NEWSL Er TERJEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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Vol. III, No. 10 January 1982

NewsBriefsNo Unity: A meeting of Arab Leagueforeign ministers, proposed by Syria todiscuss the Golan Heights, has beencancelled. Western and Arab diplomatssay it indicates a failure by Syria tobring about a unified Arab positionagainst Israel's application of civil lawto the Golan. Diplomats also say themajor reason for the failure is lingeringresentment among some Arabs, par-ticularly Saudi Arabia, over Syria's rolein breaking up the Fez Conference inNovember. This is coupled with newtension between Syria and Jordan, andthe concern of some conservative Arabgovernments over Syria's statement thatthe Arabs should seek a "strategicalliance" with the Soviet Union.

Friendly Jets: The Pentagon has an-nounced that two Soviet TU-95s flewwithin a mile of the nuclear-poweredaircraft carrier Vinson about 40 mileseast of Cape Charles, Va. This is be-lieved to be the first incident in whichTU-95s flew from Cuba to watchAmerican naval units off the EastCoast. The crews waved at two Navy of-ficers who flew beside them. "They ap-peared very friendly. They waved as ifto say, 'Hi, how are you?' and wewaved back. There were no hostilities atall. Everybody was just doing theirjob," said one radar intercept officer ofthe Navy planes.

Call to Arms: The Japanese Cabinet hasapproved a 7.8%7 increase in the defensebudget for the fiscal year starting IApril. This exceeds both the 6.5%7 in-crease suggested by the JapaneseFinance Ministry and the 7.5% limit thegovernment of Prime Minister ZenkoSuzuki had imposed on itself. Thisbrings the total defense budget to $11.6billion, just under 1% of Japan's totaloutput of goods and services and 5%7 ofthe Japanese federal budget. The in-crease, called "an important first step"by the Pentagon, is seen as a response toUS pressure on the Japanese tostrengthen their defense capabilities.TIhe US budget is expected to rise by14%7 in fiscal 1983, amounting to 25%of the federal budget and 6%7 of theAmerican GNP.

Soviet Planes for Cuba: Officials haveacknowledged that US intelligence hasdetected crates of new Soviet aircraft atan airfield outside of Havana, Cuba. Ina 1962 understanding with the US, theSoviets agreed to refrain from sendingoffensive weapons to Cuba; the MIG 21and MIG 23 fighters sent to Cuba sincethat time have been described byWashington and Havana as defensive.

Minimally, the six to eight new crates ofaircraft recently spotted indicate thatthe Soviet Union is continuing tomodernize the Cuban air force. At amaximum, it may be sending Cuba abombing version of the MIG 23 Flog-ger, the D model, which could representa violation of the 1962 understanding. Itcannot be ascertained from satellite orspy photography whether an airplanehas been wired for offensive operations.

War Games: The US has asked NorthKorea to agree to prior notice for futurewar games by either side. North Koreannegotiators meeting in Panmunjonrefused and accused UN forces of viola-tions of the demilitarized zone. Large-scale, unannounced war games byNorth Korea in December had sentAmerican war ships steaming towardthe peninsula.

Bucharest Invitation: Abba Gefen,Israel's ambassador in Rumania, wasinvited to a farewell reception foroutgoing Bulgarian ambassador PetarDanailov. Since 1967, no Israeli am-bassador in Rumania has been invited toa function organized by an Eastern bloccountry except Rumania itself. Gefenenquired at the Bulgarian Embassy andwas told there was no mistake. When hearrived at the reception, the am-bassadors of Iraq and Morocco pro-tested to the doyen of the diplomaticcorps, the Soviet ambassador. When theSoviet ambassador sidestepped theircomplaint, the two left. Although clear-ly unenthusiastic, the ambassadors ofEgypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan re-mained.

The Bulgarian invitation wasdeliberate, according to unofficialRumanian sources. The sources stressedthat Bulgaria is the Eastern bloc countryclosest to the Moscow line.

