expecting no nonsense,allowing none. And Marineleaders had never lost sight oftheir primary—their only—mission, which was to fight.The Marine Corps was notmade pleasant for men whoserved in it. It remained thesame hard, brutal way of lifeit had always been.

In 1950 . . . these menwalked with a certain confi-dence and swagger. Theywere only young men likethose about them in Korea,hut they were conscious of a

almost feel—fear. The people werescared to death. The NorthKoreans were very close."

On the other hand, there stoodthe solid, poised brigade which,with its aviation components,totaled 6,534 men. The three riflebattalions each had only two riflecompanies, but, taken from theskeleton 1st Marine Division atCamp Pendleton, was a widerange of auxiliary units: a companyeach from the division's Signal,Motor Transport, Medical, ShoreParty, Engineer, Ordnance, andTank Battalions; detachments fromthe Service Battalion, CombatService Group, Reconnaissance,and Military Police Companies; the1st Amphibian Tractor Company;and Amphibian Truck Platoon. The1st Battalion, 11th Marines, withthree firing batteries, was alsoattached to provide the vitalartillery support.

These units were permeatedwith an esprit de corps that wasunique to the Marines. Author T. R.Fehrenhach had this analysis in his

book, This Kind of War:

In 1950 a Marine Corpsofficer was still an officer, anda sergeant behaved the waygood sergeants had behavedsince the time of Caesar,

standard to live up to,because they had had goodtraining, and it had beenimpressed upon them thatthey were United StatesMarines.

Those young men of 1950undoubtedly did not know thattheir predecessors had been toKorea before—four times, in fact.There had been a brief skirmish in1871 (where the Marines werefired upon by a cannon dated1313!). Subsequent landings took

Dep2rtment of Defense Photo (USMC) A1229

Life on board ship was busy as the Ma rines prepared jhr battle. Here three of themare test-firing their Browning Automatic Rfles.

Other Marines, in this case members of Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,huddled intently over instructions in the use of their light machine guns.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1291

9

A color guard from the South Korean Army, carlying thecolors of the United States, the United

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1257

Korea, joins with a Korean band to greet 1st Provisional

place in 1888 and 1894, and in1905 Marines served as theLegation Guard in Seoul—littledreaming of the ordeal their suc-cessors there would undergo 45years later.

Two things that were prominent-ly visible on the pier were the 3.5-inch rocket launchers ("bazookas")and the M-26 Pershing tanks whichequipped the Marines—newweapons that the battered Armydivisions lacked.

Invisible, but fundamental to theaction that lay ahead, were thequalities that had been ingrainedinto the Marines themselves. JosephC. Goulden in Korea: The UntoldStory of the War described the menthis way: "They had been in com-bat training in the United States;they arrived in cohesive units in

which officers and men had servedtogether for months . . . . Theyinsisted on controlling their ownair support in coordinated actionsbased upon years of experience."Another writer, Clay Blair, in TheForgotten War, pointed out that"the ranks were filled with physi-cally tough young men who hadjoined the corps to fight, not tosightsee. The Marines had superiorfirepower in squads, platoons, andcompanies."

However, amongst all the unitsin the Pusan Perimeter there wasone point of similarity. Except forsenior generals, no one—soldier orMarine—had more than a vagueidea of how or why they came tobe there in a life-or-death situationin a country of which they hadnever heard five weeks before.

10

High-Level Decisions

The actual events that had ledup to the brigade being poised onthat dock were a tangled skein ofhigh-level meetings, flurries oforders, and long-distance airplanetrips that spanned half the globefrom New York to Washington,D.C., to California, to Honolulu,and to Tokyo.

It all began when alarm bellswent off in the pre-dawn of 25June 1950 at the United Nations inNew York and the U.S. StateDepartment in Washington. Therehad been a violent, surprise attackacross the 38th Parallel, an inva-sion of South Korea by some90,000 well-trained, heavily armedsoldiers of the North KoreanPeoples Army (NKPA). As the star-

Nations, and South Brigade Marines on the dock at Pusan.

Brigadier General Edward A. Craig

Edward raig was born on 22 No ember 1 96 in DanblllY.onnecticut, and attended 't. Johns Military cademy in isconsin.fter being cOlTImi ioned in the larin C rp in August 19] , he

served in a wide range of po t : in '\ ashington as aide [0 lajor G neralommandant John A. Lejeune in 1926. and in IIaiti, the Domini an

Republi ,China, icaragua, and the Philippines ombined ~ ith tours onboard the aircraft carrier "York/owl7 and L'. En/elpri 'e.

By May of 1942 he had b n promoted to colonel. and thi brought himommand of the 9th [arine:. He led his regiment in combat onuadalcanal in July 19'-f3, then that ovember on B ugainville ~ here he

was awarded the Bronze tar. In December 191 ,h wa, given a tempo­rary pr motion to brigadier general. In July-Augu, t 19,*4 hi' regiment ledthe attack on Guam. Craig' valiam condu t ther brought him a 'avy

ro ·s.Mo ing to a staff a'signm nt he ser ed a' op ration officer

Amphibiou' Corps, in the assault on lwo Jima in February 1945. Legionof M rit wa' pre 'ented to him for that ervic .

Duty as a sistant division commander, 1 't Marine Divi'i n, in China in1947, came with his promotion to permanent brigadi r g neral. raig thenas 'um d command f th 1 t Provisional Marine Brigade in Jun > of thatyear. Thi brought him back to Guam, aim st thr e y £Irs after he had par­ti 'ipaLed in its re apture.

In 19 9, he was tran, ferr d to Camp Pendlet n a a i, tant divisionommander, 1st larine Divi'ion, ery oon thereaft r came the attack onouth Korea, which led t hi designation, for a 'econd time, as

rnmanding General. 1st Pro isional larine Brigade. Thi time, howev­er, it moved qui kly to combat. When the brigade, after it' victories in thePusan P rimeter, was deacti ated in eptember 19~0, its troops \\'eremerged into a reformed 1 t Marine Division. raig r verted to his formerI ill l a a"i 'tant di i inc mmander. For hi noteworthy performance ofduty during 19')0 peration in Kor a, he received an Air Medal with goldstar, a 'ilver tar, and a Di:tingui hed ervice Medal.

JanualY 1951 brought his promotion to Iieut nant gen ral, and a fewmonth' later, in .Tun , he r tir d with 33 years of di tinguished ervice. liedied in December 1994,

11

tling news continued to pour in, itquickly became apparent that thehalf-trained, lightly armed Republicof Korea (ROK) troops defendingSouth Korea were being smashedand overnm.

At an emergency meeting of theU.N. Security Council that sameafternoon, followed by anothertwo days later (27 June), there wasa decision to call for armed forceto repel the invaders. That was allthat was needed for GeneralClifton B. Cates, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps, to seize the ini­tiative. The next day, 28 June, hearranged a meeting with AdmiralForrest P. Sherman, Chief of NavalOperations, and Francis P.Matthews, Secretary of the Navy,and he recommended that theFleet Marine Force (FMF) "beemployed." Their reaction wasnoncommittal, since U.S. groundforces were not yet involved inSouth Korea. Cates, however, hadlearned over a long career a fewthings about combat-whether itwas called by a euphemism suchas "police action," as in this case,or was realistically a "war," in sev­eral of which he had distinguishedhimself. Acting upon instinct,when he returned from the indeci­sive meeting, he sent a warningorder to the 1st Marine Division atCamp Pendleton, California, to getready to go to war. (Due to peace­time cuts, the strength of the entireMarine Corps at that time was only74,279, with 11,853 in the divisionand its accompanying aircraftwing. Thus, in reality, the "divi­sion" was little more than a rein­forced regimental combat team infighting strength, and the "wing"little more than a Marine air group.

Cates' gut reaction was con­firmed the following day, on 29June, when President Harry S.Truman authorized General of theArmy Douglas MacArthur, Com­mander in Chief, Far East, in

Tokyo, to use the U.S. naval,ground, and air units he had avail-able to support the desperateRepublic of Korea forces.

Now there ensued examples ofthe arcane complexities of high-level decision-making at a time ofgreat stress. At Gates' urging,Admiral Sherman asked AdmiralArthur W. Radford, Commander inChief, Pacific Fleet, how long it

would take to ship out a Marineregimental combat team (RCT).Radford replied on 2 July: "load insix days, sail in ten." Then, in atime-honored communicationsprocedure for top-ranking officers,Sherman sent a private message forthe eyes of MacArthur via his navalcommander in the Far East, ViceAdmiral C. Turner Joy, asking if thegeneral would like a Marine RCT.Swamped with bad news fromSouth Korea, MacArthur acceptedimmediately with "unusual enthu-siasm."

Accordingly, he fired off toSherman in Washington, D.C., thatsame day (2 July) an urgent radiorequest for a Marine RCT and asupporting Marine aircraft group(MAG).

A Brigade is Born

Sherman took the request to ameeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) for their decision. Althoughthe Commandant of the MarineCorps was not, at that time, amember of the JCS, Cates felt that,since the decision directly affected"his Marines," he should beinvolved in it. Showing up uninvit-ed at the meeting, he was allowedto join it in view of the disastrousnews from the Korean front.

The JCS voted to commit theMarine RCT and MAG, and withTruman's concurrence, gaveMacArthur the good news on 3July. (Gates later asked Shermanhow it had all come about, and the

Engine:Dimensions:

Weight:Maximum Speed:

Radius of Action:

Crew: 5

Armament:

M-26 Pershing Medium Tank and ItsNorth Korean Counterpart

The M-26 Pershing, shown above, was the backbone of Marine armorduring the first half of the Korean War. The 1st Tank Battalion, FleetMarine Force, at Camp Pendleton, replaced its M-4A3 Sherman

tanks with Pershings during the summer of 1950, shortly after the invasionof South Korea.

Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, sailed for Korea with the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade after having been able to test drive and fire only two of itsnew tanks. While enroute, 14 tanks were damaged when the cargo holdof a ship flooded. Landing at Pusan in August 1950, the tank crews had abrief familiarization period before going into action. In concert with theclose-air support of Corsairs, 75mm recoilless rifles, and 3.5-inch rocketlaunchers, the tanks gave the brigade a level of firepower that proved veryeffective against the North Korean enemy.

Technical DataFord V-8 gasoline, liquid-cooled, 500HPLength: 20 feet 8 inchesWidth: 11 feet 4 inchesHeight: 9 feet 1 inches46 tonsOn roads: 30mphCross country: 18mphOn roads: 92 milesCross country: 62 miles

One 90mm M3 gunTwo .30-caliber machine gunsM1919A4 (bow & coaxial)One .50-caliber M2 machine gun on turret

T-34 North Korean Medium TankAfter great success early in the war and acquiring a fearsome reputa-

tion, the T-34, not shown, met its nemesis in the Marines' anti-tankweapons. Supplied from Russian stocks, it weighed 32,000 kilograms andcarried a crew of five men. A V-12 diesel engine gave it an off-road speedof 30 kilometers per hour. Armament was an 85mm gun, supplemented bytwo 7.62mm machine guns.

12

The 3.5-Inch Rocket Launcher

The 3.5-inch rocket launcher (also kno",n a.'> the ", uper Bazooka")offered the infantryman a portahie 1'0 ket weapon, designed tieu. ed as an anti-tank defen 'e. Introduced in early 19'50, the 3.5-inch

launcher gave the larine Corps the means to pierce any arm red vehiclefrom a greater di tance th3n previous launchers, and with impr ved accu­racy.

The M20 3.5-inch launcher 3ppeared aft r i~ prede e '501', the 2.36-inchlauncher developed in \l orld '\ ar U), proved ineffective against theRussian tanks in Korea. The M20 \ as a t\Vo-piece. smooth-bore we3ponformed by connecting the front and rear barrels tog ther. Weighing only12 pounds \yith an assembled length of 60 inche , the 3.5-inch launcherwas easily tran ponabl and could be fired from a standing, ,itting, I'

prone position. The M20 I' cket had a "shaped harge" that c ncentratedthe force of the pia ion on a velY mall area, thu.'> allowing the proj 'c­tile to pen trate armor plate as thick a.'> 11 inch . In addition to thew 3pon' deadly force, a unique gunsight that allowed for various rangesand speeds provided the 3.5 an accuracy up to 900 yards.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo

General Clifton B. Cates

These men were shippedfrom the posts and stations byair, most of them arriving withjust a handbag. Their seabagswere to be forwarded at alater date. They didn't havedog tags and had no healthrecords to tell us how manyshots they needed. Theirclothing generally consistedof khaki only, although a fewhad greens.

They had no weapons andtheir 782 equipment wasincomplete. We had a prob­lem of trying to organizethese men into a platoon andgetting them all squared awaybefore our departure date.

night by bus and plane and train, aflood of men from 105 posts andstations.

Captain "Ike" Fenton long re­membered the ensuing problems:

Other officers recalled oddaspects of those hectic days: noone got any sleep; some men weredetailed to help in the filming of

The initial building blocks werethere, the 5th Marines at CampPendleton and MAG-33 at thenearby EI Toro Marine Air Station.The critical manpower problemwas to flesh out these units fromtheir peacetime reductions so thatthey could fight with maximumeffectiveness. By telegraph andtelephone orders went out to regu­lar Marines all over the country:"get to Pendleton NOW!" And sothey came pouring in day and

admiral replied in a baseballmetaphor: "From Cates toSherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, toJCS!")

