Nuclear Fuel Cycle Issues

in the New ROK-US Nuclear

Cooperation Agreement

2017. 9. 18

Lee, Kwang Seok

IntroductionI

CONTENTS

U.S. PerspectiveII

ROK PerspectiveIII

New ROK-US 123 AgreementIV

ConclusionV

Introduction

Nuclear Energy Development in Korea

’70

Localization

Completed

First NPP

(Turnkey )

Localization

StartedOPR1000

’80’90

’00

Kori 1

(Westinghouse)

Wolsong 1

Kori 2

Kori 3, 4

Uljin 1, 2

Yongkwang1,2

Yongkwang 3,4

ABB-CE (now

Westinghouse)

Tech. Transfer

(Joint Design)

Shin-Kori 3.4

Shin-Uljin 1,2

’10

APR1400

Export to UAE

(’09.12.27)

Uljin 3,4 (first KSNP)

Yongkwang 5,6

Uljin 5,6,

Shin-Kori 1, 2

Shin-Wolsong 1, 2

TRIGA-Mark II,

Research Reactor

from General

Atomics, 1962

First Reactor

3

’09.12Export of

NPP to UAE

1950 1970 1990 2010

US-ROK NCA on

the Non-Military

Uses of Nuclear

Energy (’56.2.3

Signed, Enforced)

’58.3.141st Rev.

’58.12Contract of TRIGA MARK II

RR(100 kW) with GA

’65.7.302nd Rev.

’68.12 Contract of TRIGA MARK III RR(2 MW) with

GGA

US-ROK NCA on the

Civil Uses of Nuclear

Energy (’72.11.24

Signed, ’73.3.19

Enforced)

’70.6 KEPCO, Contract of Kori #1(600MWe) with Westinghouse

’74.5.151st Rev.

US-ROK NCA on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (’15.6.15 Signed,

’15.11.25 Enforced)

Substitute

’10.10Start of

Negotiation for a new NCA

Substitute

’15.4.22 Conclusion

of Negotiation

US-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Expiration of the NCA The old NCA was supposed to be expired on Mar. 19, 2014

Large political and economic consequences expected to both countries if there is a lapse of the NCA

Remarkable Nuclear Energy Development in Korea 5th nuclear power generation in the world (23 units, 2010)

Nuclear export to UAE and Jordan (’09.12)

Evolution of the Korean Nuclear Energy Policies Nuclear industry as a key export industry

Long-term Plan for the Development of Future Nuclear Energy Systems (SFR, Pyroprocessing)

Evolution of ROK-US Relationships From one-way assistance to both-way collaboration

Bilateral strategic partnership

Rationale for the Revision of the NCA

5

Main Issues in the Negotiation

ROK’s political status as a valued ally and full and equal cooperating partner of the U.S. in civil nuclear cooperation

National challenges of the ROK in managing its spent fuel properly, obtaining a stable supply of nuclear fuel, and promoting the competitiveness of its nuclear exports in the global nuclear market

Global nonproliferation concerns of the U.S. in preventing the global spread of sensitive nuclear technology

6

McGoldrick, Fred, The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Between South Korea and the United States –

From Dependence to Parity, Special Studies Series No. 6, KEI, September, 2015.

U.S. Perspective

US Atomic Energy Act (AEA)

9 Requirements to be included

in the Agreement

Responsibility: DOS

Concurrence of DOE,

consultation with NRC

Nuclear Proliferation

Assessment Statement (NPAS)

President’s approval and

determination

Congressional procedures

Procedures for subsequent arrangement of the Agreement (e.g. prior consent)

Responsibility: DOE Concurrence of DOS,

consultation with NRC and DOD

Analysis of Consent

Determination of Secretary of Energy

Federal Register (Congressional procedures if necessary)

AEA Section 123(Nuclear Cooperation Agreement)

AEA Section 131(Subsequent Arrangement)

