NKUS Motion to Recuse and to Stay Proceedings

of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

NORTHERN DIVISION AT COVINGTON

CASE NO. 2:16-CV-00028-WOB-JGW

-Filed electronically-

JANE DOE PLAINTIFF

v. DEFENDANT, NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY’S

MOTION TO RECUSE AND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY, et al. DEFENDANTS

***** ***** *****

Comes now the Defendant Northern Kentucky University (“the University”), by and

through counsel and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and moves the presiding Judge to recuse

from the further consideration of this matter and to stay any further proceedings. In support, the

University states it was only recently informed that Plaintiff’s counsel hired the presiding

Judge’s grandson as an attorney at his firm while this case was pending. Under these

circumstances, the presiding judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In further

support of its Motion, the University submits the attached Memorandum in Support of its Motion

to Recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 455(a) and Motion for Stay of all proceedings.

The University has attempted to address the recusal issue prior to filing the instant

Motion. Specifically, the University worked with the Court to schedule a telephonic or in-person

conference to discuss the issue. However, Plaintiff’s counsel declined to agree to a conference

until he had the opportunity to review the University’s Motion. The Court then sent the parties an

email on April 4, 2017, stating it had been “advised that the grandson in question has no

involvement whatsoever in the case before the Court and no financial interest therein,” as would

require recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). The Court also indicated it had been aware of the

Judge’s grandson’s employment with Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm for some time as Judge

Page 1 of 3





-Filed electronically-

JANE DOE PLAINTIFF


MOTION TO RECUSE AND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS


***** ***** *****

Comes now the Defendant Northern Kentucky University (“the University”), by and

through counsel and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and moves the presiding Judge to recuse

from the further consideration of this matter and to stay any further proceedings. In support, the

University states it was only recently informed that Plaintiff’s counsel hired the presiding

Judge’s grandson as an attorney at his firm while this case was pending. Under these

circumstances, the presiding judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In further

support of its Motion, the University submits the attached Memorandum in Support of its Motion

to Recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 455(a) and Motion for Stay of all proceedings.

The University has attempted to address the recusal issue prior to filing the instant

Motion. Specifically, the University worked with the Court to schedule a telephonic or in-person

conference to discuss the issue. However, Plaintiff’s counsel declined to agree to a conference

until he had the opportunity to review the University’s Motion. The Court then sent the parties an

email on April 4, 2017, stating it had been “advised that the grandson in question has no

involvement whatsoever in the case before the Court and no financial interest therein,” as would

require recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). The Court also indicated it had been aware of the


Case: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 1 of 3 - Page ID#: 5591

cv-

”), by and

In support, the

of 3

Bertelsman had reviewed the statute, “both before his grandson accepted employment at MLJ,

and within the last week.” The University replied indicating that, since Plaintiff’s counsel had

refused to participate in a conference, the University would file its Motion to Recuse absent

further instruction from the Court.

Nevertheless, the University abstained from filing its Motion pending a conference to be

set by the Court for purposes of addressing the matter. By Order entered April 5, 2017, the

Court set the conference for April 7, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. Docket Entry (“DE”) #194. Later that

same day on April 5, 2017, pursuant to scheduling orders of the Court, the University filed its

Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. DE #195. The Court denied the University’s motion

within twenty-four hours after the University filed its reply and less than twenty-four hours

before the aforementioned conference set for April 7, 2017. DE #198. Unfortunately, the timing

of the Court’s summary judgment ruling, combined with the facts and circumstances outlined in

the memorandum supporting this Motion to Recuse, underscore the questions and concerns at

issue in this Motion. Accordingly, the University files this Motion for the reasons outlined

above and in its supporting memorandum.

Respectfully Submitted,

STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MOLONEY, PLLC

/s/ Katherine M. Coleman

Bryan H. Beauman (KBA#86968)

Katherine M. Coleman (KBA#84089)

333 West Vine Street, Suite 1500

Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 255-8581

[email protected]

[email protected]

and

Page 2 of 3


and within the last week.” The University replied indicating that, since Plaintiff’s counsel had

refused to participate in a conference, the University would file its Motion to Recuse absent

further instruction from the Court.


set by the Court for purposes of addressing the matter. By Order entered April 5, 2017, the

Court set the conference for April 7, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. Docket Entry (“DE”) #194. Later that

same day on April 5, 2017, pursuant to scheduling orders of the Court, the University filed its

Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. DE #195. The Court denied the University’s motion

within twenty-four hours after the University filed its reply and less than twenty-four hours

before the aforementioned conference set for April 7, 2017. DE #198. Unfortunately, the timing

of the Court’s summary judgment ruling, combined with the facts and circumstances outlined in

the memorandum supporting this Motion to Recuse, underscore the questions and concerns at

issue in this Motion. Accordingly, the University files this Motion for the reasons outlined

above and in its supporting memorandum.







Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 255-8581

[email protected]

[email protected]

and


Accordin

mailto:[email protected]


of 3

Jeffrey C. Mando (KBA # 43548)

ADAMS, STEPNER,

WOLTERMANN & DUSING, PLLC

40 West Pike Street

Covington, KY 41011

(859) 394-6200

(859) 392-7263 (FAX)

[email protected]

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT,

NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 6th

day of April, 2017 I electronically filed the foregoing with

the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic

filing, if applicable, to the following:

Kevin L. Murphy, Esq. Steven A. Taylor, Esq.

Murphy Landen Jones PLLC

2400 Chamber Center Drive, Suite 200

P.O. Box 17534

Ft. Mitchell, KY 41017-0534

[email protected]

[email protected]

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF

Barbara A. Kriz, Esq.


