Non-timber forest products, common pool resources and the role … · 2011. 3. 16. · Costs of...

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Non-timber forest products, common pool resources and the role of the state: an intervention role of the state: an intervention model…? Sinclair Tedder Ministry of Forests and Range University of BC, Faculty of Forestry WFE May 5-7, 2008

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  • Non-timber forest products, common pool resources and the role of the state: an interventionrole of the state: an intervention model…?

    Sinclair TedderMinistry of Forests and RangeUniversity of BC, Faculty of ForestryWFE May 5-7, 2008

  • Outline

    Overview: Why am I doing this research?Overview: Why am I doing this research?Problem definition: what am I trying to overcome?Sources of social-ecological stress. Assessing the need for interventionAssessing the need for intervention.

    WFE May 5-7, 2008CPRs and the role of the state: Sinclair

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  • Overview – Why am I doing this research?

    Non-timber forest productsHistory of regulatory effortFocused on regulation not forest resource managementNTFP pilot projectSelling the concept to ministry executiveWindow of opportunity closesCurrent research focus:

    Why and when should a state intervene in a CPR market?market?How does a state intervene in a CPR market?

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  • Problem definitionNTFP characteristicsBroader resource category: common pool resourcescommon pool resourcesExamples: NTFPs, fisheries, groundwater…Open access to resources Resulting incentivesResulting incentives Lack of incentivesTragedy of the Commons outcome?Institutional failureCollective action

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  • Overcoming problemProperty rights

    Private property rights – market mechanismsState property regulatory mechanismsState property – regulatory mechanismsCommon property – norms and customs/strategies

    GovernanceDecentralizationDecentralizationCo-managementCorporatizationCentralizationMulti-level, nested units,

    …but what do all these concepts mean when trying to design an appropriate response to the problem? How do they relate to the problem, the user-community and existing systems of

    t?management?What is the problem and what is its source? What are state / user objectives?

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  • The role of the state in managing common pool resources

    Why, when and how does the state intervene to manage open access common pool resources?

    Wh ? I tit ti l f il k t li ll ti tiWhy? Institutional failure – market, policy, collective action

    When? Is there a single or set of indicators that suggests intervention is warranted?

    How? There is no certainty in the success of institutional design, so how does the state approach the need for intervention?

    Focus on the why and when questions.

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  • Why intervene…?

    Market failure:Lack of property rights – open access/limited user open access, incomplete property rightsAppropriation externality – subtractable supply, increasing marginal costs, rent dissipation, resource degradationPublic goods related externalityub c goods e ated e te a tyFree riders Imperfect information – resource use and values, and presence of informal institutions

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  • Why intervene…?

    Government or policy failureLack of policy when there is a need for oneInappropriate policy leading to inefficiency – subsidy, fiscal measures, un-enforced property rightsNegative or non-decisionsInequitable / inefficient transfers of income, property rights, powerpowerPath dependent policy Corruption, power dynamicsImplementation failuresUncommitted elected/public sector

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  • Why intervene…?

    Collective action failureCollective action failureIndividual incentive overrides collective goodResource salienceResource salienceCosts of cooperation - 1st, 2nd and 3rd order dilemmasHeterogeneity and group sizeHeterogeneity and group sizeTrust and social capitalInformationExternal influences

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  • Why intervene…?

    ResultIndividual incentive to over-harvestLack of incentive to investI di id l i t t ll tiIndividual interests over collective High transaction costs Di i ti f tDissipation of rentsResource degradation“Tragedy of the Commons”?Tragedy of the Commons ?

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  • When to intervene…?

    Response – structured or spontaneous?Response structured or spontaneous?Will property rights necessarily evolve? Who initiates this evolution?How is the problem defined…is there a problem?

    Structuring an argument for or against interventionStructuring an argument for or against intervention.Model assumes CPR is in open access, limited user open access, or under-managed.Model focuses on public land.

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  • When to intervene…?

    Dissipation of rent – but what if sufficient informationDissipation of rent but what if sufficient information is not available? What causal factors underlie this inefficiency, or socially sub-optimal outcome?

    Indicators of riskIncreasing or high valueExclusivenessHistorical and current use

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  • When to intervene…?

