Northwest African Air Forces-1943

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

AJL 194

To

SVU

u t ^

i f IV

gtMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

FORT LEAVEN WORTH KANSAS

AIR MAIL 19 March 1943

Coiruaanding General Twelfth A i r r o r c e APO 650 co PostmasterNew York NY

Dear Spaatz

We are progressively expanding our instruction from Air CorpsStaff officers trying to improve its quality To do this we haveneed for information from air units which are actively operating andto have the benefit of their observations and experiences You willhelp us greatly if you can give us answers to the attached list ofquestions If parts of the answers are extremely confidential orsecret so indicate and we will act accordingly

I inclose a copy of our latest program for the General StaffCourse to show the character of the instruction now being given andthe amount of special instruction given to the group of Air Corpsstudents This group now numbers 132 future classes will be 165We intend to increase the amount of Air Force instruction as fastas our instructors can prepare the material Every effort is beingmade to get our operational information from the field so as to keepthe doctrine up to date and sound and thus insure that your graduateswill improve in quality

It is our hope that the junior members of active staffs will beprocessed through the School whenever they return to this country orbecome otherwise available and that their replacements graduatesfrom this School will be observed and checked on their new jobs andthat we be informed so as to further improve the methods and techniquestaught here

Whatever help you may offer will be greatly appreciated

All best wishes

) Ml-KARL TRUESDELLMaj Gen U S Army

2 Incls- ComdtQuery shyProgram 12GS Course CampGSS

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL FORT LEAVENWOR7H KANSAS

19 March 1943

Twelfth Air Force

a General description of Twelfth Air Force its constituentunits and their locations

b What kind of operations are they carrying out How do youcoordinate them with the Royal Air Force and the British Navy

poundbull How is your aircraft warning service set up

d How is your Air Service Command operated

pound What relations exist between Ninth Ait Force in the Middle East

fbull Particularly what have you discovered about the air supportof ground units the methods of communication with ground unitsthe methods of passing on requests for air support missions whetheror not air support units are attached to ground units what special problemshave arisen over the air support of troops of other of the United Nationshow the observation squadron works out as at present constituted withlight bombardment fighter and liaison types present in it

poundbull How are bombardment targets in enemy country selected and theirpriority established Ytfhat practical difficulties arise in followingsuch a system

h Is a central replacement depot maintained for the Twelfth AirForce or does each command maintain its own

d Is additional training given at the replacement depots or isthis given after replacements join their units

j To what extent are ground units supplied by air

k How are troop carrier units assigned and employed

NOTEThe practical mission of the General Staff Course is to train

assistant As and chiefs of Special Staff sectionsbullCommand is imparted only indirectly Methods and techniques are

taught Sample operation orders mdash tactical and logistical mdash iffurnished would be practical guide They should be within the scopeof the School (air commands assorted)

HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCESOffice of the Commanding General

Commandant CommandFt Leavenworth Kansas

Dear Truesdell

I am enclosing our answers to your queries of March 191943bull I sincerely hope they will be of assistance to you inthe Command and General Staff School program There is a vishytal need for and a great lack of trained staff officers toman our staffs in all fields at the present time I am thorshyoughly in sympathy with your problem

All best wishes

Sincerely

LieutenantComm

7 InclsshyAnswers to QueryGO Nos 1-18-23 NAAE1

Annexure 5 to G-0 Ho 1Report on Operations 9 Apr43 XII ASCOperations Bulletin No 1 Cogy No 425

Cl

S JOHNS Colonel Infapound CUSTODIAN

1 I Siops tNgr laquopound i i to In

ssm ampmr staffs la nil ^ i H at tho |ilaquo^mt ttal 1

Operations Bulletin No 1 QOpy uo 425

HEADQUARTERS NORTHSOffice of the Co

14 May 1943__

Answers to Questions Requested in Letter 19 March 1943

Question at General description of Twelf th Air Force its constituentunits and their locations

was J DOI ^ ^ its stead was organizedthe ^Northwest ifrican AirForces1^^pjp^La^n^jpbullbullTwtK3fXtpound^lM andAmericanILIIT organ zat ions in the Northwest African iheatre shy

Northwest African Air Forces is a subordijaate command ofthe^Mejampterranejm^^^Ndr^hwest IfHcan Air Forces RAB1 Malta RAF Middle East and the Ninth AirForce

Copies of Northwest African Air Forces General Orders Nos 118 and 23 which cover the formation of its seven subordinate commandsare attached A brief description of the responsibilities operationscomposition and locations of these seven commands follows

i Northwest African Tactical Air Force This Air Force iscomposed of short range fighters light bombers and medium bombers Allthe fighters except Spitfires have bomb racks and can be used as fighter-bombers During the Tunisian battle this force operated in support of theground troops

j2 Northwest African Strategic Air Forcebull This Air Force iscomposed of heavy bombers medium bombers and long-range fighters Duringthe Tunisian campaign it conducted strategic bombing of enemy-held ports andairdromes in Tunisia southern Italy Sardinia and Sicily At times duringthe progress of the battle this force augmented the Tactical Air Force indirect support to the ground forces On such occasions its missions wereprescribed by and closely coordinated with the operations of the TacticalAir Force

2+ Northwest African Coastal Air Force This Air Force iscomposed of fighter night fighter reconnaissance torpedo-bomber andanti-submarine organizations It is charged with the air defense of theentire Allied-held Northwest African coast with the air protection offriendly convoys and with anti-submarine operations in the Western Medshyiterranean and off the French Moroccan coast Its airdromes are locatedalong the Northwest African coast from Agadir to Tripoli

Jpoundraquo Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Y7ingAt the presenttime this Wing is composed of one AAF Hlotographic Groupplus one RAF Hlotographic Reconnaissance Squadron It conducts photoshygraphic reconnaissance of strategic targets in enemy-held territory inSouthern France Italy Sardinia and|^^|3| |t has also assisted

-1shy

compiling maps for the use of ground forces mm meUIbnaining and opershyational purposes Its organizations are bas^|fl|^^tsectea^|e bullbullmdash--Jlt- i

Detachments of this Wing are attached to theAir Force for direct operational control

Jpoundraquo Northwest African Air Forces Troop Carrier CommandThis command is composed of all troop carrier units It trains and planswith the airborne ground troops Detachments from the Troop Carrier Comshymand are made to the Northwest African Air Service Command and to theMediterranean Air Transport Command for movements of supplies and theoperation of scheduled air routes

j$ Northwest African Training Command Organizations ofthis command are located in French Morocco and Northwestern Algeria Itinadntains replacement pools of personnel and airplanes it trains newlyarrived combat crews for tactical operations peculiar to this theatreAll tactical Air Force organizations arriving in this theatre are firstassigned to it for a period of unit training

2raquo Northwest African Air Service Command This command iscomposed of AAF and BAF service organizations throughout this theatre Itis charged with the supply and technical maintenance of these tacticalorganizations Depots are operated in the vicinity of Casablanca OranAlgiers and Constantine

Question braquo What kind of operations are they carrying out How do youcoordinate~them with the Royal Air Force and the British Navy

The type of operations as covered in general by the GeneralOrders 1 18 and 23 attached The combining of the British and AmericanAir Forces in North Africa under the same headquarters in effect combinesthe total air strength in this theatre to act as a single force Theliaison with the British Navy is effected primarily by the NorthwestAfrican Coastal Air Force which maintains a combined operations room inconjunction with the Royal Navy Naval liaison officers are located atthe other headquarters concerned ie Northwest African Air ForcesNorthwest African Tactical Air Force and Northwest African Strategic AirForce As an example of its functioning the following sequence wouldnormally follow the movement of a convoy

1 Navy notifies Northwest African Coastal Air Force datesand times of the passage past certain given points

2 Northwest African Coastal Air Force informs NAAF

3 NAAF instructs NASAF to place heavy attack on airdromesfrom which aircraft might attack convoy

4 NACAF provides anti-submarine patrol and fighter patrolto cover convoy against hostile submarines and aircraft

I bull $

Question c Plow is your aircraft warning

Warning System

bull RraquoDraquoF Coastal chain

Consisting of GCI stations COL stations MRUstations and in a few instances LW sets

2 Observer Corps

Consisting of WOVs and the French CRDAT

3raquo All the above stations centres and units are fed intothe various Sector Filter Rooms by land line mdash or in certain circumstancesWP mdash and in all cases there exists an emergency 7T link vhich is freshyquently tested

4laquo In this theatre of war e_ach_sector has a Combined Opershyations and Filter Room so that the information received in the FilterRoom can be passed from the Filter Table to the Operations Table withthe least possible delay Only clean tracks are plotted on the OperationsTable and all tracks of interest to lateral Sectors are passed to them byland line

Question d+ How is your Air Service Command operated

See annexure No and GO 1

Question e Yhat relations exist between the British Air Force in theMiddle EasT

The Ninth Air Force the Malta Command and the NAAF areparallel forces under the jurisdiction of the Mediterranean Air Command

Question t Particularly what have you discovered about the air supportof ground units the methods of communication with ground units themethods of passing on requests for air support missions whether or notair support units are attached to ground units what special problemshave arisen over the air support of troops of other of the United Nationshow the observation squadron works out as at present constituted withlight bombardment fighter and liaison types present in it

