NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC COUNCIL - NORMAC

NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC

COUNCIL

RESEARCH BRIEFS

2020

NORMAC 2020 Research Briefs 1

1. Overview

Current Arctic Council priorities

In May 2019, the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council passed from Finland to

Iceland. Iceland will now hold the chair until the next Ministerial meeting in May

2021. In keeping with conventional practice, Iceland set out a programme to guide the

work of the Arctic Council over their two-year chairmanship. This programme will

also guide the issues to be discussed at NORMAC 2020.

The overarching theme of the Icelandic Chairmanship is ‘Together Towards a

Sustainable Arctic’. Under this theme, Iceland have established the following

priorities:

• Arctic marine environment

• Climate and green energy solutions

• People in the Arctic

• Stronger Arctic Council

Under each of these priorities, Iceland have proposed continued cooperation on

certain issues with which the Arctic Council has been engaged:

• Arctic marine environment: plastic pollution in the Arctic Ocean; safety at sea

and pollution prevention; ocean acidification; Arctic marine tourism

• Climate and green energy solutions: further solutions for non-fossil-fuel energy

production in small Arctic communities; black carbon and methane

• People in the Arctic: improved connectivity; adaptation and resilience;

biodiversity issues; status report on mercury; gender equality in the Arctic

• Stronger Arctic Council: coordination of communications from the Arctic

Council; ties with relevant international organisations; participation of observers

Iceland have also introduced the following additional issues:

• Arctic marine environment: innovation and efficient utilisation of marine

biological resources

• Climate and green energy solutions: digital elevation model of Arctic glaciers;

freshwater inflow and accumulation in the Arctic Ocean

• People in the Arctic: preventative measures targeted at young people

• Stronger Arctic Council: enhanced cooperation with the Arctic Economic

Council


Issues to be discussed at NORMAC 2020

Given the theme, priorities and issues on which Iceland have focused their

chairmanship, and considering the important Arctic and global challenges currently in

the news as well, the two issues for discussion at NORMAC 2020 will be:

1. Safety in Arctic marine tourism

2. Plastic pollution in the Arctic marine environment

3. Sustainable energy in Arctic communities

As explained in detail in the NORMAC 2020 Delegate Guide, Delegates will attempt

to negotiate jointly agreed draft declarations on these issues at the Working Group

level. These draft declarations will then be considered and potentially amended at the

SAO level, before moving to the Ministerial level for a final decision. Assuming

consensus can be reached, they will then be adopted in the Ministerial as the 2020

‘Norwich Declaration’.

To this end, NORMAC 2020 will involve a simulation of three of the Arctic Council’s

six Working Groups:

• Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) – Issue 1

• Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) – Issue 2

• Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) – Issue 3

If time permits, NORMAC 2020 will also consider the question of the EU as an Arctic

Council Observer. Due to its politically sensitive nature, however, this issue will be

discussed at the Ministerial meeting only.

Whilst researching these issues for the conference, Delegates may find helpful the

following research briefs and stimulation questions. Delegates may also find useful the

additional resources noted in the NORMAC 2020 Delegate Guide, in the section

entitled ‘Before the conference: Researching and preparing’.


2. Research briefs

Safety in Arctic marine tourism (EPPR)

Arctic marine tourism as a commercial endeavour began in the 1850s, with steamship

visits to the Norwegian fjords. By the end of the 19th century, paying tourists could

make steamship journeys not only to Arctic Norway but also Iceland and Alaska, and

as far afield as Svalbard and Greenland. Today, very large cruise ships visit the Arctic,

such as the Crystal Serenity, which carried well over 3,000 passengers and crew

through the Northwest Passage on two transits in 2016 and 2017, visiting local

communities along the way. Arctic marine tourism now even involves nuclear-

powered icebreaker cruises to the North Pole.

Increased Arctic marine tourism raises certain special concerns about the safety of

large numbers of people in remote waters. The Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise

Operators, the Arctic marine-tourism industry body, have adopted voluntary safety

guidelines, but accidents do happen. In an emergency situation such as grounding or

sinking, the sheer number of people aboard a large cruise ship such as the Crystal

Serenity could overwhelm the limited Arctic search-and-rescue (SAR) capabilities

available. When in 2010 a small cruise ship struck a rock shelf in the Canadian Arctic,

nearly 200 passengers and crew had to wait almost two days—fortunately in very

favourable weather—to be rescued by a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker, at a cost of

nearly C$500,000 in public funds.

