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CHAPTER 6

Northern Saipan: End of the Campaign 1

THE PICTURE ON 1 JULY

The scene of Saito’s last stand hadbeen sketched out on 27 June by Thirty-first Army Headquarters; “The defenseforce . . . is at present setting up witha line between Tanapag—Hill 221—Tarahoho as the final line of resist-ance.” z Withdrawal to the line wasordered by Saito on 2 July.

In contrast, on the same date, the 2d

Marine Division moved forward morerapidly than ever since the landings.Holland Smith’s objective line, fixed on1 July, ran from Garapan up the west

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis chapter is derived from: TF 51 OpRpt;TG 52.2 OpRpt; TF 56 OpRpt ; NTLF OpRpt;2d Mat-Div OpRpt; 4th MarDiv OpRpt; 27thInfDiv OpRpt; 2d Mar SAR; 6th Mar SAR;8th Mar SAR; 10th Mar SAR; 23d Mar Rpt;24th Mar Rpt; 25th Ma~ Rpt; 105th Znf OpRpt; 106th Inf OpRpt; 165th Inf OpRpt; Sa-buro Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, K6gun: TheJapanese Army in the Pacific War ( Quantico:The Marine Corps Association, 1959 ) , here-after Hayashi and Coox, K6yun; Capt JamesR. Stockman and Capt Philips D. Carleton,Campaign fw the Marianas (Washington:HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), hereafter Stockmanand Carleton, Ca?npaign for the Marianas;Crowl, Marianas Campaign; Hoffman, Saipan;Isely and Crow], Mam”nes and AmphibiousWar; Johnston, Follow Me!; Love, 27th InfDiv History; Morison, New Guinea and theMa~ianas; Proehl, 4th Ma~Div Histo~y; Sher-rod, Marine Air History; Smith and Finch,Coral and Brass.

‘ Thirty -jivst Ar Outgoing Msg No. 1120.

332

coast to Tanapag, then eastward acrossnorthern Saipan. Three American di-visions—the 2d Marine Division on theleft, the 4th Marine Division on theright, and the 27th Infantry Divisionbetween—were intent upon concludingthe battle. Before executing the lastmoves, they turned to a straighteningof the corps line.

On 1 July the 2d Division did notattempt to advance its left flank regi-ment, the 2d Marines, from favorablehigh ground outside Garapan, butawaited the advance of the 6th and 8thMarines on the right. The 27th Divi-sion, held up for five hours by opposi-tion from several previously unknownenemy strongpoints, advanced 400 to500 yards. The 4th Division held fastand supported the Army units by fire.Marine patrols found no Japanese up to1,800 yards forward of the 4th Divisionline.

To the west, however, the 2d Division,like the 27th, encountered the enemy.In the division center, Marines of 3/6,moving toward the coast above Gara-pan, reached a wooded ravine defendedby three Japanese field pieces, sup-ported by rifles and machine guns.After briefly probing the strong point,

Colonel Riseley bypassed it. He leftCompany B to destroy the resistance, amission accomplished the next day.

On the division right, the 8th Ma-rines picked up speed across relatively

NUK’l HEKN 3AlrAl~ : MAu U~ ‘1llu u~lvlr,qlbn

even terrain, where, better than aroundTapotchau, the tanks could serve theinfantry. At 0730 on 1 July, the 1stBattalion, 29th Marines, in a well exe-cuted tank-infantry thrust, overranTommy’s Pimple with no casualties.The battalion then advanced, in con-junction with 2/8, toward the TanapagHarbor area.

To the regimental left, on 1 July, the1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was joinedby 2/2, relieving 3/8, and the two bat-talions reported good progress. Theday’s action included seizure of the lasttwo Pimples, Larry’s and Stan’s.

By sunset of 1 July, then, the corpsline had been straightened consider-ably. There was no longer any reasonto delay the thrust toward Tanapag.The corps commander issued the appro-priate order.

VICTORY A WAITS NORTH WARD

At 2245 on 1 July, the 2d Marinesreceived attack orders from division or-dering an advance into Garapan. Thenext morning at 1030, Colonel Stuartbegan to move out, the 1st Battalion onthe right, the 3d on the left.

By 1200 the 3d Battalion, supportedby Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, was800 yards inside the town, finding grimevidence of what artillery, aircraft, andnaval guns could do. Yet Japanese sol-diers were still there—not many, butsome-and hostile fire was encountered.Some American war correspondents re-ported that at Garapan the Marines ex-perienced their first street fighting ofWorld War II. According to divisionaccounts, however, “actually there waslittle, if any, of this type of fightingcompared to European standards. . . .

asrs

The town had been leveled com-pletely.” 3 Garapan had been the sec-ond largest town of the Marianas, nextonly to Agana in Guam. Before thefirst World War it had been headquar-ters of the German administration, anda village centuries before that.

Twisted metal roof tops now litteredthe area, shielding Japanese snipers.A number of deftly-hidden pillboxeswere scattered among the ruins. As-sault engineers, covered by riflemen,slipped behind such obstacles to set ex-plosives while flamethrowers seared thefront. Assisted by the engineers, andsupported by tanks and 75mm self-pro-pelled guns of the Regimental WeaponsCompany, the 2d Marines beat downthe scattered resistance before night-fall. On the beaches, suppressing firefrom the LVT (A)s of the 2d ArmoredAmphibian Battalion silenced Japaneseweapons located near the water.

Advancing to the coast above thetown, 1/2 sliced through scattered en-

emy defenses. Southeast of Garapan,riflemen of Company A seized Flame-tree Hill, where, despite the blasting byMarine artillery on 29 June, the enemyhad continued to hold out.

While the 2d Marines was movinginto Garapan, the 6th Marines attackedthe high ground overlooking the townand overcame moderate resistance.Company A of 1/6 joined men fromCompanies A and B of 1/2 in silencingthe fire from caves on rockbound SugarLoaf: a distinctive hill on the regimen-tal boundary.

Inland, the 8th Marines continued to-

ward Tanapag Harbor. Progress of

2/8 and 1/29, however, was stopped on

‘ 2d MarDiv OpRpt, SplCmts, p. 3.

NORTHERN SAIPAN : END OF THE CAMPAIGN 335

the afternoon of 2 July, when machineguns opened up from a coral-limestone

hill to the right of the flat terrain.Fire enfiladed the entire front of 2/8and much of that of 1/29. Lieutenant

Colonel Tompkins, commanding 1/29,was wounded by a shell fragment, andwas immediately replaced by Lieuten-

ant Colonel Jack P. Juhan, the 8th Ma-rines executive officer.

The strongpoint lay too close to Ma-rine lines for artillery fire. Major

Chamberlain, commanding 2/8, at-

tempted an envelopment, swingingCompany F to the east along the onlyavailable route. The Marines cutthrough entangling underbrush hopingfor surprise, but the enemy anticipatedthe move and turned the attackers backwith a withering fusillade.

In the early evening, tanks and flame-

throwers were employed against thehill. They did some damage, but em-placements were so well dug-in, and the

caves so well fortified and arranged,

that nothing but slow yard-by-yarddemolition would neutralize the posi-tion. It was decided, therefore, to by-pass the strongpoint and resume theadvance the next morning, leaving

Company F to contain it. On the eve-ning of 3 July, the 2d Provisional Com-pany, one of the units formed from the

shore parties, came up to relieve Com-pany F of its task, and the latter re-joined its battalion, then 1,000 yards

ahead.Opposition to the progress of the 4th

Division was markedly less than thatmet by the 2d Division. On 2 July,ending its brief pause, and with the 23dand 24th Marines in assault, the 4thDivision advanced toward the north-west coast. A gain of some 1,600

yards was reported for the day against

such light resistance that only one Ma-rine was wounded. At 1345, the divi-sion dug in until units of 3/165 on theleft could catch up.

The 27th Infantry Division, rejoinedthe day before by the 165th Regiment,spent 2 July mopping up rough terrainin its zone of advance. Five enemytanks emplaced as pillboxes were en-countered and knocked out by the 106th

Infantry. Heavy machine gun fire de-layed 3/105, creating a risky gap be-

tween 3/165 on its right and the 106thInfantry on its left. General Grinerordered 1/105 to wheel around the 3dBattalion combat area and march northto close the gap, a mission it accom-plished before dark. The divisionreported gains for 1,400 to 1,800 yards

on 2 July and made contact on theright with the 4th Marine Division.

(See Map 19.)

A NEW LOOK AT THE MAP

Satisfied with the overall situation,Holland Smith felt it was time to exe-cute certain changes. Desiring to restthe 2d Marine Division for the Tiniancampaign, he altered direction of thecorps attack late on 2 July, bending it

left, more to the northwest. Underthis plan, the 2d Division would bepinched out above Garapan, while the27th infantry Division inclined westtoward the sea near Tanapag, forminga barrier against Japanese retreatnorthward. The 4th Marine Division,after reaching the west coast aboveTanapag, would veer east, to compressthe enemy in the remaining northernarea. On 3 July, the 25th Marines wasreleased from corps reserve, enabling

336 CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

General Schmidt to attack on a three-regiment front.

Marines of the 2d Division spent abusy Fourth of July, prior to leavingthe lines. The 3d Battalion of the 2dMarines took Mutcho Point by 0900,

eliminating a small Japanese garrison.The only headache of the operation was

an enemy heavy antiaircraft gun far-ther up the shore, which delivered airbursts uncomfortably close to the at-tacking troops.

By 1000 on the same day, the 6thMarines was on the beach at TanapagHarbor, and at 1320, the 8th Marinesreached the same vicinity. During theafternoon, Marines of 1/2 employingLVTS cleaned out the few enemy

trapped in the boat basin. About theharbor the hulks of damaged shipssheltered some Japanese snipers. Upand down the coast there were still anumber of undestroyed concrete pill-

boxes.with the action of 4 July, most of

the 2d Marine Division passed intoNTLF reserve. The 4th Marine Divi-

sion and the 27th infantry Divisionwere assigned to conclude the cam-paign. During the afternoon of 4 July,

the Army division shifted its frontlineunits and prepared for the drive towardMarpi Point. The 105th Regiment

was shortly to be joined by its 2d Bat-talion, which started marching northon the 4th after its release from duty akNafutan Point. Soldiers of the 106th

took over the shell-wrecked seaplanebase at Flores Point on 4 July.

The NTLF commander addressed anIndependence Day “well done” to alltroops. The day was appropriately

noted in 4th Division reports by thecapture of “Fourth of July Hill,” a

heavily wooded knob on the easternside of Hill 721. The higher hill was,in fact, the more significant rise, sincethe Japanese there observed much sur-rounding terrain. Efforts by 3/23 tocapture Hill 721 on 3 July had beenviolently opposed. The infantrymen,deprived of tank support by mines,were stopped short. Colonel Jones,commanding the 23d Marines, there-fore ordered the battalion pulled backsome 300 yards, to permit night bom-bardment by howitzers of the 14th Ma-rines. Next morning, 1/23 passedthrough 3/23 and swept to the top ofHill 721 against surprisingly lightsmall arms and machine gun fire.Most of the battered enemy had de-parted for a more healthful area. (SeeMap 19. )

A neighboring hill, 767, was taken bya strong combat patrol from 1/23 with-out meeting enemy fire. This hillmarked the deepest thrust of the Amer-ican advance on 4 July. Around it, the25th Marines tied in with the 23d,while the 24th Marines—with Hill2214 pocketed the day before—drew upon the left. Marines were by nowpractically neighbors of General Saito,for Hill 767 was next door to ParadiseValley (labeled “Valley of Hell” by theJapanese), site of the last Japaneseheadquarters on Saipan. (See Map20. )

WRAPPING UP THE CAMPAIGN

General Smith fixed noon of 5 Julyas jump-off hour for the final push on—

‘ The hill was nicknamed Radar Hill by theMarines because of Japanese radar installa-tions there.


northern Saipan, involving the 4th Ma-rine Division on the right and the 27thInfantry Division on the left. Armytroops were by then on the Tanapagplain. Prior to the attack, the 106thInfantry went into reserve. The lastadvance was assigned to the other regi-ments, the 105th on the left and the165th on the right. These soldiersnear the eastern shore were due forsome of the toughest combat experi-enced on the island.

In the middle interior, the 4th Ma-rine Division advanced so rapidly toKaraberra Pass on 5 July that the corpscommander resolved upon a change ofmissions. He felt concerned that the27th Infantry Division, which was mov-ing against stiffer resistance, would gettoo far behind. At 0900 on 6 July,therefore, he ordered the 27th Divisionto alter its direction of advance fromnortheast to north, and he moved theleft flank of the 4th Division to thenorthwest. (See Map 20.)

When Army troops reached the coastnear the village of Makunsha the 27thDivision would be pinched out. The4th Division was then to pick up theadvance to Marpi Point, northern tip ofthe island. The new zone of the 27thDivision extended up the coast fromTanapag to just above Makunsha andpartially inland. It included a canyon,shortly to be dubbed Harakiri Gulch,and Paradise Valley. Everythingnortheast of the Army sector was as-signed to the 4th Division. On 6 July,the 2d Marines was attached to thatdivision and charged with destroyingany Japanese that slipped away fromthe Army vanguard. On the sameday, 1/29 passed to control of GeneralJarman’s Garrison Force.

On the afternoon of 6 July, the 25thMarines, advancing with 13 tanks, gotas far northeast as Mt. Petosukara,which was taken after digging out Jap-anese from cliffs en route. The day’saction included surrender of a group ofmore than 700 civilians shortly beforedark. The 24th Marines, to the left,gained up to 1,800 yards without diffi-culty, but the 23d Marines, probing thefringes of Paradise Valley, was delayedby fire from caves and underbrush,much of it at their backs. Contactwith the 24th Marines was lost, butconnection was made with elements ofthe 27th Division. Next day, the 2dMarines was put into line between the23d and 24th Marines.

With the 106th Infantry going intoreserve on 4 July, the 105th pursuedthe advance up the west coast while the165th. moved through the adjoining in-terior. The 2d Battalion, 105th passedthrough the ruins of Tanapag unop-posed on 5 July, but beyond there itsadvance was blocked by machine gunfire. Shortly after moving out on 6July, the battalion was stopped by ahail of small arms fire coming from theimmediate front. The source, atfirst undetectable, proved to be a shal-low ditch just 150 yards ahead. Itseemed a suitable target for 60mm mor-tars, but ammunition was lacking. Arifle squad rushed what appeared to bethe most active machine gun position,but the squad leader was wounded andthe bold effort repulsed. Three rovingArmy tanks then turned up and joinedthe fight, with the result that some 150Japanese soldiers jammed along theditch were killed. The action freedthe advance of 2/105.

On 6 July, 3/105, operating farther


inland, approached the edge of Hara-kiri Gulch and was stopped by fire.This canyon, stretching 400 yards long,east to west, and 50 yards wide, layastride the regimental boundary. On5 July, a company of the 165th Infantryhad collided with a nest of enemy de-fenders in the same area and had beendriven back by a veritable wall of en-emy fire. On the next day, when 1/165attempted the canyon, its men weresurprised by a series of explosions in-side some straw shacks, caused whenabout 60 Japanese committed suicidewith grenades. The event did not in-dicate capitulation, however. Resist-ance by other Japanese kept the gulchimpenetrable to 1/165, as well as to3/105 which attacked it on the west.A relieving battalion, 3/106, aided by aplatoon of tanks, was at last able to se-cure the floor of the canyon by 0900 on7 July.

The enemy’s defense of HarakiriGulch, grim though it was, becomes ob-scured by the size and fury of whatbefell the 1st and 2d Battalions of the105th Infantry on 7 July. A desper-ate scheme had been evolved by theweary and ill Saito—then “a pitifulsight,” an enemy staff officer recalled.4Oppressed by reports of ground lost--of Saipan, last hope of Imperial victory,slipping away—he meditated uponcheerless alternatives. Saito’s sixthand last command post, taken up on 3July, was the smallest. A cave shel-tered by jungle, it cut low into a hill ofParadise Valley. More like a refugethan a headquarters, the cave lay some1,000 yards inland from Makunsha. It

was miles and days from the village

4NTLF OpRpt, Encl D, Pt II, App G, p. 2.

schoolhouse in Charan Kanoa, Saito’sfirst command post of the Saipan cam-paign.

SAIT(YS LAST DECISIONS

By now the valley of Saito’s despairwas raked daily by Marine artillery andnaval gunfire. The general himselfhad been wounded by a shell fragment.After consulting staff officers and ViceAdmiral Nagumo—likewise at a caveheadquarters—the Japanese commanderplotted a last grand banzai attack tostart before the dawn of 7 July. Itwas one alternative to waiting for de-struction; no tactical accomplishmentwas apparently expected. “Whetherwe attack or whether we stay where weare, there is only death” said the gen-eral’s melancholy summary of afiairs.sSaito, the advocate of mobile defense,was at last immobilized. In repay-ment to the Empire for the loss ofSaipan, he exhorted each Japanese sol-dier to exact seven lives for one.

Saito would lead the advance, heproclaimed, but actually he had otherplans for himself. The order prepared,the general adjourned to a farewellmeal of sake and canned crabmeat.Next morning, leaving the attack tohands less old and tired, Saito commit-ted hwakiri.e

The desperate assault was expectedby General Smith, among others. On6 July, the corps commander, accom-panied by General Watson, visited the

‘ From the text of Saito’s last order, quotedin NTLF OpRpt, Encl D, Pt I, pp. 57–58.

‘ Japanese prisoners said the command ofthe attack devolved upon Colonel Eisuke Su-zuki of the 135th In fcmt~y Regiment, who wasreported killed.


27th Division CP and cautioned Gen-eral Griner to be on the alert for aJapanese counterattack. The Tana-

pag plain furnished the most likelyavenue of approach if the enemy choseto attack. Holland Smith also indi-cated that when the Army divisionlines had advanced about a mile to thenorth, he intended to pass Watson’s 2dDivision through the 27th and continuethe attack with the 2d and 4th Divi-sions on line.7

Just before sunrise, about 0400 on 7July, like some ancient barbaric horde,the Japanese soldiers started down theTanapag plain from around Makunsha.The attack route followed mainly alongthe coastal railroad. The men wereled by officers, and they were equippedwith machine guns, mortars, and tanks.Yet it was like military order goneawry, replaced by individual passion, afearful charge of flesh and fire. Sav-age and prifiitive, the assault revertedto warfare of centuries before. Someof the enemy were armed only withrocks or a knife mounted on a pole.(See Map VI, Map Section.)

