diagram development, scenario analysis, tabletop tactical analysis, and upgrade analysis. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection, Fundamentals of NMAC

Physical Protection Performance Testing v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, measurement and NMAC personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises, equipment demonstrations

Performance testing for physical protection systems (an IAEA-recommended requirement for Category I and II nuclear facilities), NMAC systems, and protective forces is integral to nuclear security. Participants gain basic knowledge for planning and implementing performance testing for each of these areas.

Course content defines performance testing and analyzes scenario timelines, performance plan elements, methods and considerations for testing interior Passive Infrared Sensors and exterior sensors, access control systems, detection of prohibited items, and delay elements. The course includes a discussion on testing Alarm Communication & Display (AC&D) system and Central Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station (CAS/SAS) operations and equipment. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security, Fundamentals of Physical Protection

Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment v1.0AuAuAuAuAuuudiddddd ence: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnnnnnnenennnnn l, protective force/response personnelDays / Parrrrrrrtitittttt cic pants: 5 / 20Modality: Classsssrsrsrsrsrsrsroooooo m instruction and small/large group exercises

Vulnerability Assesssssssssssss memm nt analyzes prevention, detection, delay, and response to theft, sabotototototototagagagagagagage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or oto her malicious acts with raaaaaaadidididddid oao ctive and nuclear material andasasasassososs ciated facilities. Participantststststtss lllleae rn basic steps for vulnerability asseeessssssssmemm nt (VA); identify the strenggggggthththththths s and weaknesses of different methoddddolololologogogo ical approaches to VA; and eeeeeevavavavavvavalul ate upgrades thataddress defififiicicicicienene cies and increase physical prorororororootetettttt ction effectiveness.

Individual and smamamamallllll group exercises analyze facilllitititititii yyyyy yycharacterization, Desisisiigngngngn Basis Threat development, oututututtututsisisisisisisided r/insider threat ranking, Adversary yy SeSeSeS quq ence Diagram developmenttt, scscscscscscscene ario analysis, tabletop tactical analalalalysysysysisi , and upgrade analysis.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals offff NuNuNuN clc ear Security,Fundamentals of Physical Protection, Fundammmmenenee tals of NMAC

Physical Protection Performance Testststtininininggg v1.0Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, memememeasasa urement and NMAC personnel, protective force/response personnelDays / Participants: 5 / 20Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises, equipmmmenenenent t demonstrations

Performance testing for physical protection systems (an IAEA-rererecommended requirement for Category I and II nuclear facilities), NMNMMACACAC systems, and protective forces is integral to nuclear security. Particicipipananants gain basic knowledge for planning and implementingperformancnce ee tett sting for each of these areas.

Course contentt dddefefefiniines performance testing and analyzes scenario timelines, performanancecece ppplan elements, methods and considerations for testing interior Passisivevee IIInfrared Sensors and exterior sensors, access control systems, detetectcttioioion of prohibited items, and delay elements. The course includes a a dididiscscscussion on testing AlarmCommunication & Display (AC&D)D) ssysysystetetem and Central Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station (CASS/S/SSASASAS) operations and equipment.

te: Fundamentals of Nuclear Securityy,sical Protection

Course PrerequisitFundamentals of Phys

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Holdup Measurement Techniques – Audience: Competent Authorities, measurement and NMAC personnel Days / Participants: 4 ½ / 15 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The primary objective of this training course is to provide participants with an overview of nondestructive assay techniques as they apply to the in-situ measurement of nuclear material held up in process equipment.

Introductory lectures are combined with hands-on experience to reinforce concepts and provide students with practical experience in operating equipment and software. Expert instructors and a low student-to-instructor ratio provide opportunities for tailored examples to be used and some application-specific questions to be addressed. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of NMAC

Measurement Control v1.0 Audience: Measurement and NMAC personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Personnel with responsibility for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control should understand basic principles for measurement control. A well-defined, well-managed Measurement Control Program helps sustain material control. However, poor measurement processes, equipment malfunction, and substandard operator performance are factors that most commonly result in measurement errors that led to costly and dangerous missteps.

Course content focuses on how a sound measurement control program can guide the selection of a measurement system, when to apply certain methods, and how to monitor performance. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of NMAC

Holdup Measurement Techniques –Audience: Competent Authorities, measurement and NMAC personnelDays / Participants: 4 ½ / 15Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The primary objective of this training course is to provideparticipants with an overview of nondestructive assay techniques as they apply to the in-situ measurement of nuclear material held up inprocess equipment.

Introductory lectures are combined with hands-on experience to reinforce concepts and provide students with practical experience in operating equipment and software. Expert instructors and a low student-to-instructor ratio provide opportunities for tailored examples to be used and some application-specific questions to be addressed.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of NMAC

Measurement Control v1.0Audience: Measurement and NMAC personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20MoMMMMM dality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

Personononononononnen l with responsibility for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control shshshshshshouooooo ld understand basic principles for measurement control. A wellllllllllllll ---dedd fined, well-managed Measurement Control Program helps sustststststststaiaaaaaa n material control. However, poormeasurement processeseseseseseses, , ,,,,, equipment malfunction, and substandard operator performance are fffffffacacaacaaactors that most commonly result in measurement errors that led tooooo cccccccosoo tly and dangerous missteps.

CoC urse content focuses on how a sounununnnnnd d ddddd measurement control prprprrogogogogram can guide the selection of a measasassasassurururuuuu ement system, when to appllly yy cecececertain methods, and how to monitor peeeeeeerfrfrfrfrfrfrformance.Course Preeerererereququqq isite: Fundamentals of NMAC

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Page 12: NUCLEAR SECURITY ENGAGEMENT - sandia.gov · International Nuclear Security U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration ... INSIDER THREAT Insider Threat, v1.1

Overview of Nondestructive Assay – Audience: Licensees, managers, measurement and NMAC personnel Days / Participants: 2 / 15 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The primary objective of this training course is to provide participants with an overview of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques used for nuclear materials including gamma and neutron measurement techniques. The overview is intended for individuals who interact with NDA indirectly as end users of the results, higher level managers, or those in regulatory roles.

