North Cotabato v Government

8/11/2019 North Cotabato v Government

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008.]

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS

SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his ownbehalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented bySEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREYCANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser onthe Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on thePeace Process, respondents.[G.R. No. 183752. October 14, 2008.]CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L.LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the

City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICOBASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners, vs. THEGOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACENEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAHARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN andHERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on PeaceProcess, respondents.[G.R. No. 183893. October 14, 2008.]THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCHCRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented bySEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREYCANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.,in his capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the PeaceProcess; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,respondents.[G.R. No. 183951. October 14, 2008.]THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as representedby HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON.FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman,1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rdCongressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Provinceof Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON.FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON.EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L.ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C.AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON.ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners, vs.THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE


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NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA andHON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of PeaceProcess, respondents.[G.R. No. 183962. October 14, 2008.]ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III,

petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESPEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA,and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL,represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioner-in-intervention.MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N.DEANO, petitioner-in-intervention.THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYORCHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioner-in-intervention.THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T.

MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Provinceof Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples inMindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C.ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan,petitioners-in-intervention.MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC. (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT(MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.D E C I S I O NCARPIO-MORALES, J p:Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President inpursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on thearmed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country wherethere has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform adelicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which thePresident may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to theConstitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that sameConstitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace processeffectively. cDTHIEI. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONSOn August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and theMILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, werescheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia.


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The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under theleadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National LiberationFront (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of whatSalamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basistowards Marxist-Maoist orientations. 1

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize,however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases beforethe scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Orderenjoining the GRP from signing the same. IECcaAThe MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding ofseveral prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panelssigned the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, theysigned the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by statingthat the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace

negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolutionand pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attainundue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. 2Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in theGRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attackeda number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control ofthe town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. 3 In response, then President JosephEstrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. cHDaEIWhen President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive againstthe MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. TheMILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation,but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime MinisterMahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, theMILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually,decided to meet with the GRP. 4The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated bythe Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on theGeneral Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF.The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. 5 SDAcaTFormal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22,2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (TripoliAgreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects ofthe negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect.With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting".A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect ofthe Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This wasfollowed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation andDevelopment Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002


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at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence betweengovernment forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and hewas replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF.Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. 6

ISCHETIn 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur,eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, asmentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGSBefore the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied inan instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitionsbearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain 7and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol

filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayerfor the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 9Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compelrespondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pendingthe disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultationthereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declaredunconstitutional. 10 TDcAIHThis initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also forMandamus and Prohibition 11 filed by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor CelsoLobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise prayfor similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City ofZamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro JuridicalEntity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Ordercommanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist fromformally signing the MOA-AD. 13 The Court also required the Solicitor General tosubmit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD, 14to which she complied. 15Meanwhile, the City of Iligan 16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief,docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing theMOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and thatthe MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally impleadExecutive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. HSDCTAThe Province of Zamboanga del Norte, 17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-GovernorFrancis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 apetition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, 19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951.They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operativeeffect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.


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On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed apetition for Prohibition, 20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgmentprohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executingthe MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, andnullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein

additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by itsChairman Mohagher Iqbal. AcICTSVarious parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas,former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela 21and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat 22 and Gov. SuhartoMangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, 23 Ruy Elias Lopez ofDavao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao andbusinessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, GerardoDilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The MuslimLegal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for

Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.aIHSEcBy subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted theirrespective Replies.Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the ExecutiveDepartment shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations toaddress the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In thesucceeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous oppositionfrom petitioners.The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled thefollowing principal issues:1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of officialcopies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units isconcerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with thefinalization of the draft; DIESHT2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panelcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when itnegotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters ofpublic concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of fulldisclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II,Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCALGOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;


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5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippineswould be BINDING itself ACcISaa) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front forancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLESRIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bindthe Government of the Republic of the Philippines;6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities ofZamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Nortein/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciablequestion; and aHDTAI7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid

commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 24The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most ofthe parties submitted their memoranda on time.III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-ADAs a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject fivepetitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the twocomments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of theMOA.The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only fourearlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between theGRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on theImplementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during theadministration of President Fidel Ramos. TICAcDThe MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes the organic act for theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 25 and the Indigenous PeoplesRights Act (IPRA), 26 and several international law instruments the ILO ConventionNo. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relationto the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter,among others.The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rightsentrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact)and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treatydevice".During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the worldthrough a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway,while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslimlaws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world, however, became


