www.fas.org

Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Information Project

Federation of American Scientists Phone: 202-454-4695

Email: hkristensen@fas.org

Research and illustrations in collaboration with Matthew McKinzie (NRDC) and Theodore Postol (MIT)

Presentation to Arms Control Association Annual Meeting

Washington, DC June 6, 2016

Nuclear Modernization, Enhanced Military Capabilities, and Strategic Stability

Life-ExtensionProgramsCanAddMoreCapabili9esThanYouMightThink

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2Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

“TheUnitedStateswillnotdevelopnewnuclearwarheadsorpursuenewmilitarymissionsornewcapabili9esfornuclearweapons.”

StatementbyPresidentBarackObamaontheReleaseofNuclearPostureReview,April6,2010.

Thisisactuallythreepolicies:1)notdevelopnewnuclearwarheads 2)notpursuenewmilitarymissionsfornuclearweapons 3)notpursuenewcapabili9esfornuclearweapons

TheNPRformula9onisslightlydifferentandexplicitaboutLifeExtensionPrograms:

“TheUnitedStateswillnotdevelopnewnuclearwarheads.LifeExtensionPrograms(LEPs)willuseonlynuclearcomponentsbasedonpreviouslytesteddesigns,andwillnotsupportnewmilitarymissionsorprovidefornewmilitarycapabili9es.”

NuclearPostureReviewReport,April2010,p.xiv.

Itmightbeunclearwhatismeantby“newmilitarymission”ora“newmilitarycapability,”butcurrentandplannednuclearweaponslife-extensionprogramsallappeartobeaddingnewmilitarycapabili9estomaketheweaponsmoreeffec9veandmoreflexible.

USPolicy:ClearandExplicitLimits?“Weseeknonewmilitarycapabili9esinournuclearforces.“ AdmiralCecilHaney,USSTRATCOM,March2016

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3Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

Andyet…

• B61-12willbethefirstguidednuclearbomb.TherearecurrentlynoguidednucleargravitybombsintheUSnucleararsenal–Anewnuclearbomb?Anewmilitarycapability?

• B61-12willhaveanewtailkittoprovidedincreasedaccuracythatwillallowstrikeplannerstoselectloweryieldsformissionsthattodayrequireuseofhigheryields,thusreducingradioacAvefallout–Anewmilitarycapability?Anewmilitarymission?

• B61-12willhavesomeearth-penetraAngcapabilitythatcanholdhardanddeeply-buriedtargetsatriskthattodayrequireveryhigh-yieldweapons(B61-7,B83-1),anddosofrommoreaircra]–Anewmilitarycapability?

•  Insteadofsixdifferentgravitybombswithdifferentmilitarycapabili9esdeployedondifferentaircra],theB61-12willmergeallmilitarycapabiliAesintoonetypesthatwillbedeployedonallaircraD(B-2,B-21,F-15E,F-16,F-35A,PA-200)–Anewmilitarycapability?(Boldtypeindicatesaircra]thatcanmakeuseofincreasedaccuracyprovidedbynewtailkit)

•  Insteadofsomegravitybombs(B61-7,B61-11,B83-1)beingdeployablebyonlyonestealthaircra](B-2),theB61-12willbedeployablefromthreestealthaircraD(B-2,B-21,F-35A)–Anewmilitarycapability?

•  Insteadoftac9calbombsdeployedinEuropeandstrategicbombsdeployedinCONUS,B61-12willmergetacAcalandstrategicandbringstrategicnucleargravitybombcapabiliAesonstealthaircraDtoEurope(F-35A)forthefirstAme–Anewmilitarycapability?

B61-12:EnhancedMilitaryCapabiliAes

B61-12(top)andB61-7(insert)

“Theselifeextensionprogramsarenotprovidinganynewmilitarycapabili9es…We’renotdesigninganynewsystems—newwarheads,newnuclearbombs—withnewmilitarycapabili9es.Whatwearedoingisjusttakingtheseoldsystems,replacingtheirparts…”

MadelynCreedon,NNSAPrincipalDeputyAdministrator,November13,2015

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4Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

Doestherela9velylowyieldandincreasedaccuracyoftheB61-12changethewaythemilitarythinksabouthowtousetheweapon?