P.O. Box 499

Lexington, KY 40588

[email protected]

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KACHUREK




x:\wdox\clients\64764\0005\pleading\00806048.docx

Page 3 of 3


ADAMS, STEPNER,


40 West Pike Street

Covington, KY 41011

(859) 394-6200

(859) 392-7263 (FAX)

[email protected]











P.O. Box 17534


[email protected]

[email protected]




P.O. Box 499

Lexington, KY 40588

[email protected]







th

x:\




of 9





-Filed Electronically-

JANE DOE PLAINTIFF


MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECUSE

AND STAY PROCEEDINGS


***** ***** *****

Comes now the Defendant Northern Kentucky University (“the University”) and submits

this memorandum in support of its Motion to Recuse pursuant 28 U.S.C § 455(a) and Motion for

Stay of all proceedings.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s counsel’s four-attorney law firm, Murphy Landen Jones, PLLC, hired Judge

Bertelsman’s grandson as an attorney during the pendency of this case. Although known by both

Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court, the grandson’s employment was not disclosed to the University

until March 21, 2017. Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court recently made verbal statements

regarding a “Chinese Wall” but the University has received no evidence to support that claim.

Under these circumstances, recusal is required because the Court’s impartiality might reasonably

be questioned. For this and the reasons further set out below, the University respectfully asks the

Court grant its Motion for recusal and a stay of all proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On March 21, 2017, the Honorable U.S. District Court Judge William O. Bertelsman

verbally disclosed to defense counsel in an informal setting that the Judge’s grandson is currently

employed as an attorney with Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm. Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Counsel for

Page 1 of 9





-Filed Electronically-

JANE DOE PLAINTIFF


MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECUSE

AND STAY PROCEEDINGS


***** ***** *****

Comes now the Defendant Northern Kentucky University (“the University”) and submits

this memorandum in support of its Motion to Recuse pursuant 28 U.S.C § 455(a) and Motion for

Stay of all proceedings.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s counsel’s four-attorney law firm, Murphy Landen Jones, PLLC, hired Judge

Bertelsman’s grandson as an attorney during the pendency of this case. Although known by both

Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court, the grandson’s employment was not disclosed to the University

until March 21, 2017. Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court recently made verbal statements

regarding a “Chinese Wall” but the University has received no evidence to support that claim.

Under these circumstances, recusal is required because the Court’s impartiality might reasonably

be questioned. For this and the reasons further set out below, the University respectfully asks the

Court grant its Motion for recusal and a stay of all proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On March 21, 2017, the Honorable U.S. District Court Judge William O. Bertelsman

verbally disclosed to defense counsel in an informal setting that the Judge’s grandson is currently

employed as an attorney with Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm. Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Counsel for

Case: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202-1 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 1 of 9 - Page ID#: 5594

cv-

of 9

Defendant Jeff Mando. In this initial disclosure, details of the timing and nature of the

employment relationship were lacking but Judge Bertelsman stated Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm

had set up a “Chinese Wall.” Id. On March 30, 2017, defense counsel confirmed through

Plaintiff’s counsel that his firm hired the Judge’s grandson after this action had already been

filed. Plaintiff’s counsel had never previously disclosed to defense counsel that his law firm had

hired the Judge’s grandson.

The silence by Plaintiff’s counsel is significant. The possible conflict from the decision to

hire the Judge’s grandson is apparent from Plaintiff’s counsel’s reported efforts to set up a

“Chinese Wall.” However, the efficacy and credibility of those efforts can be reasonably open to

question at this point because of Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to promptly and fully disclose to the

University the potential conflict and what measures were taken to prevent what could otherwise

be a patent conflict of interest. Plaintiff’s counsel was required to make a prompt and full

disclosure of the conflict and any measures taken are required directly from Plaintiff’s counsel

even before the hiring because it took place during the pendency of this case. That was not done.

Instead, defense counsel recently learned of the issue from Judge Bertelsman by mere chance

while substantial post-discovery motions pend and as pretrial filings are due. Indeed, the initial

disclosure by Judge Bertelsman was informal in nature and made during a local Inns of Court

chapter meeting.

The University attempted to address the recusal issue prior to filing the instant Motion.

See Exhibit 2, April 4-5, 2015 Emails between Law Clerk D. Rogers and Counsel. Specifically,

the University worked with the Court to schedule a telephonic or in-person conference to discuss

the issue. Id. However, Plaintiff’s counsel declined to agree to a conference until he had the

opportunity to review the University’s Motion. The Court then sent the parties an email on April

Page 2 of 9

Defendant Jeff Mando. In this initial disclosure, details of the timing and nature of the

employment relationship were lacking but Judge Bertelsman stated Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm

had set up a “Chinese Wall.” Id. On March 30, 2017, defense counsel confirmed through

Plaintiff’s counsel that his firm hired the Judge’s grandson after this action had already been

filed. Plaintiff’s counsel had never previously disclosed to defense counsel that his law firm had

hired the Judge’s grandson.

The silence by Plaintiff’s counsel is significant. The possible conflict from the decision to

hire the Judge’s grandson is apparent from Plaintiff’s counsel’s reported efforts to set up a

“Chinese Wall.” However, the efficacy and credibility of those efforts can be reasonably open to

question at this point because of Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to promptly and fully disclose to the

University the potential conflict and what measures were taken to prevent what could otherwise

be a patent conflict of interest. Plaintiff’s counsel was required to make a prompt and full

disclosure of the conflict and any measures taken are required directly from Plaintiff’s counsel

even before the hiring because it took place during the pendency of this case. That was not done.

Instead, defense counsel recently learned of the issue from Judge Bertelsman by mere chance

while substantial post-discovery motions pend and as pretrial filings are due. Indeed, the initial

disclosure by Judge Bertelsman was informal in nature and made during a local Inns of Court

chapter meeting.

The University attempted to address the recusal issue prior to filing the instant Motion.

