Notes

1 POWER

1. J. M. Rothgeb, Defining Power – Force and Influence in the ContemporaryInternational System, p. 17, St. Martin’s, New York (1993).

2. K. Knorr, Power and Wealth: the Political Economy of International Power,p. 75, Macmillan, London (1973).

3. S. P. Huntington, ‘Why International Primacy Matters’, InternationalSecurity 17 (4), pp. 68–83 (1993).

4. E. Luttwak, ‘Where Are the Great Powers?’ Foreign Affairs 73 (4), pp.23–8 (26) (1994).

5. See the useful tables, summarising the views of a number of leadingacademic thinkers, in C. W. Kegley & G. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 14–15, St. Martin’s,New York (1994).

6. Luttwak, op. cit.7. For a more detailed and widely cited basic definition of what consti-

tutes international economic power, see R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, pp. 32–4,Princeton University Press, Princeton (1984).

8. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, pp. 132ff., Macmillan,London (1970).

9. K. E. Boulding, Three Faces of Power, Sage, London (1990).10. A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, ch. 7, pp. 103 & 106. Johns

Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (1962).11. For a definition of influence in this way, see A. Rubinstein (ed.), Soviet

and Chinese Influence in the Third World, ch. 1, Praeger, New York (1975).12. A. Fenton Cooper et al., ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership

in the Gulf Conflict’, Political Science Quarterly 106 (3), pp. 391–410(1991).

13. R. Gilpin, ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War’, Journal of Interdiscipli-nary History XVIII (4), pp. 591–613 (1988). For another ‘single hegemon’argument, this time in the context of the world economic system, seeC. P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929–1939, ch. 14, espe-cially p. 305, Allen Lane, London (1973).

14. Thucydides, ‘History of the Peloponnesian War’, in R. M. Hutchins(ed.), Great Books of the Western World: Herodotus, Thucydides, p. 353,para. 15, Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago (1952).

15. Ibid., p. 369, para. 81.16. Ibid., p. 353, para. 18.17. L. M. Johnson Bagby, ‘The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in Interna-

tional Relations’, International Organization 48 (1), pp. 131–53 (153)(1994).

18. Thucydides, op. cit., p. 378, para. 120.

181

182 Notes

19. R. W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essayin Method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (2), pp.162–75 (171) (1983).

20. See G. J. Ikenberry & C. A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and HegemonicPower’, International Organization 44 (3), pp. 283–315 (1990).

21. A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918, pp. XXIV& XXXII, Clarendon, Oxford (1960).

22. Carr, op. cit., p. 109.23. M. van Creveld, On Future War, p. 219, Brassey’s, London (1991).24. M. Howard, War in European History, p. 37, Oxford University Press,

Oxford (1976).25. Ibid., pp. 62ff. & pp. 99–103.26. C. von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 118–19, Penguin, London (1982).27. W. Lippmann, US Foreign Policy, pp. 5–6, Hamish Hamilton, London

(1943).28. For an example of its more recent usage see S. P. Huntington, ‘Coping

with the Lippmann Gap’, Foreign Affairs 66 (3), pp. 453–77 (1987/8).29. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 81, Fontana,

London (1990).30. Ibid., p. 193.31. See, for example, T. C. Smith, ‘Political Reconstruction’, in A. W. Ward

et al. (eds), The Cambridge Modern History: the United States, pp. 648–9,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1934).

32. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 316.33. C. Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’,

International Security 17 (4), pp. 25–8 (1993).34. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 313.35. C. Degler, Out of Our Past: the Forces That Shaped Modern America,

pp. 494–5, Harper & Row, New York (1984).36. Ibid., pp. 5 & 95.37. Quoted in G. P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe 1878–1910, p. 297,

Cassell, London (1923).38. J. M. Roberts, The Penguin History of the World, ch. 11, pp. 506ff.,

Penguin, London (1995). J. Keegan, A History of Warfare, pp. 289–96,Hutchinson, London (1993).

39. N. Davies, Europe: a History, pp. 931–2, Oxford University Press, Oxford(1996).

40. H. A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 80, Simon & Schuster, New York (1994).41. See inter alia Degler, op. cit., pp. 118–19.42. Quoted in W. Collinge, ‘The Great Powers in Modern Times’, in W.

Collinge & W. Murray (eds), European History: Great Leaders andLandmarks, pp. 22–4 (23), Gresham, London (1915).

43. Leon Gambetta, quoted in Gooch, op. cit., p. 63.44. W. F. Reddaway, A History of Europe from 1715 to 1814, ch. 8, Methuen,

London (1961).45. On the Concert system see R. Jervis, ‘From Balance to Concert: a

Study of International Security Cooperation’, World Politics 38 (1),pp. 58–79 (1985). Also Kissinger, op. cit., ch. 4.

46. Quoted in Gooch, op. cit., p. 130. See also p. 143.

Notes 183

47. Quoted in Taylor, op. cit., p. 239.48. Quoted in Gooch, op. cit., p. 6.49. P. Calvocoressi, Resilient Europe: a Study of the Years 1870–2000, p. 6,

Longman, London (1991).50. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 29–30.

2 THE TWO COLD WAR SUPERPOWERS

1. J. Dos Passos, USA, pp. 1155–61, Penguin, London (1981).2. W. T. R. Fox, The Super-Powers. The United States, Britain and the

Soviet Union: Their Responsibility for Peace, p. 21, Harcourt Brace, NewYork (1944).

3. W. T. R. Fox, ‘The Super-Powers Then and Now’, International Jour-nal XXXV, pp. 417–36 (418) (1980). J. Nijman, The Geopolitics ofPower and Conflict: Superpowers in the International System 1945–1992,p. 31, John Wiley, New York (1993).

4. C. Jonsson, Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy,ch. 1, Pinter, London (1984).

5. The classic articulation of this view remains C. P. Kindleberger, TheWorld in Depression 1929–1939, Allen Lane, London (1973).

6. Figures taken from Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994, p. 446.US Government Printing Office (hereafter USGPO), Washington D.C.(1994).

7. On this see S. May, ‘Measuring the Marshall Plan’, Foreign Affairs 26(3), pp. 457–69 (462) (1948).

8. Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1950, vol. I,p. 199, USGPO (1977).

9. On the historical US global strategy see C. Layne & B. Schwarz, ‘Ameri-can Hegemony: Without an Enemy’, Foreign Policy 92, pp. 5–23 (1993).

10. On this see L. C. Gardner, ‘Old Wine in New Bottles’, in C. Kegley(ed.), The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projec-tions, pp. 125–46 (130), Harper Collins, New York (1991).

11. N. Davies, Europe: a History, p. 1063, Oxford University Press, Oxford(1996).

12. R. Jervis, ‘The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War’, Journalof Conflict Resolution 24 (4), pp. 563–92 (1980).

13. H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War, p. 36,Oxford University Press, Oxford (1993).

14. D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins 1917–1960, p. 415,Doubleday, New York (1961).

15. S. M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword, p. 31,W. W. Norton, New York (1996).

16. Department of State Bulletin 85 (2095), pp. 1–2 (1985).17. R. Reagan, An American Life, p. 219, Arrow, London (1991).18. US Statistical Abstract, op. cit., p. 352.19. T. Sorensen, ‘Rethinking National Security’, Foreign Affairs 69 (3), pp.

1–18 (9) (1990).20. In 1989 the NATO membership comprised the US plus Canada, the

184 Notes

UK, France, the FRG, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain, Portugal,Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greece and Turkey.

21. R. O. Keohane, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy 2,pp. 161–82 (163) (1971).

22. T. Kivimaki, ‘Strength of Weakness: American-Indonesian HegemonicBargaining’, Journal of Peace Research 30 (4), pp. 391–408 (1993).

23. FRUS 1947, vol. III, p. 228, USGPO (1972).24. For background see ‘East–West Trade in Europe’, The World Today V

(iii), pp. 98–108 (106) (1949).25. See W. Diebold, ‘East–West Trade and the Marshall Plan’, Foreign Affairs

26 (4), pp. 709–22 (718) (1948).26. Quoted in G. Partos, The World That Came in from the Cold, p. 19,

BBC Books, London (1993). For a good and concise historical over-view of the issues and debates surrounding the Marshall Plan fromthe perspectives of European governments of the time, see D. Reynolds,‘The European Response: Primacy of Politics’, Foreign Affairs 76 (3),pp. 171–84 (1997).

27. See ‘The World America Created’, The Economist 24 December 1988,pp. 44–6 (45).

28. The phrase was coined in G. Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? TheUnited States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Re-search 23 (3), pp. 263–77 (1986). See also G. J. Ikenberry, ‘Rethinkingthe Origins of American Hegemony’, Political Science Quarterly 104(3), pp. 375–400 (1989).