    Outcome: resource congestion?Outcome: resource congestion?Based on contextual influences the outcome may range fromoutcome may range from …

    Resource over-exploitation – rent dissipationCapacity constraint rent capture/dissipationCapacity constraint – rent capture/dissipationRobust social-ecological system – rent capture

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  • When to intervene…?Contextual influences

    Resource attributesResource attributesSupplyCapacityResilienceResilience

    Appropriator attributesGrowth capacityCapital intensityCapital intensityHeterogeneity

    Institutional attributesTransaction costsInformation flowsInformal rules-in-useGovernment resolve

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  • Why and when – CPR open access intervention model

    Increasing or high resource

    valueRisk factor 1 Contextual

    influences

    Resource type – exclusiveness subtractability

    Current and past

    Risk factor 2

    Resource attributes: - supply - capacity - resilience

    Exploitation outcomes

    Current and past levels of activity

    Risk factor 3

    Resource over-exploitation

    Human or natural capacity

    constraint

    Robust social-ecological

    s stem

    Appropriator attributes: - growth

    capacity - capital

    intensityconstraint system

    Rent dissipation

    Rent capture

    y- heterogeneity

    Institutional attributes: - transaction

    Government intervention warranted and necessary to avoid commercial or

    natural resource collapse

    Government intervention discretionary –

    contingent on ethical collection of rents and net

    benefits of intervention

    costs- information

    flows - informal

    rules in use - government

    resolve

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  • Model output - exploitation outcomes

    Based on interaction of three risk factors and contextual attributes…

    Resource over-exploitation the tragedy of the commons outcomethe tragedy of the commons outcome full rent dissipation, resource degradation

    Human or natural capacity constraintA resource or appropriator constraint limits extraction potentialRent capture/dissipation

    Robust social ecological systemg yResource able to withstand significant annual harvest that does not affect long-term supplyCommunity able to withstand annual variations in supply

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    y pp y

  • Model output – source of failure

    Indicates/highlights source of failure

    Indicates areas requiring further investigation

    Provides a basis for intervention based on resource, appropriator and institutional attributes

    Focuses the basis of intervention on the CPR social-l i l t t i t ti diecological system, not an intervention paradigm

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  • Intervention model case study –commercial salal harvest. Salal used as a floral background source of berriesSalal used as a floral background, source of berries.

    Significant level of harvest, thousands employed.

    Based on seriesof interviews with harvestersharvesters, buyers and researchers.

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  • Salal example

    Increasing or high value.$B.C. export value – $50+ million, value fluctuates.

    Daily wages – significant range, $50/day - $200/day.

    Costly exclusionCostly exclusionOpen access to resource on roaded public land, some private.

    Current and past levels of use pReturn of volumes to Europe expected, growth in demand expected from Asia.Indications of over harvest significant competition amongIndications of over-harvest, significant competition among harvesters.

    Model indicates risk of degradation

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  • Salal example – model outcomeModel output: human or natural capacity constraint

    Contextual factors – easing stressgLabour shortage, opportunity cost or other jobs suggest capacity constraint limits degradation.Resource robust, able to regenerate, but commercial quality can declinecan decline.

    Contextual factors – increasing stress Demand may increase pushing prices higher, attracting additional labour, entry costs low.additional labour, entry costs low.

    Rent dissipation/captureRent capture likely, but tending toward dissipation, higher costs due to over-use, loss of commercial quality salal, need t t l f th h d t fi d titi f tto travel further, harder to find, competition from too many users, timber industry.Rent capture through knowledge differences, variable transportation costs.

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    p

  • Salal example – sources of failure

    Significant external demandSignificant external demand

    Lack of trust among users, buyers.

    Information lacking, benefits of cooperation unclear to appropriators.

    No informal user-based rules-in-use.

    High transaction costs associated with cooperation and monitoring.

    Exclusion costs limit efficacy of tenure rights.

    Government and forest industry shows little interest in managing, places no pressure on sector to coordinateplaces no pressure on sector to coordinate.

    Sector lacks incentive to act collectively.

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  • State intervention

    Research part 2pHow to intervene in a CPR market?Focus on sources of institutional failureDevelopment of institutions based on level of intervention required/possible and the definition of rules guiding SES communityrules guiding SES community

    Other concepts to considerIndigenous knowledged ge ous o edgeSituating indigenous rights in model

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  • CPRs and the role of the state

    Comments – suggestions?Comments suggestions?

    Resource type – l i

    Increasing or high resource

    value Risk factor 1

    Risk factor 2

    Resource attributes:

    Contextual influences

    Exploitation outcomes

    exclusiveness subtractability

    Current and past levels of activity

    Risk factor 2

    Risk factor 3

    Resource over-exploitation

    Human or natural capacity

    Robust social-ecological

    - supply - capacity - resilience

    Appropriator attributes: - growth

    capacity - capital

    intensityconstraint system

    Rent dissipation

    Rent capture

    Government intervention warranted and necessary to avoid commercial or

    Government intervention discretionary –

    contingent on ethical

    intensity- heterogeneity

    Institutional attributes: - transaction

    costs - information

    flows - informal

    natural resource collapse collection of rents and net benefits of intervention

    rules in use- government

    resolve

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