Now Cates (and the MarineCorps) had to deliver. On 7 July hehad the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade activated, but then a mon­umental effort, carried out at afrantic pace, was needed to assem­ble the essential manpower, equip­ment, and weapons-and to do allthat in one week flat!

13

Hollywood's "Halls of Monte­zuma"; other men were detailed tofight fires in the Santa MargaritaMountains. The supply crisis wasovercome by a precipitous changefrom an attitude of "countingshoelaces" to "take whatever youneed." Acquisition of the new 3.5­inch rocket launcher was madepossible by shipments from allover the country. There was aninflux of senior staff noncommis­sioned officers, some of whomwere physically unfit, and this ledto some sergeants major beingassigned to ride shotgun on ambu­lance jeeps. A number of WorldWar II officers with no infantryexperience also arrived.

The 5th Marines was beefed upby an emergency authorization toadd a third platoon to each of thetwo rifle companies, but it provedimpossible to get a third rifle COm­pany for each of the three battal­ions. This was a serious sholtage.It meant that the battalions wouldhave to go into battle without acompany they could use formaneuver or have in reserve. Andthat would cause extra casualtiesin the weeks ahead. There were,however, two compensating fac­tors for the shortages. First, theregiment was a well-trained, cohe­sive unit. Murray put it this way:"We had been extremely lucky, inthe previous year we had virtuallyno turnover . . . so that we had aregiment which, for all intents andpurposes, had been together for afull year, training."

Second, 90 percent of thebrigade's officers had seen combatbefore On the bloody beaches andin the jungles of the Pacific. Thiswas also the case for two-thirds ofthe staff noncommissioned offi­cers. Here was a group of leaderswell prepared for the rigors ofcombat.

With the addition of supportingunits hastily assembled, a rein-

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray

Born 30 January 1913 in Lo.' Ang les, alifornia, lurray gre'\\' up toanend Texas &M ollege. hile there he wa em lied in theResene Officer Training Course. Graduating in 193- with a bache­

lor of arb degre , he did a 'hort tint in the Tcxa ,'arional uard andthen \"as commissioned in the .\larin orps on IJuly. After Basi ,choo!.he was ordered to duty in hina, 193 -1910. radical change I' ,;ceneryled to an as.ignment a a aptain \vith the 1st Provisional ,\larine Brigade

in Iceland, 1911-1912.100'ing over.eas in O\'ember 1912 with the 2d Division, he \\':.1

awarded the 'ilv'r . tar in January 1913 for hi. service as ommandingffic r, 2d Battalion, 6th larines, on Guadal anal. ow a Ii utenant

c I n I, h took his battalion on to Tarawa in 'O\'cmber 1913, where herec iv d a second, ilvcr :tar. This '\\'as followed b exploits on ~aipan thatbr ught him a avy ross and a Purple lleart inJune 19'1'1.

The years after World War II 'aw MUITay in a variety of peacetimelarine orp' duties, leading 10 his taking over in July 1950 asonunanding ffic r, 5th Marine' (a billel normally reserved for a full

clone! l. hen his regiment became the core of the 1st ProvisiomlMarine Brigade in Korea. and then wa' a key unit in th<: 1nchon- oul bat­tle , he again distinguished him elf in combat and wa. award·d his third:i1ver, tar, a fOUI1h one from the rmy, and a Legi n of Merit with ombar..y" in ugu')t and S ptember 19:;0,

Further combat at the 'akrong River, In hon, ·cou!. and the hosinResen'oir brought a cond a\)' ros and an rmy Distinguished,ervice Cross.

In January 1951. after nearly ight years as a lieutenant olonel, he \Vaspromoted to full colonel. and then, after a sequence of duties in'\ a hington. Quantico, and amp Pendleton. LO the rank of brigadier gen­eral in June 1959. Thi. led to his as. ignment a~ sistant Division

ommander, 3d 1arine Division, on Okinawa, Promoted to major gener­al in February 1963, he sa\"\- duty as D 'puLy ommander. III 1arineAmphibiOUS oree, in ietnam in tober 19

After 33 years of highly decorated active duty, Iurray retired in ugu:t

1968 as a major g neral.

14

forced RCT came into being. Sucha unit normally would be com-manded by a full colonel, but thiscase was different. As then-Lieutenant Colonel Murray laterrecalled:

I was sure that a colonelwould he brought in. It was-n't until sometime later whenI was talking to [Major]General [Graves B.] Erskine[commanding the 1st MarineDivision] . . . and he told methat when this broke, GeneralCates told him, "I'll get you acolonel as soon as I can to getout and take the regiment,"and General Erskine said hetold General Cates, "Don'tneed one. I've got somebodywho can take the regiment."

Along with the manpower prob-lem came materiel problems. Thepeacetime economies forced on allthe military Services by politicaldecisions in Washington had hithard the resources of equipment,

supplies, and weapons. TheMarine Corps, however, had an aceup its sleeve for just such a highpressure, short-deadline situationas this.

Tucked away in the Californiadesert was the huge Marine SupplyDepot at Barstow. It had beenfilled five years earlier by followinga prudent, far-seeing policy thatcountless past emergencies hadtaught the Marine Corps: "Whenyou get a chance to stock up, do it,because you'll never know whenyou'll really need it!"

Thus, at the end of World War II,Marine salvage teams had lookedaround the Pacific islands for aban-doned equipment. Then theybrought it back to Barstow, re-painted it "Marine green," stenciled"USMC" on it, and "rnothballed" itfor future use. From this treasuretrove came the old jeeps, the oldtrucks, and the old amphibian trac-tors that would he so vital to thebrigade's operations. Brand new,however, were the M-26 tanks withtheir 90mm guns. The Marines in

the 1st Tank Battalion had trainedin a different, older tank with dif-ferent armament, and their race toswitch over, train, and prepare forembarkation was typical of thepressure to which all hands weresubjected. (Each tanker got to fireexactly two rounds before depar-ture.)

It was the same frantic scene atEl Toro as MAG-33 struggled to getits aviators and planes up to com-bat readiness. As with the groundtroops, the organizational unitswere mere peacetime skeletons.Thus the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing(1st MAW) was a wing in nameonly, and had to be stripped barejust to give MAG-33 what it need-ed.

Adding a wholly new resourcewere "the first helicopter pilots ofthe United States Armed Forces tobe formed into a unit for overseascombat service." They came fromQuantico, Virginia, where, since1947, the Marine Corps had pio-neered helicopter combat tech-niques. On their arrival, there werejust 48 hours to join up the fourHO3S-1 helicopters with the fourusable OY-2 observation planes,and have Marine ObservationSquadron 6 (VMO-6) ready to shipout.

15

Somehow, it was done underthe unbelievable pressure of time,and the brigade air-ground teamwas ready to sail on schedule.There was one final vignette thatexemplified the morale of the men.A reporter-photographer, DavidDouglas Duncan, in his book, Thisis War!, described a scene whereGeneral Craig had spoken to amass meeting of his men justbefore they went on board ship.When they heard they were head-ed for Korea and Craig referred tothe traditional Marine role, "themen were dead-panned . .

expressionless." But Duncan con-tinued:

V(/hen a brigade goes to wai' it needs a lot of supplies and equipment. HereMarines labor on the dock at San Diego to load up the ships that will take themto war.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1063

Then Craig, with hisBrigade Surgeon standing athis side, told his men that aslong as there were anyMarines alive in Korea whocould still fire a rifle, or toss agrenade, no other Marineswould be left behind uponthe battlefield, either wound-ed or dead. Over four thou-sand men shouted in unisonas his Leathernecks gleefullyslugged each other in the ribs,grinned happily and wantedto know when the hell theywere going aboard ship.

On 14 July the ships left SanDiego, taking Marines to combatonce more.

Preparing the Way

With the troops enroute at sea,General Craig and BrigadierGeneral Thomas J. Cushman hadboarded an airplane and flown toHawaii. There they met withLieutenant General Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific(FMFPac). Craig underscored thepainful shortage of rifle companies;the missing 105mm howitzers in hisartillery, the 1st Battalion, 11thMarines; and his lack of motortransport.

Flying on to Tokyo on 19 July,the two Marine generals wentquickly to meet General Mac-Arthur. Craig made his feelings veryclear:

While talking to GeneralMacArthur, I informed himthat we were on a peace-strength basis, that we werean air-ground team and hadtrained as such at Pendletonand would be very effective ifleft intact. However, I told himthat if they took our air forceaway from us, our fighting

potential would be cut about99 percent as far as I was con-cerned.

MacArthur went on to assureCraig that the Marines could retaintheir planes, and he so informedLieutenant General George E.

Stratemeyer, commander of the U.S.Far East Air Forces. This was a greatrelief to Craig, who later stated that"Stratemeyer was very anxious to

16

get Marine air under his commandas soon as they arrived in that area."

The discussion continued on aharmonious note, with MacArthursaying, "I'm veiy glad to have youhere with the 1st Brigade." Whenhe learned of Craig's manpowershortages, he directed that a dis-patch go to the JCS requesting fullwar strength for the brigade.(During this time, messages contin-ued to fly back and forth regarding

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1185

The men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade have landed in Pusan, Korea, and are marched off to combat.

the mobilization of the full 1stMarine Division for a future cam-paign that MacArthur was alreadyplanning. This led to the call-up ofMarine Reserves on 19 July.)

The meeting ended with a direc-tive from MacArthur to set up bil-lets for the brigade in Japan. It wasnot to be. The situation in Koreahad degenerated to a near-col-lapse. U.S. Army troops had beenrushed from comfortable occupa-tion duty in Japan to bolster thereeling ROK divisions. Things hadgone badly—very badly. The offi-cial Army history recounts a con-tinuous series of problems: tanksambushed, sentries asleep, soldierskilled while riding in trucks insteadof marching, repeated retreats,communication breakdowns, etc.The history characterizes the situa-tion at the time the Marine brigadearrived by stating: "Walker wasconcerned about the failure of histroops to carry out orders to main-tain contact with the enemy."Overall, it summarized the crisis instark language: "Never afterwardswere conditions as critical .

Never again did the North Koreanscome as close to victory."

Faced with this situation,Walker, as ground commander,had withdrawn all the troops into alast-stand enclave called the PusanPerimeter.

This was a 60-by-90-mile rectan-gle with the Sea of Japan on theeast, the Korean Strait on thesouth, the Naktong River on thewest, and a line of mountains onthe north. It did have one advan-tage crucial to Walker. This was hisability, in this constricted area, touse his interior lines of movementto set up a final defensive perime-ter with the capacity to rush emer-gency reinforcements to quell anyserious enemy threat where abreakthrough seemed imminent.

With the whole beachhead onthe Korean Peninsula now in suchperil, Craig received new, urgentorders on 25 July: the brigadewould go straight to Korea to serveas Walker's "fire brigade" wheremost needed. The next day Craigwas in Taegu, Walker's headquar-ters in South Korea. He used his

17

stay there to absorb all possibleinformation on the fluid situationon the front lines—including acareful aerial survey he made ofsites where his brigade might bethrown into action.

On 30 July, Craig headed forPusan, set up a temporary com-mand post, and wrote out a pre-liminary operations order for thebrigade as the NKPA tide rolledover Chinju and headed for nearbyMasan. Arrangements were madewith MAG-33 in Japan to be readyfor action the moment the brigadearrived on board its transports.

The next day, still without adecision by Walker on the deploy-ment of the brigade, Craig sensedthe threat to Masan, looming sucha short distance from Pusan, as aprobable priority. Accordingly, hedecided to supplement his previ-OUS aerial view with a groundreconnaissance by jeep. Then hewaited tensely for his brigade toarrive.

It came 2 August; it moved out 3August. One historian, DonaldKnox, crystallized that moment in

out to meet head-on the mosturgent enemy threat. It went with aringing message from Gates: "Theproud battle streamers of ourGorps go with you in combat. Thepride and honor of many genera-tions of Marines is entrusted to youtoday. You are the old breed. Withyou moves the heart and the souland the spirit of all whoever borethe title United States Marine.Good luck and Godspeed."

Part of the men (1st Battalion)went by truck to the staging areaof Ghangwon. Since the Marineshad been forced by a shortage ofshipping to leave their heavyequipment back in the UnitedStates, the transportation was madepossible by borrowing two Armytruck companies, with an addition-al bonus in the form of a loan ofcommunication jeeps and recon-naissance company jeeps with .50-caliber machine guns. Going bytrain were the precious tanks andsome of the men. Duncan, thereporter, described what thosekind of trips were like:

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-416920

The F4U Corsairs of VFM-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513, with a helicopter Qf The first stage of movingVMO-6, jam-pack the deck of the USS Badoeng Strait enroute to Pusan. up to the front was no prob-

his book, The Korean War: Loading up the old Korean railroad cars, the men have their packs full, andcarry entrenching tools, as they head for their changwon staging area.

The fluid situation the National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A1181

brigade would encounter inthe Pusan Perimeter woulddemand the very elements theMarines had in abundance—courage, initiative, élan .

morale in the rifle companieswas extremely high. In spiteof what they'd heard, theMarines knew the NorthKoreans could be beaten. TheMarine Gorps was sending toKorea the best it had.