29. See inter alia FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 11 & 287, USGPO (1974).30. FRUS 1949, vol. IV, pp. 485 & 491–3, USGPO (1975).31. Figures taken from E. C. Ravenal, ‘Europe without America: the Erosion

of NATO’, Foreign Affairs 63 (5), pp. 1020–35 (1026) (1985).32. Fox (1980), op. cit., p. 434.33. C. Wiebes & B. Zeeman, ‘“I Don’t Need Your Handkerchiefs”: Holland’s

Experience of Crisis Consultation in NATO’, International Affairs 66(1), pp. 91–113 (98–9) (1990).

34. Ibid., p. 101.35. See D. U. Stikker, ‘NATO and Its Smaller Members’, Orbis XIII (1),

pp. 324–31 (328) (1969). Stikker was a former Secretary-General ofNATO.

36. D. Healey, The Time of My Life, pp. 431–2, Penguin, London (1990).H. Schmidt, ‘Saving the Western Alliance’, New York Review of Books31 May 1984, pp. 25–7.

37. For a thorough account of West European views and influence on theUS during the Cuban crisis, see T. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation amongDemocracies: the European Influence on US Foreign Policy, ch. 6,Princeton University Press, Princeton (1995).

38. This paragraph draws on information obtained in interviews with cur-rent and former senior NATO officials. For a good recent study tracingthe evolution and significance of European influence in NATO, seeRisse-Kappen, ibid., ch. 7.

39. Quoted in Partos, op. cit., p. 117.40. Department of State Bulletin LXIX (1792), p. 529 (1973).

Notes 185

41. D. P. Calleo, ‘NATO’s Middle Course’, Foreign Policy 69, pp. 135–47(144) (1987/8).

42. P. Dibb, The Soviet Union: the Incomplete Superpower, Macmillan, London(1988).

43. M. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 215, Doubleday, London (1996).44. J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, p. 5,

Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992).45. Nijman, op. cit., ch. 4.46. A. Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, pp. 289–95, Penguin, London

(1982). D. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph & Tragedy, p. 531, Weidenfeld& Nicolson, London (1991).

47. Both quotes taken from A. Gromyko, Memories, pp. 122 & 197, Ar-row, London (1989).

48. FRUS 1955–1957, vol. XIX, p. 640, USGPO (1990). For general back-ground, see J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence ofMajor War, pp. 145–7, Basic Books, New York (1989).

49. For an introduction to the Cold War debates, see N. Graebner (ed.),The Cold War: Ideological Conflict or Power Struggle?, Heath, Lexing-ton (1963). See also Dibb, op. cit., pp. 15–16, & P. Shearman, ‘SovietForeign Policy, 1917–1991’, in Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policysince 1990, pp. 15–17, Boulder, Westview (1995).

50. S. Talbott (ed.), Khrushchev Remembers, p. 493, Andre Deutsch, London(1971). Although some have doubted the authenticity of this volume,which claims to be based on taped reminiscences by the former Sovietleader, it is today widely accepted as genuine. It is treated as being soin this study.

51. F. Burlatskiy, ‘The Lessons of Personal Diplomacy’, Problems of Com-munism XLI, pp. 9–11 (1992).

52. S. M. Miner, ‘How Close We Came’, Foreign Affairs 76 (4), pp. 142–6(144) (1997).

53. On this, see Miner, ibid., p. 145.54. Quoted in 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

p. 31, Novosti, Moscow (1971).55. For the text of the Basic Principles agreement, see Pravda 30 May

1972. Translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafterCDSP) XXIV (22), pp. 22–3. For the text of the Soviet concludingcommentary, see Pravda 2 June 1972. CDSP XXIV (22), p. 25.

56. For good general surveys of Soviet policy in the 1970s, see V. V.Aspaturian, ‘Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces’, Prob-lems of Communism XXIX (3), pp. 1–18 (1980); R. S. Litwak & S. N.MacFarlane, ‘Soviet Activism in the Third World’, Survival XXIX (1),pp. 21–39 (1987).

57. Cited in J. Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power,p. 116, Basic Books, New York (1991).

58. R. Legvold, ‘The Nature of Soviet Power’, Foreign Affairs 56 (1), pp.49–71 (58) (1977).

59. On this see G. Sokoloff, ‘Sources of Soviet Power: Economy, Popula-tion, Resources’, in Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s, Part 1 (AdelphiPaper No. 151), pp. 30–6, IISS, London (1979).

186 Notes

60. W. I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Interventionand Hegemony, pp. 320–3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge(1996).

61. Gorbachev’s memoirs convey the degree of importance which he andhis reformist associates attached to participation in G7 meetings. SeeGorbachev, op. cit., ch. 28.

62. Z. Brzezinski, ‘The Soviet Union: Her Aims, Problems and Challengesto the West’, in The Conduct of East–West Relations in the 1980s (AdelphiPaper No. 189), pp. 3–12 (9), IISS, London (1984).

63. A. V. Obolonsky, ‘Russian Politics in the Time of Troubles: Some BasicAntimonies’, in A. Saikal & W. Maley (eds), Russia in Search of ItsFuture, pp. 12–17, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1995). F.Fukuyama, ‘The Modernizing Imperative: the USSR as an OrdinaryCountry’, The National Interest 31, pp. 10–18 (1993).

64. Pravda 8 December 1988. CDSP XL (49), p. 3 (1989).65. S. Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign

Policy, p. 56, Westview, Boulder (1989).66. Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to France, p. 63, Novosti, Moscow (1989).67. For the purposes of this analysis the Soviet sphere in Europe describes

the non-Soviet member states of the Warsaw Pact: the German Demo-cratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria andRomania.

68. Talbott, op. cit., p. 370. The new archival evidence was presented anddiscussed in a BBC-TV documentary, Russia’s Secret War, broadcastin the UK on 21 January 1996.

69. On this, see Volkogonov, op. cit., pp. 536–7.70. P. Calvocoressi, Resilient Europe: a Study of the Years 1870–2000, p. 95,

Longman, London (1991).71. M. Walker, The Cold War, p. 109, Fourth Estate, London (1993).72. E. Moreton, ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives in Eastern Europe’, in K.

Dawisha & P. Hanson (eds), Soviet–East European Dilemmas: Coercion,Competition and Consent, ch. 11, p. 178, Heinemann, London (1981).

73. Ibid., pp. 181–4. See also S. L. Sharp, ‘National Interest: Key to SovietPolitics’, in Graebner, op. cit., pp. 70–7 (75–6).

74. Talbott, op. cit., pp. 514–15.75. Pravda 26 September 1968. CDSP XX (39), p. 10 (1968).76. For evidence of this see the article which appeared under the name of

Yuri Frantsev in Pravda 22 September 1968. CDSP XX (39), pp. 6–8.77. On this see C. Gati, The Bloc That Failed: Soviet–East European Rela-

tions in Transition, pp. 85–7, I. B. Tauris, London (1990). Also M.Povolny, ‘The Soviet Union and the European Security Conference’,Orbis XVIII (1), pp. 201–30 (205–6, 209, 216) (1974).

78. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 182.79. For background, see J. M. Kramer, ‘Soviet–CEMA Energy Ties’, Prob-

lems of Communism XXXIV, pp. 32–47 (1985).80. Gati, op. cit., p. 120. See also Dibb, op. cit., pp. 228–9.81. Kramer, op. cit., pp. 43–4, provides an example.82. Ibid., pp. 32–3.83. This definition is fleshed out in E. A. Kolodziej, ‘The Cold War as

Notes 187

Cooperation’, in R. E. Kanet & E. A. Kolodziej (eds), The Cold Waras Cooperation: Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Manage-ment, ch. 1, Macmillan, London (1991).

84. R. E. Kanet, ‘Superpower Cooperation in Eastern Europe’, in Kanet& Kolodziej, op. cit., pp. 99–100.

85. C. E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929–1969, p. 413, Weidenfeld &Nicolson, London (1973).

86. Wiebes & Zeeman, op. cit., p. 102.87. Talbott, op. cit., p. 498.88. Ibid., pp. 497–8.89. Bohlen, op. cit., pp. 283–5 (Berlin) & pp. 349–52 (Korea).90. See FRUS 1955–1957, vol. XVI, pp. 156–60, USGPO (1990).91. For a useful general overview of US–Soviet tacit co-operation and

attempts to manage relations amongst the smaller powers in the MiddleEast, see G. Golan, ‘Superpower Cooperation in the Middle East’, inKanet & Kolodziej, op. cit., ch. 5.

92. The best-known academic argument along these lines is J. Mearsheimer,‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, Inter-national Security 15 (1), pp. 5–56 (1990).

3 THE UNITED STATES: CAJOLER OR CONTROLLER?

1. ‘War of the Worlds: a Survey of the Global Economy’, The Econo-mist 1 October 1994, p. 4. ‘The New World Order’, The Economist 8January 1994, p. 23.

