LMI TOPIC 5: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1949-1993

SYLLABUS: PERSPECTIVES

POLITICS AND ADMINSTRATION: From Brookeborough to O’Neill; the civil rights movement; emergence of the Provisional IRA; the fall of Stormont; direct rule; republican and loyalist terrorism; Sunningdale and power-sharing; the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985; The Republic- responses to the Troubles.

CASE STUDY: The Sunningdale Agreement and the Power-Sharing Executive, 1973-74

SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: Impact of Welfare State: education, health, housing. Social and economic developments prior to 1969. Impact of the Troubles: (a) the economy (b) society- education, health, housing.

CASE STUDY: The Coleraine University Controversy

CULTURE AND RELIGION:Religious affiliation and cultural identity; ecumenism; cultural responses to Troubles.

CASE STUDY: The Apprentice Boys of Derry _______________________________________________________________________________________________

KEY CONCEPTS

Bigotry Civil Rights Cultural identity

and traditions

Ecumenism Gerrymandering Power-Sharing

Propaganda Sectarianism Tolerance/Intolerance

KEY PERSONALITIES

• Gerry Adams • Bernadette Devlin • Brian Faulkner • John Hume • James Molyneaux

• Conn and Patricia McCluskey • Terence O’Neill • Ian Paisley • Margaret Thatcher _______________________________________________________________________________________________

20161. During the period 1949-1969, how successful was the government of Northern Ireland in responding to

problems posed by the economy and/or community relations? 2. Why did controversy arise from the activities of the ABOD or the siting of a new university at Coleraine?3. What were the strengths and weaknesses of Brian Faulkner as a political leader? 4. What was the impact of one or more of the following on N. Ireland: Bernadette Devlin; John Hume; Seamus

Heaney?2015

1. Would you agree that there was considerable social and economic change in Northern Ireland, 1949-1969, but that nothing changed politically?

2. What was the contribution of Terence O’Neill and/or Ian Paisley to the affairs of N. Ireland up to 1993? 3. What was the Sunningdale Agreement and why did the power-sharing executive, 1973-1974, collapse? 4. In what ways did the “Troubles” have a social & economic impact and/or give rise to cultural responses?

20141. What were the main social and economic changes that took place in Northern Ireland, 1949-1993? 2. Which was more successful, the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) or the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985)?

Argue your case, referring to both. 3. How did the people of Northern Ireland express their religious affiliation and cultural identity, 1949-93? 4. What was the contribution to Northern Irish affairs of Bernadette Devlin and/or Margaret Thatcher?

20131. How was N. Ire. affected by developments in one or more of the following: education; health; housing? 2. What were Brian Faulkner’s strengths and weaknesses as a political leader?

Mr Fitzgerald1

3. What was the impact of Republican and Loyalist terrorism on Northern Ireland? 4. What was the significance for N. Ire. of one or more of the following: religious affiliation and

cultural identity; the ABOD; Seamus Heaney?2012

1. How effective was the contribution of Terence O’Neill to the affairs of Northern Ireland?2. What was the significance of the Coleraine University controversy and/or the activities of the ABOD? 3. What political attempts were made to resolve the “Troubles”, 1969-1993? 4. What was the impact of one or more of the following on N. Ire. up to 1993: Bernadette Devlin; Ian

Paisley; Seamus Heaney?

2011 [DBQ]What was the significance of the activities of the ABOD for both Unionists & Nationalists in N. Ireland?

2010 [DBQ]What were the difficulties associated with implementing the Sunningdale Agreement?

20091. Who was the more effective leader of N. Ire., Brookeborough or O’Neill? Argue your case, ref. to both.2. To what extent were the activities of the ABOD and/or the choice of Coleraine as the site of N. Ireland’s

second university divisive?3. What were the social and economic effects of the “Troubles”?4. What was the importance of one or more of the following: the Sunningdale Agreement, 1973; the

Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985; the Downing Street Declaration, 1993?

20081. How successful was the government of N. Ire. in responding to social & economic problems,1949-69?2. Why was the choice of Coleraine as the site for Northern Ireland’s second university controversial? 3. Why did the Civil Rights movement emerge in Northern Ireland and was it successful?4. What moves were made towards finding a peaceful resolution of the “Troubles”, 1973-1993?