See Exhibit 2, April 4-5, 2015 Emails between Law Clerk D. Rogers and Counsel. Specifically,

the University worked with the Court to schedule a telephonic or in-person conference to discuss

the issue. Id. However, Plaintiff’s counsel declined to agree to a conference until he had the

opportunity to review the University’s Motion. The Court then sent the parties an email on April


Id.

Id.

of 9

4, 2017, stating that it had been “advised that the grandson in question has no involvement

whatsoever in the case before the Court and no financial interest therein,” as would require

recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). Id. The Court also indicated that it had been aware of the



and within the last week.” Id. The University replied indicating that, since Plaintiff’s counsel had

refused to participate in a conference, the University would file its Motion absent further

instruction from the Court. Id.


set by the Court for purposes of addressing the matter. By email and subsequent Order entered

April 5, 2017, the Court set the conference for April 7, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. Docket Entry (“DE”)

#194; Exhibit 2. Later that same day on April 5, 2017, pursuant to scheduling orders of the

Court, the University filed its Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. DE #195. The Court

denied the University’s motion within twenty-four hours after the University filed its reply and

less than twenty-four hours before the aforementioned conference set for April 7, 2017. DE

#198. Unfortunately, the timing of the Court’s summary judgment ruling, combined with the

facts and circumstances outlined in the memorandum supporting this Motion to Recuse,

underscore the questions and concerns at issue in this Motion. Accordingly, the University filed

its Motion for the reasons outlined above and further herein.

While the Court may disclaim any bias or impartiality due to Plaintiff’s counsel’s law

firm hiring his grandson after this case was filed, recusal does not necessarily require actual bais

or an actual conflict of interest. “[W]hat matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its

appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). The law requires that “[a]ny

Page 3 of 9

4, 2017, stating that it had been “advised that the grandson in question has no involvement

whatsoever in the case before the Court and no financial interest therein,” as would require

recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). Id. The Court also indicated that it had been aware of the



and within the last week.” Id. The University replied indicating that, since Plaintiff’s counsel had

refused to participate in a conference, the University would file its Motion absent further

instruction from the Court. Id.


set by the Court for purposes of addressing the matter. By email and subsequent Order entered

April 5, 2017, the Court set the conference for April 7, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. Docket Entry (“DE”)

#194; Exhibit 2. Later that same day on April 5, 2017, pursuant to scheduling orders of the

Court, the University filed its Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. DE #195. The Court

denied the University’s motion within twenty-four hours after the University filed its reply and

less than twenty-four hours before the aforementioned conference set for April 7, 2017. DE

#198. Unfortunately, the timing of the Court’s summary judgment ruling, combined with the

facts and circumstances outlined in the memorandum supporting this Motion to Recuse,

underscore the questions and concerns at issue in this Motion. Accordingly, the University filed

its Motion for the reasons outlined above and further herein.

While the Court may disclaim any bias or impartiality due to Plaintiff’s counsel’s law

firm hiring his grandson after this case was filed, recusal does not necessarily require actual bais

or an actual conflict of interest. “[W]hat matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its

appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). The law requires that “[a]ny


Id.

Id.

Id.

of 9

justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. 455(a) (emphasis added).

For the reasons stated below, recusal is required here because the impartiality of the Court could

be reasonably questioned based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm having hired the Judge’s

grandson while this case was pending and the failure to promptly and fully disclose the hiring

and ongoing employment to the University.

RECUSAL STANDARD

Under Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, “[a]ny justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. 455(a) (emphasis added). The Sixth

Circuit has held that this section requires recusal “when a reasonable person would harbor

doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1143

(6th

Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989)) (emphasis added); see also Ragozzine v. Youngstown State

University, 2014 WL 1153715, *1 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d

1495, 1501 (6th

Cir. 1990)). It is not required that an actual bias or conflict of interest be found

for Section 455(a) to require recusal. See In re Aetna, 919 F.2d at 1145. Rather, the Section

applies when the circumstances taken as a whole would cause a reasonable party to harbor any

doubt about the Court’s impartiality. Id. at 1144-45. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that

Section 455(a) creates an objective standard for evaluation where “what matters is not the reality

of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548. On this point, courts have held

that Section 455(a) not only addresses fairness to the parties to the action, but also “concerns the

public’s confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to

proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted.” In re Kensignton Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 220

Page 4 of 9

justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. 455(a) (emphasis added).

For the reasons stated below, recusal is required here because the impartiality of the Court could

be reasonably questioned based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm having hired the Judge’s

grandson while this case was pending and the failure to promptly and fully disclose the hiring

and ongoing employment to the University.

RECUSAL STANDARD

Under Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, “[a]ny justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. 455(a) (emphasis added). The Sixth

Circuit has held that this section requires recusal “when a reasonable person would harbor

doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1143

(6th

Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989)) (emphasis added); see also Ragozzine v. Youngstown State

University, 2014 WL 1153715, *1 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d

1495, 1501 (6th

Cir. 1990)). It is not required that an actual bias or conflict of interest be found

for Section 455(a) to require recusal. See In re Aetna, 919 F.2d at 1145. Rather, the Section

applies when the circumstances taken as a whole would cause a reasonable party to harbor any

doubt about the Court’s impartiality. Id. at 1144-45. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that

Section 455(a) creates an objective standard for evaluation where “what matters is not the reality

of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548. On this point, courts have held

that Section 455(a) not only addresses fairness to the parties to the action, but also “concerns the

public’s confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to

proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted.” In re Kensignton Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 220


(6th

; see also

th

impartiality. Id. at 1144

of 9

(3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10

F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3

d Cir.

1992)).

ARGUMENT

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm currently employs the Judge’s

grandson as an attorney. Disqualification is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) if a person

within the third degree of relationship to the Judge is “acting as a lawyer” in the proceeding.

