MATTER OF B-P-

APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION

Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office

DATE: OCT. 14,2016

PETITION: FORM I-360, PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT

The Petitioner seeks immigrant classification as an abused spouse of a U.S. citizen. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(iii). Under the Violence Against Women Act (VA WA), an abused spouse may self-petition as an immediate relative rather than remain with or rely upon an abuser to secure immigration benefits.

The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (VA W A petition), concluding that the Petitioner did not enter into the marriage with her spouse in good faith.

The matter is now before us on appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence. The Petitioner claims that the Director did not properly analyze or consider the evidence in the record of proceedings.

Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. LAW

Section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(I) of the Act provides that an individual who is the spouse of a U.S. citizen may self-petition for immigrant classification if the individual demonstrates that he or she entered into the marriage with the U.S. citizen spouse in good faith and that during the marriage, the individual or a child of the individual was battered of subjected to extreme cruelty perpetrated by the individual's spouse. In addition, the individual must show that he or she is eligible to be classified as an immediate relative under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, resided with the abusive spouse, and is a person of good moral character. Section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II) of the Act.

The eligibility requirements for a self-petition under section 204(a)(l )(A)(iii) of the Act are further explicated in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(l), which provides,' in pertinent part:

(v) Residence. . . . The self-petitioner is not required to be living with the abuser when the petition is filed, but he or she must have resided with the abuser ... in the past.

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(ix) Good faith marriage. A spousal self-petition cannot be approved if the self­petitioner entered into the marriage to the abuser for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws. A self-petition will not be denied, however, solely because the spouses are not living together and the marriage is no longer viable.

The evidentiary guidelines for a self-petition under section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii) of the Act are further explicated in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2), which states, in pertinent part:

(iii) Residence. One or more documents may be submitted showing that the self­petitioner and the abuser have resided together . . . . Employment records, school records, hospital or medical records, rental records, insurance policies, affidavits or any other type of relevant credible evidence of residency may be submitted.

(vii) Good faith marriage. Evidence of good faith at the time of marriage may include, but is not limited to, proof that one spouse has been listed as the other's spouse on insurance policies, property leases, income tax forms, or bank accounts; and testimony or other evidence regarding courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence and experiences. Other types of readily available evidence might include the birth certificates of children born to the abuser and the spouse; police, medical, or court documents providing information about the relationship; and affidavits of persons with p~rsonal knowledge of the relationship. All credible relevant evidence will be considered.

The burden of proof is on a petitiOner to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369 (AAO 2010). A petitioner may submit any evidence for us to consider; however, we determine, in our sole discretion, the credibility of and the weight to give that evidence. See section 204(a)(l)(J) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(i).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND EVIDENCE OF RECORD

The Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica, married K-P-, 1 a U.S. citizen, in Connecticut on 2009. K-P- filed a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative (alien relative petition), on the Petitioner's behalf and the Petitioner filed her own Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (adjustment application), in conjunction. Both the alien relative petition and the adjustment application were denied, and the Petitioner subsequently filed a VA W A petition.

1 Name withheld to protect the individual's identity.

2

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The Director issued a request for evidence (RFE) establishing that the Petitioner entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith. The Petitioner submitted additional evidence in response to the RFE, which the Director found insufficient to establish the Petitioner's eligibility. Accordingly, the Director found that the Petitioner did not enter into her marriage with K-P- in good faith and denied the VAWA petition. The Petitioner timely appealed. We have reviewed all of the evidence in the record of proceedings.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Entry into Marriage in Good Faith

The relevant evidence submitted before the Director and on appeal does not demonstrate that the Petitioner entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith.

In the personal statement she submitted with the VA W A petition, the Petitioner recounts that she and K-P- first met in January 2004 when she rented a room in an apartment and he was the other tenant in the apartment, although they did not begin a romantic relationship until approximately six months later. She recounts that they were "cooking together and having a discussion ... [when] he reached out and asked [her] to stay with him because [she] was thinking about going back to Jamaica." At that point, their relationship became serious, K-P- proposed in December 2008, and they married the following at The remainder of her initial personal statement describes abuse during their marriage.

In her second personal statement, which was subthitted in response to the RFE, the Petitioner provides a few additional details regarding her interactions with K-P- prior to their marriage, including that K-P- helped her moved into their shared apartment, they had long conversations, and she reiterates that their romantic relationship began when they were cooking together and K-P­reached out and asked her stay with him. The remainder of her second personal statement discusses abuse during their marriage and she reports that she does not have many documents relating to their marriage because K-P- "controlled everything" and she left their apartment without taking any documents or paperwork with both of their names on it.

The Petitioner submits a third personal statement with this appeal, in which she provides a few additional details regarding their activities prior to their marriage, including that K-P- worked a midnight shift, she made him breakfast and ate with him, and they talked with each other about their lives. In this third personal statement, however, the Petitioner provides a markedly different description of how the couple's relationship became romantic than she related in her prior personal statements. She recounts that, in January 2005, she helped K-P- shave his head and, as she was doing so, "he turned around and kissed me." She continues with the following description:

I will never forget that moment. He said to me, "From the first time I saw you, I knew I wanted you." I kissed [K-P-] back and I knew that I wanted him too .... Since that first kiss our relationship blossomed and we began to get closer to each other.

