Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology

8/4/2019 Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology

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CONTENTS

Part One: IntrOductIOn [Prolegomena]

1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2. God: The Metaphysical Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3. Miracles: The Supernatural Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

4. Revelation: The Revelational Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

5. Logic: The Rational Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

6. Meaning: The Semantical Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

7. Truth: The Epistemological Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

8. Exclusivism: The Oppositional Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93

9. Language: The Linguistic Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101

10. Interpretation: The Hermeneutical Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117

11. Historiography: The Historical Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132

12. Method: The Methodological Precondition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149

Part twO: BIBle [BiBliology]

Section One: Biblical

13. The Origin and Inspiration of the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169

14. The Divine Nature of the Bible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

15. The Human Nature of the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

16. Jesus and the Bible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Section Two: Historical

17. Church Fathers on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21118. The Historical Church on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

19. The History of Destructive Biblical Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .236

20. Liberalism on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

21. Neo-Orthodoxy on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

22. Neo-Evangelicals on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289


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23. Evangelicals on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

24. Fundamentalism on the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Section Three: Theological

25. The Historicity of the Old Testament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .329

26. The Historicity of the New Testament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34627. The Inerrancy of the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369

28. The Canonicity of the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

Part three: GOd [Theology ProPer]

29. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407

30. Gods Pure Actuality and Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416

31. Gods Aseity and Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

32. Gods Immutability and Eternality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444

33. Gods Impassibility and Infinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46234. Gods Immateriality and Immensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .476

35. Gods Omnipotence and Omnipresence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .487

36. Gods Omniscience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496

37. Gods Wisdom and Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515

38. Gods Majesty, Beauty, and Ineffability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .524

39. Gods Life and Immortality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531

40. Gods Unity and Triunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547

41. Gods Holiness and Righteousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565

42. Gods Jealousy and Perfection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57443. Gods Truthfulness and Goodness (Love) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .581

44. Gods Mercy and Wrath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

45. A Response to Gods Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604

Part FOur: creatIOn

46. Alternative Views on Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615

47. The Origin of Material Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 628

48. The Creation of Spiritual Creatures (Angels) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .648

49. The Sustenance of All Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66250. Gods Transcendence Over and Immanence in Creation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 671

51. Gods Sovereignty Over Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677

52. Gods Providence in Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688

Part FIve: humanIty and SIn [anThroPologyand hamarTiology]

53. The Origin of Human Beings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707

54. The Nature of Human Beings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721

55. The Origin of Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741

56. The Nature of Sin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75657. The Effects of Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768

58. The Defeat of Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 790

Part SIx: SalvatIOn [SoTeriology]

59. The Origin of Salvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813


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60. The Theories of Salvation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828

61. The Nature of Salvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842

62. The Evidence of Salvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870

63. The Assurance of Salvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894

64. The Extent of Salvation (Limited or Unlimited Atonement) . . . . . . . . . . . 923

65. The Extent of Salvation (Universalism) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .953

66. The Exclusivity of Salvation (Pluralism). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .968

67. The Results of Salvation (Infants and Heathen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .982

68. The Condition for Salvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011

69. The Contents of Salvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051

PART Seven: THe cHURcH [eccleSiology]

70. The Origin of the Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077

71. The Nature of the Universal Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1092

72. The Nature of the Visible Church(es) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1105

73. The Government of the Visible Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1130

74. The Ordinances of the Visible Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1152

75. The Ministry of the Visible Church (Spiritual Gifts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176

76. The Relationship of the Church to the State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1193

PART eIGHT: LAST THInGS [eSchaTology]

77. The Intermediate State and the Resurrection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1213

78. The Final State of the Saved (Heaven) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1247

79. The Final State of the Lost (Hell) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126680. The Alleged Temporary State of the Saved (Purgatory). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282

81. Annihilationism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301

82. The Interpretation of Prophecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1317

83. The Kingdom of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1347

84. The Covenants of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1377

85. The Second Coming and the Millennium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1413

86. The Tribulation and the Rapture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1450

Appendices1. Christology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1497

2. Biblical References to Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1524

3. Various Views of the Days of Genesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1526

4. The Age of the Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1534

5. The Scientific Evidence for Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1536

6. Pneumatology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1553

7. Wesleyan Perfectionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1556

8. Only the Apostles Spoke in Tongues at Pentecost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1563

9. Liberation Theology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1565

1 0 . U l t r a d i s p e n s a t i o n a l i s m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 6 8

1 1 . R e i n c a r n a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 7 0

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1573

Scripture Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1598

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1622


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P a r t o N e

iNtroductioN

[ PrOlegOmena ]


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c h a P t e r 1

inn

THeOLOGIcAL DeFInITIOnS

Prolegomena (lit.: pro, before, and lego, speak) is the introduction to theology. It

deals with the necessary preconditions for doing systematic theology.

Theology (lit.: theos, God, and logos, reason or discourse) is a rational discourseabout God.

Evangelical theology is defined here as a discourse about God that maintains that there

are certain essential Christian beliefs.1 These include, but are not necessarily limited to,2

the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible alone,3 the triunity of God, the virgin birth of

Christ, the deity of Christ, the all-sufficiency of Christs atoning sacrifice for sin, the phys-

ical and miraculous resurrection of Christ, the necessity of salvation by faith alone through

Gods grace alone based on the work of Christ alone, the physical bodily return of Christ

to earth, the eternal conscious bliss of the saved, and the eternal conscious punishment of

the unsaved.4

Theology is divided into several categories:

(1) Biblical Theology is a study of the biblical basis for theology.

(2) Historical Theology is a discussion of the theology of the great theologians of the

Christian church.

(3) Systematic Theology is an attempt to construct a comprehensive and consistent

1 Not all of these are necessary for traditional orthodoxy, but they are necessary for a consistent orthodoxy.

Inerrancy, for example, is not a test for evangelical authenticity but for evangelical consistency. See our book

Conviction Without Compromise, part 1 (Eugene, OR: Harvest House), 2008.

2 The belief in a theistic God and miracles are also fundamental beliefs, as is creation ex nihilo (out ofnothing).

3 Traditional Roman Catholics deny the alone in these statements.4 Recently a number of individuals and groups calling themselves evangelicals have denied eternal conscious

punishment of the wicked in favor of annihilationism. Historically, however, eternal conscious punishment

has been affirmed by orthodox theology, from the earliest time down through the Reformation into the

modern era (see W. G. T. Shedd, Eternal Punishment).


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14 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYwhole out ofall revelation from God, whether special (biblical) or general (natu-

ral) revelation.5

Apologetics (Gk: apologia, defense) deals with the protection of Christian theology

from external attacks. Polemics defends orthodox Christianity from internal doctrinal threats

such as heresy and aberrant teachings.

THe BASIc DIvISIOnS OF SySTeMATIc THeOLOGy

Systematic theology is generally divided into the following categories: (1) Prolegomena

(Introduction); (2) Bibliology (Gk: biblios, Bible); (3) Theology Proper, the study of God;

(4) Anthropology (Gk: pl. anthropoi, human beings); (5) Harmartiology (Gk: harmartia,

sin); (6) Soteriology (Gk: soterios, salvation); (7) Ecclesiology (Gk: ecclesia, [the] church);

(8) Eschatology (Gk: eschatos, the last things).

