November 24, 1972, Memcon Vietnam

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OFCONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Nguyen Phu Duc, Special Assistant to PresidentThieu

Pham Dang Lam, Chief of GVN Delegation toParis PeaceTalks

Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassador to the U.S.Nguyen Xuan Phong, Deputy Chief of GVN

Delegation to Paris PeaceTalksVuong Van Bac, Ambassadorto the United Kingdom

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to thePresident for National Security Affairs

Major GeneralAlexander M. Haig, Jr., DeputyAssistant to the President for National SecurityAffairs

AmbassadorWilliam Sullivan, Deputy AssistantSecretary, Department of State

AmbassadorWilliam Porter, U. S. Chief Delegateto the Paris PeaceTalks

Hayward Isham, U. S. Delegation to the ParisPeaceTalks

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Friday, November 24, 19727:30 - 8:45 p.m.

PLACE: LibraryAmbassador’s Residence41, rue du faubourg St. HonorParis

AmbassadorLam: Saigon gave us this memorandumto give you whichindicates our instructions. [Hands over the memorandumat Tab AJ

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Dr.Kissinger: Thank you. [Reads it] I have seenLe Duc Tho this morning and told him what I told you yesterdayI would tell him, and I alsorequesteda meeting for my delegationandme for tomorrow afternoon - -

to which he agreed. In the light of this reply I will now ask him for aprivate meeting at 10 o’clock tomorrow, and I will requesta postponementof the full meeting for one week. If there is a breakdown, the consequencesfor your governmentwill be disastrous, and you will bear fullresponsibility.

I also want to readyou a messageI have receivedfrom the President, ofwhich I will give you a copy:

November24, 1972

"I have checkedtoday as to the attitude of the leading Democrats and Republicanswho support us in the Senateon Vietnam.In preparingthem for the consultationwhich must take placeonce agreementis reachedwe have informed them of the keyelementsof the October8 agreement:the return of our POWs,a ceasefire, and a formula under which Thieu remains in powerandall South Vietnamesehave an opportunity to participate in afree election to determinewhat governmentthey want for thefuture. The result of this checkindicates that they were notonly unanimousbut vehementin stating their conclusionsthat ifSaigonis the only roadblockfor reaching agreementon this basisthey will personally leadthe fight whenthe new Congressreconvenes on January 3 to cut off all military and economicassistanceto Saigon. My evaluationis that the date of the cut-off would beFebruary 1. They further believe that under such circumstanceswe have no choice but to go it aloneand to make a separatedealwith North Vietnam for the return of our POWs and for ourwithdrawal.

"Theseare men who have loyally supportedus on November 3,Cambodia,and Laos, and May 8. They have greataffection forthe South Vietnamesepeopleand great respectfor PresidentThieupersonally, but they point out that the votes in the Senatethis pastyear for appropriationsfor support of the effort in Vietnam havebeenwon only by great effort andby very small margins. Theyalso point out that this time the House cannotsaveappropriationsbecausethe Senatewould block any Housemove to restore funds

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which, incidentally, in view of the makeupof the new House,is highly unlikely, by simply letting the appropriationsbill diein conference.

"This message,unlessyou have strong feelings otherwise,shouldbe immediately passedon through the South Vietnamesenegotiators to Thieu. Tell him the fat is in the fire. It is timeto fish or cut bait. We do not want to go it alone. I personallywant to standby Thieu and the South VietnameseGovernmentbut as I havetold him in three separatemessages,what reallycounts is not the agreementbut my determination to takemassiveaction againstNorth Vietnam in the event they break the agreement.The North Vietnamesetroops in the Southmeanabsolutely nothingin that eventuality. If they had no forces there at all and I refusedto order air retaliation on the North wheninfiltration started tobegin, the war would be resumedand the outcomewould be verymuch in doubt.

"You must tell Tbieu that I feel we have now reachedthe crossroads. Whetherhe trusts me and signs what I have determinedis the bestagreementwe can get or we have to go it aloneandend our own involvement in the war on the best terms we canget.I do not give him this very tough option by personaldesire, butbecauseof the political reality in the United Statesit is not possible for me, evenwith the massivemandateI personally receivedin the election, to get the support from a hostile Congresstocontinue the war when the North Vietnameseon October8 offeredan agreementwhich was far better thanboth the Houseand theSenateby resolution and directive to the Presidentduring thislast sessionindicated they thoughtwe ought to accept.

