Normative Power Israel

Normative Power Europe and the State ofIsrael: An Illegitimate EUtopia?jcms_2065 579..616

GUY HARPAZHebrew University of Jerusalem

ASAF SHAMISCity University of New York*

Abstract

This article re-examines the concept of Normative Power. It is viewed here not merelyas an abstract concept, but also as part of a complex historical, socio-political andeconomic context, examined through the prism of non-Europeans, in our caseIsraelis. By analysing the dominant Israeli approaches towards the EU and itsnormative apparatus, this article aspires to depict the multifarious and concreteperceptions of Normative Power Europe and to contrast these perceptions with theEU self-perceived and self-portrayed normative view.

Introduction

In recent years the EU has intensified its efforts to become what is elusivelytermed a ‘Normative Power’. Internally, the EU utilizes common Europeanvalues such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the peacefulsolution of international disputes to buttress its identity and enhance itslegitimacy as a socio-political entity. Such enhanced legitimacy is used, inturn, as an impetus for further integration (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002,p. 767).

* The term ‘EUtopia’ is borrowed from Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002. We are grateful to Emanuel Adler,Arie Reich, Alfred Tovias, Lior Herman, Nellie Munin, Dian Shalem, Hila Elroy and Evgeny Finkel fortheir comments on very early drafts of this article, for the comments of the two anonymous reviewers andfor the generous support given by the EU under the aegis of the Jean Monnet Action and by the LeonardDavis Institute for International Relations, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The usual caveat applies.

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© 2010 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148,USA

Externally, the EU (as well as many of its Member States) has in recentyears intensified its efforts to become a significant player across the world,grounding such agenda on, inter alia, normative foundations. For thatpurpose the EU attempts to spread its core values within its vicinity andbeyond, calling upon its neighbours and trading partners to commit them-selves to its normative agenda (see Whitman, 1998; Gardner-Feldman, 1999;Van Ham, 2001; Manners, 2002; Adler and Crawford, 2004; Youngs, 2004;Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007, p. 436; Dunne, 2008).

Consequently, Normative Power Europe has become a central theme in thedisciplines of European integration and IR. Most of the scholarship on thistheme is both Eurocentric and abstract. As such, the academic discourse failsto ascribe appropriate weight to the manner in which Normative Power isperceived by the non-European and to the actual political predicaments thatthe European Normative agenda creates, examined from that same perspec-tive (but see Lucarelli, 2007). This article aspires to contribute to existingliterature by examining Normative Power Europe through the prism of the‘other’, adding the much-needed concrete political dimension to the livelytheoretical discourse.

More specifically, by considering Normative Power Europe through anIsraeli prism, this article attempts to: (i) depict the multifarious and concreteviews of Normative Power Europe; (ii) contrast these views with the mannerin which the EU perceives itself and portrays itself; (iii) question, within theEU–Israeli context, the assumed theoretical link between Normative Powerand legitimacy; (iv) link the issues of external legitimacy and effectiveness,arguing, against the backdrop of the above analysis, that Normative EuropePower in its contemporary form, might bring about an external legitimacydeficit and a resultant impediment to the EU’s norms-advancement agenda;and (v) offer means to enhance the effet utile of Normative Power Europe.

The thesis of this article is developed as follows. We begin by introducingthe article’s theoretical apparatus, conceptualizing and theorizing NormativePower Europe. We then analyse the evolution of EEC/EC/EU–Israeli rela-tions, indicating their material and normative elements. We subsequentlyexpose the dominant Israeli approaches to Normative Power Europe, namelyHistorical Europe, Political Europe and Economic Europe. Drawing on thesediverse approaches, we demonstrate that Normative Power Europe has incertain ways been a cause of Europe’s external legitimacy deficit, especiallywhen there is a gap between the manner in which the EU perceives andportrays Normative Power Europe and the manner in which it is perceived bythe ‘other’. We proceed by linking that legitimacy deficit with the ineffec-tiveness of some of the EU’s Middle East actions and policies. We concludeby calling on the EU to develop a more cautious, self-reflective notion of

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Normative Power Europe, backed by a shrewd use of instruments of positiveand negative conditionality.

A methodological caveat is in order. The EU is not a unitary entity and theIsraeli society is complex and varied. It is therefore difficult to draw theprecise image of the EU in Israel. Such image may differ along socio-economic, religious or national-ethnical lines and vary from one context tothe other (for example, the Israeli political establishment, the Israeli bureau-cracy, socio-political elite, the media, organized civil society or the Israelimasses). Moreover, existing high-quality, primary empirical work on theEU’s image in Israel is scarce and mainly one-dimensional (see Sadeh, 2007,interviewing public officials and Dror and Pardo, 2006, relying on a publicpoll. But see Pardo, 2009, for a wider perspective). The picture painted inthis article, which focuses primarily on Israel’s political establishmentand socio-political elite, is based on the other hand on multiple sources,including a close examination of political statements, the Israeli press,public polls, media coverage, secondary scholarly sources and experiencein teaching thousands of Israeli students in numerous Israeli academicinstitutions.

The findings of this article apply to the EU–Israeli context and yet theymay be seen as part of a wider academic approach: the ‘other’ does andshould matter in the disciplines of European integration and IR (see Lucarelli,2007, p. 257; Neumann, 1996). Further research is thus called for to examinethe interface between the EU’s normative agenda, its external legitimacy andthe effectiveness of its external policies, vis-à-vis other countries and regions,building on recent relevant scholarship (Theophanous, 2004; Hettne andSöderbaum, 2005; Men, 2006; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007, p. 436).

I. Normative Power Europe

The culturally, linguistically, legally and economically diverse nations ofEurope have a long history of armed conflict. Their ambitious attempt atpeaceful integration under a separate legal order was first seen in the creationof the EEC, followed by the EC and the EU. The achievement of peace,stability, political moderation and protection of human rights in a region thathad experienced wars, nationalist divisions, Nazism and Fascism, is a trans-formation from which the EU can derive justifiable satisfaction.

Since the early 1990s the EU has been striving to export its successfulmodel of peace through democracy and of democratization through trade(Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002, p. 768) to other parts of the world, therebyextending its sphere of economic and normative influence (Whitman, 1998;

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Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002; Manners, 2002; Aoun, 2003, p. 299; Lavenex,2004) and increasing the geographical scope of its ‘peace community’(Gardner-Feldman, 1999, p. 77). For that purpose the EU has positioneditself, as Duchêne predicted as early as 1973, as a Normative Power, advanc-ing civilian values through reliance on, inter alia, soft power instruments:‘Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a majorcenter of the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not acolonized victim but an exemplar of a new stage in political civilization. TheEuropean community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate theinfluence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed toexert essentially civilian forms of power’ (Duchêne, 1973, p. 19; see alsoKagan, 2002; Manners, 2002).

The concepts of ‘Normative Power’, ‘Civilian Power’ and ‘Soft Power’captured the attention of Duchêne (1973), Whitman (1998), Kagan (2002),Manners (2002), Nye (2004), Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007), Nicolaïdis andHowse (2002), Börzel and Risse (2009) and others.1

The concept of ‘Normative Power’ refers to the ability to exert ‘power overopinion’ (Manners, 2002, p. 239.) It pertains, in the European internalcontext, to the EU’s ability to ground its integration agenda in a distinctivenormative foundation (peace through economic integration and the pursuanceof democracy, human rights, environmental protection, etc.). Externally, thisconcept relates to the EU’s attempts to export that normative ‘EuropeanModel’ elsewhere. In the words of Manners, Normative Power Europeembodies ‘an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on anormative basis, but more importantly that this predisposes it to act in anormative way in world politics’ (Manners, 2002, p. 252).

Such a normative basis places heavy emphasis on the formulation andpromotion of advanced, common civilian values, which enjoy a pivotal posi-tion in EU foreign relations (Leino, 2008, p. 262) and which lead somescholars to treat the EU as a ‘Civilian Power’.

As a Normative, Civilian Power, the EU relies on ‘soft power’ instruments(Nye, 2004, pp. 75–83). These instruments, which rest on cultural and politi-cal values and foreign policies (Nye, 2004; Duchêne, 1973, pp. 19–20),enable the EU to obtain at times what it wishes through attraction, as opposedto force, coercion or payment (Nye, 2004). Such reliance is based on theassumption that ‘In the twenty-first century, the vectors of soft power andlegitimate power are far more effective levers for obtaining outcomes than thethreat or use of force’ (Dunne, 2008, p. 14). Despite certain recent attempts on

1 See Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002, p. 770) who argued that the ambivalence of this concept accounts forboth its longevity and its contestation. First, ‘civilian power’ was both descriptive and prescriptive. Second,it could refer alternatively to means or ends – civilian as civil (non-military) and as civilizing.



the part of the EU to gain hard powers (Börzel and Risse, 2009), these EUnormative aspirations and the reliance on soft, civilian instruments, are stillcentral to the EU internal and external ethos, as evident in the (rejected)Constitutional Treaty2 and in the Lisbon Reform Treaty.3

Nevertheless, European IR scholars are at odds regarding the motivesbehind the EU’s normative agenda. At the risk of over-simplification,Normative Power Europe may be theorized along either Realist, rational,self-interest, material-based and hegemonic lines or along Constructivist,normative, value-based lines.

According to the Realist rationale, Normative Power Europe is an effectivestrategy to meet the EU’s hard-power deficit, and is utilized to promoteEurope’s material interests, be it economic or geo-strategic: ‘Their [Euro-pean] tactics, like their goals, are the tactics of the weak. They hope toconstrain American power without wielding power themselves [. . .] theywant to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience’ (Kagan, 2002,p. 7; for the EU’s hard power deficit, see Aoun, 2003).