Recognising this problem, as well as the general importance of coordinating Arctic SAR

for those living and working in the Arctic, the Arctic Council’s EPPR Working Group

helped develop a binding SAR treaty between Arctic States in 2011. This treaty

specifies which Arctic State is responsible for SAR in which part of the Arctic, and

commits them to sharing information and best practice. In 2017, the International

Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN agency responsible for shipping, also adopted a

Polar Code regulating safety at sea in Arctic waters, complementing existing IMO

codes regulating safety in waters distant from SAR capabilities.

Yet none of these treaties or codes commits Arctic States to invest further in Arctic SAR

capabilities, such as coordination centres, helicopters, ice-strengthened vessels, mobile

medical facilities and the like. They also do not require Arctic States to ensure that

contingency plans are in place for communities or other locations to be visited by

Arctic cruise operators, or that sailing hazards are adequately identified and mapped.


And the IMO’s Polar Code mostly regulates safety at sea in or near ice-covered waters,

and not in the open waters through which most Arctic summer cruising passes.

Arctic marine tourism also raises other concerns. Potential environmental problems

include possible spills of fuel or garbage, the introduction of ‘stowaway’ invasive

species, and the effect of busier seaways on Arctic marine life. In addition, remote

communities with the physical infrastructure to accommodate a few hundred residents

may find themselves coordinating onshore visits of over a thousand people across

multiple days. The costs in time and money to such a community can be high, and the

disruption to daily life and the local environment severe. Some small Arctic

communities question whether the benefits of tourism outweigh the costs of managing

its less welcome effects.

All the same, these benefits can be significant. One visit of the Crystal Serenity to

Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, in the Canadian Arctic, left more than C$100,000 in the

community. Tourism in Iceland—mostly by air though also by cruise ship—accounts

for about 10 percent of the country’s GDP and about 30 percent of its export revenues.

Arctic residents and tourists alike can gain more intangible benefits as well, such as

shared cultural and educational experiences, and the potential of first-hand encounters

to foster greater understanding of and respect for the Arctic and its peoples.

Whatever its advantages or disadvantages, Arctic marine tourism seems only set to

grow along with the public’s mounting fascination with the polar regions. Whilst

tourists to the Arctic, like those to the Antarctic, have some responsibility to be aware

of the dangers, there would seem to be an equal if not greater responsibility on those

who exert authority over the Arctic to prevent needless injury or loss of life in an

emergency.

Questions to consider

Questions remain over the best way that SAR can be strengthened and coordinated

across the Arctic, not only for the safety of tourists, but also of those living and working

in the Arctic. At the Arctic Council, the EPPR Working Group continues to manage

work to address these issues, particularly through a special SAR Task Force established

after the Arctic Council agreed its SAR treaty. The Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and

informal body involving the coast guards of the Arctic States, also cooperates on

enhancing safety at sea.


At NORMAC 2020, the issue of safety in Arctic marine tourism will be considered by

the EPPR Working Group. When researching this issue, Delegates may wish to bear in

mind the following questions:

• How do the benefits and costs of Arctic marine tourism vary across the different

countries or parts of the Arctic?

• How will the types and characteristics of Arctic tourism change in future as the

Arctic climate changes and sea-ice recedes?

• What steps still need to be taken to ensure the safety of large numbers of cruise-

ship tourists in the Arctic, so that accidents and emergencies can be avoided?

• Can existing treaties and codes be extended to deal better with concerns about

safety at sea in the Arctic, or are new treaties or codes needed?

• How should indigenous peoples be involved with ensuring the safety of growing

numbers of tourists in their communities?