Additionally under Section 455(b)(5), disqualification is also mandatory where a person within

the third degree of relationship has “an interest that could be substantially affected by the

outcome of the proceeding.” The mandatory Section 455(b)(5) disqualification is inapplicable

when the relative-lawyer is merely employed by the law firm representing a party in the

proceeding and not actively participating. See U. S. ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d

456, 463 (5th

Cir. 1977) (“The fears of judicial bias that might result from an offspring’s active

participation in a proceeding do not merit automatic disqualification of the law firm to which the

relative belongs.”). But in this instance, all the University has is the Court’s oral representation

that a “Chinese Wall” had been erected. Plaintiff’s counsel has made no affirmative statements in

writing on that topic, nor has Plaintiff’s counsel disclosed anything on the record in order to

avoid automatic and mandatory recusal.1

While the Court represents in its April 4, 2017 email that unilateral review was made

regarding the Judge’s grandson’s lack of involvement in this matter and lack of financial interest,

Plaintiff’s counsel has not provided any information or notice of the date of hire or the screening

1 The University lacks information to argue that mandatory recusal under any subpart of Section 455(b) is required.

However, Plaintiff counsel’s failure to make any disclosure regarding the nature of the employment relationship or

assurance that the judge’s grandson has been and continues to be screened from involvement with this case creates a

situation where the University must speculate on the possibility that the Judge’s grandson has been an active

participant as contemplated under Section 455(b)(5).

Page 5 of 9

(3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10

F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3

d Cir.

1992)).

ARGUMENT

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm currently employs the Judge’s

grandson as an attorney. Disqualification is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) if a person

within the third degree of relationship to the Judge is “acting as a lawyer” in the proceeding.

Additionally under Section 455(b)(5), disqualification is also mandatory where a person within

the third degree of relationship has “an interest that could be substantially affected by the

outcome of the proceeding.” The mandatory Section 455(b)(5) disqualification is inapplicable

when the relative-lawyer is merely employed by the law firm representing a party in the

proceeding and not actively participating. See U. S. ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d

456, 463 (5th

Cir. 1977) (“The fears of judicial bias that might result from an offspring’s active

participation in a proceeding do not merit automatic disqualification of the law firm to which the

relative belongs.”). But in this instance, all the University has is the Court’s oral representation

that a “Chinese Wall” had been erected. Plaintiff’s counsel has made no affirmative statements in

writing on that topic, nor has Plaintiff’s counsel disclosed anything on the record in order to

avoid automatic and mandatory recusal.1

While the Court represents in its April 4, 2017 email that unilateral review was made

regarding the Judge’s grandson’s lack of involvement in this matter and lack of financial interest,

Plaintiff’s counsel has not provided any information or notice of the date of hire or the screening

1 The University lacks information to argue that mandatory recusal under any subpart of Section 455(b) is required.

However, Plaintiff counsel’s failure to make any disclosure regarding the nature of the employment relationship or

assurance that the judge’s grandson has been and continues to be screened from involvement with this case creates a

situation where the University must speculate on the possibility that the Judge’s grandson has been an active

participant as contemplated under Section 455(b)(5).


(3d

th

of 9

measures. It is unknown if there is a basis for mandatory recusal based on the information

currently available to the University as Plaintiff’s counsel has not advised of the arrangement for

screening the Judge’s grandson from this case or provided any information upon which to

evaluate potential conflict. This complete lack of information or knowledge creates the

possibility of mandatory recusal under Section 455(b)(5) as well as the appearance of conflict.

Moreover, even if the Judge’s relative is not actively participating in the proceeding,

mere employment of the relative by the law firm is among the “considerations that might move

the district judge to examine whether his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” under

Section 455(a). See id. at 463 – 64. And unlike a preexisting employment relationship, the need

to consider and examine the employment issue is even greater when the Judge’s relative was

hired (and perhaps actively recruited?) after the litigation had been filed and while it was

pending, which appears to be the case.

In fact, while the Ohio State Bar Association details the judge’s grandson as working at

Plaintiff’s law firm, the firm’s website is conspicuously absent of any reference to the attorney.

Compare Attorney Profile for Nicholas Gregg, Ohio State Bar Association website, available at

https://www.zeekbeek.com/lawyers/41017-OH-Nicholas-Gregg-130649/list/yes (last visited

April 4, 2017) screenshot capture attached as Exhibit 3; Our Team, Murphy Landen Jones PLLC

website available at http://www.mljfirm.com/attorneys/ (last visited April 4, 2017) screenshot

capture attached as Exhibit 4. Why would the firm conceal the identity of one of its attorneys?

That fact creates ample suspicion around the timing of the hire, the manner in which the

employment relationship was formed, how the attorney was recruited, and what involvement he

has had with the firm and maybe even with the case to date. Because these questions are

unanswered, and perhaps even because they have been hidden from the University and the

Page 6 of 9

measures. It is unknown if there is a basis for mandatory recusal based on the information

currently available to the University as Plaintiff’s counsel has not advised of the arrangement for

screening the Judge’s grandson from this case or provided any information upon which to

evaluate potential conflict. This complete lack of information or knowledge creates the

possibility of mandatory recusal under Section 455(b)(5) as well as the appearance of conflict.

Moreover, even if the Judge’s relative is not actively participating in the proceeding,

mere employment of the relative by the law firm is among the “considerations that might move

the district judge to examine whether his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” under

Section 455(a). See id. at 463 – 64. And unlike a preexisting employment relationship, the need

to consider and examine the employment issue is even greater when the Judge’s relative was

hired (and perhaps actively recruited?) after the litigation had been filed and while it was

pending, which appears to be the case.