The Fire Brigade Goes to War:

Crisis Number One

It was an early start; at 0600 on3 August the "fire brigade" moved

18

Brigadier General Thomas]. eu hman

Bom on 27 June 1895 in aint Loui , Cushman graduated from thel'niversity of Washington in ' attle and suo, equently enlisted in the'larin Corps in July 191. onunis ion d in 'tober 1918, he

r civ d hi naval aviat r wings the following year. Duty in Guam,i aragua, and Haiti followed the di erse larine aviation patlern of the

1920..ext, in June 1933, came a tour in the Bur au F eronautics of the

avy Department. and th n, hroadening his inter ervi experience, heattended the Army ir orps Tactical chool in 1935. ith the commitmentof Nlarin aviation in World War IJ, u, hman \vas appointed hier of taFf,Marine ir Taft 'J ings, Pacifi. ith a temporary rank of brigadier generalin January J9<tQ, he \>\'as next a' 'igned a, Air Defense ommander,~Iarianas bland, . For the rvic's he was a\yarded a Br nze. tar and theL gion of Merit with Combat" ."

'h n his rank wa made permanent in 19'! ,h became ommandingGen ral, ircraft, Fleer Marine Force, Pacific rhe following ear. \1(/ith theoutbreak of the Korean 'J ar, he \vas a sign d as s. istam ing

ommand r, 1st Marine AircraFt Wing, in June 1950. 'J ith the Forward ech­elon f th wing, he proVided th air support For the Marine Brigade whenit went to Korea. In 1951 h took command of the wing. llis leadershiprher hrought him hb second L gion of Merit and a Di tinguished ServiceMedal.

lIi, final billet \ as Deputy omrnander, Fleet larine Force, Pacific, asa major general in 1953, and, after promotion to Ii utenant general in 1954.h retired. lIe died in July 1972.

19

lem, but it was slow. Thetroop trains were sturdy,wooden-bodied old coaches,leftovers from the days whenthe Japanese had run thecountry. . . . The Marinesinside showed almost nointerest in the slowly passingscenery. They ate theirrations, oiled their weapons,slept in the vestibulesbetween the cars with theirrifles held close. They wereprofessional men riding towork.

The planes of MAG-33 had abusy time that same day of 3August. Under the command ofGeneral Cushman were the fightersquadrons VMF-323 ("DeathRattlers") under Major Arnold A.Lund and VMF-214 ("BlackSheep") commanded by LieutenantColonel Walter E. Lischeid. Theywere eqUipped with 60 of the gull­winged Corsair F4Us. One of theirpartners was Marine Night FighterSquadron 513 (VMF[N]-513)("Flying Nightmares") under MajorJoseph H. Reinburg. This was asquadron specially trained fornight fighting with its F4U-5NCorsairs and new twin-engine F7FTigercats. The other partner wasVMO-6, commanded by MajorVincent J. Gottschalk, with its fourusable OY-2 light observationplanes and, for the first time in realcombat for any U.S. Service, fourSikorsky H03S-1 helicopters.

When the ground elements ofthe brigade were unloading inPusan, MAG-33 had been in Kobe,Japan. From there, VMF-323 hadgone on board the Badoeng Strait,while VMF-214 was based on theSicily (CVE-lI8). VMF(N)-513 wasbased at Hawke Airfield onKyushu Island. Marine Tactical AirControl Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)traveled by ship to Pusan. VMo-6amazed the Japanese citizens

when it simply took off in its lightobservation planes and helicoptersfrom the streets of Kobe. Four ofits helicopters and four of its OYplanes made the short hop toPusan on 2 August, so they werethere, ready to go with the brigade,even though they had not beenvisible in that memorable scene onthe waterfront.

VMF-214 launched an eight-plane flight from the Sicily on 3August and pummeled Chinju withincendiary bombs, rockets, andstrafing, a small preview of whatthe Marines had in store for theNKPA 6th Division. This attacktook place less than a month afterthe receipt of official orders send-ing the planes to the Far East. (Aneven earlier mission—the first forMarine planes—had been on 4 Julywhen two F4U Corsair photo-graphic planes from MAG-12 onthe carrier Valley Forge (CV-45)had joined in a Navy air strikeagainst the North Korean capital ofPyongyang.)

On a succession of those earlyAugust days, all three of theMarine fighter squadrons kept up asteady pattern of bombing, straf-ing, and rocketing attacks on NKPAtargets. On 5 August, for instance,Major Kenneth L. Reusser led afour-plane division of Corsairs toInchon, the port of the SouthKorean capital of Seoul. There hewas responsible for the discoveryand the destruction of an enemytank assembly plant, an oil refin-ery, and an oil tanker ship. Thetwo Corsairs which Reusser flewon two successive strikes duringhis attacks of that day were severe-ly damaged by enemy fire. He wasawarded a gold star in lieu of asecond Navy Cross for his heroismon this mission.

VMO-6 was also busy. Thesquadron had moved west fromPusan to Chinhae, a base close tothe threatened city of Masan and

Vought F4U-4B Corsair

The familiar Vought F4U Corsair emerged Out of World War II syn-onymous with American victory in the Pacific and became the air-craft most closely associated with Marine Corps aviation. The

Corsair was a versatile, tough, and heavy fighter-bomber and night-fight-er, and was easily recognized by its distinctive inverted gull wings. At theconclusion of the war, Vought's concentration was in the limited procluc-tion of the F4U-4 models, producing 2,356 up to 1947.

The 4B model was equipped with a 2,100 horsepower engine of thePratt and Whitney R-2800-18W type. The aircraft had a top speed of almost450 mph, a climb rate of 3,870 feet per minute, and a range of more than1,000 miles. Operational altitudes could be reached as high as 41,500 feet.Standard armament for the 4B were the awesome six .50-caliber machineguns, and a payload capability of eight 5-inch rockets and up to 4,000pounds of ordnance.

When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade made its entry into the KoreanWar, supporting the Marines on the ground were both Navy squadronsand, in particular, the Marine units from the carriers Badoeng Strait andSicily,VMF-214, better known as the Black Sheep Squadron, andl VMF-323,the Death Rattlers Squadron.

Starting on 7 August 1950, VMF-214 and -323, both of which had effec-tively absorbed the lessons of close air support during WWII, provided thebrigade support by having four to 10 Corsairs continuously overhead.Flying a total of 6,575 combat support missions, the favorite ordnance car-ried for close air support missions was napalm, deadly jellied gasoline thatwas most effective against NKPA armor. The Corsairs usually carried two150-gallon napalm bombs that weighed approximately 1,400 poundsapiece.

During the month of August, the close air support missions fromBadoeng Strait and Sicily gave everyone a lasting impression. Observingfrom the ground, said an Army soldier of the Marine aviators: 'The effec-tiveness of Marine close air support astonished Army troops fightingalongside the Leathernecks." On 18 August, several hundred NKPA fellunder the Death Rattler's Corsairs' merciless air assault that pounded theirretreat across the Naktong River.

20

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-Al 30913

The eyes of the brigade: the OY light observation plane was invaluable in the rugged terrain and endless hills.

the brigade's forthcoming zone ofaction. This location had been aSouth Korean naval base andammunition depot, but it had a2,600-foot airstrip with two com-pleted hangars and quonset hutsfor housing. So VMO-6 set upquickly for business.

Craig took off early on 3 Augustin one of its helicopters and put ina remarkable day that demonstrat-ed the amazing versatility and use-fulness of the new aircraft. Hestopped to give instructions to thelead battalion on the march; hethen selected a site for his forwardcommand post (CP); and he thenflew to Masan to confer withWalker and Major General WilliamB. Kean, USA, commander of the25th Infantry Division, to whichthe brigade would be attached.Finally, on his return trip, Craiglanded three more times to meetwith his unit commanders.

Craig's own later evaluation ofthis mobility was very specific.After noting that fast travel by jeepwas often impossible due to traffic-clogged roads, considerable dis-tances to his objectives, and fre-quent tactical moves, he contrastedthese impediments with his obliga-

tions. These included conferenceswith Army generals, the need toreturn to his CP to issue orders,then to observe his Marines in thefield, as well as the requirementthat he reconnoiter the terrainbefore operations began. He thencommented: "My staff faced thesame problems. Time was alwayspressing. Fortunately, Marine heli-copters attached to VMO-6 werealways available for observation,communications, and control.These aircraft made my day!Without them I do not believe wewould have had the success wedid."

The squadron's OY-2 lightplanes were equally useful on thatday as they flew convoy for thebrigade and made reconnaissanceflights over the staging area, look-ing for any signs of enemy infiltra-tion. This proved so successful thatVMO-6 set up a regular procedureto have an OY over the brigadearea at all times during daylighthours. To provide this non-stopsupport, there were shifts with anew plane, new pilot, and newobserver coming in relays everytwo hours. Similarly, two heli-copters went every morning to the

21

brigade CP, to be relieved at noonby two others.

This new element of air mobili-ty proved to be a vital asset to theground troops. Craig pointed outthat "maps were poor, and no onein the brigade had personal knowl-edge of the terrain over which wewere to fight. Helicopters were alife saver in this connection, asthey provided the means for evencommanders of small units to getinto the air quickly from almostany point and identify roads, vil-lages and key points prior to mov-ing their troops." The helicopterssoon were employed for a widevariety of additional missions:evacuating the wounded; trans-porting supplies to inaccessible hillpeaks; scouting enemy locations;and rescuing downed fighterpilots.

Of course, the NKPA was quickto open fire whenever it spottedone of the helicopters on theground. Duncan, the reporter, wasagain on the spot for one typicalepisode. He was cutting across oneof the rice paddies to where an air-craft sat with rotor blades keptspinning for a fast take-off.General Craig emerged from that

helicopter, checking the disposi-tion of his troops. As the reporterlooked closely at him, a convictiongrew: "I knew that [he] could takeanything that Korea could handout."

Duncan's account continues:"Suddenly that old familiar bucket-swinging swoosh cut out all othersounds and two mortar bombsdropped into the riverbed. Greatgeysers of mud and gravel mixedwith red-hot fragments shot intothe sky. So did the helicopter.Before another bracket of bombscould fall the aircraft was halfwaydown the valley, General Craigwas in his jeep headed for his CPon the mountainside."

With the full brigade concentrat-ed at Changwon by the late after-noon of 3 August, Craig faced avery uncertain situation. Althoughhe had been ordered into a"bivouac" status as Eighth Army

reserve, he was wary, for hisChangwon location was very closeto a vital road junction atChindong-ni where heavy fightingwas taking place. With the perime-ter shrinking at an alarming rateand an NKPA envelopment fromthe west headed straight for Pusan,Craig decided:

We felt that going intobivouac would leave us wideopen for surprise. To ensureour security and be preparedfor any eventuality, I deployedthe brigade tactically.

Although a little trigger-happy, we were ready forcombat, even though situatedbehind the so-called front-lines. During the few days wewere at Changwon, we knewwe were observed by enemyobservation posts and patrolsoff on the flank. They did not

22

bother us. A major penetrationof the U.S. Army lines atChindong-ni could have beenfatal to us if we had beencaught in bivouac.

The general's reference to "a lit-tle trigger-happy" was an under-statement made some time later, forthe first night they were anythingbut professional. In pitch darkness,with thoughts of enemy infiltrationmaking some of the men tense,nervous firing broke out among theMarines.

Although there were varyingopinions of how widespread thefiring was, one private first classnamed Fred F. Davidson, laterrecalled:

I raised my carbine andsqueezed the trigger. Themuzzle flash blinded me. Forthe next few seconds I saw

Weapons

A Jfarille ill a riJle comjJClII)' bad Cl ll'ide cariel)' ojll'eapOIlS Ihal he could lise himself or Ihal ll'erecJl'ailable ill olher Illlils 10 sIIppor1 him. As always,

b/~" basic ll'eapoll /l'ClS his lijle.

. . Rifl . 0- alib r 1The .30-calib r 11 rin ,vas a gJS-Op rJted, clip-fed.

air-cooled, semi-automatic weapon. It \\'eighed 9.­pounds, had an average rate of aimed fire of 30 roundsper minute, a muzzle velocity of 2,6 -2 800 feet persecond, and a bullet clip capacity of eight rounds.Inherited from ~ arid ar n, the II provided, trong andaccurate fir power for the rineman.

U. . Carbine, .30- aliber, MlThe .30-caliher M I carbine was a ga-operated, mag­

azine-fed, air- ooled, semi-automati shoulder 'Neap n.The weight \ as only 5.75 pounc.b. Eight inches shorterthan the f] rille, it had a muzzle \' locity I' just 2,000feet per. econd, and a magazine -apacity of 1- rounds,This size and weight led to its i. suance to offi 'rs,although it la ked the hitting pO\\er of the 11,

Automatic Pi tol, .45- aliber 1911AlRegardless of whal \ as offi -ially prescribed, a num­

her of Marine. carried a ...J5-caliber automatic pistol inKorea. This was a time-honor'd \\eapon featured in thelore of the orps. Describ'd as a recoil-operated, maga­zine-fed, elf-loading hand weapon, the .'i5- -aliber\\'eighed 2."'6 pound - \\'hen fully loaded, was 8.59 inch-.' in length, and ha I a capacity of sev n r unc.b. The

muzzle velocity was 802 feet per second, while the max­imum ff ct..i\'(~ range for the troops using it \\'a only 25yards. [n close ombat, it often proved invaluahle.