2. M. Walker, ‘Present at the Solution: Madeleine Albright’s AmbitiousForeign Policy’, World Policy Journal XIV (1), pp. 1–10 (9) (1997).See also ‘Brave New World?’ Financial Times 9 September 1997.

3. Economic Survey of the United States, November 1997. OECD websitewww.oecd.org – unpaginated.

4. ‘Japan’s Economic Plight’, The Economist 20 June 1998, p. 24.5. See C. Layne & B. Schwarz, ‘American Hegemony: Without an Enemy’,

Foreign Policy 92, pp. 5–23 (1993). Also S. P. Huntington, ‘America’sChanging Strategic Interests’, Survival XXXIII (1), pp. 11–13 (1991).

6. Text in US Department of State Dispatch (hereafter USDSD) 4 (9),pp. 115–16 (1993).

7. ‘Containing China’, The Economist 29 July 1995, p. 13. For an argu-ment that Clinton was trying to change traditional foreign policy culture,see M. Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, ch. 3, Pinter, Lon-don (1995).

8. USDSD 4 (4), p. 46 (1993).9. J. Bhagwati, ‘The US–Japan Car Dispute: a Monumental Mistake’,

International Affairs 72 (2), pp. 261–79 (276) (1996).10. Statement by President Clinton Concerning Implementation of the Cuban

Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 16 July 1996, US InformationService website www.usembassy.org.uk.ukusis.html – unpaginated.

11. Briefing Given in Washington on Clinton Administration Position on EU’sWTO Challenge to the Libertad Act, 20 February 1997, US Information

188 Notes

Service website www.usembassy.org.uk.ukusis.html – unpaginated.12. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA): Decision in the South Pars Case,

US State Department Website www.state.gov – unpaginated.13. House Foreign Affairs Committee, The Future of US Foreign Policy,

Part I: Regional Issues, p. 121, US Government Printing Office (here-after USGPO), Washington D.C. (1993).

14. See, for example, ‘A Prussian in the White House’, Financial Times21 February 1994 & ‘Uncle Sam, Salesman’, Financial Times 16 May1994.

15. Figures from ‘Priorities in World Trade’, Financial Times 28 April1995.

16. See, for example, R. D. Hormats, ‘Making Regionalism Safe’, For-eign Affairs 73 (2), pp. 97–108 (1994). ‘WTO Chief Fears Wave ofProtectionism’, Financial Times 7 July 1995. ‘Ruggiero Plea for USFaith in Multilateralism’, Financial Times 17 October 1995. ‘BrittanUrges US to Stop Use of Unilateral Trade Pressure’, Financial Times20 March 1996.

17. ‘Geneva’s Trade Convention’, The Economist 23 May 1998, pp. 20–1.18. On US problems with EU–Asia ties, see G. Hufbauer & J. Schott,

‘Toward Free Trade and Investment in the Asia-Pacific’, The Wash-ington Quarterly 18 (3), pp. 44–5 (1995).

19. R. J. Art, ‘A US Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance with-out Dominance’, Survival 34 (4), pp. 3–23 (7) (1992/3).

20. 75 per cent of US tactical aircraft and 40 per cent of its tanks. See‘On Top of the World?’ The Economist 9 March 1991, p. 15.

21. P. Kennedy, ‘The American Prospect’, The New York Review of Books4 March 1993, p. 42.

22. R. Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, pp. 52–62, Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge, Mass. (1995).

23. See, for example, J. Clarke, ‘Leaders and Followers’, Foreign Policy101, pp. 37–51 (46) (1995/6).

24. For the defence budget comparisons see M. Walker, ‘The NewAmerican Hegemony’, World Policy Journal XIII (2), pp. 13–21 (13)(1996). For the Shalikashvili statement, see Walker, ‘Present at theSolution’, p. 2.

25. See ‘US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop’, NewYork Times 8 March 1992.

26. ‘Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers’, New York Times24 May 1992. See also A. R. Coll, ‘America as the Grand Facilita-tor’, Foreign Policy 87, pp. 47–65 (51) (1992).

27. M. Danner, ‘Marooned in the Cold War: America, the Alliance andthe Quest for a Vanished World’, World Policy Journal XIV (3), pp.3–4 (1997).

28. On this see A. Tonelson, ‘Superpower without a Sword’, Foreign Af-fairs 72 (3), pp. 166–80 (1993). A. H. Cordesman, US Defence Policy:Resources and Capabilities, RUSI, London (1994).

29. USDSD 5 (20), p. 315 (1994).30. ‘On Top of the World?’ The Economist 9 March 1991, p. 15.31. On this, see: P. G. Cerny, ‘Political Entropy and American Decline’,

Notes 189

Millennium: Journal of International Studies 18 (1), pp. 47–63 (1989);and D. P. Calleo, ‘America’s Federal Nation State: a Crisis of Post-Imperial Viability?’ Political Studies 42, pp. 16–33 (1994). See alsoS. P. Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’, ForeignAffairs 76 (5), pp. 28–49 (1997).

32. On these issues, see, for example: R. D. Hormats, ‘The Roots ofAmerican Power’, Foreign Affairs 70 (3), pp. 130–49 (1991); and D.Gergen, ‘How is America Changing?’ in America’s Role in a ChangingWorld (Adelphi Paper No. 257), pp. 11–14, IISS, London (1990/91).

33. J. S. Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power,pp. 14–16 & 219–30, Basic Books, New York (1991).

34. J. E. Spence, ‘Entering the Future Backwards: Some Reflections onthe Current International Scene’, Review of International Studies 20(1), pp. 11–12 (1994).

35. Z. Khalilzad, ‘Losing the Moment? The United States and the Worldafter the Cold War’, The Washington Quarterly 18 (2), pp. 87–107(104) (1995).

36. C. W. Maynes, ‘“Principled” Hegemony’, World Policy Journal XIV(3), pp. 31–6 (1997).

37. K. Mahbubani, ‘The United States: “Go East Young Man”’, The Wash-ington Quarterly 17 (2), pp. 5–23 (1994). See also S. P. Huntington,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp. 107–9,Simon & Schuster, New York (1996).

38. USDSD 4 (39), pp. 658–9 (1993).39. Ibid., p. 663.40. For an outline of the Clinton typology, see A National Security Strategy

of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 12, USGPO (1995).41. By Henry Kissinger amongst others. See his article ‘At Sea in a New

World’, Newsweek 6 June 1994, pp. 6–8 (7).42. S. J. Del Rosso, ‘The Insecure State: Reflections on “the State” and

“Security” in a Changing World’, Daedalus 124 (2), p. 195 (1995).43. R. N. Haass, ‘Paradigm Lost’, Foreign Affairs 74 (1), pp. 43–58 (1995).44. M. Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign Affairs 75

(1), pp. 16–32 (1996).45. For an insightful and balanced assessment of the formulation of the

new doctrine see D. Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: the ClintonDoctrine’, Foreign Policy 106, pp. 111–27 (1997).

46. As has Martin Walker. See Walker, ‘New American Hegemony’, p. 17.47. For examples of this kind of analysis of US foreign policy and inter-

national activity overall, see: W. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy:Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge (1996); and N. Chomsky, World Orders, Old andNew, Pluto, London (1997).

48. M. E. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, chs 1–4, Yale UniversityPress, New Haven (1987).

49. K. Sikkink, ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policiesin the United States and Western Europe’, in J. Goldstein & R. O.Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy, ch. 6, Cornell UniversityPress, Ithaca (1993).

190 Notes

50. H. Molineu, US Policy toward Latin America: From Regionalism toGlobalism, p. 10, Westview, Boulder (1990).

51. Ibid., pp. 39–41.52. A. Hurrell, ‘Latin America in the New World Order: a Regional Bloc

of the Americas?’ International Affairs 68 (1), pp. 121–39 (130) (1992).See also R. A. Pastor, ‘The Latin American Option’, Foreign Policy88, pp. 107–25 (1992).

53. USDSD 6 (5), pp. 57–8 (1995).54. US Credibility at Stake in Haiti Moves, Lake Says, p. 5, US Informa-

tion Service, London (1994).55. Haass, op. cit., pp. 54–5.56. See the two articles ‘Meet Jimmy Clinton’ and ‘Tangled in Haiti’,

The Economist 24 September 1994, pp. 13–14.57. See Hurrell, op. cit., pp. 127–8. Also P. Krugman, ‘The Uncomfort-

able Truth about NAFTA: It’s Foreign Policy, Stupid’, Foreign Affairs72 (5), pp. 13–19 (1993).

58. M. Naim, ‘Latin America the Morning After’, Foreign Affairs 74 (4),pp. 45–61 (58) (1995).

59. See F. Pena, ‘New Approaches to Economic Integration in the SouthernCone’, The Washington Quarterly 18 (3), pp. 113–22 (21) (1995). Also‘The Mirage That Won’t Go Away’, The Economist 10 May 1997,p. 70.

