A Textual Analysis of Aristotle’s Discourse on the Intellectual Excellences in the

Nicomachean Ethics Or How Does One Know He Is Living Well?

Zachary Resch Great Ideas Program, Carthage College

Celebration of Scholars 2014: Exposition of Student & Faculty Research, Scholarship &Creativity

Discussion Aristotle himself has to concede that the life of a man

concerned with φιλοσοφία is unrealistic insomuch as he is

a man.

οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ

θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο

τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ

τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν

ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν

ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

[F]or it is not in so far as he is man that he will live

so, but in so far as something divine is present in

him, and by so much as this is superior to our

composite nature is its activity superior to that

which is the exercise of the other kind of excellence.

If intellect is divine, then, in comparison with man,

the life according to it is divine in comparison to

human life (X, 7, 1177b27ff.).3

Given this line of reasoning, σοφία is an intellectual

capacity understood as divine by nature and, thus, more

fitting for the life of a divinity than of man. The vestige of

this intellectual capacity as a possibility for human

happiness is expressed in Aristotle’s hope that as men we

would strive as much as possible to imitate the divine, or

ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ

ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ “[to] make ourselves

immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with

the best thing in us” (X, 7, 1177b34ff.). In spite of this, he

does remind us that τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει

κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ “that which is proper

to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each

thing” (X, 7, 1178a5ff.). The life of the divine, therefore,

would not seem fitting for a man and to live the best life,

man must set aside σοφία.

Introduction In the winter semester of 1924, Martin Heidegger delivered a lecture course with the intention to provide a new

interpretation of two Platonic dialogues, the Sophist and the Philebus. Heidegger claimed that it was necessary to use

a hermeneutic approach to truly understand the substantive content of the Platonic dialogues. Essentially, his

methodology was to use Aristotelian expansions of Plato’s philosophy to better understand what Plato himself was

trying to resolve through the dialectic investigation. The perspective that Heidegger offers, that one should rely on

using Aristotle rather than the pre-Socratic philosophers, is based on the notion that Aristotle was working with the

concepts that Plato left at his disposal, although the concepts are articulated “more radically and developed more

scientifically” by Aristotle.

In his investigation of Aristotle’s work, Heidegger sought to elaborate on the intimate relationship of φρόνησις

and σοφία within Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. While reading over Heidegger’s Sophist during the summer, I

came away with the conclusion that the relationship of these two concepts within Aristotle was not altogether clear to

Heidegger and that their relation leaves open the suggestion that there may be a certain ambiguity in either the relation

of φρόνησις and σοφία or in the definition of either concept in the Nicomachean Ethics that would produce this lack

of clarity. In order to address some of the possible inconsistencies that arose in Heidegger’s examination of Aristotle, I

attempted to chart every use of the terms φρόνησις and σοφία throughout the Nicomachean Ethics to determine

whether such a textual ambiguity could be found in Aristotle’s writings, and whether Heidegger’s own research was an

attempt to offer a solution to a standing problem, in addition to completing a close textual analysis of Book VI of the

Nicomachean Ethics. This thesis will look to clarify the concepts of φρόνησις and σοφία throughout the

Nicomachean Ethics through a close examination of their particular usages and, furthermore, to elaborate on the

relationship that they have to each other as this seems to be what may cause the inconsistencies in Heidegger’s reading

of Aristotle’s texts. As a result of the analysis of the varying intellectual capacities, including both φρόνησις and σοφία,

I will endeavor to make the argument that Aristotle provides a false priority to σοφία over φρόνησις at 1143b32,

1145a7, and 1178b29, when discussing what intellectual capacity is the highest in excellence, and thereby highest in

accordance with the happy life.

The structure of the thesis was ultimately divided into three parts:

1. An Examination on the Division of the Soul as a Means to Understanding the Intellectual Excellences

2. The Examination of the Intellectual Capacities: τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς

3. An Argument Concerning the False Priority of σοφία over φρόνησις in the Attainment of the Best Life for Man

Figure 1. The figure above is a chart showing the initial division of

the soul that takes place in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics.

Additionally, the parenthetic additions are the intellectual capacities

described by Aristotle in the same book and, for the most part, have

been aligned with their respective part of the soul. Philosophical

wisdom is an exception, however, since it is said to be a combination

of knowledge and comprehension. The latter capacity, comprehension,

does not have a firm place in the division of the soul since it is in itself

not well-defined. Despite this difficulty, there is a close kinship with

philosophical wisdom and theoretical contemplation in Book X of the

Nichomachean Ethics, suggesting the placement in that part of the

rational soul.

Acknowledgements & References This research was made possible by the funding provided by the Interdisciplinary Studies SURE program.

A special thanks goes to faculty advisors Dr. D. Ben DeSmidt and Dr. Joseph McAlhany.

1. Aristotle (trans. 1984). Metaphysics, tr. W.D. Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton

University Press, USA.

2. Aristotle (trans. 1984). Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle.

Princeton University Press, USA.

3. Heidegger, Martin (trans. 1997). Plato’s Sophist, 1st ed., tr. R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer. Indiana

University Press, USA.