Whatever it was that drove the Jap-anese, or inspired them, they came onand on, straight into the muzzles ofopposing guns. “They just kept com-ing and coming,” recalled Major Ed-

ward McCarthy, commanding 2/105.“I didn’t think they’d ever stop. It

was like a cattle stampede.” 8 Theexact number of the attackers willprobably never be known, but it was

believed to approximate 3,000, includ-

‘ MajGen George W. Griner, Jr., USA, ltrto ACofS, G–3, dtd 12Jan63.

‘ Quoted in Love, 27th InfDiv Histovy, p.443.

ing remnants of every unit on theisland, even walking wounded.s

First to receive the impact of thebloody attack were the isolated posi-tions of the 1st and 2d Battalions,105th Infantry, which had dug in for thenight 1,200 yards south of Makunsha.At 0530 Colonel Bishop, commandingthe Army regiment, telephoned to divi-sion that terrific mortar fire was fall-ing on the two battalions.

The soldiers fought for their lives astremendous masses of the enemyflooded into a 300-yard gap between thebattalions, discovered by enemy patrolsthe night before. Both American bat-talions had pressed their attack until1630 on 6 July, too late to consolidatetheir lines before nightfall.l”

By 0635, after a night of fierce com-bat, the Japanese had overrun the 1stand 2d Battalion. Lieutenant ColonelWilliam J. O’Brien, commanding1/105, symbolized the high courage ofthe resistance. After emptying pistols

held in each hand, and though seriously

wounded, he turned a machine gunagainst the enemy until, like so manyother officers and men, he was cut downin the hopeless struggle. Shortly

‘ From its positions on the heights inland,the 23d Marines could see “considerable num-bers of Japanese moving southward down theplain. These were taken under fire by machineguns and mortars. Jones hr.1“Colonel Bishop indicated that the day’s

plan of attack called for units advancing onthe right of the 105th to seize objectives whichwould have pinched out or at least narrowedthe zone of his regiment. When this attackfailed to reach its objective, he wrote, “Wefound ourselves off balance and with a gapbetween our 1st and 2nd Bns.” Col LeonardA. Bishop ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3, HQMC,dtd 28 Feb63.


before he was killed, he had radioed the105th Infantry command post: “Thereare only 100 men left from the 1st and2d Battalions of the 105th. For God’ssake get us some ammunition and waterand medical supplies right away.” 11But four jeeploads of ammunition couldnot get through.

An offshoot wave of the enemy at-tack broke against the positions of3/105 at Harakiri Gulch, but here theAmericans, holding high ground, beatoff the Japanese. The 1st and 2d Bat-talions, what was left of them, werepushed back across the plain to Tana-pag, where house-to-house fightingensued.

About 500 yards southwest of Tana-pag on that fateful morning was the3d Battalion, 10th Marines. Nearbywas 4/10. The two battalions, nowattached to the 4th Division, had movedinto position the day before, to providesupporting fires for the 23d Marines.About 0515, just at daybreak, enemywere identified at 400 yards, movingupon the most forward battery, H, of3]10. It then seemed hardly minutesbefore nearly 500 Japanese, employingmachine guns, rifles, grenades, andtanks assaulted the entire battalionposition.

Only Battery H, on the left of therailroad tracks, was able to fire its105mm howitzers. The guns of otherbatteries were silent, forced to holdtheir fire by the fact that Americanswere positioned to their front. Artil-lerymen of Battery H cut their fuses tofour-tenths of a second; shells explodedless than 50 yards forward of the

“ Quoted in Love, 27th InfDiv History, p.447.

muzzles. At such a range the artil-lerymen swung one howitzer around todestroy a Japanese medium tank ap-proaching from the rear.

A number of the Marine cannoneerswere shot in position, crippling thefiring effectiveness of the battery.Finally, an enemy breakthrough at 0700in a wooded ravine to the left forced thesurvivors of Battery H to withdrawabout 50 yards across a road. Therethe unit set up a defense in an aban-doned Japanese machinery dump,where the Marines held out with car-bines, an automatic rifle, a pistol, andeight captured Japanese rifles untilrelieved around 1500 by Army troops.

Personnel of Headquarters and Ser-vice Battery, set up behind Battery H,were run over at the crest of the drive.The battalion commander, Major Wil-liam L. Crouch, was killed in the vaindefense. Battery I repelled a lightbrush with the enemy at 0455 beforethe full weight of the assault was felt.Thereafter, however, the supply ofartillery and small arms ammunitiondwindled rapidly, and, after removingthe firing locks from their howitzers,the artillerymen fell back to the posi-tions of Battery G. There the twobatteries stood ground, joined at mid-afternoon by elements of the 106thInfantry.

Southeast of 3/10, Marines of the 4thBattalion defended their own firingpositions, killing 85 Japanese who wereon the fringe of the tide. Several menof the battalion also helped bring somesmall arms ammunition to 3/10 andevacuate wounded from that area. Agroup of 12 men and 1 officer of the bat-talion joined counterattacking Armytroops. Of the 4th Battalion casual-


ties on 7 July—three enlisted menkilled and seven wounded—most werethe Marines who were helping out for-ward.

Following the assault of the Marinebattery positions, the Japanese swepton, approaching the regimental com-mand post of the 105th, about 800yards south of Tanapag. Here, how-ever, they could not get through thedefenses. The enemy spearhead wasbeginning to show the blunting accom-plished by the desperate fighting of theunits that had been overrun. At 1130,the depleted and tiring enemy wasconsidered pretty well stopped, butfighting dragged on through the after-noon. By then, however, the impetushad entirely vanished from the attack,and some of the Japanese were turninggrenades upon themselves.

The end, at last, was due both toArmy and Marine efforts. After send-ing every available tank to support thebeleaguered battalions of the 105th,General Griner had issued orders at0700 to the 1st and 2d Battalions of the106th, the division reserve, movingthem into position at Flores Point toattack north along the railroad. The2d Battalion was already at a FloresPoint assembly area. In support of theattack by the 106th, a provisional com-pany of tanks was attached. The twoArmy battalions were to relieve the105th and help regain the Marinebattery positions. They would be sup-ported by the three 105mm howitzerbattalions of 27th Division artillery.

The counterattack got under way at1000, the movement of units hamperedby communication difficulties. The 2dBattalion of the 106th had been partic-ularly directed to reinforce the Ma-

rines, and its Company F helped retakethe Battery I position by 1135.

Entire reoccupation of the Marinepositions was accomplished during theafternoon, and a line was then formedfrom the beach to the left of the 4thDivision. Upon request by the 27thDivision, a Marine battalion, 3/6, wasattached and it helped solidify the newline. By 1800, most of the ground lostby the banzai attack was again infriendly hands.

Saito’s farewell order had cost thetwo 105th Infantry battalions 406killed and 512 wounded. The 3d Bat-talion, 10th Marines, lost 45 killed and82 wounded, and in turn killed morethan 300 Japanese. Survivors wouldnever forget “the raid, ” as they termedit.

A staggering total of Japanese werekilled. In the area of the banzai at-tack, 4,311 Japanese corpses werefound. Some of these dead wereundoubtedly the victims of artillery ornaval gunfire prior to the attack, butthe vast majority were killed in theclimatic, fanatical charge of the Saipangarrison.

POSTSCRIPT TO “THE RAID”

The casualty-ridden 27th Division(less the 165th Infantry) was relievedby Holland Smith at 0630 of 8 July,and put into corps reserve. To accom-plish the mop up of the devastatedwest coast, the corps commander re-committed the 2d Marine Division, at-taching to it the 165th. He alsobrought 3/6, 3/10, and 4/10 back to the2d Division.

Some resistance was met by the 6thMarines on 8 July, from about 100

,.,


Japanese well entrenched east of Tana-pag. After a brief exchange, Com-pany F was left behind to eliminate thepocket. Otherwise, the Marines foundthe enemy along the coast to be poorlyarmed and disorganized. Inland hills,however, still contained hidden defen-ses where few could kill many, andJapanese holdouts here slowed the pro-gress of the 8th Marines.

The 1st Battalion of the 165th, aftera costly action at Harakiri Gulch,moved through the canyon area andreached the west coast on 9 Juiy.Paradise Valley was bypassed by 2/165,which left the 3d Battalion to destroythe Japanese still there. The 2d Bat-talion went on to Makunsha, by thena center of enemy stragglers.

In those last days, the spirit of thebanzai attack flamed again occasionally.Japanese would charge from a hidingplace, reckless of the consequences.Some, of course, were simply trying toescape. At the beaches a number ofJapanese swam hopelessly out to coraloutcropping, where they either werekilled or destroyed themselves.

The 4th Marine Division, which on6 July took over the entire front beyondMakunsha, found the advance towardMarpi Point eased somewhat as a re-sult of the banzai attack—there werefewer Japanese. The 2d Marines,attached on 8 July, went into line be-tween the 23d Marines to the left andthe 24th and 25th to the right. Thus,with four Marine regiments abreast ona 6,300-yard front, the division at-tacked toward the northwest on 8 July.(See Map 20.)

The 2d and 24th Marines securedtheir beach area at 1530. The advanceof the 23d Marines was marked by

214-881O-67—23

destruction of stubborn resistance on acliff overlooking Karaberra Pass. AsMarines struggled against the enemythere on 7 July, they nicknamed thehigh ground “Prudential Hill” becauseit resembled an American insurancecompany trademark. But, unlike thepeaceful scene of Gibraltar, there weremines hidden at the base of the hill.The area was masked for fire by 4thDivision artillery, and in order toprovide support, truck-mounted rocketlaunchers were lowered over the cliffwith their rate of descent controlled bytanks chained to the trucks. Oncethey reached the base of the cliff, thelaunchers fired into its face to beatdown Japanese resistance.lz Offshore,rocket gunboats joined in the deluge offire turned on the caves that held theenemy holdouts.

Reduction of “Prudential Hill” in-sured that Marines moving across thecoastal plain would not be fired uponfrom the rear. By 1410 of 8 July, the23d Marines reached the shore aboveMakunsha. The next morning theregiment was assembled in divisionreserve and assigned to mopping upalong the coast. A detachment of the2d Armored Amphibian Battalionhelped demolish lingering cave re-sistance.

With the total good progress on 8July, General Schmidt prepared to un-leash a thrust to Marpi Point. At 1330on that day, he directed the 25th Ma-rines to seize commanding ground 700yards forward of positions then held, inorder to gain observation of the MarpiPoint area. The move was madeagainst practically no resistance.

u Jones ltr.


THE ISLAND SECURED

The next morning, the 25th, the 24th,and the 2d Marines, from right to left,attacked with the mission of securingthe last objective line on the island.Some scattered counterattacks werebeaten off by the 2d Marines at Mt.Marpi, but much of the hill was by-passed. The airfield beyond was foundutterly wrecked by bombardment.

By 1615 all three Marine regimentswere at the coast, having advanced atotal of 2,500 yards that day. Thefire-scarred earth of Saipan lay behind.Vice Admiral Turner declared the is-land secured, putting the time at 1615of 9 July. The next day an officialflag-raising took place at HollandSmith’s headquarters in Charan Kanoa.

For the Marines at Marpi Point, atragic sight took the edge off a happyoccasion. Hundreds of Japanese civil-ians, fearful of the Americans, com-mitted suicide by jumping from theseaside cliffs. Some took their child-ren with them. Efforts to stop themfell upon ears deafened by Japanesepropaganda. Fortunately, many civil-ians had previously surrendered ami-cably, entrusting their fate to Marineand Army civil affairs officers, andwere grateful for the care and safetyfound in the internment camps.

Many of the more than 42,000 Jap-anese, Korean, and Formosan civilianson the island had been evacuated beforethe battle. Starting in March 1944,following seizure of the MarshalIs,some 5,000 persons on Saipan, mostlyJapanese women and children, weresent home. Of the Japanese still on theisland, 9,091 were in camp by 15 July.Half of the number were children.

The interned Korean civilians, at thesame date, came to 1,158, includingchildren.

A 1937 census of the native islandersof Saipan showed 3,143 Chamorros and1,037 Kanakas.”+ When the UnitedStates and Japan fought over theirhome in 1944, the natives were mostlysympathetic to the Americans andglad to come under their protection.Nearly 3,000 of the islanders, mainlythe Chamorros, were in an internmentcamp by the end of the battle.

The total number of POWs held onSaipan as of 9 July stood at 736, count-ing 438 Koreans. But the post-cam-paign mopping up raised the total to1,734 by 27 July, including 838 Koreans.

After Saipan was secured, a minia-ture amphibious operation took placeon 13 July. A small island in Tana-pag Harbor—Maniagassa Island—wasseized by the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,which landed from LVTS after a prep-aration by artillery and naval gunfire.In taking over the island, the Marinesreceived hostile fire from only one pill-box, where a light machine gun wasmanned. Of the small enemy garrison,which numbered 31, 15 were takenprisoner, including 2 Army laborersand 10 Koreans who could not speakJapanese. The rest of the garrisonwas killed. One Marine was wounded.

The taking of Maniagassa ended Ma-rine action on Saipan. Leaving thehunt for Japanese stragglers to theArmy Garrison Force, the 2d and 4thMarine Divisions prepared for their

mTadao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands UnderJapanese Mandate (London: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1940), Table I, p. 30.


next mission, due very soon—the cap-ture of neighboring Tinian.

SAIPAN IN RETROSPECT

Letters from home were already tell-ing Marines how the American pressevaluated the campaign just over.“One of the bloodiest battles in U.S.military annals,” said Time maga-zinc.1’ The Marines knew well thatSaipan was costly, but most of themunderstood something more. Therewere compensations, if there could beany to the bereaved, for the loss of morethan 3,000 American lives. NTLF ac-counting on 5 August put Americancasualties at 3,225 killed, 13,061wounded, and 326 missing; 15 knownenemy dead were recorded as 23,811.

Holland Smith felt that Saipan was“the decisive battle of the Pacific offen-sive.” Capture of the island, he said,“breached Japan’s inner defense line,destroyed the main bastions, andopened the way to the home islands.” lGDuring the battle, Saito wrote that“the fate of the Empire will be decidedin this one action.” 17 It would havecomforted many American homes tohear in 1944 what Vice Admiral Shige-yoshi Miwa said after the final Japanese

‘4 Time, v. 44, no. 2 (1 OJU144), p. 33.‘5A final medical summary, dated 9 Sep-

tember 1944, in TF 56 OpRpt, listed Americancasualties as 3,100 killed, 13,099 wounded, and326 missing. Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 268–269,contains a unit breakdown of Army and Ma-rine casualties in Saipan. Final official Marinecasualty totals are contained in Appendix H.

‘“ Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 181.1’ NTLF G–2, Tgs Sent and Received by

Thirty-First ArHq on Saipan, dtd 25Ju144, p.16.

surrender: “Our war was lost with theloss of Saipan.” 18

The B–29s could now bomb the Jap-anese homeland from Saipan. Indeed,the Army Air Forces lost no timebuilding on the island it had coveted.The first B–29 airdrome there wasbegun on 24 June 1944, and on 24 No-vember, a hundred B–29s departed Sai-pan for a strike at Tokyo, the first sinceLieutenant Colonel Doolittle’s daringraid in 1942.

The advance of United States navalpower, permitted by the capture ofSaipan, also worried the Japanese. Asearly as 26 June 1944, Emperor Hiro-hito expressed to Foreign MinisterShigemitsu a desire for diplomatic set-tlement of the war, and the actual fallof Saipan caused the resignation ofPremier Tojo and his entire cabinet on18 July. Yet, except for the Emperor,there was still no one in Japaneseofficialdom, including the new PremierKoiso, who dared to suggest peace.The military, as they continued thehopeless struggle, drew some tacticallessons from Saipan. The chief lessonwas to organize defenses in depth, achange which would be noticed onPeleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

For American planners there werevarious lessons derived from the cam-paign. One of the most vital con-cerned the proper employment ofsupporting aviation. Complaints hadarisen on Saipan that Navy and Armyplanes did not arrive in time, becauseof faulty control procedures. Re-

“ USSBS Interrogation Nav No. 72, VAdmShigeyoshi Miwa, IJN, II, p. 298. Miwa wassuccessively Director, Naval Submarine De-partment, and Chief, Sixth ( Submarine) Fleet.


quested missions were often cancelledbecause infantry had advanced past thetarget before the planes appeared.One result of the criticism was thatclose air support techniques, many ofthem pioneered and developed by Ma-rines, received better attention afterSaipan. On Luzon, where Armyground troops were supported by bothMarine and Army Air Forces squad-rons, close air support would reallycome into its own.

In the Saipan campaign, Marine avi-ation was represented by two obser-vation squadrons, VMO–2 and VM04,which performed artillery spotting forthe Marine divisions. On 17 June, forthe first time, the OYs—the mono-planes called “grasshoppers’’-took offfrom carriers. Landing at YellowBeach or Charan Kanoa, they moved toAslito airfield after its capture on 18June. The little observation planesserved valuably, not only in artilleryspotting missions but also in gatheringintelligence. Another Marine aviationunit, Air Warning Squadron 5, alsooperated with ground troops at Saipan,one detachment serving with corpstroops, and two others with the Marinedivisions. Not a single enemy air-craft slipped by the alert radar unitsof the squadron.

Naval gunfire seemed to impress theJapanese most at Saipan. The firecame from assorted vessels—LCI gun-boats to battleships—and from guns20mm to 16 inches in caliber. Thegunfire ships supported troops on call,laid down preparatory fire, and illumi-nated the battlefield with star shells.