60. M. D. Hayes, ‘The US and Latin America: a Lost Decade?’, ForeignAffairs 68 (1), pp. 187–9 (1988/9). A. Lowenthal, ‘Rediscovering LatinAmerica’, Foreign Affairs 69 (4), pp. 27–41 (29) (1990).

61. C. Layne, ‘Superpower Disengagement’, Foreign Policy 77, pp. 17–40(21) (1989/90).

62. H. A. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 426, Little Brown, Boston (1979).63. S. P. Huntington, ‘The US: Decline or Renewal?’ Foreign Affairs 67

(2), pp. 76–96 (93) (1988/9).64. P. R. S. Gebhard, The United States and European Security (Adelphi

Paper No. 286), p. 25, IISS, London (1994).65. ‘US Warns Trade Dispute Could Imperil NATO’, The Independent

10 February 1992 (Quayle). ‘Trade Dispute Threatens the West’sSecurity Says Quayle’, Daily Telegraph same date (Lugar).

66. USDSD 4 (44), p. 762 (1993).67. K. Tong, ‘Revolutionizing America’s Japan Policy’, Foreign Policy 105,

pp. 107–14 (115) (1996/7). For a similar argument with regard to theUS and NATO, see G. Lundestad, The American ‘Empire’, p. 79, Ox-ford University Press, Oxford (1990).

68. Quoted in ‘GATT Deal “Vital to US Link with Europe”’, The Inde-pendent 4 December 1993.

69. The New Transatlantic Agenda; Joint US–EU Action Plan, p. 9, USInformation Service, London (1995).

70. House Foreign Affairs Committee, The NATO Summit and the Futureof European Security, p. 2, USGPO (1994).

71. On the Big Emerging Markets, see J. Stremlau, ‘Clinton’s Dollar Diplo-macy’, Foreign Policy 97, pp. 18–35 (1994/5).

72. For an edited English-language translation of the leaked memoran-

Notes 191

dum, see ‘Cracks Are Appearing in the Alliance’, Financial Times 2December 1994.

73. Text in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 31 (48), p. 2062,USGPO (1995).

74. J. Hillen, ‘Superpowers Don’t Do Windows’, Orbis 41 (2), pp. 241–57(250) (1997).

75. R. Rotberg, ‘Clinton Was Right’, Foreign Policy 102, pp. 135–41 (141)(1996).

76. J. A. Baker, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a PacificCommunity’, Foreign Affairs 70 (5), pp. 3–4 (1991/2).

77. J. Kelly, ‘US Security Policies in East Asia: Fighting Erosion andFinding a New Balance’, The Washington Quarterly 18 (3), pp. 31–4(1995). G. C. Hurst, ‘The US–Japanese Alliance at Risk’, Orbis 41(1), pp. 69–76 (1997).

78. ‘Clinton Is Warned of Policy Flop in Asia’, Daily Telegraph 6 June1994.

79. For an insightful discussion of shifts in US policy during 1994, seeH. Harding, ‘Asia Policy on the Brink’, Foreign Policy 96, pp. 57–74(1994).

80. ‘Greeting the Dragon’, The Economist 25 October 1997, pp. 17–18.81. During the Cold War period the members of ASEAN were Brunei,

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Viet-nam became the seventh member in 1995 and Laos and Burma(Myanmar) joined in 1997. Cambodia’s accession was deferred in 1997due to political instability in that country.

82. See ‘ASEAN Given Initiative over Burma’, Financial Times 28 July1997 & ‘US Starts to Dance in Tune with ASEAN Music’, FinancialTimes 30 July 1997. See also ‘Don’t Shout, I’m from ASEAN’, TheEconomist 26 July 1997, p. 66.

83. For an example of the first argument, see ‘ASEAN’s Failure’, TheEconomist 28 February 1998, pp. 73–4. For the latter perspective,see J. T. Almonte, ‘Ensuring Security the “ASEAN Way”’, Survival39 (4), pp. 80–92 (1997/8).

84. D. P. Rapkin, ‘Japan and World Leadership?’ in Rapkin (ed.), WorldLeadership and Hegemony, p. 199. Lynne Rienner, Boulder (1990).

85. ‘Hashimoto Designs a Grander Foreign Policy’, Financial Times 14January 1997. See also ‘Not So Fast’, The Economist 18 January 1997,p. 67.

86. Almonte, op. cit., p. 82.87. M. M. May, ‘Japan as a Superpower?’ International Security 18 (3),

p. 186 (1993/4).88. See Ozawa’s article, ‘Reforming Japan’, The Economist 9 March 1996,

pp. 19–21 (21).89. ‘Japan and US Struggle with Resentment’, New York Times 3 December

1991.90. T. U. Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of

Anti-Militarism’, International Security 17 (4), pp. 119–50 (131) (1993).91. See, for example, ‘East Asia’s Wobbles’, The Economist 23 December

1995, p. 82.

192 Notes

92. On the impact of the North Korean crisis, see C. W. Hughes, ‘TheNorth Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security’, Survival 38 (2),pp. 79–103 (1996). On the impact of Chinese bullishness, see M. J.Green & B. L. Self, ‘Japan’s Changing China Policy: From Commer-cial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism’, Survival 38 (2), pp. 42–5 (1996).

93. On these guidelines, see ‘A Sense of Security’ and ‘Can Japan BeAsia’s Policeman?’ The Economist 14 June 1997, pp. 16 & 81–2.

94. M. Mochizuki & M. O’Hanlon, ‘A Liberal Vision for the US–JapaneseAlliance’, Survival 40 (2), pp. 129–30 (1998).

95. ‘ASEAN’s Failure’, The Economist 8 February 1998, p. 74.96. For details and analysis of the IMF’s role in responding to the Asian

crisis, see S. D. Sharma, ‘Asia’s Economic Crisis and the IMF’, Sur-vival 40 (2), pp. 27–52 (1998).

97. See ‘Japan Presses Ahead with Regional Rescue Plan’, Financial Times23 September 1997 & ‘An Asian IMF?’ The Economist 27 September1997, p. 114. For an exploration of traditional Japanese policy, seeK. E. Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explainingthe Reactive State’, World Politics XL (4), pp. 517–41 (1988).

98. For a sampling of recent assessments and analysis of the Chineseeconomy and its prospects, see: ‘How Poor Is China?’ The Econ-omist 12 October 1996, pp. 79–81; ‘China’s Economy “to OvertakeUS”’, Financial Times 22 April 1997; ‘China “Heading to Be BiggestEconomy”’, Financial Times 7 August 1997; ‘China’s Next Steps’, TheEconomist 13 September 1997, pp. 23–6.

99. For two different views, see the successive articles: R. S. Ross, ‘En-ter the Dragon’, Foreign Policy 104, pp. 18–25 (1996); & G. Mastel,‘Beijing at Bay’, Foreign Policy 104, pp. 27–34 (1996). See also D.Wall, ‘China as a Trade Partner: Threat or Opportunity for the OECD?’International Affairs 72 (2), pp. 329–44 (1996).

100. Kantor quote: ‘China “Fails to Make WTO Grade”’, Financial Times23 October 1995. Chinese response: ‘A Great Leap Forward?’ TheEconomist 25 November 1995, p. 22. See also N. Chomsky, WorldOrders, Old and New, pp. 175–6, Pluto, London (1997).

101. Ross, op. cit., pp. 23–4.102. On this, see: M. Oksenberg, ‘The China Problem’, Foreign Affairs 70

(3), pp. 1–16 (9) (1991); J. L. Domenach, ‘The Loosening of China’,in Z. Laiedi (ed.), Power and Purpose after the Cold War, ch. 6, p. 138,Berg, Oxford (1994).

103. See: J. M. Roberts, The Penguin History of the World, pp. 128–42 &442–8, Penguin, London (1995); & L. W. Pye, ‘China: Erratic State,Frustrated Society’, Foreign Affairs 69 (4), pp. 56–74 (1990).

104. Good on these arguments is J. A. Goldstone, ‘The Coming ChineseCollapse’, Foreign Policy 99, pp. 35–52 (1995).

105. G. Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy (AdelphiPaper No. 287), IISS, London (1994). See also: ‘China’s Feuding Re-gions’, The Economist 20 April 1996, pp. 63–4; ‘China’s RebelliousWest’, The Economist 15 February 1997, pp. 69–70; ‘China’s RebelliousProvince’, The Economist 23 August 1997, pp. 49–50. For a question-ing of Segal’s views on growing economic disparities, see Y. Huang,

Notes 193

‘Why China Will Not Collapse’, Foreign Policy 99, pp. 54–68 (1995).106. For arguments along these lines, see: Almonte, op. cit., pp. 83–4;

L. M. Wortzel, ‘China Pursues Traditional Great Power Status’, Orbis38 (2), pp. 157–75 (1994); D. Roy, ‘Hegemon on the Horizon? China’sThreat to East Asian Security’, International Security 19 (1), pp. 149–68 (1994); R. Bernstein & R. H. Munro, ‘The Coming Conflict withAmerica’, Foreign Affairs 76 (2), pp. 18–32 (1997).