To furnish a high volume of direct fire in support ofthe rille platoons, there wer' tim: types of automati\yeap ns.

Browning .30-CaJib r, M1919A4Th> .30-caliber "Browning" light machine gun was a

re ·oil-operated. belt-fed. air-cooled weapon. It weighed31 pounds, but with it. tripod mount that ro e to <19. 5pounds. While the .. yclical" rate of firc \\'as 400-550rounds per minute, the "u ahle" rate \"\'a. really 150round,; per minute. ~luzzle \elo ity varied b tween2,600 to 2, 00 feet per second, depending on the car­tridge us d.

Browning .30- alib r, 191 1The "Browning" ..30- aliber water- oled "hea\ ,"

machin gun was ext nsi ely used in the hattle for'eoul and in the tr nches at the end of the \var. It. effec­tiv rate of fire was 3";0- 150 round. p'r minute. '\' ith amuzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per minute, in dire t fire itsmaximum effective range was 3,000 ards. This dr ppedto 300 yards for indirect fir . Its length wa. 38.5 in hes."Ileavy" ~ as an accurJte term, since the gun alone

23

weighed II pounds, and its tripod added another 53pounds. Each ammunition belt onrained 2";0 rounds.

Browning Automatic-Rifl.30- alib r 1918A2

., a main';tay of the rifle squad. the "B-A-H" (a,; itwa,; always called) \\'a. an air-cooled. gas-op rated.magazine-~ d, shoulder weapon. \' eighing _0 pounds.it had a magazine capa -ity of 20 round.,. The man u,;ingit carried still more weight in Ih magazine pou hes onhis \) eb bell. Although maximum range could be 5 ')00ards, its effectiv range wa ' 500 yards. There were twoyclical rates of fire for the 13 [{-man to choos'; slO\\,

350, and nonml, 550.Two other specialized weapons W 're invaluable for

the larines during Pusan and the subsequent streetfighting in ,'eoul. gainst orth Korean tanks, strongp< in~ . and snipers in buildings, they \vere deadly.

3.5-Inch Rock t LauncherFamiliarly call the "bazooka," the r ket launcher

fired an R,5-pound rocket with a hoIlO\\'-shaped chargein it. h ad. It \\'eighed 15 pounds and \va usually lun­dl d by a t\\'o-man team.

75mm Recoille RifleThe 5mm recoilles, rifle fired c nvenrional ,;h lis in

a flat trajectory. \\. 'ighed 10"; pound, and required atrip d in use. Its effe tive range was 1.000 to 2,0 0yards.

MortarThe 60mm mortar was a smooth-bore, muzzle-load­

ing, high-angle-fire " eap n used by a rifle ompany.With it. bas plate and bipod support, it weighed .1­

p unc~. ormal rate of fire" as 18 rounds per minute,using either high explosive, white phosphorous, or illu­minating shells. These had ranges varying from 1,07"; to1,985 yards.

The Imm m rtar could fire a 6.8 pound high explo­sive shell up to 3,290 yards. Its weight, combining bar­rel, base plate, and tripod totaled 136 pound. EJe\ ationould be varied from 10 to "; degree .

The 1.2-inch mortar, Jffectionately referred to a th"four-deuce," fired a round with more explosive powerthan a 105nU11 ho\\'itzer. Equi\'alenr t lO~mm in cal­iber, it could fire a 25.5-p und shell up to I, 100 yarc.Ls.Total weight \"·a. 330 pounds.

10Smm Ho itzer 101 1a light, towed field artillery weapon. thi. was us 'd

in lirect support of infamry units. A b:.Illalion had threebaueries with ix howitzers each. Weighing .950pound., the cann n fired a 33-pound shell to a maxi­mum range of 11,000 meters. While usually 11100'ed hya truck. a heavy h Ii opter could also carry il. The 105needed nly three minutes to el11pla 'e and could sus­tain a rate of fire of three rounds per minute.

lights and stars. Andy shouted,"Hey, you almost hit me!" Oh,God, I didn't know I was aim-ing in that direction. It was sodark I couldn't see my frontsight. I said to myself, "Youbetter take it easy, ol' buddy,before you kill some Marine."Over to my rear someone elsepulled off a round. Next it wassomeone to my front.

Then the firing pinballedfrom place to place all overthe hill and back down towardthe railroad track Finally• . . all firing ceased . . . . Therest of the night I lay awake,scared, my finger on the trig-ger.

The brigade's stay at Changwonwas brief but useful. The rifle unitsgot a pithy lecture about fire disci-pline and conducted patrols to thehigh ground beside them—a fore-taste of the endless hill climbsahead. The tank and artillery unitshad a opportunity at last to dosome training in firing theirweapons, and the ReconnaissanceCompany started its probing oper-ations. Firm communications wereset up with the fighter squadronsafloat.

Craig made two trips to Masanfor planning meetings with Walkerand Kean, and late on 5 August thebrigade got the word to be pre-pared to move out by truck thenext day to Chindong-ni withaction to come immediately there-after. The town was eight milessouthwest of Masan on the road toChinju. It was the point now sub-ject to imminent NKPA attack.

Walker had assigned three unitsto this first offensive: the Marinebrigade, two regiments of the 25thInfantry Division, and the Army's5th RCT. They would be calledTask Force Kean.

For the brigade, the 3d Battal-ion, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Robert D. Taplett, wasdesignated to move first on 6August. Arriving at Chindong-ni,Taplett had to scout out the situa-tion, since his battalion was due tobe temporarily under the opera-tional control of an Army colonelcommanding the Army's 27th RCTthere. When he got to the Armyregimental command post (CP),the colonel was not there, and hisoperations officer did not knowwhere he could be found, and nei-ther could Taplett contact the com-manding officer of the battalion inChindong-ni. Its CP was there,right in the middle of the road, soTaplett quickly chose a very differ-ent location for his CP—on thereverse slope of a ridgeline.

As 7 August began, Task ForceKean was ready to jump off on thefirst real American offensive of theKorean War. Looking back on thisday, Craig later felt that the funda-mental requirement was for corn-

bat readiness. He had seen this ina brigade which was activated atCamp Pendleton on 7 July and wasin combat by 7 August—only onemonth later.

It was in truth a memorable datefor the brigade: exactly eight yearsearlier, to the day, Marines hadopened the first American groundoffensive of World War II atGuadalcanal. The plan now calledfor a three-pronged attack, withthe brigade on the left followingthe south (roundabout) fork of themain road, the 5th RCT movingstraight ahead on the road in thecenter (the direct line west toChinju), and a regiment of the 25thInfantry Division swinging aroundin an arc on the right to join upwith the 5th RCT halfway toChinju.

It looked good on paper, but theNKPA refused to cooperate. The6th Division fully expected to con-tinue its unbroken string of victo-

A Marine guides a work detail of South Korean carriers, bringing ammunitionand water to the front lines.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1303

24

ries. Its commander, under ordersto roll into Pusan forthwith, hadissued this stirring proclamation tohis men:

Comrades, the enemy isdemoralized. The task givento us is the liberation ofMasan and Chinju and theannihilation of the remnantsof the enemy. We haveaccelerated the liberation ofall Korea. However, the liber-ation of Chinju and Masanmeans the final battle to cutoff the windpipe of theenemy. Comrades, this glori-ous task has fallen to our divi-sion! Men of the 6th Division,let us annihilate the enemyand distinguish ourselves!

Thus, just as Task Force Keanlaunched its attack, so did the 6thDivision. The Army's 5th RCT ledoff on the 7th with its 1st Battalion.When it got to the road junctionwest of Chindong-ni, for someunknown reason it took the left(south) fork that was assigned tothe Marines instead of goingstraight ahead (west) on the roadthat led to Chinju. Advancing threemiles on the wrong road, it leftopen to enemy control Hill 342which overlooked and command-ed the main supply route that thetask force would need. Kean hadordered that this was to be held "atall costs."

A company of the 2d Battalion,5th RCT, had earlier been on thehill, hut it was now quickly sur-rounded and cut off. To help breakthe siege, a midnight order camefrom the 25th Division, via thecommanding officer of the Army's27th Infantry Regiment, to send aMarine platoon to help the belea-guered Army company on Hill 342.It would be the first infantry actionfor the brigade.

Badoeng Strait before a mission.

Second Lieutenant John J. H."Blackie" Cahill from Company Ggot the job that night of 6-7August. Reinforced with a machinegun squad and a radio operator, heset out for the CP of the Army's27th Infantry and then the CP ofthe 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. There hereceived the astonishing order thathis one platoon was to relieve theArmy's besieged company andhold the hill by itself. Moving outthrough the night of 6 August, theMarines suffered two woundedfrom fire that proved to be fromthe 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. Therefollowed the next morning (7August), the beginning of a hotday, an agonizing series of hillclimbs in untempered sun whichled to heat prostration and emptycanteens, and then enemy fire onthe platoon as it staggeredupwards to the hilltop, urged onby Cahill and his noncommis-sioned officers. Only 37 of theoriginal 52 men reached the top.Once there, Cahill used his radio tocall his own 3d Battalion for badlyneeded supporting artillery fireand air drops of water and ammu-nition.

When the severity of the prob-lems on Hill 342 became clearer,

25

Company D from LieutenantColonel Harold S. Roise's 2dBattalion was sent into action on 7August. As the NKPA continued toreinforce its troops, the rest of the2d Battalion became heavilyengaged nearby. In air temperatureof 112 degrees men continuallycollapsed from nausea and heatexhaustion. Water was scarce andthe slopes of the hill seemed to goon straight up forever. Finally, atthe end of the day (7 August),Company D had nearly reachedthe crest, but, exhausted, dug inwhere it was for the night.

Meanwhile, the Army companyand Cahill's platoon on the cresthad had a brutal day. Parched forwater and completely surroundedby enemy fire, they managed tohang on with reinforcements nownear at hand. And so the day forthe 2d Battalion ended in a stale-mate with the enemy on andaround Hill 342.

There were problems every-where else. The 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, under Lieutenant ColonelGeorge R. Newton, was backed upin Chindong-ni because the Armybattalion had taken the wrongroad. Taplett's 3d Battalion hadrelieved a battalion of the Army's

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A413601

The pin-point attacks of their Corsairs gave the Marines invaluable close air sup-port. Here the F4Us of VMF-323 are being loaded with rockets on board the USS

27th RCT the day before, but nowthe latter found itself attacked as ittried to move into reserve in therear. The 5th RCT was stalled.

The official Army history de-scribes this day of 7 August per-fectly when it refers to "a generalmelee" amid "confusion." Theproblems were compounded whenthe NKPA slipped around Chin-dong-ni and occupied a command-ing height, Hill 255, that dominatedthe task force's supply road toMasan in the rear.

Hearing of the stalled attack ofhis 5th RCT, Kean was exasperatedand took prompt action. He con-tacted Craig, who never forgot theday. His men were relieving theArmy's 27th RCT, with Chindong-nito be the jump-off point for theMarines' attack once the Army's 5thRCT had cleared the road intersec-tion just ahead. Craig remembered:"At Chindong-ni I found the most

confused situation that I've encoun-tered in the Marine Corps .

Finally, due to the inability of theArmy to clear the road junction andthe hold-up of our offensive,General Kean put all troops in thatarea under the Marine brigadecommander, and I was given thebrigade plus the [Army's] 24thRegiment and the 5th RCT."

This took place on 7 August, andnow Craig would have to sortthings out and get the task forcemoving forward, To do this, heacted in a typical way: he wentstraight to the front lines to observethe situation first-hand. This kind ofon-the-spot leadership immediatelystruck Second Lieutenant Patrick G.Sivert, an observer overhead in anOY. He was "amazed" on that veryfirst day at how close the brigadeCP was to the front lines. In con-trast, he noted that "with the otheroutfits in the surrounding area, it

was just the converse. Conse-quently, our communications, forthe most part, with the Marine unitson the ground were almost alwaysvery good, and with the other unitsalmost always very had."

When Craig went forward, hefound that the 5th RCT, underColonel Godwin L. Ordway, USA,was still held up, even though"enemy resistance was light." It wasclear to Craig that, to break thedeadlock, he would need to launcha series of aggressive attacks by allhis ground units, with heavyartillery and air support.

Thus, early the next morning, 8August, Company D pushed to thecrest of Hill 342. Cahill and the bat-tered survivors greeted them withenormous relief. It remained, how-ever, a touch-and-go situation.Enemy fire was sweeping the encir-cled position, Marine officers weregoing down, and NKPA riflemen

'first taste of the enemy," whom they found to be "spirited,tenacious, and well trained."