Related Invitation: Mcnachem Beginmet recently with an emissary of NicolaeCeausescu of Rumania. ForeignMinistry Officials said Vassily Pugnanhad brought Begin an oral messagefrom the Rumanian President, and aBegin spokesman said the Israeli PrimeMinister had accepted in principle, aninvitation to visit Rumania when hishealth and official duties permitted.Begin visited Rumania in 1977.

Non-Explosive "Caramel": The Frenchgovernment has indicated that it will in-sist on the use of a special low-gradefuel (called "caramel") for any nuclearreactor it builds in Iraq to replace theone destroyed by Israel last summer.

(Continued on page 6)

by Yossef BodanskyEditor's Note: Yossef Bodunskv is theformer Technical Editor of Israel AirForce Magazine, and is currentvly avisiting scholar in the Security StudiesProgram at the Johns Hopkins Univer-sity School of Advanced Studies.

When the Syrians, with extensiveSoviet assistance, examined the lessonsof the 1973 war and the short war of at-trition which followed, they concludedthat one of the primary deficiencies onthe Golan Front was the collapse ofwhat little command structure had everexisted. It became clear that non-Syrianunits (Saudi, Jordanian, Moroccan andCuban) were not fully utilized and werenot committed to battle at the right timeor in the right place. Lack of com-munication between adjacent unitsprevented coordinated activities andconcentration of fire. The prime Sovietrecommendation was that the Syriansknow in advance and organize the ex-tent of future Arab commitments tobattle, requiring a unified plan of opera-tion and systematic exercise to operateefficiently in the next round. In view ofthe extent of Soviet planning andrebuilding of the Syrian Armed Forces,it would appear that the Soviets insistedupon the establishment of a unifiedcommand as a prerequisite for theirassistance.

When Syrian President Hafez al-Assad went to Moscow on 11 April1974, the nucleus of the new programhad already been activated. Throughout1974 and 1975, various components ofthe coalition exercised individual rolesas well as low-level and secondary coor-dination. At the same time, the Syrian-Soviet team prepared for a large dressrehearsal during which the entire con-cept of a future war would be examined.

DRESS REHEARSALIn November 1975, forces were ready

for the first such rehearsal. A Saudi ex-peditionary force with units of the SaudiAir Force took part in a major wargame with substantial Syrian forces.The exercise simulated a developingcrisis in the Middle East calling forrapid reinforcement of the Syrian front,and for eventually launching a massiveoffensive against Israel.

When the "crisis" was declared, com-ponents of the Royal Saudi Air Forcedeployed from Ta'if to the Royal Jorda-nian Air Force Base at Mafrak. Theforce included a squadron of F-5Es, Bell205 and 212 helicopters and a transportelement of C-130s. The transports and

helicopters later deployed to forwardbases in Syria. In the exercise, an Arabforce launched a massive offensiveagainst "Israel"' after protracted fire-suppression by both artillery and aerialbombing carried out by Saudi andSyrian aircraft and Saudi, Jordanianand Syrian artillery components. Theground offensive was launched alongthree axes, with the Syrian forces com-prising the northern two and Saudiforces with a token Jordanian presencecomprising the southern third axis. TheSaudi forces enjoyed t he air support andair defense of their own F-5Es operatingfrom Mafrak, while cooperating withthe Syrian-Soviet Ground Control andcoordinating their operations withSyrian MIG 21s and 23s as well as Su20s. Saudi helicopters carried out com-mando raids into the "Israeli" rear indirect cooperation with their Syriancounterparts, demonstrating their abili-ty to coordinate and execute division-level operations. The Saudis at the sametime demonstrated their ability todeploy large components of their AirForce to Jordanian bases and operatefrom there, relying entirely on Jorda-nian ground crews. The main Saudideficiency was their slow reaction time.This was attributed to the distance be-tween Ta'if and the Syrian front, andwould he corrected by building two ma-jor military air base complexes in Tabukand Turayf near the Jordanian borderand transferring forward basings tothese as well as to Jordanian bases.

(Continued on page 4)

Preparing for the NextRound: The Syrian Armed

Forces Revisited

MiG 21. The Syrian Air Force will have 240 of these by mid-1982.