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more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the internationalcommunity of nations. aDIHTEAs Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States andinter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam anddar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways

of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land ofcompact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under asecular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, havingbeen bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on theother hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States,maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF andthe Philippine government the Philippines being the land of compact and peaceagreement that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly definedas "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and

benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principlesdeclared in the [MOA-AD]". 29The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED ASFOLLOWS", and starts with its main body.The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts andPrinciples, Territory, Resources, and Governance.A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLESThis strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and allIndigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as'Bangsamoros'". It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants ofMindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the timeof conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,including their spouses. 30Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro", as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includesnot only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims, 31 but all indigenouspeoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom ofchoice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists inhas not been specifically defined. ICTaEHThe MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland", the ownership of whichis vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights ofoccupation. 32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does notform part of the public domain. 33The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, whichright is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerainauthority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates weredescribed as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all theelements of a nation-state in the modern sense. 34The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people onthe past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as theBangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the


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Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independentprincipalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supremeover the others. 35 DaTHAcThe MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the 'First Nation' withdefined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity

and commerce with foreign nations".The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of thatterritory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenouspeoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation", hence, all of them are usuallydescribed collectively by the plural "First Nations". 36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, byidentifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" suggesting its exclusiveentitlement to that designation departs from the Canadian usage of the term.

The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE)to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and AncestralLands of the Bangsamoro. 37 ADaECI

B. TERRITORYThe territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as themaritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and theatmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of theARMM thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu,Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certainmunicipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001plebiscite. 39Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities andbarangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each ofthese areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart fromeach other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later thantwelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. 40 Category B areas, alsocalled "Special Intervention Areas", on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscitetwenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement the ComprehensiveCompact. 41 DHSCEcThe Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all naturalresources within its "internal waters", defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers fromthe coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters", whichshall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of thePhilippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within theseterritorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP)shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. 43Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint".The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial watersbetween the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through productionsharing and economic cooperation agreement. 44 The activities which the Parties areallowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the


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exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishingactivities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similarprovision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internalwaters of the BJE.C. RESOURCES

The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation andtrade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missionsin those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to includeaggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperationagreements. 46 ACcaETThe external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the CentralGovernment. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensurethe BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEANand the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate inPhilippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements orprotocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues

involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of theancestral domain. 47 cISDHEWith regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources ofenergy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and controlthereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorialjurisdiction". This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, whenpublic interest so requires", the Central Government may, for a fixed period and underreasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operationof such resources. 48The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertainingto natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. 49The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arisingfrom any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary landtenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is nolonger possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties. 50STDEcAThe BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts oragreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA),Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instrumentsgranted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM. 51D. GOVERNANCEThe MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe andmonitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embodythe "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for theactual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that theparticipation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationshipbetween the Central Government and the BJE. 52The "associative" relationshipbetween the Central Governmentand the BJE


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The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as"associative", characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that thestructure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, andadministrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the ComprehensiveCompact. HACaSc

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legalframework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and uponeffecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prioragreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the ComprehensiveCompact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on thelegality of this provision.The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutionsinclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal,economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions,the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.AIaDcH

As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by RodolfoGarcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRPand the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-ADidentifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties", meaning the GRP andMILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels. 53 In addition, the signaturepage of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak,Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" AmbassadorSayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) SecretaryGeneral and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "INTHE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP andDato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whomwere scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps ofthe provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentionedin the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY. IEaATDIV. PROCEDURAL ISSUESA. RIPENESSThe power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts declineto issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mereacademic questions. 55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases andcontroversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches ofgovernment. 56An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of oppositelegal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical orabstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can beinterpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court candecide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposingparties is submitted for judicial determination. 58 CEHcSI


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Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverseeffect on the individual challenging it. 59 For a case to be considered ripe foradjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performedby either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must

allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of thechallenged action. 61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger ofsustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 62The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe forjudicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that:The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to furthernegotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed atattaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposalthat does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the listof operative acts required have been duly complied with. . . .xxx xxx xxx

In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authorityto pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interestswith no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there areno concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since theacts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peaceagreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merelyimaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures.(Underscoring supplied) TAcSaCThe Solicitor General cites 63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:TERRITORYxxx xxx xxx2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:xxx xxx xxxd. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Governmentstipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12)months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas asenumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the"Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Towardthis end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve alloutstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from thesigning of the MOA-AD. caTESDxxx xxx xxxGOVERNANCExxx xxx xxx7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementationof this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take suchsteps to enable it to occur effectively. CASTDI