More than 8,500 tons of ammunitionwere expended on troop support mis-sions. The ships could maneuver bet-

ter than land-based artillery, but theflat trajectory of naval guns provedsomewhat limiting, particularly a-gainst a reverse slope target. In addi-tion to requested naval gunfire, certaindestroyers, which were designated“sniper ships, ” cruised near the coast,picking out targets of opportunity.

Saito was so vexed by the incessantshelling from the sea that he wrote:“If there just were no naval gunfire, wefeel we could fight it out with theenemy in a decisive battle.” 19 Thestatement seemed to support Navyclaims for their guns and marksman-ship. It is probable that the Japaneseswitch to defense in depth, after Sai-pan, was due partly to fear of navalgunfire. Certainly it was a lesson ofthe campaign that naval gunfire couldbe enormously effective. Every prev-ious operation had shown the necessityfor more of it.

Saito’s lament regarding naval gun-fire could well also have been: “If therejust were no artillery. . . . “ As Hol-land Smith recalled, “never before inthe Pacific had Marines gone intoaction with so much armament, rang-ing from 75’s to 155’s.” 20 Marine andArmy artillery shook the island.

General Smith felt, how ever, that theavailable wealth of artillery was notsufficiently appreciated by infantrycommanders, at least at the beginningof the campaign. On 1 July, he specif-ically ordered that “massed artilleryfires will be employed to support infan-try attacks whenever practicable. In-fantry will closely follow artillery

—“ CinCPac–CinCPOA Item No. 9983–85,

Disps Sent and Received by Thirty-first ArHq.w Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 191.


concentrations and attack ruthlesslywhen the artillery lifts.” 21

In every war the foot soldier hasbeen skeptical of the cannoneer’smarksmanship. There were instanceson Saipan of friendly artillery fire hit-ting the lines and causing casualties.But such incidents did not detract fromthe praise accorded both Marine andArmy artillery on Saipan. The de-struction of Japanese water points was,in itself, quite decisive. The enemy’sshortage of water-and food also—became truly desperate. Rain, cursedfor the mud it caused, was blessed forthe thirst it quenched.

The directing of artillery fire by for-ward observers and air spotters wassometimes hampered on Saipan by therapidity of infantry movement. Underthe hard-driving Holland Smith “theJapanese never got a minute’s peace,”as he said himself.zz “The Saipancampaign followed a definite pattern ofcontinuous attack,” said a 4th Divisionsummary. z;]

Some regimental commanders ob-jected, however, that corps insistenceon unrelenting pressure upon theenemy, often to a late hour, was notalways a good thing. Extreme push-ing of the attack could bring a unitto untenable ground. The policy ofjumping off right after dawn some-times prevented sufficient reconnais-sance of caves and density ofunderbrush, features which seldomshowed on a map. Inadequate recon-naissance could also result in a waste

n NTLF OpO 19-44, dtd 1Ju144.= Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 167.%~th ,Wa9-Div OpRpt.

of fire on areas containing few, if any,of the enemy.

It was felt by some Marine officersthat the factors of time and space werenot always sufficiently consideredby NTLF headquarters. “Progressthrough heavy canefields, throughdense underbrush, and over extremelyrough terrain, such as was encoun-tered, cannot be made at ‘book’ speed,”said one regimental commander.24Yet the incessant urgency whichmarked command policy on Saipanquite likely shortened the campaignand saved lives. “I was determined totake Saipan and take it quickly,” saidHolland Smith afterwards.zb

Logistics progress kept up, breath-lessly, with General Smith’s impellingcampaign. Unusual conditions en-countered during the battle accountedpartly for some faulty supply estimates.The 81mm and 60mm mortars, whichwere sparingly used on the small landareas of the atolls, were much indemand on Saipan for close infantrysupport. The unit of fire tables whichsufficed for previous Central Pacificbattles did not here provide for enoughmortar ammunition. Extreme short-ages resulted. In particular, the earlycommitment of the 27th Division taxedinitial supplies of ammunition.

It was, in fact, the early debarkationof the Army division that led to aclassic example of wholesale beach con-gestion. The imminence of a navalbattle, added to the hard combat ashore,hastened the landing of the corps re-serve, but evidently no plans had beenformulated for landing in that partic-

% Ibid.

m Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 185.

,,,


ular area, directly behind the 4thMarine Division. Beach parties wereconsequently overwhelmed by suppliespiling up and getting mixed up. Therewas not enough time to sort and sepa-rate, and some Marine equipment gotinto Army dumps. Soldiers receivedutility clothes marked USMC, andmuch of the 27th Division artillery am-munition turned up in Marine dumps.20

A certain opportunism marked theunloading, which did not help the beachparties any. There was a tendency,once a beach was in friendly hands, toshove all supplies over that beach,rather than risk the artillery and mor-tar fire which harassed unloading else-where, The plan relative to generalunloading did permit supplies to be putoff on any beach, but organic equip-ment was to be landed only on properlyassigned beaches. “In practice, how-ever, this was not done,” said a 4th Di-vision report,z’ and misappropriationresulted. After the Saipan experience,Admiral Hill felt that matters wouldimprove if a permanent corps shoreparty was organized. It would besolely responsible for the movement ofsupplies from the beach to the dumpsand for issue therefrom to the divisions.

On top of the other headaches was aspecial circumstance which delayed un-

—%Admiral Hill recalled that when the com-

plaints began to come in from the two divi-sions, he talked to the NTLF chief of staff,General Erskine, who sent out orders thatthere would be common dumps for all exceptorganic equipment and supplies. The admiralpointed out that as soon as the supplies of theArmy division “began to flow, there was noreal problem.” Hill comments Saipan.

z Lth MarD&v Opl?pt.

loading. The Battle of the PhilippineSea was in the making, and the dangerof air or surface attack by the ap-proaching Japanese fleet required cau-tion. Admiral Turner ordered alltransports and landing ships exceptAdmiral Hill’s flagship, the Canzbfi”a,to retire for the night of D-Day, 15–16June, and not to return until daylight.The next two nights there were only afew ships with high priority cargopermitted to stay and continue unload-ing. Then, until the naval battle wasover, most of the transports stayed atsea both day and night, interruptingthe flow of supplies.

Once the ships were unloaded, thebattle of corps dimensions absorbedequipment at unprecedented rates.Estimates of resupply requirementsproved much too low. Each signalunit loaded 20 days of equipment, butthe campaign showed that on an ob-jective like Saipan the supply wouldnot last for 20 days’ of combat. Ashortage of radio batteries was notovercome. Such errors were not for-gotten, however, and for the battles yetto be fought the logistic lessons ofSaipan were useful.

The campaign also imposed tacti-cal demands new to the Pacific war. Itwas a battle of movement on a sizableland mass, but movement was compli-cated by the Japanese system of caves.The enemy had defended caves before—on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo—but never so extensively. On Saipanthe caves were both natural and man-made, and often artfully hidden byvegetation. To cope with them, theMarines perfected various methods ofapproach. Where terrain permitted, a

,,,


flame-throwing tank 28 would advanceunder cover of fire from medium tanksor half tracks. In terrain where ar-mor could not be moved up, the infan-trymen would cover for the engineerswho placed demolition charges. Some-times a cave proved so inaccessible thatengineers had to 10b satchel chargesfrom cliffs above it.

In other approaches, Marines firedautomatic weapons or hurled grenadesdirectly into the cave entrance. It wasalways dismaying to find that a cavewhich had been seared or blasted couldbristle with live Japanese the next day.The enemy’s clever use of caves wasprophetic of Peleliu, Iwo Jima, andOkinawa and showed detailed planning.A number were well-stocked with sup-plies. Some had steel doors whichwere opened periodically to loose burstsof machine-gun fire.

Where a cave defense was not avail-able, the enemy built emplacements ofconcrete or coconut logs, covered withearth and vegetation. A coconut groveoften contained some Japanese strong-point. Reserve slope defenses werepopular, and the wooded valleys fav-ored the enemy’s talent for digging in.The canefields were a favorite hidingplace for Japanese snipers, until thegrowth was flattened by a bulldozer.But sniping from trees, a commonpractice on other Pacific islands, sel-

= The flame-throwing tank, recommendedafter Tarawa, appeared first on Saipan. Ac-tually, it was the M3A1 light tank, mountinga flamethrower. Although the 318th FighterGroup pioneered in the use of napalm firebombs during operations in the Marianas, nonapalm was yet on hand for flamethrowers,only fuel oil, and the range was still tooshort.

dom occurred on Saipan. Marines be-lieved that perhaps the enemy fearedartillery air bursts in the wooded areas.

From the beginning of the Saipancampaign the Japanese did not organ-ize a true main line of resistance. In-stead, they defended strong pointswhich were not connected. For themost part, they made piecemeal count-erattacks, attempted by relatively smallgroups of platoon or company size.

Infiltration was a beloved tactic.Nearly every night a handful of Japa-nese ventured out, bearing demolitions,grenades, and mines. But such enemybehavior was familiar to the Marines,who reported, in fact, that “no newtactics were observed” on Saipan.2g

Night or day, except at rash mo-ments, the Japanese cautiously re-spected their opponents. Prisonersexpressed wonder at the accurate andtremendous firepower of Marine units.That included not only what was de-livered by artillery but also by otherweapons, not the least of which was theinfantryman’s rifle. On Saipan theMl continued as an excellent weapon,more durable than the carbine, and,although much heavier, it was pre-ferred by most Marines. A carbinebullet would not always stop an enemysoldier, and the weapon rusted tooeasily.

Next to his rifle, the infantrymancherished the tank, which, like a lum-bering elephant, could either striketerror into a foe or be a gentle servantto a friend. On the open field, hospitalcorpsmen, moving behind a tank, couldget to the wounded and safely bringthem off. In attack, the Marine tank-

* 4th MarDiv OpRpt.


infantry team felt itself unbeatable,and the Saipan experience added con-fidence. The medium tank would pre-cede the riflemen who, in return,protected the tank from Japanese anti-tank grenades. Each half of the teamneeded the other.

Such interdependence, which markedthe tank-infantry team, was illustratedin a thousand ways at Saipan, whereMarines and soldiers fought a hardcampaign side by side. The contro-versy arising from the relief of GeneralRalph Smith, which was to have reper-cussions beyond the war years, shouldnot obscure the fact that on the battle-field itself there was neither place nortime for interservice rivalry. Themerits of the relief, however muchthey were argued at headquartersthroughout the chain of command backto Washington, were largely academicto the men locked in combat with theenemy. What they looked for wasmutual support and cooperation—andthey got it. To an infantry unit des-perate for artillery support, it matteredlittle if the shells that crashed downahead were fired by Marine or Army

batteries—only that they explodedwhen and where they were needed.

The same analogy applied to everyphase of combat on Saipan, where themeasure of value was how well eachman stood his share of the commonburden, not what his uniform color waswhen he stood clear of the mud anddust.

In truth, there could be no otheranswer to success in combat than inter-service cooperation. The longer Armyand Marine units fought together aspartners with the Navy in the amphib-ious assaults in the Central Pacific, thesurer would be the grounds for mutualunderstanding and respect. AdmiralNimitz, a man who was in an unrivaledposition to assess the effect of theSmith against Smith controversy onfuture operations, noted that he was“particularly pleased that . . . the Armyand Marine Corps continued to worktogether in harmony—and in effective-ness.” 30

a FAdm Chester W. Nimitz ltr to ACofS,G-3, HQMC, dtd 8Jan63.

,.,

PART V

Assault on Tinian

CHAPTER 1

The Inevitable Campaign’

For Marines who had made the3,200-mile voyage from Hawaii to Sai-pan, the trip to the next objective wasa short one. Just three miles of waterseparate Tinian from Saipan, In thePacific war, such proximity of the ob-jective was unusual, but there werealso other details of the Tinian assaultwhich made it unique. Here was one

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis chapter is derived from: TF 51 OpRpt;TF 56 OpRpt; TF 52 Rpt of Tinian Op, dtd24Aug44, hereafter TF 52 OpRpt; NTLF OpRpt; NTLF OPlan 30–44 (FORAGER, PhaseIII), dtd 13Ju144, hereafter NTLF OPkua 30-44; VAC ReconBn OpRpts, Saipan-Tinian, dtd5Aug44, hereafter VAC ReconBn OpRpts; 4thMarDiv Representative Translations made onTinian, hereafter 4th MarDiv Translations(Tinian); MCS, Quantico, Vs., ‘<Study of theTheater of Operations: Saipan-Tinian Area,”dtd 15Sep44; LtCol Richard K. Schmidt, “TheTinian Operation: A Study in Planning foran Amphibious Operation,” MCS, Quantico,Vs., 1948–1949 ; Lt John C. Chapin, TheFourth Marine Division in World War 11(Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, Aug45), here-after Chapin, 4th MarDiv in W W II; MajCarl W. Hoffman, The Seiwre of Tinian(Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1951), here-after Hoffman, Tinian; Crowl, The Marianas;

Isely and Crowl, Ma~ines and AmphibiousWar; Johnston, Follow Me!; Morison, NewGuinea and the Marianas; Proehl, 4thMarDivHistory; Sherrod, Ma~ine Air History; Smithand Finch, Coral and Brass; Stockman andCarleton, Campaign for the Marianas. Unlessotherwise noted, all documents cited are lo-cated in the Marianas Area OpFile and Mari-anas CmtFile, HistBr, HQMC.

of those military enterprises that ob-servers like to term classic. AdmiralSpruance called Tinian “probably themost brilliantly conceived and executedamphibious operation of World WarII.” z General Holland Smith sawgratifying results of the amphibiousdoctrine he helped develop before thewar. Tinian, he wrote afterwards,was “the perfect amphibious operationin the Pacific war. ” 3 Marines in thebattle for Tinian profited by the flex-ible application of amphibious warfaretechniques so laboriously evolved dur-ing the practice landings of the 1930s.

WHY TINIAN ?

Capture of the island was a militarynecessity. It was, of course, unthink-able that Japanese troops remain onTinian, next door to Saipan. Butthere also existed a more positive rea-son for wanting Tinian–its usefulnessfor land-based aircraft. The island isthe least mountainous of the Marianas,the one which was most suited for newAmerican long-range bombers. It wasfrom Tinian that the B–29s rose tobomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Aug-ust 1945.

The Japanese knew the military

‘ Adm Raymond A. Spruance ltr to CMC,dtd 27Nov50.

s Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 201.

355


value of Tinian. They had used theisland for staging planes and as a re-fueling stop for aircraft en route toand from the Empire. On Ushi Pointthey had constructed an airfield whichwas even better than Aslito on Saipan.The two excellent strips on this fieldwere labeled by American intelligenceas Airfield No. 1 and Airfield No. 3.The older north strip, the site of themain airdrome, was 4,750 feet long.Two villages adjoined the activity,housing the personnel. On GurguanPoint was another airstrip which ex-tended 5,060 feet (Airfield No. 2).Northeast of Tinian Town lay AirfieldNo. 4, still under construction. Al-ready 70 percent surfaced, it could beused for emergency landings. Theseairfields drew the bulk of Japanesedefensive weapons on Tinian. Theenemy had sited a number of heavy andmedium antiaircraft and light machineguns in the vicinity of each field, par-ticularly the prized Ushi Point strips.(See Map 21.)

American photographic reconnais-sance of Tinian, begun on a carrierstrike of 22–23 February 1944, focusedon the airfields, though not to the neg-lect of the rest of the island. Perhapsno other Pacific island, not previouslyan American possession, became so fa-miliar to the assault forces because ofthorough and accurate mapping priorto the landings. Documents capturedon Saipan were also informative, be-cause the Japanese, as well as theAmericans, had linked the two islandsin their military plans.

In the whole field of intelligence, theTinian operation benefited from earlyplanning, general though it was. De-tailed planning for Tinian had to yield

precedence to that for Saipan andGuam, but once the end of the Saipancampaign was in sight, NTLF head-quarters began daily conferences re-garding the assault on the nearbytarget.

DESCRIPTION OF TINIAN

The island the commanders talkedabout was scenically attractive, ob-served from either a ship or a plane.In fact, it was said that naval and airgunners were sorry to devastate theidyllic landscape of Tinian. It con-sisted mainly of small farms, square orrectangular, which, viewed from theair, appeared like squares of a checker-board. Each holding was marked offby bordering ditches, used for irriga-tion, or by rows of trees or brush,planted for use as windbreaks.

Tinian measures about 50 squaremiles. It extends 12-1/4 miles fromUshi Point to Lalo Point but never ismore than 5 miles wide. In thewettest months (July to October) ofthe summer monsoon, the island isdrenched by nearly a foot of rainfallper month. Ninety percent of the areais tillable. In 1944, the population of18,000 consisted almost entirely of Jap-anese, for all but a handful of thenative Chamorros had been moved offto lesser islands of the Marianas.Most of the Japanese had been broughtto Tinian by a commercial organizationto produce sugar, the chief island prod-uct. Tinian produced 50 percentmore sugar cane than Saipan. TinianTown was the center of the industryand had two sugar mills which receivedthe raw product, mostly freighted overa small winding railroad. A good net-


work of roads also served the trans-portation needs of the island.

Basically, Tinian was a pleasant andprosperous island. The sole forbid-ding aspect, except for the Japanesemilitary installations that summer of1944, were the coral cliffs which risefrom the coastline and are a part of thelimestone plateau underlying Tinian.A few hills jut up from the plateau,but the principal one, Mt. Lasso, in thecenter of the island, is only 564 feethigh, just a third the size of Mt. Tapot-chau on Saipan; Mt. Maga, in thenorth, measures 390 feet, and an un-named elevation in the south is 580 feethigh. The cliffs which encircle theplateau vary in height, from 6 to 100feet. Breaks along the cliff line arefew and narrow, putting beach space ata premium.

It was, in fact, the question of land-ing beaches which particularly domi-nated the planning for Tinian, evenmore than it usually did for otherisland campaigns. The Japanese knewthey could not escape an assault ofTinian—but where would the landingsbe made, when, and in what force?Concerning these matters, the enemyhad to be kept in the dark until theinvasion actually began.