See copy of General P L Williams own report and comments onAir Ground Support attached Additional points requested and not coveredby General Williams report are as follows

(a) Air Support units are not detached to ground units butstay under the direct control of the Air Support Commander who cooperatesvery closely with the commander (See next to last par p 23 Gen Williamsreport) bdquo_

(b) No special problems l^lJliiîfe^ôur own troops except communication difficulties when the air headquarterswas not at the same place as the ground headquarters

(c) In general the composite observation group is not satisshyfactory Forces are unnecessarily broken down into groujjs which are toosmall to realize their full effectiveness in this theatre Ho use hasbeen found for the liaison type aircraft in the observation group

Question poundbull How are bombardment targets in enemy country selected andtheir priority established What practical difficulties arise in followshying such a system

1 Targets for bombing for the Strategic Air Force are selectshyed in conformity with a strategic directive given the M A P by the MAC Inturn the ITAAF gives a general directive to the NASAF Day to day conferencesare held by A-3 of the 3SASAF with A-3 of the NAAF on the operation to be conshyducted for the next day Reconnaissance intelligence reports weather andthe necessity for dispersion of the enemy defenses determine the targets fromday to day The greatest latitude is permitted the NASAF in targets selectedand methods of attack in so long as the basic directive as to priorities isfollowed Only in special cases such as bombing in support of a ship convoydoes the NAAF designate a particular objective

2 Targets for the support of the ground forces are designated by the ground commander However until air supremacy has been established Lthe commander of the Tactical Air Force may refuse any butjfce_mosturpenttargets in order to concentrate his effort on the enemy airdromesaneL inshystallations necessary to secure air supremacy mdash

(Question ji Is a central replacement depot maintained for the Twelfth AirForce or does each command maintain its own

A central replacement depot is maintained for the NorthwestAfrican Air Forces New units and replacement aircraft and crews cominginto the theatre are placed under the command of the Northwest AfricanTraining Command

Question bull Is additional training given at the replacement depots oris this given after replacements join their units

All training is conducted by the Training Command up to thepoint of readiness for the group When the crews join the groups theyare given short indoctrination training by the group

Question j[ To what extent are ground units supplied by air

Following is the total tonnage including mail carried byair for the period January 1 1943 - March 25 1943- The ratio betweensupplies carried for ground forces and others remains fairly consistentfor periods not covered here

x

bullf

Total Tons US GroundCarried Forces

5423 2561 2862

Percentage of to ta l carried for US Ground Forces shy

Includes supplies carried for US Air Forces British Air amp GroundForces and French Air amp Ground Forces

Question kraquo How are troop carrier units assigned and employed

1 There has been set up in this theater a Troop CarrierCommand to which all troop carrier units now in this theatre have beenassigned and those arriving in the future will be assigned

2 Depending upon the requirements in the various sectionsthe Troop Carrier Command in turn attaches the required number of aircraftwhether it be a portion of a squadron a full squadron or a group to theservice command or command headquarters in that particular locality foremployment in transporting freight and passengers At present the Northshywest African Troop Carrier Command has approximately 35J of its aircraftattached to service areas or commands located in various parts of NorthAfrica This method is employed to eliminate the necessity of requestingtransportation from the Troop Carrier Command for movement of personneland materiel falling under a particular service area The communicationfacilities are not adequate and dependable enough to allow a more centralshyized control without considerably hampering movements The extent of deshycentralization of control in any theatre will depend upon the demands invarious localities and the character of communications as effectingefficient operations

3 The Troop Carrier Command and Headquarters is primarilytactical and is located in close proximity to the Headquarters of the airshyborne troops This is essential to secure the best results in planningand training

Secret by HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST AFRICAN 4IH FORCES auth CG

AFO 650 -bull-bull 14 Mar 43

GENERAL ORDERS ) 14| March 1943u bullbullbullamp

Number Id )

1 Prragrph 9 of General ampr4er No^J-fÊq Northwest African AirForces 18 e rvary 1943 is rescinded and the following substituted

bullTo the Northwest African Air Service Command arc assigned

a Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron XII Air ForceService Command

b Royal Air Force personnel as appointed to fill RAFTftar Establishment No UmWIAl0G6

c All Service Groups Depot Groups arms and Serviceunits essigned to the Twelfth Air Force Service Commnd

d All Maintenance Units Aircraft Repair Units Aircraftbull ~ and M T Assembly Units Embarkation Units M T Base

Depots and Mobile Parachute Servicing Units formerlyassigned to the Eastern Air Command and as detailed inAnnexure 5 (issued herewith) to Geieral Order No 1

e Airdromes and bases as detailed in Annexure 5

Brigadier Gcnoral DELMAR H DUNTON is dlt signated as CommandingGenerrl Northwest African Air Service Command

2 Paragraph 11 b of Geaeral Order No L is rescinded and thefollowing substituted ~

wllb Airdromes will be assigned to the Tactical Strategicand Coastal Air Forces and to the Training and Air ServiceCommands ho Corrmianding General Northwest African Air ServiceCommand viil furnish Station Complement personnel for theoperation cf TISAAF air brses with more than two squadrons andwithin the moans at his disposal At all b- ses operated by AirService Co jnarid Station Complements the Air Service Commanderwill designate the Station Commander who will be responsibleto the Coi manding General Air Service Comma d through theService Agt-ea Commander for all matters effecting the base Atall other bases the Commanding General or Air Officer Commandshying the bullorce or Command to which the base is tssigned willdes i gnat 3 the C omraand ing Off i c e r

By c nmand of Lieutenant General SPAATZtbullE P CURTIS

OFFICIAL 4 bdquo - bdquo _ Colonel USMP gt

Air 4ijutant General

DISr_IRIBUTICN 10 -- TAG 10 -- CG AAF W i n 10 - - CinC MAC 10 -- CG AF 10 - CG NATOUSA 10 -- CG ETOUSA

6 -- EIGHT AF 6 -- NINTH AF 2 bull- L i b r a r i a n EIq AAI

1feshn DC 3 -- D AOC ea Gen amp pound ypec

S t a f f Sec RAiLF 20 bull- CG iampASAP 20 - CG NATA 20 -- CGNNAASC 20 bull- CG WiTC 20 laquo - CG NACAF 20 bull- CO KAAFTCC 20 bull- CO RAHRW

I1-- 16th mil1 bull- Major McDonald

HEADQUARTERS NORTHSAPI

GENERAL ORDERS ) 19 March 1943t

Number bull 23 )

Activation of the Northwest African Air Forces Troop CarrierCommand (Provisional) laquo bull laquo 1

Reassignment of Air Force Unit laquo II

SECTION I mdash Activation of the NAAF Troop Carrier Command (Prov)

1laquo The Northwest African Air Forces Troop Carrier Command (Prov)is hereby activated with headquarters at Algiers Algeria

2 Colonel RAY A DUNN 0-9561 AC is announced as Acting Commandshying Officer

3 The 51st Troop Carrier King is hereby relieved from assignmentto XII Air Force Service Command

ampraquo The Hqf amp Hq Sltjlaquo 51st Troop Carrier ingj the 60th 62nd and64th Troop Carrier Groups and such other Troop Carrier units as mayarrive in the North African Theatre are assigned to the Northwest AfricanAir Forces Troop Carrier Command (Provisional)

5 Report will be submitted immediately to this Headquartersand Cabled to TAG CG NATOUSA and CG AAF Yuashington DC giving dateof completion of activation

SECTION II - Reassignment of Air Force Unit

The Twelfth Air Force Combat Camera Unit is relieved fromsassjfcgmantto Northwest African Air Service Command for administration and is assignedto Northwest African Air Forces for administration IIt-will remainassigned to A-2 Section NAAF for operational control

By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZt

E P CURTISColonel USAAF

OFFICIAL Chief of Staff

T JV BROGANColonel A Graquo DAsstraquo Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION10 shy TAG T 10 shy CG ETOUSA 20 shy CG NASAF 10 shy CG AAF Washn DC 6 - CG EIGHTH A F 20 CG NATAF 10 shy CinC MAC 6 shy CG NINTH AF 20 CG NiuSC 10 shy CG AF 3 shy DampOC ea Gen amp 20 CG IL1TC 10 shy CG NATOUSA Spec Staff Sec NAAF 20 CG NATC

1 shy 16 MRtf 1 -raquoYQ Frye 20 CO Q jjt î ^j poundi iji

copy ireg i By Authority s OG XII Ai s Ini t ials ^^ S Dates ^X^ril 194

7 ^ 3

K y M

HEADQUARTERS XII ASC APO 766

9 APRIL 19^5

REPORT ON OPERATIONS I r i

CONDUCTED BY XII AIR SUPPORT COMMAND

UNITED STATES ARi-Ef AIR FORCE

TUNISIA

7gt JANUARY 1945 shy 9 nm

PRE P A C E

This report of the first American Air Support Command to operate tactically in the theatre of operations is submitted vhile the Command is s t i l l in actual operation but at the conclusion o~ a period of direct support of American Troops of II Corps A report b the ground forces has or will be mdcopy separately and this report in conjunction with the one of II Corps should give a complete picture of American operations during the period covered