Plastic pollution in the Arctic marine environment (PAME)

Plastic pollution in the world’s oceans has become a cause célèbre, especially after

world-renowned British environmentalist Sir David Attenborough highlighted the

problem in his recent television documentary on the oceans, Blue Planet II. But

perhaps less well known is that plastic pollution from elsewhere in the world tends to

accumulate in the Arctic marine environment. It can occur in greater concentrations in

Arctic sea-ice than in the ‘garbage patches’ of the Atlantic and Pacific, and even at

levels in some remote Arctic locations comparable to polluted waters near cities.

Arctic marine plastic pollution takes various forms, particularly as fragments from

packaging, bottle caps, fishing gear, cigarette butts and paint, but also from many other

sources. Some of it, such as fragments of fishing gear or paint from ships, may have

entered the Arctic environment locally, but much of it seems to have travelled long-

distances on global oceanic and atmospheric currents that tend to deposit it in the

Arctic. Broken down by sunlight and wave action, it typically occurs as microplastic—

i.e. plastic fragments less than 5mm in size. But it will otherwise degrade only over

hundreds or thousands of years, meaning that the plastic pollution currently in the

Arctic environment will persist there in the long term.

It is not yet clear how plastic pollution affects marine life on a large scale, whether in

the Arctic or elsewhere in the world. But it is now well known that marine creatures

ingest significant amounts of plastic, either inadvertently or by mistaking it for food.

Studies have found plastic in the digestive systems of Arctic seabirds, whales, seals,


sharks, fish, and invertebrates such as crabs, mussels and starfish. None of these

animals can digest the plastic they consume, meaning that it ‘bioaccumulates’,

occurring at ever greater concentrations in living tissue as it moves up the food chain.

Humans, too, ingest considerable amounts of plastic. A 2019 study—the first to

attempt to measure human ingestion of plastic from all sources—suggests that the

average American takes in at least 50,000 particles of microplastic per year through

eating and drinking, and perhaps the same again through breathing. Some of this

microplastic enters the human body through the consumption of fish and other

seafood—a special cause for concern for Arctic peoples such as the Aleut and Inuit

whose diets remain tightly entwined with the marine food chain, including the

consumption of predatory marine mammals such as seals and whales in whose bodies

microplastics have already bioaccumulated.

What microplastic does in the human body, and whether or not it is harmful, is not yet

known. But Arctic peoples have experienced similar problems before. The same

global circulation patterns that cause plastic pollution to accumulate in the Arctic have

in the past also brought other pollutants to the Arctic at dangerously high levels.

Industrial pollutants such as mercury, as well as persistent organic pollutants (POPs)

such as pesticides, dioxins and PCBs have accumulated in the Arctic over many

decades. Some Arctic peoples now have unhealthy levels of POPs in blood and breast

milk—and some scientists worry that microplastics may act as carriers transferring

POPs and other pollutants from the environment into the body.

Scientists are only beginning to understand the routes by which plastic pollution travels

into the Arctic marine environment, the trends in its accumulation there, and its impact

on Arctic marine life and, ultimately, Arctic people. Particularly concerning is the

possibility that oceans are becoming polluted with nanoplastics—i.e. plastic fragments

less than 100nm in size—which can penetrate cellular membranes and interfere with

proper cell functioning, though the existence of such extremely small pollutants in the

environment is difficult to demonstrate. However that may be, the tendency for plastic

pollution to accumulate in the Arctic seems to show that—like for instance POPs,

ozone depletion, and climate change—it is another global problem with perhaps more

direct consequences for the Arctic than for many other places on Earth.


Questions remain not only over the sources, types, amount and impacts of plastic

pollution in the Arctic, but also over how the Arctic and international community can

best tackle the problem. At the Arctic Council, the PAME Working Group is currently


engaged in research to help answer these questions, and the Arctic Monitoring and

Assessment Program (AMAP) Working Group has established an Expert Group tasked

with designing and supporting a system for monitoring microplastics and other litter in

the Arctic environment. As part of their Arctic Council chairmanship programme, the

Icelandic government plans to host an ‘International Symposium on the Threat of

Plastics to the Arctic and Sub-Arctic Marine Environment’ in Reykjavik in April 2020.

At NORMAC 2020, the issue of plastic pollution in the Arctic marine environment will

be considered by the PAME Working Group. When researching this issue, Delegates

may wish to bear in mind the following questions, alongside others that they may

formulate themselves:

• What are the gaps in knowledge about plastic pollution in the Arctic marine

environment, and what can the Arctic Council do help fill those gaps?