Along the entire coastline of Tinian,only three areas have beaches worthyof the name. One is the vicinity ofSunharon Harbor near Tinian Town,where the several sandy stretches arethe widest and most suitable beachesfor invasion. On the opposite side ofthe island, along Asiga Bay, the cliffline breaks off, resulting in a beachapproximately 125 yards wide. On thenorthwest coast, below Ushi Point, aretwo stingy strips of beach 1,000 yards

apart. Intelligence reported one to beabout 60 yards wide and the otherabout 160. Japanese civilians hadfound the white, sandy beaches pleas-ant and the water there good enoughfor swimming and, in fact, had calledthem the White Beaches. This hap-pened also to be the code name assignedto the two beaches by invasion plan-ners, while the Asiga Bay beach wasdesignated Yellow Beach. (See Maps22 and 23. )

Colonel Keishi 0gata,4 commander ofthe 50th Infantry Regiment and re-sponsible for the defense of Tinian,believed the Americans would land ei-ther near Tinian Town or at AsigaBay. The colonel’s “Defense ForceBattle Plan,” issued from his commandpost in a Mt. Lasso cave on 28 June,showed only such expectations.5 Hedid not, of course, ignore the northwestbeaches, but he anticipated only a smalllanding party there, at the most. Tomeet such a remote contingency, thecolonel directed that some troops bepositioned inland of the beaches. A“Plan for the Guidance of Battle,” is-sued to those troops on 7 Julyj was cap-tured by Marines the day after thelanding on Tinian. In that plan, Colo-nel Ogata ordered his men to be readyto counterattack on the larger WhiteBeach (White 2). But he scorned thesmaller beach (White 1) as being un-worthy of consideration.

An enemy strongpoint, Americanintelligence reported, was located

4Chief, War HistOff, Def Agency of Japanltr to Head, HistBr, &3, HQMC, dtd 9Nov63.

6DefFor BatPlan, dtd 28Jun44, in 4th MarDiv Translations (Tinian), hereafter Def ForPlan.

THE INEVITABLE CAMPAIGN 359

about 500 yards northeast of theWhite Beaches. It included the usualtrenches, dugouts, and light machinegun or rifle positions in a wooded area.Among the heavier weapons emplacedhere were a 37mm antitank gun, a47mm antitank gun, and two 7.7mmmachine guns.

JAPANESE TROOPS ANDEQUIPMENT

Colonel Ogata had only about 8,900men to dispose judiciously before theAmericans came. The mainstay of theTinian garrison was the well-trained50th Infantry Regiment, with astrength of about 3,800 men.G Theregiment consisted of headquarters,three infantry battalions (each with880 men, organized into a headquartersdetachment, three rifle companies, anda battalion gun platoon with two 70mmguns), one 75mm mountain artillerybattalion (three four-gun batteries, oneto each infantry battalion), supply,signal, and medical companies, oneantitank platoon (six 37mm guns), anda fortification detachment.

Other Army elements included the1st Battalion of the 135th Infantry

Regiment, the tank company of the—

eThe 50th Infantry Regiment had beentransferred from Manchuria in March 1944.It had been scheduled to leave Tinian on 15June to defend Rota, but the arrival of TaskForce 58 in the Marianas on 11 June causeda change of plans. On 7 July, Imperial Gen-eral Headquarters switched the responsibilityfor the defense of Tinian from the NorthernMarianas Army Group on Saipan to the South-ern Marianas Army Group on Guam. Conse-quently, the 50th Infantry Regiment cameunder the .%?thDivision, whose headquarterswas on Guam.

214-SS1O-67—24

18th Infantry Regiment, a detachmentof the 29th Field Hospital, and a motortransport platoon. The infantry bat-talion had been engaged in amphibiousexercises off Tinian when, at the ap-proach of Task Force 58 on 11 June, itwas detached from its parent regimenton Saipan and put into the defensesystem for Tinian.7 As a result, justabout half of the strength available toColonel Ogata was made up of Armypersonnel.

The naval complement on Tinian con-sisted chiefly of the 56th Naval GuardForce (Keibitai), numbering about1,400 men that had been partiallytrained as infantry. Most of the sail-ors of the Keibitai were assigned to thecoastal defense and antiaircraft guns,but some of them comprised a CoastalSecurity Force which operated patrolboats and laid beach mines. The 233dConstruction Battalion came to about600 men, while other miscellaneousconstruction personnel totaled around800. The antiaircraft units of the56th Keibitai were later identified asthe 82d and 83d Air Defense Groups,each numbering between 200 and 250men, the former unit being equippedwith 24 25mm antiaircraft guns andthe latter with 6 dual-purpose 75mmguns. Other naval units included adetachment of the 5th Base Force andthe ground elements of seven aviationsquadrons.8

‘ Japanese records in Tokyo indicate thatother elements of the 135tk Infantry movedfrom Saipan to Tinian on 29 May, 31 May,and 1 June and that the strength of the regi-ment on Tinian may have been greater thanthe 900 men listed in NTLF G–2 estimates.Japanese War HistOff Cmts Tinian, op. cit.

8 Ibid.


In charge of all naval personnel onthe island was Captain Goichi Oya,though the senior naval officer presentwas Vice Admiral Kakuj i Kakuda, com-manding the First Air Fleet, whoseheadquarters was on Tinian. Kakuda,however, was more interested in trans-ferring his command elsewhere, and heleft the Tinian naval duties to CaptainOya, who, a week before the invasion,moved his command post from TinianTown to high ground near the town.Captain Oya was supposed to report toColonel Ogata, but he was inclined toact independently.

Colonel Ogata had marked off theisland into three defense sectors. Thesouthern, the largest of the three, com-prised the entire area below Mt.Lasso and included Tinian Town. Thenorthern sector covered the Ushi Pointair strips and Asiga Bay. To defendeach of those sectors, Ogata assigned abattalion of the 50th Infantry Regi-ment and a platoon of engineers. Inthe western sector, however, where thenorthwest beaches lay, he left only the3d Compan~ of the 1st Battalion andan antitank squad. The rest of theI st Bat talion was put into reserve justsouth of Mt. Lasso. Though in thewestern sector, these troops were posi-tioned much closer to Asiga Bay thanto the northwest beaches. (See Map21.)

A “Mobile Counterattack Force”-the Ist Battalion of the 13,5th Infantry

Regiment, actually another reserve—was located in the southern sector,centrally stationed to move either to-ward Asiga Bay or the Tinian Townarea. The force was called mobile be-cause it would “advance rapidly to theplace of landings, depending on the

situation, and attack.” $ Mobility, infact, was a keynote of the Japaneseplan. Each sector commander wouldbe prepared not only “to destroy theenemy at the beach” but also “to shifttwo-thirds of the force elsewhere.” lo

Incorporated within the defense werethe twelve 75mm mountain guns of theartillery battalion of the 50th InfantryRegiment which, when reinforced by the70mm guns of the infantry battalions,made up a Mobile Artillery Force.The artillery battalion would rapidlydeploy to support jointly a counter-attack with the tank company of the18th Infantry Regiment, whose 12light tanks were the enemy’s onlyarmor on Tinian. This unit, posi-tioned in the southern sector, also pos-sessed two of the rare Japaneseamphibian trucks.

Naval personnel on the island werevariously employed by Colonel Ogata.They guarded the airfields, particularlyat Ushi Point, and protected the harborinstallations of Asiga Bay and Sun-haron Harbor. Naval gunners mannedmost of fixed artillery on the islandand its antiaircraft weapons. Theformer included ten 140mm coast de-fense guns—three of them on UshiPoint, three on Faibus San Hilo Point,and four commanding Asiga Bay.

Three of the ten 120mm dual purposeguns on Tinian shielded the Ushi Pointair strips, while three more served theairfield at Gurguan Point. BehindTinian Harbor stood four more 120mmdual purpose guns, in addition to three6-inch naval guns of British 1905 make.These 6-inch guns were so artfully con-

‘De fFov Plan.‘0 Ibid.


cealed in a cave that until they openedup on the day of the landing their pres-ence was unknown. The prized UshiPoint airfield was solicitouslyguarded by antiaircraft weapons, in-cluding 6 13mm antiaircraft and anti-tank guns, 15 25mm twin mounts, 420mm automatic cannons, and 6 75mmguns.

Miscellaneous types rounded out theJapanese arsenal of weapons on Tinian.In 23 pillboxes which ringed AsigaBay there were machine guns of un-known caliber. They never took aMarine’s life, however, for they—like anumber of the other guns pinpointedby reconnaissance-were destroyed bybombardment prior to the invasion.

PREPARATORY BOMBARDMENT

Tinian received a more thorough go-ing over than most other island objec-tives of the Pacific war, chiefly becausethe usual naval and air bombardmentwas augmented for weeks by the firesof artillery. On 20 June, hardly aweek after the landings on Saipan,Battery B of the 531st Field Artilleryturned its 155mm guns, the “LongToms,” upon Tinian. Other units wereadded thereafter until, by the middle ofJuly, a total of 13 battalions of bothMarine and Army artillery were drawnup on southern Saipan, under the com-mand of the Army Brigadier GeneralArthur M. Harper, General HollandSmith’s valued artillery officer. (SeeMap 21.)

The Corps Artillery thus emplaced inposition and firing on Tinian includedthe 10th Marines (less the 1st and 2dBattalions, attached to the 14th Ma-rines); the 3d and 4th Battalions, 14th

Marines (Headquarters and the 1st and2d Battalions stayed with the 4th Divi-sion) ; and the 4th 105mm HowitzerBattalion, VAC, hitherto serving withthe 14th Marines. These five battal-ions of 105mm howitzers were attachedto XXIV Corps Artillery on 15 July andwere designated Groupment A, undercontrol of Headquarters, 10th Marines.The artillery of the 27th Infantry Divi-sion (less the 106th Field ArtilleryBattalion) was likewise attached on 15July and comprised Groupment B.Five battalions of XXIV Corps Artil-lery formed Groupment C, and they setup the long-range 155mm guns and155mm howitzers, The other Armyand Marine battalions were equippedwith 105mm howitzers. The Marines’four 75mm pack howitzer battalionswere not used but were reserved moresuitably for the invasion, where theywould furnish close support for theassault divisions to which they wereattached.

There was quite enough steel andpowder to support the operation. Theartillerymen used up 24,536 roundsprior to the landings. A total of 1,509preinvasion fire missions includedcounterbattery, harassing, and areabombardment. Corps Artillery kept avaluable file of intelligence data onTinian which was used by both aviatorsand naval gunners. A Corps Artilleryintelligence section worked very closelywith the Force G–2 at the NTLF com-mand post on Saipan. Light spotteraircraft were assigned to the artilleryunits to observe fire results and tocollect target intelligence data foreither immediate or future use.

The sea bombardment of Tinianbegan before artillery was ashore on

362 -—---- ..- .—-—.- ——.-.—

Saipan. On 13 June, fire support shipsof Task Force 52, which could bespared from the pounding of Saipan,were employed against Tinian. Thechief object then was to forestall inter-ference with the Saipan operation byTinian guns or aircraft. Destroyersstarted a relentless patrol of SaipanChannel, turning their 5-inch gunsupon shore batteries and harassingUshi Point airfield.

Destroyer activity was rapidly ex-tended to other waters. Star shellswere placed over Tinian Harbor to pre-vent movement from the area of TinianTown. That whole vicinity, especiallythe airfield, received harassing fire.Here, because of a shortage of destroy-ers, much of the responsibility fell todestroyer escorts (DEs), destroyertransports (APDs), or destroyer mine-sweepers (DMSS ), whose crews en-joyed the change of routine. On 25June, two DEs, the Ekien and theBancroft, spotted a few Japanesebarges attempting to leave SunharonHarbor and blocked their escape byshelling and destroying them. De-stroyer escorts also roved to the north-west to harass Gurguan Point airfieldby gunfire.

Starting 26 June, the cruisers Indi-anapolis, Birmingham, and Montpelie~undertook a daily systematic bombard-ment of point targets, which lasted aweek and paid special attention to thearea of Tinian Town. Intensive bom-bardment by cruisers was resumed thelast few days before the Tinian land-ings when the Louisville and the NewOrleans delivered main and secondarybattery fires. Both of these ships, likethe Indianapolis, were heavy cruisers.The Louisville served as flagship for

U15N’1’KALYAGH?lU UKIVE

Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, whocommanded the fire support ships forTinian.

During the numerous naval gunfiremissions at Tinian, a variety of shellswere utilized. On 18 and 19 July, twodestroyers attempted to burn thewooded areas on Mt. Lasso with whitephosphorus projectiles. Results weredisappointing, however, evidently be-cause of dampness due to rain. Butsince such fire proved terrifying to theenemy on Saipan, destroyers continuedto employ it against caves on Tinian.LCI gunboats also shelled the cliffsidecaves of Tinian with their 40mm guns.

Nowhere on the island were the Jap-anese left at peace. Starting on 17July, destroyers from the Saipan Chan-nel patrol delivered surprise night fireat irregular times on the beaches ofAsiga Bay, where the enemy was work-ing feverishly to install defenses. Theairfields of Tinian were incessantlyharassed to deny their use by theenemy. On a single day, 24 June, thebattleship Colorado shelled every air-field on the island.

The routine of bombarding Tinian,stepped up on 16 July, was climaxed onthe 23d, the day before invasion, when3 battleships, 5 cruisers, and 16 de-stroyers were involved. Only thebeaches due to receive the landingswere slighted; for the sake of decep-tion, they were subjected to merelycasual fire from the Louisville and theColorado. The old battleship sur-passed all its previous efforts bydestroying, on the same day, the three140mm coast defense guns of FaibusSan Hilo Point, with 60 well-placed16-inch shells. On the day of the land-ings, however, the Colorado was herself


to suffer tragically from the fire of acoastal battery which had notbeen destroyed.

From the beginning, the Japanesedid not suffer the naval shelling with-out reacting violently, and their returnfire caused damage and casualties to afew of the fire support ships. Theenemy’s defenses were, as usual, welldug in, and some were able to survivethe heaviest shelling. Ships found aposition difficult to destroy totally ex-cept by a direct hit. Because therewas a lack of profitable or suitabletargets fir the largest gunfire supportships, the naval bombardment was sus-pended for a week between the securingof Saipan on 9 July and 16 July. Theonly exception was night heckling ofthe enemy by DEs in the area of TinianTown.

Provisions for naval gunfire were tiedinto the overall bombardment plan forTinian. Efficient interlocking of thethree supporting arms was served by adaily conference at NTLF headquar-ters on Saipan attended by represent-atives of artillery, air, and navalgunfire. Responsibility for daily as-signments was left mainly to the firedirection center of XXIV Corps Artil-lery because of its collected intelligencedata and excellent communicationsetup. Here the targets were allocatedas appropriate to each of the support-ing arms. If there was a unique as-pect to direction of preliminary firesfor Tinian, it was that artillery was adecisive factor.

The big land guns were, of course,aimed mostly at northern Tinian. The155mm guns could stretch to the south-ern part of the island, but they seldomattempted it, leaving that half to air-

craft instead. Sometimes all threesupporting arms had a go at a target.The area of Tinian Town, perhaps themost punished of all, was such anexample, though naval gunfire did themost damage there. Use of the islandroad network was virtually denied tothe enemy by the shells and bombswhich came from everywhere, isolatingsome sections and destroying others.

It was neither naval gunfire nor ar-tillery, however, which started the pre-paratory bombardment of Tinian. On11 June, Vice Admiral Mitscher’s fastcarrier task force sailed into the Mari-anas. Its immediate object was tosupport the Saipan operation. Tominimize interference from the air-fields, antiaircraft guns, and shore bat-teries on Tinian, these installationswere bombed and strafed. The Battleof the Philippine Sea began on 17 June,and TF 58 steamed there to join thebattle. Five days later, however, sur-face elements returned to the Tinianassignment. They then were joinedby CVE-based aircraft of Task Force52 and P–47 fighters based on Aslito.All Iandbased aircraft (except the Ma-rine observation squadrons), as well asthe carrier-based planes engaged in theTinian operation, operated under Com-mander Lloyd B. Osborne, CommanderSupport Aircraft, who was embarkedin the Canabr-ia, flagship of AdmiralHill.11

“ Commander Osborne acted as CommanderSupport Aircraft off Saipan during the periodswhen Admiral Turner was on night retirementand Admiral Hill was SOPA. Osborne as-sumed control of air operations over Tinianwhen Admiral Hill relieved Turner as CT F52. Adm Harry W. Hill interview and cmts ondraft MS, dtd 20Nov63.


Marine observation planes of VMO–2and VMO–4 also took part in the pre-invasion activity over Tinian. For sev-eral days prior to the landings, pilotsoperating from Aslito flew over theisland, learning about it and searchingfor targets of opportunity. The littleunarmed and unarmored OYS, veteransof Saipan, would again serve infantryand artillery missions on Tinian. Un-til then, they performed some spottingfor the artillerymen shelling Tinianfrom Saipan.

After the capture of Saipan, aerialreduction of the enemy’s defensivepositions was undertaken by rocketry,glide bombing, and strafing. Targetsincluded railroad junctions, pillboxes,roads, covered artillery positions, andcanefields. The beaches, in the main,were ignored to keep the enemy puzzled,but the airfields were unreservedlyraked. Enemy air strength had al-ready been decisively cut down. Ofthe 107 planes estimated as beingbased at Tinian airfields prior to 11June, 70 were destroyed on the groundby carrier strikes long before the cap-ture of Saipan.

Something new was added to airbombardment at Tinian. On 19 July,an enthusiastic Navy commander ar-rived on Saipan with an impressiveArmy Air Forces film showing whathappened when napalm powder wasmixed with aircraft fuel. He showedthe pictures to Admiral Hill and Gen-eral Schmidt and both were enthusi-astic about the possibilities of the newfire bomb.” Enough napalm and de-tonators were at hand for a trial run

= Adm Harry W. Hill interview with MidnStephen S. Toth, CCL.1963, encl to Ibid.

by P–47s. Oil, gasoline, and napalmwere mixed in j ettisonable fuel tanks.The formula was later improved, butinitial results proved good enough toensure acceptance.13

The first use of the fuel-tank bombswas an attempt to burn off woodedareas which, due to dampness, hadpreviously resisted white phosphorusand thermite. The new incendiarybadly scorched the trees, but left theneedles only partially burned. Becausemany of the trees were of hardy andindestructible ironwood, the experi-ment was inconclusive. Much betterresults were obtained when napalm wasused on canefields. Shouldering pilesand smoking ashes appeared whereonce grew flourishing cane stalks. On23 July, two fire bombs burned out con-siderable underbrush in the WhiteBeach area.