HEADQUARTERS XI I AIR SUJ A P O 766

t D a t e L$ A p r i l

SUBJECT Repor t o f O p e r a t i o n s

TO Commander i n Chief Nor thwest A f r i c a nTheater of Operations

THRU Commanding General Northwest African Air Force

SECTION I AUTHORITY SECTION XT GENERAL SECTION I I I mdash OPERATIONS 1ST PHASE SECTION IV--mdash OPERATION 2ND PHASE SECTION Vmdashbullmdash OPERATIONS 5RD PHASE SECTION VI OPERATIO3S SUMMARY SECTION VIImdash ADMINISTRATION SECTION V I I I - SERVICE AND SUPPLY SECTION B I - SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION X COLLUSIONS AID RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION I ~ AUTHORITY

1 In compliance with paragraph 10 AR 545-IO5 a report of operations of the XII Air Support Command from 13 January to 9 Apri l is hereby submitted

SECTION II - GENERAL

1 The XII Air Support Command was or ig ina l ly ordered into t a c t i c a l opershya t ion by l e t t e r ^ J a n u a r y Headquarters Twelfth Air Force which placed th is organization in direct support of the Sat in Task Force and attached there to The CG XII Air Support Command outlined the following objectives to be accompshyl i shed

a To gain a i r super ior i ty in the I I Corps sector in so faras possible with the limited number of a i r c r a f t avai lable

]gtbull To support the ground forces d i rec t ly by

( l ) Reconnaissance over t he i r ent i re front and flanks

(2 ) By at tacking enemy ground raovements and concentrations located by a e r i a l observation

(5 ) To a t tack rS requested by our Air Support par t ies with the ground u n i t s

1 tgtL f A

(4) To provide photo reconnaissance whenever equipmentwas available

V pound5) To provide a maximum of protection to our groundunits from enemyair attacks

bullv- 2 As operations progressed and the striking force under this Command was increasedif became possible not only to strike immediately in front of our troops and to offer them protection from enemy aircraft but to strike at the enemy air installations with bombardment aircraft accompanied by strong fighter sweeps to destroy any planes that might be airborne At the same time intensive straffihgr miss ions were being flown far behind enemy lines striking at enemy concentrations and communication routes

gt When our forces began their final attack emphasis was placed on thorough reconnaissance and coordinated bombing attacks in front of our adshyvancing troops as well as fighter sweeps to intercept enemy aircraft attemptshying to attack our troops During this phase a careful check was kept for any indication that the enemy might be attempting to withdraw and when the first signs of this withdrawal came a l l aircraft were directed against the enemyrs columns bull bull bull bull

4 From the outset the Headquarters of this CoBsaand was set up inclose proximity to the Headquarters of the ground forces we were supportingand the closest liaison between staff officers of corresponding departmentswas carried out - i

SECTION 111 - OPERATION PHASE I

15 January to 14 February

1 The XII Air Support Command was ordered to give full support to II Corps during the preparation and prosecution of the Satin plan (This plan called for the occupation of the h i l l mass ft-om FONDOUK to MAKNASSY- and eventual occupation of GABES) An attack by the eneray in the OUSSELTIA Valley which forced the French to withdraw made i t imperative for our forces to postshypone the plan Of attack and send forces to that point to stabilize the s i t shyuation After this engagement our ground forces were active in the EampID and

SEIZED areas bull

2 XII Air Support Command Objectives

bull bullltampbullbull To deny the enemy the use of the a i r

_b To afford reconnaissance for the ground troops bull

poundbull To afford close support for the ground forces by bombing andstraffing attacks against eneay -ground targets - shy

--bull 3 Order of Battle v

a 5^rd Fighter Group (2 Squadrons)

br 47th Bomb Group (L)

craquo 92nd Fighter Squadron

dlaquo 154th Observation Squadron (Fr0121 -2^ January)

pound Lafayette Escadrille -

4 Aircraft operational for 15 January 1943

a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os

5 From 13 January to 21 January missions were ordered yerbally by the Commanding General Operations were largely reconnaissance straffing and bombing missions were carried out when suitable targetSuWere found From 21 January to 15 February we were in direct support of theSATIN plan with i ts modifications and the XIX Corps Operational strength of our units had been built up somewhat and on 26 January the following aircraft were operational

bulla 52 P-4O-fs

In additiontwo Spitfire-squadrons of the 52nd Fighter-Group were attached this organization on 2u_Fg|gtr sectr7 and the 51st Fighter Group of three Spitfire squadrons became a part of this organization on 9 February on which date the ^rd -Fighter Group was withdrawn for reorganization r 7

6 Missions by type during this period were as follows

_ampbull Photo 2 gt-ltbull- Sorties pound

_b Reconnaissance ypound u^ Sorties 516 bull - bull bull

_c Escort bull - -81 Sv v Sorties 880

_d Strafe - 35 31 Yo SorîeB 224

poundlaquo- 3omb bull 29 1 o Sorties 201

f Fighter Sweeps 18 Sortios 172

jg Misaellaneous 5 71 fa Sorties 6

- ( bull T01ALS r 137 bull 1801

Escort not counted in mission tote Is due to fact that primary mission ilaquo bomb or reconnaissance wao counted as the mission

7 Air Victories and losses during this period were as follows

ja Victories bull

Destroyed 2^ ) Probably destroyed 8 ) All in aer ia l combat Damaged 7 )

ltb Losses

Combat 25Flak 7Other 6

8 barrage infl icted to ground units of the enemy during th is time and a t a l l times was di f f icul t to estimate due to dust and smoke that invariably accompanied our a t tacks In order to claim a vehicle destroyed i t must have been seen to burn or explode In other cases where i t was known that vehicles were definitely h i t by a concentration of fire and damge noted but not comshyplete destruction the vehicle was claimed as damaged only On this basis the following claims as to damge of ground vehicles is made

bulla Trucks bull

Destroyed 77 Damaged 175 bull

b_ Tanks

Destroyed 4 bull Damaged 5 bull - bull

_claquo Miscellaneous Vehicles bull

Destroyed 20) This includes half-tracks motorcycles Damaged 71) staff cars and miscellaneous armored vehicles

All of these claims are results of straffing missions- No estimation can be made of damage inflicted by bombardment a i rcraf t on ground ta rge t s

SECTION IV - OPERATIONS HftSE I I

bull 15 February to 16 March

1 On 14 February the enemy started a throe point attack in force with tanks armored units arti l lery and infantry Theso attacks were aimed toshyward Sidi Bou Zid from the Faid area and from the Maknassy area toward Gafsa These operations bythe enemy forced our elements to withdraw to Fcriana in order to meet this threat to our airdromes and supply bases in the Thelepte area Our forces continued to resist these attacks by the enemy and our air forces gave1 continual reconnaissance in the rear of the attacking units and at the same timepreventing observations and attacks by enemy aircraft Our fighters and bombers attacked enemy movements and concentrations of vehicles

and personnel The advance of the enemy continued in spiteof the vigorousresistance of our outnumbered ground forces and on 17 February we were forcedto evacuate our forward airdromes from the Thelepte area-to prepared airdromesin the Tebessa area This evacuation was carried out-with minimum loss ofaircraft and sate rial while the ground forces held theenemy along a linefrom Feriana to Sbeitla During this move no interruption of scheduled missshyions was necessary and our operations continued fron our new bases as fromthose evacuated giving all of tho support that could be mustered to our forcesThe enemy advance continued until 22 February when by force of superiornumbers of personnel and equipment they had reached a point 1-vell within thepass at Kasserine and with their forward elements 12 kilometers south of Thalawhere our air crews were kept employed to the limits of physical enduranceflying continual attack miseions over the battle area On this day the attackwas stemmed i-ynri rrnunfl forces_gave utmost

35SIiiip^^p wore inflicted on the enemy by these operations On the evening of the 22ndthe enemy started their withdrawal to the Kasserine Pass andon the succeedingdays our aircraft continued to harass their retreating columns toward Gafsaand Sbeitla Following the withdrawal of the enemy our air units reoccupiedthe Thelepte airdromes From these fields our aircraft were able to reconnmdashoiter and attack the enemy from Faid and Gafsa to the coast giving detailedinformation to ground units of all enemy movements observed and attacked andto gain valuable information that was to be used by our forces in their assaulton Gafsa and Maknassy positions

2 Xir Air Support Command Objectives

bullbullbull bull Bi ^deg afigtord the ground forces protection against enemyair duringtheir withdrawal from Sidi 3ou Zld -Kasserine Sbeitla and Gafsa

braquo To provide reconnaissance along the entire II Corps front

c^ To a ss is t the ground forces on halting the -enemy by bombardment and straffing

draquo To harass and destroy the enemy in his withdrawal from Kasse-riePass

poundbull To gain detailed information for the attack by our troops o n

nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler

a 3gt3-sgtk Fighter Group

b j2nd Fighter Group (2 squadrons )

c 47th Eomb Group (L)

draquo SIst Fighter Group (2 squadrons)

Graquo 154th Observation Squadron

9

Aircraft operaticopynal for 16 February

-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls

bull-bullcL The Lafayette Sscadri l le wa-s withdrawn for reorganization 17 February-- -

yraquo Missions by type during t h i s period were as follows-

a Photo 6 Sorties- 6

b_ jRe connai s s ance Sorties 386

-aCraquo Sscort 60 Sorties CM) cU Strafe 25 Sorties 129

e Eomb 17 Sorties 79

h f Fighter Sweep 15 Sorties 159

pound Miscellaneous 4 Sorties 20

TOTALS 128 1455

Only 2 of these counted asmissions because they did not escort our shipsi Remainder counted under primary objective