20071. What impact had the introduction of the welfare state to N. Ire. on one or more of the following:

education; health; housing?2. Account for the fall of Stormont and for the collapse of the power-sharing executive, 1973-1974.3. What was the importance of each of the following: the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985; the Downing Street

Declaration, 1993?4. What problems and opportunities did ecumenism present to society in N. Ireland between 1965 and 1993?

20061. During the period, 1949-1969, what was the impact of the welfare state on one or more of the following:

education; health; housing? 2. What was the contribution of Terence O’Neill to the affairs of N. Ireland during the period, 1949-1969?3. What was the contribution of the ABOD to the celebration of religious & cultural identity among that city’s unionist minority?4. Why was Direct Rule (from London) introduced, 1972, and why did it last so long?

Mr Fitzgerald2

2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

POLITICSAND

ADMIN.

NICRA/Civil Rights

*

Emergence of PIRADirect Rule *Rep/Loyalistterrorism

*

A-Ir Agr. 1985

†J ‡J †J †J

ROI response to TroublesSunningdale/ Power-sharing

* †J DBQ ‡J †J *

SOCIETYAND

ECONOMY

Impact Welf. State

*J * *J *J * * *

Impact of Troubles

†J *J *J *

Col Uni. Controv.

†J *J †J *

CULTUREAND

RELIGION

Rel affiliation Cultural ident

* †J

Ecumenism *Cultural responses to the Troubles

†J

App. Boys Derry

†J †J *J DBQ †J *

KEYPERSONS.

AdamsDevlin J‡ J‡ †JFaulkner * *Heaney J‡ †J †JHume J‡MolyneauxMcCluskeysO’Neill *J * *J *Paisley *J †JThatcher J‡

Mr Fitzgerald3

Questions related to the Sunningdale Agreement andOTHER Power Sharing Initiatives in Northern Ireland, 1973-93

2015: DIRECT Q. ON CASE STUDY 2014: COMPARATIVE Q. ON SUNNINGDALE 1973 & AIA 1985 2012: GENERAL Q. ON ‘POLITICAL ATTEMPTS’ (NOTE START DATE 1969)2010: DBQ- DIRECT Q. ON CASE STUDY 2009: GENERAL Q. ON ALL THREE INITIATIVES: SUNN. 1973/AIA 1985/DSD 1993.2008: GENERAL Q. ON ‘PEACEFUL RESOLUTION’ 1973-19932007: DIRECT Q. ON CASE STUDY 2007: SPECIFIC Q. ON BOTH AIA 1985 AND DSD 1993. 2006: Why was Direct Rule (from London) introduced, 1972, and why did it last so long?_______________________________________________________________________________________________

THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT & THE POWER SHARING EXECUTIVE, 1973-74

1. Direct Rule (23 March 1972): end of 52 years of devolved government in N. Ireland.

2. White Paper on Northern Ireland (following Darlington Conference 1972): the paper suggested

Self-government: form of devolved govmt. in N. Ire.; An elected assembly for N. Ire. (using PR system); Power-sharing executive between unionists and nationalists; A Council of Ireland for north-south (NI/ROI) co-operation.

4. Unionist & Nationalist Responses:

Ulster Unionist Council and Faulkner supported White Paper (NI status in UK guaranteed); Ian Paisley and the DUP, along with the Orange Order and the UDA opposed it. William Craig left the UUP and established the Vanguard Party- also opposed to White Paper. New Fine Gael-Labour coalition in ROI (led by Liam Cosgrave) supported White Paper. SDLP supported the proposals while the IRA opposed them (no promise of a united Ireland)

5. Assembly Elections (June 1973)

Pro-Power sharing Unionists: 24 seats; SDLP: 19 seats; Alliance Party: 8 seats; NILP: 1 seat. Anti-Power sharing Unionists (Paisley/DUP/Vanguard Party): 26 seats

6. Power-Sharing Executive (PSE) Talks (November 1973):

An 11-minister Executive was agreed by the UUP (6), SDLP (4) and the Alliance Party (1). Faulkner (UUP) as Chief Executive and Gerry Fitt (SDLP) as Deputy Chief Executive. Details of the Council of Ireland were to be discussed at the Sunningdale Conference (Dec. 1973). In response, some UUP members, the DUP, the Vanguard Party and the Orange Order now formed the

United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) to oppose the power sharing Executive.

