INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),petitioner, vs.HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGFACTS:International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. which include. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.The difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. Was contested during negotiations for a new CBA there was a deadlock between the parties as to the said CBA and petitoners filed a notice to strike.The NCMB failed to compromise the parties so the DOLE assume over the dispute and resolve the issue infavor of the school finding that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires:HELD:International law, which springs from general principles of law,likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation[- all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. The "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

[G.R. No. 114974. June 16, 2004]

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, respondents.FACTS: Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new CBA between the bank and the Union, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Banks Human Resource Manager and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno(head of the negotiating team for the bank) suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.There was deadlock in the negotiations. Both parties alleged ULP. Bank alleged that the Union violated its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Union alleged unfair labor practice when the bank allegedly interfered with the Unions choice of negotiator. It argued that, Dioknos suggestion that the negotiation be limited as a family affair was tantamount to suggesting that Federation President Jose Umali, Jr. be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. It further argued that, damage or injury to the public interest need not be present in order for unfair labor practice to prosper. The Union also contended that the Bank merely went through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an agreementISSUEWON HONORABLE SECRETARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ON THE GROUND THAT NO PROOF OF INJURY TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST WAS PRESENTED.Under the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE to which the Philippines is a signatory, workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.[42] Workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs.[43] Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective BargainingThe said ILO Conventions were ratified on December 29, 1953. However, even as early as the 1935 Constitution[44] the State had already expressly bestowed protection to labor as part of the general provisions. The 1973 Constitution,[45] on the other hand, declared it as a policy of the state to afford protection to labor, specifying that the workers rights to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work would be assured. For its part, the 1987 Constitution, aside from making it a policy to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,[46] devotes an entire section, emphasizing its mandate to afford protection to labor, and highlights the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers to promote industrial peace.

THE HOLY SEE V. HON ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO238 SCRA 524Facts:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 61,Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case N0.90-183The order dated June 20 1991 denied the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September19, 1991 denied the motion for the reconsideration of the June 20,1991 OrderPetitioner was the Holy see who exercises soveregnity over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented by the Papal Nuncio.Private Respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., us a domestic corporation engaged in the real Estate business.The petition was arose over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of the Petitioner(Holy See-Papal Nuncio). The said lot Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Realty Corporation (PRC).The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., Acting agent to the sellers. Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises.In view if the refusal of the squatters to vacat the lots sold to the private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. . Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (TropicanaIssue:1.the annulment of teh Deeds of the sale between petitioner and the PRC on hand; the conveyance of the lots in questioned; specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners lot and damages2.procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss3.determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, Held:This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperiiThe operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suitIn the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy SeeThe issue of petitioner's non-suability -the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country;]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relationsPrivate respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims The petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

MIJARES V. RANADAFacts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III,Facts Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only theMilk Codebut also various international instrumentsregarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.Issue: won the respondent position is tenable?The Court held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely,(1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation; however, they do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The international instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either bytransformationorincorporation.The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land throughtransformationpursuant toArticle VII, Section 21 of the Constitutionwhich provides that[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

The Court held that theICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treatiesas they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, according to the Court, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation,the Milk Code.Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBSper se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk Code did not adopt the provision in theICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertisingor other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead,the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the landand adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. The provisions embodies theincorporationmethod.Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Theclassical formulation in international law sees thosecustomary rules accepted as bindingresult from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistentpractice on the part of States; and apsychological element known as theopinion jurissive necessitates(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is abelief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states,i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity,a person's right to life, liberty and due process,andpacta sunt servanda,among others. The concept of generally accepted principles of law has also been depicted in this wise:Customary international means a general and consistentpractice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation[opinio juris].This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: thematerial factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological orsubjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states. Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do becausethey consider it obligatoryto behave thus ordo they do it only as a matter of courtesy?Opinio juris, or the belief thata certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