A competing Constructivist school of thought focuses on the normative,value-based aspects of such a normative agenda, treating them as part of theEU’s attempt to formulate its own common internal and external socio-political identity, to project its values and to advance its own legitimacybeyond its borders.

Indeed, through the 1990s a growing number of scholars focused onEurope’s normative stance in world politics as a primary source of a Europeanconstructed supranational identity (see Diez, 1999; Nicolaïdis and Howse,2002; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007). This scholarly focus has been verymuch influenced by the ‘Constructivist Turn’ in the IR discipline (Priceand Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 263), which redirected the theoretical spotlightfrom traditional Realist-materialist factors to more normative and ideationalones.4 Constructivist literature views norm exportation as an endogenous,

2 According to the rejected Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Union ‘is founded on thevalues of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for humanrights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’, O.J. 2004/C 310/01, 16 December 2004,Article I-2. These values are declared to be ‘common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’. The samedocument asserts that ‘in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its valuesand interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity andmutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of humanrights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development ofinternational law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’, O.J. 2004/C 310/01,16 December 2004, Article I-3.3 See Article 21 EU of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, at «http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF».4 See Buzan and Little (2001, p. 21), ‘The ending of the Cold War saw an explosion of interest insociological questions of identity, and in legal questions of human rights’.



identity-forming process that may lead to transnational convergence of collec-tive values, identities and interests of non-EU countries alongside those of theEU, while formulating and reinforcing the EU’s own identity and legitimacy.5

Different perspectives can be identified within this school of thought.The Utilitarians, for example, contend that while military actions tend to

divide Europe, human rights and environmental issues are a source ofcommon European identity (Keohane, 2002, p. 744), while scholars subscrib-ing to the critical-discursive approach perceive Normative Power Europe as ameans to turn third parties into ‘others’, thereby representing the EU as apositive force (Diez, 2005, p. 613). Constructivism may also perceive nor-mative power as an instrument utilized to socially construct an expandingpluralistic, security community (Adler and Crawford, 2004, p. 13).

Whatever differences may exist among these and other different Construc-tivist perceptions, it may be safely argued that they all subscribe to theargument that core European values may serve as a fulcrum for the process ofEuropean integration (Manners, 2002, p. 242). Thus within the EU a link isassumed between normative agenda, enhanced legitimacy and further socio-political and economic integration.

More recent scholarship strives to reconcile the Realist and Constructivistschools of thought in an attempt to examine the compatibility and commen-surability of the normative, sociological and the self-interest perspectives ofNormative Power Europe (Youngs, 2004). In fact, the European SecurityStrategy considers global responsibilities and ethical foreign policy as satis-fying both the EU’s normative and material (security) concerns.6 The attemptto reconcile that duality of materialistic and normative motives is also relevantto EU–Israeli relations, to be discussed in the next two sections.

II. The EU and Israel: An Historical Overview

As early as 1959, Israel and the European Economic Community (EEC)established full diplomatic relations and the Arab–Israeli conflict was one ofthe first themes addressed under the framework of the European PoliticalCo-operation (for further analysis, see Aoun, 2003, p. 289; Shachor-Landau,1994; Reich, 1997). Yet during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the EEC, thena tyro in global politics, was only a marginal player in the Middle East,having a limited impact on major geo-political regional events including, inparticular, the Camp David Peace Process, which resulted in the 1979

5 See, for example, Manners (2002); Gardner-Feldman (1999); Adler and Crawford (2004); Whitman(1998).6 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, European CouncilMeeting in Brussels, 12 December 2003, as analysed by Lucarelli (2007, pp. 250–1).



Israeli–Egyptian Peace Treaty. EEC–Israeli relations were thus mainly eco-nomic and trade-oriented (see Reich, 1997) with no discernible normativedimension.

In an attempt to alter this state of affairs, in 1980 the nine EEC MemberStates produced the Venice Declaration, which recognized the right of thePalestinians, represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO),to self-determination, called for the return of Territories that had come underIsrael’s occupation in the wake of the Six Day War (1967) and asserted thatEurope must play a ‘special role’ in that respect (The Venice Declaration,1980). It will be argued below that the normative grounding of the VeniceDeclaration aggravated negative Israeli perceptions of Europe, therebyexpanding Europe’s legitimacy deficit in the eyes of Israel and underminingits normative status. Indeed, the impact of the EEC in the Middle East duringthese years was barely felt (Aoun, 2003, pp. 289, 297).

In the early 1990s the EU attempted to assume an increasingly activepolitical role in the Middle East.7 The historic breakthrough between Israel andthe PLO that came in 1993 in the course of yet another major Middle Eastprocess, on which the EU had no initial impact, provided further impetus forintensified involvement of the EU in the Middle East. Such involvement tookplace both bilaterally and regionally. Bilaterally, during the Essen EuropeanCouncil of December 1994, the European Council expressed its willingness toestablish special relations with Israel, declaring that it ‘considers that Israel, onaccount of its high level of economic development, should enjoy special statusin the relations with the European Union’.8 The Association Agreementbetween the EC and its Member States and the State of Israel followed suit in1995.9 The Association Agreement was chiefly aimed at advancing reciprocaltrade and economic interests, yet it also promoted a political agenda,10 and wasexplicitly grounded in the commitment to respect for human rights anddemocratic principles, which were defined as ‘essential element’ of it.11

Regionally, the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP) (known as theBarcelona Process) was launched in 1995 with a view to formulating anEU regional framework for governing Euro–Mediterranean relations and to

7 Due, inter alia, to the termination of the cold war, to the adoption of the common foreign and securitypolicy and to the EU’s desire to translate economic might into political influence.8 See Commission of the European Union, ‘Extracts of the Conclusion of the Presidency of the EssenEuropean Council’, 9–10 December, 1994, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 2/95.9 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities andtheir Member States, on the one part, and the State of Israel, on the other part, Official Journal L 147,June 21, 2000, p. 0003-0171. For analysis, see especially, Munin (2003, pp. 145–226); Reich (1997,pp. 398–403).10 See Articles 1 and 3–5 of the Association Agreement.11 Article 2 of the Association Agreement.



regulating economic, political and social relations between the EC (and itsMember States) and the non-EU Mediterranean countries.12 The BarcelonaProcess was designed to create a common Euro-Med area ‘of peace andstability’ and of ‘shared prosperity’, which would bring the peoples of theregion closer together.13 The ambitious normative agenda of the BarcelonaProcess raised high expectations, leading Adler and Crawford to consider it as‘a laboratory where one of the most outstanding experiments in internationalrelations may have started to take place. We are referring to the invention ofa region that does not yet exist and to the social engineering of a regionalidentity that rests neither on blood, nor religion, but on civil society, voluntarynetworks and civic beliefs’ (Adler and Crawford, 2004, p. 23). Thus theBarcelona Process may be seen as an external manifestation of NormativePower Europe. However, its accomplishments have been rather modest,14

leading to the more recent launch of the Union for the Mediterranean.15 Onemay already contend that contrary to the value-laden Barcelona Process, theUnion for the Mediterranean is based on a more concrete economic, environ-mental and educational agenda.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2003, wasdesigned to link the EU’s aforesaid regional and bilateral initiatives. The ENPserves to develop closer and more coherent economic, political and socialrelations between the EU and all of the Union’s neighbours, in the Middle East(including the State of Israel), North Africa and Europe that currently have noprospect of membership in the EU. It is designed to integrate the economies ofthe neighbouring countries, to an extent yet to be determined, with the enlargedEU, in order to contribute to increased stability, security and prosperity for theEU and its neighbours. Compared with the EMP, the ENP manifested a morebilateral, tailor-made approach, which addressed each neighbouring countryindividually, while maintaining, at least formally, a regional framework.Although the Action Plans signed by the EU and the Mediterranean countriesunder the aegis of the ENP still maintain the normative terminology, the ENPframework seems to be less ambitious, as compared with the BarcelonaProcess, in reference to norm-advancement, institution-building and attaininga European-sponsored peaceful Middle East.

12 See Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27–28 November 1995,Barcelona, 28 November 1995, final version.13 The Preamble to the Barcelona Declaration states that the parties are ‘convinced that the generalobjective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaran-teeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights,sustainable and balanced economic and social development’. The parties indeed undertook ‘to develop therule of law and democracy . . . to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms’.14 For analysis, see, for example, Aoun (2003); Asseburg (2003); Bobitski (2008).15 For analysis, see Emerson (2008); Gillespie (2008).



The EU–Israeli Association Agreement, the Barcelona Process, the ENP,like other bilateral and regional instruments mentioned above, are all mani-festations of the EU’s attempt to increase its actorness and to advance itsmaterial interests in the Middle East. As such, they may be explained alongRealist theoretical lines. Alternatively, these policy frameworks may also beseen as a means of crystallizing the EU’s identity as a regional normativeactor and as such they may be explained along Constructivist theoretical lines.

The achievements of the EU on the normative front have, however, beenmodest, especially in the Middle East and vis-à-vis the State of Israel, evokingscholarly linkage between the EU’s external legitimacy and effectiveness(see, for example, Harpaz, 2007).

The concept of legitimacy has been extensively examined in the EUcontext (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; Hansen and Williams, 1999; Horeth,1999). Suffice to say that legitimacy may be seen as a normative belief that arule or institution should be obeyed, not due to coercion or self-interest, butdue to its inherent normative strength (Steffek, 2003, p. 252; Hurd, 1999, pp.379, 381, 287; Franck, 1990), being perceived as desirable, proper or appro-priate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs anddefinitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).

