NLB Exhibition Guide - Lo-res

R A F F L E S L E T T E R S :

I N T R I G U E S B E H I N D T H E

F O U N D I N G O F S I N G A P O R E

KEVIN Y L TAN

Lim Chen Sian

ii

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION vi

THE FOUNDING OF SINGAPORE: A TALE THROUGH RAFFLES LETTERS

Letter 1 Raf es to Colonel James Young, 12 January 1819 2

Letter 2 Raf es to Hastings, 15 February 1819 4

Letter 3 Raf es to John Adam, 16 February 1819 6

Letter 4 Raf es to Colonel James Young, 16 February 1819 8

Letter 5 Raf es to George Dowdeswell, 5 May 1819 9

Letter 6 Raf es to Hastings, 19 May 1819 10

Letter 7 Raf es to Hastings, 8 June 1819 12

Letter 8 Raf es to John Tayler, 9 June 1819 13

Letter 9 Raf es to Hastings, 17 June 1819 14

Letter 10 Major William Farquhar to Raf es, 22 June 1819 15

Letter 11 Raf es to Hastings, 29 September 1819 16

Letter 12 Raf es to Hastings, 25 November 1819 17

Letter 13 Raf es to Hastings, 25 March 1820 18

Letter 14 Raf es to Lansdowne, 15 April 1820 19

Letter 15 Raf es to Hastings, 12 August 1820 20

Letter 16 Hamilton to Dundas, 14 October 1820 21

Letter 17 Raf es to Lansdowne, 19 January 1821 22

Letter 18 Raf es to Lansdowne, 1 March 1822 23

Letter 19 Raf es to Reverend Thomas Raf es, 12 January 1823 25

Letter 20 Raf es to Lansdowne, 20 January 1823 26

iii

FOUNDING OF SINGAPORE

European Trade Rivalry in Asia

Introduction 27

The Conquest of Malacca 28

The Dutch and the English Move In 29

The China Trade

Introduction 29

Opium for Tea 29

New Markets 30

The British East India Company

In Search of Spices 31

The End of Portuguese Dominance in the East Indies 32

The British East India Company (EIC) in Southeast Asia 32

The Dutch East India Company

Introduction 34

Monopolising the Spice Trade 34

Making of the Dutch East Indies 35

The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry

Introduction 35

The Napoleonic Wars and British Opportunism 36

British Concerns & the Invasion of Java 36

The Dutch Return 36

Raf es Secret Mission

Agent to the Governor-General in the Malay States 38

Lieutenant-Governor of Java 38

Securing Britains Interest in the Eastern Seas 38

iv

The Johore Sultanate and Singapore

The Old Johore Sultanate 39

Political Organisation of Johore 39

The Death of Sultan Mahmud Shah III and the Succession Dispute 40

Raf es Capitalises on the Succession Dispute 41

The Search for a Southern Factory 41

Raf es, Hastings and Bannerman 43

Arrival at Singapore 45

The 1819 Johore-Britain Treaties 45

Free Port Singapore Flourishes 46

Becoming Part of the British Empire 47

Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raf es 49

Raf es Meteoric Rise 50

Raf es and the Conquest of Java 52

Race to Found a New Settlement 55

Raf es in Bencoolen 56

THE BUTE MAP THE EARLIEST LANDWARD MAP OF SINGAPORE 60

Looking at the Bute Map 62

Ancient Lines of Singapore 62

Bukit Larangan 62

Singapore Stone at Rocky Point 63

The Early Defences of Singapore 64

Gun Batteries 64

Military Cantonment 65

Government Hill 65

vThe Raf es Town Plan 66

European Town 68

Singapore River 68

Proposed Bridge 68

Chinese Town 70

Gambier Plantations 70

The Temenggongs Village 70

Sultan Husseins Domains 71

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raf es (17811826) 72

Marquess of Hastings (17541826) 73

John Adam (17791825) 74

Lieutenant-Colonel James Young (d. 1848) 74

Lieutenant-Colonel John Alexander Bannerman (17591819) 75

Marquess of Lansdowne (17801863) 76

John Tayler (d. 1820) 77

Lieutenant-Colonel William Farquhar (17741839) 77

Captain Thomas Otho Travers (17851844) 78

Captain William Lawrence Flint (17811828) 79

Temenggong Abdul Rahman (d. 1825) 79

Sultan Hussein Mahmud Shah (d. 1835) 80

REFERENCES 81

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 82


vi

Introduction

There are numerous accounts of how the ambitious Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raf es, Lieutenant-

Governor of the British outpost of Bencoolen, came to establish a British trading station at Singapore in

January 1819. Modern-day historians consider his founding of Singapore as one of the most important

and signi cant events that transformed the face of colonialism and trade in Southeast Asia. Most historical

accounts have relied on posthumous biographies of Raf es, eyewitness notes, and the many letters he wrote

to his friends and supporters; and Raf es was an amazingly proli c letter-writer.

For the rst time ever, exhibited at the National Library of Singapore are 13 of 26 letters from The Bute

Collection at Mount Stuart, Isle of Bute, Scotland. They were the private papers of Lord Hastings (Francis

Rawdon-Hastings) the Governor-General of India between 1813 and 1823. These letters were written to

Hastings (known at the time as Lord Moira) between April 1818 and October 1824. Of these, the most

important ones were those written almost contemporaneously with Raf es efforts to establish a new

settlement in the eastward. Originally opposed to Raf es, Hastings later supported Raf es and in fact

instructed Raf es to establish a British settlement at the southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. This led

directly to Raf es decision to establish a trading post in Singapore in 1819.

These letters are exhibited through the generosity of the 7th Marquess of Bute, owner of The Bute Collection.

The Raf es letters from The Brute Collection form the centrepiece of this exhibition. They are supplemented

with Raf es letters in the collection of the National Library of Singapore.

Also on display is a replica of one of the earliest landward maps of Singapore drawn after Raf es landing.

The Bute Map was probably commissioned within the rst two years of the founding of Singapore between

1819 and 1820.

The letters and the map are exhibited for the rst time ever in Raf es Letters: Intrigues behind the Founding of

Singapore, an exhibition held at the National Library of Singapore from 29 August 2012 to 28 February 2013.

I n t r i g u e s B E H I N D T H E F O U N D I N G O F S I N G A P O R E

1

The Founding of Singapore: A Tale Through Raf es Letters

The 13 letters from The Bute Collection at Mount Stuart presented in this exhibition were written between

January 1819 to August 1820. These letters provided a primary account on Raf es plan to establish a new

British settlement in the East Indies to counter the Dutch in uence. They revealed the complexities behind

the plan and how it was almost derailed by Raf es superiors if not for the support Raf es received from

Hastings. Hastings decision to support Raf es and how he originally opposed Raf es settlement plan was

also captured in the exhibited letters.

To supplement the narrative, particularly to show Raf es re ections on Singapore in its early days as a British

settlement, the exhibition also features six letters from the collection of the National Library of Singapore and

one letter from the National Museum of Singapore. Collectively, the letters provide an insightful tale on how

Singapore was founded.


2

Letter 1Raf es to Colonel James Young12 January 1819

In March 1818, Raf es arrived in Bencoolen (Bengkulu) in Sumatra to take up his post as its Lieutenant-Governor. By this time, he had been knighted by the Prince Regent (later King George IV) and was a celebrity in Londons intellectual circles. In addition to his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor, Raf es was also special agent of the British East India Company. His was tasked with reporting all happenings throughout the East Indies and to check Dutch in uence in the region.

On 16 April 1818, he wrote to Francis Rawdon-Hastings, the Governor-General of India, requesting a personal interview so that he could personally submit his views on how best to secure British interests in the Eastern Seas. Hastings responded favourably in a letter dated 6 July 1818, and invited Raf es for a conference in Bengal. Raf es set off immediately, arriving in Bengal on 29 September 1818. At the end of their discussions, Hastings was convinced that Raf es had the right strategy to thwart Dutch ambitions in the East Indies. He signed a memorandum (drafted by Raf es), giving Raf es considerable discretion to act independently to establish another British settlement in the East Indies, so long as he did not antagonise or come into con ict with the Dutch.

Raf es left Bengal for Prince of Wales Island (Penang), arriving on 29 December 1818. He met up with the Governor, Colonel John Bannerman, who was hostile to Raf es and his plans. By this time, the Dutch had occupied Rhio (Riau modern-day Tanjung Pinang on the island of Bintan) and were beginning to assert control over all of the Johor Sultanates territory.