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A12036

Exhausted due to the strenuous climb and scorching heat,Marines establish a hasty perimeter on a hillcrest west ofChindong-ni. Chingdong-ni would be where they got their

26

were slowly and steadily wormingtheir way up the approaches. Aprivate in Company D, DouglasKoch, felt the pressure: "I felt pret-ty bad. This was a very hectic time.There'd been a lot of climbing, wewere under fire . . . . Someonehollered that the lieutenant wasdead . . . . Firing was hot andheavy. Guys fell around me." Itgrew worse. NKPA soldiers cameright up to the Marine lines. Thefirefight continued to grow inintensity. When word was shoutedthat there was a new commandingofficer, First Lieutenant Robert T.Hanifin, Jr., it was soon followedby the depressing news that hehad collapsed in the heat. Thispassed command of the companyto a veteran gunnery sergeant.Koch knew that there was onlyone thing for him and the sur-rounded men to do: hang on.

One of the reasons that theycould "hang on" was that theMarines called on a weapon thatthe enemy had not previouslyexperienced: air strikes that werenot only immediate but also gavetruly close air support. Panels werelaid out to mark the ground posi-tions, a radio call went to the for-ward air controller at battalionheadquarters (who personallyknew the pilots) and then to thecontrol plane in the Corsairsalready orbiting overhead. Downthey screeched, strafing and rock-eting. They came close in—veryclose in—to the defender's lines.Empty shell casings from theirmachine guns fell into the laps ofthe men below. This was morethan the previously all-victoriousNKPA troops had bargained for.Their firing slacked off, and thecrucial hilltop held. Some 600enemy attackers had failed in theirattempt to cut the task force's mainsupply route.

These strikes were part ofCraig's plan to push his men ahead

with continuous close air support.In the first three days of combat,the two Marine fighter squadronsflew well over 100 sorties. Thesquadrons had tailored their flightschedules so that one or the otherwas always overhead, readyinstantly to respond to calls forstrikes during the daylight hours.

The other planes of MAG-33were also daily demonstrating theirworth. The OYs had bomb racksattached to their wing struts, thusenabling them to carry rations orcans of water to the ground troopspanting in the heat and strugglingup the ever-present hill slopes.This was supplemented by "daisychains" of South Korean laborerswho would pass up five-galloncans of water, along with ammuni-tion, to the men on the hilltops.The observation planes alsobecame expert at spotting artilleryfire for the 11th Marines. The OYsslow speed proved to be a bigadvantage. Sivert explained:

In this type of terrain theenemy was so adept at cam-ouflage that most of the timehigh-performance aircraftwere just too fast to get downand search out a target. We inthe slower moving aircraftwere able to get down muchlower, take our time in spot-ting a target, and then tostand off to one side or theother of the [bombing] runs,and make sure the aircraftwere hitting the correct tar-gets.

Too, we were using thesame maps that the groundcommanders were using.They were able to give us tar-gets and pinpoint the targetswith exact coordinates.

Another advantage of the OYswas the ability to look down onhills (particularly reverse slopes)

27

where the forward air controller(FAC) with the infantry on theground was blocked from seeingthe enemy target. Sivert found thata pattern of effective teamworkdeveloped: the FAC would call onan OY to spot a target and givehim the direction in which thebombing runs should be made.Sometimes the OY would evengive the type of ammunition to beused on the target. Then, when thebombing runs had been complet-ed, the OY would furnish damageestimates to the FAC. Teamworkwas essential, since the OY couldonly communicate with the aircraftby relaying all directions throughthe FAC.

Helicopters also carried precioussupply cargoes to isolated areas. Inaddition, they became invaluablein evacuating wounded riflemen.The fighter pilots developed anenthusiastic appreciation of thesenew "birds" when they similarlyproved adept at rescuing pilotswho had been shot down.

The full 2d Battalion was con-solidating its control of Hill 342 on8 August, much to the relief ofCahill (who received a Silver Starfor his leadership). Meanwhile, theother rifle units of Murray's 5thMarines were also very busy.Taplett's 3d Battalion drew theassignment on 7 August of drivingthe enemy off the strategic Hill255, which overlooked andblocked the main supply route(MSR) to the rear. The first small-scale attack on 8 August wasdirected at a lower hill that wouldgive access to 255. It was repulsed.The commander of Company H,Captain Joseph C. Fegan, Jr., waslater awarded a gold star in lieu ofa second Silver Star for his boldactions when he personally led thenext assault, after a platoon leaderrefused to move (Fegan relievedhim for that). It came down to themessy business of cleaning out

meet the NKPA thrusts and launchhis own attacks, Newton's 1stBattalion was finally able to moveout of Chindong-ni early on 8August. Its orders were to proceedto the now-famous road fork andtake the left (south) route, whilethe Army's 5th RCT was to take thestraight-ahead (west) route. Tryingto approach the junction, Newtonfound that the 5th RCT was stillstalled there. The road to the forkwas jammed with soldiers and

each enemy foxhole, one at a time,for the NKPA troops fought to thedeath. Fegan was ably assisted bythe heroics of such men asCorporal Melvin James (ArmyDistinguished Service Cross andSilver Star), and Technical SergeantRay Morgan and Private First ClassDonald Terrio (Silver Stars).

When Company H hastily dug infor the night, Staff Sergeant JamesC. Davis had his platoon in a for-ward position only 75 yards fromthe enemy. While repairing adefective hand grenade, it slippedout of his grasp and dropped inthe midst of his men. A posthu-mous award of a Navy Crossdescribed his immediate reaction:"Without a moment's hesitation, hechose to sacrifice himself, ratherthan endanger his companions,and threw himself upon the livegrenade."

In parallel action by Company Gthat day, Sergeant Jack E. Macywould later be awarded aDistinguished Service Cross for hisperilous rescue trips to bringwounded men into safety. By theend of the day, the Marines weresecurely in possession of the first

hill, with 255 looming ahead. Thecompany had advanced more than1,400 yards in the teeth of a fierce-ly resisting enemy. It had takennine gruelling hours with great suf-fering from lack of water, heatexhaustion, and overexertion inthe stifling weather. One man inthe battalion later admitted: "Guysalmost went mad for water. I neverfelt the kind of heat I felt in Korea.I just burned up. My hands wentnumb. I couldn't help myself; I

began crying like a baby. I wasashamed. I felt I could crawl into amouse hole and die, but I couldn'thelp what was happening to me."

This kind of water-deprivationand dehydration in the midst ofblinding heat seriously affected thecombat strength of all of the bat-talions. Murray, the regimentalcommander, admitted: "One time Ifigured I had about at least a thirdof my regiment lying at the side ofthe road with heat prostration."

In spite of the gruelling physicalproblems—and the fanatical resis-tance by the enemy—the battalionhad now successfully positioneditself for the final lunge at Hill 255.

As Craig jockeyed his forces to

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Army vehicles; it was a scene of"congestion and confusion." Withthe advance of the Marine battal-ion thus blocked, the solution forprogress came in an order fromKean to Murray: send your 1stBattalion on a night march to Hill308 to relieve the Army battalionthat took your south road in error.It was expected to be a dangerousmaneuver. The commander of theArmy battalion felt that his compa-nies were "cut ofe' by the NKPA;the Marines were to veer off themain road short of the cloggedjunction and file in column alongnarrow dikes in a wide rice paddy,totally exposed if fired upon; twoSouth Korean civilians of unknowntrustworthiness were to guidethem through the pitch black night(since the assigned Army guidenever appeared). Newton wasdeeply upset when the Army bat-talion prematurely withdrew fromits position without waiting for theMarine relief force. As AndrewGeer described this unfortunatedevelopment in The New Breed,"there was a display of temper"between the two battalion com-manders.

By midnight the Army troopshad cleared the rice paddy paths,and the Marines quickly movedout. To the gratified surprise of themen, they encountered no enemy,and by dawn on 9 August theywere safely assembled at the baseof Hill 308. The battalion had been

Depaitment of Defense Photo (U5MC) A2262

Supporting fire from the howitzers of the 11th Marines was a crucial prelude toevery attack f the riflemen.

on the move, afoot, for 22 consec-utive hours; the men were thirstyand dog-tired, hut they had carriedout the relief as ordered.

Kean, meanwhile, had not limit-ed himself to his orders to Murray.He had come up to the deadlock atthe junction, and his next orderswere short and to the point.Indicating the hill that controlledthe junction to one of his battalioncommanders (who had earlierfailed to capture the hill), Keanbarked, "I want that hill tonight!" Itwas finally done.

The events of 8 August were notdecisive in themselves, and did notappear to represent any realprogress for the task force.Nevertheless, the groundwork hadbeen laid, and Craig now had histroops where they were in positionnot only to crush the enemy'soffensive, but also finally to makereal progress of their own towardthe ultimate objective of Chinju.

Two of the opposing forces,NKPA and Marine, had learnedsomething about each other inthese first clashes. Colonel RobertD. Heinl, Jr., in Soldiers of the Seasummed it up:

The Marines got their firsttaste of the enemy. Theyfound him spirited, tenacious,well trained, and generouslyequipped with Russian gear.Used to having the campaigntheir own way, the NorthKoreans fought confidently,hut reacted with considerablesurprise when they foundthemselves facing troops whogave no ground, hung on totheir weapons, and broughtin their wounded and dead.

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The Marines learned torespect a hardy enemy for hisskill at camouflage, ambush,infiltration, and use of cover.They learned that supportingair and artillery fires often hadlimited effect on a foe makingclever use of reverse slopedefenses to offset Marine con-centrations. Thus a ridgemight protect and conceal anenemy strong point untilattackers were too close forsupporting fires.

When this situation developed,with the heavy firepower of theMarines neutralized, their attackwas reduced to the familiar basicessential of small arms fire fights.In these circumstances, the NKPAwas able to meet them on eventerms, man-to-man.

Just as the Marines had sized upthe enemy, so, too, they hadformed their own opinion of the

A subsequent article in theMarine ColDs Gazette by historianLynn Montross analyzed the battleskills of the NKPA this way:

Army units with whom they werein contact. Other judgements werealso being made at this time. AnArmy colonel had been sent byGeneral Mark Clark's Army FieldForces Headquarters to evaluatethe units of the Eighth Army in lateJuly and early August. On 9 Augusthe made his report to LieutenantGeneral Matthew B. Ridgway,whose aide prepared a detailed 12-point memorandum on the find-ings.

The report was very harsh. It isquoted at length in a recent bookby Brigadier General Uzal W. Ent,USA (Ret), entitled Fighting on theBrink: Defense of the PusanPerimeter. The book has Ent'ssummary, saying that the report"verbally ripped the officers andenlisted men of Eighth Armyapart." It underscored three "prin-cipal deficiencies": lack of knowl-edge of infantry fundamentals; lackof leadership in combat echelons;

and the absence of an aggressivefighting spirit.

Regardless of Army problemsand wary of a tough enemy, butconfident it could smash ahead,the 5th Marines made real progresson 9 August. Murray was a driverwho knew that aggressive attackswould, in the end, reduce his casu-alties. Even though his 1stBattalion had barely arrived at thebase of Hill 308, Murray radioed anorder to attack immediately. Onceagain it was the familiar story ofover-tired, thirsty men staggeringup one more hill—this time after27 hours of continuous, tense exer-tion. Fortunately, there was onlysniper fire and the crest wassecured, as the men collapsed onthe broiling ground.

There was to be no let-up, how-ever, for the beat-up 1st Battalion.Murray kept pushing. He orderedNewton to take his men backdown from the hill they had just

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climbed so laboriously and tomove along the south roadtowards the next objective, a vil-lage called Paedun-ni. It was apathetic remnant that was able tocome down that hill. There wereonly 30 men and two officers outof the whole company who wereable to make it down without col-lapsing. Captain John L. Tobin, inbad shape himself, stayed with therest of the men on the hilltop.Fenton painfully recalled thescene:

The troops that had passedout had to be left where theyhad fallen, since no one hadthe strength to move them.The men who had heat pros-tration, but weren't out, triedto place themselves along theridge where they could covertheir fallen buddies in case ofan enemy attack. The heatreached 114 degrees, and I

personally don't believe thatour men on the hill couldhave repulsed 10 enemytroops.

Once Newton finally was able toget his survivors down to thePaedun-ni road, they were joinedby his Headquarters Company, hisWeapons Company, and a platoonof tanks. But Newton's troublescontinued. He was stuck withobsolete Japanese maps which fre-quently used different names fortowns, had no contour lines for thehills, and were undependable as toroads. This resulted in his takingthe wrong fork in the road shortlyafter starting. Not one to be out oftouch with his troops, Murrayappeared shortly to correct theproblem. It developed that themaps Newton and Murray hadwere each different. The upshotwas that Murray decided that thewhole column had to turn aroundon the primitive narrow road,retrace its steps, and take the otherfork. Amidst the milling in thisreversal, Newton was probably dis-mayed to see Craig appear on theconfused scene. The general wasnot pleased, and without knowingthe background, he expressed histhoughts in vivid language. Whenthe battalion finally got restartedon the proper fork, Craig—anotherofficer who kept in close touchwith his troops—went with themto supervise the further attack hewas planning. As evening fell, the1st Battalion had come two milesfrom its jump-off and was orderedto dig in for the night.

Back in the zone of the 3dBattalion, the payoff came on 9August for the hard fight the daybefore. The day began with a thor-ough saturation of Hill 255 by theartillery of the 1st Battalion, 11thMarines, under Lieutenant ColonelRanson M. Wood.