As argued above, inward-looking European scholarship to a large extentassumes a link between normative power and legitimacy. This is not neces-sarily the case with respect to the EU’s external activities: ‘while the EU istoday both capable and willing to do “good”, many of its actions appearineffective, badly justified or simply arrogant and ought to be re-evaluated’(Leino, 2008, p. 288).

This perception of Normative Power Europe is particularly prevalent fromoutside the EU, and especially through the Israeli prism. The next section willthus analyse the dominant views on Normative Power Europe held in Israelwith a view to better understanding the dissonance between the EU’s self-perceived and self-portrayed normative image and its image as perceivedby the ‘other’, and the dissonance between the EU normative attempts (andresultant expectations) and its achievements.

III. Normative Power Europe – An Israeli Perspective

The scholarship on contemporary Israeli approaches towards the EU revealsa somewhat oversimplified account: EU and its Member States are perceivedas illegitimate political brokers (for early writings, see Greilsammer andWeiler, 1988). Actually, one of the authors of this article asserted that thereis an Israeli negative Pavlovian reaction towards most forms of European



intervention, based on a widespread Israeli narrative that in their MiddleEast activities, the EU and most of its Member States are simply unbalancedand anti-Israeli, hence they cannot serve as legitimate brokers (Harpaz, 2007.See also Kas and Pardo, 2007, p. 17 who conducted a public poll of 511Israelis and found that close to 70 per cent of them perceived EU involvementin the peace process as detrimental to the peace process).

In this section we revisit this theme, in light of major recent Middle Eastevents in which the EU pursued an active role, in an attempt to provide morenuanced and pluralistic Israeli images of Normative Europe, unravelling threedifferent approaches, namely the Historical Approach, the Political Approachand the Economic Approach.

Historical Europe

To understand the roots of Israel’s approach to Normative Power Europe, itis useful to recognize that contemporary Israeli perceptions are stronglyrooted in the long and complex history of Europe and of European Jewry.Israel’s historical approach towards Normative Europe can be characterizedas oscillating between feelings of admiration and of belonging and those ofbitter cynicism and resentment. Such ambivalence is articulated in a mono-graph published by Reinhartz and Shavit under the title: Glorious, AccursedEurope: An Essay on Jews, Israelis, Europe and Western Culture: ‘for thepast two hundred years, there has been a complex relationship betweenJews and Europe. On the Jewish side, on the one hand, there is an attrac-tion, an admiration and a deep love for Europe. European culture is per-ceived as the acme of human culture [. . .] On the other hand, Europeis also perceived in Jewish collective memory as damned and accursed; it isseen as decadent, corrupt and monstrous [. . .] Europe is the place whereJews were slaughtered and all Europeans are to blame, in one way oranother’ (Reinhartz and Shavit, 2006, p. 14, authors’ translation fromHebrew).

European influence on Israeli nationality was substantial (Ben Israel,2003, p. 31) and Zionism as a secular ideology is deeply rooted in 19th-century European political and social thought. Many Israelis favourablyacknowledge these intimate historical ties between Israel and Europe.

This positive historical experience forged cultural commonality and affin-ity for Europe, and that affinity is very much evident in daily life in Israel,while European heritage and culture strongly affect Israeli mores. The closecultural ties, which are fostered and reinforced by several cultural Europeaninstitutes based in Israel, such as the Goethe Institute, Adenauer Shtiftung, theBritish Council and Alliance Française, further strengthen the ‘we feeling’



that prevails amongst many Israelis towards Europe as a normative, regionalactor.16 In the words of Duchêne, ‘Israel can never be wholly foreign to [. . .]Europeans [. . .] Jews are so much part of the fabric of European history andcontemporary life that relations with Israel, must, in some sense, be anextension of folk memories on both sides’ (Duchêne, 1988, p. 11). Thus, thepositive dimension of that ambivalent approach has a salutary influence oncontemporary Israeli attitudes towards Normative Power Europe.

Per contra, the memory of Jewish persecution and anti-Semitism inEurope has a negative influence on Israeli attitudes towards Normative PowerEurope. In Israeli eyes, events such as the Dreyfus Affair, the Exodus tragedyand, most of all, the Holocaust, are not mere relics of the past, but are primarymoral and historical catalysts for the very foundation of the State of Israel.Avraham Burg, former chairperson of the Jewish Agency and Knesset chair-man wrote, in his controversial book Victory Over Hitler: ‘The Holocaust isstill the principal formative experience of the Jewish public, everywhere inthe world [. . .] The dramatic proximity between 1945 [the end of World WarII] and 1948 [the foundation of the State of Israel], the years of grief alongsidethe utopian years, the depressing years alongside the ecstatic years [. . .] thesemelting years had turned the two colossal events, the extermination ofEuropean Jewry and the foundation of the State of Israel, to one wholeand inseparable entity’ (Burg, 2007, pp. 72, 120, authors’ translation fromHebrew).

The Euro-Jewish historical experience does not cease to be relevant withthe creation of the State of Israel. Ever since its establishment, such experi-ence had served as a constitutive role in shaping Israel’s collective identityand memory.17

More specifically, such experience impacted Israeli foreign and securitypolicies and the formation of a strong nationalist sentiment. The virtualextinction of European Jewry during World War II generated what some maycall an anxiety complex that still influences Israeli foreign and security

16 See the address of the former Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom before the EU Council of Ministers in July2003: ‘Israel and Europe share a common cultural and social heritage, similar values [. . .] Our closegeographic proximity [. . .] and shared commitment to democratic values and institutions all combine tocreate a fundamental unity of purpose between us. These shared foundations are more profound and lastingthan any specific policy differences’ (Shalom, 2003a).17 This strong link between Europe’s historically evil deeds and contemporary Israel’s perceptions andcollective identity is evident, for example, in the address delivered by the former Israeli prime ministerEhud Olmert at the Opening Ceremony of Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day: ‘A Jew whosteps on European soil feels an invisible cloud in the depth of his soul. Under his feet are the traces of aculturally-rich Jewish presence with remarkable heritage, which was wiped out in an instant. Above himare skies tainted by ineradicable smoke. A warning and indictment hangs in the air, with only one wordwritten on it: “Remember!” ’ (Olmert, 2006a).



policies (see Levite, 1989; Landau, 2003).18 Israel’s willingness (or unwill-ingness) to compromise with regard to its borders, its pursuance of the nuclearproject, like its pre-emptive attack on Egypt in 1967, may all be seen as casesin point.

This link between the Jewish-European past and present Israeli policiescomes up again and again in Israeli public discourse on Europe, casting ashadow over contemporary Israeli–European relations and over Israel’s will-ingness to allow the EU to contribute constructively to the Middle East inpolitical terms.19

For most Israelis, critical European policies towards Israelis are perceivedas preaching by those disqualified from preaching, in the light of their past.This link between the past and the present affects even the most ardentsupporters of the EU’s normative agenda and of its role as a Middle Eastmediator: ‘European mediation is probably the best key to opening theMiddle East gridlock. But do Prodi, his colleagues in Brussels and theEuropean public, have the slightest idea of the bitterness they arouse in Israelipublic opinion? Of the long-harboured fear, mistrust and even hate thatEurope’s icy silence, mounting hostility, lack of ‘intercultural dialogue’ hasbred among historically-minded Israelis? The new united Europe has nevercome to terms with its collective past and with its collective responsibility forthe Middle East conflict. It has made no public attempt to reckon with amillennium of Jewish European life, now dead and gone. It has not addressedthe brutal memories that haunt so many individuals in the Middle East’(Oz-Salzberger, 2001).

Consequently, and as will be demonstrated in the next section, the EU’sreliance on such values as human rights, peace, liberty and respect for publicinternational law as rationales for Europe’s foreign policies and for the EU’scall upon Israel to adopt territorial compromises is perceived at times in Israelas duplicitous, threatening and illegitimate, thereby causing Europe to bediscredited as a normative player.

18 The Holocaust experience has a clear impact on what Ariel Levite calls Israeli Offensive-DefensivePolicy which embodies two main principles, deterrence and self-reliance (Levite, 1989). As Burg cynicallynoted: ‘A state that lives by the sword and worships its dead is doomed, it transpires, to live in a state ofpermanent emergency. Because everyone is a Nazi, everyone is a German, everyone is an Arab, everyonehates us and the world has always been against us’ (Burg, 2007, p. 52, authors’ own translation fromHebrew).19 It is worth citing Abba Eban’s definition of the 1967 border as ‘the Auschwitz border’. The words ofPrime Minister Begin at the beginning of the first Lebanon War in 1982 are telling as well: ‘Do you knowwhat I have done and what we have all done to avoid war and bereavement, but it is our fate that in the Landof Israel there is no alternative other than to fight with perseverance. Believe me that the alternative isTreblinka and we have decided that there will not be another Treblinka’, quoted in Burg (2007, pp. 44, 97),as translated from Hebrew by the authors.



