NJIT Big Data Visualization ContestBeverage Industry includes bottled water, juice, sparkling and...
Transcript of NJIT Big Data Visualization ContestBeverage Industry includes bottled water, juice, sparkling and...
Permission to reprint or distribute any content from this presentation requires the prior written approval of S&P Capital IQ. Not for distribution to the public. Copyright © 2014 by Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (S&P). All rights reserved.
Innovation Lab S&P Capital IQ
NJIT Big Data Visualization Contest
M&A Case Example -- Coca-Cola: Identifying acquisition target
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Beverage Industry Landscape
Overview • The industry has a lengthy history of steady single-‐digit yearly sales and net-‐profit growth.
• Demand for beverages is driven by consumer tastes and demographics.
• The profitability of individual companies depends on effec>ve marke>ng.
• The Beverage Industry is dominated by a few sizeable players and compe>>on among them is oCen intense.
• The US industry is highly concentrated: the top 50 companies account for 90 percent of revenue.
• Top 5 firms in the beverage industry globally (by LTM 2013 total revenue results) are Pepsico, Coca-‐Cola, Anheuser-‐Busch, Heineken and Fomento Económico Mexicano.
*MSCI World Beverage Index (2009-‐2013)
15.7% CAGR
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total Revenue EBITDA
Gross Profit
1 Year Growth of the Global Beverage Industry
Sources: S&P Capital IQ Beverage Industry includes bottled water, juice, sparkling and still drinks, syrups, nectars, ready-to-drink and regular teas and coffees, dairy drinks, energy drinks, sports drinks, fruit powders, and alcoholic drinks such as beer, wine, cider and spirits.
Growth Forecast—Key Companies
EPS (2013-‐2017)
Growth Margin % (2013-‐2017)
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The Market Environment and Timing The compeAAve environment creates pressure and opportunity
M&A drives Coca-‐Cola’s growth
Ø Revenue CAGR 15.7% in 2009-‐2012
Ø Three-‐year annualized change of 22.45% in opera>ng profit margin
Ø In 2013 alone, it invested in 5 successful company mergers or acquisi>ons.
Ø Compe>tor’s ac>ons create pressure
Ø In 2011, PepsiCo made its largest interna>onal acquisi>on by purchasing 2/3 stake in a Russian food company.
Ø PepsiCo to invest $5bn in Mexican beverage business
M&A in Food/beverage industry
M&A growth will support organic developments
Compe>>ve industry The >me to move forward is now
Timing op>miza>on
Ø Funding is available Ø Growth in North America
is stagna>ng. Ø Increase focus on global
growth.
Key Financials of Coca-Cola (in $ mm except EPS)
Year 2011 2012 2013
Total Revenue 46,542 48,017 47,241.75*
Total assets 79,974 86,174 89,432
EBITDA 12,866 13,198 13,542.46*
Cash& ST Investment 14,035 16,558 20,506
Diluted EPS 1.85 1.97 2.09*
Sources: S&P Capital IQ * Estimated by S&P Capital IQ
SoC Drink Market Share in U.S.
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How We Chose the M&A Target
Overview of the working process:
Selection Criteria: Attractiveness mapping based on TEV, EBITDA
margin, and Revenue Growth
Narrow it down to three:
Scoreboard based on
synergy effects, revenue, risk etc
Future Prospects:
Return on Equity forecast
Picking the target
Filtering the candidates:
Sources: S&P Capital IQ
? From the ahrac>veness map, we assess the poten>al targets on three key characteris>cs: • Total Enterprise Value: It provides accurate takeover valua>on of a company. Coca-‐Cola moved into Q4 2013 with $30.04 billion in cash & equivalents. • EBITDA Margin: Provides a clean view of a company’s core profitability • Revenue Growth, 5 Yr CAGR % Coca-‐Cola has an es>mated Revenue CAGR 4.41% within 3 years. Current markets are facing low growth, therefore strong prospect is a key factor
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Narrow Down to Three Targets
Company Synergy Effects
Equity recomm. Revenue Investment
Risk Affordable Score
10
9
7
8
7
Select three candidates: • Our five candidates are further narrowed down based on the scores in the
table above. The scores are calculated as weighted ranking of factor characteris>cs.
• Using a valua>on es>mate, we found that Want Want China Holding is not an affordable target to Coca-‐Cola.
• Coca-‐Cola once offered a coffee-‐flavored soC drink-‐Coca-‐Cola BlāK in U.S., but discon>nued it in 2008. However, it is s>ll a growing market worth to re-‐enter.
• J.M.Smucker mainly engages in the manufacture and marke>ng of branded food products, which are not very relevant to Coca-‐Cola’s.