7. The Sunningdale Conference (6-9 December 1973):

Pro-Power sharing parties met with the British and Irish governments (led by Edward Heath and Liam Cosgrave respectively).

William Whitelaw was replaced as NI Secretary of State by Francis Pym. Heath and Faulkner disliked each other which made discussions difficult. The Council of Ireland issue was divisive: Fitt and Devlin (SDLP) wanted to minimise its role to placate

Unionists while Hume (SDLP) and the Irish govmt. wanted to extend its role. Faulkner wanted Articles 2 and 3 removed from the Irish Constitution while Cosgrave said it was a constitutional matter for a referendum (which would be defeated anyway).

Mr Fitzgerald4

Cosgrave would not agree to Faulkner’s request for extradition of IRA suspects from the ROI.

8. The Sunningdale Agreement (December 1973):

The British and Irish governments declared that there would be no change in the status of N. Ireland until the majority of its people agreed to it.

Along with the Power Sharing Executive (PSE) itself, the Council of Ireland would have a Council of Ministers, a Consultative Assembly, a Permanent Secretariat and a Special Commission on Extradition as well as all-Ireland laws.

There would be two police authorities, one North and one South.

9. Problems of/Responses to Sunningdale:

All the power sharing groups made compromises but only saw these as short-term:o Faulkner dismissed the Council of Ireland as ‘necessary nonsense’ to win over the objections

of the Irish govmt. and the SDLP- the concession of status was vital;o Devlin admitted later that the SDLP’s main long-term aim was a united Ireland and that

Sunningdale would aid this goal. The IRA opposed Sunningdale as it saw the agreement as supportive of partition. The Irish government did not introduce extradition or officially recognise N. Ireland (until March). By

this time, the Executive’s position had been undermined.

10. Power Sharing Begins (January, 1974):

Executive begins on January 1 but is beset by riots and armed violence across N. Ireland. Faulkner resigns from UUC after it rejects Sunningdale Agreement by 53 vote majority. All the Unionist parties opposed to Sunningdale colluded to halt the workings of NI’s Assembly. Former FF Minister Kevin Boland takes High Court case against Sunningdale- Irish govmt.has to admit that

Articles 2 & 3 are still legal: embarrassing for the Executive and the Irish govmt.

11. GB General Election (February 1974):

Heath called a General Election on 28 February (which he subsequently lost)- disaster for PSE. The ONLY electoral issue in N.I: Council of Ireland (‘Dublin is only a Sunningdale away.’) The UUUC won 11 of the 12 seats- which was a massive blow for the legitimacy of the PSE.

12. Ulster Workers’ Council and Strike (March/May 1974):

New PM Harold Wilson & new Sec. State NI Merlyn Rees faced with the newly formed Ulster Workers’ Council (mostly power/electricity workers) supported by Loyalist paramilitaries.

Intimidation of workers common- NI came to a standstill. Loyalists suspected in Dublin & Monaghan bombings on 17 May- 32 people killed. Rees did not order British Army or RUC to ‘break’ the strike- tacit support? order ignored? Wilson’s speech about Northern ‘spongers’- no hope of breaking strike after this comment. Faulkner attempted to reduce power of Council of Ireland as a last resort. UWC threatened to cut supplies even more- Faulkner resigned on 27 May: Executive collapsed.

Mr Fitzgerald5

The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985

‘Whatever many of you think, the idea of attempting to undermine the right of the people of Northern Ireland to decide the jurisdiction under whose sovereignty they wish to live was, and has always been, abhorrent to me.’

-Garret Fitzgerald, open letter to Unionists, The Belfast Newsletter, 1994.

1. What was the AIA?

Following the rejection by all parties of the New Ireland Forum (with the exception of the Irish government and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, SDLP) and the IRA bombing of the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton in October 1984, the future looked bleak for any form of peace in Northern Ireland. In response, the British government started negotiations in secret with the Irish government to find a resolution to the Northern problem. Working closely together for the next 10 months, the AIA was signed by then Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald and the British PM, Margaret Thatcher on 15 November 1985 at Hillsborough, Co. Down. The agreement was notable as it stated that the Irish government had ‘an advisory role’ in the governing of Northern Ireland. The agreement was also clear in stating that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its citizens voted to join the Republic of Ireland . It also laid out the circumstances needed for the founding of a shared ‘consensus government’ in Northern Ireland and the need for both governments to confer regularly on ‘matters of mutual interest.’

2. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference

The AIA discussed these matters of mutual interest through the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. Based in the Maryfield area of Belfast, there was a full-time civil service secretariat, including representatives from both Irish and British governments. They dealt with cross-border issues such as security, legal jurisdiction and political matters. Above all, the AIIC only had powers of consultation; as the wording of the AIA stated, any proposals made by the Conference would not be considered ‘…the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland.’ The reason for this was the hope that unionists would be more open to a power-sharing devolved government if Irish government influence was lessened in the Intergovernmental Conference. The presence of civil servants from the Republic particularly annoyed unionists.

3. Voting and Unionist Responses (I)

On 21 November 1985, Dail Eireann approved the AIA by 88 votes to 75 (Fianna Fáil led by Charles Haughey voted against it). The British government voted in favour of the AIA by a majority of 426 on 27 November (473 for and 47 against). All Unionist MPs opposed the AIA. In Northern Ireland, only the SDLP and the cross-community Alliance Party supported the agreement. Unionist reaction to the AIA was predictable. The Ulster Unionist Party leader, James Molyneaux, said that Northern Ireland would be ‘…delivered, bound and trussed like a turkey ready for the oven, from one nation to another.’ A central controversy was the fact that, following their public expressions of disapproval, Unionist leaders had not been included in the negotiations prior to and during the AIA. The Irish and British governments would not admit them to the negotiations unless they accepted the terms of devolved government and power-sharing.

4. Voting and Unionist Responses (II)

Similarly, the Unionist-dominated Northern Ireland Assembly saw inequalities in the way Britain and Northern Ireland were members of the United Kingdom. (They argued that a British government would never allow English, Scottish or Welsh parliaments to be directly influenced by what they saw as a ‘foreign’ government). Both the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) and the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) resigned en masse from the House of Commons as well as organising mass protests, strikes and rallies. They mirrored the tactics of the 1912 opposition to Home Rule by gathering over 350,000 signatures protesting against the AIA. The DUP leader, Rev. Ian Paisley told a rally in Belfast that ‘…Mrs. Thatcher tells us that that Republic [of Ireland] must have some say in our province. We say, ‘Never, never, never!’’

Mr Fitzgerald6

5. Republican and Irish Responses

The reaction among Republicans was also negative. Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams said that the AIA ‘reinforces partition because Dublin is recognising Northern Ireland’ (i.e. the AIA recognized that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom). The Provisional IRA refused to acknowledge the AIA and bombings continued. With the exception of Fianna Fail, all other Irish political parties and institutions accepted the AIA . (Mary Robinson resigned from the Irish Labour Party because of the exclusion of Unionist leaders). The Seanad passed it by 37 votes to 16. In opposition, Charles Haughey, the Fianna Fail leader, claimed that the AIA was in breach of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish Constitution). Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution claimed the ‘national territory of Ireland’ as the ‘whole island of Ireland’ and that Irish parliaments should ‘…exercise jurisdiction over the whole territory.’ Haughey argued that this was denied by the AIA, as it recognised British right of law in Northern Ireland.

6. British Responses

British government support for any decision by the majority of Northern Ireland’s citizens (even if they supported a united Ireland) was not unanimously supported by Thatcher’s Conservatives. Thatcher’s former Private Secretary and Treasury official, Ian Gow (who was killed by the IRA in a car bombing in 1990) resigned over the AIA as he felt the Agreement would ‘prolong and not diminish the agony of Ulster.’ Nevertheless, in spite of Unionist resignations and opposition in the Commons, Thatcher would win out thanks to the massive parliamentary majority – 426 votes – in favour of the AIA. Moreover, Thatcher and the Conservatives won the General Election in 1988. By then, the AIA was due for a governmental review and when it remained largely unchanged by both Irish and British governments, most of the Unionist political parties accepted its existence although denying its legitimacy. In hindsight, Thatcher was more critical, saying she ‘regretted signing it [the AIA]’ because it failed to achieve the security measures she had sought.