6 Air victories-and losses during t h i s period were as fallows

a Victories

Destroyed U) Probably destroyed 1) Al l in ae r ia l combat Damaged 10)

ib Losses-

Combat 14 bullbullbullbull bullbullbull

Flak 11

Other 1

7raquo Known damage to ground forcesby s t raff ing

a Trucks bull DestroyedDamaged j 128

tc Tanksi

Destroyed 15

Damaged ijtk

Miscellaneous Vehicles-

Destroyed 28 Damaged 55

V - OPERATIONS PHASE III

IT March to 9 April

1 Prior to the beginning of this-phase of our operations Air Forces- in ITorthwest Africa were reorganized and this organization was placed under the control of Northwe st Af rican_JEJardiicaX-gtA43- ilo-rltje- oemaanded- by- Air Mar shall Cunningham Slô~iSerrNATAF was organized the Tactical Bomb Force and al l bombardment aircraft that had been a part of this command were transferred to TBF and were available to this command on call through NATAF Prior to this phase also the Jrd Air Defense Wing was added to this command for the purpoiflae of setting up an air defense system that would not only give warning of enemy planes in a position to attack our air installations but would give warning of enemy aircraft in position to attack our ground forces and to direct outt planes-in their flights assisting them in intercepting the enemy The gtrd Air Defense Wing also set up homing devices -which proved invaluableîn many cases In preparation for this phase of operations in which our ground forces planned to attack and take Gfafsa El Guettar and Maknassy aircraft from our units in conjunction^ with bombers from Northwest African Tactical Air Force and the Strategical Air Force pounded airdromesin the area of the planned offensive and back as-far as-the ctgtast At the same time a comprehensive program of reconnaissance for the coming assault was in effact

The planned offensive started on 17 March with a coordinated bombshying attack onGafsa Throughout the day our aircraft hammered at the enemy wherever he could be found in front of our advancing forces- and made long range reconnaissance flights to note any possible reinforcements or supplies moving up Every effort was made to intercept all enemy aircraft attempting to attack our ground forces- This program was carried out over the days7

that followed as our troops^ advanced accomplishing their objectives

Orr 7 April the enemy began to retreat from the El Guettar and Maknas-sy fronts-and all aircraft of this command asr well as bombers of NATAF were off to destroy al l equipment passible Our fighterB-yvjpre over the enemy continshyually straffing and dive bombing as long as daylight permitted I t is-imshypossible to estimate the to ta l number of vehicles destroyed during these attacks but a ground observer in aforward OP reported that at one time ho could count 6p burning vehicles-on one stretch of road following two attacks on a convoy at that location After that day of withdrawal our planes again followed on succeeding days-to strike at any movements and made the retreatu as-costly as^ passible On 8 April we were also given the job of supporting IX Ctorps- in their advance of Fond auk and Kairoueaa and operated exeiisively

7

iin that area-with fighter and reconnaissance sweeps Due to the fact that the enemy was rapidly getting beyond our range all units-were moved to airdromesin the vicinity of Sbeitla and this headquarters to the town of Sbeitla the move being completed on 7 April Of particular note during this period is the success that acc^p^^d^^ôj^Jlplusmn^tQr^ByjQe^sraquo In one engagement 14 Stukas^WeTe^shot down asdegTn^y attempted to attack our ground forces


EUfTo defeatitfoebull eneniy b y bull fighter sweep s and escort for intensive bombardment of airdromes Inthe TeBagaand LaTauconnerie areas

bgt To provide visual and photo reconnaissance along the I I Corps front

_ shybullySL ^deg S^-ve direct-support to ground forces by attacks on enemy

supply columns vehicle concentrations and any enemy armored uni t s shy

bullj bullpound bdquo di To interce-pt enemy aircraft attempting to attack pur forces

i 3f Order of Bat t le

r a_ 52nd Fighter Group bullbull bull

-bull V 51st Fighter Group _ bull bull

_amp 81st Fighter Group _shy

_d 154th Observation Squadron bull

e_ 55rd Fighter Group (Back into operation as of 25 March)

bull bullpoundbull Jrd AirDefense Wing

bull 81 sf Fighter Group vraer withdrawn on 5 April for reorganization

4 Aircraft-copyperaticmal for 17 March

a lid-spitfires

li 3 F ^ s ( P h o t o ) yx jr7bullbullbull - 1

A vs i - i A-20 xphotraquo)-v bull bullbull _ bull -

- 5raquo M i s s i o n s by t y p e d u r i n g - - t h i s p e r i o d were a s - f a l l o w s ^

- v_bull - pound bull Pho to 50 |J ^ o S o r t i e s - bull $0

-I bull bullbullbullbullbullbullbdquobullpoundbullbull pecormaissanee ^ gt- bull6^^ [U - S o r t i e s

pound Escort 157 Sort ies

^ 8

draquo Strafe Tt^^9 Sorties-

Qj_ Fighter Sweep lcYb5X Sortie amp bull bull 7 5 8

f Miscellaneous 1 SorticopysL-mdash

ggt Bomber fyVA S o r t i e sr

TOTALS 271

TJ oltpound t h e s e laquof lawn as e s c o r t t o bombers of KATAF and SAP are counted i n totalsi bull bull bull bull bull

These bombardment missions were escorted by us and were planes of LIATAF and SAP operating in- the sector ve were supporting They are not included in the t o t a l s shown bull bull bull bull

6 Air vic tor ies and losses^ during this-period were as follows

a Victoriesi bull - shy

- Destroyed Probably Destroyed 27) All in aerial combat D a m a g e d 7 4 ) bullbullbullbullbull c bull

Combat poFlak 1 Other 0

bull bull bull

7raquo Known damage to enemy ground forces-

a Trucks-

Destroyed 515Damaged bullbull

by Tanksr

De stroyed 2 1 - Damaged lt shy

c Miscellaneous Vehicles-


SECTION VI - OPERATIONS SU1AKY

H -GEMUL

a The operations section of the XII Air Support Clommand operated in

9

accordance with methods-as-outlined in FM 51-35 Aviation i n Support of Ground Forces dated 9 April 1942 Prearranged message code forms outlined there in and standard signal communications were employed Direct wire t e l e shyphone 9j teletype and radio were made available at each Command Post location Generally all these channels of signal communication were highly sat isfactory Close l ia i son with the supported ground force was maintained by lcreatampng the Air Support Headquarters-immediately adjacent to the Command -Fast of the ground command Air Support parties-were allacated to Division and Combat Command Headquarters Their function of t ransmit t ing Air Support request wasphighly-satisfactory Air Support party officers also provided an inr valuable function as a i r advisors- to ground s t a f f s

2 EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT

a FIGHTERS

bull bullbullbullbullbull--()bull Numbers-permitting the normal fighter formation was-a squadron of twelve a i rplanes-operat ing in f l i g h t s of four each

(2)raquo Operating Spi t Vs and P-4Os against the enemy f igh te r s successful ly i t was--necessary to use large formations The speed and climtb of enemy a i r c r a f t enabled him t o ehocse whether t o a t tack or run Having gainedair super ior i ty we forced the enemy into f ight ing by conductingbxgtmbrshying missions and f ighter sweeps against him

Fighter sweeps-were conducted by 1 2 or p squadronsy deshypendingupon the enemy-fighter opposition which we ejected to encounter Approximately 2000 feet altitude between squadrons were maintained on these sweeps Altitudes-varied from 12000 to 25000 feet

(4) Eomber Escort missions were carried on most -extensively by our fighters The standard and most successful method of escort being the close cover by one squadron a medium cover by another squadron and a free lance high cover by the third squadron Our fighters^were proud that ireforty six bomber escort missions only tvo biombersr were destroyed by enemy aircraft

(5) Local protective cover and patrol missions were also perr Kigt ormGamp by out fighters for the protection of important ground attacks Usshy

ually individual squadrons of twelve airplanes-were assigned for this purpose

(6) On rare occasions when the enemy was moving andshad note established Anti-Air craft defense our fighters-were used on straffing mi ssiejas to exploit the situation

b^ STRAFFING MISSIONS - -

( l ) The P-^9 with i t s r (deck) speed and tremendous f i ro power proved the most effective a i rc ra f t for s t ra f f ing I t s sturdy construction enabled i t to complete i t s mission even though often h i t badly by Anti-Aircraft f i r e Straffing missions-were normally effective against moving columns P-59s preformed approximately 90$ of our straffing missions-andaccounted for about tha t percentage of damage

10

(2)laquo The P-59 t a c t i c s were t a f ly from the airdrome to thet a rge t at minimum a l t i t ude attack from an angle and tu rn away withoutever having passed over the t a r g e t

( 5 ) I t was found tha t the damage done by straffing of t a rge t swhere1 the eneiay had had time to i n s t a l l protective Anti-Aircraft was notcommensurate with the loss of-our own a i r c r a f t