107. K. W. Kim, ‘Maintaining Asia’s Current Peace’, Survival 39 (4), pp.52–64 (56) (1997/8).

108. M. G. Gallagher, ‘China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea’,International Security 19 (1), pp. 169–94 (1994). R. S. Ross, ‘Beijingas a Conservative Power’, Foreign Affairs 76 (2), pp. 35–8 (1997).

109. J. S. Nye, ‘China’s Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific’,Survival 39 (4), pp. 65–79 (70) (1997/8). For Nye’s views on the in-creasing importance of information technology as a source of power,see J. S. Nye & W. A. Owens, ‘America’s Information Edge’, ForeignAffairs 75 (2), pp. 20–36 (1996).

110. ‘Clinton in China’, The Economist 27 June 1998, p. 25.111. ‘Japan Seeks Better Links with China’, Financial Times 19 March

1994. ‘Concern as Japan Surplus Crosses Pacific’, Financial Times 20April 1994. ‘Japan in the Balance’, Financial Times 3 September 1997.

112. See ‘US Seeks Closer Economic Ties with EU’, Financial Times 19December 1994.

113. On the diverse factors listed here, see: R. Horlemann, ‘Japan’sChanging Policy on China’, Aussenpolitik 46 (iv), p. 390 (1995); D.Roy, ‘Assessing the Asia–Pacific “Power Vacuum”’, Survival 37 (3),p. 55 (1995); ‘Japan’s Unspoken Fears’, The Economist 7 October1995, pp. 93–4; T. J. Christensen, ‘Chinese Realpolitik’, Foreign Affairs75 (5), pp. 37–52 (1996); ‘Japan’s War with China, Revisited’, TheEconomist 6 September 1997, pp. 73–4.

114. G. Segal, ‘The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan?’World Policy Journal X (2), pp. 27–32 (1993). See also ‘Asia’s NewGreat Game’, The Independent 18 January 1994.

115. F. Lewis, ‘The “G7 12” Directorate’, Foreign Policy 85, pp. 34–5 (1991/2).

116. C. W. Kegley & G. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politicsin the Twenty-First Century, pp. 195–6, St. Martin’s, New York (1994).

117. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Relations in a Multipolar World,p. 185, USGPO (1990).

4 SUCCEEDING THE SOVIET UNION

1. These are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia,Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

2. Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1 April 1992. Translated in The Current Digest ofthe Post-Soviet Press (hereafter CDPSP) XLIV (13), p. 4 (1992).

3. M. Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States,pp. 108–9, Manchester University Press, Manchester (1996).

194 Notes

4. Izvestia 4 January 1992. CDPSP XLIV (1), p. 23 (1992).5. See, for example, A. Kozyrev, ‘Russia: a Chance for Survival’, Foreign

Affairs 71 (2), pp. 1–16 (1992).6. Izvestia 11 March 1994. CDPSP XLVI (10), p. 2 (1994).7. J. Sherr, Russian Great Power Ideology: Sources and Implications, Conflict

Studies Research Centre (hereafter CSRC), Camberley (1996).8. S. Stankevich, ‘Russia in Search of Itself’, The National Interest 28,

pp. 47–51 (1992). See also Nezavisimaya Gazeta 28 March 1992. CDPSPXLIV (13), pp. 1–4 (1992). For an assessment of Eurasianist ideassee G. Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, ch. 8,Routledge, London (1996).

9. Kozyrev, op. cit., p. 14.10. Kozyrev, CDSP XLIV (13), p. 5 (1992).11. J. F. Matlock, ‘Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil’, Foreign Affairs 75

(3), pp. 38–51 (47) (1996).12. ‘Army Cuts “Threaten Russia’s Security”’, Daily Telegraph 17 March

1994. More generally, see B. D. Taylor, ‘Russian Civil-Military Rela-tions after the October Uprising’, Survival 36 (1), pp. 3–29 (1994).

13. J. Sherr, Russia Returns to Europe, CSRC, Camberley (1994).14. Kozyrev, CDSP XLIV (13), p. 5 (1992). See also: S. J. Blank, Towards

the Failing State: the Structure of Russian Security Policy, CSRC,Camberley (1996); S. Garnett, ‘Russia’s Illusory Ambitions’, ForeignAffairs 76 (2), pp. 64–5 (1997).

15. See the report in Nezavisimaya Gazeta 29 April 1993. CDPSP XLV(17), pp. 13–15 (1993).

16. Izvestia 24 February 1994. CDPSP XLVI (8), p. 29 (1994). See also:J. Sherr, ‘Doomed to Remain a Great Power’, The World Today 52(1), pp. 9–10 (1996); & Webber, op. cit., pp. 260–7.

17. Nezavisimaya Gazeta 31 December 1994. CDPSP XLVII (1), p. 23 (1995).18. S. R. Covington, Moscow’s Insecurity and Eurasian Instability, CSRC,

Camberley (1994). M. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 688, Doubleday, London(1996).

19. S. Crow, ‘Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?’ RFE/RL Re-search Report (hereafter RFE/RL) 3 (18), pp. 1–6 (1994).

20. M. Danner, ‘Marooned in the Cold War: America, the Alliance, andthe Quest for a Vanished World’, World Policy Journal XIV (3), pp.1–23 (5) (1997). For a sample of Western analysis of the Russianmilitary’s difficulties see: J. Erickson, ‘Fallen from Grace: the NewRussian Military’, World Policy Journal X (2), pp. 19–24 (1993); C. J.Dick, A Bear without Claws: the Russian Army in the Nineties, CSRC,Camberley (1996); T. R. W. Waters, Crime in the Russian Military,CSRC, Camberley (1996); M. J. Orr, The Current State of the RussianArmed Forces, CSRC, Camberley (1996).

21. For a sample of views on the state of and prospects for the Russianeconomy see: A. Kennaway, An Economy of Russia in June 1994, CSRC,Camberley (1994); A. Aslund, ‘Russia’s Success Story’, Foreign Affairs73 (5), pp. 58–71 (1994); A. Stent, ‘Russia’s Economic Revolution andthe West’, Survival 37 (1), pp. 121–43 (1995). ‘Russia Five Years On’,The Economist 24 June 1995, pp. 43–4; ‘In Search of Spring: a Survey

Notes 195

of Russia’, The Economist 12 July 1997, pp. 3–18; D. Remnick, ‘CanRussia Change?’ Foreign Affairs 76 (1), pp. 35–49 (1997).

22. For a sampling of Russian and Western views during this period see:Nezavisimaya Gazeta 13 May 1998 (CDPSP 50 [19], pp. 6–7 [1998]);Izvestia 9 June 1998 (CDPSP 50 [25], pp. 7–9 [1998]); ‘The Price ofan Icon’ & ‘Russia’s Crisis’, The Economist 11 July 1998, pp. 15–16 &21–5.

23. D. W. Blum, ‘Conclusion’ in Blum (ed.), Russia’s Future: Consolida-tion or Disintegration? p. 147, Westview, Boulder (1994).

24. A. Rubinstein, ‘The Geopolitical Pull on Russia’, Orbis 38 (4), pp.567–83 (571) (1994).

25. M. Smith, Pax Russica: Russia’s Monroe Doctrine, RUSI, London (1993).26. See A. Sheehy, ‘Commonwealth of Independent States: an Uneasy

Compromise’, RFE/RL 1 (2), pp. 1–5 (2) (1992).27. On this see ‘Trick or Treaty?’ The Economist 30 March 1996, pp. 43–9.28. See M. A. Smith, Russia and the Near Abroad, pp. 9–10, CSRC,

Camberley (1997). Also ‘Yeltsin Floats Idea of Merger with Belarus’,Financial Times 14 January 1997.

29. Sevodnya 16 September 1993. CDPSP XLV (37), p. 22 (1993).30. ‘An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’, RFE/

RL 3 (28), p. 38 (1994).31. Webber, op.cit., p. 176. See also: Izvestia 18 February 1994. CDSP

XLVI (7), p. 25 (1994); ‘New States Are Finding Russian EmbraceTough to Resist’, Wall Street Journal 2 March 1995.

32. In support of this view, see: M. Smith, ‘Anchoring Russia’, The RUSIJournal 137 (2), p. 31 (1992); ‘Russia Resurgent’, The Economist 4December 1993, p. 17.

33. Izvestia 30 June 1992. CDPSP XLIV (26), p. 4 (1992).34. S. Crow, ‘Russian Federation Faces Foreign Policy Dilemmas’, RFE/

RL 1 (10), pp. 15–19 (1992).35. Izvestia 26 June 1992. CDPSP XLIV (26), p. 20 (1992).36. Nezavisimaya Gazeta 30 July 1992. CDPSP XLIV (30), p. 8 (1992).