Pilots of the P–47s, which droppedmost of the bombs, objected that suchmissions required extremely low flying,at a risk of attracting heavy groundfire. They also reported too much up-ward flash, which decreased the incen-diary value, and too brief a burningtime—60 to 90 seconds. The idea wasa promising one, however, and, whenthe correct formula was evolved, thenew fire bomb became one of the mostformidable weapons in the Americanarsenal.

Thus while planes, ships, and artil-lery foreshadowed the land battle, or-ganization and plans for the invasionwere concluded. A few commandchanges took place, mostly because the

= Napalm was a thickener, consisting of amixture of aluminum soaps, used in jellyinggasoline.


recapture of Guam would be attemptedat the same time.

COMMAND STRUCTURE ANDASSIGNMENTS

Admiral Hill took command of areconstituted Northern Attack Force(TF 52) on 15 July, relieving AdmiralTurner, who could now exercise morefully his responsibility in command ofthe Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51).Hill had been Turner’s able second-in-command at Saipan. General HollandSmith was relieved on 12 July and or-dered to assume command of the newly-established Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,whose functions included administra.tive control of all Marines in the Pacific.Command of NTLF and of the V Am-phibious Corps was assigned to GeneralSchmidt, who was relieved as 4th Divi-sion commander by Major General Clif-ton B. Cates, one of the few officers whohad commanded a platoon, a company,a battalion, a regiment, and now a di-vision in battle. General Watson con-tinued in command of the 2d Division.

General Smith, in retaining commandof Expeditionary Troops (TF 56), alsocontinued in overall command of groundforces in the Marianas operations.But neither he nor Admiral Turnerwas present at the Tinian landings.They sailed on 20 July, on board theRocky Mount, to witness the invasionof Guam the next day. Though theyreturned on 25 July, they left the direc-tion of the Tinian campaign to AdmiralHill and General Schmidt.

As landing force commander for Tin-ian, General Schmidt would be in tac-tical control of the troops. AdmiralHill, the attack force commander, was

responsible to Admiral Turner for thecapture of Tinian. Slated to commandTinian garrison troops was Marine Ma-jor General James L. Underhill. Hewould have the job of developing Tinianas an air base.

The 2d and 4th Marine Divisionswould still compose the assault troopsof NTLF, which would make the firstcorps-sized Marine shore-to-shore oper-ation under combat conditions. Thetwo divisions, however, had sufferedgrievously on Saipan, and only one re-placement draft of 1,268 officers andenlisted men was due before the battleon Tinian. After designating the 4thDivision to make the assault landing,General Schmidt reapportioned the menand equipment available. On 18 July,he took all the armored amphibian andamphibian tractor battalions, reorgan-ized them under a Provisional Head-quarters, Amphibian Tractors, VAmphibious Corps, and attached itto the 4th Division.14

The 2d Division lost its 1st Amphib-ian Truck Company, its 2d Tank Bat-talion, and its last two battalions (the1st and 2d) of the 10th Marines to aheavy buildup of the 4th Division,whose final reinforced strength includedalso the 1st Joint Assault Signal Com-pany, the 1st Provisional Rocket De-tachment, the 2d Amphibian Truck

“ The 2d Division gave up its 2d ArmoredAmphibian Battalion, 2d Amphibian TractorBattalion, 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,and 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion( Army). The Provisional LVT Group also em-braced the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,already with the 4th Division, and the 534thand 773d Amphibian Tractor and 708th Am-phibian Tank Battalions (Army).


Company, and the 1341st Engineer Bat-talion (Army).

While such reorganization served tomass combat power in the assault divi-sion for seizing and holding the beach-head, it left the 2d Division markedlyunderstrength for its own mission oflanding in support. The only reinforc-ing units left to General Watson werethe 2d Joint Assault Signal Companyand the 2d Provisional Rocket Detach-ment.

The reserve 27th Infantry Divisionwas to be prepared to embark on fourhours’ notice to land on Tinian. TheArmy division, however, had been muchreduced by casualties and detachmentsand could muster only about half of itsoriginal strength. One of its regi-ments, the 105th Infantry, was requiredfor garrison duty on Saipan, and itsdivision artillery had been detachedearlier to the XXIV Corps Artillery forthe reduction of Tinian.

In the two-weeks’ interval betweenthe capture of Saipan and the invasionof Tinian, the battle-experienced Ma-rines enjoyed a break, except for Japa-nese sniper activity. No rehearsal forthe Tinian assault was held, nor wasone regarded as necessary, but a certainamount of reorganization went on. On11 July, the 2d Marines reverted to the2d Division and moved to an assemblyarea near Garapan. The next day, the165th Infantry was returned from the2d Division to the 27th Division. On13 July, the 4th Division began movingto a rest area on southeast Saipan, be-hind the beaches where the Marines hadlanded. The 23d Marines stayed innorthern Saipan to destroy remainingpockets of Japanese resistance until re-lieved on 16 July by the 105th Infantry.

At the same time the Army relieved the6th Marines, which ended its moppingup activities and followed the 2d Ma-rines into the assembly area. The or-phan 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, whichhad been detached from the 2d Divisionto Island Command on 6 July, was dueto stay on Saipan for garrison duty.

While the Saipan veterans relaxed,speculation as to the next objective wasrelatively absent. Troops knew thenext island would be Tinian. Theywere left to guess where the landingswould be made. That, in fact, was aquestion unresolved by the high com-mand itself even after Saipan was se-cured.

THE ISSUE OF WHERE TO LAND

On 8 July, as time for the invasionof Tinian approached, Admiral Turnerput the question to the man due to takeover the Northern Attack Force. Ad-miral Hill was directed to prepare as-sault plans, suggesting where thelandings be made. The debate overwhich beaches to use was months old.Admiral Turner’s inclination to favorthe beaches around Sunharon Harborwas opposed by the majority. Fourpossible landing spots had been notedin this area; those just off Tinian Townhad been designated Red Beach andGreen Beach, with the Orange and BlueBeaches nearby. The width of all thesebeaches totaled 2,100 yards. Theywere certainly the best on Tinian andsuperior to those on Saipan. Each waswide, with a gentle slope, and the off-shore reef contained numerous channelopenings. Although Tinian Harborwas a poor anchorage and would haveto be developed shortly after the land-


ing, it was the only feasible place forthe landing of heavy equipment.

There were, however, two major ob-stacles to an invasion through the Tin-ian Town area. One, of course, wasthat the Japanese expected just such aneventuality and had concentrated somany troops and weapons that a land-ing there could be made only at a heavycost to the assaulting forces. Theother drawback, related to the first, wasthat an attack there-or at Asiga Bay—would deprive the Tinian operation ofjust about the only element of surpriseyet left to it. “The enemy on Saipan,”said Colonel Ogata on 25 June, “can beexpected to be planning a landing onTinian. The area of that landing isestimated to be either Tinian Harbor orAsiga Harbor.” ‘5

From the beginning, therefore,American planners had viewed with in-terest the two small beaches on thenorthwest coast which, to the Japanese,seemed entirely incapable of supportinga major landing. Perhaps surprisewould be obtainable there. What alsofavored the beaches was their proximityto Saipan for resupply purposes, andthe fact that artillery support of thelanding would be possible from that is-land.

Admiral Turner, however, saw an-other side to the problem. True, thebeaches were close to Saipan, but thatalso meant a long advance down the is-land, once the landing on Tinian hadbeen accomplished. A shore-to-shoremovement involved risking small craftto the vagaries of uncertain weatherconditions, whereas at Tinian Town

“ Tinian GarFor OpO A58, dtd 25Jun44, in4th MarDiv Translations (Tinian).

there was a protected harbor, favorableto small boats and unloading opera-tions. Weather could also prevent therapid displacement to Tinian of fieldartillery when the troops outran therange of such support from Saipan.

The limited size of the northwestbeaches was the chief concern of Ad-miral Turner, and hardly less so forGeneral Smith and others, though theywere not so dubious about them. Ev-eryone felt that the utmost knowledgewould have to preface a decision. And,at best, such beaches could serve onlyas paths or routes, rather than as land-ing beaches in the usual sense of theword.

When reporting later to Fleet Admi-ral King, Admiral Hill stated, in simpleterms, what the problem was: couldtwo divisions of troops be landed andsupplied across beaches the size ofWhite 1 and White 2? Of uppermostconcern was whether the amphibiantractors would be able to get ashore,move up to unload, and then turnaround. Intelligence sources reportedthat on White 1 there were only about60 yards usable for passage of amphib-ian vehicles and that on the widerWhite 2 only the middle 65 yards werefree of coral boulders and ledges.

To check such findings and also to ob-tain better knowledge of the beaches,lea physical reconnaissance was neces-sary. It would have to include YellowBeach on Asiga Bay, should White 1and White 2 be found unusable. On 3July, men of the VAC Amphibious Re-

‘“ Part of the assorted intelligence on thebeaches of Tinian had been obtained by inter-rogation of native Chamorro and Kanakafishermen captured on Saipan.


connaissance Battalion were told to beready for a mission on some Tinianbeaches. On 9 July, General HollandSmith issued the operation order toCaptain James L. Jones, specifying thebeaches. The mission had the approvalof both Admiral Turner and AdmiralHill. The latter ordered the participa-tion of Naval Underwater DemolitionTeams.

The mission of the Marines was to in-vestigate the beaches, measure thecliffs, and note the area just beyond,including the exits. They were to re-port the trafficability of the beaches forLVTS and DUKWS in particular. Thenaval UDT-men were to do the hydro-graphic reconnaissance-measuring theheight of the surf and the depth ofthe water, observing the nature of thewaves, checking the reefs and beachapproaches, and looking for under-water obstacles.

After a rehearsal on the night of 9–10 July, off the beaches of MagicienneBay, Saipan, the Marines and the Navyteams boarded the transport destroyersGilrner and Stringhcun. Company Aof the Marine battalion, under the com-mand of Captain Merwin H. Silver-thorn, Jr., was assigned to investigateYellow Beach, while Company B, com-manded by Lieutenant Leo B. Shinn,would undertake a reconnaissance ofthe White Beaches.

The evening of 10 July was very dark~,hen the men debarked into their smallrubber boats about 2030. Moonrise oc-curred at 2232, but fortunately a cloudysky obscured the moon until almostmidnight. Thus the final 500-yardswim to the beaches could be made un-der the cover of darkness.

Reconnaissance of Yellow Beach, by

20 Marines and 8 UDT-men went offjust right, but the reports were unf av-orable. On each side of the 125-yardbeach, swimmers observed forbiddingcliffs which were 20 to 25 feet high.They found also that approaches to thebeach contained floating mines, an-chored a foot under water off the reef,and that many underwater bouldersand potholes would endanger a landing.Craft might be affected also by the rel-atively high surf, which is generallywhipped by prevailing winds.

On the beach itself, the enemy hadstrung double-apron barbed wire.After working his way through it, Sec-ond Lieutenant Donald F. Neff ad-vanced about 30 yards inland to locateexit routes for vehicles—a bold mission,for a night shift of Japanese was busyconstructing pillboxes and trenchesnearby, and their voices could be plainlyheard. Noises resembling gunfire,which had been puzzling while the Ma-rines were moving to the beaches, couldnow be identified as blasting charges.The enemy seemed vaguely conscious ofsomething strange. Three Japanesesentries were observed peering down atthe beach from a cliff, and a few lightsflashed seaward. Though all wentwell for the reconnaissance teams, suchimminence of danger caused a sugges-tion after the reconnaissance that, in-stead of being unarmed, the swimmersshould be equipped with a lightweightpistol or revolver which could be firedeven when wet. Captain Silverthornreported that the reef at Yellow Beachappeared suitable for the crossing ofLVTS and DUKWS, but the sum totalof the situation at Yellow Beach wasplainly unfavorable to a landing.

Exploration of White 1 and White 2


got off to a bad start. Whereas thecurrent off Yellow Beach was negligibleat the time, it was so unexpectedlyrough on the northwest coast that itpushed the rubber boats off course.The men who were scheduled for White2 landed instead on White 1, which theyreconnoitered. The men headed forWhite 1 were swept about 800 yards tothe north, where there was no beach.

Reconnaissance of White 2 wasdelayed, therefore, until the next night,when Company A undertook themission, sending 10 swimmers ashore.On the previous night, the operationhad been handled by the GWmer, butthis time the Stringham took the Ma-rines and the UDT-men toward White2, leaving the pickup to the Gilmer.Radar, which the Si%ingham possessed,enabled it to guide the rubber boats andto send course corrections over an SCR-300 radio.

Findings at the White Beaches wererelatively encouraging. They showedthat the measurements indicated by airand photographic coverage were ap-proximately correct. White 1 provedto be a sandy beach about 60 yardswide, and White 2 more than twice thatsize. At the larger beach, however,there were coral barriers which aver-aged 3~L feet high. They formed thebeach entrance and restricted it, forvehicles, to about 70 yards, though in-fantry could scramble over the barriers.On the beach itself was found a man-made wall sloping up about 11/2 to 2feet but judged passable by vehicles.

Primarily, the physical reconnais-sance verified that LVTS, DUKWS, andtanks could negotiate the reef and land.Moreover, it showed that LCMS andLCVPS could unload on the generally

smooth reef which extends about 100yards from the shore. It appeared,however, that White 1 would be able toreceive just 8 LVTs—and then only ifsome unloaded opposite the cliffs. AtWhite 2, the landing of a maximum of16 LVTS seemed possible, if about halfunloaded in front of the adjacent cliffs.

While the cliffs at the White Beacheswere not more than 6 to 10 feet high—lower than those at Yellow Beach—andcould be scaled by ladders or cargo nets,they were nevertheless rocky and sharpand were deeply undercut at the bottomby the action of the sea. There were anumber of breaks in the cliff walls atboth beaches, where it appeared thatMarines could land single file withoutaid and move inland. In effect, whilethe avenues of approach for amphibi-ous vehicles were severely limited, thelanding area was fairly wide—onWhite 1 a probable 200 yards; on White2, 400 yards.

Marines who debarked from LCVPSon the reef would be able to wade ashorewithout risk underfoot except fromsmall holes and boulders. No danger-ous depths were found, nor any line ofmines or man-made underwater obsta-cles. The scouts, however, were notequipped to detect the buried mine—not easy to set into coral but quitepractical in the gravel at the shoreedge.

Bearing such detailed reports, UDTand VAC Reconnaissance Battalion of-ficers went to see Admiral Turner onboard the Rocky Mount early on 12July. They felt that landings could bemade on the White Beaches, and thatsuccessful exits were possible inland.

With the reports at hand, AdmiralTurner opened a meeting on board the


Rocky Mount on 12 July. He startedthe conference by talking about thevarious beaches of Tinian from a navalstandpoint. General Schmidt and Ad-miral Hill then were asked for theiropinions, and they spoke unreservedlyin favor of the White Beaches, express-ing the following views:

(1) landings at the Tinian Townarea would prove too costly;

(2) the artillery on Saipan could wellsupport an invasion over the northernbeaches ;

(3) capture of Ushi Point airfield, aprimary objective, was immediately de-sirable for supply and evacuation;

(4) tactical surprise might be possi-ble on the White Beaches;

(5) a shore-to-shore movementwould be feasible; and

(6) most supplies could be preloadedon Saipan and moved directly on wheelsand tracks to inland dumps on Tinian.

Admiral Turner was agreeable to theidea. He remarked, later, that he hadalready become reconciled to the WhiteBeaches and, like everyone else, wasawaiting favorable reconnaissance re-ports. General Smith had been a pio-neer advocate of the White Beaches, sonow, with the consent of AdmiralSpruance, the issue was settled.17

The next day, Admiral Turner re-leased his operation plan, later promul-gated as an order. Some 300 copies ofthe plan were circulated, starting in

l7 Admiral Spruance, in commenting on thispassage, wrote that it was the reports of thereconnaissance and UDT teams that “decidedus on the change in plan. This operation, likethat later on at Inchon in Korea, requiredtrained and efficient troops like our Marinesto be successful.” Adm Raymond A. Spruanceltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 40ct63.

motion the troops and equipment whichhad hardly been idle since the captureof Saipan. On 20 July, Admiral Spru-ante confirmed J-Day as the 24th, buthe authorized Admiral Hill to alter thedate, if necessary, for the weather hadto be right. This invasion was goingto take place at the height of the sum-mer monsoon period, a time of suddenlya p p e a r i n g t y p h o o n s a n d t h u n d e r -storms. The exacting logistical effortwould require at least three calm daysfollowing the landings, a period to beforecast by Fifth Fleet weather recon-naissance.

LOGISTICS: PLANS ANDPROBLEMS

Logistics, indeed, formed the heartof the operation plan, for upon thatbranch of military art depended, morethan usually, a victory on the battle-field. The invasion of Tinian was go-ing to test whether Navy and MarineCorps amphibious tactics were suffi-ciently flexible. In the attempt to landand supply two divisions over a spaceof less than 200 yards, there would bethe risk of a pile-up at the beaches,which would be tragically compoundedif the hope of surprising the enemyproved false.

A great variance from normal ship-to-shore procedure would be the factthat, except for the initial emergencysupplies on LSTs, all supplies were tobe landed in a shore-to-shore movementfrom Saipan. The usual beachheaddumps were going to be out of thequestion. No supplies could be landedinitially except those which could rollacross the beaches in LVTs or DUKWsfrom the LSTs to inland dumps. The


supply plan also envisaged a shuttle ofresupply by LCMS and LCTS carryingpreloaded cargo trucks and trailersfrom Saipan and by several LSTS de-voted to general reserve supplies. Allequipment and supplies required wereon Saipan except for petroleum pro-ducts and certain types of food andammunition, which were available onvessels in Tanapag Harbor.