( 4 ) The P-40 equipped with bombs- found tha t they could not strafe over the same ta rge t area where they dropped t h e i r bombs as the bombingalerted the enemy and the a i r c ra f t were subject t o heavy and in shytense Anti-Aircraft iire

c FIGHTER BOMBERS laquo

( 1 ) The P-40 and Hurri-Boinbers-(often attached for specif ic operations) were assigned missions of bombing MT and gun posi t ions They were very successful against MT but due to the d i f f icu l ty of locating gun posi t ions t he i r employment i n this- ro le was not very productive of goad resuitsi bull bull - - -

(2) Their methods of bombing were the conventional dive type bombing tactics modified They released their bjombs at abcut gtPreg0 to 1500 feet depending upon the intensity of enemy defensive fire

d HORIZONTAL BCMBING bullbullbullbull

()bull The A-20s and 3-25 Is were used for horizontal bombing against area targets at an altitude usually between 9000 and 12000 feet Heavy escort always provided usually at least 100 more fighters thafr bombers^ The fragmentation cluster bomb proved very effectivo against airshycraft at rest Aircraft were usually bombed up with the standard loadgt consisting of two to four 500 pound demolition bombs and eight to twelyo fragmGnfation cluster bombs bull lt bullbullbull-bull

bull (2) It was found that only whenthe enemyis depoundidegralizcd and caught making- a- rapid retreat was itc possitelo tq use the A~20s at mi alt i tude - bull

(5 Ori the onGmyTs retrampst from the Kassorinq Pass AÔs vere used in group-s-bf throo banbing the congested MT with delayed ac t ion bombs Undor t h i s condition thoy took no losses- from enomy f lak

0^ RE00K1AISSANGEMISSIONS^ bull v

(1 ) Daily rGconnaissance of areas- and raads wero normally made by tvo P~59s escorted by a squadron of

(2)j Spot roconiiaissanco was made by tvjo P-JPs î1^ later when available P-^^s flying at miniinum altitude to gather the necessary informshyation and returning under the protection of their speed Spot re dermal ssanco was found of more value than area reconnaissance Tho second ship of the pairs- sent in wasbull for tho purpose of watching behind the f i rs t ship thus

11

permitting the first to give greater attention to its reconnaissance missionbull With the advent of the warning service these reconnaissance aircraft were advised of the presence of enemy aircraft in their area

5 Each poundir Support Party was equipped with an SCR 522 VHF modified for ground use This was installed in the SCR 299 capable of operashytion from outside the vehicle This was ofgreat Value in passing in the clear enemy information Routine reconnaissance reports can await the reshyturn of the pilot to his base Vital enomy inforifiation was passed directly from the aircraft to the Air Support Party with the Division G- Section gt this Air Support VHF channel is capable of much greater value

bull bull bull bull

(4) This Command had no aircraft suitable for night reconnaissance ~~tradencTithcr were pilots trained for this typo of work Knowing that the enemy

moved ontiroly by night the II Corpsbull constAg^L-d^s^red ni^t^r^connjaiesanco missions On some occasions tl is leys from the RAF 2^2 Group were employed in this role but usually the time factor was such that the information reshyceived from them was of doubtful value A Reconnaissance Unit assigned to an Air Support Command must bo equipped and trained for night employment

pound PHOTOGRAPHIC AIRCRAFT

( 1 ) This type of a i rc ra f t was not available during most of the campaign However for a while A-2Os escorted by f ighters were used sa t shyisfactorily

(2) In order to keep escort missions cf fighters-to the minimum that the fighters may be employed in an offensive role the P~l is considered the most suitable aircraft for reconnaissance and intelligence photography

normally to be flown in pairs This aircraft presently is not equipped with camerascapable of producing suitable photographs for artillery control or terrain study Phpto^4p^^-unitsinthe rear have not been able tc furnish

this type of photography within the time limits- required by the ground forces I t is deemed essential that a suitable number of aircraft be provided either

in the Reconnaissance Squadron or as- a separate unit preferably F-5Ts arid P-^^s with an adequate mobile laboratory andpersonnel These missions can be flown at high altitude approximately ^0000 feet in pairs= namely a P-^8 to watch in the rear of the photographic F~5raquo

$bull L iqUID COOLED WGffES

a Our losses through Glycol leaks were excessive The Jls t Fighter-Group suffered 12 known losses through Glycol leaks 8 of which were caused by enemy aircraft and 4 which developed internal GlycoL leaks

b I t is urgently recommended that a study be made with the view of determining whether the radial type motor would notbe more desirable

4 MAINTSHANCE OF AIRCRAFT bull bull

a Maintenance of aircraft and armamentinthe field was highly satshyisfactory The American Aircraft showed no outstanding bugs They were

12

endurable and dependable and their sturdy construction hasbeen justifiedOnly a few non-combat motor fai lure ampoccur re d

braquo The 20MM and 50 calibsr guns were highly dependable and effectiveThe 57MM of the P-59 gave trouble which was to a large degree overcome in thofield

5 AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION AND RECOGNITION OF GROUND TROOPS

laquou Notwithstanding the fact tha t some of our a i r un i t s had had conshysidcrable combat operations before tho beginning of our operat ion^ wo regrets ] to report tha t on ono occasion tho ground forces-were straffed by our own a i r - craft and on one occasion bombed These were tho only occuranGes- i n t h i s ~ campaign and they occurred in the campaign1 s early stages

b raquo There follows seme of the measures-taken to insure safety of our own ground troops from friendly a t tack Photographic reproductions of a l l American vehicles-were furnished to S-2s of a l l the t a c t i c a l u n i t s Colored smoke was-used to mark front l ine posi t ions 1HF radio from a i r to ground was helpful and i s believed t o be_jugceptjbjle__of jauj^gjêator help with dlt3v(Ji0jM(int

helpful singlb factor consistea or assoitTng in maintainingg a s i tua t ion mapp in the p i l o t s - b r i e f i n gg J

operations room A liaison officer each night obtained an overlay from tho ()-ipound) Corps of ground positions oJid ground plafrst This was taken by him before dayshylight each day to the tactical unit and posted on tho situation map A close coordination wasmaintained between S-2 with the A-2 end the ground foreeSE G~2 and Gmdash3 Every change in front line movement and the bomb line was- transshymitted to all tactical units by telephone and teleprinter enabling them to maintain an up to date situation map and bomb line A Radio Par-ty at each Airport monitored the Air Support frequency further to obtain a more complete picture Bombing or straffing to the rear of the bomb line was accomplished only upon specific order

craquo Panel reading in combat is of questionable valuebull The most certain meansôf target identification was by coordinates and prominent terrain featureo

jd We have sustained severe and continued losses by friendly Anti-Aircraft and ground firo

e_ Tho records of tho Jl^t Fighter Group 52nd Fighter Group and 55 Fighter Group and 154th Observation Squadron disclose that friendly troops hava dostroyodiJO__ofôur aircraft since tho beginning of operations and damaged an additional^29laquo _This doesnot include severe losses- from friendly tiro suffered by the 81 st Fighter Group or tho losses suffered by the 47th Bomb Group for which no reports are available

f While i t is to be oxpoctcd that green troops-beingJiarrassed by enemy aircraft will occasionally firo upon friendly aircraft we believe that stepsrshould bo taken that will insure the correction of continuous firing by our ground force troops upon friendly aircraft Our losses have continued from this-source throughout tho campaign

gj^ Our Corps Commanders have cooperated in this matter and ordered in

15

substance Aircraft shampl not he f ired upon unless posi t ively indentifiod SSHostile or upon tho commission of a hos t i l e a c t n This order must be s t r i c t l y complied with and a i rc ra f t indent i f icat ion t ra in ing continued

SECTION VII - AIMINISTRATION

No major problems-in administration were apparent during this- Gjsmpaign Routine administration was handled by groups-and subordinate un i t s within the Command Problems requiring action by higher authority were passod through the Air Support Command Headquarters i n i t i a l l y to the Twelfth Air Force arid l a t e r t o the North we st African Air Forces Headquarters

Administration personnel wasrkept t a the minimum i n the advanced aroaraquo The XII Air Support Command operated i t s Headquarters with an average of 28 officers and pound0 en l i s ted mem I t was found prac t ica l to divide squadrons

into flight and ground echelon The f l i gh t echelon at an advanced airdrome The ground echelon at a rear f ie ld whore a l l a i rc ra f t -not idmodiatcly r e shyquired for operations wore pooled for 2nd and 3rd echo lorn service (Youks lies Bains) shy

bullbullbull No difficult was encountered i n the replacement of caaibatcrewsr for American type a i rc ra f t however there was a shortage of American Spi t f i re p i l o t s and at a letter date i t became necessary to es tab l i sh a t r a n s i t i o n t r a in ing f ie ld in t he rear area for these type p i l o t s -

t bull bull bull

lt bull Mail was received at I r regular In tervals o cr tr--rEporblaquo-service and i t s - rece ip t was bullbullof high morale value t o the uni t - ct tc front A postal unit for- the Commandwas-established at Teaessa- Post Exchange rat ions ( c iga re t t e s and candy) wore received regularly by al l troops i n the front areas - bull

An attempt wasmade to make awards and citations- as earned with the l eas t pract ica l delay however a shortage of medals and ribbons existed during most of the period