For more on Shelov’s views, see J. Lough, Defining Russia’s Role inthe ‘Near Abroad’, pp. 6–9, Soviet Studies Research Centre, Camberley(1993).

37. Izvestia 7 July 1992. CDPSP XLIV (27), pp. 10–11 (1992).38. Rossiiskaya Gazeta 4 August 1992. CDPSP XLIV (32), pp. 1–4 (1992).39. Quoted in ‘Peacekeeping: Russia’s Special Role’, RUSI Newsbrief 13

(4), p. 25 (1993).40. C. J. Dick, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, p. 5, CSRC,

Camberley (1993). This monograph includes a condensed translationof the published text of the doctrine document.

41. See the interview with Kozyrev, ‘Caging Russia’s Monsters’, Newsweek14 February 1994, p. 56.

42. Kozyrev’s remarks are reprinted in ‘Fate of the Russian-SpeakingPopulation of CIS and Baltic Countries’, International Affairs (Moscow)6, pp. 107–15 (113–14) (1995). On reaction in Russia see Izvestia 20April 1995. CDPSP XLVII (16), pp. 15–16 (1995).

43. The arguments made in this paragraph and the ones which follow

196 Notes

draw substantially on the authors’ earlier work. See K. J. Aldred &M. A. Smith, ‘Imperial Ambition, Humanitarian Concern, or What?:Russia and its “Near Abroad”’, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance(website journal: www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a004.htm.).

44. See R. Krickus, ‘Latvia’s “Russian Question”’, RFE/RL 2 (18), p. 30(1993).

45. Izvestia 10 July 1993. CDPSP XLV (28), p. 24 (1993).46. Kozyrev, ‘Fate’, p. 109.47. S. Marnie & W. Slater, ‘Russia’s Refugees’, RFE/RL 2 (37), p. 49

(1993).48. M. Webber, ‘Coping with Anarchy: Ethnic Conflict and International

Organisations in the Former Soviet Union’, p. 42. Paper presented tothe annual conference of the British International Studies Associa-tion, December 1995.

49. Rubinstein, op. cit., p. 573.50. T. Goltz, ‘The Hidden Russian Hand’, Foreign Policy 92, pp. 92–116

(1993).51. Izvestia 26 February 1993. CDPSP XLV (9), p. 27 (1993). ‘The Threat

That Was’, The Economist 28 August 1993, p. 19.52. M. B. Olcott, ‘Sovereignty and the “Near Abroad”’, Orbis 39 (3), pp.

353–67 (1995). A. Tsipko, ‘A New Russian Identity or Old Russia’sReintegration?’ Security Dialogue 25 (4), pp. 443–55 (443) (1994).

53. Rubinstein, op. cit., p. 573.54. Izvestia 16 September 1993. CDPSP XLV (37), p. 23 (1993).55. ‘Great Russia Revives’, The Economist 18 September 1993, p. 41.

Sevodnya 28 September 1993. CDPSP XLV (39), p. 27 (1993).56. P. Shearman, ‘Russian Policy toward the United States’, in Shearman

(ed.), Russian Foreign Policy since 1990, p. 113, Westview, Boulder(1995).

57. Quoted in M. Smith, Russia and the USA, p. 2, CSRC, Camberley(1994).

58. On Soviet-era concerns see V. V. Aspaturian, ‘Soviet Global Powerand the Correlation of Forces’, Problems of Communism XXIX (3),pp. 5–9 (1980).

59. ‘No Sensible Choice But a True US–Russia Partnership’, InternationalHerald Tribune 19 March 1994. A. Kozyrev, ‘The Lagging Partner-ship’, Foreign Affairs 73 (3), pp. 59–71 (63) (1994).

60. G. Arbatov, ‘A New Cold War?’, Foreign Policy 95, p. 96 (1994).61. See M. Smith, Chechnya and the Yeltsin Presidency, p. 3, CSRC,

Camberley (1995).62. N. Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, pp. 153–4, Pluto, London

(1997).63. S. N. MacFarlane, ‘Russia, the West and European Security’, Survival

35 (3), pp. 3–25 (20) (1993). For Cohen see House Foreign AffairsCommittee, The Future of US Foreign Policy, Part I: Regional Issues,pp. 213–4, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. (1993).

64. Pravda 7 August 1993. CDPSP XLV (32), p. 21 (1993). Krasnaya Zvezda10 August 1993. CDPSP XLV (33), pp. 10–11. See also ‘Directive 13:Clinton’s New Russia Policy’, RUSI Newsbrief 13 (10), pp. 75–6 (1993).

Notes 197

65. On the nature of what was on offer see E. Mortimer, European Secu-rity after the Cold War (Adelphi Paper No. 271), pp. 25–6, IISS, London(1992).

66. Remarks by the President in Live Telecast to Russian People, White HouseOffice of the Press Secretary – website text – www.whitehouse.gov/WTH/html/briefroom.html – unpaginated.

67. Z. Brzezinski, ‘The Premature Partnership’, Foreign Affairs 73 (2), pp.67–82 (70) (1994).

68. See, for example, ‘Toward the Brezhnev Doctrine’, The Wall StreetJournal 24 January 1994. ‘The West Underwrites Russian Imperial-ism’, The Wall Street Journal 7 February 1994.

69. US Department of State Dispatch 5 (14), p. 191 (1994).70. Ibid. 6 (10), pp. 175–6.71. See, for example, L. Buszynski, ‘Russia and the West: Towards Re-

newed Geopolitical Rivalry?’ Survival 37 (3), pp. 104–25 (1995).72. Quoted in Nezavisimaya Gazeta 16 March 1994. CDPSP XLVI (11),

p. 28 (1994).73. For good general background on Russia’s Cuba policy see Y. Pavlov,

‘Russian Policy toward Latin America and Cuba’, in Shearman, Rus-sian Foreign Policy, pp. 257–64.

74. Sevodnya 12 November 1994. CDPSP XLVI (45), pp. 23–4 (1994).75. Sevodnya 13 & 17 October 1995. Both in CDPSP XLVII (42), pp.

6–7 (1995).76. For an abbreviated version of the text of Gorbachev’s lengthy speech

see Pravda 29 July 1986. CDSP XXXVIII (30), pp. 1–8 (1986). OnSoviet follow-up see S. W. Simon, ‘Superpower Cooperation in SoutheastAsia’, in R. E. Kanet & E. A. Kolodziej (eds), The Cold War as Coop-eration, pp. 352–4, Macmillan, London (1991).

77. Rossiiskaya Gazeta 6 August 1992. CDPSP XLIV (31), p. 16 (1992).78. On this see M. Applegate, Siberia and the Russian Far East, CSRC,

Camberley (1994).79. Quoted in Sevodnya 30 July 1993. CDPSP XLV (30), p. 22 (1993).80. See C. Harada, Russia and North-East Asia (Adelphi Paper No. 310),

pp. 62–5, IISS, London (1997).81. Izvestia 26 March 1994. CDPSP XLVI (12), p. 26 (1994). Izvestia 9

November 1994. CDPSP XLVI (45), p. 22 (1994).82. For background and discussion see R. Menon, ‘Japan–Russia Rela-

tions and North-East Asian Security’, Survival 38 (2), pp. 59–78 (1996).83. See ‘Bear Hug’, The Economist 9 August 1997, pp. 54–6.84. ‘China to Build Top-Class Russian Fighters’, The Independent 8 Feb-

ruary 1996.85. R. de Nevers, Russia’s Strategic Renovation (Adelphi Paper No. 289),

p. 69, IISS, London (1994). E. Bazhanov, ‘Russian Policy toward China’,in Shearman, op.cit., ch. 8, p. 166. For a nuanced but still generallypositive assessment see R. Menon, ‘The Strategic Convergence be-tween Russia and China’, Survival 39 (2), pp. 101–25 (1997).

86. V. Lukin, ‘Our Security Predicament’, Foreign Policy 88, pp. 57–75(61) (1992).

87. Izvestia 1 February 1994. CDPSP XLVI (5), p. 26 (1994).

198 Notes

88. Quoted in ‘Russia Looks East for Allies’, Financial Times 16 November1995.

89. Harada, op.cit., ch. 2, ‘Russia and China’, The Economist 26 April1997, pp. 21–3.

90. For evidence in support of this proposition see Blank, op. cit., pp. 8–12.91. K. N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, Inter-

national Security 18 (2), pp. 44–79 (52) (1993).92. Samuel Huntington shares this conclusion. See his The Clash of Civi-

lizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 164, Simon & Schuster,New York (1996).

5 WHAT NEXT FOR EUROPE?

1. The term ‘European Community’ is used in this study for the periodprior to the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (theMaastricht Treaty) in November 1993. ‘European Union’ is used there-after.