In addition, the study of the Holy Spirit (a subdivision of Theology Proper) is titled

Pneumatology (Gk:pneuma, spirit), and discourses about Christ are called Christology.

Theological discussions about demons are designated Demonology, those about Satan are

titled Satanology, and the study of angels is labeled Angelology.

THe PRecOnDITIOnS OF evAnGeLIcAL THeOLOGy

Evangelical theologians believe the Bible is an infallible, absolutely true communica-

tion in human language that came from an infinite, personal, and morally perfect God.

This belief presupposes that many things are truemost of which are challenged by our

current culture. Evangelicalism presupposes that there is a theistic God (the metaphysi-cal preconditionchapter 2) who created the world and can miraculously intervene in

it (the supernatural preconditionchapter 3); a God who has revealed Himself in both

general and special revelation (the revelational preconditionchapter 4); which revelation

is subject to the laws of logic (the rational preconditionchapter 5) and which contains

objectively meaningful statements (the semantical preconditionchapter 6) that are true

objectively (the epistemological preconditionchapter 7) and true exclusively (the opposi-

tional preconditionchapter 8); which statements can be properly understood in analogous

language (the linguistic preconditionchapter 9), the meaning and truth of which can be

understood objectively (the hermeneutical preconditionchapter 10), including those

elements relating to historical events (the historical preconditionchapter 11); and whichrevelation can be systematized by a complete and comprehensive theological method (the

methodological preconditionchapter 12).

Foreboding as this project may seem, these are the preconditions necessary to make

evangelical theology a possibility. Each one will be treated successively in the following

chapters.

THe IMPORTAnce OF PRecOnDITIOnS

A precondition makes possible what is based on it. For example, the preconditions fortwo human beings communicating with each other minimally include:

(1) There is a mind capable of sending a message (encoder).

(2) There is a mind capable of receiving a message (decoder).

5 See chapter 4.


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INTRODUCTION 15(3) There is a common mode of communication (like a language) shared by both

persons (code).

Without these necessary preconditions communication could not take place.Likewise, without the above stated preconditions, evangelical systematic theology is

not possible. One of the most important preconditions is the metaphysical one, theism,which is discussed in the next chapter.


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c h a P t e r 2

g: t mpysl

Pnn

THe nATURe AnD IMPORTAnce OF MeTAPHySIcS

The existence of a theistic God is the foundation of Christian theology. If the God oftraditional Christian theism does not exist, then logically evangelical theology crumbles.Attempting to construct a systematic evangelical theology without the superstructure oftraditional theism is like trying to put together a house without a frame.

The Significance of Metaphysics

Theism is the metaphysical precondition for evangelical theology. It is fundamentalto all else, being the framework within which everything else has meaning. It makes nosense to speak about the Bible being the Word of God unless there is a God. Likewise, itis meaningless to talk about Christ as the Son of God unless there is a God who can have

a Son. And miracles as special acts of God are not possible unless there is a God who canperform these special acts. In fact everything in evangelical theology is based on this meta-physical foundation of theism.

The Definition of Metaphysics

Metaphysics (lit.: meta, beyond;physics, the physical) is the study of being or real-ity. It is the study of being as being, as opposed to studying being as physical (physics) orbeing as mathematical (mathematics). Metaphysics is often used interchangeably withontology (lit.: ontos, being; logos, study of).

Evangelical Theology Entails Metaphysical TheismEvangelical theology implies a certain understanding of reality, and there are many

views about the world that are incompatible with the claims of evangelical thought. Forexample, evangelicalism believes that God exists beyond this world (world in this casemeaning the whole created universe) and that He brought this world into existence. Italso embraces the belief that this God is one eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect, personal


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18 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYDeism: God Is Beyond the Universe, But Not in It

Deism is like theism minus miracles. It says God is transcendent over the universe but

not immanent in the world, certainly not supernaturally. In common with atheism, it holds

a naturalistic view of the operation of the world, yet in common with theism, it believes

the origin of the world is a Creator. In brief, God made the world, but He does not involve

Himself with it. The Creator wound up creation like a clock, and ever since it has run on

its own. In contrast to pantheism, which negates Gods transcendence in favor of His imma-

nence, deism negates Gods immanence in favor of His transcendence. Deism is represented

by such thinkers as Franois Voltaire, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine.

Finite Godism: A Finite God Exists Beyond and in the Universe

Finite godism is like theism, only the god beyond the universe and active in it is not

infinite but is limited in his nature and power. Like the deist, the finite godist generally

accepts the creation of the universe but denies any miraculous intervention in it. Often,

Gods apparent inability to overcome evil is given as a reason for believing He is limited inpower. John Stuart Mill, William James, Peter Bertocci, and Rabbi Kushner are examples

of adherents to this worldview.

Polytheism: There Are Many Gods Beyond the World and in It

Polytheism is the belief that there are many finite gods. The polytheist denies any

infinite God beyond the world, such as in theism; however, the gods are active in the

world, in contrast to deism. And in contrast to finite godism, the polytheist believes in a

plurality of finite gods, often each having its own domain. The belief that one finite god is

chief over all the others (such as Jupiter for the Romans) is a subview of polytheism called

henotheism. Chief representatives of polytheism are the ancient Greeks, the Mormons, andthe neo-pagans (such as Wiccans).

Clearly, if theism is true, then all six forms of non-theism are false. God cannot be, for

instance, both infinite and finite, or personal and impersonal, or beyond the universe and

not beyond the universe, or able to perform miracles and not able to perform miracles, or

unchanging and changing.

PLURALISM vS. MOnISM

Pluralism,4 as opposed to monism, holds that more than one being exists (e.g., God

and creatures). While monism asserts that all reality is onethat there is only one beingpluralism, by contrast, believes that there are many beings in existence: God is an infinite

Being, and He created many finite beings that are not identical to Him, though they are

dependent on Him.

Thus, to be successful, evangelical theology must defend philosophical (or ontological)

pluralism against monism. Since theism affirms there is at least one finite being that exists

along with only one infinite Being, it follows that if theism is true then so is pluralism.

However, it does not follow that theism is true simply because pluralism is true, since there

are other forms of pluralism (e.g., deism, finite godism, and polytheism).

The Argument for MonismIf one is to defend pluralism, to say nothing of theism, there is a fundamental argu-

ment for monism that must be answered. This argument was stated by the early Greek

4Actually, there are two basic metaphysical preconditions entailed in evangelical theology: theism and

pluralism.


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 19philosopher Parmenides (b. 515 bc), who presented as follows (Parmenides, P5): Therecannot be more than one thing (absolute monism), for if there were two things, they wouldhave to differ. For things to differ, they must differ either by being or by nonbeing. But sincebeing is that which makes them identical, they cannot differ by being. Nor, on the otherhand, can they differ by nonbeing, for nonbeing is nothing, and to differ by nothing is not

to differ at all. Hence, there cannot be a plurality of beings but only one single indivisiblebeinga rigid monism.