"Tell Thieu that I cannotkeep the lid on his strong supportersinthe Houseand Senatemuch longer. They are terribly disturbedby what they readandhear out of Saigon. It is time for us todecide to go forward together or to go our separateways. If wego separateways, all that we fought for, for so many years, willbe lost. If, on the other hand, he will join us in going forwardtogether on the course I have laid out we can, over the long pull,win a very significant victory.


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"The third option of our trying to continue to go forward togetheron thebasis of continuing the war is simply not open. The doorhasbeen slammedshut hard and fast by the longtime supportersof the hard line in Vietnam in the Houseand Senatewho controlthe pursestrings."

[Dr. Kissinger thenhandsthem a copy.]

This is all I have to tell you. I will see Le Duc Tho at 10 o’clock in themorning and seeka postponementof one week. If he refusesa negotiation,we have no choice but to go our own way. If he acceptsa negotiationyouhave one week for consultations.

If you wish to get in touch with me before 10 o’clock, you are free to do so.

AmbassadorBac: Do you think he will accept?

Dr.Kissinger: I don’t know. It is fifty-fifty. You give us no choice.

Mr.Duc: Did you give him our November 19 proposalaboutwithdrawalof North Vietnamesetroops and demobilization in two phases? What washis reaction?

Dr.Kissinger: I told him. He said therewere no North Vietnameseinthe South andthe only forces are southernersor the sons of southernerswhoregroupedin the North. I told you yesterdaythis was an absurdity. I toldhim today that it was a lie, which we went along with only becauseit hasthe advantageof not claiming any North Vietnameseright to keep forcesin the South. It is the principal subjectwe have discussed. Out oftwenty hours of conversationwith him we have spentalmost sixteen onthis. The only context in which we candiscuss it is the withdrawal ofsometroops in MR-i. As I havetold you I think this is a bad deal foryou. The prisonersyou have are a tangible reality; the withdrawal of afew troops is not, becausethey can easily reinfiltrate -- not legally butpractically.

If the provisions on Laos and Cambodiaand the DMZ are maintainedthey cannotmaintain their forces in the South. If theseprovisions arenot kept, adding an additional provision that is not maintainedwon’t help.


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The only context in which they are willing to nelgotiate is in the context

of demobilization, and in negotiation with the PRG. There is no chance

whatever that they will go beyond this.

What do my colleagues think?

GeneralHaig: That would be tantamountto surrender.

Dr.Kissinger: They tell us that they have given up their demandfor theimmediate resignation of PresidentThieu and the installation of a coaliti.on government, and stripped their political demands to nothing.

Mr.Duc: You say the agreementis a surrender for them, but there area number of obligations for the United Statesand South Vietnam, but whatobligations are there for North Vietnam?

Dr.Kissinger: The ceasefire, respect for the DMZ, Laos and Cambodia,and a political process. In all other negotiations they have constantlydemandedthe resignation of Thieu and a coalition government. As aresult of this agreement, the legitimacy of the GVN is established, thepossibility of unlimited American aid is legally maintained for the postwar period, and the possibility of strong American action to defend theagreementis preserved. I told President Thieu that we should treat thisas a joint victory. You have managedto turn it from a victory into a setback.

If the President - - who has supportedyou all alone, all along - - has losthis patience as this letter indicates, imagine how the others are.

You [Ambassador Phuongand Mr. Dud can come back with us if you like.We are trying for a 4:00 p.m. departure.

Mr.Duc: I tried to get here earlier.

Dr.Kissinger: If there is another negotiation or not, you have run out oftime. I will leave Friday morning for Paris again.

Mr.Duc: Whatever the decision President Nixon has to take, we remaingrateful for all your help, particularly Vietnamization, which has succeeded. But for us to accept an agreementthat does not explicitly dealwith the North Vietnamese troops, our Government could not explain tothe people.


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Dr.Kissinger: I will ask him for one week. If he acceptsyou have a

deadline. If he refuses, the negotiations are at an end and the conse

quencesdescribed in the President’s letter will take place.

You have had seven weeks to work with us.

Mr.Duc: The North Vietnamese troops do not have to be mentioned by

name, but the agreementcan refer to a general comprehensive formula.