7. Results of the AIA

While the Agreement did not bring a lasting peace to N. Ireland, it prepared much of the groundwork for the form of devolved government that would emerge after the Good Friday Agreement, 1998. The AIA was crucial in changing attitudes to power-sharing among the Nationalist community. The biggest political ‘winners’ were the SDLP and their leader, John Hume, who had consistently advocated the idea of recognition of the Nationalist tradition in any power sharing solution. This was to become the ‘principle of consent’ under the Good Friday Agreement. The Agreement also proved a major step forward in terms of Anglo-Irish government relations. As a result, there was much more consultation and co-operation between Irish and British governments. In terms of the political future, the AIA showed that the British government recognised officially, for the first time, that the Republic of Ireland had a necessary involvement in the way Northern Ireland was governed . Ultimately, the British government’s support for the AIA demonstrated to Unionists that political processes could not be stopped by vetos or threats. In contrast to the Sunningdale Agreement of a dozen years previously, the AIA held firm as a political agreement in spite of similar reactionary violence and opposition from Loyalists (and Republicans).

Mr Fitzgerald7

The Downing Street Declaration 1993

1. What was the DSD?

On December 15, 1993, the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds and the British Prime Minister, John Major made a joint statement which declared that the people of Northern Ireland had the right to determine their own political governance. Furthermore, the Northern state would only be governed by the Republic of Ireland if the majority of its citizens voted in favour of such a proposal. This became known as the Downing Street Declaration. Building on the recognition of Irish perspectives that had been seen in the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985, the DSD also laid out the principle that Irish citizens both in the North and in the Republic, had a right to solve their political, social and economic problems ‘by mutual consent.’ It also included the provision for political parties with paramilitary connections (such as Sinn Fein) to enter talks with the two governments on the condition that they renounced violence. Eight months later, after many negotiations, the Provisional IRA declared a ceasefire in late August 1994. A Loyalist ceasefire was announced in October 1994 by the Loyalist Military Command.

2. Initial Talks

The groundwork for the DSD was begun in 1991 when the NI Secretary of State, Peter Brooke began negotiations with mainstream Northern parties. He announced to the House of Commons that ‘discussions must focus on the three main relationships: those in Northern Ireland … among the people of the island of Ireland; and between the governments.’ British PM John Major and then Taoiseach Charles Haughey were involved in the initial plans for the declaration but Haughey’s defeat in the 1993 General Election meant there were delays to the process while his replacement as Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds became involved. Crucially, a series of secret talks had been taking place since early 1993 between the SDLP leader, John Hume and the Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams. Many commentators, particularly Unionist politicians were critical of Hume’s engagement with paramilitary representatives but Hume replied that he did not care ‘two balls of roasted snow’ for such criticism. Meanwhile the violence continued as an IRA bombing on the Shankill Road was followed by a Loyalist massacre at Greysteel, County Derry. Following further talks between the two governments, the DSD was announced in December 1993.

3. Downing Street Declaration 1993

In the DSD, by building on the points of agreement from the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, the British government outlined the necessities for a lasting peace settlement: the principle of self-determination (the actual phrase was to ‘…exercise the right of self-determination on the basis of consent freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish’) and the absence of social, military or economic motives in British efforts. They also acknowledged their leading role in developing any efforts towards peace including (and this was the key point) any parties willing to engage in a ‘peaceful settlement of relevant issues.’ In effect, this ‘opened the door’ for paramilitaries in general and the IRA in particular to engage in the peace process. This was hugely significant for the Provisional IRA, as it removed much of their argument for violent struggle.The Irish government accepted that Protestant communities would not be coerced into any government to which they were opposed.

4. Unionist and Republican Reactions

Reactions to the DSD among the Unionist political parties differed greatly. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by Ian Paisley labelled the DSD a ‘betrayal and a sell-out.’ However, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and its leader, James Molyneaux termed it ‘a declaration of principles- no more, no less.’ The UUP’s argument was that it was hardly a threat to the sovereignty of Northern Ireland if the principle of a majority decision was accepted. On the Republican side, there was a similar difference. Sinn Fein’s President Gerry Adams, whose meetings with John Hume had made the DSD a reality, said he was merely the political representative of a military organisation and that the IRA Army Council would have the final decision. The key word used by Sinn Fein during this period was ‘clarification’- Sinn Fein had to be sure that the DSD would deliver what it promised. Neither Republican nor Loyalist paramilitaries wanted to be seen as the ‘first’ to look for peace negotiations . The next stage in the process was to see who would take the next big step towards full negotiations.

