NPSA Chemotherapy Project
description
Transcript of NPSA Chemotherapy Project
• Structure & function of the NPSA• Chemotherapy Project• Oral chemotherapy Treatment Plan• BNF Chapter 8• Website
About the NPSAArms length body of the Department of Health
• NRES- National Research Ethics Serviceprovides safety and dignity of research participants by facilitating ethical research
• NCAS- National Clinical Assessment Service provides confidential services to help manage concerns with the performance of practitioners
• NRLS- National Reporting and Learning Serviceimproves patient safety by enabling the NHS to learn from patient safety incidents
The journey so far
An Organisation with a Memory (June 2000)
‘failures often have a familiar ring….strong similarities to incidents which have occurred before…almost exact replication’
Building a Safer NHS for Patients (May 2001)
‘A new independent body, the NPSA, will be established within the NHS’
Safety First (Dec 2006)
‘NRLS should identify sources of risk and harm…acted upon at a local and national
level’
Size of the problem
• ‘First do no harm’ or ‘to help, or at least do no harm’ (Hippocrates 4th Century BC)
• Medical error accepted as part of practice• A study in the USA estimated that 44,000 to 98,000
die each year from medical mistakes1
• NHS hospitals – harm in about 10% admissions – in excess of 850,000 a year
• £2 billion a year in additional hospital stays• £400 million a year in negligence claims
1 Brennan et al. (1991) New England Journal of Medicine 324:377-384
Patient Safety Incident (PSI)
• A patient safety incident is an event or circumstance which could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a patient.
• An adverse event is an incident which results in harm to a patient.
Errors and violations
• An error may be defined as a failure to carry out a planned action as intended or application of an incorrect plan.
• A violation implies deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, standard or rule.
Incident vs Error
• Cardiac arrest under general anaesthesia• Related to violations• About 75% of adverse events involve error
Contributing Factor
• A circumstance, action or influence which is thought to play a part in the origin or development of an incident, or to increase the risk of an incident.
e.g. distraction/inattention, fatigue/exhaustion, cognitive factors, communication, protocols/procedures, resources/workload.
Part of clinical governance
• "A framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continually improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish."
G Scally and L J Donaldson, 'Clinical governance and the drive for quality improvement in the new NHS in England' BMJ (4 July 1998): 61-65
Safety
Efficiency Effectiveness
Appropriateness
Access
Patient-centred
Part of quality
Nothing new- 400 years ago -- 400 years ago -
“Cure the disease “Cure the disease and kill the patient”and kill the patient”
Francis BaconFrancis Bacon(1561-1626)(1561-1626)
- 300 years ago -- 300 years ago -
“Cur’d yesterday of my disease, “Cur’d yesterday of my disease, I died last night of my physician”I died last night of my physician”
Matthew PriorMatthew Prior (1664-1721) (1664-1721)
-- 200 years ago -200 years ago -
“I do not want two diseases - one nature-made, one doctor made”“I do not want two diseases - one nature-made, one doctor made”Napoleon Napoleon
BonaparteBonaparte(1769-1821)(1769-1821)
Safer Carenot just a by-product of well
educated, well intentioned staff -
needs to be ‘hardwired’ into the design and delivery of
systems of care…..
Unsafe Care significant source of patient
morbidity and mortality - major cause of distress to patients
and families
Patient Safety Is Important
we need safe individuals and safe systems
The Role of the NPSA and the Reporting and Learning System
capture and analyse incidents
learn from mistakes
change practice & system factors to reduce risk
improve patient safety in the NHS
NPSA philosophy
• learn from things that go wrong • improve patient safety in frontline services • systems not individuals• learning not judgement• fairness not blame• openness not secrecy• develop and implement solutions to problems
Incident Reporting
• Adapted from the critical incident technique in aviation
• Relies on good safety culture• Inherent value is in the learning• Near misses collected• Should not be used for epidemiological analysis• Under-reporting will always occur
Reporting Routes
Local
paper
form
Specifics e.g.