“Withoutadoubt.Improvedaccuracyandloweryieldisadesiredmilitarycapability.”

Woulditresultinadifferenttargetsetorjustmaketheweaponbefer?

“Itwouldhavebotheffects.”AnswersbyGen.NortonSchwartz,January2014

“IfIcandrivedowntheyield,drivedown,therefore,thelikelihoodoffallout,etcetera,doesthatmakeitmoreusableintheeyesofsome—somepresidentorna9onalsecuritydecision-makingprocess?Andtheansweris,itlikelycouldbemoreusable.”Gen.JamesCartwright,formerSTRATCOMcommander,November2015

Comparingbombaccuracy

Bombergravitybombdropsinlate-1990shadagoalof550](167m)CircularErrorAverage(CEA)buto]enachieveda380(116m)CEAforbothhighandlowal9tudereleases,oranaverageof364(111m)CEAinlow-yieldbombing.

B61-12:lessthan98](<30meter)CEAdemonstratedinafullyguideddroptestfromanF-15EonOctober20,2015.

TheB61-12appearstobe3-4AmesmoreaccuratethanexisAngnucleargravitybombs.

“…wearetryingtopursueweaponsthatactuallyarereducinginyieldbecausewe’reconcernedaboutmaintainingweaponsthatwouldhavelesscollateraleffectifthePresidenteverhadtousethem.”

Gen.RobertKehler,Commander,STRATCOM,October2013

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5Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

“Theyieldrequiredofanuclearweapontodestroyahardanddeeplyburiedtargetisreducedbyafactorof15to25byenhancedground-shockcouplingiftheweaponisdetonatedafewmetersbelowthesurface.

Nuclearearth-penetratorweapons(EPWs)withadepthofpenetra9onof3meterscapturemostoftheadvantageassociatedwiththecouplingofgroundshock.”

NaWonalAcademyofSciences,2005

Earth-PenetraAonEffectOnB61-12BombCapability

YieldOp9on YieldEquivalentWithEnhancedGround-ShockCoupling

Compa9bleExis9ngWarheadsBeingRe9red

0.3kt 4.5kt-7.5kt B61-3,B61-4,B61-10

1.5kt 22.5kt–37.5kt B61-4,B61-10

10kt 150kt–250kt B61-3,B61-7

50kt 750kt–1,250kt B83-1

400kt(B61-11) 6,000kt–10,000kt B53(re9red)

Note:STRATCOMrequiredaB61-12yieldmodifica9on.Itisunknownwhichone.

TheB61-12alsoappearstohaveearth-penetra9oncapabilityinsoil.Ifdetonatedunderground,enhancedground-shockcouplingwouldgivetheB61-12acapabilityagainstundergroundtargetssimilartoa1MTsurfaceburst.DODsaysB61-12allowsre9rementofthe1,2MTB83-1.

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6Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

LRSO:EnhancedMilitaryCapabiliAes

ALCMVersusLRSOCapabiliAes

ALCM LRSO

Missiles 575 1,000-1,100

Range 2,500km >2,500km

Stealth Lifle Yes

Speed 550mph +5%,+15-20+,supersonic

Warhead W80-1 W80-4

Yield 5-150kta 5-150ktb

Number 528 528

AircraD B-52H(44) B-2,B-21,(B-52)

Number 44 19,41=60

Stealth No Yes

Loading x20 x16,x16,(x20)

MaxCapacity 880 304,656,(820)=960(1,124)

aW80-1isofficially150ktwithlowerselectableyields.bW80-4willhavesamemaximumyieldbutmightgetimprovedyieldselec9onop9onstoemphasizeuseoflower-yieldop9onsinastrike.

AvarietyofsourcesindicatethatLRSOwillhaveenhancedandnewmilitarycapabili9escomparedwiththeexis9ngALCM.

NotonlywillLRSObemorecapable,butitwillbecarriedonbombersthataremorecapablethanthecurrentALCMcarrier(B-52).