On 8 January 1819, Raf es wrote to Hastings, telling him of the dire situation and his belief that the Dutch will extend their in uences over the whole of the ancient territories of Johor. He informed Hastings that he had instructed Major William Farquhar (former Resident and Commandant of Melaka) as well as Captains Daniel Ross and J.F.G. Crawford to proceed to Rhio to collect intelligence regarding Johor and the Carimon Islands (Karimun). In this letter, Raf es stated his belief that the island of Singcapore (Singapore) would be a better place for a settlement as it is more conveniently located for the protection of our China Trade and for commanding the Straits than Rhio

At Penang, Governor Bannerman did all he could to stop Raf es from proceeding eastwards to establish another British settlement. He refused to provide Raf es with any troops and ordered him to proceed with Captain

I N T R I G U E S B E H I N D T H E F O U N D I N G O F S I N G A P O R E

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John Monckton Coombs to Aceh to help settle a dynastic dispute and secure relations between Aceh and Penang. This was clearly intended to delay Raf es departure and to keep him in Penang as long as possible.

Farquhar set sail on 18 January 1819 and on the same day, Bannerman instructed Raf es to delay his mission to Aceh until sanction from the Government in Bengal was obtained. Raf es agreed but made secret plans to depart Penang that evening to catch up with Farquhar, whose vessel the Ganges was still anchored outside the harbour awaiting the next tide. Raf es left on the Indiana, captained by James Pearl, and wrote to Bannerman, saying that he would comply with his wishes to delay the Aceh mission, and that his time was most productively employed in carrying out his other mission to the Eastward.

In this letter to Colonel James Young, Secretary to the Military Board in Bengal, who supported Raf es and who was anti-Dutch, Raf es complains about Colonel Bannermans scheme to keep him in Penang and from undertaking his expedition. He further urges Young to convince the authorities in Bengal in particular John Adam, Political Secretary to Hastings not to listen to unfounded rumours and reports about the situation in the Straits and to allow him to proceed with his mission which he characterises as a matter of National honor.

(Left)Map of the Rhio Archipelago

Top)The Honourable Company Ship Indiana(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


4

Letter 2Raf es to Hastings15 February 1819

Raf es caught up with Farquhar, Ross and Crawford in the Carimon Islands on 27 January 1819. Early next morning, they set sail for Singapore and at 4.00 pm, arrived near a ne sandy beach. Raf es and Farquhar welcomed a delegation from the hereditary Temenggong of Johore, Abdul Rahman, before going ashore that evening for discussions with the Temenggong. On 30 January 1819, Raf es concluded a Preliminary Agreement with the Temenggong to allow the British to establish a trading factory on the island.

Raf es capitalised on a succession dispute to the Johore Sultanate that arose when Sultan Mahmud Shah III died in 1812 without designating an heir. At the time of Sultan Mahmuds death, his eldest son and heir-apparent Tengku Hussein (Tengku Long) was in Pahang getting married and Husseins younger brother Abdul Rahman was elected Sultan in his stead. Raf es employed two Anak Rajas to fetch Tengku Hussein from the island of Penyengat in Rhio to Singapore.

Tengku Hussein arrived on 1 February 1819 and held discussions with Raf es the following day. The British would recognise Tengku Hussein as the rightful heir to the throne and Sultan of Johore. On 6 February 1819, Hussein signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in his new capacity as Sultan of Johore. This treaty rati ed the Preliminary Agreement of 30 January. Raf es had succeeded in out-manoeuvring the Dutch and establishing a British port on Singapore.

The earliest image of Singapore. Sketch of the Land round Singapore

Harbour 7 February 1819 (Courtesy of National Archives of

United Kingdom)


5

Raf es left Singapore almost immediately for Penang afterwards, arriving on 13 February 1819. He appointed William Farquhar as Resident and Commandant of Singapore under his direct command. In the meantime, Raf es drafted a very long despatch, detailing the whole sequence of events that led to the foundation of Singapore. Dated 16 February 1819, this of cial despatch was sent to John Adam, Political Secretary to Hastings.

In the meantime, Raf es wrote a shorter and much more personal letter to Hastings. This is the letter exhibited here. In it, he reports his full accomplishment of his mission and informs Hastings that a British Station has been established in the Straits of Singapore in the vicinity of Johor in a situation combining every advantage geographical and local which we could desire.

Proudly, Raf es informs Hastings that he has done this without immediate collision or interference with the Dutch. He also sent Hastings a Sketch of the Harbour of Singapore shewing the position with relation to the China Trade and took the opportunity to complain of Bannermans lack of cordial cooperation and assistance.

Plan of Singapore Harbour by Captain Daniel Ross(Courtesy of National Archives of United Kingdom)


6

The Dutch Navy in action by Hendrik Cornelisz Vroom

Letter 3Raf es to John Adam16 February 1819

By establishing a British trading station at Singapore, Raf es effectively out anked the Dutch who were absolutely livid with rage. But the Dutch were not the only ones who were infuriated by Raf es. Bannerman never forgave Raf es for disobeying him and sneaking off in the middle of the night to join Farquhar at the Carimons. Opposition to Raf es actions in Singapore thus came from both these quarters.

The Dutch, who had occupied Rhio, prevailed over Sultan Abdul Rahman of Johore and maintained the right to object to any British occupation of any territory under the control of the Johore Sultan except for the Carimon Islands, which the British had earlier been given a right to occupy by Sultan Abdul Rahman while the latter was still an independent monarch. Jan Samuel Timmerman-Thyssen, Dutch Governor of Malacca even threatened to sail to Singapore with an expeditionary force and bring Farquhar back in chains. Godert van der Capellan, the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, decided against military action but protested to Hastings nonetheless.


7

Godert van der Capellan, Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies

In the meantime, the Johore Sultanate, anxious not to upset the Dutch, alleged that Tengku Hussein had been kidnapped and forced to sign the treaty under duress. Tengku Hussein later recanted this statement and stated that the English established themselves at Singapore with my free will and consent and that the earlier allegation of duress had been motivated solely from the apprehension of bringing on me the vengeance of the Dutch at some future period.

The rst of cial protest note arrived on Bannermans desk on 16 February 1819. The Dutch authorities in Malacca enquired under what authority Raf es occupied Singapore. Bannerman dutifully transmitted this to Calcutta and then ordered Raf es to evacuate Farquhar from Singapore lest there be any bloodshed.

Raf es remained unmoved, convinced that the occupation of Singapore was necessary if British in uence and power was not to be eclipsed by the Dutch. In this letter, he writes to John Adam, Political Secretary to Hastings, highlighting the advantages of Singapore as a port and assuring Calcutta that he can support the settlement from the budget allocated to Bencoolen. His main fear is that Bannerman would be given control over Singapore.


8

Letter 4Raf es to Colonel James Young16 February 1819

Raf es remained in Penang from 13 February to 8 March 1819 before departing with Captain John Monckton Coombs for their delayed mission to Aceh. In the meantime, he busied himself writing to several persons, including Colonel James Young in Bengal, and then later to Hastings.

In this letter to Young, Raf es complains about the lack of cooperation on the part of Bannerman and the Government at Penang. He reveals that he founded Singapore with only one Company of troops and was unable to secure from Bannerman another two Companies that were necessary to maintain British presence in Singapore. Raf es was convinced that Bannermans behaviour was prompted by his anxiety to protect Penangs interests and that Bannerman would give up all our Eastern & China Interests to maintain his little authority at Penang against my interference further East

Lieutenant- Colonel John Alexander Bannerman (17591819)

Map of Penang and Province Wellesley(Courtesy of Lim Chen Sian)


9

Letter 5Raf es to George Dowdeswell5 May 1819

Raf es returned to Penang from Aceh on 28 April 1819 and on 22 May 1819 set sail for Bencoolen by way of Singapore. He arrived in Singapore on 31 May 1819. This was his rst trip back to Singapore after signing the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Tengku Long, who was now acknowledged as the Sultan of Johore by the British. He remained in Singapore for almost a month, leaving only on 28 June 1819.

This letter was written during his brief stay at Penang just after he returned from his Aceh mission. It is addressed to George Dowdeswell, Secretary to the Government of Bengal. In the letter, Raf es reports that Singapore is making great progress and that three Companies of Sepoys have arrived from Bencoolen to support the administration. The port, he proudly notes, is already crowded with Native Vessels and the population is most rapidly increasing.

(Top)The Government of Bengal at Fort William, Calcutta

(Bottom)Sketch of Singapore three months after its establishment (Courtesy of National Archives of United Kingdom)


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Letter 6Raf es to Hastings19 May 1819

Raf es wrote this letter just a few days before departing Penang for Bencoolen via Singapore. He was clearly in better spirits than when he rst returned from Aceh. The Aceh mission, which had been to settle a dynastic dispute, saw Raf es cross swords with his fellow commissioner John Monckton Coombs.