2. J. Galtung, The European Community: a Superpower in the Making,Allen & Unwin, London (1973).

3. A. Sampson, The New Europeans, p. 207, Hodder & Stoughton, London(1968).

4. F. Duchene, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Inter-dependence’, in M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager (eds), A Nation WritLarge? ch. 1, Macmillan, London (1973).

5. These were: the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Neth-erlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The UK, Eire and Denmark joinedthe Community in 1973. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portu-gal in 1986. Most recently Austria, Sweden and Finland joined thepost-Maastricht European Union in 1995.

6. See the text reprinted in Bulletin of the European Communities (hereafterBEC) 3 (11), p. 10 (1970).

7. H. Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’ Journalof Common Market Studies XXI (1/2), pp. 149–64 (1982). See alsoR. Dahrendorf, ‘International Power: a European Perspective’, ForeignAffairs 56 (1), pp. 72–88 (1977).

8. On the Middle East: R. Rummel, ‘Political Perceptions and MilitaryResponses to Out-of-Area Challenges’, in J. Coffey & G. Bonvicini(eds), The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East, p. 217, Macmillan,London (1989). On the Falklands: G. Edwards, ‘Multilateral Coordi-nation of Out-of-Area Activities’, ibid., p. 234 and S. J. Nuttall, EuropeanPolitical Co-operation, pp. 207–13, Clarendon, Oxford (1992).

9. BEC 22 (10), p. 117 (1989).10. Nuttall, op. cit., pp. 264–5.11. See: M. Brenner, ‘The Alliance: a Gulf Post-Mortem’, International

Affairs 67 (4), pp. 670–5 (1991); D. Buchan, Europe: the Strange Super-power, pp. 34–6, Dartmouth, Aldershot (1993); T. Salmon, ‘TestingTimes for European Political Co-operation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia,1990–1992’, International Affairs 68 (2), pp. 236–48 (1992).

Notes 199

12. J. Delors, ‘European Integration and Security’, Survival XXXIII (2),pp. 99–102 (1991).

13. S. Nuttall, ‘The EC and Yugoslavia: Deus ex Machina or Machinasine Deo?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (annual review), pp.11–25 (21–2) (1994).

14. For critical assessments of the EC’s approach to the Yugoslav crisis,see: M. Brenner, ‘The EC in Yugoslavia: a Debut Performance’, SecurityStudies 1 (4), pp. 586–609 (1992); J. Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessonsfrom a Failure, RUSI, London (1993). For a more sympathetic view,see J. Gow & L. Freedman, ‘Intervention in a Fragmenting State: theCase of Yugoslavia’, in N. Rodley (ed.), To Loose the Bands of Wicked-ness, ch. 4, Brassey’s, London (1992).

15. A. G. Kintis, ‘The EU’s Foreign Policy and the War in Former Yugo-slavia’, in M. Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy: theRecord and Reforms, ch. 4, pp. 150–1, Pinter, London (1997). See alsoNuttall, op. cit., pp. 22–3 (n. 13).

16. M. Walker, ‘Present at the Solution: Madeleine Albright’s AmbitiousForeign Policy’, World Policy Journal XIV (1), pp. 1–10 (9) (1997).

17. For good overviews of the debates and key issues involved, see: A.Menon et al., ‘A Common European Defence?’ Survival 34 (3),pp. 98–118 (1992); and S. Duke, ‘The Second Death (or the SecondComing?) of the WEU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (2),pp. 167–90 (1996).

18. See H. Mueller & L. van Dassen, ‘From Cacophony to Joint Action:Successes and Shortcomings of the European Nuclear Non-ProliferationPolicy’, in Holland, op. cit., ch. 3.

19. D. Moiesi & M. Mertes, ‘Europe’s Map, Compass, and Horizon’, ForeignAffairs 74 (1), pp. 122–34 (124) (1995).

20. P. Calvocoressi, Resilient Europe: a Study of the Years 1870–2000,p. 184, Longman, London (1991).

21. See S. Hoffmann, ‘Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited’, Daedalus 123(2), pp. 1–23 (6) (1994).

22. Eyal, op. cit., p. 76.23. Italy and the Gulf crisis: Salmon, op. cit., p. 237. Italy in 1996: ‘Italy

Takes It on the Chin for Poor Presidential Leadership’ & ‘One LastChance to Get Back on Track’. Both in The European 22 February1996.

24. Buchan, op. cit., p. 52, Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, p. 19.25. ‘Each State for Itself’, Financial Times 6 January 1995.26. Nuttall, op. cit., p. 316.27. L. Brittan, ‘Europe and Asia: the Case for Convergence’, RUSI Jour-

nal 140 (5), p. 4 (1995).28. On this idea, see: Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 252; and ‘“Security Coun-

cil” Proposed for EU’, Daily Telegraph 28 January 1995.29. All quotes taken from Draft Treaty of Amsterdam. European Union

website – www.europa.eu.int/ – unpaginated text.30. WEU Treaty: Western European Union: Brussels Treaty, p. 5, WEU

Secretariat, London (1969). NATO Treaty: The North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation: Facts and Figures, p. 377, NATO, Brussels (1989).

200 Notes

31. On this see Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure, WEU As-sembly, Paris (1995).

32. A European Security Policy, pp. 12–13, WEU Assembly, Paris (1994).33. On this, see the comments of the then WEU Secretary-General, Willem

van Eekelen, reported in Menon et al., op. cit., p. 106. Author inter-views with WEU officials have also borne out this point.

34. Hannoversche Allgemeine 10 April 1991. Translated in The GermanTribune 1464, p. 2 (1991).

35. For a good general account of the debates and operations see L. Freedman& D. Boren, ‘“Safe Havens” for Kurds in Post-War Iraq’, in Rodley,op. cit., ch. 3.

36. Political Relations between the United Nations and WEU, p. 9, WEUAssembly, Paris (1993).

37. A European Defence Policy, pp. 23–6, WEU Assembly, Paris (1994).38. BEC 3 (1), p. 12 (1970).39. BEC 4 (12), p. 26 (1971). On early US lack of interest in the CSCE,

see Nuttall, op.cit., p. 57.40. BEC 6 (9), p. 14 (1973).41. H. A. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 426, Little Brown, Boston (1979).42. Text reprinted in Survival XV (4), p. 189 (1973). For an interesting

contemporary insight into American thinking, by an anonymous author,see ‘Z’, ‘The Year of Europe?’ Foreign Affairs 52 (2), pp. 237–48 (1974).

43. For the text of the EC’s statement, see BEC 6 (10), pp. 105–6 (1973).44. BEC 7 (3), p. 7 (1974).45. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, pp. 152–3. See also K. E.

Birnbaum, ‘Alignments in Europe: the CSCE Experience’, The WorldToday 37 (6), pp. 219–23 (1981).

46. Poos: ‘War in Europe’, The Economist 6 July 1991, p. 11. Delors: N.Malcolm, ‘The Case Against “Europe”’, Foreign Affairs 74 (2), p. 68 (1995).

47. BEC 25 (6), p. 19 (1992).48. M. Holland, ‘Bridging the Capability–Expectations Gap: a Case Study

of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa’, Journal of Common MarketStudies 33 (4), pp. 555–72 (559) (1995).

49. See, for example: W. Goldstein, ‘EC: Euro-Stalling’, Foreign Policy85, pp. 129–47 (1991/2); M. Brenner, ‘EC: Confidence Lost’, ForeignPolicy 91, pp. 24–43 (1993); G. Hodgson, ‘Grand Illusion: the Failureof European Consciousness’, World Policy Journal X (2), pp. 13–18(1993).

50. Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 16.51. A. D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, Inter-

national Affairs 68 (1), pp. 55–76 (75–6) (1992).52. Malcolm, loc. cit.53. For good background, see W. Grabendorf, ‘Relations with Central

and Southern America: a Question of Over-Reach?’, in G. Edwards& E. Regelsberger (eds), Europe’s Global Links: the European Com-munity and Inter-Regional Cooperation, ch. 6, Pinter, London (1990).

54. See the text of Brittan’s speech: Europe and Latin America: Partnersin a Global Economy, European Union website – www.europa.eu.int/– unpaginated text.

Notes 201

55. For a good presentation of Commission thinking, see the report TheEuropean Union and Latin America: the Present Situation and Pros-pects for Closer Partnership 1996–2000, CABIII/164/95-EN. EuropeanUnion website – www.europa.eu.int/ – unpaginated text.

56. Ibid.57. See M. Naim, ‘Latin America the Morning After’, Foreign Affairs 74

(4), pp. 57–8 (1995). Also ‘EU–Mercosur Pact “Set for 1999”’, Finan-cial Times 15 September 1997.

58. F. Pena, ‘New Approaches to Economic Integration in the SouthernCone’, The Washington Quarterly 18 (3), pp. 113–22 (120) (1995).

59. A Consistent and Global Approach: a Review of the Community’s Rela-tions with Japan, pp. 3 & 11, European Commission, Brussels (1992).