HSE, MHRA
SHAs or WAG
(SUIs)Local
eform
NPSA
eform
RLS
RISK TEAMFRONTLINE STAFF
Patient
Reporting to NPSA
Data C
leansing
RLS
Database
Analysis tools
Reports & Analysis
99% upload from
local trust reporting system
eform
Currently most reporting comes from the acute sector
Reported incident types
Chart 1: Number of incidents reported and organisations reporting by quarter, October 2003 to December 2007
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
Oct -Dec2003
Jan -Mar2004
Apr -Jun2004
Jul -Sep2004
Oct -Dec2004
Jan -Mar2005
Apr -Jun2005
Jul -Sep2005
Oct -Dec2005
Jan -Mar2006
Apr -Jun2006
Jul -Sep2006
Oct -Dec2006
Jan -Mar2007
Apr -Jun2007
Jul -Sep2007
Oct -Dec2007
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%Incidents submitted
Average proportion of trusts reporting per month
Average proportion of trusts reporting per month
Number of incidents reported
3 million incidents Jan 2009
Outputs
SafetySolutions
Case Review
Filtered on severity, themes
QDSDMG DH
SHAWAG
FOI Parliamentary Questions
6 monthly Extranet feedback reports
Standard report
Ad hoc report
NRLS
Database
RLS
Database
Quarterly Reports
• Trends in reporting and profile of reports
• Clinical topics in each issue such as:
• Chemotherapy Project
• Available on website
Thematic Analysis
• 424/576 deaths reported to the NRLS in 2005/06 occurred in acute hospitals
• 3 key themes:
o Diagnostic errors (n = 71)o Clinical deterioration not recognised or
not acted upon (n = 64)o Problems with resuscitation after
cardiopulmonary arrest (n = 43 in acute/general hospitals)
In-depth Analysis on Topics and Issues
4Full-
scope
20Issues followed up
with mini-scope e.g. RLS search, basic literature
search
50Incidents & issues considered by
the Weekly Response Group
2000Systematic review of RLS death & severe incidents
Systematic review of STEIS reportsAd hoc incident / issue reports e.g. coroners, clinicians
1
Acting on Urgent Risks
• Fast-track urgent issues identifies immediate action
• System to track activity with deadline
• Evaluation shows support for one-pager
• Oral chemotherapy
• Vinca Alkaloids
Outputs – to improve patient safety guidance
Adapted from REASON, 2005
People
Environment
Workspace
Task
Equipment
Staff
The ‘system’
Factors within the healthcare system that could potentially lead to harm
Staff act as harm absorbers
Organisation
Patients
Cancer Projects
• Radiotherapy• Chemotherapy• Early Diagnosis
Chemotherapy Project
• Between Nov 2003 and June 2008• 219,000 patient safety reports (medication)• 4829 (2.2%) anti-cancer medicines• Manual validation 25/272• 8 Deaths, 9 Severe Harm, 8 Moderate Harm• 6 deaths associated with ORAL CHEMOTHERAPY• >95% resulted in Low Harm or No Harm
• 43% of errors associated with administration• 33% of errors associated with wrong dose,
frequency or quantity of medication• 18% of errors associated with delayed or
omitted treatment
Chemotherapy Project
Chemotherapy Project
• Taxanes – 436 reports• Cisplatin – 404 reports• Etoposide – 396 reports• Capecitabine – 368 reports• Cyclophosphamide – 359 reports• 35 named drugs
Chemotherapy Project
• Quantitative data - limitations• Qualitative data - limitations• Eight emerging themes• Trends• 20 recommendations• Links to NCEPOD, NCAG
Chemotherapy Project
• Data often incomplete• No specific research question• Exaggeration of degree of ACTUAL harm• Potential harm not easy to assess• Large amounts of ‘noise’
• Side effects, ADR, extravasation, protocols followed correctly
• An F2 doctor was electronically prescribing chemotherapy whilst his consultant, oncology pharmacist and System Administrator were away on annual leave.
• The patient’s serum creatinine was not automatically entered on the system, so the doctor attempted to do it manually.
• The level was entered incorrectly and a low creatinine clearance was subsequently produced.
• This resulted in a low dose of carboplatin being calculated, which the doctor amended manually by changing the AUC to 30.1 resulting in a 500% dose increase.
• Three weeks later a second unsupervised F2 doctor, again working without Consultant supervision prescribed further carboplatin for the same patient. The dose of 4875mg was queried by the pharmacist and reduced(!)
• A patient had been changed from OxMdG to capecitabine and oxaliplatin. The nurse selected the OxyCap regimen from the computer, and they received their first cycle. On returning for their second cycle it was realised they should have received XelOx. On the computer OxyCap referred to an arm of FOCUS 2 which delivered a 30% dose reduction of the two drugs.
• A patient was receiving ifosfamide and Mesna and three doses of Mesna were omitted resulting in the patient experiencing haemorrhagic cystitis.
• A 69 year-old patient with relapsed multiple myeloma received four times the intended dose of idarubicin. He was admitted with neutropenic sepsis from which he did not recover and he died 11 days after commencing the idarubicin.