The Alternatives to Monism

The alternatives to Parmenides are few and far between for pluralists who wish toescape the clutches of monism. Basically, there are four other options.

The first two forms of pluralism, which we will call atomism and platonism, affirm thatthe many beings differ by nonbeing. The last two views, called aristotelianism and thomism,hold that the many beings differ in their being.

Atomism: things Differby Absolute nonbeing

The ancient atomists, such as Leucippus (fl. c. fifth century bc) and Democritus (c.460370 bc), contended that the principle separating one being (one atom) from anotheris absolutely nothing (i.e., nonbeing). They called this the Void. For them, being is full andnonbeing is empty. The atoms, which do not differ at all in their essence, are separated bythe different space they occupy in the Void (empty space). This difference, then, is merelyextrinsic; there is no intrinsic difference in the atoms (beings).6

In short, the atomists response to Parmenides was that there are many beings (atoms)that differ by nonbeing. Each being occupies a different space in the Void that, in itself, isabsolutely nothing (empty space).

Of course, this is scarcely an adequate answer to Parmenides, since he would simplypoint out that to differ by absolutely nothing is to have absolutely no difference at all. Andto have absolutely no difference is to be absolutely the same. Monism appears to win theday over atomism.

PlAtonism: things Differby relAtive nonbeing

Plato (c. 427347 bc), with the help of Parmenides, struggled with how the Formscould differ if they were absolutely simple.7 Plato believed that all things had an ideal arche-type behind them. This Idea (or Form) was the real world. All things in this world of ourexperience are only shadows of the real world by virtue of their participation in this trueForm. For example, each individual human being in this world participates in a universal

form of humanness in the world of ideas. Plato later adopted the view that the Forms (orIdeas) are not indivisibly and unrelatedly separated by absolute nonbeing but are related bythe principle ofrelative nonbeing.

By this principle of relative nonbeing, also called the other, Plato believed he couldhave many different forms (beings) and thus avoid monism. Each form differed from otherforms in that it was not that other form. All determination, in this case, is by negation.

For one example, the sculptor determines what the statue is in relation to the stoneby chipping away (negating) what he does not want. Likewise, each form is differentiated

5All sources cited in the text are included by author and title in the bibliography; they are abbreviated

here.6 For our purposes here, extrinsic means lying outside, not properly belonging to the nature of a thing,

while intrinsic is defined as belonging to the inmost constitution or essential nature of a thing (Websters

Third New International Dictionary).7 On this whole question of Platos later view of the Forms (Teske, PLD), his Parmenides and Theaeteus seem

rather to represent a break away from his early theory. He apparently saw the fallacy of the atomistic posi-

tion (with which his own earlier view of indivisible forms [ideas] behind all things was akin).


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20 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYfrom every other form by negationwhat it is, is determined by what it is not. For another

example, the chair is distinguished from everything else in the room in that it is not thetable, it is not the floor, it is not the wall, etc. This does not mean that the chair is absolutely

nothing. It is something in itself, but it is nothing in relation to other things. That is, it isnot those other things.

Even so, Parmenides would not have been impressed by Platos attempt to evade monism.He would simply have asked whether there were any differences in the beings themselves. Ifthere were not, then he would have insisted that all these beings (forms) must be identical.

For the monist there are not many beings but only one.

AristoteliAnism: things Differ As simPle beings

Both Plato and the atomist took one horn (the same horn) of the parmenidean dilemma:They tried to differentiate things by nonbeing. But, as we have seen, to differ by nothing

is not to differ at all. Aristotle (384322 bc) and Thomas Aquinas (12251274) took theother horn of the dilemma: They sought to find a difference in the beings themselves. Both

contend that there are many beings that are essentially different. Aristotle held that thesebeings are metaphysically simple, and Aquinas8 viewed them as metaphysically composite,having an act/potency distinction on the level of pure forms or beings.

Aristotle argued that there is a plurality of forty-seven or fifty-five beings, or unmovedmovers, that are separated from one another in their very being (Aristotle, M, XII). Thesebeings (movers) caused all the motion in the world, each operating in its own separate

cosmic domain. Each was a pure form (being) with no matter (which Aristotle used to dif-ferentiate things in this world). This plurality of totally separated substantial forms has no

commonness or community of being whatsoever. They cannot be related to one another(Eslick, RD, 15253), and they are completely diverse from one another.

Of course, Parmenides would ask Aristotle just how simple beings can differ in theirvery being. Things composed of form and matter can differ in that this particular matter isdifferent from that matter, even though they have the same form. But how do pure forms

(beings) differ from each other? They have no principle of differentiation. If there is no dif-ference in their being, then their being is identical. Thus, neither does Aristotles solutionavoid monism.

thomism: things Differ As ComPlex beings

The fourth pluralistic alternative to parmenidean monism is represented by Thomas

Aquinas, who, in common with Aristotle, sought difference within the beings themselves.But unlike Aristotle, who had only simple beings, Aquinas believed that all finite beings

are composed in their very beings. Only God is an absolutely simple Being, and there can beonly one such Being (God). However, there can be other kinds of beings, namely, composed

beings. Beings can differ in their very being because there can be different kinds of beings(Aquinas, ST, 1a.4.1, 3).

God, for example, is an infinite kind of Being; all creatures are finite kinds of beings.

God is Pure Actuality (Act); all creatures are composed of actuality (act) and potentiality(potency). Hence, finite things differ from God in that they have a limiting potentiality; He

does not. Finite things can differ from each other in whether their potentiality is completelyactualized (as in angels) or whether it is being progressively actualized (as in humans).

In all creatures their essence (what-ness) is really distinct from their existence (is-ness).

In God, on the other hand, His essence and existence are identical. Aquinas was not the firstto make this distinction, but he was the first to make such extensive use of it.

Aquinas argues in his book On Being and Essence that existence is something other thanessence, except in God, whose essence is His existence. Such a being must be one and unique,

8 See below, under Thomism.


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 21since multiplication of anything is only possible where there is a difference. But in such a being asGod there is no difference. From this it follows necessarily that in everything else, except inthis one unique existence, its existence must be one thing and its essence another.

In this way Aquinas provided an answer to the age-old predicament posed by monism.Things do differ in their being because there are different kinds of beings. Parmenides was

wrong because he assumed that being is always understood univocally (the same way).Aquinas, on the other hand, saw that being is analogous,9 being understood in similar butdifferent ways. All beings are the same in that they are all actual; however, finite beings differfrom an infinite Being in that they have differing potentialities that have been actualized.

THe SUPeRIORITy OF THOMISTIc THeISM10

The value of Aquinass view is made manifest by both its own rationality and theimplausibility of its alternatives. Parmenides position, by contrast, does violence to ourexperience of a differentiated yet interrelated multiplicity of beings. But again, if a rigid

monism is unacceptable, it seems there are only four basic pluralistic alternatives.The atomist attempts to explain multiplicity by affirming that absolute nonbeingthe

Voidis that which separates one being from another. But surely this answer is insufficient,for as Parmenides painstakingly pointed out, to differ by that which is absolutely nonexis-tent is not to differ at all. And if there is no real distinction, then there is no distinction inreality at all. All is one.