The dispute arose when Sultan Jauhar al-Alam Shah of Aceh began asserting his authority by enforcing royal monopolies on commerce and channeling trade to Banda Aceh, the capital. Jauhars regional chiefs were opposed to these restrictions and together with a number of Penang merchants, conspired to replace Jauhar with a new Sultan. The prime candidate for this plan was Syed Hussein, a wealthy merchant from Penang. However Syed Hussein declared himself too old to rule Aceh and the mantle fell on his son Saif-al-Alam.

Hastings was agnostic as to who succeeded to the throne, so long as order was restored and trade continued unhindered. Raf es supported the incumbent Jauhar while Coombs favoured Saif-al-Alam as Sultan. After almost 7 weeks of investigations, arguments and counter-arguments consisting of not less than a thousand pages, Raf es persuaded the Supreme Government to support Jauhar, and he was restored to the throne in April 1819.

In this letter, Raf es tells Hastings that the unpleasant feeling excited by the Mission has in great measure subsided, noting with pleasure Hastings instruction to Bannerman to support Singapore. Indeed, Hastings had castigated Bannerman in a stinging rebuke leading the Penang Governor to despatch 200 men and 6,000 rupees to Singapore on 18 May 1819.


11

Seopys of the Madras Army in the late 19th century

View of Acheh, 1741(Courtesy of Lim Chen Sian)


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Letter 7Raf es to Hastings8 June 1819

After arriving in Singapore on 31 May 1819, Raf es lost no time in attending to the running of Singapore. According to his wife Sophia, Raf es time was most agreeably occupied as he spent time marking out the future town and giving instructions to Colonel Farquhar for the arrangement and management of the new Colony. Raf es also found time to write to his friends and supporters, and more signi cantly, to important personalities in London to inspire con dence in Singapore and obtain support for its existence. Among the in uential friends he wrote to were Colonel Addenbrooke, equerry (personal attendant) to Princess Charlotte; Conservative politician Sir Robert Harry Inglis; and the Duchess of Somerset.

Naturally, Raf es also wrote to Hastings, informing him of his return to Singapore en route to Bencoolen. In this letter, Raf es reports to Hastings on the general prosperity and rapid advancement of our Establishment. Obviously pleased with the work of Farquhar, he tells Hastings that Farquhar has been indefatigable and that the settlement has assumed a new appearance with the harbour lled with shipping and the defences already respectable. The population has also grown tremendously to not less than ve thousand souls with numbers daily increasing.

Princess Charlotte Augustus of Wales (17961817) and her husband Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld (17901865)

(Left)Sir Robert Harry Inglis(17861855)

(Right)Charlotte Seymour, Duchess of Somerset (17721827)


13

Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie(17661814)

Lord Minto, Governor-General of India, 1807-1813

Letter 8Raf es to John Tayler9 June 1819

Raf es wrote this letter to John Tayler, his commercial agent. Tayler ran an agency house, Edmund Boehm & John Tayler, which provided the 10,000 bond required by the East India Company when Raf es was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen. Tayler was more than a mere commercial representative. In the aftermath of Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespies complaints of Raf es maladministration of Java, Tayler wrote to Governor-General Minto to defend Raf es. Back in Singapore, Raf es felt close enough to Tayler to write to him about Singapore. In this letter, he candidly complains to Tayler about the obstacles he faced from Bannerman over his settlement in Singapore. He even insinuates favouritism and nepotism on Bannermans part in respect of his son-in-law William Edward Phillips.


14

Letter 9Raf es to Hastings17 June 1819

In this letter to Hastings, Raf es informs the Governor-General that he despatched three Companies of the 20th Bengal Regiment of Native Infantry to be stationed in Singapore. At this time, Colonel Bannerman in Penang was refusing to supply the new settlement with troops.

The three companies had only recently been relieved from Bencoolen and were to return to Calcutta. The troops were under the charge of Captain Nicholas Manley (17841823), an of cer for whom Raf es had the highest regard. Raf es placed Manley and his troops under the command of Major William Farquhar, Resident and Commandant of Singapore, and authorised Manley to order their three vessels to proceed directly to Calcutta without calling at Penang. They were to proceed without delay to the Port of Singapore where a British Station has been established, & where you will be pleased to consider yourself under the general orders of the Resident Major Farquhar

When reinforcements arrived that same month, the troops proceeded to Calcutta. There, Manley raised an additional company of the Fort Marlborough Local Corps in January 1821. He was promoted to the rank of Major on 26 August 1822 but died on 23 May 1823. Manley was held in such high esteem that when he died, the commanding of cer of the cantonment at Barakpur was ordered to go into mourning. Manley was succeeded as Commandant of the Troops at Fort Marlborough by Captain Thomas Otho Travers, another Raf es protg.

Subadar - Chief Native Of cer, Bengal Native Infantry 1814. Reproduced from John Williams An historical account of the rise and progress of the Bengal Native Infantry, 1817

Grenadier Sepoy Rank and le infantryman 1814. Reproduced from John Williams An historical account of the rise and progress of the Bengal Native Infantry, 1817


15

Letter 10Major William Farquhar to Raf es22 June 1819

More than four months after Raf es signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Sultan Hussein, the Dutch were still disputing Britains right to establish a trading port in Singapore. The controversy arose largely through the uncertainty over the exact extent of Dutch control over the territories of the Johor-Rhio-Lingga empire. While it was clear that the Dutch controlled much of the Rhio Archipelago, their in uence and control of Johore (and Singapore) was seriously in doubt.

On 31 December 1818, Bannerman sent Raf es a copy of the correspondence between Farquhar and the Dutch Commissioners at Malacca Jan Samuel Timmerman Thijssen and Vice-Admiral J.C. Wolterbeek in which the latter claimed in very strong and decided language that the Rhio Archipelago, Johore and Pahang were dependencies of the Netherlands. Notwithstanding this clear assertion of authority by the Dutch, it was unclear if Johor included either the Carimon Islands or Singapore. This is the context in which Farquhars letter to Raf es was written.

In reply to Raf es query whether the Dutch Commissioners at Malacca speci ed the islands at the mouth of the Straits of Malacca as dependencies of Malacca, I beg to inform you that to the best of my recollection during the whole course of our of cial Proceedings, the Commissioners never once particularised the Islands in question as such Dependencies.

Major William Farquhar (17741839), rst Resident and Commandant of Singapore

View of Malacca, 1746 (Courtesy of Lim Chen Sian)


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Letter 11Raf es to Hastings29 September 1819

Raf es left Singapore on 28 June 1819 and reached Bencoolen on 31 July 1819, more than a month later. The otherwise peaceful journey was marred by a minor accident in the Rhio Straits. His vessel had struck a bank and just as the crew were to abandon ship, someone suggested emptying the water casks to lighten the ship so it could oat clear of the bank. This worked but they were short of water and were refused water when they tried to re ll the casks at Rhio, the Dutch Resident probably having heard that Raf es was on board. Luckily, a passing American clipper supplied the ship with casks of water and they ended their voyage safely.

On 8 August 1819, Governor Bannerman died suddenly after contracting cholera. He was 60 years old at the time of his death. Having just learnt of Bannermans death and having received a report that his second-in-command and son-in-law William Edward Phillips had also died, Raf es wrote this letter to Hastings for favourable consideration of his pretensions to the Government of Pinang, and the advantage which must result from uniting the charge of all Interests to the Eastward under one authority. In this letter, he argues that he is more senior within the Penang establishment and adds that by the latest accounts from Sincapore everything was going on well.

Bannerman indeed passed away on 8 August 1819, but the news that Phillips had also died was untrue. Phillips was well and alive and would outlive Raf es by almost 40 years, dying at the age of 96 in 1865 in London. He eventually succeeded Bannerman as Governor of Penang and occupied that post till 1824, retiring at the age of 55.

William Edward Phillips, Lieutenant-Governor of Prince of Wales Island from 18201824

Fort Marlborough, Bencoolen, Sumatra


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Letter 12Raf es to Hastings25 November 1819

To further his claims to the Governorship of Penang, Raf es decided to leave for Calcutta to meet with Hastings. He left Bencoolen in the middle of October 1819 and arrived there on 12 November 1819. Raf es expectation at being appointed Governor were not purely speculative or fuelled by pure ambition though that was certainly much in evidence. When he had last seen Hastings, the Governor-General had intimated to him that should the Governorship become vacant, he would recommend Raf es for the post.

When Raf es got to Calcutta, Hastings told him that when he had made that offer, he had not expected the post of Governor to become vacant so suddenly and so soon. More importantly, the idea of putting all the British settlements in the east Penang, Bencoolen and Singapore under one government had not yet been discussed, much less approved by the Court of Directors in London. In these circumstances, Hastings felt compelled to appoint Phillips to the Governorship and retain the system of separate administration for the three territories.