Dr.Kissinger: "Non-South Vietnamese forces." We have submitted

every single changeyou wanted, but the limit to what they will agree to

is maybe "demobilization on a one-for-onebasis" and to have the Council’smembers "appointed equally by the two sides. ‘ Maybe they will withdrawsome forces out of MR-l in conjunction with release of civilian prisoners.Maybe they will accept this, maybe they will refuse.

Mr.Duc: You think their refusal is unreasonable?

Dr.Kissinger: We have to look at it from our point of view. For fouryears, by maneuvering and manipulation, we have managedto keep theCongress from passing resolutions requiring United Stateswithdrawal inexchangefor our POWs. This was my nightmare. On October 8 I thoughtthat their acceptanceof our proposal plus your enthusiastic support wouldmake the American people so proud of what we had achieved that they wouldenable us to support your government. Imagine now the attitude of a Midwesterner who reads every day that we are accusedof betrayal. If it isportrayed as a worthless agreement, how can the American people supportit?

What is your protection? Your protection is our unity. Your protectionis our enthusiastic support. You won’t be able to wave a documentatthem, whateveris in it. The North Vietnamesefear is whether the B-52smay come again; if we convince them of this, the agreementwill be kept.If we can’t convince them of this, all your 69 changesmeannothing.

We think we are watching a suicide. You are losing your public support.Why did we want an agreementin October, in November and flow? Theelection meantnothing. If we got it now it would be our success. If ithappensnext March, every liberal newspaperin the country would thinkit had brought it about.


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It has to be an agreementthat you say is a success.

If we had wantedto sell you out, we had more opportunities for this.We have fought for four years and sentyou another billion dollars of aid.

Mr.Due: We never said it was a sell-out.

Dr.Kissinger: That is the impression you are giving in America.

Mr.Due: You say the best guarantee is not a scrap of paper but yourwillingness to retaliate. I am not arguing with this. But if there is noprovision about the North Vietnamesetroops, on what basis could youretaliate?

Dr.Kissinger: In the agreementthere are the following provisions:respect for the DMZ, respect for Laos and Cambodia, a ceasefire, a banon the introduction of military personnelinto South Vietnam, and militaryequipment on a replacementbasis. In addition, there is theunilateralstatementwe gave you yesterday in which we announcethat we do notrecognize any right of North Vietnam to keep troops in the South. And inhis speechannouncing the agreement, the President would say that if thereis any violation we would respondviolently.

Imust tell you, the next thing our opponentswill do is try to undermineany remaining obligation of ours to you. The more we disagree, the easierit is for them.

AmbassadorLam: You said you have gotten no responseat all fromSaigon. I am obliged to be more precise, becauseI have transmitted toyou Saigon’s responses. Saigon’s decision not to respondconcretely is achoice, a decision betweenaccepting the agreementor not accepting theagreement. If it does not deal with the two main questions it is a difficultchoice for us, to weigh. the pros and cons.

Dr.Kissinger: I understandyour motives. You are in a difficult position.The argument is not betweenyou and me. The argumentis now exactlyas the President put it. This is now the case. We have told you since theend of October where we should go. We have been on a confrontationcourse when we should be cooperating. There is no other choice any more.If the talks break down the consequenceswill follow. If there is one more



meeting either we will have your answeror we go unilaterally. We willdo our best to get another meeting. But I can add nothing to the President’s letter. It explains the situation, what we have to do, and why wehave to do it. It will destroy you andall we have done. Al?

GeneralHaig: Mutual confidence between us is the key and this has brokendown.

Mr.Due: No,we still maintain confidence in you.

Dr.Kissinger: Not actively.

Mr.Due: The disagreement is becauseVietnam is an important problemfor you but a vital matter for us.

Dr.Kissinger: If you say your vital interests are ruined, they will beruined. The agreementis better than anything we thought we could achieveor than Congresswas willing to support. Look over the Congressionaldebates:did any of our supporters ever argue that your governmenthad tobe maintained or that military aid had to be maintained or that anything hadtO be done for Laos and Cambodia? The only issue was withdrawal forprisoners and the question of a ceasefire.

Bill,you testified before Congress. What is your reading?