The platonists tried to use relative nonbeing as the principle of differentiation. That is,while admitting that things differ by nonbeing, he argued that nonbeing in some way exists,even though it is other than being. That is, differentiation is by negation: One being isdistinct from another not by what it is but by what it is notdifferent not by being but by

nonbeing. In other words, the differentiating factor is not within being but is outside ofbeingit is not real or actual. But nothing that is external to being can be the principle ofdifferentiation within being. And if there is no actual difference within the nature of things,then there is actually no difference between them at allthe old parmenidean dilemma ina different form.

The aristotelian multiplicity of simple, separated substances has no principle of indi-viduation at all.11 Aristotle calls on neither absolute nonbeing nor relative nonbeing toexplain how there can be many simple, separate beings. Not only is this view without aprinciple of differentiation, but as Plotinus noted (E, VI.5.9), it is also without any principleof unification. That is, there is nothing to coordinate the separate operations of the many

prime movers.Finally, the thomistic (i.e., following Thomas Aquinas) position on plurality is that mul-

tiplicity is possible because there are different kinds of being. This is possible because beingshave within them a real distinction in their being between their existence and their essence.That is to say, being is not a homogenous, undifferentiated whole. Rather, created being isa dynamic, complex composition of essence and existence. It has the correlative principlesof potency and act. The question is not to be or not to be, but what kind of being?

For Thomas Aquinas, things differ from one another by the kind of being or actualitythey are. Being is not predicated of things univocally,12 for then all would be one. Nor is it

9 See chapter 9.10 Thomistic theism is also called classical theism, a view shared among Augustine, Anselm, the Reformers,

and many modern thinkers, including C. S. Lewis.11 In the physical world Aristotle used matter as the principle of individuation, but these pure Forms have no

matter. Hence, in the metaphysical realm Aristotle had no way to distinguish one being from another.12 In this case, univocal means characteristic of or restricted to things of the same nature (Websters Third

New International Dictionary).


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22 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYpredicated of things equivocally,13 for then all would be totally different and isolated. Rather,being is predicated of things analogicallyeach essence has being in its own distinct wayand is related to others only by analogy. Each thing has its one mode of be-ing. In otherwords, essence, the principle of differentiation, is real. It is part of the very being of things;a co-constitutive principle.14

In brief, the real distinction within being (Lat. ens) between essence (essentia) andexistence (esse) seems to be the only satisfactory answer to the parmenidean problem ofunity and plurality. Without an analogy of being15 there is no way to account for multiplicity.In univocity of being, things are either unrelated or identical. As we have seen, if being istaken univocally (instead of analogically), then there can only be one being, for if whereverbeing is found it means entirely the same thing, then all being is identical (entire samenessleaves no room for any difference in being).

What is more, if being is taken equivocally (as entirely different), then there can be nomore than one being, for ifthis is being and everything else is totally different from it, theneverything else is nonbeing. (This is true because what is totally different from being would

be nonbeing.) Seemingly, the only way to avoid the monistic conclusion that follows fromeither an equivocal or a univocal view of being is to take an analogical view. And the onlyway being can be analogical is if there is within being both the principle of unification and

the principle of differentiation. Aquinas called these, respectively, esse and essentia: Existence(unification) is to essence (differentiation) what actuality is to potentiality. Since finite beingshave different potentialities (essences), these finite beings can be differentiated in reality whenthese potentialities are actualized (or brought into existence) in different kinds of beings.

What is being? Being is that which is. How many beings are there? Being can be eithersimple (Pure ActualityGod) or complex (both actuality and potentiality). There cannot

be two absolutely simple beings, since there is nothing in a pure Being by which it coulddiffer from another pure Being.Of course, a simple Being can (indeed, must) differ from complex beings, since it has

no potentiality, as they do. Therefore, there can be only one Being purely and simply, butthere are many beings with a mixture of act and potency. Only one is Being; everythingelse has being.

In this way Aquinas seemed to provide the only rational answer to monism. Plotinusdid attempt to answer the problem by positing an absolute One that goes beyond reasonand beyond being, but it is self-defeating to reason about what is beyond reason.

THe RATIOnAL BASIS FOR THeISM: THe ALTeRnATIve TO MOnISM

Thomas Aquinass answer for pluralism makes theismpossible, but only sound argu-ments for Gods existence make theism viable. Many such arguments have been offered, whilefour of them have dominated discussion over the centuries: the cosmological argument, theteleological argument, the ontological argument, and the moral argument.

The Cosmological Argument for Gods Existence

The cosmological argument comes in two basic forms: horizontal and vertical. Thehorizontal argument, known as the kalam (Arabic for eternal) argument, argues for a

13 Equivocal here means called by the same name but differing in nature or function (Websters Third New

International Dictionary).14 This is not to say that essence is real prior to its connection to existence or independent of it (a position

not held by Aquinas but by Giles of Rome). The reality of essence is in its correlation with existence. Thus

an existing essence is real.15 See chapter 9.


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 23Beginner of the universe. The vertical argument reasons to a Sustainer of the universe.One posits an original Cause and the other a current Cause. The horizontal argument wasembraced by Bonaventure (c. 12171274), who followed certain Arab philosophers. Thevertical argument was championed by Thomas Aquinas.

the horizontAl formofthe CosmologiCAl Argument

The essence of this argument is as follows:

(1) Everything that had a beginning had a cause.(2) The universe had a beginning.(3) Therefore, the universe had a Cause.

The first premise (Everything that had a beginning had a cause) is often taken asself-evident, since to admit otherwise would amount to the ridiculous claim that nothingproduces something. Even the infamous skeptic David Hume (17111776) confessed, Inever asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause (LDH,

1:187).The second premise (The universe had a beginning) is defended both philosophically

and scientifically. Philosophically, it is argued that

(1) An infinite number of moments cannot be traversed.(2) If there were an infinite number of moments before today, then today would never

have come, since an infinite number of moments cannot be traversed.(3) But today has come.(4) Hence, there were only a finite number of moments before today (i.e., a beginning

of time). And everything with a beginning had a Beginner. Therefore, the temporal

world had a Beginner (Cause).

The scientific evidence for the world having a beginning comes from the so-called BigBang view held by most contemporary astronomers. There are several converging lines ofevidence that the space-time universe had a beginning. First, the universe is running outof usable energy (Second Law of Thermodynamics), and what is running down cannot beeternal (otherwise it would have run down by now). An entity cannot run out of an infiniteamount of energy.