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The information in the Petitioner's third personal statement directly contradicts her prior personal statements both in time and place regarding a critical point in her relationship with K-P-. For example, in her first statement, the Petitioner stated that the turning point in their relationship occurred in approximately June 2004 when K-P- expressed his feelings for her while they were cooking dinner in response to her declaration that she was returning to Jamaica. Now, on appeal, the Petitioner identifies this turning point as having occurred in January 2005 when the Petitioner was helping K-P- shave his head. The Petitioner's differing descriptions of when their relationship changed from being roommates to being a couple diminishes the weight we attach to the descriptions ofher relationship with K-P- contained in all three of her personal statements.

Even without these inconsistencies, overall the Petitioner's personal statements only generally describe her relationship with K-P- and do not provide detailed information regarding the couple's courtship, wedding ceremony, residence, and shared experiences sufficient to establish that she entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(vii). In particular, the Petitioner does not explain the dynamics of her relationship with K-P- prior to and during their marriage and their decision to marry. Accordingly, her personal statements are not sufficient to establish that she entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith.

In support of her VA W A petition, the Petitioner provides a statement from her daughter. The Petitioner's daughter recounts that she first met K-P- in 2007, the Petitioner and K-P- "were only in a dating relationship" at that time, and the Petitioner told her on the telephone that her relationship with K-P- was getting serious, although her daughter does not indicate when those conversations occurred. The statement from the, Petitioner's daughter contains a general description of the relationship between the Petitioner and K-P-, and does not provide detailed information regarding the couple's courtship, residence, and shared experiences. The statement, therefore, is not sufficient to establish the Petitioner's intentions at the time that she entered into her marriage with K-P-.

In a statement by J-W-, the Petitioner's former landlord, he confirms that, iii January 2004, the Petitioner moved into an apartment on where K-P- was already living, and the Petitioner and K-P- told him they were in a relationship, although he do~s not specify when they told him that information. J-W- also recalls that he observed the Petitioner and K-P- go to the laundromat together and come home with groceries but he does not provide a timeframe for what he observed. The statement by J-W-, however, is inconsistent with other information supplied by the Petitioner: on the VA WA petition, the Petitioner indicates that she and K-P- lived at the address from January 2004 until November 2011, although her personal statements reflect that she moved out of that address in December 2010; a Form G-325A, Biographic Information, signed by the Petitioner and submitted in support of her adjustment application, indicates that she lived at the

address starting in December 2008, not January 2004. Accordingly, the inconsistent information from the Petitioner and J-W- regarding when the Petitioner lived at the address diminishes the weight we attach to J-W-' s statement.

The record of proceedings includes additional evidence relevant to the Petitioner's entry into her marriage with K-P- in good faith. A lease submitted by the Petitioner in support of her VA WA

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petition indicates that the Petitioner and K-P- leased the apartment on from April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2010, and rental receipts relate to a limited period from July 8, 2009, until August 20, 2009. As noted above, in light of the inconsistencies between the Petitioner's personal statements and the statement by J-W- with respect to when she lived on the weight we accord to the lease and the rental receipts, all of which are signed by J-W -, is also diminished. Three greeting cards relate to the wedding of the Petitioner and K-P- but, on their own, they do not establish that the Petitioner entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith. One photograph depicts the Petitioner and K-P- when they married, and three other photographs depict the Petitioner and K-P- together on two other occasions, but these latter photographs are undated and do not indicate where they were taken and, without probative testimony, they do not establish the nature of the relationship or the Petitioner's good faith intentions in entering into the marriage. Accordingly, this evidence, together with the remainder of the evidence in the record of proceedings, does not establish that the Petitioner entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith.

When viewed together, the personal statements and other evidence in the record of proceedings do not demonstrate that the Petitioner entered into her marriage with K-P- in good faith, as required by

· section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(l)(aa) of the Act.

B. Joint Residence

As an additional matter, the Petitioner has not established that she resided with K-P-.2 As noted above, the Petitioner indicates on the VA WA petition that she and K-P- lived at the address from January 2004 until November 2011, although her personal statements reflect that she left that address in December 2010. The Petitioner submits a lease which indicates that the Petitioner and K-P- leased an apartment on from April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2010, as well as rental receipts for the period from July 8, 2009, until August 20, 2009. In addition, the Form G-325A submitted in support of her adjustment application, indicates that she lived at the

address starting in December 2008. Accordingly, based on these material inconsistences regarding her residential history with K-P-, the Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she resided with K-P-, as required by section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II)(dd) of the Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

On appeal, the Petitioner has not established that she married K-P- in good faith or that she resided with him. She is consequently ineligible for immigrant classification under section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii) of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the VAWA petition will remain denied for the above-stated reasons.

2 We may deny an application or petition that does not comply with the technical requirements of the law even if the Service Center does not identity all of the grounds for denial in the initial aecision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d I 025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001 ), affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).

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In visa petition proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

Cite as Matter of B-P-, ID# 8331 (AAO Oct. 14, 2016)

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