MOA-AD CASE GR. No 18359The Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-MILFTripoliAgreement on Peace of 2001 inKuala Lumpur,Malaysia. The GRP-MILF agreement is the result of a formal peace talks between the parties inTripoli,Libyain 2001. The pertinent provisions in the MOA-AD provides for the establishment of an associative relationship between the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) and the Central Government. It speaks of the relationship between the BJE and the Philippine government as associative, thus implying an international relationship and therefore suggesting an autonomous state. Furthermore, under the MOA-AD, the GRP Peace Panel guarantees that necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.Issue: won the MOA-AD is constitutional?No. The SC ruled that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, theassociative relationshipenvisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence, it said.Moreover, as the clause is worded, itvirtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powersvested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.While the MOA-ADwould not amount to an international agreementor unilateral declaration binding on thePhilippinesunder international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD contains provisions which are repugnant to the Constitution and which will result in thevirtual surrender of part of the Philippines territorial sovereignty. She further said that had the MOA-AD been signed by parties, would have bound the government to the creation of a separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil institutions, and armed forcesThesovereignty and territorial integrityof the Philippines would have been compromised.RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) requires all national offices toconduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

MINUCHER, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALSKhosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement.In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.ISSUE: WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic RelationsHELD:The SC DENIED the petition.Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleadedA foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

SEAFDEC AQD v. NLRC Facts:Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand. Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate. Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The LA and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. SEAFDEC-AQD claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.Issue:W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case? Held:Supreme court Granted the petition Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

WHO vs Aquino Facts:Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government.The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.Issue:Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunityRuling:The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executivebranch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

BAYAN vs Executive secretary Ronaldo ZamoraFACTS:On march 14, 1947 , the Philippines and the united states forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the united states entered into a Mutual defense treaty on August 30, 1951 , under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forcesm public vessels, and aircraft.In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US military Bases Agreement in 1991.The united states panel, heahed by US defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippines panel Headed by Foreign Affairs Undersec. Rodolfo Serverino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interest of the united stated and the Philippines in the asia pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the VFA. Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of confereences and negotiations that culminated in manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then Pres, FVR approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent sec. Siazon and US ambassador Thomas Hubbard on Feb 10, 1998.On October 5 1998 Pres. Estrada, through respondent secretary of foreign affairs, ratified the VFA.On October 6 1998 the Pres. Acting through respondent sec Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the senate of the Philippines, the instrument of ratification the letter of the president and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant ot sec 21, art VII of the 1987 consti. The senate, in turn referred the VFA to its committee on Foreign Relations for their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two committees.On may 3 1999 the committes submitted proposed senate resolution no. 4438 recommending the concurrence of the senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative oversight committee to overs its implementation. Debates then ensued. Was approved may 27 same year.On june 1 1999 the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes bet. Siazon and hubbard.The VFA, which consist of a preamble and 9 art. Provides for the mechanisim for regulating the circumstance and conditions under which US armed forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines.Petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citieznes and taxpayers-ISSUE: won VFA is constitutional.? And won respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.HELD:Treaties or international Agreements; Philippine constitution contains two provisions requiring concurrence of the senate on treaties or international agreements.- the 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec.21, Art.VII which states that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the senate.This provision lays down the general rule on treaties of international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the senate to be valid and effective.In contrast sec. 25 Art.XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. This further require that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held or that purpose if so required by congress and recognized as such by the other contracting state.The ratification by the president, of the VFA and the concurrence of the senate should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. No grave abuse of discretion in the lawful exercise of executive and diplomatic powers by the president. It is the courts considered view that the president in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the constitution. It is of no moment that the president, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion much less a grave patent and whimsical abuse of judgment may be imputed to the president in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the president merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the senate for concurrence under the provisions of sec 21 Art. VII instead of section 25 of art. XVIII of the constitution, still the president may not be faulted or scarred much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent gross and capricious manner.

Estrada vs DesiertoFACTS:It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.ISSUE: WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.HELD:The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

Estrada vs ArroyoFACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.ISSUE: WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.HELD:The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

Secretary of justice vs LantionFacts:On 18 January 2000, the Court dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent with copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him reasonable period with in which to file his comment with supporting evidence.On 3 February 2000, the petitioner filed an Urgent motion for Reconsideration assailing the aforesaid decision.Issue: is WON the private respondent is entitled to due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.HLED:There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D no. 1069 which gives an extradite the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a court cannot alter, amend , or add to a treaty by insertion of any clause, small or great or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convince or substantial justice.

AKBAYANvs.AQUINO. Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.Issues:1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.Rulings:SC dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.