Political Europe

The EU and the State of Israel hold in many instances different perceptionsof nationalism, sovereignty, security, territory, borders and the appropriatemeans to settle ethnical and territorial disputes. These different perceptionsrender it more difficult for the Israeli political establishment and society atlarge to comprehend the EU’s political interventions, let alone welcomethem.20

Moreover, some central elements which grant the EU’s normative agendaits aura of legitimacy when viewed by the EU are either irrelevant or counter-productive when viewed by Israel. Humanitarian aid, the fight against globalpoverty, sustainable development and environmental protection are central inthe EU’s normative discourse but are not so in Israel’s public discourse.Another component of the EU’s normative persona is its reliance on multi-lateralism, international law and international institutions and its ambition tocounter-balance the US hegemony. These elements are, however, negativelyviewed by most Israelis, due to Israel’s traditional suspicious approachtowards international law and institutions and due to Israel’s heavy relianceon the US (compare with Poletti, 2007, p. 284, with respect to Brazilianapproaches to the EU and with Peruzzi et al., 2007, p. 321, with respect toChinese’s approaches to the EU). This state of affairs, in turn, makes itdifficult for most Israelis to fully understand the heavy reliance of the EU oncivilian, peaceful means to tackle conflicts over territories and security and towant to imitate the European normative model.21

As demonstrated elsewhere, these obstacles to appreciating and welcom-ing the European normative model have also permeated the Israeli judiciary(Harpaz, 2007, pp. 103–4). It was evident, for example, in the proceedingsconducted before the Israeli Supreme Court regarding the legality of con-troversial legislation that denied the automatic right to Israeli nationalityto the Palestinian spouses, residing in the West Bank Territories, of

20 See, for example, Del Sarto, 1999, p. 62: ‘Israelis may find some difficulties in assessing the concept ofnational identity prevailing in Europe [. . .] The widespread irrelevance of religious narratives for thedefinitions of national identities, the importance attached to the civic notion of citizenship, the relevanceof cultural homogeneity, the perceived threat of mass immigration, the existence of somewhat hybrid andoverarching European identity – along with obvious absence of a “European people” – these features ofcollective identity in Europe may be deeply puzzling for Israelis’.21 The words of the previous Head of the EC Commission Delegation to Israel, Ambassador Chevallard, aretelling: ‘The young Israeli state, born out of two thousand years of Diaspora and continuously faced withexternal threats, has naturally been grounded on strong nationalistic feelings. The pursuit of almost totalself-reliance, the practice of exclusive sovereignty, the importance given to land and the control of borders,as well as to military rather than civilian components of security are core principles of the State of Israel.The European countries have, on the contrary, developed the EU to make those very principles obsolete,by pooling national sovereignties, abolishing borders and establishing the EU as a civilian rather than amilitary world player’ (Chevallard, 2003, p. 13).



Israeli-Palestinians, through marriage.22 The majority of the Supreme Courtheld that the legislation was constitutional, basing its decision on securitygrounds. Deputy President, Justice Cheshin, leading the majority, referred toEuropean and other international human rights-laden norms governing unifi-cation of families, only to cynically dismiss them as ‘Utopian’.23

It must, however, be emphasized that these differences between the EUand Israel do not translate into a uniform Israeli political approach towardsthe EU. Not all Israelis dismiss the European normative agenda as utopian.Not all of them would like to exclude EU involvement in the Middle East.

In fact, three broadly different political approaches can be identified incontemporary Israeli politics and public discourse regarding the role thatNormative Europe plays and should play in the Middle East: the AntagonistApproach, the Ideological-Supportive Approach and the PragmaticApproach.

The adherents of the Antagonist Approach, usually drawn from Israel’spolitical right, are hostile towards most forms of European political interven-tion. Their approach is based on the assumption that Normative Power Europeis not as Constructivist and normative as it purports to be, but is motivatedinstead by Realist, self-interested considerations serving as a powerful instru-ment which Europe utilizes for the promotion of its material (be it economicor security) self-aggrandizement. According to this approach, the differentIsraeli-European perceptions and values are not caused by misconceptionsnor by different evolutionary stages which the EU and Israel have reached,but by conflicting interests, which Europe seeks to disguise with a normativecloak.

Thus proponents of the Antagonist Approach question the bona fides ofNormative Europe as a regional normative player. According to them, the EUclaims to act in the Middle East and elsewhere by universal values but in factit utilizes universal terminology in order to promote its own particular mater-ial political and economic interests with a view to gaining regional hegemony(for a European perspective on this theme, see Leino, 2008, pp. 264–5).

More specifically, European critical normative positions towards Israel areexplained by the proponents of the Antagonist Approach as the outcome of aEuropean surrender to Arab energy interests and to Muslim electoral pres-sures.24 Gerald Steinberg, Director of the Programme on Conflict Resolutionat Bar-Ilan University, is a vocal speaker for the Antagonist camp. He asserts

22 HCJ 7052/03 Adalah et al. v The Minister of the Interior and others, 14 May, 2006, for summary andcomment, see «http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/may06/fet.pdf».23 As Note 22, Para. 1 of his Opinion.24 Pirouz and Leonard, 2003; Gerstenfeld, 2005, p. 2. For analysis of this perspective, see Dror and Pardo(2006, pp. 25, 31–2, 35).



that Europe’s Kantian ideology lacks an intellectual and substantive frame-work for responding to the use of deadly violence and for distinguishingbetween illegitimate use of force for aggression and legitimate self-defence.This, coupled with ‘idealist utopianism, simplistic analyses, fictitious history,distorted images of Israeli society and cognitive dissonance that result in thefailure to examine evidence that is inconsistent with the dominant ideology,have resulted in Europe’s diplomatic impotence in the Arab–Israeli conflict’(Steinberg, 2004, p. 22). These perceptions of Europe as an unbalancedand biased regional player are reflected in hostility towards most formsof European political intervention. This hostility both affects and isaffected by Israel’s noticeable preference for US-led mediation in the MiddleEast.25

In contrast to the Antagonist Approach, the Ideological-SupportiveApproach favours the Constructivist, norm-advancement dimension of Nor-mative Power Europe. It postulates that Normative Europe and Israel sharecommon, western values such as democracy, respect for human rights, therule of law and basic freedoms. The proponents of this Approach, usuallydrawn from Israel’s political left, Israel’s elite and organized civil society,26

strive therefore to foster closer socio-political Israeli–European ties, treatingthese broad normative common values as a fulcrum to lever Europe into amore active and dominant role in Middle East politics. According to them,any difference arising from historical and political circumstances that mayexist between Europe and Israel must not be allowed to obscure this broadnormative commonality and must not hinder the EU in contributing to norm-advancement, institution building and the peaceful settlement of conflicts inthe Middle East.27

25 Thus, for example, Zalman Shoval, former Israeli Ambassador to Washington and a member of theright-wing Likud Party concluded that ‘The attitude of a number of European countries has proven onceagain to Israel that it is impossible to trust Europe [. . .] this behaviour can only further reduce Europe’srole in relation to the United States regarding any settlement with the Palestinians’ (Shoval, 2003).26 See Pardo (2009, pp. 12–14) who conducted a survey of 40 Israeli politicians, decision-makers andshapers, members of leading trade unions and NGOs and leading journalists and found that 33 per cent ofthe participants in this survey perceived the EU as a superpower. The same percentage perceived the EUas the best framework to maintain peace and stability in the world. In the same work Pardo found agenerally favourable approach towards the EU amongst 100 leading Israeli NGOs.27 As Amos Oz, Israel’s leading novelist writes: ‘our discussion with Europe is not closed and should notbe closed. We have much to talk about. We certainly have issues to dispute, and there is room for pain andanger. But the time has come to renew our conversation with Europe–and not only at a political level. Wehave to talk about the present and about the future. And it is fitting for us to talk in depth about the past –on one condition: that we always remember that our past belongs to us, and we do not belong to it [. . .]I believe that putting ourselves in the place of others, imagining that we are those others, provides a verystrong antidote to bigotry and hate. I believe that authors who have us imagine we are others immunize usto some degree from Satan’s pranks, including those of the inner Satan, the Mephistopheles in our hearts’(Oz, 2006, pp. 79–80, as translated from Hebrew by the authors).



Professor Shlomo Ben-Ami, first Israeli Ambassador to Spain and formerIsraeli Foreign Minister, is one such ardent advocate of European involve-ment in the Middle East conflict: ‘The EU is the first empire in history that isbeing created through consensus rather than occupation [. . .] Israel is endan-gering vital interests with its “cold shoulder” policy toward Europe. It mustview a change in its relations with the old Continent as a vital strategic goal’(Ben-Ami, 2004). In the same vein, Ambassador Avi Primor, former IsraeliAmbassador to Germany and then to the EU, argued that ‘Israel with itsspecial relationship with the EU should become the link between the neigh-bours with whom it will sign a peace treaty, on the one hand, and the EU onthe other’ (Primor, 2002, p. 24). Some Israelis would go as far as to suggesteventual Israeli membership of the EU. Alfred Tovias, Jean Monnet Chair atthe Hebrew University of Jerusalem argues: ‘The strategic changes whichhave been taking place since then [the 1990s] both in Europe and in theMiddle East call not only for the economic but also the political integration ofIsrael in the European Union, i.e. membership [. . .] now is the time to raisethe issue of future Israeli membership in the EU’ (Tovias, 2002; see alsoTovias, 2007).

The third political approach towards Normative Power is the PragmaticApproach, which forms a middle ground between the Antagonist Approachand the Ideological-Supportive Approach. The proponents of the PragmaticApproach, usually drawn from the political centre, acknowledge the norma-tive and identity differences between the EU and Israel, and like the propo-nents of the Antagonist Approach, are suspicious of EU external policies andthe motives behind them. Yet contrary to the Antagonist Approach and incommon with the Ideological-Supportive Approach, the Pragmatic Approachfavours enhanced relations with the EU, notwithstanding such normativedifferences.