In fact, while the Ohio State Bar Association details the judge’s grandson as working at

Plaintiff’s law firm, the firm’s website is conspicuously absent of any reference to the attorney.

Compare Attorney Profile for Nicholas Gregg, Ohio State Bar Association website, available at

https://www.zeekbeek.com/lawyers/41017-OH-Nicholas-Gregg-130649/list/yes (last visited

April 4, 2017) screenshot capture attached as Exhibit 3; Our Team, Murphy Landen Jones PLLC

website available at http://www.mljfirm.com/attorneys/ (last visited April 4, 2017) screenshot

capture attached as Exhibit 4. Why would the firm conceal the identity of one of its attorneys?

That fact creates ample suspicion around the timing of the hire, the manner in which the

employment relationship was formed, how the attorney was recruited, and what involvement he

has had with the firm and maybe even with the case to date. Because these questions are

unanswered, and perhaps even because they have been hidden from the University and the


. It is unknown if there is a

is

OH-

) screenshot capture attached as

https://www.zeekbeek.com/lawyers/41017-OH-Nicholas-Gregg-130649/list/yes

http://www.mljfirm.com/attorneys/

of 9

public, Plaintiff’s counsel has placed the Court in a position where its “impartiality might

reasonably be questioned,” thus necessitating recusal.

Supreme Court precedent from Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation

further explains how Section 455 should be enforced to encourage judges and litigants to

“carefully examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly disclose them when

discovered.” 486 U.S. 847, 868 (1988) (emphasis added). Employing the Judge’s grandson under

the circumstances discussed above clearly poses at least “possible grounds for disqualification”

as contemplated by Liljeberg. Even Plaintiff’s counsel’s perceived the potential conflict of

employing the Judge’s grandson by reportedly setting up the “Chinese Wall.” Yet, the potential

conflict in this case was not “promptly disclosed” to be subject to careful consideration

consistent with the guidance from Lijeberg. The nondisclosure is significant in terms of

appearance and legal effect. Liljeberg indicates that the basis for questioning the Court’s

impartiality could have been removed had full and prompt disclosure been made. See id. at 866

(“A full disclosure at that time would have completely removed any basis for questioning the

judge’s impartiality ….”). Of course, the failure to make full and prompt disclosure logically has

the opposite effect of strengthening the appearance of bias as a result of potential concealment.

Finally, this Court should stay all proceedings pending the resolution (and, if necessary)

appeal of this motion for recusal. After having a “full disclosure on the record of the basis for

disqualification,” the Court must immediately consider the recusal issues. Barksdale v. Emerick,

853 F.2d 1359, 1362 (6th

Cir. 1988). As the Sixth Circuit has instructed in Barksdale: “[t]hese

issues concerning the propriety of the action of the District Judge in adjudicating the case

logically precede the adjudication of the case on the merits. The litigant is entitled to the decision

of a judge eligible to preside.” Id. Only “after properly considering the issues under § 455, and

Page 7 of 9

public, Plaintiff’s counsel has placed the Court in a position where its “impartiality might

reasonably be questioned,” thus necessitating recusal.

Supreme Court precedent from Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation

further explains how Section 455 should be enforced to encourage judges and litigants to

“carefully examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly disclose them when

discovered.” 486 U.S. 847, 868 (1988) (emphasis added). Employing the Judge’s grandson under

the circumstances discussed above clearly poses at least “possible grounds for disqualification”

as contemplated by Liljeberg. Even Plaintiff’s counsel’s perceived the potential conflict of

employing the Judge’s grandson by reportedly setting up the “Chinese Wall.” Yet, the potential

conflict in this case was not “promptly disclosed” to be subject to careful consideration

consistent with the guidance from Lijeberg. The nondisclosure is significant in terms of

appearance and legal effect. Liljeberg indicates that the basis for questioning the Court’s

impartiality could have been removed had full and prompt disclosure been made. See id. at 866

(“A full disclosure at that time would have completely removed any basis for questioning the

judge’s impartiality ….”). Of course, the failure to make full and prompt disclosure logically has

the opposite effect of strengthening the appearance of bias as a result of potential concealment.

Finally, this Court should stay all proceedings pending the resolution (and, if necessary)

appeal of this motion for recusal. After having a “full disclosure on the record of the basis for

disqualification,” the Court must immediately consider the recusal issues. Barksdale v. Emerick,

853 F.2d 1359, 1362 (6th

Cir. 1988). As the Sixth Circuit has instructed in Barksdale: “[t]hese

issues concerning the propriety of the action of the District Judge in adjudicating the case

logically precede the adjudication of the case on the merits. The litigant is entitled to the decision

of a judge eligible to preside.” Id. Only “after properly considering the issues under § 455, and


486 U.S. 847, 868 (1988)

(“A full disclosure at that time would have completely removed any basis for questi

a “full disclosure on the record of the basis for

853 F.2d 1359, 1362 (6th t]hese

of 9

making findings and conclusions thereon, the District Judge below, or if he be recused, another

District Judge to whom the case may be transferred, shall []consider the merits of the case.” Id.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court must recuse under Section 455(a) because its

impartiality might be reasonably questioned. Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s four-attorney law firm

hired the grandson of the Judge hearing this matter while the case was pending but did not

disclose this fact to defense counsel. Neither the potential conflict nor the details of any attempts

to avert the conflict were timely or fully disclosed to the University. The nondisclosure in

combination with the small size of Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm and the publicity of this case could

further jeopardize confidence that the potential conflict has been effectively and appropriately

managed. The situation creates an appearance of impropriety to any reasonable observer and

creates a situation where the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Based on the

above-described circumstances, the University’s Motion to Recuse and to Stay proceedings

should be granted.







Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 255-8581

[email protected]

[email protected]

and

Page 8 of 9

making findings and conclusions thereon, the District Judge below, or if he be recused, another

District Judge to whom the case may be transferred, shall []consider the merits of the case.” Id.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court must recuse under Section 455(a) because its

impartiality might be reasonably questioned. Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s four-attorney law firm

hired the grandson of the Judge hearing this matter while the case was pending but did not

disclose this fact to defense counsel. Neither the potential conflict nor the details of any attempts

to avert the conflict were timely or fully disclosed to the University. The nondisclosure in

combination with the small size of Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm and the publicity of this case could

further jeopardize confidence that the potential conflict has been effectively and appropriately

managed. The situation creates an appearance of impropriety to any reasonable observer and

creates a situation where the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Based on the

above-described circumstances, the University’s Motion to Recuse and to Stay proceedings

should be granted.







Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 255-8581

[email protected]

[email protected]

and


[Jconsider the merits of the case.” Id.



of 9


ADAMS, STEPNER,


40 West Pike Street

Covington, KY 41011

(859) 394-6200

(859) 392-7263 (FAX)

[email protected]











P.O. Box 17534


[email protected]

[email protected]




P.O. Box 499

Lexington, KY 40588

[email protected]






Page 9 of 9


ADAMS, STEPNER,


40 West Pike Street

Covington, KY 41011

(859) 394-6200

(859) 392-7263 (FAX)

[email protected]











P.O. Box 17534


[email protected]

[email protected]




P.O. Box 499

Lexington, KY 40588

[email protected]







th

x:\




buef_fq=N

buef_fq=N


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

AT COVINGTONCASE NO. 2:16-CV-00028-WOB-JGW

JANE DOE PLAINTIFF

v.

NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY, et al DEFENDANTS

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY C. MANDO

The Affiant, having first been duly cautioned and sworn, for his Affidavit states as

follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky

and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. I entered my

appearance for the Defendant, Northern Kentucky University, on February 9, 2017.

2. On the evening of March 21, 2017,1 attended an Inn of Court meeting. Judge

Bertelsman was also present. During the cocktail hour, Judge Bertelsman and I greeted

each other and spoke briefly about his recent trip to Florida. During the conversation, Judge

Bertelsman asked if he had permission to speak with Plaintiffs counsel, Kevin Murphy,

about getting the above-referenced litigation settled. I said, "Sure.” Judge Bertelsman also

stated that he asked Magistrate Judge Greg Wehrman to assist in getting the case resolved. I

stated that Judge Wehrman had called me earlier in the day. Judge Bertelsman and I did not

discuss any substantive facts about the case or any pending motions. As the conversation

with Judge Bertelsman ended, he stated something to the effect of, "You know my grandson

is working for Kevin" and that they had erected a "Chinese wall.” I was not aware that Kevin

Murphy’s law firm had hired the Judge's grandson and I do not recall making any comment.

1 EXHIBIT 1


At that point, our conversation ended and we both circulated to talk to other persons at the

meeting.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

COUNTY OF KENTON

)) ss )

/ vjJ^Sworn to before me and subscribed in my {0 day of April. 2017. f\

jresence by JEFFREY C. MANDO, this

OTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

ID#:________________

Christina WaHdey Notary PubHc, ID No. 549217

State at Large, Kentucky My Commission Expires 2/21/2020

1608587.1226101-76631

2

buef_fq=O

buef_fq=O


Joshua Salsburey

From:Sent:To:Subject-Attachments:

Bryan BeaumanThursday, April 06, 2017 6:00 PMJoshua SalsbureyFwd: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 — recusalmime-attachment.png

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: <Dawn [email protected]>Date: April 5, 2017 at 1:09:29 PM EDT To: Kevin Murphy <[email protected]>Cc: "Bryan H. Beauman ('[email protected])" <bbeauman@sturgi 11 turner.com>, Barbara Kriz <[email protected]>, Jeff Mando <[email protected]>,, Kacey Coleman <[email protected]>, "Steven Taylor" <[email protected]>Subject: Re: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 -- recusal

Counsel,

Thank you all for your responses. We will set the conference for Friday, April 7 at 1:00 pm. You will receive an order. Anyone wishing to attend by phone should email me the number where you can be reached at that time.

Thank you.

Dawn L. Rogers Career Law Clerk toWilliam O. Bertelsman, United States District JudgeEastern District of Kentucky35 W. Fifth StreetCovington, KY 41011(859) 392-7900

From: "Kevin Murphy" <KMurphv@mlifirm com>To: 'Dawn [email protected]" < Dawn [email protected]>Cc: Jeff Mando <[email protected]> "Bryan H. Beauman ([email protected])" <[email protected]>. Barbara Kriz<[email protected]>, Kacey Coleman <[email protected]> "Steven Taylor" <[email protected]>Date: 04/05/2017 12:28 PMSubject: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal

For the last two days I was in a mediation in Minneapolis, and I just returned to the office.

I am available all day on Friday. I am not available today nor tomorrow. I will attend in person.

i EXHIBIT 2


Sj;2400 Chamber Center Drive, Suite 200Ft. Mitchell, KY 41017(P) 859.578.3060 | (F) 859.578.3061The preceding information is from the law finn of Murphy Landen Jones PLXC and may be protected by attomey/client privilege. If you believe it has been sent to you in error, do not read it. Please reply to the sender that you have received the message in error, then delete the message. Do not retain a copy. Thank you.

Kevin L. Murphy

Disclaimer

The information contained in this communication from the sender is confidential. It is intended solely for use by the recipient and others authorized to receive it. If you are not the recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking action in relation of the contents of this information is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful.

This email has been scanned for viruses and malware, and may have been automatically archived by Mimecast Ltd, an innovator in Software as a Service (SaaS) for business. Providing a safer and more useful place for your human generated data. Specializing in; Security, archiving and compliance. To find out more Click Here.