Disappointed at his patrons response, Raf es turned his attention to submitting to Hastings his suggestions for the future arrangement of our Eastern Establishments, which had been prepared on the assumption that both Bannerman and Phillips had died. In this letter, Raf es explained that his proposals are not actuated by purely personal motives but by a natural ambition to render himself instrumental in carrying into effect a plan which appeared to be calculated to promote the public interest, and expend the sphere and in uence of Hastings enlightened administration. Raf es also raises the prospect of setting a limit to Phillips tenure as Governor of Penang.

(Above) Fort Cornwallis, Penang

(Left) View of Penang, 1814(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


18

Letter 13Raf es to Hastings25 March 1820

Raf es was to remain in Calcutta for some three months on account of illness. Here began a series of severe headaches that would totally cripple him and send him into a t of depression. Raf es only recovered suf ciently to leave Calcutta at the end of January 1820, arriving back in Bencoolen on 11 March 1820.

He was glad to be home with Sophia and his two children Charlotte (named after Princess Charlotte) and Leopold (named after Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg). He had lost a lot of weight but was on the mend. Earlier in February 1820, the Court of Directors in London had stated that, though they were displeased at Raf es initiative in establishing a British trading settlement at Singapore and that Raf es had clearly exceeded his authority in doing so, but they were not prepared to annul his action nor recall him until further advised by the Governor-General. Hastings received this news with some satisfaction, seeing it as a means to prolong discussion and putting off any action for the time being.

In the meantime, Farquhar, who had been administering Singapore since February 1819, had requested to be relieved of his post so that he could go on home leave. Raf es agreed and appointed his Second Assistant, Captain Thomas Otho Travers (17851844) to succeed him as Resident and Commandant of Singapore. In this letter, Raf es informs Hastings of this change of command, asks him to con rm the appointment of his brother-in-law, Captain William Lawrence Flint, to replace Francis James Bernard (Farquhars son-in-law) as Master Attendant of Singapore.

Raf es goes on to inform Hastings that he managed to reduce the costs of running Singapore to the lowest possible standard and that the monthly expenses of this highly important Station will not in future exceed 5,000 Dollars a month. Raf es then asks Hastings to approve his visiting Singapore and remaining there for some months.

Captain Thomas Otho Travers (17851844)

Captain William Lawrence Flint(17811828)


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Letter 14Raf es to Lansdowne15 April 1820

While Hastings was busy gathering more information on Tengku Longs claim to the throne of Johore, Raf es supporters in London were busy seeking endorsement for his actions. One of his staunchest and most in uential supporters was Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, the 3rd Marquess of Lansdowne (17801863), who had brie y been Chancellor of the Exchequer (18061807). Lansdownes father, William Petty (better known as the Earl of Shelburne), was Prime Minister of England from 1782 to 1783.

Lansdowne had been introduced to Raf es by the Duchess of Somerset and he shared many of Raf es interests. He was a founding member of Royal Asiatic Society of which Raf es was also a member, a Fellow of the Royal Society (like Raf es) and President of the Statistical Society of London, and later succeeded Raf es as President of the Zoological Society of London. A strong supporter of free-trade, Lansdowne was thrice Lord President of the Privy Council and chaired the House of Lords Select Committee responsible for reviewing Eastern trade. In his various political capacities, Lansdowne played a key role in Raf es battle to keep Singapore under the British ag.

In this long and wide-ranging letter, Raf es starts off discussing botany Sumatran plants with which he hoped to enrich Lansdownes collection and other zoological subjects. Raf es then thanks Lansdowne for acknowledging his political exertions on the island of Sumatra and moves quickly and excitedly to tell Lansdowne about Singapore. Writing like a proud father, Raf es informs Lansdowne that there are now over 10,000 persons on the island and no less than 173 sail of vessels of different descriptions, principally Native, arrived & sailed in the course of the rst two months, and it already has become a Commercial Port of importance. Raf es takes this opportunity to once again reiterate his vision for British interests in the Eastern Seas and includes a copy of the Memorandum he had sent to Hastings much earlier.

Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 3rd Marquess of Lansdowne (17801863)

The rich botany of the East Indies(Courtesy of Lim Chen Sian)


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Captain Thomas Otho Travers (17851844)(Courtesy of National Museum of Singapore, National Heritage Board)

Title page of Travers Journal (Courtesy of National Museum of Singapore, National Heritage Board)

Letter 15Raf es to Hastings12 August 1820

This letter to Hastings was written from Bencoolen. Captain Travers, who had been sent to Singapore to take over the post of Resident and Commandant from Farquhar, found Farquhar reluctant to leave his post. After staying in Singapore for more than half a year, Travers and his family proceeded to England via India.

In the meantime, Raf es appointed his Second Assistant, Captain William Gordon Mackenzie, to succeed Travers and take charge of Singapore.

Raf es is restless and anxious about Singapore and informs Hastings that he would have liked to take personal charge of Singapore if not for the fear of creating further tension between the English and the Dutch. He ends with the hope that the time is not far distant when the real value and object of the Settlement at Singapore will be fully and justly appreciated by all parties.


21

Letter 16Hamilton to Dundas14 October 1820

Little is known about Captain Archibald Hamilton, author of this letter. Hamilton appears to be very familiar with the Eastern Seas and the trade of the region. Hamilton wrote this letter to Robert Dundas, 2nd Lord Melville who was, at this time, First Lord of the Admiralty. Prior to becoming First Lord, Dundas had been President of the Board of Control for India from 1807 to 1812 and clearly maintained a continuing interest in the affairs of the East Indies. The two men appeared to be well acquainted with each other as Dundas thanked Hamilton personally for the letter. What is fascinating about this letter is the commercial perspective Hamilton brings to the discussion of Britains interests in Southeast Asia. His letter gives a detailed description of the kinds of goods in high demand and traded regularly in the region.

Batavia, port of call for many traders including the English

The Princess Royal, an East Indiaman in the eastern seas, 1770


22

William Wilberforce (17591833)

Letter 17Raf es to Lansdowne19 January 1821

This letter to Lansdowne again begins with a discussion of botany and agriculture, and then moves quickly to bring news of how well Singapore is doing. Raf es then goes further in his assessment of the various territories in the area, including the island of Nias which impresses Raf es greatly as a potential British settlement. He quotes extensively from a eld report of the island. Of particular concern to Raf es is the slave trade then taking place on the island. Raf es was opposed to slavery and was close friends with the great anti-slavery campaigner William Wilberforce (17591833).

Map of the Sumatra. Reproduced from Marsdens History of Sumatra, 1811


23

Letter 18Raf es to Lansdowne1 March 1822

This letter was written after Raf es suffered a series of tragedies and illnesses. He apologises to Lansdowne for his tardy reply on account of long continued illness and a series of domestic af ictions. This is a sublime understatement: His eldest son Leopold died during an epidemic on 4 July 1821 while his eldest daughter Charlotte fell ill with dysentery at the end of 1821. His youngest son, Stamford Marsden, died on 3 January 1822 from illness and Charlotte died 10 days later. Only Ella, among his four children, left Bencoolen alive.

Raf es terrible headaches returned quite possibly the result of congenital arterio-venous malformation and the death of his children drove him to the depths of depression. He longed to visit Singapore once more in order to make such general arrangements as will admit of the expansion and rise of the Settlement without endangering the principle on which it is established. Convinced that his health was rapidly failing, Raf es saw this as his last chance to do something for Singapore before retiring to England.

The letter concludes with a long discourse on the importance of Siam as a place of great riches and a country with which the British could trade and in uence. He informs Lansdowne of the mission of Dr. John Crawfurd (later to replace Farquhar as Resident of Singapore) to the Court of Siam. However, Raf es does not envisage a rise in revenue from Britains direct trade with Siam but rather, the riches that would be earned in the trade in Siamese goods and produce with Singapore as an entrepot base.

Dr. John Crawfurd (17831868), second Resident of Singapore


24

Map of Siam(Courtesy of Lim Chen Sian)


25

Letter 19Raf es to Reverend Thomas Raf es12 January 1823

Raf es set out for Singapore with Sophia and his daughter Ella on 17 September 1822, arriving in Singapore on 10 October 1822. It had been 3 years and 8 months since he founded the settlement, and Raf es was to remain on the island till June 1823. It would be his third, nal and longest visit to the settlement he established.

Raf es was delighted with what he saw. The settlement was bustling and trade was booming. Compared to Bencoolen, Singapore was alive, exciting and forward-looking and Raf es spirits and health improved, at least for a while. Soon, Raf es splitting headaches returned and he became depressed and irritable. One person who suffered most from Raf es irritability was Farquhar, who had done a very creditable job of administering Singapore, given all his limitations. Raf es brother-in-law, Captain Flint (mentioned in this letter), who hated Farquhar, took every opportunity to turn Raf es against his old compatriot. This led to Raf es relieving Farquhar of his Residency in April 1823. Raf es then took over the administration of the island himself.