To permit vehicular access over thecoral ledges adjoining the beaches—and thus, in effect, widen them—a Sea-bee officer” on Saipan designed an in-genious portable ramp carried ashoreby an LVT. Six of the 10 constructedby the 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalionwere used at Tinian after being trans-ported to the island by the LSD Ash-land on the morning of the assault.

Even vehicles as heavy as the 35-tonmedium tank could cross the ramp,which was supported by two 25-foot steel beams. These beams couldbe elevated 45 degrees by the LVT toreach the top of the 6-to-10 foot cliffs.As the LVT backed away, a series of18 timbers fell into place on the beams,forming a deck for the ramp. Theother end of the beams then droppedand secured in the ground at the baseof the cliff, breaking free of the LVT.Such ramps were used to land vehiclesuntil pontoon causeways were put intouse. After 29 July, however, badweather, caused by a “near-miss” ty-phoon, precluded unloading by any-thing but the agile and hardy DUKWS.

‘“ This inventive officer was Captain Paul J.Halloran, CEC, USN, Construction Officer,NTLF. He submitted an interesting, detailedreport which may be found as Enclosure B toTF 52 OpRpt.

At Tinian, the amphibian trucks werethe prized supply vehicles. Theywere better suited to the roads thanwere LVTS, which clawed the earth.For the amphibian tractors, the engi-neers often constructed a parallel road.

The shipping and amphibious craftemployed for moving troops and sup-plies were impressively numerous atTinian, considering the size of theoperation. Every available LST in theSaipan area, 37 of them—including afew from Eniwetok—was drafted tolift the troops of the 4th Division forthe landing and the initial supplies forboth Marine divisions. Ten LSTSwere to be preloaded for the 4th Divi-sion, 10 for the 2d Division, and 8 forNTLF. In command of the TractorFlotilla was Captain Armand J. Rob-ertson.

Most of the ships were loaded atTanapag Harbor at whose excellentdocks six could be handled in a day.Troops of the Saipan Island Commandacted as stevedores. Beginning on 15July, they loaded the top decks of theLSTS with enough water, rations, hos-pital supplies, and ammunition to lastthe landing force three and a half days.The assault Marines would not landwith packs at Tinian. In their pocketswould be emergency rations, a spoon, apair of socks, and a bottle of insectrepellant. Ponchos were to be carriedfolded over cartridge belts.

Four of the LSTS each loaded one ofthe 75mm howitzer battalions on 22July, off the Blue Beaches. Individualartillery pieces were stored in DUKWSon board to permit immediate move-ment to firing position by the twoamphibian truck companies assigned tothe 4th Division. Full use of the pack


howitzers was especially desired, forthe division did not have its 105s.

Another four of the LSTS each loaded17 armored amphibians in their tankdecks while at Tanapag anchorage on23 July. Two of these four ships car-ried medical gear stowed on their topdecks. In fact, all of the preloadedcargo on the LSTS was placed topside,and as much as possible remained incargo nets. On each LST were twocranes to expedite loading and unload-ing over the sides into LVTS andDUKWS.

Because all the LSTS were needed tolift 4th Division troops and supplies,one regiment of the 2d Division—the6th Marines—would remain on Saipanuntil 10 LSTS could unload their troopsand return to Tanapag Harbor fromTinian. The 2d and 8th Marines wereto be moved on seven transports for aJ-Day feint off Tinian Harbor. Nogeneral cargo was loaded on the trans-ports, but each carried organizationalvehicles of the units embarked.

On 21 and 22 July, two LSDS, theAshland and the Belle Grove, loaded atthe Charan Kanoa anchorage most ofthe tanks assigned to the 4th Division.The LSDS each took 18 medium tanks,each tank carried in an LCM. Theirother cargo included flamethrower fueland ammunition received from themerchant ship Rockland Victory on19–20 July and a supply of water.

General Schmidt rounded up 533LVTS, including 68 armored amphib-ians and 10 LVTS which were equippedwith the special portable ramp.lg

‘o TF 52 OpRpt, Encl A, p. 6 indicates that537 LVTS were used; the lower figure is con-tained in landing force reports.

DUKWS available came to 130. Land-ing craft employed for the Saipan-to-Tinian lift numbered 31 LCIS, 20LCTS, 92 LCMS, and 100 LCVPS.Nine pontoon barges were loaded on 19July with fuel in drums received fromthe merchant ships Nathaniel Currierand Argonaut. These barges would betowed to positions off the reef to serviceamphibious vehicles and landing craft.Captured Japanese gasoline and match-ing lubricants were stocked on thebarges. Five additional barges wereloaded on 24 July from the Gwrrier.

After the initial landing, the shuttlesystem for resupply would begin tooperate between the 7th Field Depotdumps on Tinian. Twenty LCTS, 10LCMS, and 8 LSTS were allotted forsuch use. Also assigned to the re-supply system were 88 21\2-ton trucksand 25 trailers.

On 22 and 23 July, 32 of the LSTSsailed into the Saipan anchorage, wherethey embarked LVTS, DUKWS, andtroops of the 4th Division from theBlue, Yellow, and Red Beaches of Sai-pan. Herein lay another variancefrom the usual ship-to-shore movementof an island campaign, for, except forthe two regiments of the 2d Divisionembarked in transports, all other Ma-rine units were moved to Tinian inLSTS or smaller craft.

The remaining five LSTS, still atTanapag Harbor, embarked other troopsand LVTS or DUKWS at the same time.Of the 20 LCTS available, 10 were de-signated for the 4th Division vehicles,which were loaded at the seaplane basein Tanapag Harbor on 23 July. Fiveadditional LCTS were loaded the sameday at the same plac~three with me-dium tanks, four to each LCT, and two

THE INEVITABLE CAMPAIGN

with bulldozers and cranes. The re-maining five LCTS were loaded in theforenoon of J-Day at the seaplane basewith 2d Division vehicles.

Of the 92 LCMS available, 36 bearingmedium tanks were loaded onto the twoLSDS. Ten were loaded with 4th Divi-sion armor on 23 July at the steel pierof Tanapag Harbor; these LCMS wouldmake a direct passage. Forty-one ofthe remaining 46 loaded medium tanksand waited off the Blue Beaches formovement on 24 July or shortly after.Five of these LCMS moved to Tiniandirectly, and 36 were loaded on boardthe 2 LSDS when they returned fromTinian. The other five LCMS took on2d Division vehicles at the seaplanebase on 24 July for direct transfer toTinian. The available 31 LCIS wereused to carry troops and vehicles of the2d Division to the 7 transports atTanapag Harbor on 20–23 July, whilethe 100 LCVPS loaded 4th Divisionvehicles at the Green Beaches on 23July for direct movement to Tinian.

While all such loading went on, theshore party of the 4th Division pre-pared for its modified task on Tinian.Usually, the shore party is responsiblefor first dumps off the beaches, but inthis case not a pound of ammunition orother supplies could be landed on thesand. Still, there would be plenty todo. The shore party at Tinian wasexpected to keep supply traffic movingto the inland dumps, where some of itsmen would be working. It was also toprovide equipment and personnel toexpand and improve the beaches. Far-ther inland, responsibility for the trailsand roads fell to Seabees of the 18th

373

and 121st Naval Construction Battal-ions and to the assault engineers of the1st Battalions of the 18th and 20thMarines.

Lieutenant Colonel Nelson K. Brown’s4th Division Shore Party for Tinianwas composed of the pioneers of the2d Battalion, 20th Marines on WhiteBeach 2 and the Army 1341st EngineerBattalion on White 1. The ForceBeachmaster was Commander Carl E.Anderson. The 2d Division did notoperate a shore party, since there werealready enough men on hand. But aplatoon of 2/18 pitched in on WhiteBeach 2, and the rest of the battalionworked at the division dumps.

On 26 July, an NTLF Shore PartyHeadquarters, commanded by ColonelCyril W. Martyr of the 18th Marines,was superimposed upon the 4th Divi-sion Shore Party. The change indic-ated recent attention to consolidatingshore party activities. The NTLFShore Party Headquarters, with astrength of 6 officers and 8 enlistedmen, was taken from the Headquartersof the V Amphibious Corps and of the18th Marines.

A departure from Saipan supplypractice took place at Tinian, where theunit distribution system was used.Small arms and mortar ammunitionwere not delivered to the regiments.Instead, those units drew from thedivision dumps and delivered by truckto the battalions. This practice onTinian was in keeping with logisticalprocedures employed on a smaller is-land, and, as a result, regimental sup-ply dumps did not have to be moved asoften as they were on Saipan.


ATTACK PLANS

Because of the unusual shore-to-shore operation, involving constrictedbeach area, logistics monopolized muchof the planning effort for Tinian. Butmastery of the supply details could onlyenable that victory which arms mustsecure. In preparing for this battle,Marine commanders had a rare oppor-tunity for reconnaissance. A numberof them were taken on observationflights over the island or on cruises nearits shores.

Under General Schmidt’s attackplans, the 4th Division, upon pushinginland over the White Beaches, was toseize Objective O–1, which included Mt.Maga. The main effort would be to-ward Mt. Lasso, reaching to a linewhich would include Faibus San HiloPoint, Mt. Lasso, and Asiga Point.(See Map 22.)

General Cates issued his operationorder to the 4th Division on 17 July.He planned to use the 24th Marines in acolumn of battalions on White Beach 1and the 25th Marines with two battal-ions abreast on White Beach 2. The23d Marines would be held in divisionreserve and wait immediately offshore.

Because the beaches were so narrow,only Company D of the 2d ArmoredAmphibian Battalion was to be em-ployed in the assault landing. Oneplatoon would precede troop-carryingLVTS toward White 1, while the othertwo platoons led the attack againstWhite 2. When the naval gunfirelifted, the armored amphibians wouldfire on the beaches and then turn to theflanks at a distance 300 yards from

shore, where they would fire into adj a-scentareas. The first wave of Marineswould continue forward to the beachesalone, except for the fire of the .30caliber machine guns mounted on theLVTS.

The 2d Division was to satisfy, par-tially, Colonel Ogata’s belief that themajor landing was due in the TinianTown area. The 2d and 8th Marines,as part of a naval force, would executea feint off Tinian Town at the hour ofthe actual landing to divert attentionfrom the northern part of the island.Included in the show by the Demon-stration Group would be the battleshipColorado, the light cruiser Cleveland,and the destroyers Remey and Norman

Scott, delivering a “pre-landing” bom-bardment. Following the demonstra-tion off Tinian Town, the 2d DivisionMarines would return northward toland on the White Beaches in the rearof the 4th Division. General Watsonplanned to put the 2d Marines ashoreon White 2 and the 8th Marines onWhite 1, while the 6th Marines wouldland over either beach. The commandpost of the 2d Division was set up onboard the assault transport Cavalier at0800 on 23 July, as the men made readyfor both a fake landing and the realthing.

The 27th Division, less its 105thInfantry and division artillery, wouldbe ready to embark in landing craft onfour hours’ notice to land on Tinian.Though Army infantry was nevercommitted there, Army aircraft, ar-tillerymen, amphibian vehicles, andengineers helped invaluably toward suc-cess of the Tinian operation.

THE INEVITABLE CAM PAIGN 375

THE MOUNTING THUNDER

Since 20 June, artillerymen onsouthern Saipan had been hammeringTinian. On 23 July, Corps Artilleryfired 155 missions, and for J-Day, Gen-eral Harper planned a mass bombard-ment by all 13 artillery battalions justbefore the landing—a crescendo of fireagainst every known installation onnorthern Tinian, every likely enemyassembly area, and every possible laneof approach by land to the WhiteBeaches.

The Army Air Forces was likewisededicated to seizing Tinian, which, ofcourse, was to become particularlytheirs. On the day before the landing,P-47s of the 318th Fighter Group flew131 sorties against targets on the is-land,zo joining carrier aircraft fromthe Essex, Langley, Gambier Bay, andKitkun Bay, which made 249 sorties.The same day saw the arrival of asquadron of B–25s on Saipan, whichwere shortly to join the battle forTinian.

In order to permit heavy air strikeson southern Tinian on 23 July, navalgunners withheld their own fire forthree periods of up to an hour. Offnorthern Tinian, the Colorado and theLouisville also ceased fire at 1720 toallow a napalm bombing mission on theWhite Beach area, where two firebombs burned out some underbrush.The naval gunfire of 23 July, started atsunrise, was partly destructive, partlydeceptive. Yellow Beach and thebeaches around Sunharon Harbor re-

n Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF HistDiv,ltr to Head, HistBr, G–3, HQMC, dtd 29Nov63.

214-881O-67—25

ceived fire intended chiefly to misleadthe enemy. At Tinian Town, particu-larly, care was taken to confuse ColonelOgata. Mine-sweeping and UDT re-connaissance of the reef off TinianTown were conducted, both withoutfindings or incident. In fact, mine-sweepers operating in Tinian watersprior to the landings reported no obsta-cles to shipping, though, later on, 17mines, previously located by UDT re-connaissance, were swept from AsigaBay.

Before 1845 on 23 July, when all buta few fire support ships left the areafor night retirement, the Tennesseeand the California had fired more than1,200 14-inch and 5-inch shells into thevicinity of Tinian Town, alreadynearly demolished. A notable fact ofthe nawd bombardment on 23 July wasthe comparative sparing of the AsigaBay coastline. It would have beenfolly to invite Colonel Ogata’s reservesto an area quite near the WhiteBeaches, when it was better to keepthem farther south.

After 1845, night harassing fire wasassumed by the light cruiser Birming-ham and five destroyers. The Birm-ingham and three of the destroyerscovered road junctions between FaibusSan Hilo Point and Gurguan Point onthe western half of the island, besidesshelling areas of enemy activity to thesouthwest. The destroyer NormanScott was assigned to isolate road junc-tions on the east side of the island andthe Yellow Beach vicinity.

To the rumbling of such gunfire,General Cates took the 4th Divisioncommand post on board LST .42 at 1500


on 23 July.zl Admiral Hill, in his at-tack order of 17 July, had fixed H-Hourat 0730. The sun would rise at 0557on a day which would tell whetherTinian planners had gambled wiselywhen they picked such a landing areaas the White Beaches. Another ques-tion was interjected shortly beforedawn of J-Day, when a UDT mission

n The 4th Division chief of staff recalledthat this unusual use of an LST as a commandship “worked very well . . . ,“ as, “we got inquite close to the beach and could see whatwas going on there.” Maj Gen William W.Rogers ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd ca.240ct63.

on White Beach 2 was defeated by asquall which scattered the floats carry-ing explosives. The men had been sentfrom the Gilme~ to blast boulders anddestroy boat mines on the beach, thelatter spotted by reconnaissance air-craft.

The squall was a phase of the rainwhich fell upon the assault-loadedLSTS the night of 23 July, when at1800 they moved out to anchor.Nearby lay the line of departure, about3,000 yards off the White Beaches,where Marines were to find everyanswer.

CHAPTER 2

J-Day and Night

STRATAGEM AT TZNIAiV

1

TOWN

While Marines of the 4th Divisionwaited in their LSTS for the morningof 24 July, transports lifting Marinesof the 2d Division sailed from theanchorage off Charan Kanoa at 0330 indarkness appropriate to their secretmission. Just before sunrise, thetransports and their fire support ships—the battleship Colorado, the lightcruiser Cleveland, and the destroyersRemey, No~man Scott, Wadleigh, andMonsse+moved into the waters oppo-site Tinian Town. The 2d and 8thMarines were on board the transports

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis chapter is derived from: TF 51 OpRpt;TF 52 OpRpt ; TF 56 OpRpt ; NTLF OpRpt ;NTLF OPlan 30-44; NTLF Jnl, 23Jul-8Aug44, hereafter NTLF Jnl; 2d MarDivRpt of Ops (Pts 1 & 2), Phase III, FORA-GER, dtd llSep44, hereafter 2d MarDiw OpRpt Tinian; 4th MarDiv Rpt of Ops (inclRpts on Admin, Intel, Ops, Sup and Evac,Sig, SpecCmts and Recoins, 14th, 20th, 23d,24th, and 25th Mar and 4th TkBn, dtd 25Sep44, hereafter 4th MarDiv OpRpt Tinian; 4thMarDiv D4 Jnl, 21Jul–3Aug44; -ithMarDivTranslations (Tinian); Capt John W. Thoma-son, 111, “The Fourth Division at Tinian,”Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 1 (Jan45),hereafter Thomason, “Tinian ;“ Chapin, .lthMa.rDiv in W W 11; Crowl, Marianas Cam-paign; Hoffman, Tinian; Isely and Crowl, Ma-rines and Amphibious War; Johnston, FollowMe/ ; Morison, New Guinea and the Ma&anas ;

Proehl, .4thMarDiv History; Smith and Finch,Coral and Brass; Stockman and Carleton,Campaign fo~ the Marianas.

Knox, C’alvert, Fuller, Bell, Heywood,John Land, and Winged Arrow, withCaptain Clinton A. Mission on theKnox in command of the Demonstra-tion Group. Two patrol craft, PC 581and PC 582, rounded out the taskgroup.

The fire support ships were to deliverneutralizing and counterbattery fire onTinian Town, and on the high groundnorth and south of the town, to divertthe enemy further. The heavy cruiserNew Orleans and the light cruiserMontpelier would meanwhile execute asimilarly deceptive mission at AsigaPoint, delivering 30 minutes of air-burst fire over the vicinity of YellowBeach.

Shortly after 0600, the Demonstra-tion Group, lying about four miles offTinian Town, began the planneddeception. The commander of the Cal-vert logged the action at 0612: “Stop-ped ship. Commenced loweringlanding craft. Simulated debarka-tion of landing team.” 2 By 0630 all 22boats of the Culvert were waterborne.Shortly before 0700, Navy planes sweptover the vicinity of Tinian Town, bomb-ing and strafing.

From each transport the Marinesdescended cargo nets into the landingcraft and then climbed up again. Notroops remained in the boats, but to theJapanese on shore it may well have

‘ USS Culvert ( APA 32) AR, dtd 4Aug44.