• How can Arctic states and peoples effectively tackle plastic pollution that mostly

enters the Arctic from elsewhere in the world?

• To what extent will climate change make local-source plastic pollution worse in

the Arctic, by allowing an increase in activities such as shipping, fishing, etc?

• What can be learned from international attempts to tackle other forms of

pollution that tend to accumulate in the Arctic—e.g. the Minamata Convention

(mercury), the Stockholm Convention (POPs) or the Montreal Protocol (ozone-

depleting chemicals)?

• Do Arctic peoples deserve special consideration relative to non-Arctic people

regarding any potential health or cultural impacts from plastic pollution?

Sustainable energy in Arctic communities (SDWG)

Sustainable energy, sometimes known as ‘clean’ or ‘green’ energy, is energy generation

that meets present needs without preventing future people from meeting their own

needs. It includes hydro, solar, wind, tidal, geothermal and biomass energy sources.

These sources are all renewable, but not all renewable energy sources are sustainable.

Replacing forests or food crops with biofuel crops is a paradigmatic example of

renewable but not sustainable energy, and some argue that hydro, solar or wind

installations so alter the environment that they are not sustainable at scale. Conversely,

some argue that nuclear energy, which is not renewable, is nevertheless sustainable

because it does not pollute the air, create carbon emissions, or use much land.

In general, Arctic communities tend to use much more energy per capita than non-

Arctic communities. Colder temperatures throughout the year, as well as longer


periods of darkness in winter, make demand for heat and electricity high. Long

distances between communities, as well as between the Arctic and the rest of the

world, make demand for transportation fuels similarly high. Arctic communities do not

typically have their own energy sources, and even where sources exist nearby, it is

usually too expensive to develop them to meet the needs of a single, small and remote

Arctic community.

As a result, governments tend to subsidise the cost of importing and consuming energy

in the Arctic. Yet despite these subsidies, energy costs to Arctic households, businesses

and local governments are usually much higher than they are for their non-Arctic

counterparts. High energy costs constrain the local economy, divert government funds

away from other social programmes, and make the land-based lifestyles of Arctic

peoples harder to maintain. Even Arctic communities located near energy sources

developed for export to non-Arctic consumers face higher energy costs than non-Arctic

communities do.

Today, most Arctic communities generate electricity and heat from non-sustainable,

non-renewable fossil-fuel sources, typically diesel and fuel oil. And even small Arctic

communities have fleets of cars, motorboats, snowmobiles and other vehicles that run

on petrol or diesel. Fossil fuels such as petrol, diesel and fuel oil are easy to transport

and store, and they can power a wide variety of generators and engines. Any plausible

sustainable energy alternative for Arctic communities must provide the same flexibility

at the same or lower cost.

So far, it has proved very difficult to discover that plausible alternative. Unlike non-

Arctic communities, many remote and dispersed Arctic communities cannot normally

benefit from energy economies of scale—the centralised and distributed generation

that would justify the capital investment needed to build and maintain, say, a large

hydropower facility and the associated transmission lines. Dark winters and very cold

conditions also test the current limits of technologies such as solar or wind power.

Only Iceland, with its uniquely abundant hydrological and geothermal resources, has

managed sustainable energy in the Arctic on any great scale.

Nevertheless, there is some scope for small-scale hydro, solar, wind and biomass

generation in the Arctic, if it could be made cost-effective. Such projects would have

the additional advantage of making Arctic communities more energy-independent.

Proponents of nuclear energy have also proposed powering individual towns and

villages with small reactors like those used on submarines. More prosaically, Arctic


homes and other buildings could be better constructed and insulated, so as to

contribute to the sustainability of local energy generation.

Arctic peoples, who live on the front lines of fossil-fuel-induced climate change, and

who tend to have a special connection to their environment, take a special interest in

today’s trend toward sustainable energy. At the same time, some of them live in

communities that depend on fossil-fuel industries, such as the Alaskan Inuit, and some

hope to benefit from it, such as some Greenlandic Inuit. And with energy costs already

high, no Arctic people could easily afford carbon taxes or other disincentives against

fossil-fuel use. Whilst developing sustainable energy alternatives for Arctic

communities seems a laudable imperative, it is more easily said than done.