AmbassadorSullivan: I told AmbassadorPhuong the very same thing inWashingtontwo weeks ago, exactly as the Presidentsaid. I want to saythree things. If you had driven out the North Vietnameseyou would, ofcourse, be in a different position in a ceasefire. Secondly, an agreementthat does not limit your sovereignty and includes provisions that preventthe reintroduction of the NVA andkeeps your prisoners .

Dr.Kissinger: We hope.

AmbassadorSullivan: W had this on October 22. Le Due Tho looks atthis not as a North Vietnamese but as a leader of the Lao Dong party, andhe has to worry about his cadre in the South. The only thing he can point oto Madam Birth or to Nguyen Huu Tho is the leverage of their troops.

So you ask,is there any realism in North Vietnamese forces being permitted in a ceasefire situation while preserving the principle that they


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must withdraw? I say yes, becausethere is an opportunity to negotiatethem out, using the leverage of the prisoners which President Thieu hasalways said could be a minor problem.

If you face this situation saying "We don’t have confidence in ourselves anddon’t have confidence in the U. S. to back us up,!’ then how can we haveconfidence in you? Many leaders in Congress lost their offices, defeatedbecausethey supportedyou.

Dr.Kissinger: Allott lost, and Margaret ChaseSmith and Jack Miller.These are serious losses. They had seniority and stood by us.

We kept the war going by always keeping North Vietnam in the position oflooking unreasonableon issues that Americans could understand, like overthrowing an ally. But even that would not last beyond next year.

There is anotherfact. We cannotkeep all our carriers therebeyondJanuary becauseof the operation of the military establishment.

AmbassadorSullivan: You have the example of SouthKorea. In 1953 SyngmanRhee did not like the agreementand did not trust us. But we have kept everycommitment to SouthKorea, and today SouthKorea is in the strongestposition and North Korea has come to them and done things they have always saidwere contrary to their principles.

Dr.Kissinger: Let’s face it. A unilateral deal will be,only our prisonersin exchangefor our withdrawal.

AmbassadorSullivan: The military aid bill won’t come up until about June.On economic aid we never got a bill last year, only a continuing resolution.Therefore we have to submit new bills on January 3. They may never comeout of Committee.

Mr.Due: Let me discuss the troops. North Vietnam violated the agreements they made on Laos.

AmbassadorSullivan: A piece of paper.

Mr.Due: They did not keep it. They won’t keep this one.

AmbassadorSullivan: Do you know this? Becausethe 1962 agreementwasforced upon them by Khrushchev. They violated it from the first moment.


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But this time I am convinced it is different. One part of my mind saysyou can never trust them, and there is plenty of experience with that, butanother part of my mind says it is different now.

Dr.Kissinger: Let me make a more fundamental point. We have no moretime for debate. We do not believe you can start another round of discussions. There is no more time for working groups and memoranda. ThePresidentwill tell you the same. Hopefully Le Due Tho will agree toanother meeting. Hopefully, we can bluff him with a threat of air attacks-- which we did. By the latest by next Thursday, we will have a commonposition or we will go alone.

Mr.Due: I did not meanto start a debatebut you say we should try toportray it as a victory.

Dr.Kissinger: You have made it hard for yourselves now.

Mr.Due: But it says nothing about the big issue of North Vietnamese troops.

Dr.Kissinger: I would point to the demobilization provisions. I would saythat we had repelled North Vietnameseaggression. I would claim victory.

Mr.Due: We repelled the offensive but the North Vietnamese troops arethere.

Dr.Kissinger: The North Vietnamesetroops are in small enclavesandalong the DMZ. You turned it into a formidable force by talking about it.

Mr.Due: Though there is nothing in the agreementthat gives them theright to stay there, in Vietnameseeyes it is there indirectly. You and allour allies have to leave. It mentions three Indochinese countries .

Dr.Kissinger: The ‘three" is out.

Mr.Due: But the intention is there.

Dr.Kissinger: It is up to you to say it is four.

Mr.Due: The agreementtalks about "the question of Vietnamese forces inSouth Vietnam." The word "South" is suppressedbut the two SouthVietnameseforces are .to discuss them.


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Dr.Kissinger: That is a good point.

GeneralHag: *It is a good point but it is no longer pertinent. We have got

a problem. We can no longer afford this. The key is the kind of support

we gave you on May 8. You are depriving us of the ability to support you.