Staff Changes at JINSAThe Board of Directors and the Board of Advisors of JIN-

SA are pleased to announce recent changes and additions toour staff. Shoshana Bryen, previously Associate Director, hasbeen named Executive Director of the Institute and ManagingEditor of the Newsletlter. We welcome to JINSA threeoutstandingly qualified Contributing Editors for our Newslet-ter: Leon Sloss, Frank Hoeber, and Forrest Frank. Theybring with them a depth of knowledge and concern aboutdefense and strategic policy which will greatly enhance ourpublication.

Vol. 111, No. 10 January 1982

January 1982

NEWSLETTERThe Jewish Institute is committedto explaining the link between U.S.national security and Israel'ssecurity, and assessing what we canand must do to strengthen both.

After the GolanWe welcomed the US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding

signed in November as a step in the right direction. Its suspensionor cancellation is not in the interest of the US or Israel, but only ofthe Soviet Union.

The US must keep its sights firmly on its strategic interests,which go beyond swipes at a friend. President Reagan has longbeen rightly convinced that the Soviet Union is at the heart ofregional turmoil, and this is no time for him to let a disagreementon what is essentially a peripheral issue turn his attention awayfrom the primary problem.

A three-pronged Soviet policy has evolved which poses a threatto vital American interests in the Middle East. First, and at the coreof their strategy, the Soviets played a central role in converting thePLO from an ad hoc commando-terrorist force to a strategic unitby the introduction of heavy weapons including long-range artilleryand rockets. The price of this conversion has been the liquidationof Lebanon as an independent, democratic country.

The second prong is the pincer movement on the Persian Gulf, asevidenced by the growth of Soviet influence and power on the Hornof Africa through Cuban and East German proxies, and insouthern Arabia. Soviet undertakings in this region include effortsto destabilize pro-Western regimes such as Oman; to reach accom-modation with shaky states such as Kuwait; and to influence,privately and by propaganda, key oil producers, including SaudiArabia. This pincer has great value as a military choke point onSaudi Arabia and other Gulf states and presents American forcesand our more oil-dependent allies with some exceedingly difficultlogistical problems which have yet to be overcome.

The third prong is the invasion of Afghanistan, the transforma-tion of Syria into a full-fledged Soviet client, and the growing ef-fort by the Soviets to influence the future of Iran-therebyestablishing a presence along the Persian Gulf far more meaningfulthan at the bases in Iraq and South Yemen, which are neverthelessimportant.

In light of this, Israel's application of civil law to the GolanHeights hardly changes the face of the region. There was never apeace process there to be threatened by the move; there was neveran indication of Syrian willingness to negotiate. In fact, well beforethe annexation there was an increase in the size, sophistication andorganization of the Syrian Armed Forces-which gave the appear-ance of a war waiting to happen. (See related article, this issue.)

Criticism can be leveled at Israel for timing, failure to consult itsmost important friend, stridency, emotionalism, and any one of anumber of things. However, punishment in the form of suspendingthe Memorandum of Understanding, and pique in cancelling it, areluxuries neither side can afford to indulge in. The MOU was notmeant to be contingent on either side's performing services, andshould have held a place of importance above political differences.As the Soviets continue to make political and military advances inthe Middle East, the US and Israel must return to their common in-terest.

The US veto of the blatantly one-sided Security Council resolu-tion introduced by Jordan may be an indication of an Americandecision to put the issue of the Golan Heights into perspective. Thiswould allow the US and Israel to get back to the real problem ofMiddle East turmoil and again forge a strategic relationship to dealwith the political and military manipulation by the Soviet Union inthe region.

The Fine LineTo keep political, literary and moral interests simple, the Soviet

Union appears to have done away with the fine line that allowsanti-Semites with a feel for the politically acceptable to callthemselves anti-Zionists. The USSR has been conducting a viciousanti-Semitic campaign which gives the lie to those who sayhypocritically they are opposing the policies of the State of Israel,when they are really expressing their bias against Jews.