Such desirability does not rely, as in the case of the Ideological-SupportiveApproach, on normative arguments but on Realist, geo-strategic and eco-nomic considerations. For those who subscribe to the Pragmatic Approach,the possibility that Israel ‘shall dwell alone and shall not be reckoned amongthe nations’ is not viable. Accordingly, Israel needs regional economic andpolitical backing, and the EU may partially satisfy these needs. For Israelregional co-operation creates trade dependency and carries with it member-ship fees, and allowing for greater EU involvement is part of that payment.Thus geo-political and economic trends and interests require Israel to pursuemore co-operative policies vis-à-vis the EU and to allow the latter somegreater role in the Middle East, despite the different evolutionary stages inwhich the parties are situated. The proponents of the Pragmatic Approachtherefore advocate enhanced relations with the EU, including allowing the



EU and its Member States more meaningful status in the Middle East, whilepaying the lowest possible price in terms of erosion of national sovereignty.

In recent years the Pragmatic Approach has been gaining a more prevalentposition in Israeli politics.28 This is evident, for example, in Israel’s willing-ness to adopt an EU-sponsored solution to the dispute between the EU andIsrael regarding the exportation of goods from the Jewish settlements in theOccupied Territories (Harpaz, 2004) and in Israel’s willingness to allow EUinvolvement in the monitoring of the Palestinian–Egyptian cross point atRafah. Such a trend is also evident in Israel’s willingness to allow the EU andits major Member States a not insignificant political role in the aftermaths ofthe Second Lebanon War (2006) (Schmid, 2007, pp. 101, 119–22) and of theIsraeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (2009), a theme that will be revisitedbelow.

The Economic Approach

The third approach towards Normative Power Europe is the EconomicApproach. This approach places heavy emphasis on Europe’s economicpersona and on the desirability of enhanced Israeli–EU trade relations. Basedon that perception, the Economic Approach strips away the historical andpolitical dimensions of Normative Europe, which are perceived as potentiallyinjurious to the close economic co-operation between the EU and Israel.(Compare with Bayoumi, 2007, p. 333 for a similar Egyptian prevalentapproach which supports an economic partnership with the EU but whichrejects paternalistic political interference.)

The Economic Approach is evident in the words of Nellie Munin, formerIsraeli Minister of Economic Affairs to the EU: ‘The State of Israel is a fullpartner in the Barcelona Process, and views its main importance on thepolitical level. On the economic level, the main shortcomings of the processare the making of economic progress contingent upon political progress’(Munin, 2003). An implicit acknowledgment of that approach can also befound in a public poll conducted in Israel in regard to Israelis’ perceptions ofthe EU. The poll found that the vast majority of Israelis perceive the EU asanti-Israeli and hence an illegitimate political broker, and yet a sweepingmajority of the participants favoured Israel’s accession to the EU (most likelydue to economic considerations).29

28 See former Israeli Foreign Minister Livni (Livni, 2006, p. 4): ‘I truly believe that the road shouldultimately lead us to a significant participation of Israel in the European integration project’.29 See Dror and Pardo (2006, p. 34) who analyse a Dahaf poll conducted in 2004 in which 60 per cent ofthose surveyed agreed with the proposition that the EU stance towards Israel is anti-Semitism thinlydisguised as moral principles.



The Economic Approach is also evident in statements of leading Israelipoliticians,30 in official Israeli publications,31 and in the launch in Israel of ajoint EU–Israeli Chamber of Commerce.32 (For more on the economic-tradeperspective, see Harpaz, 2006; Herman, 2006).

Indeed, the Economic Approach is grounded in solid legal and tradefoundations. The 1995 EU–Israeli Association Agreement provides not onlyfor the reinforcement of the free trade area in industrial goods, and for theliberalisation of trade in agricultural goods, but also for a framework forenhanced co-operation in numerous significant areas, such as research anddevelopment, energy, transportation, agriculture, tourism, competition andthe provision of services. Israel was, in addition, the first non-EU country tojoin the EU’s research and development programme. Consequently, Israelmaintains close scientific, technological and cultural ties with the EU and itsMember States. Israelis are avid consumers of European culture and goods,Europe has long been Israel’s preferred tourist destination, and the EU isIsrael’s chief trading partner.

In 2007 the total reciprocal trade between Israel and the EU was of nearly$29 billion33 and between January and June 2009 of nearly $12.5 billion.34

During the latter period 31 per cent of Israel’s exports (excluding diamonds)were destined for EU countries while 37 per cent of its imports (excludingdiamonds) came from EU countries.35 Moreover, since the early 1990s, Israeliinvestment in east European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007has swelled considerably. Many Israeli entrepreneurs are investing substantialfunds in real-estate and infrastructure ventures in countries such as the CzechRepublic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.

30 This approach is also reflected in a speech by former Prime Minister and then acting Finance MinisterEhud Olmert in the ‘Go 4 Europe Conference’, February 2006: ‘Europe is Israel’s most important tradepartner. The scope of mutual trade between Israel and Europe approaches $30 billion per annum. This isan immense scope. The State of Israel purchases more from European countries than [does] any othercountry in the Middle East’ (Olmert, 2006b).31 This perception of Europe as an economic superpower is made clear on the Israeli Foreign Ministrywebsite: ‘EU is Israel’s most natural trading partner [. . .] This growth in trade has been accelerated by thedevelopment of close business connections between entrepreneurs and investors and the setting up of jointventures, as well as by efforts to strengthen economic ties with the member countries of the European FreeTrade Association (EFTA)’, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.32 Syrquin (2007).33 As compared with only $17 billion with the US in the same period, Lamas (2007).34 Lamas (2009), available at: «http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/hodaot2009n/16_09_147b.doc».35 Lamas (2009), available at: «http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/hodaot2009n/16_09_147b.doc». In the sameperiod only 32 per cent of Israel’s exports were directed to the US while only 14 per cent of Israel’s importscame from the US, Lamass (2009).



It is important to point out that the Economic Approach towards Norma-tive Europe has virtually no downside, as the other two Approaches do.36

However, it may be contended that it is naïve and over-simplistic, because itlacks historical profundity.

Moreover, traditionally the Economic Approach is the least widespread ofthe three approaches, being manifested mostly in Israel’s business commu-nity and socio-political elite. Major EU events such as the launch of the euroand the last two waves of EU enlargement have improved the visibility of theEU as an economic superpower and consequently enhanced the EconomicApproach in the Israeli grass-root public discourse. These trends are notexclusive to the State of Israel. As Lucarelli found with respect to numerousother countries, the EU is often perceived not so much as a civilian orcivilizing actor but rather as an Economic Power Europe: ‘a key issue forpolitical elites and the media is the EU’s might as a trade giant and a sourceof foreign direct investments [. . .] By and large, the main image the EU castsof itself has to do with its economic might. For the Indian, Chinese, SouthAfrican and Brazilian elites, the EU is a strategic opportunity for developmentand economic growth and is mainly described as a trade partner and thebiggest market in the world. Likewise, economic linkages between thesecountries and the EU are by a long way the most common issues presented bythe media’ (Lucarelli, 2007, pp. 264–6).

The Interface between the Historical, Political and Economic Approaches

The previous section provided nuanced, pluralistic and somewhat self-contradictory images of Normative Europe in Israel. Yet, the historical,economic and three sub-political approaches delineated supra are not asdistinct as they appear to be. In fact, they may to some extent intertwine.

For instance, the sub-political, Ideological-Supportive Approach mirrorsthe sub-political, Antagonist Approach in that it substitutes a wide range ofshared values for the particularism evidenced by the Antagonist Approach. Inthe same vein, the differences between the three sub-approaches characteriz-ing the Political Approach could possibly be ascribed to each one’s view ofthe historical aspects of European–Israeli and Jewish–European relations.The more suspicious, Antagonist Approach is influenced by the importance it

36 Yet one may argue that this one-dimensional Economic Approach is over-simplistic. After all Israelipolicy-makers and trade negotiators are painfully aware that the EU is promoting its own self-interest inits trade relations with Israel. The chronic huge trade deficit with the EU has long troubled them, the EU’slong-standing and stubborn refusal to allow accumulation with the Palestinian Authority and other Arabneighbours is in stark contradiction to its pro-peace rhetoric, and their protectionist rules of origin(especially in textiles) are all part of this narrow self-interest that is also part of the Economic Approach.We are grateful to Arie Reich for this insight.



ascribes to past Jewish persecution and anti-Semitism. Per contra, theIdeological-Supportive Approach bases its positive stance towards Europe onthe importance it attaches to Jewish–European positive historical experience.

Moreover, the internal dissonance found in the Historical Approach hasbroader effects on the Political Approach. Furthermore, as demonstratedin the next section, when dealing with Israel, Europe tends to linkeconomic and political issues, thereby weakening the positive EconomicApproach, while strengthening the anti-European dimensions of both thePolitical and Historical Approaches.

Moreover, even vocal Israeli proponents of European norms and of Euro-pean involvement are at times cynical about Europe’s ability to comprehendthe charged relations between the Middle East peoples and the Europeans andhence to contribute to the Middle East. This was reflected yet again in thewritings of the influential Israeli novelist and peace activist Amos Oz.37 In thesame vein, not all members of the Israeli Right will at all times opposeEuropean involvement. Thus, for example, the only prominent Israeli politi-cian who called in unequivocal terms for Israel’s accession to the EU was thehard-liner, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman (Liberman, 2007).