AmbassadorPorter: It is incredible that you are on a march to disaster

instead of marching with us.

Dr.Kissinger: Look at October 26. You all misunderstoodwhat I wasdoing. I was preventing President Thieu from being isolated. I was sayingthat the concerns are ours, not just yours. Or else you would have beenkilled. It would have been easy to say that President Thieu was the one.

And then we see your press attacking me.

Mr.Due: No.

Dr.Kissingr: We know who Nha is. We know it is instigated from thePalace.

After October 26 liberal members of the press called me and GeneralHaig and didn’t believe what was in it. They accusedme of lying becauseNorth Vietnam could not have agreed to it. Everything they had beenwritingbefore then assumedthat a coalition government would have to be imposed.The left cannot accept that this is a good agreementbecauseif so,it was allworthwhile. So the left attacks it. The right, which isn’t all that unhappywith the agreement, watches you, and now they won’t support the agreement.You are getting support now only from left wingers who are using it notbecausethey support you, but to attack us. But you wait until the talksbreak down. Then you will see that all the people who joined some of thecriticism you have made are not your friends.

The choice isn’t between this agreementand the continuation of the war. Itis betweenthis agreementand a Congressional cut-off of aid. We don’t likeit. Your choice is to join with us or destroy yourselves. These are facts.I tried to tell you this in Saigon. General Haig tried to tell you this in Saigon.

GeneralHaig: One other thing is not understood. At present Hanoi is licked,defeated.


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Mr.Due: Militarily, not politically.

Dr.Kissinger: Militarily andpolitically, becausethe cadres know whatthey fought for. When I first told Le Due Tho our proposal for a ceasefiresome years ago, he laughed: "Did we fight for twenty years to stop fighting? We have fought to bring about a political solution. The objective ofwar is victory." Yet now he is pushing for a ceasefire without a politicalsettlement. His cadreknow what this means. The fruit of ten years ofrevolutionary war is a eeasefire with your government still there.

They are pleading with us for economic aid. Do they think they can geteconomic aid from us if they are fighting our ally?

Mr.Due: Economic aid is not a sufficient incentive.

Dr.Kissinger: Their objective is to destroy you. But North Korea’sobjective is to destroy SouthKorea. The key isn’t what the intention is.In peace, over five years, which Vietnam will advancemore economically?North Vietnam will always want to destroy you unless you wipe it off themap. We are not children. Our common objective is to prevent it. Thatis what we are onthe brink of totally joepardizing.

Mr.Due: Supposewe demandedthat the whole Hanoi politburo had to resignand the governmenthad to be dismantled and then new elections held. Andthen we dropped this demand. This would not be proof of goodwill.

Dr.Kissinger: You are partly right. But to the American people . . . Apoll was taken during the campaignwhich asked: "Do you support the GVNif the resignation of President Thieu is the only obstacle to a settlement"?Only eight percent said yes.

Mr.Due: President Thieu has argued for mutual withdrawal at Manila andat Guam.

Dr.Kissinger: He has done it courageously, but we have run out of time.I will be back here leaving Friday morning.

Mr.Due: I shall come.

Dr.Kissinger: The President will see you on the day of your arrival.


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Mr.Due: I assumeI can be there on Monday or Tuesday.

AmbassadorSullivan: That is cutting it fairly close.

Dr.Kissinger: That is your business. We offered you a ride on our planeand thought it was accepted. But it is up to you.

Do not believe that by protracting your arrival it will changeby one hour.

Mr.Due: No, we are not. I need instructions from President Thieu onwhat I am to say to President Nixon.

AmbassadorSullivan: Can’t you await them in Washington?

Mr.Due: I am under instructions to await them here.

Dr.Kissinger: You are playing a delaying game with an inflexible schedule.Any time you use is your own.

I would appreciate, in view of the importance of this, you may want to staya few minutes and go over with General Haig and AmbassadorSullivanwhat we have conveyedto you, just to make sure you have understoodwhatwe have said.

Mr.Phong: We think we got it.

Dr.Kissinger: It is up to you.

Mr.Due: Can you have another working sessionwith them on the issueswe raised?

Dr.Kissinger: No. It will break up. The only way to avoid a breakup isto delay a week. If I go back on the issues .