This letter was to his rst cousin the Reverend Dr. Thomas Raf es (17881863). Educated at Homerton College, Thomas Raf es became a pastor at Hammersmith in 1809 and then moved to Liverpool where he was minister of the Great George Street Chapel for 49 years. They corresponded regularly and in this letter Raf es tells his cousin of how successful Singapore had become, and shared with him his plans for setting up a college in Singapore with the help of the famous Scottish evangelist and educator, Dr. Robert Morrison (17821834).

Reverend Dr. Thomas Raf es(1788 1863)

The Singapore Institution, 1841 (Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


26

Letter 20Raf es to Lansdowne20 January 1823

This letter to Lansdowne is primarily about Singapore and how successful it has become. He contrasts the busy, energetic and economical Singapore with Bencoolen and supplies Lansdowne with a range of impressive achievements in Singapore. These include the setting up of a press, establishment of a land registry, creating of a legal system, introduction of the rst set of administrative regulations and the eradication of piracy in Singapore waters. That said, Raf es remains anxious over retaining Singapore. This, however, was not to be settled till the following year with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824.

(Right)Early instructions and regulations by Raf es

(Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore)

Signatories to the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty, Anton Reinhard

Falck (top) and Charles Watkin Williams-Wynn (bottom)


27

Founding of Singapore

Pepper, nutmeg and cloves are some of the most valuable items of trade for the British East India Company(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)

European Trade Rivalry in Asia

Introduction

Trade and commerce lay at the heart of rivalry between the European powers

in Asia. Until about 1800, spices like cloves, mace and nutmeg could only be

found in the Spice Islands in the Moluccas (modern-day Maluku). Because

of their scarcity, spices were expensive and before long, the great European

powers began ghting each other for control of the spice trade.

European explorers and traders had long sought the prospects and produce of

Asia in a quest to bring home the most precious and valuable commodities the

European market desired. Some goods such as silk, pepper and spices could

only be found in certain parts of Asia and whoever secured a regular supply

of these commodities stood to make a fortune. The land route, pioneered by

explorers like Niccolo and Maffeo Polo of Venice in the 13th century, proved

arduous and dangerous. Furthermore, the mode of transport limited the

amount of goods that could be transported across the vast distances.


28

The Conquest of Malacca

For the enormous risks to pay off, a viable sea route to Asia had to be found.

For centuries, the sea route between Asia and the Middle-east was dominated

by Arab traders. But by the 15th century, the Europeans began building larger

and larger ships and sending them further and further a eld. The Portuguese,

the premier naval power of the 1400s and 1500s, were the rst to expand into

Asia with the establishment of a fort in Kochi, India, in 1503 and the conquest

of the ancient city of Malacca in 1511.

The conquest of Malacca was signi cant for two reasons. First, the Portuguese

capitalised on its location and used it as a strategic base for Portuguese

expansion in the East Indies, including the Spice Islands. Second, the conquest

of Malacca signalled the beginning of the trading rivalry between the great

European powers Portuguese, English, Dutch and French in the region that

would lead to the colonization of Southeast Asia.Malacca from the sea, 1814

(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


29

The Dutch and the English Move In

The Portuguese had a signi cant rst-mover advantage over the other

European powers and this allowed them to dominate the spice trade in the

16th century. However, the other European powers, most notably the Dutch

and the English, were not content to allow Portugal to dominate trade in the

East Indies. They too began sending their own expeditions to establish trading

ports in the East. By the end of the 16th century, Portugal was over-extended

and was quickly eclipsed as a naval power by Spain, Holland and England. The

Spanish concentrated their expansion on the Philippines and Formosa while

the Dutch and English battled for supremacy in Southeast Asia. To facilitate

these trading ventures, the English established the East India Company (EIC)

in 1600 and the Dutch followed suit with their Vereenigde Oost-Indische

Compagnie (VOC) or United East India Company in 1602.

The China Trade

Introduction

The British rst attempted to nd a naval trade route to China in 1596, but the

eet commanded by Captain Benjamin Wood never reached its destination

and disappeared without a trace. It was only in 1637 that Captain Weddell

successfully landed in Canton (Guangzhou) but he left empty-handed. The

British East India Company nally established a trading post on Formosa

(Taiwan) in 1672 and succeeded in engaging in direct and regular trade with

the Chinese. Thereafter, British vessels began plying the trade routes along the

Chinese ports of Amoy (Xiamen), Chusan (Zhoushan) and Canton. Within this

limited compass, trade between British and Chinese merchants ourished.

Over the next 150 years, attempts by the British East India Company to secure

preferential trade terms or to have greater British trade representation in China,

or even to get trade restrictions lifted, failed.

Opium for Tea

Not withstanding these limitations, trade with China ourished. In the 18th

century, the British East India Company traded British wool and Indian

cotton for Chinese tea, porcelain and silk. The English love of tea made the


30

commodity the single biggest item on Britains trading account. With declining

trade in English wool and Indian cotton, Britain soon found it dif cult to pay

for the large amounts of tea it needed. Opium, which was technically banned

in China, was grown in abundance in British-controlled India and the British

facilitated the sale of opium to the Chinese and used that income to pay for

its tea.

This trade was extremely lucrative as it ensured a cheap supply of tea and

healthy pro ts from the sale of Indian opium simultaneously. At one point, the

British East India Company was importing up to half a million pounds worth

of tea per ship before it was re-exported to the rest of Europe. The enactment

of Pitts Commutation Act of 1784 further boosted the tea trade by greatly

reducing taxes on the import of tea. This trade was also essential in nancing

the Companys increasingly expensive operations in India.

New Markets

Besides the huge pro ts earned from the opium and tea trade, the British

East India Companys China trade gave British manufacturers a new market

to export their goods. In the mid 1700s, the Industrial Revolution further

unleashed the potential of British manufacturers, allowing them to mass-

produce goods at a much cheaper price than before. But with the onset of

the American Revolution and Napoleon Bonapartes campaign in continental

Europe, these manufacturers were in dire need for new markets for their

goods. As such, China proved to be the next best market for the sale of British

goods, especially for British cotton manufacturers who created much mass-

produced products by the 1770s.

The China trade continued to remain pro table and by 1799 the British East

India Companys Canton factory had a Company staff of 17. However, the ban

on the sale of opium and increasing competition and trade restrictions made

it increasingly dif cult to capitalise on the China trade. By 1813, the British

East India Companys China trade was in trouble. Furthermore, the end of

the Companys monopoly in India resulted in the India trade being opened to

other merchants. This forced the British East India Company to look to the East

Indies in search of income.

Opium Poppy(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


31

The British East India Company

In Search of Spices

The quest for spices provided all the necessary impetus for the establishment

of the British East India Company (EIC). The company was founded by

Royal Charter on 31 December 1600 following more than a year of political

negotiations and capital formation. The Charter named 218 subscribers to the

new enterprise and granted the Company a 15-year monopoly in all British

trade and commerce in the East. It also provided for the management of the

Company by a committee comprising a Governor, a Deputy Governor and 24

members who were elected by a Court of Directors.

By the time the British East India Company was formed, the Portuguese had

dominated the spice trade in the East Indies for a century. The Dutch, on the

other hand, had found a direct route round the Cape of Good Hope and to

directly import spices. As a result, it was necessary for the British to establish a

more aggressive commercial entity to compete against the Dutch. The London

merchants invested their monies in four ships which were to venture to the

East. This investment netted the merchants a 234% pro t, allowing them to

establish themselves as a major commercial powerhouse. Its monopolistic

power gave it an edge over other competitors, including merchants from

Holland or Portugal.

British East India Company Coat of Arms(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)

East India House, Leadenhall Street, London(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


32

The End of Portuguese Dominance in the East Indies

In some ways, the British East India Company put the nal nail on the cof n of

Portuguese power in the East. In 1615, the British eet under the command of

Nicholas Downton battled the Portuguese eet in India and won. The victory

forced the Portuguese to withdraw from the Indian Ocean and they never

regained their power nor in uence in the region. Without the Portuguese, the

British East India Company was able to expand rapidly throughout India. By

the end of the 18th century, the Company ruled over Bombay, Calcutta, and

Madras. Although the British East India Company was known for its successful

conquest of India, its interests were not limited to the sub-continent. Since

its inception, the Company had far bigger ambitions to dominate trade in

the East Indies, but was unable to do so because of Dutch domination of

the Spice Islands. Indeed, English merchants in the mid-1600s complained

bitterly about the United East India Companys (VOC) monopoly over the

spice trade claiming that it was impossible to move one single clove without

Dutch authorization.