• In the process of completing an SAE form following the sudden death of a patient, it was noticed that he had received four cycles of capecitabine at 1250mg/m2. As the patient was >70 yrs the QUASAR TT protocol indicates that his maximum dose should have been 1000mg/m2.
• A chemotherapy trial patient was admitted due to acute breathlessness. Scans had shown pulmonary fibrosis, pulmonary emboli and a pleural effusion. He died in ITU 6 days later of pulmonary fibrosis secondary to receiving an overdose of bleomycin - on seven separate occasions.
• A patient had received two prior cycles of PECC for relapsed NHL• Prednisolone 40mg daily for 7/7 days• Etoposide 400mg daily for 3/7 days• Chlorambucil 40mg daily 4/7• CCNU 200mg daily 1/7
• For his third cycle the prescription was misread and he received• Etoposide 400mg daily for 8 days• CCNU 200mg daily for 7 days• Prednisolone & Chlorambucil were correctly supplied
• The patient’s concerns regarding the extra medication were ignored• He was admitted 10 days after starting 3rd cycle with toxicity• He died 30 days after admission as a result of the excessive doses
BNF Chapter Eight
• “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing”• Long standing concern regarding the advice it offers
and how it’s interpreted• Doesn’t fully reflect the complexities of current
chemotherapy, especially oral treatments• Lack of consistency re; dosing information• Status of BNF “brand” may provide a false sense of
security for non-specialists• Cancer professionals use other sources
BNF Chapter Eight
• “Be very afraid……”• Main focus is introductory section • Standardisation of drug monographs?• BNF acknowledge that some changes may be
required• Draft chapter for consultation• BNF editorial policy• Oncology Pharma input?
Treatment Plan• Open to interpretation!
• Is it a Protocol – no
• Is it a Patient Diary – no
• Is it something in between – probably!
Treatment Plan
• Not designed as patient information• Not part of the Information Prescription project• Target audience is primarily non-specialists • Patient is the ‘conduit’• Potentially valuable during any health care intervention;
• Admission• Discharge• Dispensing• Reviewing
The information on this side of the card is designed specifically for health professionals who may need to know about your treatment. It is NOT a prescription and cannot be used to obtain extra supplies of your tablets.
Treatment Plan for Oral Chemotherapy for < John Smith >DOB < 11/12/1940 > who is taking oral Capecitabine for a maximum of FOUR cycles
CYCLE No 1
Days of Treatment……14.First day……12 Sept 08……Last day… 25 Sept 08……...
Treatment Authorised By B Brown
Date 10 Sept 08
Next Review/Blood Test on 1 Oct 08.
Date 12 Sept 13 Sept 14 Sept 15 Sept 16 Sept 17 Sept 18 Sept 19 Septetc
Daily Dose
2150mg 2150mg 2150mg 2150mg 2150mg 2150mg 2150mg 2150mg etc
CYCLE No 2
Days of Treatment……First day…………Last day… ……...
Treatment Authorised By
Date
Next Review/Blood Test on
Date
Daily Dose
<Rows Repeated>
ORAL CHEMOTHERAPY TREATMENT PLANDate of issue 10 September 2008
Patient Name;
John Smith
NHS/Hospital Number
123456789/A
Address
12 Acacia GardensAnytownBerksAY1 2BC
Telephone
0123 456 7890
This card contains detailed information regarding your chemotherapy. You should carry it with you at all times and show it to any doctor, nurse, pharmacist or other health professional who is giving you care or advice.You are being treated at;
St.Elsewhere’s Hospital
Your Consultant is;Dr. Brown………………………………
Contact Details;
Phone 0123 456 0987
Email [email protected]
Your chemotherapy regimen is called;
CAPOXYou will be receiving TWO
different chemotherapy drug (s). Some of the drugs will be in the form of tablets or capsules and
they are calledCapecitabine (Xeloda)
and the strength of the tablet (s) are
150mg and 500 mg.You may take the tablets every
day without stopping or you may take the tablets for
14 day (s) at a time and then have break of 7 days.
Look at the label on your tablets for exactly how you
should take them.You may also be receiving
chemotherapy injections in the hospital clinic.
Web-based support• Cancer Network websites as a resource for (oral)
chemotherapy safety?• 30 Networks, ~ 5 have readily accessible information
on chemotherapy protocols• Web site quality extremely variable!• NPSA to develop a standard template with North of
England Cancer Network• To be continued…….
Summary
• Patient Safety is part of NHS care• Incident reporting is the key to learning• Admitting failure is the sign of a mature organisation• Learning needs to take place at local and national
level• Cancer patients can benefit from patient safety
initiatives
Any Questions?