Developing sustainable energy solutions for Arctic communities is a difficult problem.

Solutions will vary locally depending on community size, remoteness, climate, access

to local energy sources, etc. At the Arctic Council, the SDWG Working Group is

currently managing projects to help Arctic communities determine how they can most

effectively take at least the initial steps towards a transition to sustainable energy. The

SDWG has also sponsored an ‘Arctic Energy Summit’ every two years since 2007.

At NORMAC 2020, the issue of sustainable energy in Arctic communities will be

considered by the SDWG Working Group. When researching this issue, Delegates

may wish to bear in mind the following questions, alongside others that they may

formulate themselves:

• Is it realistically possible for most Arctic communities to transition to sustainable

energy in the foreseeable future, or will they remain dependent on fossil fuels?

• What can be learned from current examples of sustainable energy in the

Arctic—e.g. geothermal in Iceland, hydro in Norway, Iceland, Greenland, etc?

• Is nuclear energy a form of sustainable energy, and if so could it offer any

advantages to Arctic communities attempting to transition from fossil fuels?

• Do Arctic communities deserve special consideration or help in the transition to

sustainable energy, considering they live on the front lines of climate change?

• Should the interests of Arctic communities that depend on, or hope to benefit

from, fossil-fuel industries be protected in the transition to sustainable energy?


The EU as an Arctic Council Observer (Ministerial, time permitting)

The EU have applied to become an Observer of the Arctic Council twice, in 2009 and

2011, and they saw their application temporarily rejected both times. It seems likely

that there were a number of factors contributing to these rejections:

• The Arctic Council already includes three EU member-states—namely,

Denmark, Finland and Sweden—which could represent EU interests;

• Arctic States were generally reluctant to open governance of the Arctic to non-

Arctic actors whose agendas may vary considerably from their own;

• The EU’s published policies on the Arctic were perceived as overstepping the

bounds of the jurisdiction that the EU actually have in the region;

• The indigenous Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, which already

lack the human and financial resources of the Arctic States, were concerned that

their voices would be diluted by Observers; and

• Canada, Norway and to some extent Denmark, as well as the Inuit, had serious

objections to the EU’s ban on the trade in seal fur and other seal products.

However, in recent years, some of these factors have changed considerably:

• The Arctic Council has adopted official guidelines that Observers must follow to

be admitted and to maintain their status;

• Having adopted these guidelines, the Arctic Council admitted a number of new

non-Arctic states as Observers, including China;

• The EU have softened their approach to Arctic policy in recognition of the

policy direction of Arctic States and of the limits of its own jurisdiction;

• The European Court of Justice (ECJ) dismissed a lawsuit brought by Canadian

and Greenlandic Inuit against the EU seal-fur ban; and

• The World Trade Organisation (WTO) dismissed a challenge brought by Canada

and Norway against the EU seal-fur ban.


At NORMAC 2020, the issue of the EU as an Arctic Council Observer will be

considered at the Ministerial meeting, if time permits. When researching this issue,

Delegates may wish to bear in mind the following questions:

• Is there value in admitting the EU itself as an Observer, or is it enough that some

EU member-states are themselves already on the Arctic Council, and others—for

example, France, Germany and the UK—are already Observers?


• What are the implications for the EU of the admission of clearly non-Arctic

states such as India and Singapore as Observers of the Arctic Council?

• Should the number of Observers be limited to protect the place of Permanent

Participants, or do Permanent Participants have little to fear from Observers

because of their guaranteed special status?

• Do the decisions of the ECJ and WTO resolve the issues around the EU seal-fur

ban, or do Canada, Norway or the Inuit still have concerns that must be

addressed before the EU is admitted as an Observer?

NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC COUNCIL IS AN INITIATIVE OF POLAR ASPECT IN COLLABORATION WITH AND HOSTED BY NORWICH SCHOOL

NORWICH MODEL ARCTIC COUNCIL - NORMAC

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