The British East India Company (EIC) in Southeast Asia

The British East India Companys opportunity to break the Dutch domination in

the East Indies came in the early 1800s with Napoleons conquest of Holland

in 1795 and the crushing debt the VOC had accrued. Seizing the chance,

the British East India Company expanded its reach beyond its rst Southeast

Asian trading post on the Prince of Wales Island (Penang) which it acquired

in 1786. As the Napoleonic wars waged on in Europe, the Dutch surrendered

their colony of Malacca to the British to forestall French expansion in the

region. Malacca was eventually restored to the Dutch in 1815 after Napoleon

surrendered.

In the meantime, the British East India Company had bigger plans to secure

trade in the region. In 1811, with Prime Minister William Pitts authorisation,

the British East India Company invaded Java. This invasion saw Raf es installed

as Lieutenant-Governor of Java. This set the stage for the intense Dutch-British

East India Company rivalry that would ensue over the next decade.


33

Government House at Malacca, 1814(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)

The Java Invasion Fleet off the High Islands, Southwest Borneo, 1811(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


34

The United East India Company (VOC) ag(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)

The Dutch East India Company

Introduction

Although it was the English who unseated the Portuguese in India, it was the

Dutch who put an end to Portuguese power in Southeast Asia. When Spain

and Portugal came under King Philip in 1581, the Dutch, who had revolted

against Spanish rule, felt free to attack Portugals Asian territories. In the 1590s,

Dutch companies bandied together to nance trading expeditions to Asia.

These various companies established a cartel in 1602 that was to become

the United East India Company or Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie

(VOC). Like the British East India Company, the VOC was a state-sanctioned

monopoly, coming into existence under the authority of the Estates-General of

the Netherlands. The VOC had a 21-year monopoly on trade in Asia.

Monopolising the Spice Trade

With a start-up capital of 540,000 (compared to the British East India

Companys 30,000) the VOC was in a much better position to open up trade

routes and to capitalise on trade opportunities in the East Indies. After all,

both the English and the Dutch were after the same goods, particularly spices,

pepper and coffee.

The Dutch were not averse to using brute force to secure their monopoly on

the spice trade, and by the mid-1600s, the clove trade was rmly in the VOCs

hands. The spice trade proved highly pro table. By 1669, the VOC was the

richest private company in the world. It had some 150 merchant vessels, 40

warships, 50,000 employees and a private army of 10,000 men. Its investors

reaped a spectacular dividend of 40% on the original investment. Other

monopolies it secured in the 1600s included pepper, sugar, rice and even

opium.


35

Making of the Dutch East Indies

Between 1685 and 1755, the Dutch fought and won three wars of Javanese

Succession. Their victories gave the Dutch control over practically the whole

of the island of Java. However, the VOC began to decline thereafter, and

by 1799, it was bankrupt. The VOC was of cially liquidated on 1 January

1800 and its territorial possessions in the East Indies, including Java, were

transferred to the Dutch government and became known as the Dutch East

Indies (modern-day Indonesia). Despite the demise of the VOC, the Dutch

continued to dominate trade in Southeast Asia. However, the Dutch control

was increasingly being challenged by the British. Backed by growing British

naval power, the British East India Company made forays into Southeast Asia,

thereby threatening Dutch in uence. Eventually, the encroachment led to a

erce trade rivalry between the British and the Dutch in the East Indies which

set the stage for the establishment of the British trading settlement of modern

Singapore.

The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry

Introduction

At the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars in 1799, the VOC had a far bigger

presence in Southeast Asia than the British, who only had Penang, Bencoolen

and a few territories in India. This was partly because the British had focused

their energies on the China trade while the Dutch, unable to compete with the

British in the Asian textiles and opium trade, directed their attention to Java

and to the rest of the East Indies.

The VOCs relations with the colonies in Java, which depended on the

cooperation of local princes and rajas, was such that it continued to

assiduously exclude other European powers in the region. The Dutch and

the British differed in their respective outlooks on their colonial relations.

Since the Dutch relied on contracts and treaties with indigenous potentates

to secure their commercial interests, they were anxious that other Western

powers should not interfere in their control of the region by signing new

treaties with other local rulers that would threaten or reduce their control.


36

The Napoleonic Wars and British Opportunism

With the Napoleonic Wars raging in Europe, the British grew increasingly

worried about the continued pro tability of their China trade. By this time,

both Great Britain and the Netherlands were at war with Napoleonic

France. When the Netherlands fell to the French army in 1795, a pro-French

government established the Batavian Republic on Java to succeed the previous

government. Capitalising on this change of sovereignty, the British took over

Dutch Malacca, the Cape of Good Hope, and a sizeable part of Ceylon.

Despite this, the British East India Company was under increasing nancial

strains in India and Napoleon still had plans to conquer India.

British Concerns & the Invasion of Java

All these developments worried Lord Minto, then Governor-General of India.

Yet, amidst the maelstrom of events came a chance for the British to break

the Netherlands 200-year monopoly of the region. With French occupation

of the Netherlands, a French governor, Marshal Herman Willem Daendals,

was sent to administer the Dutch territories of Batavia and Java. Daendals was

a tyrant and was resented by both the Dutch and French and his economic

programme was a failure. This presented Minto with a golden opportunity to

remove French naval threats in the Indian Ocean by conquering Java since it

was now under French occupation and Britain was at war with France. This

set the stage for the British East India Companys conquest of Java in 1811.

The Dutch Return

With the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, Java was restored to Dutch rule

as was Malacca. The British were now only left with Penang and Bencoolen

and were very much at the mercy of Dutch hegemony and trade restrictions. It

was not a comfortable situation and Lord Mintos successor, Lord Moira (later

the 3rd Marquess of Hastings), was anxious that something had to be done to

protect Britains interests in the Eastward.


37

A view of the Government House and Council House at Fort Marlborough, Bencoolen. (Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)

The British landing at Cilincing, Java, 1811(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


38

Raf es Secret Mission

Agent to the Governor-General in the Malay States

Throughout his life, Thomas Stamford Bingley Raf es was involved in several

secret missions. The rst was related to the conquest of Java. Lord Minto

appointed Raf es as Agent to the Governor-General in the Malay States in

1810. As Mintos special agent, he was tasked with gathering intelligence

about Dutch movements and Dutch-Malay relations in Java with the view to

planning an attack on French-controlled Java.

Lieutenant-Governor of Java

Raf es proved to be the right man for the job. During his stay in Malacca, he

collected, with the help of Major William Farquhar, valuable intelligence that

allowed Lord Minto to lead a successful expedition to Java. The Conquest

of Java, as this expedition came to be known, lasted all of 45 days. After

the acquisition, Minto appointed Raf es Lieutenant-Governor of Java, a post

Raf es held till 1816.

Securing Britains Interest in the Eastern Seas

In 1818, Raf es was back in Bencoolen. After an audience with Governor-

General Hastings (who succeeded Lord Minto in 1813), Raf es presented his

blueprint for the securing of British interests in the Eastern Seas. Hastings, who

shared Raf es concerns about the Dutch and their restrictive trade practices,

appointed Raf es his special agent for the Malay States. It was under this

guise that Raf es undertook his next secret mission to nd a suitable site at

the eastern entrance of the Straits of Malacca and to establish a new trading

settlement for the British East India Company (EIC). He accomplished this

mission by establishing the new settlement at Singapore in 1819, much to the

displeasure of the British East India Companys Board of Control.


39

The Johore Sultanate and Singapore

The Old Johore Sultanate

The Sultanate of Johore was founded in 1528 by Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah

II after Malacca had been conquered by the Portuguese in 1511. At the height

of its power, it controlled a region that included modern-day Johore state and

Pahang on the Malay peninsula; Singapore, Pulau Tinggi and other islands off

the east coast of the Malay peninsula, namely the Karimun Islands, Bintan,

Bulang, Lingga and Bungaran, Benkalis, Kampar and Siak in Sumatra. But by

the late 1600s, the Sultanate was in decline. The eccentric and erratic Sultan

Mahmud Shah II died in 1699 without an heir and there began a royal intrigue

that would plague Johore in the years to come.

The political vacuum and the contested succession allowed the Bugis and

the Minangkabaus to exert considerable political power and pressure on the

royal family. By the time the Bugis helped Raja Sulaiman reclaim the throne

from a Minangkabau pretender (Raja Kecil) in 1722, the Bugis became the de

facto rulers of Johore, with their leader formally installed as Yam Tuan Muda

(Crown Prince).

Political Organisation of Johore

At the apex of the Johore political order was the Yang di-Pertuan or Sultan,

who ruled with the assistance of the Majlis Orang Kaya (Council of Rich

Men). This Council included the Bendahara (Prime Minister), Temenggong,

Laksamana (Admiral), Shahbandar (Harbour Master), and Seri Bija Diraja. The

territory of Johore was divided into four efs and the Sultans territory. The efs

were: Muar and its territories under the Raja Temenggong of Muar; Pahang,

under the Bendahara; Riau, under the Yam Tuan Muda, and mainland Johore

and Singapore under the Temenggong residing in Singapore. The rest of the

lands belonged to the Sultan who resided on the island of Lingga.