MorebomberswillcarryLRSOinthefuturethantoday.Andtheymightbecapableofcarryingmoremissiles,whicharenotlimitedbyNewSTART

DODplanstobuynearlytwiceasmanyLRSOsasthereareALCMstoday.

OfficialsdescribetheLRSOmissionasatac9calnuclearweaponintendedforuseearlyinaconflictaspartofescala9onscenarios.

TheLRSOwillbecarriedbybothB-2andB-21stealthbombers.Nostealthaircra]isequippedwithnuclearcruisemissilestoday.

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7Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

W76LEP:NewMilitaryCapabiliAes

W76life-extensionprogramtoextendserviceofwarheadforanother30years.

W76-1officiallynotanewweaponandhasnonewmilitarycapabili9es.

Butnewradar-updated,path-lengthcompensa9onfuze(MC4700Arming,Fuzing&Firing(AF&F)unit)enableswarheadtoadjustheightofbursttocompensateforre-entryinaccuracy.

The“super”fuzesignificantlyenhancesthewarhead’scapabilitytodestroyedhardenedtargets.

AsimilarcapabilityisbeingaddedtotheMinutemanIIIICBM.

Volume Where Detonation of W76-0/Mk4 Warhead

Produces Blast Overpressure of 10,000 psi or More on the Ground

W76-0/Mk4 100 kt Warhead (Uses “Conventional” fuze)

Volume Where Detonation of W76-1/Mk4A Warhead

Produces Blast Overpressure of 10,000 psi or More on the Ground

W76-1/Mk4A 100 kt Warhead (Uses “Super” fuze)

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8Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

DevelopmentofW76super-fuzeinmid-1990s,flight-tes9ngin2003-2006,anddeliverytoSSBNfleetbeganin2009.SSBNfleetbeganin2009.Produc9onof1,600warheadshalfcompleted.About1,000warheadsdeployedtoday.

Russiahas140ofits300ICBMsinsilos.

Hard Target Kill Capabilities of the

W76-1/Mk4A and W76-0/Mk4 100-kt Warheads

CEP in Feet

W76-1/Mk4A AF&F Flight Tests

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9Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

“Stabilityinthenuclearrela9onshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRussianFedera9ondependsupontheassuredcapabilityofeachsidetodeliverasufficientnumberofnuclearwarheadstoinflictunacceptabledamageontheotherside,evenwithanopponentafemp9ngadisarmingfirststrike.”DOD/DNI.ReporttoCongressonRussianStrategicForces,2012,p.5.

“…arewedoingtherightthingstoencouragestrategicstability?” AdmiralCecilHaney,Commander,STRATCOM,July29,2015

“TheUnitedStatesseekstomaintainstrategicstabilitywithRussia.Consistentwiththeobjec9veofmaintaininganeffec9vedeterrentposture,theUnitedStatesseekstoimprovestrategicstabilitybydemonstra9ngthatitisnotourintenttonegateRussia'sstrategicnucleardeterrent,ortodestabilizethestrategicmilitaryrela9onshipwithRussia.”DOD,NuclearEmploymentStrategyReport,June2013,p,3.

DespiteUSpolicynottoaddnewmilitarycapabili9estonuclearweaponsduringlife-extensionprograms,alllife-extensionprogramsappeartodosoanyway.

Thenewhard-targetcapabilityoftheW76-1/Mk4AsignificantlyincreasesthecapabilityagainstRussianandChinesehardanddeeplyburiedtargets.

UnlikeduringtheColdWar,mostUShardtargetkillcapabilityisnowonSSBNsthatcanputmorewarheadsontargetfasterthanICBMs.

Pursuitofincreasedaccuracy,enhancedhardtargetkillcapability,stealthycruisemissilesandbombers,lower-yieldop9onstoreduceradioac9vefallout,andmorewidelydistribu9onofenhancedflexiblestrikeop9onsonaircra],showanuclearposturethatappearstolookbeyondbasicdeterrenceinpursuitofwarfigh9ngandsupremacy.

This,combinedwithRussia’sandChina’slackofeffec9vespace-basedearly-warningsystems,underminesstrategicstabilityandcontradictsUSpolicytomaintainit.

ConclusionsandImplicaAonsForStrategicStability