To conclude, when considering the Historical, Political and EconomicIsraeli outlooks on Normative Europe, complex, contradictory and pluralisticimages emerge. This apparent polarity is a focal characteristic of Israel’sperception of Normative Europe and as such should be taken into account bythe EU in its pursuit of a normative agenda for the Middle East. The followingsection argues that the EU fails too often to recognize this, thus creating adissonance between its self-perceived, self-portrayed normative personaand the manner in which it is perceived by the ‘other’. Such dissonance(which may, in turn, create another dissonance between the EU actions and

37 See Oz (2006, p. 30): ‘I am often sent a warm invitation to come to Germany and to spend a few daysat some peaceable, pastured vacation spot, with Palestinian poets and authors, in order to make oneanother’s acquaintance, get friendly, be convinced that we are all very nice, good human beings. The Arabsare very, very nice, good people, our German hosts are very pleasant and likeable people, and in that waya stop may once and for all be put to the unnecessary, ugly conflict, and from then on we’ll all live happilyever after. All that is of course based on the sentimental presumption that prevails these days in [. . .]Europe to the effect that every conflict is basically nothing other than a misunderstanding: a little familyadvice, a little group therapy, a few cups of coffee enjoyed together, and right away mutual love will becreated’ (authors’ own translation from Hebrew). See also Oz’s following remark: ‘the return of the oldGerman anti-Semitism takes an anti-Israeli turn in German public opinion, the old sentimentalism, whichhas traditionally seen the world in black and white, Satan versus the victim, good people versus bad, beautyversus the monster, ‘sacred people’ versus villains. Yasser Arafat, according to a widespread sentiment, hascome across as a close buddy of Fidel Castro: both of them heroically stand at the front battle line facingthe American and Zionist Satan. Fidel, for his part, was a friend of Che Guevara. Che was Jesus. Jesus islove. Consequently, we all love Yasser Arafat’, Oz (2006, pp. 38–9, as translated from Hebrew by theauthors).



results) generates a legitimacy deficit which, in turn compromises, as dem-onstrated in the following section, the EU’s ability to serve as a regionalplayer.

IV. Normative Europe: An Illegitimate EUtopia?

This section will examine the impact of Normative Power Europe on the EU’slegitimacy and on the effectiveness of its external actions and policies. It willbe argued that there is a discrepancy between the EU’s self-representation asa Normative Power and the manner in which Normative Power Europe isperceived by the ‘other’. As a result of such discrepancy, the concept ofNormative Europe may serve, internally, as a legitimatizing force whichfacilitates further European integration, but externally it might adverselyaffect the EU legitimacy and thus prove to be counter-productive in promot-ing the EU’s normative-political agenda in the Middle East.

In light of the ideological controversy that surrounds the EU in Israel, thepursuance of an insensitive, non-reflective normative agenda might positionthe EU in the middle of Israel’s internal political strife. In this position it mayrun the risk of being disqualified by Israeli politicians as an unworthy nor-mative player. This is especially so when Europe’s normative agenda isconfronted with the negative aspect of the Historical Approach, therebyfuelling an Israeli perception of Normative Power Europe as inherentlybiased, anti-Israeli and hence as an illegitimate regional actor.

Indeed, throughout the years EU–Israeli relations have witnessed numer-ous events in which political policies wrapped in a strong normative agendaproved to be ineffective or counter-productive. A case in point is the VeniceDeclaration. As stated above, in 1980, the then nine Member States of theEEC formulated the Declaration, which recognized the Palestinian right ofself-determination (Article 6) and called for the return of territories underIsrael’s control from the Six-Day War (1967) (Article 9). Furthermore, theDeclaration recognized the PLO for the first time as the legitimate represen-tative of the Palestinian People (Article 7), and determined that Israeli settle-ments in the Territories were illegal under international law and, as such,constituted a serious obstacle to the Middle East peace process (Article 9).These determinations were repeatedly justified by such norms as peace(Article 2 and 10), human rights (Article 4) and the right of self-determination(Article 6).

In the light of the analysis conducted above, it should not come as asurprise that the normative terminology used by the EEC to justify theDeclaration’s contents struck a sensitive chord in Israel. The Declaration



stirred up anti-European Israeli instincts, leading the Israeli Cabinet led byPrime Minister Begin to discredit European intervention and its declarednormative apparatus. The European use of universal norms such as humanrights and the right of self-determination to justify the European viewpointson controversial issues such as the recognition of the PLO sharpened thenegative aspects of the Israeli Historical Approach towards NormativeEurope, leading the Cabinet to dismiss the Declaration in Holocaust-ladenterminology38 (see Grosbard, 2006 for the analysis of the influence of PrimeMinister Begin’s personal family experience in the Holocaust on his policies).Such use of universal norms also sharpened the Political-AntagonistApproach, while weakening the Ideological-Supportive as well as the Eco-nomic Approaches. Thus, the EEC’s, high-profile, bold normative frame-work, which dictated and justified the Venice Declaration, did not enhanceEurope’s ability to contribute effectively to the pacific settlement of theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict, but rather increased its legitimacy deficit, leadingDror and Pardo to conclude that EU–Israeli political relations never recoveredfully from the Venice Declaration (Dror and Pardo, 2006, p. 20).

The manner in which the EU employs economic and trade policies vis-à-vis Israel as instruments to promote its normative agenda also touches thecomplex relations between normative agenda, legitimacy and (in)effectiveexternal policies. As Hollis points out: ‘Politics and economics are basicallytoo intertwined in European–Israeli relations to disentangle’ (Hollis, 1994,p. 127).

A case in point is the EU–Israeli dispute over the legal treatment ofproducts exported to the EU from the Territories under Israel’s control fromthe Six Days War (1967) (see, for example, Hauswaldt, 2003; Hirsch, 2003;Harpaz, 2004). In 1998, EU officials argued that since the Territories do notbelong to Israel de jure under public international law, the products exportedfrom them to the EU should not benefit from the preferential treatment underthe EU–Israeli Association Agreement. Israel, on the other hand, contendedthat due to its de facto control of the Territories, the products are subject to theAssociation Agreement, and hence entitled to such preferential treatment

38 ‘Since Mein Kampf was written, the entire world, including Europe, has not heard anything moreexplicit about the aspiration to destroy the Jewish State and Nation. Several European states are preparedto underwrite, and even to guarantee militarily, the concept of ‘peace’ shared by that organisation ofmurderers [. . .] This will disgust anyone who remembers anything, and who is aware of the results of theguarantee given to Czechoslovakia in 1938, after Sudetenland was ripped from her, also in the name ofself-defense. Israel does not ask for any guarantee of her security from any of the peoples of Europe. Israelis capable of defending herself [. . .] Any person of goodwill or freeman who peruses this document willsee it as a Munich-like surrender, the second in our generation, to dictatorial blackmail and as encourage-ment for all those who are subverting the Camp David accords and who aspire to ensure the failure of theMiddle East Peace Plan’, Israeli Cabinet Statement of 15 June 1980 – authors’ own translation fromHebrew.



(Harpaz, 2004, p. 1051). In 2004 Israel agreed to adopt an EU-sponsoredsolution which determined that Israel would specify only the geographiclocation of the products, and not their origin in the Territories. This allowedIsrael to meet the demands of the EU, while not having to admit in officialdocumentation that the products were not Israeli in origin (Harpaz, 2004,p. 1053).

The EU’s unbending, normative rhetoric but pusillanimous practicecaused the dispute to drag on for years and alienated all parties involved. Theuse of the EU’s economic might to impose on Israel a political solution towhat could have been treated by the EU as a technical trade dispute, frustratedthe Israeli political establishment and the general public. The Israeli reactionwas furious. The popular Israeli media portrayed the handling of the disputeby Ehud Olmert (who was the Trade and Industry Minister at that time) assurrender to intrusive and unfair European demands. Ron Nachman, Mayor ofthe City of Ariel in the occupied West Bank, went as far as to link the EUdistinction between goods from Israel proper and from the Territories with thepractice of discriminating against Jews in the Holocaust.39

Thus the EU’s handling of the dispute strengthened the negative aspects ofthe Political Approach towards the EU, while weakening the positive Eco-nomic Approach, thereby widening Europe’s legitimacy deficit in the eyes ofmost Israelis. It is clear that a more historically and politically sensitiveapproach in the trade sphere would have been more constructive in promotingEurope’s normative power.

Paradoxically, those who advocate firmer European intervention in respectof Israel’s illegal practices in the Territories were frustrated too, believing thatthe EU proved itself unwilling to back its normative rhetoric with concretepolitical actions. Tocci, for example, considered the EU’s handling of thedispute as a manifestation of the EU’s firm rhetoric but compromised prac-tice: ‘Yet beyond the rhetoric, the Union has been uncharacteristically com-promising in practice. Not only has it refrained from any conditionality(either negative or positive) on Israel, but it has compromised itself to theextent of bending its own norms and rules to accommodate illegal Israelipractice’ (Tocci, 2005, p. 18).

The EU’s performance in relation to the second Palestinian Uprising andto Israel’s reaction to it illustrates, once again, the argument advanced in thissection. The EU invested much time and energy in normative-laden condem-nations of Israel. For example, EU officials justified time and again thecritical European position on Israel’s Separation Barrier (or the ‘Wall’, as itwas termed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion),

39 In a radio interview with Reshet B, one of Israel’s leading radio stations (6 August 2004).



constructed to meet terrorist attacks on Israel, with normative arguments(Roche, 2004). All EU Member States furthermore accepted the ICJ AdvisoryOpinion, which, on the basis of dubious legal reasoning, dismissed Israel’sright of self-defence in the face of Palestinian terrorism.

Such European normative-backed positions were received with wide-spread frustration by official Israel, which treated them as declaratory, judge-mental, condescending and biased.40 The EU’s use of normative terminologyto criticize concrete Israeli policies and actions allowed Israeli officials topoliticize Normative Europe, discrediting it as unworthy of serving as alegitimate broker: ‘Israel is particularly disappointed by the European stand.The willingness of the EU to fall in with the Palestinian position [. . .] raisesdoubts as to the ability of the EU to contribute anything constructive to thediplomatic process’ (Israeli Foreign Ministry, 2004).