60. S. Nuttall, ‘Japan and the European Union: Reluctant Partners’, Sur-vival 38 (2), pp. 104–20 (112) (1996).

61. Brittan, ‘Europe and Asia’, pp. 1–5.62. M. Mols, ‘Cooperation with ASEAN: a Success Story’, in Edwards &

Regelsberger, op. cit., p. 71. See also ‘Asia Warns EU on HumanRights’, Financial Times 7 February 1996.

63. See, for example: ‘Door Open to Wider Europe–Asia Links’, FinancialTimes 26 February 1996; ‘As Europe Meets Asia’, The Economist2 March 1996, p. 18. For a more nuanced, scholarly view, see D. Sing& G. Segal, ‘Getting Serious about Asia–Europe Security Coopera-tion’, Survival 39 (1), pp. 138–55 (1997).

64. ‘Has Europe Failed in Asia?’ The Economist 2 March 1996, pp. 63–5.65. For evidence of frictions see ‘EU and ASEAN Face a Testing En-

counter’, Financial Times 12 February 1997.66. ‘EU Angry at UK, France on ASEAN Move’, Financial Times 24 July

1996. ‘Not the ASEAN Way’, The Economist 26 October 1996, p. 94.67. During 1998 accession negotiations commenced with Poland, Hungary,

the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus.

6 HAS THE WINNER TAKEN ALL?

1. For an expression of this view see W. Pfaff, ‘Redefining World Power’,Foreign Affairs 70 (1), pp. 34–48 (1990/1).

2. H. W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: the New Civilian Powers’, ForeignAffairs 69 (5), pp. 91–106 (1990/1).

3. For examples of diffusion of power arguments see: Z. Laiedi, ‘Powerand Purpose in the International System’, in Laiedi (ed.), Power andPurpose after the Cold War, ch. 1, p. 12ff., Berg, Oxford (1994); andJ. S. Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power,pp. 182–8, Basic Books, New York (1991).

4. See ‘Now the World is Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere’, The Economist13 August 1988, pp. 41–2.

5. S. P. Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’, ForeignAffairs 76 (5), pp. 28–49 (35) (1997).

6. S. Strange, States and Markets (second edition), p. 240, Pinter, London(1994).

202 Notes

7. S. P. Huntington, ‘The US – Decline or Renewal?’ Foreign Affairs 67(2), pp. 76–96 (92) (1988/9).

8. S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of WorldOrder, pp. 156 & 186, Simon & Schuster, New York (1996).

9. See Mortimer’s article, ‘Time for a Larger Role’, Financial Times 14February 1996.

10. See 20.01.97 Text: President Clinton’s Inaugural Address & 04.02.97 Text:Clinton’s State of the Union Address. US Information Service website– www.usembassy.org.uk/ukusis.html – unpaginated.

11. K. N. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal ofInterdisciplinary History XVIII (4), pp. 615–28 (622) (1988).

12. J. Joffe, ‘How America Does It’, Foreign Affairs 76 (5), pp. 13–27 (21)(1997).

13. P. H. Nitze, ‘America: an Honest Broker’, Foreign Affairs 69 (4), pp.1–14 (1990).

14. J. Clarke, ‘Leaders and Followers’, Foreign Policy 101, pp. 37–51 (49)(1995/6).

15. ‘Going It Alone and Multilateralism Aren’t Leadership’, InternationalHerald Tribune 4/5 February 1995.

16. For a good discussion of the core-periphery concept, see J. M. Goldgeier& M. McFaul, ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in thePost-Cold War Era’, International Organization 46 (2), pp. 467–91 (1992).

17. K. N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, Inter-national Security 18 (2), pp. 52–3 (1993).

18. C. F. Bergsten, ‘The World Economy after the Cold War’, ForeignAffairs 69 (3), pp. 96–112 (102) (1990).

19. See, for example, C. Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New GreatPowers Will Rise’, International Security 17 (4), pp. 5–51 (1993).

Index

203

AsiaEuropean Union and, 146, 160–3Soviet Union/Russia and, 102,

126–30US and, 58, 65, 82–6, 179–80

Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC),82–3, 161

Association of South-East AsianNations (ASEAN), 84–7, 163

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 8, 14Brezhnev, Leonid, 36, 37, 44Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 38–9, 123Bush, President George, 52, 60,

65, 67, 71, 77, 82, 83, 156,166, 168

Calvocoressi, Peter, 16, 42, 143Carr, E. H., 2–3, 7, 10China

as potential superpower, 90–4relations with Japan, 94–5relations with Russia, 128–30relations with US, 83–4, 93–4

civilian powerEuropean Community/Union as,

134–7Japan and Germany as, 165–6limitations of, 135, 143, 164, 166

Concert of Europe, 14–17Cuban Liberty and Democratic

Solidarity Act (US), 55–6Cuban missile crisis, 29, 30, 35–6,

47–8see also Khrushchev, General

Secretary Nikita

defence spendingSoviet Union, 32United States, 24, 29, 60–1

doctrines (foreign policy)Brezhnev, 44

Clinton, 65–8, 70Nixon, 153Truman, 22

Eisenhower, President Dwight, 34, 47

Fox, William T. R. (originator ofsuperpower concept), 18–20,24, 29, 31, 165

General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT), 38, 54, 74–6,143–4, 163–4

see also World TradeOrganisation

Gorbachev, President Mikhail, 32,38–40, 105, 108–9, 126

Gromyko, Andrei, 33, 36–7Gulf conflict (1990–1), 4, 59–60,

63, 137–8, 177–8

Huntington, Professor Samuel, 1,73, 96, 167–8, 169–70

ideologydefined, 3Chinese Marxism-Leninism, 91–2European Union (‘Lisbon

Principles’), 156–7, 159in history, 12–14Soviet Marxism-Leninism, 13,

23, 33–6, 38–41, 42–3, 176;see also doctrines (foreignpolicy), Brezhnev;Gorbachev, PresidentMikhail

US, 12, 13, 23–4, 39see also doctrines (foreign

policy), Clintoninfluence, 3International Monetary Fund

(IMF), 29, 38, 51–2, 89–90,91, 106

204 Index

Iran and Libya Sanctions Act(US), 55–7

Japanas potential superpower, 86–90,

167relations with China, 94–5relations with European Union,

160–1relations with Russia, 128relations with US, 87–9

Kennedy, Professor Paul, 9–11,60

Khrushchev, General SecretaryNikita, 34–6, 41, 42–3

see also Cuban missile crisisKissinger, Dr Henry, 13, 31, 73,

153–4Korean war (1950–3), 22, 41–2,

48, 126Kozyrev, Andrei, 97, 99, 101, 103,

110–11, 114, 115, 120

Latin AmericaEurope and, 158–60Soviet Union/Russia and, 35–6,

124–6; see also Cubanmissile crisis

US and, 69–72leadership

defined, 4Cold War Soviet 46Cold War US, 22, 27,post-Cold War US, 54, 61, 70,

172, 177–9legitimacy

defined, 3Thucydides on, 5–6and US foreign policy, 63, 172, 174

Marshall Plan (US), 21, 27–8, 45

Nixon, President Richard, 37,153

North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO)

European attitudes to, 141–2,169

Russian attitudes to, 102, 103–4,121, 125, 130, 171–2, 180

US–European relations in,26–31, 78–9, 81–2

US post-Cold War policy on, 73,77–9

Nuclear weaponsunderpinning superpower status,

19Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact,

30–1, 35–6, 37; see alsoCuban missile crisis

United States/NATO, 25, 30

powerdefined, 1economic, 2hegemonic, 4–7, 21, 63, 69, 82,

107–8 120, 171–3military, 2, 7–11, 25, 33, 38–9,

42, 52, 59–61, 93political, 2–3, 33, 34, 37; see

also ideology

Reagan, President Ronald, 24–5,39, 53, 60

Russian ‘near abroad’, 107–18

Shelov-Kovedyayev, Fyodor,111–12

Stalin, Josef, 32–3, 41–2Stankevich, Sergei, 100–1, 112Superpower

continued relevance of concept,167, 170–1

defined, see Fox, William T. R.

Taylor, A. J. P., 7, 8, 10, 17Thucydides (ancient Greek

soldier/writer), 4–6Troika (European Union), 144–6

Ukraine, 121–2, 124unitripolar concept, 95–6, 173

von Bismarck, Otto, 15–16von Clausewitz, Carl, 8

Warsaw Pact, 42–6

Index 205

Yeltsin, President Boris, 97, 102,108, 112–13

Yugoslav conflicts (1991–?)European Community/Union

and, 138–41, 144–5, 155–6Russia and, 103–4, 132US and, 79–80

Western European Union (WEU),140, 148–51

World Trade Organisation (WTO),54–6, 76, 158–9, 162,168–9

see also General Agreement onTariffs and Trade