8

Requirements - AEA Section 123

1. Safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment continue in perpetuity

2. Full-scope IAEA safeguards are applied in non-nuclear weapon states

3. Nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive device or for any other military purpose

4. The United States has the right to demand the return of transferred nuclear materials and equipment, as well as any special nuclear material produced through their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement

5. There is no retransfer of material or classified data without U.S. consent

6. Physical security on nuclear material is

maintained

7. There is no enrichment or

reprocessing by the recipient state of

transferred nuclear material or nuclear

material produced with materials or

facilities transferred pursuant to the

agreement without prior approval

8. Storage for transferred plutonium and

highly enriched uranium is approved in

advance by the United States

9. Any material or facility produced or

constructed through use of sensitive

nuclear technology transferred under

the cooperation agreement is subject

to all of the above requirements.

9

Application of Consent Rights

A Legal Tool for the Supplier Country to Engage Fuel Cycle Activities in the Recipient Country

In addition to IAEA safeguards and physical security measures

“The US has exercised its consent rights on reprocessing in different ways depending on the political and security relationship it has with its cooperating partners, the status of their civil nuclear programs, their nonproliferation credentials, and the proliferation concerns in the regions in which they are located.”

Limited Consent

Advance Consent

Long-term Advance Consent

(Fred McGoldrick, “Nuclear Trade Controls: Minding the Gaps,”

Report of the CSIS Proliferation Prevention, January, 2013. )

10

Conditions for Long-term Advance Consent

The United States would offer under certain conditions to work out predictable, long-term arrangements for reprocessing and plutonium use for civil power and research needs in the context of new or amended agreements for cooperation. It

would apply only to countries with effective commitments to nonproliferation, with advanced nuclear power programs, and where such activities do not constitute a proliferation risk and are under effective safeguards and control;

would only be given for specific, carefully-defined programs and where sufficient information is available to make the necessary statutory determination under Section 123 and 131 of the Atomic Energy Act, namely that the arrangements not be inimical to the common defense and security and not result in a significant increase in the risk of proliferation;

would preserve the right of the United States to suspend the arrangements in whole or in part if it judged that these conditions and the statutory criteria were no longer met.

(US DOS, "Reprocessing and Plutonium-Use Policy," June 9, 1982)

11

ROK Perspective

Nuclear Fuel Spent Fuel

• Provide 1/3 of total electricity(24 units in operation, 5 units under construction)

• Key for the Korean economy and

energy security(2nd National Energy Plan : to maintain nuclear

capacity share of 29% by 2035)

• Stable supply(uranium and enrichment

service)

• Proper management (13,000 ton in storage, 760 ton/yr,

over 50,000 ton by 2050)

For its sustainability of nuclear energy, Korea should secure

solutions for the front- and back-end of the fuel cycle.

Nuclear

Power Plant

Hanul

Wolseong

Kori

Hanbit

Sustainability of Nuclear Energy in Korea

Proper spent fuel management is crucial for sustainable nuclear energy in Korea.

Very complex and controversial problem, involving Many stakeholders who have different interests,

Interconnected considerations in various aspects,

High uncertainties in future developments, and

Long-term more than 100 years including next generations.

Flexible strategy necessary to reflect technical developments and policy environment changes Need of variety of options on the table

Basic Plan of HLW Management (2016)

Spent Fuel Management

Physical Constraints

Physical environments:

land, geology,

population, …

Infrastructure

Technical Aspect

Technical feasibility and

maturity (RDD programs)

Social Aspect

Public attitude

Complexity of siting

Strategic Aspect

Energy security

Resource sustainability

Political Aspect

Domestic political

concerns

International relations

U.S. Consent according

to the ROK-US NCA

…

Considerations for Viable Options

15

Once-through

Direct Disposal

Disposal after Long-term Storage

Disposal after Treatment

Long-term Management Options

Recycling

Partial Recycling• DUPIC

• MOX Recycle (Overseas reprocessing)

Full Recycling• Pyro-SFR

Supplementary

Deep Borehole Disposal

International Arrangements

16

TRU Metal

Fuel Fabrication

Declading/Voloxidation

Hull

LLW

Off-gas

Treatment

Sodium Cooled

Fast Reactor

FP gases

(U+TRU+FP)

