NIST-BOULDER PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION EVENT NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION
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Transcript of NIST-BOULDER PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION EVENT NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION
NIST-BOULDER PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION EVENTNRC SPECIAL INSPECTION
Events Leading Up to the Plutonium Spill Untrained researchers use the plutonium,
unsupervised Researcher ruptures the plutonium source
during an experiment on June 9, 2008 Researcher washes hands in sink Researcher unknowingly tracks the loose
plutonium powder throughout the building Untrained workers attempt to
decontaminate the building
Initial Event Response NIST personnel attempt to decontaminate
the building themselves NIST contacts the NRC to report the event
the day after it occurred NRC dispatches a Health Physicist to NIST
the following day NRC identifies multiple deficiencies in the
NIST initial response
Continued Event Response On June 19, a second Health Physics
inspector was dispatched by NRC DOE’s Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP) Team was also there during this time to characterize the extent of contamination
Due to the results of the DOE characterization, a NRC Special Inspection Team was dispatched on June 30, 2008
EPA Involvement in the NIST Event
The City of Boulder, in coordination with the US EPA, Region VIII, initiated a biosolids monitoring program to analyze the extent of plutonium contamination, if any, in the Boulder Waste Water Treatment Facility
None of the samples revealed the presence of plutonium above background levels
Plutonium Sources and Containers
WING 1 BUILDING 1
LABORATORY 2120/2124 DIAGRAM
MULTI-USE LABORATORY
DETECTOR RESEARCH PROJECT
DETECTOR CRYOSTAT/LEAD BRICKS/MARBLE TABLE
NO EATING OR DRINKING ALLOWED!
LABORATORY 2124
TIME TO CALL IN DOE’s RAP TEAM
INSTRUMENT PEGGED
SOURCE STORAGE CABINET
STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM
Two Centimeters Wide By Four Centimeters High
MAY BE BROKEN?????
YEP, IT’S BROKEN!
LABORATORY 2124
HEPA-FILTRATION SYSTEM and CAM
HAGEN CONTAINERS
SOURCE RECOVERY DRY-RUN
326 MILLICURIES OF RECOVERED PLUTONIUM
TIME TO CLEAN (DECONTAMINATE)
48,000 POUNDS OF WASTE
312 DAYS FOR CLEAN-UP
CREEP, CREEP, CREEP
EXCAVATION OF OUTDOOR DRAINLINE
SOIL SAMPLES FROM OUTSIDE TRENCH
REMOVAL OF CONCRETE FLOOR
EXCAVATION OF INDOOR DRAINLINE
ENERGYSOLUTIONS MOBILE LABORATORY
SHIPMENT OF LLW
SOIL SAMPLES FROM INSIDE TRENCH
ORISE CONFIRMATORY SURVEYS
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
Radiological consequences were potentially very significant, but actual safety consequences were minimal· No dose limits were exceeded· Material potentially discharged to sewer did not exceed regulatory limits· Contaminated areas of the NIST facility were cleaned
DIRECT CAUSE
Breakage of glass bottle containing plutonium on a hard surface led directly to the incident· Marble top laboratory table· Lead bricks· Detector cryostat
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
· Personnel were inexperienced and not properly trained
· An adequate hazard analysis was not performed
· Written operating procedures were not developed
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
· Plutonium sources were used and stored in a mixed –use laboratory
· The setup of the experiment was insufficient
· Direct oversight of work involving plutonium was inadequate
· The immediate emergency response to the event was inadequate
ROOT CAUSE
Inadequate management oversight and accountability to ensure that the Radiation Safety Program was sufficient to handle plutonium safely
NEXT STEPS
· 10 apparent violations identified· Inspection report issued· Enforcement pending
Read The NIST Report Yourself Go to www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
Pull up ADAMS ML 093080053