Mr Fitzgerald8

5. Moves towards the Ceasefire

NI Sec. of State Patrick Mayhew, who replaced Brooke in April 1992, continued inter-party talks. Throughout 1994, both governments maintained links with paramilitary leaders on both sides through intermediaries such as Hume in the hope of forcing a concession of some sort. Brooke’s ‘3 strands’ plan (borrowed from Hume’s own statements since the 1970s) now dominated all discussions on the future of Northern Ireland: the ‘relationships’ between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland; and between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. Much effort was seen in the role of the USA also, as President Bill Clinton encouraged representatives from all sides to engage in multi-party talks. In January 1994, Clinton gave Gerry Adams a U.S. visa and allowed him to address the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, much to British displeasure.

6. Results of the DSD

There were many short-term effects of the DSD. In January 1994, Reynolds lifted the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein in the ROI. Negotiations continued but the British government refused to discuss further concessions. It was a surprise when Adams announced a three-day ceasefire in March 1994, a decision that ‘did not come easily,’ he said. The DSD set the agenda for all future discussions on N. Ireland . The British government now mentioned the handover of weapons as a future necessity; Unionists pushed for the repeal of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution; and a ceasefire was now established (contrary to Sinn Fein’s statements in 1993) as a ‘precondition for talks.’ In 31 August 1994, the Provisional IRA announced a total ceasefire, effective from midnight. Reynolds, Hume and Adams shook hands in Dublin and declared they were ‘totally and absolutely committed to peaceful and democratic methods.’ The two governments produced the ‘Frameworks for the Future’ document in 1995, much of which was realised in the Good Friday Agreement, 1998.

‘The Declaration pointed up agreements, set a direction, and opened up a future that had once seemed impossible to unlock.’ -John Major, Speech on the 20th Anniversary of the DSD.

Mr Fitzgerald9

SUNNINGDALEAGREEMENT 1973

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985

DOWNING STREET DECLARATION

MAIN TERMS

NATIONALIST VIEW

REPUBLICAN VIEW

UNIONIST VIEW

LOYALIST VIEW

PROBLEMS

SUCCESS/FAILURE?WHY?

Mr Fitzgerald10

What were the origins of the Civil Rights movement and how did it develop?

1. Origins of Civil Rights Protests:

1963: Homeless Citizens’ League (Conn and Patricia McCloskey- KEY PERSONALITIES) – 1964: Campaign for Social Justice (McCloskeys)- focus of protests on housing, employment and gerrymandering – modelled on U.S. ‘push’ for civil rights: ‘Precisely because improvement now began to seem a possibility for the time, Catholics became conscious of levels of occupational discrimination…’ (Joe Lee) – newly educated Catholic middle-class were more willing to protest against discrimination in housing, education, governance and employment.

2. Founding of NICRA

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Assoc. (NICRA) founded in 1967- initially created to be non-party and non-denominational- different groups (students, community activists, left-wing protestors, academics, Unionists, Republicans and Nationalists- initial lobbying of political support BUT changed to mirror protest culture of the US- more radical forms of ‘street’ protest and civil disobedience.

3. Coalisland-Dungannon March (August 1968)

Caledon Protest: East Tyrone MP Austin Currie (Nationalist) led squatters vs. Dungannon Council’s treatment of Catholic families (e.g. single Protestant woman got a house vs. 264 families (mostly Catholic) overlooked- RUC removed Currie/squatters- 2500 people marched Coalisland-Dungannon in support of NICRA and CSJ- Market Square, Dungannon: ‘Protestant area’- counter protest: 1500 Ulster Volunteers- 400 RUC officers- baton charge- overall PR success for marchers- Derry Housing Action Committee: NICRA march planned in October.