• Energy drink is s>ll a very profitable market to Coca-‐Cola, where it has a very small market share of ~4%, v.s. Monster’s 39% market share.
Sources: S&P Capital IQ
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters
Arca Con>nental
Monster Beverage
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Comparison of These Three Firms
Financials 2012 2013
TEV (mm) 7976.6 13018.7
Revenue (mm) 4334.5 4527.2
TEV/EBITDA 13.98 13.51
ROE 13.2% 14.6%
P/E 24.41 27.74
P/BV 3.81 3.22
Coca-‐Cola moved into Q4 2013 with $20.5 billion in cash & short term investment on its balance sheet. Before any other criteria is applied, the affordability of an acquisi>on is the priority. All these three firms are affordable. Ø A lower TEV/EBITDA ra>o indicates the company might be undervalued, which can be viewed as a good acquisi>on candidate. Ø The investors expect a higher Return on Equity (ROE) for high growth companies. Ø Generally a high Price to EPS (P/E) ra>o means that investors are an>cipa>ng higher growth in the future. Ø A lower Price to Book Value (P/BV) ra>o could mean that the stock is undervalued. However, it could also mean that something is
fundamentally wrong with the company.
Sources: S&P Capital IQ
Financials 2012 2013
TEV (mm) 5964.1 9222.5
Revenue (mm) 3859.2 4358.1
TEV/EBITDA 9.14 11.22
ROE 17.3% 19.7%
P/E 18.24 24.69
P/BV 2.61 4.05
Financials 2012 2013
TEV (mm) 9196.4 8386.6
Revenue (mm) 2060.7 2230.12
TEV/EBITDA 18.99 15.94
ROE 41.9% 35.7%
P/E 36.30 33.72
P/BV 17.40 12.20
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Prospects for the Future
Free Cash Flow Forecasts
Ø It is assumed that Coca-‐Cola would be able to maintain the firms current cash flow aCer acquisi>ons.
Ø Arca Con>nental is the most ahrac>ve target when it comes to future FCF forecast, but the differences with others are not too significant. It is engaged in the manufacture, distribu>on, and sale of soC drinks in primarily Mexico, Argen>na, and Ecuador, which is beneficial from a standpoint of global growth.
Ø Green Mountain generated more than $600 mm in FCF, which was resulted from net profit growth, lower inventory levels and lower capital investment. But its FCF varied significantly in the past 4 years and would vary as well in the near future from forecasts.
Ø Monster Beverage comes first when their revenue growth rates for the next two years are compared. Whereas Green Mountain and Arca Con>nental saw larger growth rates in 2011 and 2012.
Sources: S&P Capital IQ
Revenue Growth Forecasts
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Considering Risks of These Three Firms
• Fomento Económico Mexicano represents a strong compe>tor in the Mexican market
• Foreign governments come under pressure from industry/public calls to restrict beverage imports
• Culture differences
• It solely doing business in the North American market, which is well-‐known to Coca-‐Cola, thus reduces the risk
• Its coffee and tea business is rela>vely new to Coca-‐Cola, which it once operated but failed. This increases opera>ng risk
• Coca-‐Cola could strengthen its energy drinks porrolio by acquiring an already established player, but while Monster is becoming expensive to acquire.
• Poten>al health risks and regulatory probe • Its revenue is s>ll small compared to the other candidates
Sources: S&P Capital IQ
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Entering Latin America –Aggressive Penetration
La>n America only accounts for about 10% of Coca-‐Cola’s total revenue.
Coca-‐Cola revenues in 2012 by regions
Ø Coca-‐Cola’s sales in Mexico, Argen>na and Ecuador will poten>ally increase to USD 10 bn by 2015 through the acquisi>on of Arca Con>nental.
Ø Helps Coca-‐Cola to pursue a global growth strategy by achieving larger market posi>on in Mexico and South America.
Ø Gives Coca-‐Cola more market power in terms of pricing
Ø Arca also produces, distributes and sells soC drinks of brands owned by Coca-‐Cola and other brands owned by itself.
Arca Con>nental fits to the porrolio
Arca Con>nental revenues in 2012 by regions
Sources: S&P Capital IQ
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Picking the Winner: Latin American Adventures
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that Arca Con>nental is the best acquisi>on target.
Ø Very possible to obtain substan>al synergy effects
Ø Very familiar with Coca-‐Cola’s brands and products since it engages in the produc>on, distribu>on and sale of brands owned by Coca-‐Cola.
Ø Acquisi>on of Arca Con>nental fits well with Coca-‐Cola’s strategy of growing global presence within soC drinks, especially in La>n America
Ø There is a comparably high risk associated with direct entrance to the La>n American Consumer Staples market, which can be mi>gated by establishing joint ventures with local manufacturers.
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