The artillery batteries had to

improvise their tactics during theseearly days in Korea. Ironically,they had suffered more casualtiesthan the riflemen when the taskforce had begun its attack. Then,to counter the skillful infiltration ofthe NKPA, the three batterieswould try to set up with one aim-ing to the north, one to the east,and one to the west, with protec-tive foxholes around them.(Because the brigade was movingso fast, and with the penchant ofthe enemy for lightning hit-and-runtactics, the 11th Marines oftenwould be able to set up only onebattery for action.)

After the artillery had plasteredthe enemy positions on Hill 255,the battalion's forward air con-troller, First Lieutenant DanielGreene, got on his radio, and theCorsairs then came wheeling in,this time with napalm's firstscourge of the NKPA. It was a near-classic demonstration of theMarine concept of an air-groundteam. When the riflemen scaledthe final crest of the hill, there was

little opposition. Nevertheless, thebattles that led to the conquest ofHill 255 had cost Company H theloss of 25 percent of its men. Whenthe 3d Battalion then joined upwith part of the Army's 24thInfantry, the threat to the rear sup-ply route (Masan to Pusan) hadbeen eliminated.

With these hill captures by thethree Marine battalions, the errantArmy battalion of the 5th RCT,which had earlier taken the wrongfork at the junction, could nowretrace its steps and rejoin its regi-ment. At last the 5th RCT movedout west towards a new objectiveon the road to Chinju.

This breakup of the log jamenabled Kean to relieve Craig ofoverall command of the task forceand allowed the general to returnto his own men on the afternoonof 9 August.

With his brigade now movingalong its designated south road,Craig planned to exert maximumpressure on the NKPA by havingthe Marine battalions leap-frog

Marines carefully check individual huts to successfully drive North Koreandefenders out of this village.

Department of Defense I'hoto (USMC) A15986

31

each other, pushing forward hard.The same procedures would beused by the companies and pla-toons. Whether it was advanceguard, flankers out on the sides, orin the main column of the brigade,all the units would rotate. Thisenabled Craig to keep driving.

He had Murray pull Roise's 2dBattalion off Hill 342, and put it ontrucks which brought it to anassembly point near Hill 308, aspot familiar to the 1st Battalion.Arriving there nearly at midnighton 9 August, Roise contemplatedhis situation. He had had 9 killed,44 wounded, and a shocking 94cases of heat prostration, the lossof key officers, and now his tiredmen were due to lead the attack intwo hours—after the past 69 hoursof climbing, fighting, and march-ing. Despite all this, he wasrelieved to see that the morale ofhis men appeared high. Further-more, his riflemen had been rein-forced by the attachment of a bat-tery of artillery, a platoon of thepowerful Pershing tanks, and a75mm recoilless rifle platoon.

The attack on Paedun-ni wasonly the first objective enroute tothe towns of Kosong and Sachon,the keys to the final goal of Chinju.Craig later described his reason-ing:

This night attack was inaddition to an attack duringthe day, and, although themen were very tired and Ihesitated to carry out thenight movement, I consid-ered that, if we could surprisethe North Koreans and keepmoving when the otherAmerican troops had alreadystopped for the night, that wemight gain some addedadvantage—and this provedto be the case. We marchedthroughout the night andgained quite a bit of distance

with only occasional shotsbeing fired.

Moving through the 1stBattalion, the 2d Battalion hadpressed forward through the nightof 9-10 August, grateful that therewas no opposition. There was anepisode with a couple of tanks thatgot stuck, bringing both Craig andMurray to the spot with somestrong words to move the rest ofthe column forward. By 0800 on 10August, Roise and his men were inPaedun-ni.

And so 9 August ended with theMarine brigade finally all togetheras a unit and really starting to rollin high gear down the south road.The next day (10 August) broughtsome brisk action when theretreating enemy forces pickedstrategic places to delay the rapidadvance of the Marine column. Asusual, Craig had arrived at Paedun-ni by helicopter, and his refrain tothe troops was to move ahead with"all speed." Accordingly, the 2dBattalion, even though it had justarrived, got ready to move outquickly for Kosong. The 3dBattalion followed.

With only a few trucks available,part of Company D was put onboard, with the rest of the troopsmarching behind. As the trucksrolled down the road, they werepreceded by a four-jeep reconnais-sance team, Some 2 1/2 miles fromPaedun-ni there was a section ofthe road where it made a sharpturn and narrowed along a defile1,000 yards long underneath alarge hill. It was called theTaedabok Pass, and 300 of theNKPA were dug in and carefullycamouflaged waiting there inambush. Their mortars, antitankguns, and artillery were ready toinflict heavy casualties on anytroops who moved blindly into thepass.

However, the advance guard of

32

the Marines was not moving blind-ly. Craig was well aware of theskill of the NKPA in ambushes andenvelopments. He therefore had apolicy of using his helicopters andOY planes to the maximum forreconnaissance of his front andflanks. In addition, he deployed areconnaissance platoon in jeeps toscout ahead of the lead battalion.These men, Craig commented, "ontwo occasions uncovered verystrong ambushes and sufferedsome casualties in getting out, butthey did protect the main column."

One of those riding in a recon-naissance jeep was a young pri-vate first class. They were rollinghappily down the road, thinkinghow quiet it was, when sudden-ly:

The North Koreans openedup. [They] cut up the first cou-ple of jeeps pretty bad. Mygroup tumbled and ran forthe ditch. I landed calf-deepin warm water. I heardmachine guns chatteringaround me. Dirt kicked upalong the road that was nowlined with abandoned jeeps.

Sergeant Dickerson shout-ed over the noise, "Thosehills, the little low ones, overto the right, we gotta get overthere. Gotta return fire fromthere." I picked up my BAR[Browning Automatic Rifle],and, crouched over, ran downthe ditch.

At the same time an OY obser-vation plane, flying less than 50feet off the ground, spotted theambush. With all hope of trappingthe main column of Marines nowgone, the NKPA poured on the fire.An antitank gun smashed a jeep.Now, coming up fast and deploy-ing in counterattack on both sidesof the road, the men of CompanyD went after the high ground at

1500 that afternoon. Their 60mmmortar fire silenced the antitankgun, and, when two MarinePershing tanks arrived at 1630,their 90mm guns, combined withCorsair attacks, beat down theenemy fire.

The fact that there had been anysurprise was on Murrays mind. Hesaid later: "We moved pretty wellalong this road for a day, I guess,when we ran into an ambush.Shouldn't have been ambushed,we should have discovered it, butdidn't. The advance guard failed tospot these people and got hit.Fortunately, though, the bulk ofthe regiment didn't get involvedinitially."

The ambush had delayed thebrigade, but not for long and at acost to the NKPA of hundreds ofdead, wrecked vehicles, and largelosses in weapons. Now theMarines were poised to sweep intoKosong.

Reinforcements arrived: the restof the 2d Battalion on foot and the3d Battalion by truck. Murray, ofcourse, was there waiting for them.He took Taplett up to the top ofone of the hills and they could seeKosong five miles away. The regi-mental commander, in his usualstyle, told Taplett to move his 3dBattalion through Roise's men at1715 and attack immediately toclean out the pass and clear theway to Kosong. It was an unusual"pass through," since neitherMurray or Taplett could locateRoise or his command post.

This order came as music to theears of 2d Battalion Marines. Roisehad had them moving and fightingfor 88 hours over a distance ofalmost 50 miles. In spite of thenever-ending hills and oppressiveheat, the battalion had won eachof its battles and inflicted morethan 600 casualties on the enemy.Now it could actually relax for themoment. For the first time since

going into action, there wasenough water to drink and themen could eat their field rations inpeace. Perspiration-soaked sockshad brought on ulcer sores ontheir feet and ankles, so it was ablessed relief to be issued clean,dry socks.

As the 3d Battalion moved intoposition for its attack, the menwere naturally concerned aboutenemy fire, but the first thing to hitthem was friendly fire. One enlist-ed man later recounted his reac-tion:

We passed through one ofthe other battalions. About5:00 in the afternoon twoAmerican fighters [U.S. AirForce F-51s] zoomed downthe road around 150 feetabove our heads . . . . Nomatter where I ran, I couldn'tseem to find an escape. Their.50-caliber bullets hit thathard, dry road and it soundedas if each was exploding.There was just nowhere to goto get out of the line of fire.Someone screamed, "Breakout the air panels! Get the airpanels!" The fighters left assuddenly as they had arrived.

By 1830 on 10 August, the leadplatoons had jumped off in theattack, hut they soon receivedheavy fire from two NKPA machineguns hidden at the far end of thepass. During this encounter, someMarines at the point were wound-ed, and platoon leader FirstLieutenant Jack "Big Jack"Westerman made a daring rescuefor which he was later presented aNavy Cross. Neutralizing thoseguns took the last of daylight, andso Murray had the battalion dig infor the night, sending men up thedominating hills for security. FirstLieutenant Robert I). Bohn, thecommander of Company G, was

33

not very happy about that order:"It was just contrary to everythingyou're taught, to go up intoenemy-held territory at night, noreconnaissance, nothing like that,and hold it."

Things got worse at dawn. TheNKPA hit Bohn's company.Because he had had to feel his wayup there in darkness, he really didnot know exactly where he and hismen were, but the enemy attackrevealed:

I was on the front line. I

was on the forward slope ofthis hill, and my commandgroup got hit. I got wounded,my mortar section chief gotkilled, and I had a couple ofother casualties. But we werea well-trained outfit, so weimmediately returned fire—Ithink there were maybe eightor ten of them, probably adelaying party—and we killedthem all.

It was very close. It washand-grenade range andhand-to-hand in a couple ofinstances. I took hand-grenade fragments in theneck and shoulder, but theyweren't too serious. It was thesame hand grenade that killeda Marine right next to me. Ikilled the guy that threw it.

By the time the attack was final-ly beaten off, Bohn's cool anddecisive handling of his menwould result in the award of aSilver Star. However, Company G,which was due to lead thebrigade's advance the morning of11 August, was a half hour late get-ting to the appointed line of depar-ture. John Toland's history, InMortal Combat, records a remarkto Bohn: "Murray was furious,'When I say 0800, I don't mean0801!'

Company G then moved out at a

Sikorsky HO3S-1 Helicopter

otary-wing aircraft had come too late to have anyeffect on the tactics of World War II, although aew Sikorsky aircraft were used experimentally in

the European and Pacific theaters near the end of theconflict. Following the war, it was the Marine Corps thattook the lead in developing techniques and proceduresfor this new combat aircraft.

In February 1948, the first Sikorsky H035-1 helicopterwas delivered to the first Marine helicopter squadron,experimental Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1), atQuantico, Virginia. Three months later, the squadronmade the first helicopter troop lift in history.

Shortly after the Korean War broke out on 25 June1950, 7 pilots, 30 enlisted men, and 4 HO3S-1 helicopterswere detached from HMX-1 for service with the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade. Upon arrival at Marine CorpsAir Station, El Toro, California, these elements were com-bined with 8 fixed-wing pilots, 33 enlisted men, and 4"usable" OY-2 light observation planes to form thebrigade's air observation squadron, Marine ObservationSquadron 6 (VMO-6). The squadron's commanding offi-cer, Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, was given just 48 hoursto weld these two elements together before beingshipped overseas.

Upon arrival in the Pusan Perimeter, VMO-6 set up itsbase at Chinhae on 2 August, ready for business. Therewas not long to wait. The next day, the brigade com-mander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, took off inone of the helicopters and gave a vivid demonstration ofits versatility. In one day, he stopped to instruct a battal-ion, picked out the location for his forward commandpost, held a conference with U.S. Army commanders,

and held three more meetings with his ground comman-ders.

Besides this role in command, the squadron's heli-copters were "always available for observation, commu-nications, and control." In addition, there were a widevariety of other missions: evacuating the wounded, res-cuing downed fixed-wing pilots, transporting supplies,artillery spotting, and, scouting enemy dispositions.During the month of August 1950, VMO-6 helicoptersamassed a total of 580 flights and the HO3S-ls chalkedup the first successful combat missions. These missionswere a harbinger of the large-scale deployments thatwould come.

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Aircraft DataManufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division of UnitedAircraft CorporationPower Plant: Pratt and Whitney R 985 AN-7 Wasp Jr.Engine 9 Cylinder; Radial; Fan-Cooled; 450HorsepowerRotor Diameter: 48': 3 Blade Composite ConstructionTail Rotor Diameter: 85"; All Wood; 3 BladesLength: 41' 13/4" Without Rotor BladesOverall Length: 57' 1/2"Height Overall: 12' 11"Weight Empty: 3,795 PoundsMaximum Gross Weight: 5,300 PoundsCruising Speed: 85 Miles Per HourMaximum Speed: 103 Miles Per Hour at Sea LevelRange: 260 MilesService Ceiling: 13,000'Fuel Capacity: 108 U.S. GallonsSeating: Four including Pilot

the point platoon which wouldgovern the speed of the entirebrigade. Accordingly, the advanceflankers moved at a run to keep upwith their platoon leader on theroad. He, in turn, relieved themwith fresh men as often as possi-ble. The fast pace they set provedinvaluable when they came uponany of the enemy. The Marinescame to the first machine gunemplacement lurking on the route,and they hit it so hard and sounexpectedly that the five NKPAgunners were killed before theycould fire a shot. Three moreenemy positions fell to the sameaggressive tactics of the point pla-toon.