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, chairman of the US delega-tion to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,chose that forum in Madrid to expose at least the tip of the Sovietanti-Semitic iceberg. A few examples: The 1975 publication inKazakhstanskava Pravda of the cover cartoon of the 1934 editionof the notorious "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"; the 1977 and1979 publication of Invasion Without Arms, which vilifies theTorah as "an unsurpassed textbook" of human evil; the 1979 ex-hibit of a painting entitled "Summer Theatre" showing a pile ofcorpses in a concentration camp with a Nazi and a caricatured Jewsmirking over them; and the 1980 announcement of the publicationof Trofim Kichko's Judaism and Zionism. Kichko's 1963 JudaismWithout Embellishment was withdrawn after publication becausethe virulence of its anti-Semitism prompted international protest.Add to this the horrors inflicted on refusedniks, the ban on privateteaching of Hebrew, and the regular harassment of Jews by"hooligans," and the picture is clear.

When the Soviets export their anti-Semitism, they cover it with athin veneer of anti-Zionism and send it to Arab, African and otherThird World countries. It comes out of their mouths as anti-Zionism, but its basis lies in blatant Soviet anti-Semitism. Accord-ing to Ambassador Kampelman, "The writings of outspokenSoviet anti-Semites-Kichko, Begun Korneyev and others-havebeen prominently featured in publications of the PLO" and others.

It is fitting that Ambassador Kampelman, speaking in the nameof the US government, used the forum designed to implement theHelsinki Final Act for his charges. Government sanctioned anti-Semitism is a gross violation of the Final Act and of the humanrights of Jews. The Soviet Union champions the rights of Palesti-nians; supports with weapons, troops and money dissident groupsengaged in revolution and terror; and calls on people everywhere tofight colonialism and imperialism in the name of human rights. Butit does not hesitate to trample human rights within its realm and ex-port its hat ~d to client states everywhere.

The Re, ,an Administration has instructed its delegation toMadrid, and other diplomatic representatives, to make clear itsrecogniti and abhorrence of that form of Soviet hypocrisy. Thatis the appropriate position for the government of the US, a nationthat prides itself on its heterogeneous nature and the rights itscitizens enjoy. And Ambassador Kampelman is to be com-plimented for the graphic manner in which he has exposed Sovietanti-Semitism. However, what applies to international forums andforeign governments applies at home as well. The fine line betweendisagreement with Israel's policies and anti-Semitism also exists inthis country, and of late it is showing disturbing signs of blurring.It is in the interrest of the US to take the appropriate opportunity todenounce anti-Semitism domestically, as we instruct our diplomatsto do anywhere else it manifests itself in the world.

Board of AdvisorsSenator Rudy BoschwitzSenator Clifford P. Casel.L. KenenMarvin KlemowProfessor Walter LaqueurIvan NovickProfessor Eugene V. RostowEdward SandersSamuel StroumJacques TorczynerGeneral John Vogt (Ret.)Gordon ZacksAdmiral Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.)

Board of Directors

Saul 1. Stern, PresidentHerbert A. Fierst, Chairman

of the BoardSeymour Abensohn, TreasurerStanford AdelsteinRabbi Leon AdlerMorris J. AmitayHerschel AuerbachStanley BaruchStanley BerenzweigHerschel BlumbergWilliam BryenClement CaditzElliot H. ColeBrant CoopersmithMartin FridovichHoward 1. FriedmanNorman 1. GelmanLeon GenetDr. Leon GerberDouglas GlantNathan GoldenRobert GoldmannCarl HenryHarlan HockenbergMax M. KampelmanRabbi Gilbert KlapermanLeo KramerSeymour LachmanCecile LandrumRabbi Shmuel L.efkowitzLewis R. LehrmanAllen LesserRichard LevyBryan LittlefieldTheodore R. MannRobert B. MeyersburgAlfred H. MosesSteven PenchinaRabbi Stanley RabinowitzSusan RolnickStephen RosenRichard R. RosenbaumLyle S. Ryter, Vice Pres.Betty Sachs, Vice Pres.Richard SchifterProfessor David SidorskyProfessor Seymour SiegelKenneth B. SmilenDr. George TievskyBruno WeinschelRobert 1. WidderLeonard Zax, SecretaryMarc ZellHarriet Zimmerman

StaffShoshana Bryen, Executive Direc-

tor, Managing EditorForrest Frank, Contributing

EditorFrank Hoeber, Contributing

EditorLeon Sloss, Contributing Editor

EDITORIALS

Page 2

January 1982Paee3

Anti-Semitism In the Soviet UnionBy Ambassador

Max M. KampelmanEditor's Note: Ambassador Kampel-man is chairman of the U.S. delegationto the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe and a memberof the Board of Directors of JINSA.Below are excerpts of a recent address tothe CSCE in Madrid.