SECTION VIII - SSRYICB AND SUPPLY

14 January 194^ t o 9 April 194^

In preparation for tho planned offensive at the time of the replacement-of the XIT FighterCoE2inand by the XII Air Support Command the supply levels were requested for ^0 mission stookage at a l l f ie lds for a l l planes Duo t a limited r a i l f a c i l i t i e s and motor t ransport at XGOI t h i s request was denied Since t h i s offensive never developed the approximate 10 mission level that was maintained was found to be quite sa t i s fac tory ihcn l a t e r operating from the Gafsa and Sbeit la arcs in an offensive t h i s level proved s a t i s factory a t the f i e lds since there was in operation a Dump located about f i f ty m i l e s t o the rear in tho Youks-Tpbcssa area- bull - shy

Supply levels for the original planned offensive were basos on three hour missions and two missions a day for a l l planes Gasoline calculat ions

were based on 120 gallons per hour per plane for both Light Bomber andFighter Oil was calculated at 5 gallons per mission per plane Ammunitionand bombs were estimated at 100o expenditure for all pianos per missionThesef igures-were later revised decreasing the length jampf mis si on and theexpenditure ra te

On 14 January 1945 the 62nd Service Group moved into Thelepte 1 Air Field which strengthened the Service Units in personnel and equipment The increase in special Air Corps Equipment was the most important improvement since prior to this time equipment has been so lacking practically no salvage work had been attempted on those airplanes-that had crashed away from the fields bull

The 53rd Fighter Group was replaced by the 3^st Fighter Group Theshift was completed on J February 1943 The 55rd Fighter Group moved out ofthe Xll Air SupportCommand area

A Service Command Detachment moved into Sbeitla yfl Air Field on 1February 1943 and was-replaced by the 46th Service Squadron on 6 February

1943bull This ServiceSquadron arrived well equipped and had attached an Ordnance Company Signal Company and a detachment of a Quartermaster Company Dueto the changing Tactical Ground condition no tactical Air Corps unit was moved into Sbeitla -1 at this time Ar the situation develshyoped the Service Squadron and the supplies- vere evcated from this field on 14 February 1943 At the same time the 47th 3ceb rcup vas-evacuated from Thelepte 1 to Youks Leg Bains Air Base Supplies at Thelepte 1 were decreased to approximately 10 missions for one Fighter Group only

bull At 25OO 14 February 1945 complete evacuation of Thelepte jl and Thelepte JpgtL Air Fields was started All unite were moved back to Tebessa Air FieldLe Kouif Air Field Kallaat Djerda Air Field andYouks hem Bains Air Base For an evacuation-gin whichmost of the movement cane at night in the dark very l i t t l e organisational equipment was left behind The evacuation ended at 1200 15 February 1943 The units moved consisted of one Service Group one Fighter Group and one Fighter Squadron from Thelepte 1 and one Fighter Group and one Service Squadron from Thelepto 2 This consisted of a total of 3496 Officer_ff and Menplus- organizational equipment and supplies- A total oi approximately J0000 gallons of gasoline was- destroyed at both Thelepte 1 and sect2 Planes- that could not be flown away were destroyed by burning At Thelepte -fl this consisted of four P-40FTa three A-20sand three SpiffirecVsgt Of this to ta i two planes-were of the nonre par able classification At Thelepte $2 eight P~39 s were destroyed three ofwhich were nonreparable

Due to continued enemy-advance -intoKasserine Passj the organization that had previously been evacurted to Le liouif Air Field had tgt be withshydrawn to Youlcs Les-Bains and to Ain Seida poundFo supplies or equipment were lltpoundstin this-move and the supplies that were left kere held ready to be destroyed which proved not to be necessary vhori theenemy advance was finally halted Pianos-that were nonoperational at the time of the evacuation wore not destroyed but were merely loft on the field The plan althoughnever required to be put into effect was-to leave thes^ bull planes with the possibility of reclaiming them later even though the enemy had moved in to occupy the area This- procedure is now standard pn a l l

bull - bull 1 5 bull

evacuations as it-has been shown on the reoccupation of Thelepte 1 andThelepte $2 that the airplanes destroyed might have been reclaimed had theynot been burned Sincethe enemy could not have flown them without repairwork and parts it is anticipated that they might burin the equipment to desshytroy itbut their using the equipment against our forces would be almostimpossible

The Lafayette Escadrille that was moved into the Air Field at KalaatBjorda was also reevacuated at the same time Le Xouif Air Field was clearedApproximately 10000 gallons of gasoline was destroyed and one P-40F was burnqdon the ground This French Squadron was moved from the area of the XII AirSupport Command at this time bullbull bull

Since there was no officer of the Air Service Command nearer than Conshystantine the orders for evacuation of Service Command troops from Sbeitlaand the Thelepte area wore given by the Tactical Commander XII Air SupportCommand If this were followed as Standing Operating Procedure on change oflocation the confu-sionthat previously existed could be eliminated by havingthe Service Command Squadron or Detachment move without any further orders reshyquired to any location taken up by the Tactical Unit who they are servicing

Since this evacuation a Service Command Officer has been located in theXII Air Support Command Headquarters with authority to move any or all AirService Command units andthe policy has been adopted to have the Service Unitstay with the TacticalUnit it is servicing for any move that is made unlessunsatisfactory service is being obtained as expressed by the Tactical UnitCommanding Officer This has eliminated the problem of the Servicing Unitstarting to learn from scratch each tine a move is made the problems ofthat-particular Tactical Unit and the familiarization of the type of airplaneto be maintained

TheSupply Level Calculations were revised after one months operationin this theater using figures as follows

Missions Length 1 hour- 2 missions per day for all planes

bull Gasoline Consumption P-40F per mission 100 gallons A-20 por mission bull 180 gallons

bull bull v Spitfire per mission 35 gallons P~59 Pdegr mission 100 gallons

- bullbullbull Hurri-Bombcr per mission 100 gallons

Oil Consumption P-AO per mission J gallonA-20 per mission 5 gallons

bull - Spitfire per mission bullsectbull gallon- bull P-59per mission |r gallon

Ammunition Expenditure kO por mission

Bombs Expenditure 100$ for Light Bombers per mission

The shift of the Jlst Fighter Group from Tobossa Air Field to KalaatDjerdaAir Field cameat the completion of tho enemy thrust into ICasserino

1-6

Pass This movement took placo on 24 February 1945bull The Tactical Unitoperated with a detachment of the 62nd Service Group bull _

The 62nd Service Group starting at this time withdrew from XII Air SupportCommand Area and the 4lst Service Group moved into Youks Les Bains Air Basefor the establishment of Service Center 10

Reoccupation of the advance fields was started on 5 Iamprch 1945 by themovement into Thelepte 2 Air Field of thamp 81st Fighter Group and the 46thService Squadron shy

The 47th Bomb Group moved out of the XII Air Support Command Area on 6March 19^5raquo Supplies were maintained for two days operations of this typeof airplane at Youks Les Bains Air Base

The movement back to Thelepte 1 by the 51st Fighter Group and the 154thObservation Squadron -was completed on 12 March 1945 after a considerable delayrequired for the clearing of enemy land mines from the area The movement ofthe 8lst and 52nd Groups back to Thelepte 2 was also completed on 12 I-Iarch

Supplies were maintained at a three day level at these advance fields fortwo missions a day for all planes Reserve supplies were held in the Dump atthe Tebessa-Youka Area As the Gafsa Offensive started and the advance progshyressed up through the Sbeitla section this supply level was maintained atthese fields Youks Les Sains Air Base was maintained at a four day level andthe Dump at Tebessa~Youks was started for a build up tohold the remainder ofthe supplies required for a ten day level in the area which was computed as atotal for the supplies at the Dump Air Base andAdvance Fields

The55rd Fighter Group joined XII Air Support Command once more on 20March 19^5 This-unit moved intofSbeitla sect1 with the 26th Service SquadronSupplies were maintained at merely a two- day level due to its advance location

As soon as the Gafsa area had been occupied by the GroundForces theGafsa Air Field was-stocked with emergency supplies One Squadron of Spitfireairplanes was moved into this field for daylight hours of operation only Theyreturned to Thelepte 1 with the rest of the Group at night A small detachmenof Service Command personnel handled the stockage of supplies and the CfcoundCrews of the Flight Echelon of the Tactical Squadron rcr12ined for the dailyservicing of the airplanes Supply levels were held at merely one day1 s level

On advancement on all fronts the Thelepte and Sbeitla Areas were com pletely cleared by all units of the XII Air Support Command on 12 April 1945Advance positions were taken up around Le Sers

Through the entire period from 14 January I945 to 9 April 1945 criticalitems were motor vehicles the Tactical Units operating 75^ short until themiddle of February and approximately 50 short through to the end of thisperiod Field Ranges Tentago and Paulins and Airplane spare parts Thislater item improved_to some extent with the arrival of the 4lst Service GroupAt the eni of this 9 April 1945 period there was still considerable improvement

- 17

required for the efficient operation necessary for the bestTactical Opershyation Ordnanfce cleaning and preserving materials armament spare partsand tools have been lacking through this entire period Only by improvisingwith the minimum of supplies and equipment have the servicing personnel beenable to operate