Mr.Due: Does he maintn "an administrative structure of three equalsegments"?

Dr.Kissinger: There may be a failure of communications. We gave hima new Vietnameseword andwe will insist on it. He did not reject it, butI cannotbe sure. But we think we can get "three equal segments equallyappointed by the two sides."



Mr.Due: Can you tell us by tomorrow what his decision is on it?

Dr.Kissinger: I frankly think it is better not to negotiate tomorrow. It

would be a great mistake. If he gives you it "administrative structure"

he will ask for something back.

Our only hope is that at the last sessionwe say: "This is our position.

We concede on this and insist on that. This is our final offer." If we askfor things one at a time, he will come back one at a time. If they reallywant peace they may agree.

AmbassadorPhuong: One thing I would like to ask. Yesterday you talkedabout three options. What happenedto Article 8c? Is it in or out?

Dr.Kissinger: Article 8c we want in. Of the three options, option onewas to reject the whole thing. This is not realistic. Option two is todrop Article 8c if they withdraw 100, 000 of their forces.

AmbassadorPhuong: Yesterday that was option three.

Dr.Kissinger: Yes, you are right. I tried that with Le Due Tho today.He laughed. The other option, our preferred ones is to say: we maintainArticle 8c; we add the phrase "appointed equally by the two sides" to thepolitical chapter we add "demobilization on a one-for-one basis" and "theparties will do their utmost to accomplish this within three months"; andwe have an understandingwith them to haveyou release someprisoners inreturn for some withdrawal from MR-i. So our preferred one, whichyesterday was option 2, would keepArticle 8c.

AmbassadorPhuong: The withdrawal would be a small one.

AmbassadorSullivan: In proportion to your release of their prisoners.

Dr.Kissinger: We have not up to now agreed to have "three equal segments."That would be our concession.

There is one thing: in the Laos and Cambodia chapter they have rejectedthe phrase about "the principle that Indochinese forces shall stay withintheir frontiers." We might try -- we can think if we have a week -- usingsome phrase without the word "troops," such as "the Indochinese countrieswill not use military pressure against each other."

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Incidentally, when we reminded him about demobilization and "return totheir native places," he deniedhe ever said it.

Good. I will meet with you again tomorrow.

[After closing pleasantries, the meeting ended.]


A November 24 1972N VIT.NAM CONG.FIOA

de Ia Rpublique du Vi&-Nam

31. AVENUE RAYMOND P0INcARE

PARIS 16’

UL. KLE. 40-36KLE. 40-67

MEMORANDUM

Reference to our meeting with Dr. Kissinger on November 23,

1972, the content of which was immediately conveyed to the

Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, our Delegation has

just received instructions from our Government to communicat

the following to Dr. Kissinger.

It is now clear and obvious that the North Vietnamese side

does not sincerely want to seek an honorable and equitable

settlement of the war based on the right to seif-determinati

of the South Vietnamese people.

That is the reasonwhy the North Vietnameseside refuses to

settle in a satisfactory manner the problem of the North

Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam and rejects all ourproposals aiming at removing ambiguities about the nature

and the function of the Council of National Reconciliationand Concord.

Furthermore, the North Vietnameseside is raising issueswhich have already been resolved.

Given the serious situation created by the intransigeantattitude of the North Vietnamese side, the Governmentof th

Republic of Viet-Nam strongly feels that the matter nowfacing our two Governments is not to offer other concession:or to take new initiatives but to make the North Vietnameseside realize that it must display genuine good will and aconciliatory attitude.

-2-

The Governmentof the Republic of Viet-Nam thinks that the

decision, which is now called for on our part, is of a highly

strategic nature which goes much beyond the framework of the

current negotiations.

The survival of 17 million South Viet-Nanidepends on the

decisions which will be taken by our two Governmentsone way

or another.

We consider it extremely useful for the US Governmentand theGVN to consult each other on all aspects and implications ofthe current situation before taking any decision.

Since vital issues are at stake, the Governmentof theRepublic of Viet-Nam believes that new efforts must be madeto convince the North Vietnamese side to resolve theoutstanding issues so that the draft agreement can be

finalized and to make it acceptable to all the parties.

Sincerely,

PHAM- DANG - LAM

November 24, 1972, Memcon Vietnam

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