Second, the universe is said to be expanding. Thus, when the motion picture of theuniverse is put into reverse, logically and mathematically it reaches a point where it is noth-

ing (i.e., no space, no time, and no matter). So the universe literally came into being out ofnothing. But nothing cannot produce something.Third, the radiation echo given off by the universe, discovered by two Nobel Prize-

winning scientists, Arno Allan Penzias and Robert Woodrow Wilson (see Jastrow, GA, 1415),has the identical wavelength of that which would be given off by a gigantic explosion.

Fourth, the large mass of energy resulting from such an explosion and predicted by BigBang proponents was actually discovered by the Hubble Space Telescope in 1992.

Fifth, Einsteins own theory of general relativity demanded a beginning of time, a viewhe resisted for years and even defended by a fudge factor he introduced into his argumentto avoid it and for which he was later embarrassed (see Heeren and Smoot, SMG, 109).

The cumulative philosophical and scientific evidence for an origin of the materialuniverse provides a strong reason to conclude that there must have been a nonphysicaloriginating Cause of the physical universe. Agnostic astronomer Robert Jastrow admitsthat this is a clearly theistic conclusion (SCBTF in CT, 17). After reviewing the evidencethat the cosmos had a beginning, the British physicist Edmund Whittaker concurred: It issimpler to postulate creation ex nihilodivine will constituting nature from nothingness(cited by Jastrow, GA, 111). Jastrow concludes, That there are what I or anyone would call


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24 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYsupernatural forces at work is now, I think, a scientifically proven fact (Jastrow, SCBTF in

CT, 15, 18, emphasis added).

the vertiCAl formofthe CosmologiCAl Argument

The horizontal form of the cosmological argument argues from thepast origin of the

cosmos to an Original (First) Cause of it. By contrast, the vertical form of the cosmologicalargument begins with thepresent contingent existence of the cosmos and insists there must

be a current Necessary Being causing it. Both are causal arguments and both begin with an

existing cosmos. However, the horizontal argument starts with a universe that had a beginning(long ago), and the second with a universe that has being (right now). The former stressesoriginating causality, and the latter focuses on conserving causality. The first argues to a FirstCause (back then), and the second argues to a Necessary Cause (at present).

The vertical cosmological argument was stated in several ways by Thomas Aquinas(ST, 1.2.3). Two forms of it will illustrate the point: the argument from contingency and

the argument from change.

The argument from contingency begins with the fact that at least one contingent beingexists; that is, a being that exists but can not exist. A Necessary Being is one that exists but

cannot not exist. The argument goes like this:

(1) Whatever exists but can/could not exist needs a cause for its existence, since themere possibility of existence does not explain why something exists. The mere

possibility for something is nothing (i.e., no-thing).(2) But nothing cannot produce something.

(3) Therefore, something necessarily exists as the ground for everything that does existbut can not exist. In short, it is a violation of the principle of causality to say that

a contingent being can account for its own existence.

Another way to put this form of the vertical argument is to note that if something

contingent exists, then a Necessary Being must exist:

(1) If everything were contingent, then it would be possible that nothing existed.(2) But something does exist (e.g., I do), and its existence is undeniable, for I have to

exist in order to be able to affirm that I do not exist.

(3) Thus, if some contingent being now exists, a Necessary Being must now exist,otherwise there would be no ground for the existence of this contingent being.

The argument from change, another form of the vertical cosmological argument, beginswith the fact that there are changing beings:

(1) Whatever changes passes from a state of potentiality (potency) for that change to a state

of being actualized (act). That is, all changing beings have act(uality) and potency intheir very being. If not, then all change would involve annihilation and re-creation,

which is impossible without a Cause, since nothing cannot produce something.(2) But no potentiality can actualize itself, any more than the potential for steel to

become a skyscraper can actualize itself into a skyscraper.

(3) If no potency can actualize itself, and yet at least one being is actualized (e.g., me),then ultimately there must be something that is Pure Actuality (with no potential-

ity), otherwise there would be no ground for why something now exists that hasthe potential not to exist.

This form of the vertical cosmological argument addresses the impossibility of an

infinite regress of beings that are composed of act and potency. It points out that the very


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 25first Being beneath a changing being (with act and potency) cannot be another being with

act and potency, for what does not account for its own existence certainly cannot accountfor anothers existence. To say it could is like arguing that one paratrooper whose chute did

not open can hold up another whose chute did not open. And adding more paratrooperswhose chutes do not open does not help the problem; it compounds it.

Another way to put the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes of the presentexistence of a changing being (with act and potency) is to point out that in an infinite

regress of such causes at least one cause must be causing, since it is admitted that causingis occurring. Yet in an infinite series every cause is being caused, for if one were not being

caused, then we have arrived at an Uncaused Cause (which scientists desire to avoid). Onecause must be uncaused, for if every cause in an infinite series is being caused and at least

one cause is causing, then that cause is self-caused. However, a self-caused being is impos-sible, since a cause is ontologically,16 if not chronologically, prior to its effect, and somethingcannot be prior to itself.

Another form of the vertical cosmological argument begins with thepresent dependence

of every part of the universe. Briefly stated:

(1) Every part of the universe is right now dependent for its existence.(2) If every part is right now dependent for its existence, then the whole universe must

also be right now dependent for its existence.(3) Therefore, the whole universe is dependent right now for its existence on some

Independent Being beyond itself.

In response, critics argue that the second premise commits the fallacy of composition.

That every piece of a mosaic is square does not mean the whole mosaic is square. Also, put-

ting two triangles together does not necessarily make another triangle; it may make a square.The whole may (and sometimes does) have a characteristic not possessed by the parts.Defenders of the vertical form of the cosmological argument are quick to note that

sometimes there is a necessary connection between the parts and the whole. For example,

if every piece of a floor is oak, then the whole floor is oak. If every tile in the kitchen isyellow, then the whole floor is yellow. This is true because it is ofthe very nature ofpatches

of yellow tile that when you put more like patches of yellow tile together, you still havea patch of yellow. And while putting two triangles together does not necessarily make

another triangle, nevertheless, putting two triangles together will necessarily make anothergeometric figure. Why? Because it is of the very nature of geometric figures that when they

are combined they still form a geometric figure.Likewise, it is of the very nature of dependent beings that when you put more of them together,

you still have dependent beings. If one thing is dependent for its being, then another depen-dent being can no more hold it up than adding more links to a chain will hold it up if there

is no peg holding up the whole chain.In response, some critics argue that the whole is greater than the parts. Therefore,

while the parts are dependent, the whole universe is not. However, either the sum ofthe parts is equal to the whole or it is more than the whole. If the whole universe is equal

to its parts, then the whole must be dependent just like the parts are.17 If, on the otherhand, the whole universe is more than the parts and would not vanish were the parts

all destroyed, then the whole universe is the equivalent of God, for it is an uncaused,independent, eternal, and necessary Being on which everything in the entire universe

depends for its existence.

16 See below, under The Ontological Argument for Gods Existence.17 Proof of this is that if all the parts are taken away, the whole would vanish too. Thus, the whole universe

must be contingent also.