2


Joshua Salsburey

From:Sent:To:Subject:

Bryan BeaumanThursday, April 06, 2017 5:26 PM Joshua SalsbureyFwd: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal [IWOV-DMS.FID567186]

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: <Dawn [email protected]>Date: April 4, 2017 at 4:42:11 PM EDT To: JeffMando <[email protected]>Cc: "Bryan H. Beauman ([email protected])" <[email protected]>, Barbara Kriz <[email protected]>, "Kacey Coleman" <[email protected]>, Kevin Murphy <KMumhy@ml i firm. com>Subject: RE: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal [IWOV-DMS.FID567186]

Counsel

Judge Bertelsman has reviewed this communication and has directed me to state the following.

Judge will hold a conference before the end of the week regarding this matter, as well as the status of settlement negotiations. Counsel who are out of town may attend by phone.

Counsel are directed to respond to this email by the end of the business day tomorrow, April 5, 2017, regarding their availability for the remainder of the week, stating whether they will be available in person or via telephone.

The Court will then put on an order setting the conference.


From: JeffMando <[email protected]>To: "Dawn [email protected]" <Dawn [email protected]>Cc: "Kevin Murphy" <[email protected]>. Kacey Coleman <KColeman@sturaillturner com> "Bryan H. Beauman [email protected]<[email protected]>. Barbara Kriz <[email protected]>Date: 04/04/2017 02:50 PMSubject: RE: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal [IWOV-DMS.FID567186]

1

Case: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202-3 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 4 of 7 - Page ID#: 5608Dawn:

Thanks for your email. NKU has been attempting to set a conference (telephonically or in person) with the court to discuss the recusal issue and a briefing schedule before filing the Motion based on our understanding that the court preferred proceeding in that manner. Late this morning, Plaintiffs counsel stated that we should go ahead and file Motion since he did not know what we planned to address at the conference. He indicated we could discuss a briefing schedule after he read the Motion. Under these circumstances, and absent further direction from the court, NKU will file the Motion to Recuse.

Respectfully,

Jeff

Jeffrey C. MandoADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & DUSING, PLLC.40 West Pike StreetCovington, KY 41011(859) 394-6200(859) 392-7263 (FAX)

From: Dawn [email protected] fmailtoiDawn [email protected] Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2017 11:06 AM To: Jeff MandoSubject: Fw: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal

From: Dawn Rogers/KYED/06/USCOURTSTo: [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected]@swdlaw.com. [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected] Date: 04/04/2017 11:02 AMSubject: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal

Counsel,

The Court has been informed by counsel for NKU that NKU is considering filing a motion to recuse Judge Bertelsman based upon the fact that one of his grandsons is employed as an associate at Murphy Landen Jones, PLLC ("MLJ"). Counsel for NKU has been attempting to find a time convenient to everyone to schedule a conference with the Court on this matter.

In light of this, Judge asked me to share with you the following information.

As you may be aware, 28 U.S.C. § 455 provides the statutory basis for recusal of federal judges. Judge Bertelsman reviewed this statute carefully, both before his grandson accepted employment at MLJ, and within the last week. In pertinent part, the statute provides:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in anyproceeding

2

Case: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202-3 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 5 of 7 - Page ID#: 5609in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

***

or the(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them,

spouse of such person:

***

the

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by

outcome of the proceeding.

Courts interpreting this statute hold, seemingly uniformly, that the employment of a child of a judge in a law firm representing a party before the Court does not require recusal where the child is not a partner and is not working on the case. See, e.g., In re Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys., 85 F.3d 1353,1364-65 (8th Cir. 1996); Benko v. Judges' Retirement Sys., No. 97-1241,1998 WL199798, at *4 (6th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456,463-64 (5th Cir. 1977); Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 348 F. Supp.2d 18,19-21 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp.2d 692, 713-15 (M.D. La. 1999); Wilmington Towing Co., Inc. v. Cape Fear Towing Co., Inc., 624 F. Supp.2d 1210,1211-12 (E.D.N.C. 1986).

The Court is advised that the grandson in question has no involvement whatsoever in the case before the Court and no financial interest therein.

We hope this information is helpful to the issues under consideration.


CONFIDENTIAL WARNING

This email message, together with any attachments, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please notify us immediately by telephone

3


(859)394-6200 or by return email and delete this message, along with any attachments, from your computer. Thank you.

From: Dawn [email protected] rmailto:Dawn [email protected] Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2017 11:06 AM To: Jeff MandoSubject: Fw: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal

From: Dawn Rogers/KYED/06/USCOURTSTo: KMurphv@l\/ILJfirm.com, [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected]. [email protected]@swdlaw.com. [email protected]. Diacobs@sturqillturner com, [email protected]. [email protected] Date: 04/04/2017 11:02 AMSubject: Doe v. NKU, 16-28 - recusal

Counsel,

The Court has been informed by counsel for NKU that NKU is considering filing a motion to recuse Judge Bertelsman based upon the fact that one of his grandsons is employed as an associate at Murphy Landen Jones, PLLC ("MU"). Counsel for NKU has been attempting to find a time convenient to everyone to schedule a conference with the Court on this matter.

In light of this, Judge asked me to share with you the following information.

As you may be aware, 28 U.S.C. § 455 provides the statutory basis for recusal of federal judges. Judge Bertelsman reviewed this statute carefully, both before his grandson accepted employment at MU, and within the last week. In pertinent part, the statute provides:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

***

or the(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them,

spouse of such person:

***

the

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by

outcome of the proceeding.