Conversely, the lack of any concrete EU action against Israel which wouldsupport the EU’s stirring normative proclamations in all the above casesfurther discredited Normative Europe.

One example is the contemporary pressure exerted on Israel to halt theexpansion of settlements in the Territories. The EU could rely upon theconsensus amongst its 27 Member States against such expansion togetherwith the consensus between itself and the Obama administration on this issue,in order to confront Israel with instruments of both positive and negativeconditionality. It could offer Israel a generous economic package in consid-eration for Israel’s commitment to halt construction, and it could concurrentlythreaten to freeze negotiations with Israel intended to upgrade economicrelations under the ENP, if Israel acts differently. But a careful reading of theEU documents summarizing the June 2009 EU External Relations CouncilMeeting reveals that the EU failed to do so. Instead of offering Israel thechoice between a carrot and a stick, it spoke, yet again, hesitantly, reinforcingthe image of Normative Power Europe as merely declaratory.41

Europe’s continuous inability to employ instruments of both positive andnegative conditionality contributed to the widespread perception in Israeland elsewhere that the EU’s policies reflect the lowest common denominatorand that the EU excels in words and preaching and not in actions. Put

40 The words of the former Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom are telling: ‘Close relations between Israel andEurope are a strategic asset to both sides. I have dedicated my time in office to promoting these ties throughopen dialogue and building a partnership that is trusting and void of “judgments” (Shalom, 2004). Shalomaddressed the issue again in his speech at the Fourth Herzliya Conference in December 2003: ‘More thanonce, I have told my friends in Europe that if they want to become actively involved in negotiations, theymust adopt a more balanced approach towards the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians’ (Shalom,2003b).41 Council of the European Union (2009).



differently, Hill’s analysis conducted in 1993 of the EU’s capability–expectations gap (Hill, 1993) is still relevant to the Middle East (see Schmid,2007, p. 104 for such relevance).

Such a gap highlights the dissonance between the EU’s resounding wordsand modest concrete actions. That dissonance in turn adversely affects theEU’s external legitimacy: ‘Apart from a few exceptions [. . .] the union [EU]has never attempted to exert any form of positive conditionality on Israel. Thishas led to several paradoxical incidents damaging the EU’s credibility’(Tocci, 2005, p. 19). This state of affairs has negative repercussions for theeffet utile of EU Middle East policies and initiatives.

In fact this perception of Normative Power Europe as predominantlydeclaratory is widespread in Israeli diplomatic and political circles: ‘TheEuropeans are strong when it comes to politics and declarations, howeverwhen there is a concrete opportunity to do something and help along, they shyaway’ (Peri, 1995). Similarly, Efraim Halevy, former Ambassador to the EUand head of the Israeli Mossad, felt that the EU’s reliance on declarations wasin fact ‘bizarre’42 and that the EU treatment of the Muslim social challengein Europe, the Barcelona Process and the Iranian nuclear project are onlythree cases that demonstrate high rhetoric with no commensurate deeds.This perception of Normative, ‘declaratory Europe’ also permeates thenon-political sphere, including Israeli literature.43

42 Halevy (2006, pp. 156–7): ‘Through my eyes, the eyes of one who had come to Brussels to represent hiscountry as ambassador accredited to the European Union, the situation appeared nothing less than bizarre.One the one hand, the European Union had succeeded in healing the wounds of two successive world warsthat had engulfed the continent and had left behind them millions of dead and wounded as well aseconomic devastation [. . .] the Union had become a real economic superpower [. . .] Yet the vast economicpotential did not appear to translate itself into real political and strategic muscle [. . .] the Europeans [. . .]were only too eager to deliver a monthly statement on the Israeli–Palestinian dispute and to renderjudgment on the parties, mainly on Israel [. . .] The Middle East was a favorite of the Union and served asa convenient issue for forging a common foreign policy of the fifteen Member States. I vividly recall howI was instructed month after month to gather information on preliminary discussions that were held inBrussels [. . .] Looking back at those years it is difficult to understand why so much effort was expendedon these monthly bouts of quasi-diplomacy’.43 The words of Amos Oz are once again telling. See Oz (2006, pp. 53–6): ‘And here are those sameEuropean intellectuals themselves, coming to express a view of the Middle East Conflict, they immediatelycreate for themselves a movie of the Wild West and are seized with an uncontrollable impulse to supportthe good guys, to condemn the bad guys and to sign a petition, to go out on a demonstration in favour ofthe good and against the bad, and to lie down to sleep [. . .] by that European intellectual tradition, whoeverseems a human tragedy, suffering, horror, spilled blood – runs to sign a petition. To express identification.To express disgust. To be shocked. To demonstrate. To condemn and to point a finger of blame. That wayhe believes that he has filled his moral duty [. . .] It is sometimes easier for me to establish rapport withpragmatic Palestinians than with the friends of Palestinians here in Europe. The dispute with the Europeansis generally taken up at the level of moral rage or of an expression of disgust, sometimes towards Israel,sometimes towards fanatical Islam, whereas my meetings with pragmatic Palestinians resemble less ajudicial argument than a conversation between doctors in white hospital cloaks, in an emergency treatmenttheatre. Sometimes we have a discussion as to what should be done more urgently; what medicine will bebeneficial and what drug will harm the injured patient’ (authors’ own translation from Hebrew).



The EU’s declarations, policies and practices, when overlaid with criticalnormative rhetoric or justifications, are perceived in Israel as judgemental andunbalanced, but at the same time feeble and timorous, thereby exposing theEU to allegations of a capability–expectations gap. Such declarations, poli-cies and practices may also reveal the inconsistencies between the EU’s beingand doing, supporting Israeli political arguments that EU policies towardsIsrael are reflections of European double standards and are hence illegitimate(Harpaz, 2005, with respect to the EU’s record in the Cyprus dispute). Afterall, external legitimacy presupposes that the EU’s external, normative pres-sures should be compatible with its very own fundamental principles and withits very own raison d’être, while such legitimacy will not be achieved if theEU’s normative aspirations are high on rhetoric but low on delivery (Harpaz,2007).

In conclusion, an excessive normative agenda might expose the EU tocriticism in ways that would compromise its normative status, widen itsexternal illegitimacy and prejudice its ability to pursue effective interventionin the Middle East.

It further emerges from our analysis that Normative Europe has inadvert-ently made itself too often into a bridge, not between Europe and Israel, butbetween Israel’s contemporary security woes and its horrific past. Thus,although European scholarship assumes a theoretical link between NormativePower Europe and legitimacy, externally, Normative Europe may well provecounter-productive in strengthening the effectiveness of Europe’s soft powerinstruments and in promoting civilian values which may to a certain extent becommon to both Europeans and Israelis.

This critique does not, however, require the abandonment of the EU’snormative agenda. Nor does this article dispute the need for normativebacking of the EU’s Middle East politics or dismiss the EU’s aspirations inthe Middle East as ‘EUtopian’, as the title of this article might imply. The EUshould not content itself with a self-contained, inward-looking, normativeagenda based on a Kantian normative criterion. Such course of action mayforge an excessively rigid distinction between ‘us’ (the Europeans) and ‘them’(non-Europeans), thereby operating as a segregating force, creating a FortressNormative Europe and diminishing the relevance and effectiveness of EUexternal policies.

The EU should continue to pursue its normative agenda but it should do soin a more cautious manner. It is our view that the effectiveness of NormativeEurope in the Middle East depends, inter alia, on the ability of the EU to takecognizance of the multifaceted and somewhat incoherent perceptions of Nor-mative Europe held by the ‘other’ (in our case, in Israel), and on its ability toadjust its normative agenda and rhetoric accordingly.



By considering the three dominant Israeli approaches to NormativeEurope, namely the Historical, Normative and Economic Approaches, anattempt has been made to depict the multifarious views of Normative Europe.For example, by pointing out the Historical Approach prevalent in Israel,we demonstrated that the EU’s use of values as rationales for its policyhas strengthened the negative aspect of the Israeli Historical Approach,thereby contributing to discrediting the EU as a normative player in theIsrael–Palestinian dispute. Moreover, by analysing the diverse sub-PoliticalApproaches towards Normative Europe, which extend from the Antagonisticviewpoint to the Ideological-Supportive outlook, we contended that the nor-mative framework which guided Europe in formulating the Venice Declara-tion, as well as in its trade policy, allowed Israeli politicians to discredit theEU’s claim to be a normative player. Furthermore, by highlighting the Eco-nomic Approach, which strips away the historical and political dimensionsof Normative Europe, we demonstrated that the EU’s legitimacy may beadvanced by a move to untie, as much as possible, the Economic aspect ofEU–Israeli relations from the Historical and Normative ones.

The EU should thus avoid the pursuance of a purist, ‘fundamentalist’ andnon-reflective normative agenda aimed at turning the ‘external’ into ‘internal’and the ‘foreign’ into ‘domestic’ (Adler and Crawford, 2004, p. 13). Suchcourse of action may, for example, increase the discrepancy between the EU’snormative self-representation and the manner in which it is perceived by the‘other’. It may also expose the inherent gap between the EU’s ‘being’ and‘doing’, between its declared common norms and its actual actions as aninternational actor (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002, p. 767). Moreover, it mayrender contemporary Normative Europe somewhat paradoxical, givenEurope’s colonial history (Rosecrane, 1998, p. 22). All of those consequencesmay compromise, in turn, the EU’s external legitimacy and prejudice theeffectiveness of its policies.