377


appeared so. At 0730, the hour set forinvasion of the White Beaches, cox-swains guided their craft rapidly shore-ward under cover of naval gunfire.Soon the Calvert reported seeing“splashes from large caliber shells1500–2000 yards off starboard quar-ter,” 3 and Captain Mission confirmedthat artillery and heavy mortar firewas being received in the boat lanes.Under orders from Admiral Hill not tojeopardize the men, he withdrew theboats to reform. A second run wasthen started, to make the deceptionrealistic enough. Fire from Japaneseshore batteries was again received, andsome of the landing craft were sprayedwith shell fragments. But no casual-ties resulted, and the boats moved towithin 400 yards of the beaches—im-pressively close-before turning back.About 1000, the transports began re-covering the landing craft, and an hourlater all ships were under way to thetransport area off the White Beaches.

Was the demonstration a success?Measured by the results intended, itwas. The Japanese did believe, for awhile, that they had foiled an attemptedlanding. Colonel Ogata sent a mess-age to Tokyo, claiming that he hadrepelled more than 100 landing barges.The feint served to hold Japanesetroops in the Tinian Town area, freez-ing the 3d Battalion, 50th Infantry andelements of the 56th Naval GuardForce while Marines moved inland overthe White Beaches.

Not only was Colonel Ogata brieflydeceived but so also were his soldiers.One Japanese infantryman of 1/135wrote in his diary: “Up to 0900 artil-

‘ Ibid,

lery fire was fierce in the direction ofPort Tinian, but it became quiet afterthe enemy warships left. Maybe theenemy is retreating.” 4

Two of the American warships suf-fered grievously from the violent Jap-anese response. Air photos of Tinian,good as they were, had failed to showthe battery of three 6-inch naval gunsbehind Sunharon Harbor. At 0740,when the Colorado had moved towithin 3,200 yards west of TinianTown, she received the first of 22 directhits in a period of 15 minutes. Casual-ties were many, totaling 43 killed and176 wounded. Of the Marines onboard, 10 were killed and 31 wounded.5The ship was badly damaged but wasable to make it back to Saipan. Thedestroyer Norman Scott, while at-tempting to protect the Cokwado, suf-fered 6 hits from the same guns andhad 19 men killed and 47 wounded.Not until four days later was thisJapanese battery destroyed by thebattleship Tennessee.

INVASION—THE REALITY

Unlike those at Tinian Town, thefire support ships off the WhiteBeaches (two battleships, one heavycruiser, and four destroyers ) werenever in danger from guns on shore.The big ships here were given a specialmission before H-Hour, after theunderwater demolition team assignedto destroy the ominous mines on WhiteBeach Two had lost its explosives in an

4Diary of Takayoshi Yamazaki, in 4th MarDiv Translations (Tinian).

‘ USS Colorado AR, ser 0033 of 12Aug44.(OAB, NHD) . ,

J-DAY AND NIGHT 379

inopportune offshore squall. The Cali-fornia, Tennessee, and Louisville fireddirectly on the beach. Still, because ofthe smoke and dust there, it was diffi-cult to determine whether the mineshad been detonated, so another ap-proach, at closer range, was tried. At0625, the naval and artillery bombard-ment of the area was lifted for 10minutes in order that orbiting call-strike aircraft might ensure destruc-tion of the mines. This air strike,which involved 12 fighters and 2 tor-pedo bombers, was partially successful.Observers reported that 5 of the 14known mines were detonated. At thetime of the strike, some of the LVTSwere already waterborne. They hadbegun emerging from the LSTS at 0600,at the same time that minecraft begansweeping the waters off the beaches.

In order to obscure Japanese observa-tion of such prelanding activity, a bat-tery of 155mm howitzers on Saipanbegan firing a concentration of smokeshells at 0600 on Mt. Lasso, the site ofColonel Ogata’s command post. Corpsartillery also struck the woods andbluffs just beyond the beaches to pre-vent any Japanese there from observ-ing offshore activity. Operations offthe White Beaches went like clockworkuntil shortly before 0700, when thecontrol group commander informedAdmiral Hill that initial assault waveswere not forming as rapidly as planned.H-Hour, therefore, was delayed 10 min-utes—to 0740.

Shortly before H-Hour, a windchange caused the smoke and dust overthe target to shift offshore, where itcovered the boat lanes. Adding to thishazard to the landing was a strongtidal current running northward at a

right angle to the lanes. In order toguide the initial assault waves to thebeaches, two P–47s were assigned to flyat low altitude in the direction theLVTS were to move.

At 0721, 24 LVTS took the first waveof Marines across the line of departure.In eight of the craft, Company E, 2dBattalion, 24th Marines was embarked,ready to land on White Beach 1.There, the attack was to be by a columnof battalions. The other 16 LVTSlifted Company G, 2d Battalion, 25thMarines and Company I of the 3dBattalion, to land them abreast onWhite Beach 2. Only scattered rifleand machine gun fire was received asthe troops approached the shore. Pre-ceded by armored amphibian tractorsand supported by LCI gunboats firingrockets and automatic cannon, the Ma-rines of both RCTS hit the beach almostsimultaneously. Gunfire ships andcorps artillery supported the landing,but because of the long-range artilleryfire on the beach area the usual straf-ing attack to cover the initial assaultwas omitted.

THE SITUATION AT THEBEACHES

At 0747, the eight tractors bearingCompany E, 2/24, ground to a halt, andMarine riflemen got their first look atthe cupful of sand that was White 1.The beach was just wide enough toaccept four of the LVTS; the othershad to debark their troops opposite theledges adjacent to the beach. Surprisewas not complete; a small beach de-fense detachment offered resistance.The handful of enemy troops gave sometrying moments to the Marines,


especially to those who had to climbover the jagged coral ledges fromwaist-deep water. Marines whocrossed the beach were ab!e to treadsafely above a dozen horned mineswhich the Japanese, expecting no land-ing here, had permitted to deteriorate.

The beach defenders employed handgrenades, rifles, and machine gunsagainst the Marines. During a briefbut bitter fight, Company E destroyedthe Japanese in their cave and crevicedefenses and then pushed inland. Theattackers had to move swiftly, not onlyto keep the beaches cleared for succes-sive waves, but also to keep the enemyoff-balance and prevent them fromcounterattacking.

On the heels of Company E, the restof the 2d Battalion landed in a columnof companies—A (attached for landingonly), G, F, Headquarters, and ShoreParty (1341st Engineers). CompanyA turned left behind Company E toawait its parent battalion. By 0820,Major Frank E. Garretson had hisentire 2d Battalion on Tinian. Lieu-tenant Colonel Otto Lessing’s 1stBattalion got ashore by 0846 and im-mediately veered left.

The advance of the two battalionswas opposed by intermittent mortarand artillery fire and by small armsfire. Coming from thick brush andcaves, the source of the fire was hardto spot. Yet, after the first 200 yards,progress toward the O–1 Line eased towhat Major Garretson called a “cakewalk.” G At 0855, Lieutenant ColonelAlexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., receivedorders to land the reserve 3d Battalion,

nMaj Frank E. Garretson ltr to Maj CarlW. Hoffman, dtd 17Aug50.

and upon reaching the shore at 0925,moved his unit to an assembly areaabout 300 yards inland. Marine com-manders considered the opposition onWhite Beach 1 to be “light,” and it was,when contrasted to the situation duringthe Saipan landing or to the moderateresistance encountered on WhiteBeach 2.

While the Japanese hardly expectedany sort of landing at White Beach 1,the same was not quite true at WhiteBeach 2, for Colonel Ogata had cau-tioned against the possible appearanceof a small landing party there. Theresult was a more vigilant force andimproved defenses. The known anti-boat mines on the beach had not dete-riorated; a few had been exploded byaircraft, but the bulk of them hadescaped destruction. The better Japa-nese defense here was built around twopillboxes situated to put crossfire on thebeach. They had not been damaged bythe bombardment. Because of the per-ils on shore, it was decided not to sendLVTS over the beach until engineerscould get at the mines. Initial waveswere to avoid the beach; instead, thefirst troops would have to climb rockyledges, which rose 3 to 10 feet above apounding surf.

There had been some talk on Saipanthat the Tinian beaches would be easyto take, but the battle-tried men ofColonel Merton J. Batchelder’s 25thMarines expected no simple landings asthey crowded into the LVTS. WhileLieutenant Colonel Justice M. Cham-bers’ 3/25 would go ashore on the leftin a column of companies, a differentprocedure was planned for 2/25, com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel LewisC. Hudson, Jr. After the 2d Battal-

J-DAY AND NIGHT 381

ion’s Company G landed, the other twocompanies were to be put ashoreabreast. It was believed that such aformation would permit the greatestspeed in crossing the beach with theleast loss of control.

Despite choppy water, some LVTSwere able to edge near enough to theledges so that two Marines, standing atthe bow, could help their comradescatch a handhold on the jagged rocksalong the top. The other assault com-panies of the regiment landed at sched-uled intervals. Even the reserve IstBattalion, 25th Marines (LieutenantColonel Hollis U. Mustain) was entirelyashore by 0930.

PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK q

In the area of White Beach 1, 2/24gained 1,400 yards, reaching its objec-tive line by 1600, unopposed except byoccasional small arms fire. Elementsof the battalion reached the westernedge of Airfield No. 3 and cut the mainroad from Airfield No. 1 to other partsof the island. To the left, however,1/24’s advance was delayed at theshore, some 400 yards short of O–1,because of Japanese resistance beingoffered from positions in caves andbrush. Though armored amphibianswere employed from the water to fireinto the caves and flamethrower tanksburned out vegetation, the Japanesestill would not be routed.

At 1630, the reserve 3d Battalion,

7Additional sources for this section in-clude: 8th Mar SAR, FORAGER, Phase III,dtd 19Aug44, hereafter 8th Mar SAR Tinian;1/8 Rpt of Ops, dtd 13Aug44, hereafter 1/8Rpt Tinian; 2d TkBn SAR, dtd 14Aug44,hereafter 2d TkBn SAR.

24th Marines went into line to close agap that had opened between 1/24 and2/24. Shortly before dark, the 1stBattalion, 8th Marines (LieutenantColonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.), afterwaiting in the Culvert, was landed.It thereupon became 4th Division re-serve and took a position to the rear of2/24.

While Colonel Franklin A. Hart’s 24thMarines dealt with sporadic resistanceat White Beach 1, Colonel Batchelder’s25th Marines encountered better-organ-ized opposition. The enemy defensesincluded mortars and automatic weap-ons, located in pillboxes, shelters, caves,ravines, and field entrenchments.From Mt. Lasso some artillery piecesthat had survived the preparation firesdropped shells into the beach area.

Fewer prepared defense positionswere met as the 25th Marines pro-gressed inland, but continual fire fromsmall, well-hidden knots of Japaneseheld back the day’s advance, keeping itto approximately 1,000 yards short ofO–1. The two pillboxes that com-manded White Beach 2, and the rifleand machine gun pits which protectedthe fortifications, were bypassed by theinitial assault waves, which were moreconcerned with getting a foothold in-land. Other Marines reduced the twostrongpoints and found 50 dead Japa-nese around antiboat and antitankguns.

The entire vicinity of White Beach 2had been methodically seeded withmines, including the powerful antiboattypes on the beach and deadly antiper-sonnel mines and booby traps inland.Experienced Marines avoided even thetempting cases of Japanese beer, but,despite all precautions, two LVTS which

J-DAY AND NIGHT 383

ventured inland were blown up 30yards from the shore, and athirddeto-nated a mine while attempting to turnaround on the beach. Removal of themines required the diligent efforts ofUDT-men, bomb disposal teams, andengineers. Not until 1337 could the in-fested White Beach 2 be reported clearof mines.

Resistance to the Marine landings onTinian had been comparatively light—casualties on J-Day numbered 15 killedand 225 wounded, including casualtiesin the destroyed LVTS; the known en-emy dead came to 438. Still, GeneralCates believed it wise to land the divi-sion reserve, the 23d Marines, the firstday. His understrength regimentswere occupying a beachhead which was,by the end of the day, some 3,000 yardswide, and at its maximum depth, ap-proximately 1,500 yards. Moreover,an enemy counterattack was expectedmomentarily.

The Marine division commander wasmore interested in being ready for sucha counterattack than in simply reach-ing the entire O–1 Line. He thereforeordered his regiments to cease the at-tack about 1630 and begin digging in.Marines strung barbed wire along theentire division front and stacked am-munition near their weapons. Ma-chine guns were emplaced to permitinterlocking bands of fire, while 60mmand 81mm mortar target areas were as-signed. Bazookamen were stationed atevery likely tank approach, and 37mmgun crews got ready with canister andarmor-piercing shells.

All troops of the 23d Marines, thoughnot their vehicles, were ashore by 1630,landed over White Beach 2. At 1030,division had ordered the debarkation

into LVTS. At 1300, Colonel Louis R.Jones received word from GeneralCates, written one hour before, specify-ing the mission. In effect, the 23d Ma-rines was to pass through rightelements of the 25th Marines along thecoast and take up a frontline position incontact with 2/25. The cramped sectorassigned to the 23d, however, permittedroom for only the 2d Battalion in theline. The 1st Battalion dug in behind2/23, creating valuable depth, for hereseemed the “most probable counterat-tack zone.” 8 To the 3d Battalion fellthe role of division reserve.

A few vexations marked the landingof the 23d Marines. First, there was aseries of communication difficultieswhich delayed getting the troopsashore. Then, the fact that otherunits, 1/25 and elements of 2/25, werestill in the immediate vicinity crowdedan area where artillery and tanks alsokept landing. Finally, as the 2d Bat-talion, 23d was moving into position, ithad to subdue violent resistance fromlurking Japanese employing machinegun and rifle fire. Tanks, lumberingthrough brush and cane fields, helped tohunt down the enemy.

These tanks belonged to Company C,4th Tank Battalion, and were amongthe many landed on J-Day upon an is-land so suitable for armor that the Ma-rines eventually employed more tankshere than they had on any previous am-phibious operation. For the Tiniancampaign, Major Richard K. Schmidt’s4th Tank Battalion had received 13 newmedium tanks from the 7th Field Depot.The older tanks of the battalion, how-

‘ BGen William W. Rogers ltr to CMC, dtd20Dec50.

384

ever, were hard-used veterans of theSaipan campaign.

The tank-infantry teamwork on Sai-pan had been potent, so every effortwas made to get the tanks ashore onTinian at the first opportunity. By H-Hour the LSD Ashland had unloaded aninitial cargo of tank-bearing LCMS andwas off to Saipan to pick up armor ofMajor Charles W. McCoy’s 2d TankBattalion. At 0800, the LSD BelleGrove departed Tinian for the samepurpose, and both ships were back be-fore noon.

The landing of the 4th Tank Battal-ion, however, was somewhat hamperedby conditions at White Beach 2, wherethe fissures in the reef proved moretreacherous than was expected. One ofthe bulldozers, which were to preparethe beach, became irretrievably caughtin a pothole shortly after emergingfrom an LCT. The threat of holes inthe reef, when added to the danger ofbeach mines, led to a temporary re-rout-ing of bulldozers and tanks over White1 instead; there, at low tide, the LCTSand LCMS could safely unload theircargo on the fringing reef. From thesmaller beach, some of the dozers andtanks crawled the 1,000 yards overlandto White 2. Most of the division vehi-cles were likewise put ashore overWhite 1; in fact, except for some tanks,all vehicles were unloaded on the reef atWhite 1 on J-Day after a mishap to twovehicles—they were lost when theLCMS transporting them swamped atthe reef edge off White 2.

In view of the crowding at the smallerlanding area, one LCM debarked a tankfor a trial run to White 2 at 1100.But the tank required 45 minutes to ne-gotiate the 100 yards from reef to

CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

beach. Moreover, upon arrival, thecrew learned that the beach was not yetquite cleared of mines; a tank crewmanand a reconnaissance man had beenwounded when a jeep ran over and det-onated an undiscovered mine. Byafternoon, however, the beach was con-firmed as clear, and one entire tankcompany (Company A) was landedover White 2 without loss.

Except for Company A, the 4th TankBattalion landed over White 1; there,the LCMS could move to within 15 yardsof the beach at some places. Eight ofthe medium tanks belonging to Com-pany B, which was attached to the 24thMarines, led infantry attacks on J-Day.Tanks of Company C, attached to the23d Marines, were landed after directmovement from Saipan in LCTS. Com-pany D, the light (flamethrowing) tankunit, also made a shore-to-shore jour-ney in LCMS and one LCT.g Onceashore, light tanks were divided amongthe three medium tank companies.The initial unit ashore was the Ist Pla-toon, which landed at 1345 with two M5tanks and four flamethrower tanks, andwas attached to Company B. One ofthe M5s and two of the flame tankswere immediately dispatched to 1/24, inthe area just north of White 1, wherecanister from the M5s helped to cleanthe enemy out of some heavy under-brush. The 2d Platoon was attachedto Company C, and the 3d Platoon,landed at 1630, joined Company A.One platoon of four flame tanks of the2d Tank Battalion reached Tinian in

oThe flamethrowing tanks used at Tinianwere M3A1 light tanks, which had their tur-ret-mounted 37mm guns and ammunition racksremoved and Ronson (Canadian) flamethrow-ers installed to redate them.

J-DAY AND NIGHT 385

two increments at 1700 of J-Day andearly the next morning. No other 2dBattalion armor came ashore on J-Day,but all organic tanks of the 4th MarineDivision were on Tinian before dark.The Headquarters and Service Companyof the 4th Tank Battalion, embarked inan LST, landed during the late after-noon.

J-DAY LOGISTICS

In addition to the tanks, four battal-ions of artillery and the 75mm half-tracks belonging to the weaponscompany of each assault regiment wereput ashore on J-Day. The artillerypieces were successfully carried inDUKWS from the LSTS directly to fir-ing positions. The 1st Battalion, 14thMarines landed at 1315 on White 2.The unit went into position about 300yards inland from the southern end ofthe beach, and by 1430 its 75mm packhowitzers were supporting the 25thMarines. The two battalions of the10th Marines, which were attached tothe 14th Marines, landed next—2/10 at1630 to reinforce fires of 2/14, and 1/10at 1635 to serve with 1/14. At 1600,Colonel Louis G. DeHaven set up theregimental command post behind anabandoned railroad embankment northof White Beach 2.