Metal

TRU : Transuranic elements

NM : Noble metal elements

FP : Fission products

Air

UO2+

(TRU+FP)

Oxide

(Granule)

Oxide ReductionElectrorefining

Electrowinning

PWR

SF

Reuse/Storage

Uranium Recovery

Used Salt

(U+TRU+FP)

Salt TreatmentClean Salt

Clean Salt

Pyro-SFR Processes

Salt Recycle/Immobilization

New ROK-US 123 Agreement

Main Contents

Reciprocity Reciprocal nonproliferation obligations for both parties

Recognizing ROK’s mature and advanced nuclear capabilities

Fuel Cycle Issues Long-term Advance Consent : PIE, production of fission moly,

electro-reduction of pyroprocessing, retransfer, off-shore reprocessing

Set a pathway for possible long-term consent for pyroprocessing or enrichment of nuclear material subject to the agreement

High-Level Bilateral Commission Facilitate the Parties’ peaceful nuclear and strategic cooperation

and on-going dialogue regarding areas of mutual interest

4 Working Groups : spent fuel management, promotion of nuclear export, assured fuel supply, nuclear security

19

Consents on Fuel Cycle Activities

20

Post-Irradiation

Examination,

Production of

Radioisotopes

Consolidation and

Treatment without

Separation of Nuclear

Materials

Alteration of Form or Content

involving Separation of

Nuclear Materials

Current

Facilities

Long-term Advance

Consent

PIEF, IMEF, DFDF,

ACPF

Long-term Advance

Consent

DFDF, ACPF

N/A

Future

Facilities

Long-term Advance

Consent

IAEA Safeguards

Arrangement

Long-term Advance

Consent

US-ROK Agreed

Safeguards Approach

IAEA Safeguards

Arrangement

Pathway to Long-term Advance

Consent

Criteria : Technical Feasibility,

Economic Viability,

Nonproliferation Acceptability

Procedures : Consultation

after the completion of JFCS

Launched on 13 April 2011

Electrochemical Recycling

Safeguards and Security

Progress of JFCS ’11.04 : 1st Steering Committee

’11.07 : Phase I (‘11~’12)

’12.12 : Confirmed technical feasibility on Lab-scale basis

’13.07 : Phase II-A (‘13~’14)

’15.01 ~ : Phase II-B (‘15~’17)

Phase I Phase II Phase III

2011 2013 2018 2021

ROK-US Joint Fuel Cycle Study

21

High-Level Bilateral Commission (HLBC)

HLBC

ROK : Vice Minister, MOFA

US : Deputy Secretary, DOE

WG on

Promotion of

Nuclear

Exports and

Export Control

Cooperation

WG on

Spent Fuel

Management

WG on

Assured

Fuel Supply

WG on

Nuclear

Security

JSCNEC JFCS

Steering

Committee

ROK: MSIPUS : DOE/NE

ROK: MOTIEUS : DOE/NE

ROK: MOTIEUS : NNSA

ROK: MOFAUS : NSC

ROK: MSIPUS : DOS

ROK: MSIPUS : DOE/NE

• 1st Plenary Meeting

(2016.4, Seoul)

• Stocktaking Meeting

(2017.1, DC)

22

Conclusion

Based on Mutual Respect for the Other’s Needs and Programs

Encouraging Strategic Partnership Promotion of peaceful uses of

nuclear energy and nuclear trade

Ensuring safety, safeguards & security

Incorporating Mature Form of Collaboration Based on Mutual Trust

Facilitating Consent Arrangements on a Long-term, Predictable and Reliable Basis

New Frame of Cooperation

24

Establishment of the HLBC and WG’s : 2016

Shall meet at least once a year

Completion of the JFCS

Review of technical, economic and nonproliferation aspects of spent fuel management and disposition technologies

Bilateral Consultations in the HLBC Identifying appropriate options for the management and

disposition of spent fuel and for further development and demonstration of relevant technologies

Future Milestones

25