With this kind of speed and skillup front, and with two Corsairsand an OY cruising overhead look-ing for any trouble, the brigadecame wheeling down the road toreach the outskirts of Kosong by1000. Softening up any potentialdefenders, the 105mm howitzers ofthe 11th Marines began raininghigh explosives on Kosong. Thisbarrage and the onrushing brigadeforced the opposing 83dMotorcycle Regiment to pack upand seek safety in a hasty depar-ture.

With the flight of the main bodyof the enemy, only a few snipersremained in Kosong. Company Hpassed through G and pushedrapidly into the town. On its heelscame Taplett and Craig, with theirhands on the helm, always close tothe action. Meanwhile, CompanyG raced to seize control of Hill 88southwest of the town and domi-nating the road to Sachon. Theenemy was waiting there, but notfor long. The Corsairs swooped inlow with napalm, tank fire pouredin, the howitzers of the 11thMarines blanketed the position,and the crest was quickly taken.

It was at Kosong that there was

the long years of Navy-Marinecooperation: support of thebrigade by Landing Ship Tanks.Craig fully realized their greatvalue, for they proved a readysolution to the problem of gettingsupplies by truck on primitive,congested roads. Accordingly, hehad had his helicopters make areconnaissance of usable harborson the nearby coast. Then the LSTswould move into a harbor thatmatched the brigade's advance.Craig described the pay-off:

When we reached Kosong,we had an LST within sixmiles of that place on a cov-ered road where we couldunload and push forwardsupplies and build up abrigade dump at Kosong.Wounded could he evacuatedimmediately to the LST .

We always felt that we had amobile base of supplieswhich we could bring in asnecessary and that, eventhough we were separated bylong distance or cut off fromour rear base, we couldalways depend on these LSTsfor supplies.

With Hill 88 secured, Craig hadTaplett pull the men of CompanyG back, disregard other hills, andconcentrate for an immediate driveby the brigade to Sachon. A pair ofNKPA antitank guns were waitingon the route, but were discoveredwhen an ambulance jeep was hit(killing a Navy corpsman). With itslocation disclosed the pair wasquickly knocked out and the col-umn surged forward, led byCompany H with the forward aircontroller right up with the pointmen.

A few hours later the the march-ing men came upon an astonishingsight. When the 83d Motorcycle

35

Regiment hurriedly decampedfrom Kosong, its timing proveddisastrous, for, just at that juncture,a flight of Corsairs from VMF-323appeared on the scene. The pilotscould hardly believe the temptingtargets arrayed before their eyes,and the slaughter began; it came tobe known as the "Kosong TurkeyShoot." The Corsairs swung low upand down the frantic NKPA col-umn, raining death and destructionin a hail of fire from rockets and20mm cannon. With the vehicles atthe front and rear ends of its col-umn destroyed, the enemy regi-ment was trapped. It was a sceneof wild chaos: vehicles crashinginto each other, overturned inditches, afire, and exploding;troops fleeing for safety in everydirection. Another flight from VMF-323 arrived, and, joined by U.S. AirForce F-51s, finished off thedestruction of the trucks, jeeps,and motorcycles. Accounts of thisNKPA debacle vary widely in theirtallies of the number of vehiclesdestroyed: 100-200.

One thing was certain: when theground troops reached the scene,the usable vehicles were quicklyappropriated for the transporta-tion-starved brigade. There was, infact, a momentary slowdown inthe fast advance of the Marines tostare. Joseph C. Goulden's Korea:The Untold Story of the War pic-tures the scene: "Black SovietArmy jeeps and motorcycles withsidecars, most of which had goneinto battle in mint condition.Looking under the hoods, theMarines found the jeeps poweredby familiar Ford Motor Companyengines—apparent relics ofAmerican lend-lease aid to theSoviet Union during the SecondWorld War."

The Marines found other things,too. Included in the wreckagewere American jeeps the NKPAhad captured earlier from U.S.

fast clip. It would be the pace of a clear example of the payoff from

came down close to the jeep andbegan firing their revolvers (theplane's only armament) at the flee-ing target. Rifle fire came backfrom the jeep's front seat, but theofficer remained rigid. This contin-ued for a 20-mile stretch with noresults. Finally, the terrified drivertook one too many looks at theplane so close overhead, and thejeep hurtled over a cliff. The officernever budged from his fixed posi-tion as he plunged to his death.

Cruising the rest of the clay inadvance of the brigade, Marine airfound other targets of opportunity.Geer totalled up the results:

Score for the day to MarineAir: vehicles (all types) des-troyed, 118; supply dumpsdestroyed, 2; ammunitiondumps left burning, 2; build-ings housing troops des-troyed, 8; southeast section ofSachon set on fire; concentra-tions of troops south ofSachon, north of Kogan-niand along route of withdraw-al neutralized and dispersedwith heavy casualties; onejeep presumed to be carryinga Very Important Person,destroyed.

Army troops, and Toland assertsthat there were duffel bags con-taining Russian officers' uniforms.

There was another colorfulepisode which happened on theroad that led back to Sachon in therear of the motorcycle regiment.Andrew Geer's The New Breed: TheStoiy of the US. Marines in Koreadescribes how Master Sergeant

Herbert Valentine and SecondLieutenant Patrick G. Sivert were inan OY skimming the route whenthey observed a jeep making ahigh-speed getaway from the bat-tle site. Sitting rigidly erect, armsfolded, eyes never wavering fromstraight ahead, a high-rankingNKPA officer sat unmoving in therear seat. The Marines in the OY

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There was, as always, a pricethe Marine aviators had to pay forthese dramatic achievements. Onepilot, Captain Vivian M. Moses, hadhis Corsair shot down by groundfire. When a helicopter from VMO-6 arrived to rescue him behindenemy lines, he was dead, the firstdeath for MAG-33.

Another pilot, Lieutenant DoyleH. Cole, was luckier. Hit, his planemade a forced landing in the near-by ocean. He climbed out onto hisemergency raft, and almost imme-diately a rescue helicopter ap-peared overhead and dropped to aposition close above him. A ropewas lowered and he was pulled up

l'hoto by David Douglas DuncanAcross the rice paddies and up the endless hills, it was always on foot

to safety. Glancing at the whitehair of his rescuer, Cole slappedthe old timer on the shoulder andsaid, "Thanks for the lift, buddy!" Asecond glance gave Cole a start.He saw the star on the dungareesand realized that it was Craig. Anembarrassed, "Thank you, sir,"blurted out, followed by a relaxedreply, "Glad to be of service,Lieutenant."

Down on the road, the brigadesped forward. Taplett and his aircontroller were up front with thelead platoon, and any time enemyresistance developed, in came theCorsairs. This immediacy of sup-port was due to three factors. First,the Marines had been able to keepcontrol of their own aviation, asMacArthur had promised Craig.Secondly, there were no upperechelons of command to delaystrike requests. Each battalion andthe regiment had its own tacticalair control party. These controlparties each consisted of an officerand six enlisted men; they eachused a radio jeep and portableradios for direct orders to theplanes. They worked with pilotswho had had infantry training andhad been carefully briefed on theground situation. In addition, thebrigade staff had an air sectionusing four different radio networksfor overall coordination, plus anobservation section which used theOYs and helicopters of VMO-6 topinpoint enemy targets for the Cor-sairs and control parties. Thirdly,the Marine fighter squadrons werevery close by, based on the jeepcarriers just offshore. Thus theycould he overhead in minutes,rather than finally arriving frombases in Japan with only enoughfuel for 15 minutes' support, whichwas the predicament of the U.S.Air Force.

As 11 August drew to a close,Taplett, after nearly being shot byan enemy soldier "playing pos-

sum," deployed his 3d Battalion ontwo hills by the road and had themdig in for the night. Sachon layahead, only a day's march away.

The men felt good. They weremaking rapid progress. As the offi-cial Marine history noted: "theenemy seemed to be disorganizedif not actually demoralized. For thefirst time since the invasion began,a sustained Eighth Army counterat-tack had not only stopped the RedKorean steamroller but sent it intoreverse."

In this happy frame of mind, thebrigade got moving again early onthe morning of 12 August. Enemyopposition was light, and the 1stBattalion in the lead quicklyleaped forward 11 miles. Fentonnoted that "the boys took quite abit of pride in the fact that we haddone all this moving on foot, whileArmy units moved mostly bymotor. Morale was very highThere was evidence of consider-able enemy disorganization .

We had them on the run and want-ed to finish them off." By noon thebrigade was only four miles fromSachon, and Chinju lay just eightmiles beyond that. According toGeer, when a NKPA major wascaptured, he confessed, "Panicsweeps my men when they see theMarines with the yellow leggingscoming at them."

Things looked good—too good.The old hands knew that some-thing unpleasant always followedthe good times. And so it did. Withmen from the ReconnaissanceCompany on the alert out front,Company B of the 1st Battalionpoked its nose into a valley with asmall village called Changchon.The Marines took a few shots at apair of disappearing enemy sol-diers, the first they had seen allday. The reply was thunderous.From the hills ahead and on eitherside of the road all hell brokeloose, as 500 of the NKPA poured

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in fire from carefully camouflagedpositions above the Marines. Theenemy had brought up reinforce-ments from Sachon during the pre-ceding night and set up an ambushhere with the surviving membersof the 83d Motorcycle Regimentand part of the 2d Battalion, 15thRegiment. The reconnaissance menhad caused the trap to be sprungprematurely, before the wholeMarine column could be caught inthe heavy crossfire. Company Bimmediately rushed to help itsreconnaissance men, but it wasquickly pinned down by theavalanche of fire. An article byFenton in the November 1951Marine Coips Gazette told how itscommander, Captain John L.

Tobin, took his runners and head-ed forward, but halfway there:

An enemy machine guntook them under fire, pinningthem down in the rice paddy.Things were pretty hot, andTobin noticed one of the run-ners shaking like an oldModel-T Ford. He asked theMarine what was wrong andthe boy replied that he wasscared. Tobin put a big scowlon his face and replied, "Lad,Marines are never scared."Just then the enemy machinegunner got the range and wasreally kicking up the waterand mud around them. Tobinturned to the runner andquickly added, "I see yourpoint now. Let's get the hellout of here!"

The Corsairs and their napalmwere called in, and, with their sup-port, then fire from the tanks'90mm guns, 4.2-inch mortars, andbattalion artillery, the rest of thebattalion cleaned the enemy offone hill after another in a hardfour-hour battle. There was aggres-sive action by the rest of the

Marine column, and a squad leaderin the 3d Battalion, CorporalDonald D. Sowl, was later award-ed the Army's DistinguishedService Cross by order of GeneralMacArthur.

There was a final flourish at theend of the day. A number of theenemy was spotted sneaking upthe reverse slope of one of thehills. A veteran noncommissionedofficer took a squad, deployedthem along the ridgeline, and toldthem to wait silently. When theNKPA soldiers got within 75 feet,the sergeant gave his men the sig-nal, and they poured out a sheet offire. All 39 of the attackers werekilled instantly, except for the offi-cer leading them who was wound-ed and captured. Turned over toSouth Korean police to take backto the battalion CP for interroga-tion, the enemy officer did not sur-vive the trip. As Geer wrylyobserved: "In the future they [the

the preregistered fire of mortarsand artillery in case the enemy hadany thoughts of a night attack. Thebrigade had now covered 29 milesof road (and much more countingthe interminable distances up anddown hills) in four short days. Ithad defeated the NKPA in everyencounter, and here it was poisedfor the short step into Sachon. Nextstop after that was the final objec-tive, Chinju, now within easy reachof the hard-hitting brigade. Again,things looked good—too good.

This time the surprise came notfrom the NKPA in front but fromthe U.S. Army in the rear. Craighad received orders from Kean latein the morning of the day justended, 12 August, to send without

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delay a reinforced battalion all theway back to the original startingpoint of the task force's drive,Chindong-ni. The Army's 5th RCTwas in trouble again; its "push"towards Chinju had totally boggeddown in what one account called"an epic disaster." With only twobattalions left, Craig noted in hisunderstated way that "the conse-quence was that our right flank .was exposed. There were manyNorth Korean troops in that area,and we were, more or less, out ona limb at Sachon." Now the NKPAwas cutting the main supply routebehind the 5th RCT, and three bat-teries of the 555th and 90th FieldArtillery Battalions had been com-pletely overrun by the enemy. TheMarine battalion was urgentlyneeded to rescue the survivorsfrom the shambles and restore thetactical situation.

The call from Kean began a hec-tic afternoon for Craig. Lynn

Marines] would conduct their ownprisoners to the rear."

With all units dug in for thenight, a rice paddy area of 1,000yards between the two companiesof the 1st Battalion was covered by

Montross in his book, 6avalry ofthe Sky, stressed the crucial mobil-ity Craig enjoyed by repeated useof the helicopter. In a single after-noon, he took off from his CP atKosong, then made two landingsto give orders to his regimentalcommander, Murray, and to Taplettfor the roadlift of the 3d Battalionto the crisis spot. Montross contin-uecl the story:

Next, he spotted twocolumns of Marine trucksfrom the air and landed twicemore to direct them to dumptheir loads and provide trans-portation for the troops. HisG-3 [operations officer] andthe battalion commander hadmeanwhile been sent aheadby helicopter to reconnoiterthe objective area and planfor the Marines to deploy andattack upon arrival. Owing tothese preparations, the assaulttroops seized part of theenemy position before dark-ness.