After landing the artillery, theDUKWS unloaded ammunition fromships off the White Beaches, and driv-ers became expert at taking the loadedDUKWS through surf that ranged fromfour to six feet in height. It was theamphibian trucks and LVTS whichwere used principally for the landing ofpriority combat supplies on J-Day. Noheavy trucks and none but essential

light vehicles, such as jeeps, were putashore. As it turned out, the smallWhite Beach 1 had to absorb most ofthe landing effort on J-Day, and it in-evitably became somewhat congested.Still, LVTS and DUKWS got up to thefront line with ammunition, barbedwire, rations, and water.

Two pontoon causeway piers hadbeen assembled at Saipan. These float-ing docks were towed to Tinian the af-ternoon of J-Day, but it was 0600 on 25July, after Seabees worked all night onthe job, before the first one, installed atWhite Beach 1, went into use. Thepier for White Beach 2 was not em-placed until three days later, because ofheavy enemy artillery and mortar fire,which impeded the task and caused sev-eral casualties. Each pier carried twotractors, anchors, chains, and mooringwire. Once the causeways were se-cured in place, LSTS and smaller land-ing craft could drop their ramps on thepier ends and run loaded cargo trucksashore.

Advance elements of the shore andbeach parties landed with the assaultbattalions and were ashore with com-munications established by 0830. Allother men of these units were landedby 1000, for the need of prompt beachdevelopment was well realized. Shoreparty equipment had been preloaded intwo LCTS, and all of that was ashoreby 1400, much of it routed over WhiteBeach 1 and thence overland to theother beach.

The bulk of the shore party on White2—Major John H. Partridge’s 2d Bat-talion, 20th Marines-was kept busyinland at first, unloading LVTS andDUKWS for the 4th Division dumps.In general, these dumps were located

J-DAY AND NIGHT 387

inland of White 2, whereas the 2d Di-vision dumps were set up behind White1. Just below White 1 late on J-Day,a special portable LVT ramp was setup; it helped some of the tracked vehi-cles climb onto the land. An LVT car-rying another ramp struck a coral headon the edge of the reef and turned over.The next day eight ramps werelaunched, though two were swamped.

During J-Day, the 4th Division ShoreParty commander, Lieutenant ColonelNelson K. Brown, commanding officerof the 20th Marines, and the GroupBeachmaster, Lieutenant Samuel C.Boardman, USN, supervised operationson shore, both personally and from aradio-equipped tender. The next daythe shore party headquarters was estab-lished at a point between the twobeaches. General Cates remained athis command post on LST 42 the firstday, finding communications excellentfrom a radio jeep on deck.

Landing operations were discon-tinued for the night after 1/8 and the23d Marines were fully ashore. Theonly elements of the division supportgroup to land on J-Day were the Head-quarters and Service Company andCompany D of the 4th Medical Battal-ion, which, preloaded in LVTS on Sai-pan, landed over White 1 about 1630.Before that time, battalion and regi-mental aid stations had been set up, ofcourse, and they handled the early evac-uation of casualties to transports, USU- .ally by jeep ambulance loaded in anLVT. The division engineers, exceptfor a platoon attached to each landingteam, did not get ashore until 25 July.Aside from the division command ship,the control vessels, and three LSTS re-tained for emergency unloading, all ves-

sels and landing craft retired to Saipanfor the night. Sufficient initial suppliesof ammunition, water, rations, andmedical necessities had been landedprior to darkness.

J-Day had been a memorable day inthe history of Navy and Marine Corpsamphibious accomplishments. Morethan 15,600 American troops and theirprimary combat materiel had been putashore efficiently over beaches whichthe Japanese had regarded as impass-able for a major landing—and, in fact,mostly over the very beach at which theenemy utterly scoffed.l” On the nextday, the 2d Marine Division would be-gin landing on its own vast scale. Be-fore then, however, the Marines of the4th Division, remembering the greatbanzai charge on Saipan, waited seri-ously but calmly for the Japanese coun-terattack, expected to come the firstnight.

THE JAPANESE CO UNTERAT-TACK 11

No one supposed that Colonel Ogatahad remained long in ignorance of

‘0 Some idea of the logistical miracle of J-Day on Tinian may be gained from the fol-lowing partial list of items unloaded prior to2148: 99 DUKWS loaded with 75mm howitzerammunition; 48 DUKWS loaded with 75mmgun ammunition; 48 medium tanks; 15 lighttanks; 6 jeeps; 6 radio jeeps; 20 l-ton trucks;12 2%-ton trucks; 7 bulldozers. TransDiv 7AR, dtd lAug44.

“ Additional sources for this section include:NTLF G–2 Jnl, 27May–13Aug44, hereafterNTLF G–2 Jnl; Anx A to NTLF G2 Peri-odic Rpt No. 46, dtd 30Ju144; 4th MarDivD–2 Periodic Rpt, dtd 25Ju144; 2/23 Jnl, 7May–24Aug44, hereafter .2/23 Jnt; 2/24 Narrativeof Bat of Tinian Island, n.d., hereafter 2/2.4Navrative Tinian.


where the Marines were invading. Athis command post atop Mt. Lasso, hedwelt as a virtual prisoner of Americangunfire, behind thick smoke, whichclouded observation but not discern-ment. At 1000 on J-Day, he issuedorders for the reserve 1st Battalion,135th Infantry Regiment, the MobileCounterattack Force, to move north tothe Mt. Lasso area. Still, he could notquite divorce himself from the set be-lief that at Tinian Town lay the great-est threat. There, while Captain Oya,hearing of the landing, fumed becausehis fixed guns could not be turnednorthwest, word was received fromColonel Ogata for the 3d Battalion,50th Regiment to stay in position. Alsokept static initially, as the Marinesmoved inland, was the 2d Battalion,assigned to defend the Asiga Bay vicin-ity. In the colonel’s judgment, thatwas the only alternate invasion area.

Elements of the 56th Naval GuardForce had been stationed in variousparts of the island or had operatedpatrol boats off shore. The navaltroops in southern Tinian were kept attheir coastal defense artillery or anti-aircraft guns on J-Day. Near theWhite Beaches, there were also somecomponents of the force, chieflyantiaircraft personnel trained ad-ditionally as infantry. Other Japa-nese units at hand for a counterattackwere the tank company of the 18th In-fantry Regiment and a company ofengineers (both attached to the50th Infantry Regiment). The engi-neers were trained to double asriflemen. Finally, Ushi Airfield har-bored 600 to 1,000 naval troops, whowere charged with maintenance anddefense of that base.

Marines had already met the well-trained soldiers of the 50th Infant~early on J-Day besides some naval andaviation personnel who bore no unitidentification. The Americans hadalso felt the fire of the 2d Artillery Bat-tery; then, on the night of 24 July, theId ArtilleW Battery, under coverof darkness, lugged its pieces from theAsiga Bay area.

That the 1st Artillery, or some of theother Japanese units, moved at ColonelOgata’s bidding is improbable, forenemy communications were extremelypoor after the American bombardment.Every Japanese commander remem-bered, however, what he had been tolda month before—that when the Ma-rines land, “destroy the enemy atthe beach.” ‘2 Lacking any contraryordei, his duty appeared plain.

The most sizable enemy movementwas that of the Ist Battalion, 135thInfantry Regiment—the Mobile Coun-terattack Force—believed to numbermore than 900 men, assembled near theMarpo radio station, about twomiles northwest of Tinian Town.So cleverly did Captain Izumi move hisbattalion more than four miles thatonly once did a hedge-hopping aerialobserver see some marching men be-neath the trees. Unobserved firefell along the route, but the troopsplodded on, moving by squads, chieflyalong tree lines between cane fields,avoiding the open roads.

A day of periodic drizzle was fol-lowed by a night of pitch darkness.Close to midnight the Marines, whowere waiting for the expected enemyattack, noticed that the incoming fire

u DefFo~ Plan.

J-DAY AND NIGHT 389

changed from an occasional mortarshell to an increased number of roundsfrom heavy field guns. At 0200,men of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marinesmade out a compact group of the enemysome 100 yards away and opened fire.The battalion was then occupying theextreme left flank of the Marines’front, anchored on the coast. The offi-cer commanding Company A expressedthe belief later that the Japanese, whohad come from the Ushi Airfield vicin-ity, were marching along the beachroad, quite innocent of the fact thatthey were so near the invaders theysought.13

Startled to receive Marine fire soonerthan they expected, some 600 Japanesenaval troops hastily deployed to attack.Their small figures emerged from thedarkness into the bright light of Ma-rine flares. The enemy here was notColonel Ogata’s professional infan-try; in fact, the white gloves of someof the naval officers gave a curiousdress formality to the scene of carnageafter more than three hours of bitterfighting left 476 Japanese dead.

At the beginning of the battle, theJapanese tried to rush the preparedMarine positions, charging into thecanister of 3’imm guns, machine gunfire, mortar shells, and rifle fire.l~ The

mMaj Irving Schecter interview with HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 2Jan51.

“In preparation for the counterattack, Lieu-tenant Colonel Lessing of 1/24 had emplacedattached half-tracks and 37mm guns directlyin the front line, where, that night, “guncrews fought in the dual role of gunners andriflemen.” Col Otto Lessing ltr to CMC, dtdllDec50.

enemy’s weapons consisted mainly ofrifles, hand grenades, and machineguns taken from aircraft. The Ma-rines’ Company A received the mostpressure, being reduced to about 30men with usable weapons, but the com-pany well answered the enemy fire-the next morning showed that most ofthe Japanese dead lay forward of itslines.

In the declining phase of the battle,a platoon of Marine medium tanksmoved up, while Marine artillery of2/14 (Lieutenant Colonel George B.Wilson, Jr. ) registered on the area be-hind the enemy, preventing retreat orreinforcement. A number of Japanesesuicides by grenade signified collapse ofthis section of the enemy counterat-tack, and by 0700 the Marines werethrough mopping up. In that job,armored amphibians helped.

The counterattack on the left hadbeen repulsed with no enemy break-through, but at the center the boundarybetween the 24th and 25th Marinesproved insufficiently covered. Theenemy’s approach to the center,heralded by artillery fire, was observedshortly after midnight by a 15-mancombat outpost of 2/24, stationedabout 400 yards to the front. Theyreported Japanese in great numbers.

At 0230 the vanguard of this enemyforce, including a few tanks, attackednear the boundary of the two Marineregiments, specifically on the left flankof 3/25, but was stopped by a fusilladeof small arms, mortar, and 37mm fire.The battalion commander, LieutenantColonel Chambers, reported that “inthe light of subsequent develop-


ments” this thrust “appeared as afeint.” 15

A second attack followed, which in-volved elements of the 1S%and 2d Bat-talions, 50th Infantry, and of the IstBattalion 135th Infantry-equippedwith new rifles and demolition charges.About 200 of these well-trained footsoldiers broke through the lines ofCompany K on the extreme left of3/25. After getting to a swampwhich was not covered by machineguns, they paused and divided into twogroups.

One group headed straight for theartillery positions of 2/14 near thebeach. Here Battery D, receivingthe impact of the charge, employed notonly howitzers but also machine gunsto stem it. As the surviving Japanesestole doggedly closer, despite the fire,gunners of Batteries E and F turnedinfantrymen, leveling enfilading firefrom their .50-caliber machine gunsinto the area forward of Battery D.That fire was conclusive-it “liter-ally tore the Japanese to pieces,” saidthe battalion executive officer.le

At 0400 Colonel Hart, commandingthe 24th Marines, asked that 1/8 dis-patch a company to help protect divi-sion artillery. The riflemen ofCompany C found the situation quiteimproved; a platoon of tanks also ar-rived to mop up any surviving Japanesebehind the lines. The morninglight, replacing flares and star shells,l?

“ “Combat Narrative of Tinian Operation,”Encl B to 3/25 AR (Saipan-Tinian), dtd19Aug44.

“ Maj William McReynolds ltr to CMC, dtdSJan51.

“ Naval supporting ships lit up the entirelength of the Japanese counterattack—left,

showed some 100 enemy dead in thearea. The cost to the Marines hadbeen two men of Battery D, killedwhile manning machine guns.

The other group of the Japanesebreakthrough force fared no better.After turning west into the rear areasof the 25th Marines, the enemy wasstopped by a support platoon of 3/25,employing machine guns. Some of theJapanese, caught in a wooded area nearCompany K, were destroyed by 60mmmortars shells lobbed into their midst.

The enemy’s push at the center ofthe Marine line had cost them approx-imately 500 dead. Many of these wereJapanese that got caught on thebarbed wire forward of the line andwere. cut down’ by machine gun fire.Identification of the Japanese that fellwhile attacking the center showed thatmost of them were of the 1st Battalion,135th Regiment. Some were engi-neers, armed and fighting as infantry,and just as dangerous with the rifle,bayonet, or grenade.

The counterattack on the right, orsouth, took the form of a mechanizedthrust. Up the coastal road, whichwas crossed near the end by the linesof the 23d Marines, moved five or sixJapanese tanks,18 each transportingsome infantrymen and camouflagedwith leaves and branches. Other Jap-

center, and right. The destroyers Monssen,Eaton, and Conway provided constant illum-ination.

‘“ 4th MarDiv IntelRpt, Anx B to 4th MarDiv OpRpt Tinian, gives six as the number ofattacking Japanese tanks; the battalion com-mander of 2/23 has stated that only five tanksactually took part, an opinion supported byother witnesses. Colonel Edward J. Dillon in-terviews with HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 25Sep50and 22Jan51.

J-DAY AND NIGHT 391

anese soldiers followed on foot, march-ing over the hard white coral in thetotal darkness of the night. The tanksrepresented half the armor of the tankcompany attached to the 50th Regi-ment-in fact, half of the enemy’sentire armor on Tinian, all of whichconsisted of light tanks mounting37mm guns and 7.7mm machine guns.

Marine listening posts reported theapproach of the tanks; the stepping upof Japanese artillery fire and patrol ac-tivity had already indicated that somesort of attack was due here. At 0330the enemy tanks were observed 400yards forward of the Marine perim-eter, specifically that section guardedby 2/23. The Japanese column thenploughed right into the weird daylightcreated by naval star shells, to receiveat short range the fire of bazookas,75mm half-tracks, and 37mm guns.lgThe scene could be described only bysomeone that had seen it:

The three lead tanks broke through ourwall of fire. One began to glow blood-red,turned crazily on its tracks, and careenedinto a ditch. A second, mortally wounded,turned its machine guns on its tormentors,firing into the ditches in a last desperateeffort to fight its way free. One hundredyards more and it stopped dead in itstracks. The third tried frantically to turnand then retreat, but our men closed in,literally blasting it apart. . . . Bazookasknocked out the fourth tank with a directhit which killed the driver. The rest of thecrew piled out of the turret, screaming.The fifth tank, completely surrounded,attempted to flee. Bazookas made short

“ COI Louis R. Jones had fortunately rein-forced the position of the 2d Battalion withthe 37mm gun platoon of the 3d Battalion,thus doubling the 37mm firepower of 2/23.

214-881O-67—26

work of it. Another hit set it afire, and itscrew was cremated.~”

Such was the fate of five of the tanks,which, being visible over a wide area,received fire even from the attached37mm platoon of the regimental re-serve, 1/25.21 Despite the con-certed Marine fire, however, a sixthtank at the far rear was believed tohave fled undamaged.

The catastrophe which befell theirarmor did not break the fighting willof the surviving infantry, dedicatedveterans of the 1st and 2d Battalions,50th Regiment, and of the Id Bctttal-ion, 135th Regiment. Unwavering be-fore the canister of 37mm guns andmachine gun fire, they charged thelines of 2/23 and 2/25, the former unitreceiving the hardest thrust of theassault. A few of the Japanese evengot through to engage at savage com-bat the Marines of the regimental re-serve, 1/23 (Lieutenant Colonel RalphHaas), positioned to provide depthhere. But total destruction was thefate of the enemy’s infantry, no lessthan of their tanks. In the last hope-less moments of the assault, just atdawn, some of the wounded Japanesedestroyed themselves by detonating ama.metic tank mine, which produced aterrific blast. Evidently, these men hadbeen ordered to break through and de-

w Lt Jim G. Lucas, AsstDiv PubRelO, quotedin Proehl, 4th MarDiv History, p. 101.

= The parent unit of a 37mm gun platoonwas the regimental weapons company, which,besides three 37mm platoons (one ordinarilyassigned to each battalion), had a platoon of75mm half-tracks. Bazookas, which showedwell what they could do in stopping a lighttank attack, were carried by teams of a riflecompany.


molish Marine tanks at the rear of thelines. Some of those tanks were ofCompany C, 4th Tank Battalion, whichhelped to mop up the forward areaafter the battle.

The Japanese effort here had costthem 267 casualties. The number ofcounted enemy dead resulting from thetotal counterattack came to 1,241, ofwhich some 700 were irreplaceable in-f antrymen of organized units. Such aloss represented one-seventh of ColonelOgata’s entire defense force and sig-naled the virtual extinction of theMobile Counterattack Force.zz The

a Only two POWs were taken from 1/135 inthe counterattack. They said that their bat-talion was practically annihilated, that only afew stragglers could have remained.

percentage did not include those cas-ualties which the enemy suffered dur-ing the bombardment of Tinian orfrom the landing and initial advance ofthe Marines on J-Day.

In retrospect, General Cates felt thatby more than withstanding the organ-ized counterattack, the Marines “brokethe Jap’s back in the battle forTinian.” 23 The victory certainlyproved decisive, yet on the morning of25 July no Marine believed the fightwas over. As a matter of fact, the50th Infantry Regiment was stilllargely intact and composed of well-equipped troops. Its entire 3d Bat-talion had not yet been committed.

= .lth MarDiv OpRpt Tinian, Sec IV, p. 25,dtd 25Sep44.

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