40

Genealogy of the Johore, Rhio-Lingga and Singapore Sultanates

The Death of Sultan Mahmud Shah III & the Succession Dispute

In 1812, Sultan Mahmud Shah III died in Lingga without picking an heir. His

elder son and heir-apparent, Tengku Hussein (also known as Tengku Long)

was in Pahang getting married. Raja Jaafar, the Yam Tuan Muda, however,

insisted that Husseins younger brother, Abdul Rahman, should ascend the

throne instead. This proposal was supported by the Dutch who were anxious

to exert their power over Johore through their presence in Rhio (modern-day

Tanjung Pinang on the island of Bintan).

The appointment of Abdul Rahman as Sultan of Johore was not without

controversy. Hussein himself was displeased to say the least, and Raja Jaafars

own sister, wife of the late Sultan, refused to hand over the royal regalia to

Abdul Rahman. Bendahara Ali of Pahang decided to act and prepared his eet

of boats to head to Rhio to restore the adat.


41

Raf es Capitalises on the Succession Dispute

Raf es learnt of the succession dispute in 1818 through Farquhars intelligence

and his own conversations with Asian traders from Johore. Since Abdul

Rahman was supported by the Bugis and the Dutch, Raf es decided to use this

opportunity to support Tengku Long as the rightful heir to the throne of Johore

and then signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the new monarch.

The Search for a Southern Factory

While Raf es was in London between July 1816 and October 1817, he wrote

a long memorandum entitled Our Interests in the Eastern Archipelago to

George Canning, President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of

India (sometimes referred to as the Board of Control). In the memorandum,

he urged the Commissioners to consider establishing a new settlement either

on the island of Banca or, alternatively, on the island of Bintang (Bintan). He

favoured Banca for its tin, and Bintang for its position.

By the time he arrived in Bencoolen on 19 March 1818, his worst fears had

materialised. He quickly alerted Governor-General Hastings in Calcutta

to the aggressive measures taken by Jan Timmerman Thijssen, the newly-

installed Dutch Commissioner-General at Batavia, and alerted Hastings to

the resurgence of Dutch in uence in the Indonesian islands. Raf es was

justi ably concerned, especially after he determined that the rumour about a

Dutch naval force sailing to Rhio and that a new treaty had been concluded

between the Dutch, the Bugis and Malay rulers was true. With a strong Dutch

presence with Bugis support in the Rhio Archipelago, Raf es urgently needed

to nd another Dutch-free port to protect British interests.


42

By January 1819, Raf es had changed his mind about Rhio. Not only was it

now in Dutch hands, he felt that it was too out of the way to command the

key shipping routes for ships plying the route to China. A port closer to all-

important Straits of Malacca was preferable. On 16 January 1819, he wrote

to John Adam, Hastings Political Secretary, to report that the information he

received with regard to the capabilities of Sincapore, & other stations in the

vicinity of this ancient capital [Johore Lama], for a British Post such as we

require at the mouth of the Straits of Malacca, has been most satisfactory.

That same day, he issued instructions to Major Farquhar to ascertain the

capabilities of Sincapore & its vicinity and to secure the eventual Command

of that important Station if the Dutch had not yet set up a settlement there.

Government House, Calcutta, 1824


43

Major-General Robert Rollo Gillespie K.C.B. (17661814)

Raf es, Hastings and BannermanRaf es letters to Hastings and Farquhar revealed the many tribulations that

he faced in the founding of Singapore. His rst secret mission that led to the

invasion of Java was strongly supported by Governor-General Lord Minto,

who had a very positive impression of Raf es and his capabilities. But Lord

Mintos successor, Lord Moira (the Marquess of Hastings), did not initially

share Lord Mintos view of Raf es, especially not after Colonel Robert Rollo

Gillespie led charges against Raf es for the maladministration of Java in

December 1813, just two months after Hastings assumed his post in Calcutta.

Raf es personal appeal to Hastings was rebuffed and Hastings simply

conveyed the order of the Court of Directors that Raf es was to be relieved of

his post as Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependencies and be recalled

to London to answer Gillespies charges. However, Raf es relationship with

Hastings improved signi cantly after he was exonerated from all charges. On

6 July 1818, at Raf es suggestion, Hastings invited Raf es to Calcutta to meet

and discuss the situation in the Eastern Seas. Raf es sailed immediately to

Calcutta, arriving on 29 September 1818. Here, Raf es convinced Hastings of

the dangers of Dutch resurgence in the East. Raf es was successful and later

wrote that Lord Hastings has unequivocally declared, that his mind is made

up as to the moral turpitude of the [Dutch] transaction, and that he considers

this but as one of a course of measures directed in hostility to the British

interests and the Eastern seas.

While the relationship between Raf es and Hastings improved, the relationship

between Raf es and Lieutenant-Colonel John Alexander Bannerman (1759

1819), Lieutenant-Governor of the Prince of Wales Island (Penang), became

increasingly strained. A distinguished career soldier, Bannerman had retired

from active military duty in 1803, dabbled unsuccessfully in politics and then

served as a member of the British East India Companys Court of Directors.

Upon retiring from the Court of Directors, Bannerman secured an appointment

as Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, taking up his position in 1817.

Bannerman did not like Raf es and felt that Raf es mission to set up a

factory in the Java region would jeopardise Penangs trade and diminish its

importance. While he wrote to Raf es, promising him the most cordial and

ef cient assistance and co-operation, Bannerman also sent a private letter to


44

Hastings on 1 January 1819 stating his opposition to Raf es mission. Raf es

later sent Bannerman a letter strongly opposing Bannermans sentiment and

the two mens relationship became strained.

On 16 January 1819, Raf es ordered Farquhar to ascertain the capabilities of

Sincapore & its vicinity for securing to [the British] the eventual Command

of that important Station as Bannerman had sent him to Aceh to resolve the

dynastic dispute in the sultanate and to improve relations between Aceh

and the government of Prince of Wales Island. When Farquhar set sail on 18

January 1819, Bannerman immediately told Raf es to delay the Aceh mission

until a reference on the subject was made to the Supreme Government in

Bengal.

This was clearly Bannermans ploy to keep Raf es idle in Penang, but it

back red when, having temporarily been relieved of his Aceh mission, Raf es

boarded the ship, Indiana, and sailed out of Penang harbour in the middle

of the night. In his letter to Bannerman which he ordered to be delivered

only after the Indiana was no longer visible on the horizon, he informed his

immediate superior that he intended to embark tomorrow on the Indiana in

the expectation of overtaking Major Farquhar.

Aceh, Sumatra.(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient Singapore)


45

Preliminary Agreement, signed on 30 January, 1819

Arrival at SingaporeThe Indiana never overtook Farquhars ships. Indeed, Raf es only caught up

with Farquhar and Captains Ross, Crawford and Max eld at the Carimons

on 27 January 1819. A survey of the Carimons proved unfruitful and Ross

suggested that it might be more productive to survey Singapore island. On the

morning of 28 January 1819, seven ships set sail for Singapore and arrived on

Singapore island at 4.00 pm that same day. They were met by a deputation

sent by Temenggong Abdul Rahman, the Johore Sultanates designated ruler

of Singapore.

On nding that there was no Dutch settlement on the island, Raf es and

Farquhar proceeded on shore and paid a visit to Temenggong Abdul Rahman

that evening to ascertain the details of the political situation in the Sultanate

of Johore. Talks continued the following morning and over the next two days

European artillerymen unloaded their eld-pieces, and the accompanying

Sepoys landed on the island. The men immediately began erecting their tents

and clearing the ground. Raf es had found his new settlement.

Foremost on Raf es mind was how Singapore could act as an effectual

check to the rapid march of the Dutch over the Eastern Archipelago. This

single independent Port under our Flag Raf es wrote, may be suf cient to

prevent the recurrence of exclusion [and] monopoly which the Dutch once

exercised in these seas.

The 1819 Johore-Britain TreatiesFollowing two days of discussions, Raf es and Temenggong Abdul Rahman

signed a Preliminary Agreement on 30 January 1819 under which the British

were permitted to establish a trading factory in Singapore. This very brief

Agreement, with just ve articles, was signed by Temenggong Abdul Rahman

as Ruler of Singapore and in the name of Sultan Hussein Mahmud Shah, Rajah

of Johore.


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Article 1 gives the British the right to establish a factory at Singapore or other

place in the Government of Singapore-Johor while Article 3 requires the

British to pay the Temenggong an annual stipend of $3,000. Article 5 makes

it clear that the Agreement requires the rati cation of the Sultan of Johore and

thus provides that whenever the Sree Sultan, who is on his way, arrives here,

all matters of this Agreement will be settled.