This fluid movement of Craig'senabled him, as a finale, toobserve the start of the sunsetattack enroute to a conferencewith Kean at Masan. While therehe got the disheartening news thatWalker wanted him to withdrawthe brigade at daybreak. It was agloomy ride for Craig back to hisCP where he landed in early dark-ness.

The meeting with Kean not onlyconfirmed the overwhelming prob-lems of the 5th RCT, but alsobrought still more ominous news.The operations of Task Force Keanhad been in the far southwesternsector of the Pusan Perimeter. Nowthe NKPA had crossed the NaktongRiver in the west center of theperimeter, broken the Army's lines,and were threatening to unhingethe entire defense of the peninsu-

la. It was a time of real crisis, andWalker was calling on his battle-proven "fire brigade" to save thesituation. This presented Craigwith an even bleaker picture: hehad to pull the rest of his brigadeout of its successful drive towardSachon and rush it north to stemthe enemy breakthrough.

Withdrawal in the face of anaggressive enemy is one of themore difficult military operations.Newton, commander of the 1stBattalion, had gotten the wordfrom Murray at midnight on 12August to withdraw his men fromtheir hilltop positions and form upon the road below at 0630 the fol-lowing morning. There truckswould move them to their nextcombat assignment—unknown, asusual, to the men who would dothe fighting.

Before it could get to the road,as the 1st Battalion was preparingto evacuate its positions on Hill202, it was hit by a heavy assault.The veteran soldiers of the 6thInfantry Division were experts atnight attacks, and at 0450 theystruck. It was close-in work. For awhile, the outcome was in doubt.Separated from Company A,Company B was on its own. Itsentire left flank was overrun, thecommunications wire was cut, andtwo Marine machine guns werecaptured and turned on the com-pany. Fighting back face-to-face,the Marines called in fire from their81mm and 4.2-inch mortars,together with artillery and 3.5-inchrocket rounds that pinpointed theenemy with fire barely in front ofthe defenders. Finally, at dawn, thesituation was stabilized.

There now occurred "one of themost demoralizing incidents inCompany B's experience for theentire campaign," as Fenton latercommented. Tobin was ready atfirst light to move back and recov-er the wounded and missing men,

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just as Marine tradition (and Craig)had promised. It was not to be.Iron-clad orders from Walker toCraig to Murray to Newton forcedan immediate withdrawal, in spiteof Tobin's pleadings.

Fenton summarized the unani-mous feeling:

Twenty-nine bloody, sweat-ing miles down the drain.The men couldn't believe it. I

couldn't believe it. It didn'tseem possible, with all thelives we'd lost taking thisground, that we'd now justwalk off and leave it. BakerCompany's casualties for themorning's counterattack alonewere 12 dead, 16 wounded,and 9 missing in action. AndI'm certain those last ninewere dead, too.

I found it difficult to seemen, veterans of the last war,older guys, sitting by the sideof the road crying. They justdidn't give a hoot. They weretired, disgusted. People justcouldn't understand this partof the war.

A Relief Force

Leaving the 1st and 2d Battal-ions temporarily in the positionsthey had won in the Changchonarea, Craig moved quickly on 12August to organize the deploymentof his 3d Battalion as a relief forcefor the overrun Army field artillerybattalions. The orders from Keanhad come at 1130 and by 1300 theriflemen and an artillery batterywere in the trucks, on their way. Ahalf hour later Taplett and thebrigade operations officer, Lieu-tenant Colonel Stewart, were air-borne to scout the disaster area byhelicopter. They saw plenty oftrouble: artillery pieces in disarray;jeeps on fire; American bodieslying in a stream bed; and, incon-

gruously, one white table set in themidst of it all. The Army had "esti-mated" that 2,000 to 2,500 NKPAtroops had infiltrated the area,smashed the Army artillery units,and were threatening the mainsupply route, so Taplett had origi-nally presumed that there wouldhe heavy combat for his battalionwhen it arrived. At the scene hesaw no evidence of any suchquantity of NKPA, and he stronglydoubted the estimate.

The chaotic situation theMarines now saw had its roots inthe events of the preceding day,11 August. Without opposition,the 5th RCT had advanced justfive miles from where it had start-ed at the infamous road junctionto a small village called Pongam-ni. The 555th "Triple Nickel" and90th Field Artillery Battalionswere in support, but were notprotected or prepared for anenemy attack.

Marine procedures were muchdifferent. Craig later commentedon this:

The artillery had beentrained in Pendleton in themethods of security. Theywere armed with bazookas,.50 calibers, and everythingthat the infantrymen wouldneed to defend a position,and they were well trained indefense of their artillery posi-tions. And they from that[first] day on took up defen-sive positions wherever theymoved.

As a result we never had agun overrun. There wereattempts at sniping and soforth, but we never had agun taken or overrun; where-as I notice that the Army ona number of occasions in theperimeter lost whole batter-ies. It was simply, I think,because the artillerymen

were not trained along thesame lines as the Marines.

At this time, Kean was underheavy pressure from Walker to getthe 5th RCT to leap ahead. So thedivision commander ordered hisregimental commander (ColonelGodwin L. Ordway) to move partof his units quickly forwardthrough the pass near Pongam-ni.Then there was indecision, delay,conflicting orders, and repeatedfailures in radio communications.As a result, part of the regimentwent through the pass that night,and part stopped at Pongam-ni.With his command thus split up,and with enemy fire falling on thesupply route to his rear, Ordwaywas in a difficult situation. It gotworse after midnight on 11 Augustwhen telephone and radio com-munications with the artillery bat-talions was lost and the sounds ofbattle came from their direction.With the NKPA now on the highground above him, Ordway decid-ed at 0400 on 12 August to try tomove the rest of his troops throughthe pass. A massive traffic jamensued. As the official Army histo-ry noted: "During the hour or morebefore daylight, no vehicle inOrdway's range of vision movedmore than 10 or 20 feet at a time."

As the infantry slowly movedout, the enemy quickly moved intothe valley. Now the Army artillery,stalled behind the traffic jam, was asitting duck. NKPA tanks and self-propelled guns were able to"approach undetected and unop-posed, almost to point-blankrange, and with completely disas-trous effects." Enemy infantry fromthe 13th Regiment of the 6thDivision closed in and added itsfirepower. It was a slaughter, andthe artillery was completely over-run. A traumatic phone call fromBrigadier General George B. Barth,USA, the 25th Division artillery

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commander, to Kean revealed thescope of the disaster and led Keanto order the rescue mission by the3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Kean also ordered a battalion ofthe 24th Infantry to bring relief byan attack towards Pongam-ni. Thiseffort went nowhere on 12 August,and by the next day it was still twoand a half miles from the artillerypositions. The 555th had lost six ofits 105mm howitzers, and the 90thhad lost all six of the 155mm how-itzers in one of its batteries. Alongwith some 300 men, probably 100vehicles had been captured ordestroyed (although the NKPAclaimed an inflated 157 vehiclesand 13 tanks). The Army had giventhe site the name "Bloody Gulch."

This was the grim situation thatTaplett faced when his helicopterarrived on 12 August. He immedi-ately had the aircraft land and helooked for the liaison officer whowas supposed to meet him, nowthat he was coming under theoperational control of the Army's25th Infantry Division. No sign ofany such person.

To try to get some information,Taplett was finally able to tap intoa telephone line to the divisionheadquarters in the rear and askfor orders. The reply was to "dowhat he thought was proper." Thatvague verbal order was all the lee-way Taplett needed for immediateaction. A helicopter reconnais-sance was followed by a juncturewith his troops. Then he led themby air to the valley from where heplanned to attack the commandingridges.

Less than three hours afterboarding their trucks, the men ofthe 3d Battalion were at theirassembly area, ready to jump off inan attack on a cold, rainy, miser-able day. Taplett aggressivelydelayed only 15 minutes for anartillery preparation and somenapalm runs by Marine Corsairs,

and then moved out the riflemen.Without a single casualty, theySOOfl reached the top of the firstridge. There they found signs thata substantial body of enemy troopshad made a hasty departure, butthis was a far cry from the resis-tance they had expected from the"2,000" or so enemy troops thatOrdway had estimated hadwreaked such havoc.

At 1900 Barth arrived to takecommand. Not knowing Taplett'sstyle, he asked when the Marineswould be ready to attack. Taplettpresumably enjoyed a responseone can easily imagine, "Sir, we'vealready done that, and my men arenow digging in on top of theridge." Barth graciously congratu-lated him.

The next morning, 13 August,the 3d Battalion attacked to securethe final ridges overlooking thepitiful remnants of the lost artillery.Again, there was no opposition,and by 1000 they were on top oftheir objectives. Craig later com-mented: "We found quite a numberof Army artillerymen scatteredthrough the area, hiding in variousplaces." Besides those rescued bythe Marines, some had fled andstruggled back to safety with the25th Division.

Taplett's men were now readyto go down, clean out any enemy,and retrieve the artillery pieces inthe valley, hut the Marines oncemore got orders that they couldnot take the objective they werepoised to seize, but must, instead,move to the rear to meet the newenemy threat along the Naktong.

That marked the final episode inthe Marine mission to aid theArmy's 5th RCT. With all troops,Marine and Army, now pulledhack to their starting point atChindong-ni, it was the end of theoffensive to occupy Chinju and, on16 August, Task Force Kean wasdissolved.

First Week's Results

Things had gone badly for the5th RCT and its artillery, and thecommanding officers of the regi-ment and the "Triple Nickel" bat-talion were both relieved of duty.Higher Army echelons were notpleased with their leadership orthe morale and combat effective-ness of their men.

Craig, on the other hand, waspleased. He had seen his brigadedrive forward with vigor and pro-fessional skill. His officers wereconstantly aggressive, and the rifle-men had done very well underfire. He noted that his men were"well trained and well led" by out-standing noncommissioned offi-cers and "professional" officerswho "knew their stuff." The reasonfor the brigade's achievementswere clear to Craig:

We were a generation ofofficers who grew up with theMarine Corps' standing oper-ating procedures (SOPs) foramphibious operations. Thesewere my "Bible" when I orga-nized and trained an earlierMarine brigade on Guam dur-ing the period 1947-1949.During World War II we hadrepeatedly tested and refinedour organization and tech-niques in landings all over thePacific. These same SOPsenabled us to deploy toKorea quickly and fight effec-tively when we got there.

Equally important, the support-ing arms had coordinated wellwith the infantrymen, with theclose air support of MAG-33demonstrating a wholly new ele-ment in the Korean War, flyingmore than 400 sorties in support ofthe brigade and other units of theEighth Army. The Marines hadtwice been on the verge of seizing

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their objectives—first at Sachon-Chinju and then the recovery ofthe Army artillery—only to bepulled back by the strategic needsof the Eighth Army. Geer in hisaccount concluded:

The brigade came out ofChangallon [Changchonlphysically tough and psycho-logically hard . . . . Theyknew the enemy to be avicious, skillfully led andwell-equipped foe that couldinflict heavy casualties in anyaction. They were preparedto meet with heavy losses andto carry on the attack, andwere openly scornful of unitsunable to face these hardfacts of war.

There had been a price, howev-er. The brigade had had a total of315 casualties, with 66 killed ordied of wounds, 240 wounded,and 9 missing in action (when the1st Battalion had not been allowedto recover them).

The action of that week hadbrought results on a wider, strate-gic scale. While there had been afailure to occupy Chinju, TaskForce Kean had nevertheless beenthe first real American offensive ofthe Korean War. In a report to theUnited Nations, General MacArthurstated that "this attack not onlysecured the southern approachesto the beachhead, but also showedthat the North Korean forces willnot hold under attack."

The official Army historyacknowledged in summary that"the task force had not accom-plished what Eighth Army hadbelieved to be easily possible—thewinning and holding of the Chinjupass line," and, omitting any refer-ence to the dramatic advance ofthe Marine brigade, admitted thatthe rest of the task force, "after aweek of fighting, . . . was back

approximately in the positionsfrom which it had started itsattack." That history, however,went on to note "certain beneficialresults . . . . It chanced to meethead-on the North Korean 6thDivision attack against the Masanposition, and first stopped it andthen hurled it back . . . TaskForce Kean also gained the timeneeded to organize and wire in thedefenses that were to hold theenemy out of Masan during thecritical period ahead."

The official Marine history couldafford to be positive about thebrigade's achievements:

The Communist drive inthis sensitive area came clos-est of all NKPA thrusts to thevital UN supply port of Pusan.Up to that time the NKPAunits spearheading theadvance—the 6th Infantry

worth mentioning since theoutset of the invasion. Thenthe counterattack by the 1stProvisional Marine Brigadehurled the enemy back 26miles in 4 days from theChindong-ni area to Sachon.

It was estimated that theMarine air-ground team killedand wounded 1,900 of theenemy while destroying near-ly all the vehicles of an NKPAmotorized battalion in addi-tion to infantry armament andequipment. The enemy threatin this critical area was nulli-fied for the time being, and

Division and the 83dMotorcycle Regiment—hadnever suffered a reverse

A Marine skirmish line attacking over exposed ground to a nearby treeless hill-crest.

Photo by David Douglas Duncan

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