SEOTIOIT I X ~ SIQidL 00MLMI0ATI0K5

li During the early part of January 1943 the XII Air Support Commandwas given the mission of supporting the II Corps Tentative plans were immedshyiately drawn up for the signal requirements covering HF and VHP radio chanshynels including call signs and frequencies wire linearequireaents directcircuits and switching trunks teleprinter circuits supply dumps and mainshytenance districts

2 After the plan was thoroughly coordinated with AFHQ II Corps 12thAir Force and 12th Air Service Command the SOI for the XII Air SupportCommand was published and distribution effected prior to movement into thetheater of operations The time element involved in perfecting and coordinshyation of the plan and for the completion of the SOI was- approximately oneweek It is now a definately established fact that t-is coordination is ofprime importance bull

5raquo ^deg perform its fission the XII Air Support Corjinand had assigned toit the following signal and communication units on the dates as listed

3rd Air Support Cormiiunications Squadron 10 January 1943 927th Signal Battalion ASC 10^ January__l94

451st Signal Construction Battalion f cTMarch ~ 3rd Air Defense -fing (Hq) ) $gt jgtlarch

Dets 56lst AvfS Bn 9 March 752nd AI- Co 9 March 753rd Ayen 06 9 Harch 734th AyenCo shy bull bull 9 March

bullThe last six units were ordered into the theirfeF for the establishshyment of the Air Earning Service-

4 The signal plan and procedure followed is listed below numberedaccording to priority of installations

^ -fIRE LINES

(l) Direct talking circuits from A-3 to each airfield terminshyating at the group operations desk If airfields are located more than 20miles from Headquarters XII Air Support Command two but not more than twofields should be connected on one talking circuit

(2) A direct talking circuit from Headquarters XII AirSupport Command switchboard to next higher headquarters switchboard

18

(5) A direct talking circuit between Alaquov and Q-5 ^ Corps

(4) A direct talking circuit from A-5 o the control officerAircraft Earning Service

(5) A direct talking circuit from Operations Control AWSto the control officer of the Air Support Commands on the right and leftflanks (242 Gr~oup and VJeetern Desert Air Force) (British)

(6) A direct talking circuit from Control AVS to each airshyfield terminating in the operations officer1s office A party line to twoor more fields has been found adequate

(7) A direct talking circuit from Control AVJS to antishyaircraft headquarters located at each field when the airfields are locatedwithin -12 miles of the AlrS Control YJhen the fields are located at agreater distance the circuit in (6) above supplemented by radio is sufficshyient

(8) Group wire operational circuits are required from groupheadquarters to each squadron and to the base command headquarters switchshyboard

bull bull h ADMINISTRATIVE YIRE LINES

(1) A direct ring down trunk from base headquarters switch-hoard to the nearest switchboard connecting to the general overall wire netof the area

(2) Local drops to ordnance engineer gasoline and radiorepair sections

_c TELEPRINTER WIRE REQUIREMENTS

(1) From the immediate vicinity of A-5 to the immediatevicinity of the group operations at each field Loop circuits aiinplexed ondirect talking circuits mentioned in par 4 _a (l)shy

(2) From the vicinity of A-5 to next higher headquarterssimplexedon direct talking circuit mentioned in par 4 o (2)

bull(5) Administrative teleprinter from service center to thenearest teleprinter switchboard operating into the general overall teleprinterwire net

(4) A teleprinter from Headquarters XII Air Support Commandto nearest teleprinter switchboard operating in the general overall teleshyprinter wire net

d RADIO NETS

(1) AIR SUPPORT NET remoted from the immediate vicinity ofA-5 to all Air Support Parties attached to Divisions and Combat teams

19

(Stations in command net monitor this net)

(2) COMMAND NET remoted from the vicinity of each airfield

LIAISON NET 1 remoted from the immediate vicinity of A-to next higher tactical headquarters

LIAISON NET 2 remoted from the immediate vic ini ty of A-J to the Air Support deg lands covering the r igh t and l e f t f lanks

(5) ADMINISTRATIVE NET from the vicini ty of Headquarters XII a i r Support Command to Headquarters of tho Air Service Command and to the next higher administrative headquarters

pound AIRCRAFT WARNING NETS bull

bull ( l ) Prom operations control to each of the outlying Ground Control Intercept (Chain over Low) (GClCol) s tat ions and to a l l Light Earnshying (IiV) s ta t ions

(2) From a l l Ground Observation Posts to Control Posts to Operations Control AWS SCR-195

(3) Liaison Control net SCR-299 from the immediate v ic in i ty of the Defense Wing Headquarters to Headquarters of the Air Support Commands on both flanks

f HF RADIO NETS

(1) HOMER and RDF HET SCR-574 Homing station at copyachfield (When two or more fields are located vithin a 10 mile radius onehomer is deemed adequate) bull

(2) GROUND-AIR CONTROL NET (SCR-572 and 575) Located inthe vicinity of tho defense wing operations

( AIR-GROUND NET Air Support Party to a i rc ra f t in f l i gh t Normally on Channel D SGR-522 se t

(4) AIR TO AIRNETS Normal SCR-522 bullbullbullbull

(5) AIRIBOIiE C01-ITR0L NET- Normal modified SCR-522

g 3-IAINTENAITCE OF V RE LINES

(l) The II Corps in the initial phases of the combat covereda front of approximately l O miles Corps and XII Air Support Oornmand basesextended from this front to the rear approximately 100 miles The maintenshyance of all wire linos in the area immediately assumed a problem of conshysiderable proportions The entire area was subdivided into sections andallocated to the 5Jrd Signal Battalion II Corps and the 927th Signal Batshytalion ASC XII Air Support Command The installation operation and

2 0

maintenance of st-ritchboards switching centrals test stations and troubleshooting bivouac areas l ere likewise allocated between the two battalionsThis procedure produced excellent wire communications and reduced to a minshyimum the lost hour circuit failuro Without this close coordination andmutual assistance on the part of a11 Signal personnel in II Corps and XIIAir Support Command signal communications could not have functioned nearlyso efficiently gtbull

ji MESSAGE CENTER bullbull bull

(1) Message Centers have functioned normally except at Headshyquarters XII Air Support Command A special Message Center for the nonshystop delivery of messages of a tactical nature from A-3 to telephones teleshyprinters courier station and remote radio control truck set up adjacenttpv-Amdash35 This procedure had reduced to an absolute minimum the time intervalfrom the time the message ie written until the time receipted for by theaddressee

(2) It was initially assumed that cryptographic duties wouldbe very heavy Two cryptographic officers were initially set up along withfive-enlisted men cryptographic clerks Immediately upon engagement with shythe enemy it was found that this personne1 was too limited One additionalofficer and four enlistedmen cryptographic clerks were added to handlethe traffic and make distribution of secret documents

ri SIGNAL SUPPLIES bullbullbull

bull bullbull (l) Through mutual agreement wilSh Signal Officer II Corpssignal supplies fton Corps dumps vcre made available to tlie XII Air SupportCommand In addition the Signal Supply Sectionof the Third Service Comshymand Area has rendered excellent and speedy signal supply service freqshyuently delivering critical items lost in1combat or for replacement purposeswithin 12 hours after requests were telephoned in bull

(2) Mobile repair sections of the 3rd AirSupport CommunicationsSquadron and from the 12th Air Force Service Command have been constantlyemployed in the repair ofHF and VHF sets including airplane sets

J[ MOBILITY ~

(1) Just prior to entrance into the theater of operations the requirements for the greatest mobility-was anticipated Consequently SOH-522 airplane Tadio-sets were modified for ground use and installed in the SCPv-299 for the use of each Air Support Party

(2) A BD-89-A telephone switchboard was permanently installed in one 2sect- ton 6 X 6 cargo truck _ -

bullbullbull (5) Remote control keys michrophones and receivers vrcrc inshystalled in a 2-J- ton 6 X 6 truck These installations have materially aided inaccomplishingbullcontinuous communications during the entire operations beshytwoon rear and advanced-headquarters duringsix complete moves

1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS

(l) The Commanding Generals of both the XII Air SupportCommand and II Corps aro fully cognizant of the vital importance of signalcommunications during combat with highly mobile enemy forces Each hasdirected in each instance only the general locality into which their headshyquarters were to move The exact location of the CPraquo has been largelydetermined bjr the two Signal Officers concerned This procedure has conshyserved many miles of wire and has permitted the establishment of signalcommunications with the minimum loss of time and confusion incident to thebulldisplacement of two CP1s of this magnitude It is urgently recommendedthat this procedure b-e continued

SECTION X - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOiC-lSIlDATIOITS

The following are the personal views of Brigadier General VflLLIAlISwho commanded the XII Air Support Command from 21 January through the reshyported II Corps operations The Corps was first commanded by Major GeneralFKEDENDAHL and later by Lieutenant General PATTON

bull bull -ltJttI am thoroughly convinced that the organization of an Air Support r^f--shy

Command based oh the principles of FM 51-55 ^s sound -orkable and I ^--strongly recommend that all such commands be organized in this manner withcertain modifications ad indicated herein

The composition of iheunits composing an Air Support Coinmand willvary according to the mission thatit is required to perform The followshying units are believed to be essential to such a command operating in apurely ground action as wasthe case during thisperiod

1 A streamlinedmobile headquarters reduced in personnel to theminimum

2 One or more Communications Squadrons with Air Corps Party Officerstrained to adviseGround Commanders (One Communication Squadron vas exshypanded to operate sixteen Air Support Parties during the recent operations)