Courts interpreting this statute hold, seemingly uniformly, that the employment of a child of a judge in a law firm representing a party before the Court does not require recusal where the child is not a partner and is not working on the case. See, e.g., In re Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys., 85

4

Case: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202-3 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 7 of 7 - Page ID#: 5611F-Sd 1353,1364-65 (8th Cir. 1996); Benko v. Judges' Retirement Sys., No. 97-1241,1998 WL 199798,

at *4 (6th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1977); Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 348 F. Supp.2d 18,19-21 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp.2d 692, 713-15 (M.D. La. 1999); Wilmington Towing Co., Inc. v. Cape Fear Towing Co., Inc., 624 F. Supp.2d 1210,1211-12 (E.D.N.C. 1986).

The Court is advised that the grandson in question has no involvement whatsoever in the case before the Court and no financial interest therein.

We hope this information is helpful to the issues under consideration.


5

buef_fq=P

buef_fq=PCase: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202-4 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 1 of 3 - Page ID#:

5612

90% e ☆ ^hiipiV/’.v.w. .awoxorn/a11orm'"/sAI'i01/-ky‘ni(.iiolas-gregg-4S0fl809.!ilm

:ed Getting Started

Q. Setrcft

Nicholas Robert GreggNot yet reviewed

AWO RATING No Concern

9 Lakeside Park, KY © Licensed less than a year

Is this your profile?

Claim your profile

It's free and only takes 2 minutes.

PRACTICE AREAS No known practice areas

About Reviews Cost Contact

Contacta,.. o'' ^r

2400 Chamber Center Dr #200View larger map

.pp-©

o,'V

o %CRESCENT PARK

Center Drive #200 "%

Murphy Landen Jones PLLC2400 Chamber Center Dr Ste 200 Lakeside Park, KY, 41017-1679

Office (859) 992-4405

t. Call

©2017 Google - Map Data Terms of Use Report a map error

Nicholas Robert Gregg, is this your profile?

Claiming your profile is free and easy.

Highlight your practice areas, experience, and contact information.

Showcase your speaking engagements, awards, case histories, and more.

Claim your profile EXHIBIT 3


httpsy/w'.w.'awo.com/atto eyv'41017-ky-n cho as-gregg-4809809.htm 90% ☆ ^

ited Getting Started

Avvo

Q, Search

Lawyer directory LegaJ topics Lega services Legal forms Talk to a lawyer Sign in

a

Home Find a lawyer Nicholas Robert Gregg


AVVO RATING No Concern

9 Lakeside Park, KY G Licensed less than a year


Claim your profile



About Reviews Cost Contact

Similar lawyers SPONSORED LISTINGS

Paul JosephL O Dickman

I *****(52)AVVO RATING 10

"Better Call Paul! 23 + Years of Experience. Free

Lisa Marie Wells ***** (38)AVVO RATING 9.8

A Carol Lavonn Risk jf'Pl ***** (25)^ ■ 3 AVVO RATING 9.6

' Defending wtiat s most important to you. Your case. Your future. Your family. Can

"Experienced and Successfu Criminal Defense Attorney, Call Now For A Free


https://www,awacQm/attorneys/41017-ky-nicholas-gregg-4809809.htm!

ted ® Getting Started

90% e Q. Search ☆ ©


AWO RATING No Concern

9 Lakeside Park, KY © Licensed less than a year

About Reviews

Resume

LICENSE

State Status Acquired Updated

OH Active 2016 02/04/2017

© We have not found any instances of professional misconduct for this lawyer.

Cost Contact

AWO CONTRIBUTIONS

Legal answers 0

Legal guides 0


I Claim your profile



Reviews

Not yet reviewed

Review Nicholas Gregg

Show full resume ^

Attorney endorsements

No endorsements yetEndorsements from fellow lawyers are an important consideration for many when selecting the right attorney. Be the first to endorse your colleague!

Are you an attorney? Endorse this lawyer

buef_fq=Q

buef_fq=QCase: 2:16-cv-00028-WOB-JGW Doc #: 202-5 Filed: 04/06/17 Page: 1 of 3 - Page ID#:

5615

ft & + ft B

EXHIBIT 4


^ (T) ;v»;v mljfirm.com •attorneys,'

Most Visited Getting Started

Home

About Us

± Our Team

Areas Of Practice

e Q, Search

in Mnrpby Jeff Landtn

Mike Jonei Sirs <!n Tftylof

Sqtiarespace

O - ■>- |f ... 1, 3/30/201/





JANE DOE PLAINTIFF

v. ORDER


***** ***** *****

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Northern Kentucky University motion for

recusal and to stay all proceedings. The Court having considered the Motion, and being

otherwise adequately advised, it is ORDERED that:

1) Defendant’s Motion for recusal is GRANTED;

2) The undersigned Judge is RECUSED from services in the above-styled action;

and

3) The proceedings in this action shall be stayed until such time as the action is

REASSIGNED by random draw to another Judge assigned to accept cases on the Covington

docket for all further proceedings.

__________________________________________ WILLIAM O. BERTLESMAN, JUDGE

U.S. DISTRICT COURT





JANE DOE PLAINTIFF

v. ORDER


***** ***** *****

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Northern Kentucky University motion for

recusal and to stay all proceedings. The Court having considered the Motion, and being

otherwise adequately advised, it is ORDERED that:

1) Defendant’s Motion for recusal is GRANTED;

2) The undersigned Judge is RECUSED from services in the above-styled action;

and

3) The proceedings in this action shall be stayed until such time as the action is

REASSIGNED by random draw to another Judge assigned to accept cases on the Covington

docket for all further proceedings.

__________________________________________ WILLIAM O. BERTLESMAN, JUDGE

U.S. DISTRICT COURT


cv-

ORDER

NKUS Motion to Recuse and to Stay Proceedings

Documents

Transcript of NKUS Motion to Recuse and to Stay Proceedings