Tengku Hussein Mahmud Shah, eldest son of the late Sultan Mahmud Shah

III, did indeed arrive in Singapore after he had been summoned by two Anak

Rajas engaged by Raf es. It was clear that Raf es intended to capitalise

on the succession dispute that arose after Sultan Mahmud died without

picking an heir. Basing his understanding of royal succession on the basis

of primogeniture, Raf es saw the installation of Tengku Husseins younger

brother Abdul Rahman to the throne by the Bugis Yam Tuan Muda as illegal.

Raf es decided that the British would back Husseins claim to the throne,

recognise him as the true monarch of Johor and sign a formal treaty with him.

In the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded between Raf es and Sultan

Hussein Mahmud Shah dated 6 February 1819, the terms of the Preliminary

Agreement were af rmed. Sultan Hussein was to receive $5,000 annually and

the British agreed not to interfere in the internal politics of Johor. The terms

of the Treaty were read out in English and Malay by Raf es acting-Secretary,

Lieutenant Francis Crossley, and Farquhars scribe, Enche Yahya, respectively.

This was read before some 30 European gentlemen and troops drawn up in

line. After three copies of the Treaty were signed, the British ag was hoisted

and salutes were red.

Free Port Singapore FlourishesBy May 1819, when Raf es visited Singapore for a second time, its population

had soared to 5,000. This was partly due to the huge immigration of Chinese

from the south of China. People from different communities also arrived in

Singapore in search of opportunities. The Indians who immigrated to early

Singapore were mainly soldiers, although there were some Indian merchants

who came from Penang. Arab merchants such as Syed Mohammed bin Harun

Al-Junied eventually settled at Kampong Glam.

Last page of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, dated 6 February 1819(Courtesy of National Museum of Singapore, National Heritage Board)


47

As communications were poor between Singapore and Calcutta, Singapore

was left to itself and was guided by Farquhar in the early years. Furthermore,

as there was uncertainty as to whether Singapore would remain a British

possession, there were not many Europeans trading in Singapore then.

However, European traders who were willing to take a risk pro ted greatly

from the bustling port. One such person was James Pearl, the captain of the

ship Indiana that rst carried Raf es to Singapore, and after whom Pearls

Hill is named. Another was Alexander Guthrie, an ambitious Scotsman who

established Singapores rst trading company in 1821.

There was also a huge increase in port activity and trading volume in

Singapore. This could be explained by Raf es instruction that no trade dues

were to be levied on passing merchant ships. Raf es envisioned Singapore to

be a great port. On 28 February 1819, just weeks after the founding, he wrote

to Hastings, opining that Singapore would be viewed with jealousy by the

Dutch but it is impossible for [the Dutch] to prevent its rise. Raf es vision

proved prescient. By the 1830s, Singapore had overtaken Batavia (modern day

Jakarta) as the busiest port in Southeast Asia and was recognised by the Dutch

as a British possession in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824.

Becoming Part of the British EmpireRaf es left Singapore in the hands of Major William Farquhar, former

Resident and Commandant of Malacca and a veteran of the Straits. Raf es

gave Farquhar detailed instructions for the future governance and layout of

the settlement, including how to segregate the population, setting up simple

defences to protect the island, and having a European on St. Johns Island to

inform passing ships of the new Port.

This plan was important in resolving early administrative challenges in the

nascent settlement. Segregation of the population gave the Resident easier

control over order in the settlement as the different communities stayed in

the same area and had their own chiefs. As Singapore was still deemed as a

temporary military post by Calcutta, Farquhar had to administer Singapore on

a tight budget. He did not have suf cient clerks to assist him and even paid for

help out of his own pocket. Later, when he was running out of funds, he acted


48

against Raf es instructions and auctioned off monopoly rights to sell opium

and run gambling dens.

Raf es returned to Singapore on 10 October 1822 for his third and nal

visit. He was delighted with the progress the settlement had made but he

was anxious that Farquhar had not done more to implement his blueprint.

Raf es, who had always been warm towards Farquhar, began turning against

him, thanks in no small part to the needling of Raf es brother-in-law Captain

William Flint, who was the settlements Master Attendant and who hated

Farquhar. In April 1823, furious over a minor infarction when Farquhar failed

to show up in his uniform, Raf es relieved him of his Residency and took over

the running of Singapore himself.

It was a most uncharacteristic act on Raf es part and was regarded as one

of the most shameful episodes in his illustrious career. The man who would

eventually replace Farquhar was Dr. John Crawfurd, a Scottish physician, who

had long been part of Raf es entourage. He was appointed second Resident

of Singapore in March 1823, just months before Raf es left Singapore for the

nal time.

Crawfurd remained Resident for over three years and in that time saw the

con rmation of Singapore as British territory under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty

of 1824. It was also Crawfurd who permanently secured the sovereignty of

Singapore for the British after he negotiated the Treaty of Friendship and

Alliance under which Sultan Hussein Shah and Temenggong Abdul Rahman

agreed to cede in full sovereignty and property to the Honourable the English

East India Company, their heirs and successors forever, the Island of Singapore.

Sultan Hussein received $33,200 and a lifetime pension of $1,300 per month,

while Temenggong Abdul Rahman received $26,800 and a lifetime pension

of $700.


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Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raf esSir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raf es was born on 6 July 1781 on board a ship

off the coast of Port Morant, Jamaica, to Captain Benjamin Raf es and his wife

Ann Lyde. With his younger brothers premature death in 1788, Raf es grew

up with his mother and four sisters in England as his father was often away at

sea. The huge family strained the familys resources and this had an impact on

Raf es education.

Raf es birthplace off Port Morant, Jamaica(Courtesy of Antiques of the Orient)


50

In 1793, Raf es was forced to leave school because his father could no longer

afford it. In 1795, at the age of 14, Raf es found employment at the British East

India Company (EIC) in Leadenhall Street as a temporary clerk. His starting

salary was a meagre 70 per year and he earned no more than an average

of 100 a year in the next 10 years. His fathers death in 1797 while on a

voyage to Jamaica made Raf es the familys primary bread-winner, caring for

his mother and his ve sisters.

Raf es tenure at the British East India Company coincided with the

Napoleonic Wars that pitted Napoleons France against the rest of Europe.

France succeeded in its campaign against Holland, and to keep erstwhile

Dutch colonies like Malacca and the Cape of Good Hope out of French hands,

control of these territories went to the British. This had a signi cant impact on

Raf es career as the British East India Company needed assistants in Penang

since Malacca had been marked for destruction by the Penang authorities.

Raf es superior, William Ramsay, whom he had befriended in his decade

at Leadenhall, recommended him for the post of Assistant Secretary to the

new Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, Philip Dundas. This represented a major

salary increase for Raf es who now drew 2,000 per annum. This enabled

him to marry Olivia Mariamne Fancourt, before leaving for Penang in April

1805.

Raf es Meteoric Rise

Just 16 years after joining the British East India Company, Raf es became the

Lieutenant-Governor of Java in 1811. This meteoric rise could be credited to

his intelligence, ambition, diplomatic skills and some luck.

On his voyage to Penang between April and September 1805, Raf es took

the opportunity to learn Malay and acquired a working knowledge of the

language before arriving in Penang. This was something that his colleagues

never achieved and placed him in a useful and advantageous position in a

region where Malay was the lingua franca.


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By 1807, Raf es was competent enough to translate letters sent by the Malay

nobles and reply them in their native tongue. Such skills contributed to his

swift promotion from Assistant Secretary to Chief Secretary to the Governor

within two years of his arrival. While in Penang, Raf es met and befriended

the famous scholar and Orientalist, Dr. John Leyden, who had gone to Penang

to recuperate. Raf es put him up at his home and Olivia helped nurse Leyden

back to health.

Leyden was a loyal friend and when he had the opportunity to meet Lord

Minto, who had then just been appointed Governor-General of India, he

would draw Mintos attention to Raf es and his ideas on protecting British

interests in Java. Napoleons annexation of the Netherlands gave Napoleon

access to the Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia, and Napoleon saw Java

as a base for future conquests in the East. This was clearly a major threat to

British interests both at home and abroad. In light of these developments,

Minto was anxious to wrest control of Java from the French and needed a

man well-connected with affairs in Java to assist him. Leyden drew Mintos

attention to Raf es lengthy memorandum on British interests in the Eastern

Seas and recommended Raf es to Minto.

Seizing this opportunity, Raf es set sail for Calcutta in June 1810 to seek an

audience with Lord Minto to discuss the situation in Java. Raf es was well-

received by Lord Minto and this meeting launched Raf es career much

higher and faster than most of his other peers. At the young age of 29, he

was appointed Agent to the Governor-General in the Malay States and he

proceeded to carry out Lord Mintos secret mission to thwart French in uence

in the regio

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