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legalframework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact andupon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-


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derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in theComprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied)The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversyripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 65 this Court held:

. . . [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challengedaction, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without anyother overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law isenough to awaken judicial duty. DEaCSAxxx xxx xxxBy the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is acoequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws .. . settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. 66In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 67 the United States Supreme Court heldthat the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-ledprayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer

had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged asunconstitutional on its face. 68That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example,in New York v. United States, 69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court heldthat the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-LevelRadioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provisionwas not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New Yorkhad to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences. 70 TAECaDThe present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari andProhibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, inthe case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess ofits jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation,board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the lawspecifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfullyexcludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other isentitled. 73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raiseconstitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislativeand executive officials. 74The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O.No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001. 75 The said executive order requires that "[t]hegovernment's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and theadministrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process . . . begoverned by this Executive Order". 76The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted theterms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communitiesaffected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detaillater, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandateunder E.O. No. 3. TDcAIH


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Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate theConstitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiringamendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of aComprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legalframework", implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD.

This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will bediscussed in more detail later.As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed theirauthority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of theConstitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition,and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When anact of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, itbecomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 77HSIDTEB. LOCUS STANDI

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome ofthe controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation ofissues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalquestions". 78Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely toaffect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in theconstitutional question raised. 79When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is aboutto be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about tobe subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizenand has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81 EaHcDSFor a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds areillegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 82 The Court retainsdiscretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit. 83In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures theinstitution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can bequestioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing tomaintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution inhis office. 84An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but themere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legalprofession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it withstanding. 86As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect orvindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. 87Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfythe requirements of the law authorizing intervention, 88 such as a legal interest in thematter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.


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In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi,given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issuesraised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving theattention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90

The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues hasfor its purpose the protection of fundamental rights. HSAcaEIn not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determinewhether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of theConstitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushedaside technical rules of procedure. 91 ScHADIIn the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591)Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893)and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province ofSultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view ofthe direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories,

whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. Thesepetitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would beexpanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino PimentelIII would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that theywould be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. Thefact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident ofCagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of thetranscendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.SCHIcTIntervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers,assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal andunconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can begiven legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of"undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for theirpersonality to intervene in these petitions.With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member ofthe Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public'sconstitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interestin the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thuspossesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd districtof Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., asmembers of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer,resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and KisinBuxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions.Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality onlocus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand. ECaAHSIntervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development,an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim


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Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., a non-governmentorganization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, asthe case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays forthe denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices toclothe them with standing.

B. MOOTNESSRespondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with thesatisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncementof the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,]the government will not sign the MOA". 92 TEHIaDIn lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that thePresident had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. 93In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principlenot being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, itwill decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a graveviolation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and

paramount public interest is involved; 96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requiresformulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and(d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 98Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntarycessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filedand the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprivethe tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case mootespecially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against thepossible recurrence of the violation. 99 SICDAaThe present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into thedomain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in thepresent cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v. Calderon 101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits,supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.Petitions not mootedContrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD andthe eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. Itbears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court'sissuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list ofconsensus points", especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed orinitialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reachingConstitutional implications of these "consensus points", foremost of which is the creationof the BJE. IHCacTIn fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part ofrespondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework forcertain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions arenot confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going andfuture negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not,therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-


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AD, 102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRPPanel notwithstanding.Petitions are imbued with paramount public interestThere is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest,involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political

modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to furtherlegal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever providesimpetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, thepublic and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. 103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] onissues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] willdo more harm than good to the nation as a whole".The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, whatwas assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurementcontract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relationbetween two parties the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues

therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles oncontracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factualcircumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in thecontroversy. ATcaIDThe MOA-AD is part of a series of agreementsIn the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreementsnecessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on theAncestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to beundertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and theHumanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002. DTAHECAccordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 tothe Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimatelydecides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]", mootness will not set in in lightof the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.Need to formulate principles-guidelinesSurely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up tocarry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or inany form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Courtnotes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securingan agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way thatlong-lasting peace can be assured", it is minded to render a decision on the merits in thepresent petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the publicand, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding AncestralDomain.Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief JusticeArtemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes 104 in which he stated that the doctrine of"capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the partyraising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as adirect result of their issuance". They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction overthe subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked. DHSEcI


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The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercisesoriginal jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition forInjunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it hasfar reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. 105 At all events,the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.

Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply thedoctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of NorthCotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan andIsabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem inthe future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. cdtaiIt is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot,respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court andpetitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too,intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.

V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUESAs culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically twoSUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-ADwas negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz.: TcEAIH1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on publicconsultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed theMOA-AD?2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUEPetitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern,as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall berecognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to officialacts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis forpolicy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may beprovided by law. 107As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, 108 Court has recognized the statutory right toexamine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutionalstatus. SaHTCEThe right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution andthe 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, 110 the Court ruled that access topublic records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on mattersof public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interestin matters of social and political significance.. . . The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamentalrole of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perceptionby the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making ifthey are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enablethe members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly


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observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both itsacquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitablyceases." . . . 111 cSHATCIn the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with theexigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in

democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issuesconfronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in theaffairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is byensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed publicthat a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113The MOA-AD is a matter of public concernThat the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of publicconcern 114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD isindeed of public concern. 115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity ofreal estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, 116 the need for adequate noticeto the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee,

118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to publicofficials, 119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and the identityof party-list nominees, 121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly,the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does thesovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of thepublic at large. ACcHIaMatters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps andnegotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to theexecutory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categoricallyruled:. . . [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to theconsummation of the transaction". Certainly, a consummated contract is not arequirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can neverexercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may betoo late for the public to expose its defects.Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract,which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes faitaccompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern,a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such arequirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of anyproposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Wecan allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of itsavowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 122(Emphasis and italics in the original) HDCAaSIntended as a "splendid symmetry" 123 to the right to information under the Bill ofRights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitutionreading:Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts andimplements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving publicinterest. 124


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The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complementsthe right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights.The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, whileSection 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobodydemands. 125

The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct ofpublic affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as thecenterpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. 126These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential tohold public officials at all times accountable to the people. 127 DcaCSEWhether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of theConstitutional Commission so disclose:MR. SUAREZ.

And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will notbe in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.MR. OPLE.

I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, theimplementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer. 128HECaTDThe following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification onthe issue, is enlightening.MR. DAVIDE.

I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get theGentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It wouldrequire a legislation by Congress to implement?MR. OPLE.

Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendmentfrom Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified bythe clause "as may be provided by law". CASTDIMR. DAVIDE.

But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect andCongress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?MR. OPLE.

Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediatelyinfluence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here mayno longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which isinconsistent with this policy. 129 (Emphasis supplied)Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passingof a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for"reasonable safeguards". The complete and effective exercise of the right to informationnecessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that thebroader 130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceablewhile the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interestis not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the


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absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.SDHAECAn essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or processof communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the Statethat the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the

government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. 131 Envisioned to becorollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedbackmechanisms.MS. ROSARIO BRAID.

Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Willthe government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and canreact where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanismsto the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementingoperational mechanisms. aHcACIMR. OPLE.

Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses

take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways.xxx xxx xxxMS. ROSARIO BRAID.

Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public

officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations thatwill be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on theprivate network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do notthink we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making. 132 (Emphasissupplied) ScCEIAThe imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evidentin the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to discloseinformation and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process ismanifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declaresthat there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to thecomprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation.One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it"should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles importantto all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the differentcontending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community". 134 Included as acomponent of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowermentfor peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels tobuild consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation ofpeople's participation in the peace process". 135 HCEaDIClearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate"continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more thansufficient consultation". 136Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one ofwhich is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and otherpeace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to


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render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peaceprocess". 137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principalforum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peacepartners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on theimplementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil

society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives". 138aTADcHIn fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as acorollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.PAPP Esperon committed graveabuse of discretionThe PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinentconsultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runscontrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. cEAHSCThe Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a

particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law anddischarge the functions within the authority granted by the President. 139Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retortin justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifeststhe manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people'sparticipation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not muchdifferent from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lipservice. 140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to performthe duty enjoined. TDEASCAs for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenableunder the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3'sexplicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and locallevels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even beforethe GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers itsdefinite propositions. 141 It bears emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevantadvice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege inview of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without aprayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it wascomplying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. ESTDcCPetitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a Statepolicy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations withappropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, andother concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implementedin their respective jurisdictions" 142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter onintergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented bygovernment authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereofare complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided,


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That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evictedunless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisionsof the Constitution. 143 (Italics and underscoring supplied) cDHAaTIn Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao, 144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be

implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects coveredare those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that maycall for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where thesewill be implemented. 145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally andunilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, 146 whichcould pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great numberof inhabitants from their total environment.With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs),whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected bythe MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at alllevels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.