3 bull A Signal Construction Battalion consisting of two heavy companiesand one operational company

4 An Aviation Engineer Battalion

An Air Earning Service and Fighter Control Organization

The above units should be assigned to the Air Support Command and their CPs be with or in the immediate proximity to the Command Posts

bull In addition one or norc Service Groups should be attached to theAir Support Command and their personnel remain a part of and move with theTactical units they serve

22

All the above units should be mobile and have sufficient intregaltransportation to facilitate their own movements Tactical Commands shouldhave mobile operations equipment and principal staff officers and commandersshould have mobile living quarters

Fighter fighter bomber5 dive bomber and horizontal bomber aircraftshould be assigned and operated under the central control of the Air SupportCommand The proportion of types is dependentupon the situation which isinfluenced primarily by the enemy air strength the location of his airdromesand the particular problems of the ground forces supported In addition aTactical Reconnaissance Squadron with a Photo Section is essential

In order to give themaximum amount of support to the ground troopsthe Air Commander must be free to employ his force in the manner in whichhe is trained and knows will give maximum support Ho arbitary rules or docshytrines for Air Support can and should be established Fundamentally Airapportr can only be effective when air superiority is gained in the area inwhich the ground forces are operating Hence the first requirement is togain air superiority in the area This may or may net be done in conjunctionwith other air forces operating in the theatre Local air superiority overfriendly troops is the second definite requirement for effective supportThis is gained by bombing of enemy airdromes fighter sweep3 and interceptshyions all for the purpose of neutralizing the enemy s cii effort

With general and localair superiority established ground troops canoperate effectively The maximum localised support can than be given by theair The Air Support Commander is in a -osition to iuset all requests on thepart of the Ground Commander within the capabilities of his force

From the operations reports above it will be seen that in the firstphases the enemy destroyed more of our aircraft than we destroyed of his fith the assignment of an increased number of aircraft air superiority wasefinitely established During this period our ground forces were able to

-Love up their units from Casablanca and Algiers without harrassment by theenemy air Movements were made by day with vehicles bumper to- bumper Thisbecause of the protective air screen established by our fighters This wasour first support mission and o-f course must have been appreciated by theGround Commanders

fith ground forces in position air superiority had to be and was mainshytained Continuous support-was given through responding to requests fromGround Commanders through Air Sjjupport Party channels and also by setting uptargetsas developed by aerial reconnaissance In this connection it iswell to note that aboutn ampQjfepf tk

g support missions flown were developed bythe Air This was in accordance with the desires of both General FREDS1JDAHLand General PATTON who both stated in substance Dont wait for us to orderxair missions you know what the situation is- just keep pounding them J

I and my principal staff officers lived and operated with tho CorpsCommanders during most of the period This is absolutely essential A highdegree of cooperation and coordination ensued This dopounds not mean that allground requests were ajutQjaajt j lly ajgproved by the air In liolitiroversTalcasesa conference was held and the propeTaction taken

The above system def ini te ly works The Air Commander must have the bull in i t i a t ive i n the a i r the Ground Commander on the ground There i s noshynessessity or reason for an assignment or attachment of one force to the other

I am convinced tha t our a i r support was effect ive With the expershyience gained there i s no doubt in my mind tha t outstanding acco^pj islsments along Air Support l ines within the American Forces can be expectecU

PAUL L WILLIAMS Brigadier General USA Commanding

24

gtMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

FORT LEAVEN WORTH KANSAS

AIR MAIL 19 March 1943

Coiruaanding General Twelfth A i r r o r c e APO 650 co PostmasterNew York NY

Dear Spaatz

We are progressively expanding our instruction from Air CorpsStaff officers trying to improve its quality To do this we haveneed for information from air units which are actively operating andto have the benefit of their observations and experiences You willhelp us greatly if you can give us answers to the attached list ofquestions If parts of the answers are extremely confidential orsecret so indicate and we will act accordingly

I inclose a copy of our latest program for the General StaffCourse to show the character of the instruction now being given andthe amount of special instruction given to the group of Air Corpsstudents This group now numbers 132 future classes will be 165We intend to increase the amount of Air Force instruction as fastas our instructors can prepare the material Every effort is beingmade to get our operational information from the field so as to keepthe doctrine up to date and sound and thus insure that your graduateswill improve in quality

It is our hope that the junior members of active staffs will beprocessed through the School whenever they return to this country orbecome otherwise available and that their replacements graduatesfrom this School will be observed and checked on their new jobs andthat we be informed so as to further improve the methods and techniquestaught here

Whatever help you may offer will be greatly appreciated

All best wishes

) Ml-KARL TRUESDELLMaj Gen U S Army

2 Incls- ComdtQuery shyProgram 12GS Course CampGSS


19 March 1943

Twelfth Air Force

















Dear Truesdell


All best wishes

Sincerely

LieutenantComm



Cl






14 May 1943__










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9 APRIL 19^5




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PRE P A C E

















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bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













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9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


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Flak 11

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IT March to 9 April





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24


19 March 1943

Twelfth Air Force

















Dear Truesdell


All best wishes

Sincerely

LieutenantComm



Cl






14 May 1943__










-1shy












I bull $


Warning System



2 Observer Corps






















x

bullf


5423 2561 2862










Number Id )






















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7 ^ 3

K y M


9 APRIL 19^5




TUNISIA


PRE P A C E

















1 tgtL f A









SEIZED areas bull












a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













ja Victories bull


ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


ib Losses-


Flak 11

Other 1



tc Tanksi

Destroyed 15

Damaged ijtk




IT March to 9 April





7

















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24



Dear Truesdell


All best wishes

Sincerely

LieutenantComm



Cl






14 May 1943__










-1shy












I bull $


Warning System



2 Observer Corps






















x

bullf


5423 2561 2862










Number Id )






















Number bull 23 )


















7 ^ 3

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9 APRIL 19^5




TUNISIA


PRE P A C E

















1 tgtL f A









SEIZED areas bull












a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













ja Victories bull


ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


ib Losses-


Flak 11

Other 1



tc Tanksi

Destroyed 15

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IT March to 9 April





7

















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TOTALS 271







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14 May 1943__










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5423 2561 2862










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7 ^ 3

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9 APRIL 19^5




TUNISIA


PRE P A C E

















1 tgtL f A









SEIZED areas bull












a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













ja Victories bull


ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


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Flak 11

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Destroyed 15

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IT March to 9 April





7

















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TOTALS 271







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7 ^ 3

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9 APRIL 19^5




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PRE P A C E

















1 tgtL f A









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a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













ja Victories bull


ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


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Flak 11

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IT March to 9 April





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PRE P A C E

















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a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













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ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



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Flak 11

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IT March to 9 April





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K y M


9 APRIL 19^5




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PRE P A C E

















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a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













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ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



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Flak 11

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IT March to 9 April





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9 APRIL 19^5




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PRE P A C E

















1 tgtL f A









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a 26 P~4Os

bull 58 A~2Os


bulla 52 P-4O-fs













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ltb Losses



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Order of Hattler






9


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b - 27 P-39ls









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IT March to 9 April





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bulla 52 P-4O-fs













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Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









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IT March to 9 April





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Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









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IT March to 9 April





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bull 58 A~2Os


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ltb Losses



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9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


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IT March to 9 April





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nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


ib Losses-


Flak 11

Other 1



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IT March to 9 April





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bulla 52 P-4O-fs













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ltb Losses



bulla Trucks bull


b_ Tanks
















nd Maknassy

Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


ib Losses-


Flak 11

Other 1



tc Tanksi

Destroyed 15

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IT March to 9 April





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TOTALS 271







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H -GEMUL


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Order of Hattler






9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


ib Losses-


Flak 11

Other 1



tc Tanksi

Destroyed 15

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IT March to 9 April





7

















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9


-a J6 Spitfires

b - 27 P-39ls









TOTALS 128 1455



a Victories


ib Losses-


Flak 11

Other 1



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IT March to 9 April





7

















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TOTALS 271







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9


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Other 1



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IT March to 9 April





7

















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H -GEMUL


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t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24

tc Tanksi

Destroyed 15

Damaged ijtk




IT March to 9 April





7

















a lid-spitfires







^ 8





TOTALS 271







bull bull bull


a Trucks-


by Tanksr





H -GEMUL


9



a FIGHTERS










10














11



bull bull bull bull














12













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24

















a lid-spitfires







^ 8





TOTALS 271







bull bull bull


a Trucks-


by Tanksr





H -GEMUL


9



a FIGHTERS










10














11



bull bull bull bull














12













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24





TOTALS 271







bull bull bull


a Trucks-


by Tanksr





H -GEMUL


9



a FIGHTERS










10














11



bull bull bull bull














12













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24



a FIGHTERS










10














11



bull bull bull bull














12













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24














11



bull bull bull bull














12













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24



bull bull bull bull














12













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24













15







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24







t bull bull bull





























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24























1-6











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24











- 17











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24











^ -fIRE LINES



18















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24















d RADIO NETS


19










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24










f HF RADIO NETS








2 0








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24








J[ MOBILITY ~




1 21

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24

k MISCELLANEOUS














22













24













24

Northwest African Air Forces-1943

Documents

Transcript of Northwest African Air Forces-1943