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26 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYThe Teleological Argument for Gods Existence

There are many forms of the teleological argument, the most famous of which derivesfrom William Paley (17431805), who used the watchmaker analogy. Since every watchhas a maker, and since the universe is exceedingly more complex in its operation than awatch, it follows that there must be a Universe Maker. In brief, the teleological argumentreasons from design to an Intelligent Designer:

(1) All designs imply a designer.(2) There is great design in the universe.(3) Therefore, there must have been a Great Designer of the universe.

The first premise we know from experience; on any occasion that we see a complexdesign, we know by previous experience that it came from the mind of a designer. Watchesimply watchmakers; buildings imply architects; paintings imply artists; and coded mes-sages imply an intelligent sender. We know this to be true because we observe it happening

over and over.Also, the greater the design, the greater the designer.18 A thousand monkeys sitting at

typewriters for millions of years would never produce Hamlet. But Shakespeare did it on thefirst try. The more complex the design, the greater the intelligence required to produce it.

It is important to note here that by complex design is meant specified complexity. Acrystal, for example, has specificity but not complexity; like a snowflake, it has the same basicpatterns repeated over and over. Random polymers,19 on the other hand, have complexitybut not specificity.20 A living cell, however, has both specificity and complexity.

The kind of complexity found in a living cell is the same kind of complexity that is foundin a human language; that is to say, the letter sequence in the four-letter genetic alphabet is

identical to that in a written language. And the amount of specified complex informationin a simple one-celled animal is greater than that found in Websters Unabridged Dictionary.As a result, believing that life occurred without an intelligent cause is like believing thatWebsters Unabridged resulted from an explosion in a print shop.

Michael Behes excellent book Darwins Black Box provides from the nature of a living cellstrong evidence that it could not have originated by anything but intelligent design. The cellrepresents irreducible complexity, and it cannot be accounted for via the incremental changescalled for by evolution (Behe, DBB, all). Even Charles Darwin (18091882) admitted, If itcould be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have beenformed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely breakdown (Darwin, OOS, 6th ed., 154). The evolutionist Richard Dawkins agrees:

Evolution is very possibly not, in actual fact, always gradual. But it must begradual when it is being used to explain the coming into existence of complicated,apparently designed objects, like eyes. For if it is not gradual in these cases, itceases to have any explanatory power at all. Without gradualness in these cases,we are back to miracle, which is a synonym for the total absence of [naturalistic]explanation. (Dawkins, BW, 83.)

But Behe provides numerous examples of irreducible complexity that cannot evolvein small steps. He concludes,

18 It begs the question to point out that beavers make dams, since this is taken by creationists as evidence

that an intelligent Creator programmed this ability into beavers. Computers can produce amazing order

and design but only because they were programmed by an intelligent being to do so.19 Polymers are chemical compounds or mixtures of compounds that generally consist of repeating structural units.20 For something to have specificity is for it to have characteristics that are peculiar only to itself or to its

group of organisms.


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 27No one at Harvard University, no one at the National Institutes of Health, no

member of the National Academy of Sciences, no Nobel prize winnerno one atall can give a detailed account of how the cilium, or vision, or blood clotting, orany complex biochemical process might have developed in a Darwinian fashion.But we are here. All these things got here somehow; if not in a Darwinian fashion,

then how? (Behe, DBB, 187.)

Behe adds,

The conclusion of intelligent design flows naturally from the data itselfnotfrom sacred books or sectarian beliefs. Inferring that biochemical systems weredesigned by an intelligent agent is a humdrum process that requires no newprinciples of logic or science. . . . [Thus,] the result of these cumulative effortsto investigate the cellto investigate life at the molecular levelis a loud, clear,piercing cry of design! The result is so unambiguous and so significant that it

must be ranked as one of the greatest achievements in the history of science. Thediscovery rivals those of Newton and Einstein (ibid., 23233).Recent books from the intelligent-design movement have added to the strength

of this argument (see Meyer, Signature in the Cell and William Dembski, TheDesign of Life). They demonstrate that the only known cause that can producethe specified complexity of the DNA is intelligence.

The late agnostic astronomer Carl Sagan (19341996) unwittingly provided a powerfulexample of incredible design. He notes that the genetic information in the human brainexpressed in bits is probably comparable to the total number of connections among neurons

about a hundred trillion, 1014 bits.

If written out in English, say, that information would fill some twenty mil-lion volumes, as many as in the worlds largest libraries. The equivalent of twentymillion books is inside the head of every one of us. The brain is a very big placein a very small space.

Sagan went on to note that the neurochemistry of the brain is astonishingly busy, thecircuitry of a machine more wonderful than any devised by humans (Sagan, C, 278). Butif this is so, then why does the human brain not need an intelligent Creator, such as thosewonderful machines (like computers) devised by humans?

Another support for the teleological argument comes from the anthropic principle, whichstates that from its very inception the universe was fine-tuned for the emergence of humanlife (see Barrow,ACP). That is, the universe intricately preadapted for the arrival of humanlife. If the delicate balance had been off in the least, then life would not have been possible.

For example, oxygen comprises 21 percent of the atmosphere. If it were 25 percent,fires would erupt, and if only 15 percent, humans would suffocate. If the gravitational forcewere altered by merely one part in ten to the fortieth power (ten followed by forty zeroes),the sun would not exist and the moon would crash into the earth or veer off into space(Heeren, SMG, 196). If the centrifugal force of planetary movement did not precisely bal-ance the gravitational forces, nothing could be held in orbit around the sun. If the universewere expanding at a rate one-millionth more slowly than it is, the temperature on earthwould be 10,000 degrees Celsius. If Jupiter were not in its current order, the earth wouldbe bombarded with space material. If the earths crust were thicker, too much oxygen wouldbe transmitted to it to support life. If it were thinner, volcanic and tectonic activity wouldmake life untenable. And if the rotation of the earth took longer than twenty-four hours,temperature differences between night and day would be too great (see Ross, FG).


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28 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYAgain, Robert Jastrow sums up the implications: The anthropic principle . . . seems to

say that science itself has proven as a hard fact, that this universe was made, was designed,for man to live in. Its a very theistic result (Jastrow, SCBTF, 17, emphasis added). Formeratheistic astronomer Alan Sandage came to the same result:

The world is too complicated in all of its parts to be due to chance alone.I am convinced that the existence of life on earth with all its order in each of itsorganisms is simply too well put together. . . . The more one learns of biochem-istry, the more unbelievable it becomes unless there is some kind of organizingprinciplean architect for believers. . . . (Sandage, SRRB in T, 54.)

The anthropic principle is persuasively presented in the book The Privileged Planetby Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Richards. They demonstrate that not only were all the rightconditions for human life predetermined from the beginning of the universe, but that theearth is in the right place at the right time for humans to view our incredible place in the

universe.The great Albert Einstein (18791955) likewise declared that the harmony of naturallaw . . . reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with it, all systematic think-ing and acting of human beings is an utterly insignificant reflection (Einstein, IOWISI, 40,emphasis added).