4. Derry March and Riots (October 1968)

‘Non-sectarian route’ announced by NICRA- Apprentice Boys of Derry (ABOD) announced march on the same day- Cameron Commission Report (1969) found that ABOD march was ‘not a genuine annual event and…merely a threat to counter demonstrate.’ – Min. for Home Affairs Wm Craig banned all marches- NICRA ‘non-violent’ march went ahead- RUC baton-charged unarmed protestors in front of RTE cameras- Faulkner (ABOD member) admitted: ‘…tactics used by the RUC…left something to be desired’- the rest of 1968 followed this ‘pattern’: People’s Democracy march in October (1500 students in Belfast sit-down protest)- Derry Citizens’ Action Committee protest in November (14,000 protestors inc. Hume, Currie and Ivan Cooper).

5. Stormont and Unionist Reaction to NICRA

NICRA seen as a ‘cover’ for Republican agitation – element of truth to this as the IRA had stated it intended to infiltrate NICRA- many founding members of NICRA were also part of the Wolfe Tone Society, which was openly Republican and aimed for a united Ireland- civil rights protests showed a clear division along sectarian lines: RUC (99% Protestant) aligned itself with Unionist counter-protestors such as the ABOD- increasingly Nationalist NICRA became more radical: Eamonn McCann (People’s Democracy): ‘…our conscious if unspoken strategy was to provoke the police into over-reaction and thus spark off a mass reaction against the authorities.’

6. Burntollet (1969) & Bloody Sunday (1972)

People’s Democracy march (4 January 1969): passed Burntollet Bridge on way back from Belfast to Derry- 300 Unionist protestors (inc. 100 B-Specials) attacked the marchers with sticks, bars and rocks- RUC stood back- rioting in Derry in response- Terence O’Neill blamed the marchers for ‘provoking’ the violence- historian Paul Bew called Burntollet the ‘spark that lit the prairie fire.’

Growing violence and growing influence of IRA in 1969-70: many founding members of NICRA resigned – NICRA’s activities curtailed as a result of the Scarman Tribunal into Rioting (1969) – 30 January 1972: NICRA staged anti-internment protest in Derry – members of the Parachute Regiment opened fire on protestors, killing 13 people – NICRA stopped organising marches and demonstrations after ‘Bloody Sunday.’

Mr Fitzgerald11

What was the impact of Gerry Adams on Northern Irish affairs up to 1993?

1. Early Political Life

Born in Belfast (1948) to a family with a strong Republican tradition. Joined Fianna Eireann (Young Republican movement) in 1964 and later, Sinn Féin. Adams: sectarian violence in West Belfast was pivotal in his decision to become involved in Sinn Féin. Joined the Northern Ire. Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1967- active during Divis Flats Riots 1969.

2. IRA Split 1970 and Internment

Adams sided with Provisional Sinn Féin/IRA in the split at the 1970 Sinn Féin Árd Fheis. The split occurred between the mainly Dublin-based leadership of Official Sinn Féin/IRA and the more

Northern-based members of what became known as Provisional Sinn Féin/IRA. The former, led by Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, resisted any involvement with parliamentary politics.

Younger members of the movement, like Adams and Danny Morrison, believed that contesting elections was just one part of a ‘Long War’ strategy (political and military), in which they should also contest parliamentary elections in Belfast, Dublin and London.

1972: British govmt. introduced Direct Rule (from Westminster) and, following much violence (particularly IRA bombings), introduced internment (imprisonment without trial) to Northern Ireland in 1971.

3. Internment, Ceasefire and Imprisonment

Adams was interned but released again in 1972 to be part of a delegation (including Martin McGuinness and Sean Mac Stiofain, IRA Chief of Staff) which held secret talks with Home Secretary, William Whitelaw.

John Hume set up the meetings in the hope of brokering a ceasefire between the two sides. The ceasefire lasted from June 26-July 9, 1972, as the IRA’s demand that the British Army withdraw

fully from Northern Ireland in three years was rejected outright. It was alleged that Adams was involved in subsequent bombings as part of the IRA Army Council that summer.

The IRA campaign intensified, as 95 people from both sides of the divide were killed in July alone. Adams was arrested the following year and was imprisoned for nearly 4 years in the ‘H-Blocks’ (a.k.a. the

Maze or Long Kesh Prison). During this time, Adams wrote newspaper articles for An Phoblacht which were critical of the Dublin leadership and called for greater politicisation of Sinn Féin.