Introductory lectures are combined with hands-on experience to reinforce concepts and provide students with a practical understanding of how techniques can be applied and how to interpret results. Expert instructors and a low student-to-instructor ratio provide opportunities for tailored examples to be used and some application- specific questions to be addressed. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of NMAC

Overview of Nondestructive Assay –AuAuAuAuAuAudididddd ence: Licensees, managers, measurement and NMAC personnelDays /////// PPPPPara ticipants: 2 / 15Modality: ClClClCClClClasa sroom instruction and small/large group exercises

The primary obobobobobobbjejejejejectc ive of this training course is to provideparticipants with annnnnn ooooooovev rview of nondestructive assay (NDA)techniques used for nuclclclclclclcleaeaeaeeee r materials including gamma and neutron mem asurement techniques. ThThThThThTThe e eeee ovo erview is intended for individuals whwhwhwho oo interact with NDA indirectltltlllly yyyyyy asasaaaa end users of the results, higher levelll mamamamanan gers, or those in regulatoryryryryryyy rrrrrrolo es.

Introductototoryryryry llectures are combined with haahahahahahandndnnnnn s-on experience to reinforce concccepepepeptstst and provide students with a ppppppprararrr ctical understanding offf hhhhowowoo techniques can be applied anndddd ddd hohhh w to interpret results. Experererrtt t t ini structors and a low student-tototototooo----ininii structor ratio provide opportunitieeiesss s fofoff r r tailored examples to be usedddddd aaaaaaandndnnnn some application- specific queeeststststioioii ns to be addressed.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of fff NMNMNMNMACA

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PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Fundamentals of Physical Protection v1.2 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises This course introduces and examines how a physical protection system integrates people, procedures, and equipment to keep assets or facilities secure from theft, sabotage, or other malicious attacks. A physical security system's basic functions are to: (1) detect (discover an adversary's action); (2) delay (add time and complexity to an adversary's path, increasing response time for protective forces); and (3) respond (interrupt and neutralize the adversary). At the end of this workshop, participants will know: how to apply principles of performance-based methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system for nuclear material; how to identify and describe the strategies and general technologies used in a physical security system; and how the technologies and procedures are deployed in the field. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Introduction to Vital Area Identification v1.0 Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnel Days / Participants: 5 / 20 Modality: Classroom instruction, small/large group exercises

Identification of vital areas involves recognizing malicious precursors for equipment and areas that are vulnerable to acts of sabotage. Methods for Vital Area Identification prepare participants to determine whether to analyze (or require) nuclear vital areas which should be in accord with applicable IAEA technical guidance. Course content engages participants with a target identification process to identify potential areas of sabotage in a facility, international recommended requirements, and guidelines for organizing, managing, performing, and estimating the cost and schedule for an NSS-16 analysis to identify vital areas. Participants evaluate approaches to reduce the effort required for vital area identification, strategies to integrate sabotage protection into nuclear power plant design, and cost-effectiveness of radiological sabotage protection against insider and cyber threats. Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Fundamentals of Physical Protection v1.2Audience: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, protective force/response personnelDays / Participants: 5 / 20Modality: Classroom instruction and small/large group exercises

This course introduces and examines how a physical protection system integrates people, procedures, and equipment to keep assets or facilities secure from theft, sabotage, or other malicious attacks. A physical security system's basic functions are to: (1) detect (discover an adversary's action); (2) delay (add time and complexity to an adversary's path, increasing response time for protective forces); and (3) respond (interrupt and neutralize the adversary).At the end of this workshop, participants will know: how to apply principles of performance-based methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system for nuclear material; how to identify and describe the strategies and general technologies used in a physical security system; and how the technologies and procedures are deployed in the field.Course Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security

Innnnntrtrtrtrtrtrtrodo uction to Vital Area Identification v1.0Audiencecececececece:: Competent Authorities, licensees, managers, nuclear security personnel, prrrrrotototototottecee tive force/response personnelDays / Participaaaaaantntntnnnn s: 5 / 20Modality: Classroom inininininininsts ruction, small/large group exercises

Identification of vital areaeaeaeaeaeaeasss involves recognizing malicious precursors for equipment andndndndndndnd aareas that are vulnerable to acts of sabotage. Methods for Vital Area aaaa IdIdIdIdIdIdI entification prepare participants toto determine whether to analyze (or rererererererequququqqqq ire) nuclear vital areas whwhwhwhicicicichh should be in accord with applicablllllle eeeee IAIAIAIAIII EA technical guidance. Courseee ccccononoo tent engages participants with a targegegegegegeget t tttt identification process to iiiidededed ntn ify potential areas of sabotage in a fffffffacacacacacacacilii ity, international rerereecocococ mmended requirements, and guidelinnnnnesesesesesese for organizing, managigigiingngngng,, pep rforming, and estimating the cost anananannanand dddddschedule for an NSS-1616166 aaaananan lysis to identify vital areas. Participants evaluate approaoaaachchchchese to reduce the effort required for vital area identification, strategieieieiess s s totot integrate saba otage protection into nuclear power plant design, andndndd ccccoso t-effectc iveness of radiological sabotage protection againststst iiiinsnsnn idi er anCourse Prerequisite: Fundamentals of Nuclear Secucucuuriririr tyty

nd cyberr thrreats.

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