The Ontological Argument for Gods Existence

Ontological comes from the Greek word ontos (being). This is the argument fromthe idea of a Perfect or Necessary Being to the actual existence of such a Being. The first phi-losopher known to develop the ontological argument (though Immanuel Kant [17241804]

was the first to call it this) was Anselm (10331109).There are two forms of the argument. One derives from the idea of a Perfect Beingand the other from the idea of a Necessary Being. These are sometimes called Anselm Aand Anselm B, respectively.

the first formofthe ontologiCAl Argument

According to this statement of the argument, the mere concept of God as an absolutelyperfect Being demands that He exist. Briefly put:

(1) God is by definition an absolutely perfect Being.(2) Existence is a perfection.

(3) Therefore, God must exist. If God did not exist, then he would be lacking oneperfection, namely, existence. But if God lacked any perfection, then He wouldnot be absolutely perfect. And God is by definition an absolutely perfect Being.Therefore, an absolutely perfect Being (God) must exist.

Since the time of Immanuel Kant it has been widely accepted that this form of theontological argument is invalid because existence is not a perfection. It is argued that existenceadds nothing to the concept of a thing; it merely gives a concrete instance of it. The dollarin my mind can have exactly the same properties or characteristics as the one in my wallet.The only difference is that I have a concrete example of the latter.

Kants critique of the first form of the ontological argument is penetrating and widelyembraced. There is, however, a second form that is not subject to this criticism.

the seConD formofthe ontologiCAl Argument

In his response to the monk Gaunilo (fl. c. eleventh century), who opposed the argu-ment, Anselm insisted that the very concept of a Necessary Being demands His existence.It can be stated this way:


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 29(1) If God exists, we must conceive of Him as a Necessary Being;

(2) but by definition, a Necessary Being cannot not exist;

(3) therefore, if a Necessary Being can exist, then it must exist.

Since there appears to be no contradiction to the idea of a Necessary Being, it would

seem to follow that one must exist, for the very idea of a Necessary Being demands that itmust existif it did not exist, then it would not be a necessary existence.

Critics point to a different problem with this form of the ontological syllogism.21 Its like

saying, Ifthere are triangles, then they must have three sides. Of course, there may not beany triangles. So the argument never really gets past that initial if; it never proves the big

question that it claims to answer. It assumes, but does notprove, the existence of a NecessaryBeing, merely asserting that if a Necessary Being existsand that is the open questionthen

it must exist necessarily, for this is the only way a Necessary Being can exist.Some have further refined the argument by adding that a state of total nothingness

is not logically possible, since our own existence is undeniable. And if something exists,

then something else must exist (i.e., the Necessary Being). However, in this form it is nolonger an ontological argument, since it begins with something that exists and reasons to

something that must exist.Most theists do not believe the ontological argument as such is sufficient in and of itself

to prove the existence of God. This is not to say it cannot be useful. While the ontologicalargument cannot prove Gods existence, it can prove certain things about His nature, if God

does exist. For example, it shows that if God exists at all, then He must exist necessarily.He cannot cease to exist, and He cannot exist contingently.

The Moral Argument for Gods Existence

The roots of the moral argument for God are found in Romans 2:1215, where theapostle Paul speaks of humankind being without excuse because there is a law written on

their hearts. In the last 250 years this argument has been stated in various ways; the mostpopular form emanates from C. S. Lewis (18981963) in the first part of his popular book

Mere Christianity. The heart of the argument follows this basic structure:

(1) Moral law implies a Moral Lawgiver.(2) There is an objective moral law.

(3) Therefore, there is an objective Moral Lawgiver.

The first premise is self-evident. A moral law is a prescription, andprescriptions comeonly from prescribers. Unlike the laws of nature (which are only descriptive), moral laws are

prescriptive: Moral laws dont describe what is; they prescribe what ought to be. They arenot simply a description of the way people do behave but are imperatives as to how they

should behave.The weight of the moral argument for Gods existence rests on the second premisethat

there is an objective moral law. That is, there is a moral law not just prescribed by humans

but also prescribed for humans. The question is whether there is evidence that there is auniversal, objective prescription that is binding on all humans.

The evidence for an objective moral law is strong; it is implied in moral judgments thatwe make, such as, The world is getting better (or worse). How can we know this unless

there is some standard beyond the world by which we can measure it? Likewise, statementslike Hitler was wrong lose their intended significance if they are merely a matter of opinion

or are culturally relative. But if Hitler was really (objectively) wrong, then there is a moral

21 Properly speaking, a syllogism is a deductive scheme (see chapter 5) of a formal arrangement consisting of

a major and a minor premise and a conclusion (Websters Third New International Dictionary).


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30 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYlaw beyond all of us by which we are all bound. And if there is such an objective moral lawbeyond all of us, then there is a Moral Lawgiver (God).

C. S. Lewis effectively answers typical objections to this moral argument as paraphrasedin the following text (see Lewis, MC, part 1).

this morAl lAw is not herD instinCt

What we call the moral law cannot be the result of herd instinct22 or else the strongerimpulse in us would always win. It does not. Furthermore, we would always actfrom ourinstinct rather thanfor it in order to bolster it (e.g., to help someone in trouble) as we onlysometimes do. Finally, if the moral law were only herd instinct, then instincts would alwaysbe right, but they are not. Even love and patriotism are sometimes wrong.

this morAl lAw CAnnot be soCiAl Convention

Not everything learned through society is based on social convention (e.g., math or logic),so neither is the moral law merely a societal norm. Evidence of this is that the same basicmoral laws can be found in virtually every society, past and present. Furthermore, judgments

about social progress would not be possible if society were the basis of the judgments.

this morAl lAw is Different fromthe lAwsof nAture

The moral law is not to be identified with the laws of nature because the latter aredescriptive (are), not prescriptive (ought) as moral laws are. Indeed, factually convenientsituations (the way it is) can be morally wrong and vice versa. For example, someone whotries to trip me and fails is in the wrong, while someone who accidentally trips me is not.

the morAl lAw is not humAn fAnCy

Neither can the moral law be mere human fancy, because we cannot get rid of it evenwhen we would sometimes like to do so. We did not create it; it is clearly impressed uponus from without. And if it were fancy, then all value judgments would be meaningless,including Murder is wrong and Racism is wrong.

But if the moral law is neither a description nor a merely human prescription, then itmust be a moral prescription from a Moral Prescriber who is beyond us. As Lewis notes,this Moral Lawgiver is more like mind than nature. He can no more be part of nature thanan architect is part of the building he designs.

injustiCe Does not DisProveA morAl lAwgiver

The main objection to an absolutely perfect Moral Lawgiver is the argument from evilin the world. No serious person can fail to recognize that all the murders, rapes, hatred, and

cruelty make the world far short of being absolutely perfect. But if the world is imperfect, howcan there be an absolutely perfect God? Lewiss answer is simple and to the point: The onlyway the world could possibly be known to be imperfect is if there is an absolutely perfectstandard by which it can be judged to be imperfect. Injustice makes sense only if there is astandard of justice by which something is known to be not just. And absolute injustice ispossible only if there is an absolute standard of justice. In his own words Lewis clarifies:

My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust.But how had I got this idea ofjust and unjust? A man does not call a line crookedunless he has some idea of a straight line. . . . Thus in the very act of trying to

prove that God did not existin other words, that the whole of reality wassenselessI found I was forced to assume that one part of realitynamely myidea of justicewas full of sense. Consequently atheism turns out to be toosimple. (Lewis, MC, 4546.)