Adams and McGuinness gained greater control in a re-organisation of the IRA, as the new ‘Northern Command’ saw more autonomy for the Belfast and Derry units.

4. Hunger Strikes 1981

At the 1981 Árd Fheis, Morrison summarised the new ‘mix’ of politics and violence: ‘Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?’

During the 1981 Hunger Strikes, Adams (Vice-President of Provisional Sinn Féin since 1978) saw the emergence of Sinn Féin in political terms (although he opposed the hunger strikes initially).

The success of Bobby Sands in being elected MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone proved Adams’ strategy was successful. As Jonathan Bardon notes: ‘Adams…was certain the republican cause could be advanced by harnessing the surge of sympathy for the hunger strikers in Catholic areas.’

Adams was one of five SF politicians elected on abstentionist tickets in the 1982 N.I. Assembly elections.

5. General Election 1983

Adams was elected President of [Provisional] Sinn Féin in 1983, showing the power shift within the organisation from South to North.

He also took Gerry Fitt’s West Belfast seat in the 1983 general election (the first Sinn Féin politician to do so in 30 years). Again, given Sinn Fein’s policy, he refused to take his seat as an MP.

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Sinn Féin now aimed to replace the SDLP as the main nationalist party in Northern Ireland, as 13.4% of the electorate voted for Sinn Féin in the 1983 election (Hume’s SDLP won 17.9%).

Adams survived an assassination attempt in March 1984 by the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF).

6. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985

Following the IRA bombing of the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton (October 1984), Thatcher initiated secret negotiations with the Irish government to resolve the Northern problem.

AIA signed by Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald & Thatcher in Nov. 1985. It had four main points:o Irish government had ‘advisory role’ in the governing of N. Irelando No change in the constitutional position of NI unless a majority of its citizens voted to join ROI. o Plans for shared ‘consensus government’ in Northern Ireland o Need for both governments to confer on ‘matters of mutual interest.’

Adams was negative in his response, claiming that the AIA ‘reinforces partition because Dublin is recognising Northern Ireland.’ The Provisional IRA refused to acknowledge the AIA and bombings continued. With the exception of Fianna Fail, all other Irish political parties accepted the AIA.

Adams on the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement: ‘In the final analysis, the agreement is about stabilising British interests. British army intelligence could do nothing about the structures and organisation of the IRA in the 26 counties; only security “harmonisation” with Dublin could remedy this lack.’

Nevertheless, both governments made it clear to all groups, both Unionist and Nationalist, that they would not be derailed by political vetoes or violence. Adams and Sinn Féin took note of this new approach.

7. Electoral Collapse

At the 1986 Árd Fheis, the decision was passed to change the party’s constitution to allow SF members to take their seats in Dáil Eireann if they won elections. In protest, Ó Brádaigh and his main ally Dáithí Ó Conaill walked out, leaving Adams, Morrison and McGuinness in power.

However, this success was short-lived as the IRA bombing campaigns were rejected by all sides of the electorate. In the 1987 General Election in the Republic, SF ran 27 candidates and not one was elected. Furthermore, SF received only 1.8% of the total vote.

Similarly, in the 1987 British General Election, while Adams retained his seat, SF won only 11.4% of the total vote in Northern Ireland, as the SDLP gained votes at their expense.

After the 1987 Enniskillen Massacre in November, it was clear SF’s political failures stemmed from their support of violence as a solution to the situation in NI. In the 1992 General Election, Adams lost his seat.

8. Hume-Adams Talks, Downing Street Declaration & Ceasefire

In 1993, SDLP leader John Hume was revealed to have been in secret talks with Adams since 1988. These initial talks laid the basis for the Belfast Agreement and, later still in 1993, the Downing Street Declaration.

Taoiseach Albert Reynolds & President Bill Clinton secured a 48-hr US visa for Adams in 1994. N.B: IRA ‘permanent’ ceasefire on 31 Aug. 1994 (called off Feb 1996-July 1997): in place since July 1997.

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2013: What was the significance for Northern Ireland of one or more of the following: religious affiliation and cultural identity; the ABOD; Seamus Heaney?

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