The EU should develop instead a more low-key, cautious, conscious,self-reflective, politically and historically sensitive notion of NormativeEurope towards Middle East politics in general, and towards Israel, in particu-lar. It should heed the following advice offered by Nicolaïdis and Howse:‘Narratives of projection in this context acquire a self-reflexive quality. TheEU’s real comparative advantage, its “power”, lies less in showing off itsoutcome than its process, less an engineering convergence among its memberstowards higher standards of human rights and more in its capacity to manageenduring differences within a normative and institutional framework thatreflects a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and peaceful settlementof disagreements, contracts instead of power politics, positive sum instead ofzero sum games. Pushed to its ultimate logic, the EU is less a “model” to be



emulated than a “laboratory” ’ (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002, p. 771). As AmosOz notes: ‘Maybe it is thus best for Europe to wag its finger of morality less,and to display more empathy and assistance to both sides, the Israelis and thePalestinians’(Oz, 2006, p. 53, authors’ own translation from Hebrew.)

It is thus desirable for the EU to pursue vis-à-vis Israel a critical normativedialogue instead of a normative monologue, utilizing such dialogue as ameans to sustain normative pluralism through engagement: ‘Quite often, itmight be that it is more important to travel together than to reach anyparticular destination. If we believe in our values, then we should keep talkingabout them. However, we ought to keep in mind that there is little that isautomatic or generally accepted in our values. And we should also keep inmind that we ourselves could be wrong’ (Leino, 2008, p. 289).

Moreover, the excessive reliance by the EU on declaratory-normativediplomacy could be mitigated and to some extent camouflaged with concreteand constructive assistance, gradually replacing its ‘calling for’, ‘urging’ and‘inviting’ declaratory diplomacy (see Bischop, 2007, p. 85) with hard-thought, well-balanced practical solutions and assistance (see Shpiro, 2007,p. 64). The EU’s normative agenda should be backed with effective, down-to-earth practical assistance and with a shrewd use of instruments of positiveand negative conditionality, thereby narrowing the gap between its rhetoricand actions.44 Thus, for example, the EU should render more visible itsextensive economic relations with Israel, thereby enhancing the overall posi-tive Israeli Economic Approach to it. In its declarations, policies and prac-tices, the EU should find the optimal balance between realpolitik and morals,between idealism and realism and between rhetoric and substance. Thepursuit of these proposed courses of action may contribute to the promotionof a more legitimate and hence effective external Normative Europe, whichwill hopefully serve as a significant normative actor in the Middle East.

The EU involvement during the Israeli–Hezbollah armed conflict of 2006and in its aftermath supports our thesis. The EU criticized both parties forviolating international law but avoided too harsh normative preaching.Instead of repeating its excessive reliance on declaratory diplomacy, the EUsucceeded in forming and displaying a proactive, relatively unified, down-to-earth stance, committing large numbers of soldiers from important MemberStates to the UNFIL Force and assisting the Lebanon economic reconstruc-tion. The overall positive record of the EU in that crisis, as the EU displayednot only in Brussels and in New York, but also in Israel and Lebanon (see

44 See Dunne (2008, p. 15): ‘Europe does not need to accept a choice: either becoming a proto-superpoweror retreating to EUtopia. There is a moral middle way to be found. For Europe to play a positive role inworld affairs it needs both to develop and integrate its military capability and to deepen its commitment tocosmopolitan values which have shaped its identity’.



Nathanson and Stetter, 2007, p. 11; Bischop, 2007, pp. 67–9), may be per-ceived as part of the EU’s growing political-military commitment andresultant enhanced strategic actorness in the Middle East (Bischop, 2007, p.78). Such enhancement has improved, in turn, the credibility of the EU as apolitical-strategic player in the eyes of Israel (Schmid, 2007, pp. 101,119–122).

The same may be contended with respect to the Israeli–Hamas conflict ofJanuary 2009. It is still too early to draw conclusions from the Europeaninvolvement in this conflict, yet it may still be argued, with the requiredcaution, that the EU and its Member States succeeded in building upon itssuccessful involvement in the Lebanon war of 2006. The EU critical declara-tory diplomacy was toned down and was once again supported by concreteinvolvement on the ground, displaying vis-à-vis Israel a highly critical, yetsupportive and sensitive approach (for a more critical view, see Emersonet al., 2009). The President of the European Council, the President of France,the Chancellor of Germany and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom,Italy and Spain gathered in a united manner in the Israeli Prime Minister’sofficial residence, to express in front of the cameras Europe’s support of thenascent and shaky ceasefire and of the peace process. Europe’s unitary com-mitment to assist in meeting Gaza’s humanitarian needs and in fightingmilitary arms trafficking and smuggling to Gaza displayed a more proactive,constructive and balanced approach, enabling European leaders such asNicholas Sarkozy and special Envoy of the Quartet to the Middle East, TonyBlair, to contribute to the efforts to promote the ceasefire. Such approach wasindeed welcomed by Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister of that time: ‘I wishto express my personal appreciation and the appreciation of the people ofIsrael to you, leaders of the European countries, for demonstrating yourimpressive support for the State of Israel and your concern for its safety. Theunited front which you represent and your uncompromising stand with regardto the security of the State of Israel warms our hearts and strengthens us at thissensitive time [. . .] Our personal friendship may at times exceed that whichis accepted in the recognized diplomatic protocol, but they are friendshipswhich are beyond price. I feel a pleasant obligation to thank each and everyone of you, both for your personal friendship and your friendship towards thepeople and State of Israel’ (Olmert, 2009).

Conclusions

The scholarship on Normative Power Europe is usually inward-looking andEurocentric, focusing, in abstracto, on its interface with notions of European



identity-formation and actorness-enhancement. Insufficient attention,however, has been devoted, in concreto, to the manner in which this conceptis perceived by the non-European and to the political predicaments that theEuropean Normative agenda creates. This article has attempted to add themuch-needed external and concrete perspectives to the concept of NormativePower Europe and to the theoretical discourse pertaining to it. NormativePower Europe was viewed not merely as an abstract concept, but also as partof complex historical, socio-political and economic realities, examinedthrough the prism of non-Europeans, in our case Israelis. The article furtherquestioned Europe’s ‘normative way’ in its Middle East dealings (Manners,2002, p. 253) and the assumed theoretical link prevalent in IR and Europeanintegration theoretical discourse between Normative Power and externallegitimacy.

The article does not, however, call upon the EU to abandon its normativeagenda. Nor does it dispute the need for normative backing of the EU’sMiddle East politics or dismiss the EU’s aspirations in the Middle East as‘EUtopian’, as the title of this article might imply. The EU should intervenein the Middle East and such intervention should be normatively oriented. TheEU should, however, be aware that any failure to take cognizance of themultifarious Israeli views of its normative agenda, analysed in this article,may create a visible dissonance between its self-portrayed normative imageand the image which is perceived by the ‘other’ and may widen the capacitygap that the EU suffers from in its external activities. This dissonance andthis gap may compromise Europe’s normative status, widen its externalillegitimacy and prejudice its ability to pursue effective involvement in theMiddle East.

In a thought-provoking article, Scheipers and Sicurelli argue that the lackof reflexivity with respect to the gap between reality and European utopiannorms does not undermine the EU’s credibility as a normative power. Accord-ing to them, the rhetoric used by the EU in official documents and speecheshas contributed to attracting allies in the international arena and therefore tostrengthening its image as a normative power (Scheipers and Sicurelli, pp.452–53). We beg to differ. The findings of this article demonstrate instead thatin order to become powerful and effective in the Middle East, the EU’sexternal policies should display a significant degree of sensitivity and reflex-ivity. It was Manners who contended that ‘the most important factor shapingthe international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but whatit is’ (Manners, 2002, p. 252). That might be the case, yet this article hassought to demonstrate that the manner in which the EU pursues its external,normative aspirations is highly important too. We thus concur with Nicolaïdisand Howse who argue that the inconsistency between what the EU is and



what the EU attempts to project compromises its external legitimacy(Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002).

Scholarship teaches us that such sensitivity and reflexivity may be attainedthrough consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies (Nico-laïdis and Howse, 2002, p. 771), by refraining from pursuing utopian norms(Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002, p. 789) and by refraining from pursuing anormative agenda with ‘missionary zeal’ (Diez, 2005, p. 623). This articlebuilds upon these findings, arguing that such sensitivity and reflexivity mayalso be attained through narrowing the gap between the EU’s self-regardingnormative portrait and the manner in which it is perceived by the ‘other’, inour case, by Israel.

In conclusion, the effectiveness of Normative Europe in the Middle Eastdepends, inter alia, on the ability of the EU to take cognizance of themultifaceted and somewhat incoherent perceptions of Normative Europe heldby the ‘other’ (in our case, in Israel), and on its ability to fine-tune itsnormative rhetoric and agenda accordingly. Thus, the ‘transformation of theEuropean miracle’ (Kagan, 2002, p. 18) to the Middle East presupposes,paradoxically, toning down the EU’s normative rhetoric and backing it withconcrete assistance to all relevant parties. A more conscious, cautious, self-reflective, politically and historically sensitive notion of Normative Europetowards Middle East politics backed with effective, down-to-earth practicalassistance and with a shrewd use of instruments of positive and negativeconditionality, may enhance the EU’s legitimacy and buttress its externaleffet utile.

Correspondence:Guy HarpazJean Monnet LecturerPresident of the Israeli Association of the Study of European IntegrationLaw Faculty and Department of International RelationsThe Hebrew University of JerusalemMount ScopusJerusalem, 91905Israelemail [email protected]

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