22 Herd instinct is an inherent tendency to congregate or to react in unison; a theoretical human instinct

toward gregariousness and conformity (Websters Third New International Dictionary).


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 31Rather than disproving a morally perfect Being, then, the evil in the world presupposes

an absolutely perfect standard. One could raise the question as to whether this UltimateLawgiver is all-powerful, but not as to whether He is perfect.23

cOncLUSIOn ABOUT THe THeISTIc ARGUMenTS

Most theists do not rest their whole case for God on any one argument. Indeed, eachargument seems to demonstrate a different attribute of God along with His existence. For

example, the cosmological argument shows that an infinitely powerful Being exists; theteleological argument reveals that this Being is also super-intelligent; the moral argumentestablishes that He is morally perfect. And, granted that Something exists, the ontological

argument demonstrates that He is a Necessary Being.Some theists offer other arguments for the existence of God, such as the argument from

religious need (see Geisler, G, EF in BECA) or the argument from religious experience (seeTrueblood, PR). But the ones detailed above are the standard or classical arguments.

The objection is made that the cosmological argument does not prove a theistic God,such as evangelical Christianity holds. There are many other concepts of God besides the-ism, but these concepts cannot be identified with a theistic God.

Theism vs. Finite Godism

God must be infinite (in contrast with finite godism), since per the cosmological argu-ment every finite thing needs a cause. Hence, the Cause of all finite things must not be finite.

Further, the finite universe is made of parts, yet there cannot be an infinite number of

parts, since no matter how many parts there are, one more could always be added. And theFirst Uncaused Cause of the universe cannot be a part or have parts, otherwise He would

be caused. Hence, He must be infinite, since only finite things have parts. Since nothingcan be added to an infinite, but since all parts can be added to other parts, the Creator ofthe universe is infinite (and without parts).

Theism vs. Polytheism

The Uncaused Cause of theism is distinct from the many polytheistic gods, for therecannot be more than one unlimited existence as such. More than the Most is not possible.Such a Cause is Pure Actuality, and Actuality is unlimited and unique. Only act as conjoined

with potency is limited, such as is found in contingent beings (which exist but have thepossibility not to exist).

Further, in order to differ, one being would have to lack some characteristic that theother one had. But any being that lacked some characteristic of existence would not be

an unlimited perfect existence. In other words, two infinite Beings cannot differ in theirpotentiality, since they have no potentiality; they are Pure Actuality. And they cannot differ

in their actuality, since Actuality as such does not differ from Actuality as such. Hence, theymust be identical. So there is only one Unlimited Cause of all limited existence.

Theism vs. Pantheism

Further, the Uncaused Cause of Theism is not the God ofpantheism. Pantheism affirmsthat an unlimited and necessary being exists but denies the reality of limited and finite

beings. Theism begins with real, finite, contingent changing being(s), and from this itreasons to a real, infinite, necessary, unchanging being. So the theistic God is not the same

as the god of pantheism.

23 For a more complete theodicy (answer to the problem of evil), see Geisler, If God, Why Evil? (Bethany

House, 2011).


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32 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGYThe denial that a human being is finite and changing is self-defeating. A pantheist did

not always believe this way; he came to believe this way by some process of enlightenment.But if he went through some changing process, he is not an unchanging being after all.

Theism vs. Atheism

Nor can the Uncaused Cause of theism be identical with the material universe, as manyatheists believe. As ordinarily conceived, the cosmos or material universe is a limited andspatio-temporal system. It is, for example, subject to the Second Law of Thermodynamicsand thus is running down. But an Uncaused Cause is unlimited and not running down.

Space and time imply limitations to a here-and-now kind of existence. But an UncausedCause is not limited, and so it cannot be identical to the space-time world. The theistic Godis in the temporal world as its ground of continuing existence, but He is not ofthe worldin that it is limited and He is not.

If, in response, one claimed that the whole of the material universe is not temporal andlimited as are the parts, he would only demonstrate what theism claims, for his conclusion

is that there exists beyond the contingent world of limited spatio-temporality a whole real-ity that is eternal, unlimited, and necessary. In other words, it agrees with theism that thereis a God beyond the limited, changing world of experience. It is a substitute for God thatadmits that there is a whole reality that is more than the experienced part of reality and thathas all the essential metaphysical attributes of the theistic God.

Theism vs. Panentheism

Neither can the Uncaused Cause of theism be identical with the God ofpanentheism,also known as bipolar theism or process theology. Again, panentheism affirms that Godhas two poles: an actual pole (which is identified with the changing temporal world) and

a potential pole (which is eternal and unchanging). Such a conception of God must berejected for the following reasons:

For one thing, the conclusion of the cosmological argument demonstrates the needfor a God of pure actuality with no potentiality (pole) at all. Further, God cannot be sub-

ject to limitations, composition, or spatio-temporality, since He is unlimited in His being.Moreover, the theistic God cannot have poles or aspects, since He is absolutely simple (i.e.,uncomposed) and has no duality at all. As Pure Actuality, He is a simple and unlimited exis-tence as such, with no limited pole. A partly limited unlimited existence is a contradiction.

In addition, God cannot be subject to change, for anything that changes must becomposed of actuality and potentiality for change. Change is a passing from potentiality

to actuality, from what it can be to what it actually becomes. But since existence has nopotentiality, it follows that it cannot change. If something changes, it proves thereby thatit was not Pure Actuality but possessed some potentiality for the change it underwent. Apure and unlimited actuality cannot change.

Theism vs. Deism

Finally, the conclusion of the cosmological argument, at least the vertical form of it,cannot be a deistic God, for a deistic God is not the here-and-now Cause of the universe,as is the theistic God. Since the universe is dependent in its being, it needs somethingindependent on which to dependat all times. The universe never ceases to be dependentor contingent. Once contingent, always contingent; a contingent being cannot become aNecessary Being, for a Necessary Being cannot come to be or cease to be as a contingentbeing can. Hence, the God of theism is different from the deistic conception of God. Thisis to say nothing of the fact that the God of theism can and does perform miracles, and theGod of deism does not.24

24 See chapter 3.


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GOD: THE METAPHYSICAL PRECONDITION 33Further, deism denies that miracles can or do occur. But a God who has created the

universe from nothing has already performed the greatest miracle. Hence, such a God can-not be the God of deism.

cOncLUSIOnThe God of theism can be established by sound reasoning. Further, He is distinct from

all other views of God, since there can only be one indivisible, infinite, necessary, absolutelyperfect Uncaused Cause of everything else that exists. And since metaphysical theism is aprecondition of evangelical theology, the viability of this precondition of evangelicalism iswell supported by numerous lines of evidence.

Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology

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