147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, 148 which entails,among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of theICCs/IPs.Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agencythe power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement orcompromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. Inproceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying withthe IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearlytranscended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 onGovernance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legalframework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.TcSHaDIndeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to publicscrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is toremain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authorityemanating from them. 149ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUEWith regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannotall be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents haveadmitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itselfrecognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at leastsome of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free ofany legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the presentlegal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework aremade. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shallpass upon how ASETHCThe MOA-AD is inconsistent with


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the Constitution and laws aspresently worded.In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powersconceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceedthose granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of

the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have beenvested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves asa unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international lawconcept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 onRESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentionedprovision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisionedrelationship between the BJE and the Central Government. aTCAcI4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridicalentity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a

structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrativeinstitutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A periodof transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying therelationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoringsupplied)The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined moreprecisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that thereis a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD by its inclusion ofinternational law instruments in its TOR placed itself in an international legal context,that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term"associative" in the MOA-AD. cdrepKeitner and Reisman state that[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durablelinks. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to theother, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associationsrepresent a middle ground between integration and independence. . . . 150 (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated Statesof Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of thePacific Islands, 151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of FreeAssociation. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very closeties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of theirstatehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN SecurityCouncil and by their admission to UN membership.According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSMgenerally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, suchcapacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking,postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting itsforeign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the


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FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting eithergovernment. HEcIDaIn the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S.government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S.territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using

military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar themilitary personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for militarypurposes.It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association isunderstood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of FreeAssociation is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's nationalconstitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right ofindependence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to theUN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actuallybased on an underlying status of independence. 152 ACTISEIn international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a

transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples ofstates that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase areAntigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. Allhave since become independent states. 153Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with theinternational legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity toenter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of theCentral Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in theASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the CentralGovernment over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippineofficial missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection,and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between theislands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments ofFSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreignaffairs matter affecting them. cHECASThese provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vestin the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximatingit.The concept of association is notrecognized under the presentConstitutionNo province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws ashaving an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the conceptimplies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local orregional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other thanthe Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepareany part of Philippine territory for independence. caTIDE


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Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, alreadyrequires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically thefollowing provisions of Article X:SEC. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippinesare the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous

regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.SEC. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and inthe Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areassharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and socialstructures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitutionand the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines. IHSTDEThe BJE is a far more powerfulentity than the autonomous regionrecognized in the ConstitutionIt is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the

national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJEis a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the MontevideoConvention, 154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, anda capacity to enter into relations with other states. AEITDHEven assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion ofPhilippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of theconcept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrityof the Republic.The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government andthe BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many ofthe specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are inconflict with the Constitution and the laws.Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomousregion shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituentunits in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, andgeographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomousregion". (Emphasis supplied) THacESAs reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But evenassuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutionalprovision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2 (d) and 2 (e), the present geographic area of theARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusionin the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloanand Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, incontrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. Thatthe present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted forinclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary underthe Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion inthe ARMM, not the BJE. ScCIaAThe MOA-AD, moreover, would


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not comply with Article X, Section20 of the Constitutionsince that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of thisConstitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for

legislative powers over:(1) Administrative organization;(2) Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;(4) Personal, family, and property relations;(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;(7) Educational policies;(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the generalwelfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied) TDESCa

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. Themere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutionalprovision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powersfound in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. Itwould not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-makingpower in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states:"The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreigncountries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not includeaggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines . . . ." Under ourconstitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. ExecutiveSecretary 155 instructs:In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as thesole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative withforeign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country'smouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with theauthority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business offoreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority tonegotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CIHAEDArticle II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisionedin the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The Staterecognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within theframework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associativearrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unitybecause of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act ofplacing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, hasgenerally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to nationalunity. CTcSIABesides being irreconcilable with the


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Constitution, the MOA-AD is alsoinconsistent with prevailingstatutory law, among which areR.A. No. 9054 156 or the Organic|Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. 157

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of thedefinition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on CONCEPTSAND PRINCIPLES states:1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identifythemselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to thosewho are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands includingPalawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of itsdescendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classifiedas Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cHAaCEThis use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X,

Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of theBangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishesbetween Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers toFilipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditionsdistinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and

North Cotabato v Government

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