During the past year, harassment,mistreatment and repression have inten-sified in the Soviet Union. There ispersecution of individuals and persecu-tion of groups. Many ethnic and reli-gious minorities have been particularvictims.

The pattern of ethnic and religiousoppression, officially sanctioned, takesmany forms: the repressive legal restric-tions on Crimean Tatars which prohibitthem from returning to their historichomeland; forced Russification of theBaltic States; biased employment prac-tices against Evangelical Christians;prohibition against manifestations ofUkrainian culture. One particularly per-nicious aspect of Soviet repression-anti-Semitism-has grown in intensityand ugliness.

The roots of anti-Semitism run deepin thile human experience. Anti-Semitismhas commanded the attention and theprofound intellectual energies of expertsin psychology, sociology, religion andpolitics. The phenomenon is not yet

fully understood, but we do know thathuman beings require an avenue ofrelease for their personal frustrations.Through a confluence of accidental andhistorical forces, the Jew has oftenbecome the focus of the angerassociated with that frustration anddisappointment.

The task of civilized society has beento harness and redirect the energy ofthat anger into more constructive chan-nels, so that the basis of frustration maybe understood and thus overcome.Regrettably, totalitarian societies,unable to resolve the internal problemswhich beset them, have often divertedthe attention of their citizens away fromthe actual source of their frustration byfinding targets on which to place theblame. Time and again, that scapegoathas been the Jew.

History has taught us that anti-Semitism is a contagious disease, a virusthat endangers not only Jews but alsothe societies in which they live. It nowbecomes our concern when and whereanti-Semitism has government sanction.

Despite Soviet protestations to thecontrary, despite the Soviet Constitu-tion's prohibition of any "advocacy ofracial or national ...hostility"; despiteChairman Brezhnev's call at the 26thParty Congress in February 1981 to'fight resolutely against... anti-Semitism," government-condoned and

government-propagated anti-Semitismflourishes in the Soviet Union today.

The latest surge, I assert withouthesitation, is an officially sanctionedcampaign, stimulated by slate-controlled publication and exhibition ofovertly anti-Semitic books, articles, car-toons and exhibitions. During the pastfifteen years, a total of at least 112Soviet books and brochures with anti-Semitic overtones of various degreeshave been identified, some of themprinted and reprinted in editions of150,000-200,(XX) copies. Anti-Semniticpropaganda is also carried out throughlectures, stimulated by the CommunistParty and the state.

Soviet anti-Semitism is not limited todomestic consumption. It is also widelyexported to Arab, African and otherThird World countries. The writings ofoutspoken Soviet anti-Semites-Kichko, Begun, Korneyev and others-have been featured prominently inpublications of the PLO, for instance.In addition, their writings are oftenpublished in English and distributedthroughout tilhe English-speaking world.

It may be said that these books, ar-ticles and films are mere reflections oftheir authors, who have a right to theirown opinions, no matter how repulsive.But we all know that nothing can bepublished openly or distributed in tilheSoviet Union without the official im-primatur of the government censoringagency, Glavdit. Indeed, the chairmanof the Soviet State Committee for Print-

The latest surge...is an of-ficially sanctioned cam-paign, stimulated by state-controlled publication andexhibition of overtly anti-Semitic (material).

ing, in justifying the Soviet banning ofWestern publications at the September1979 International Book Fair inMoscow, cited legislation prohibitingbooks on racism and those that "stir uphatred and hostility between people." Itis significant that anti-Semitic books,pamphlets, films and articles publishedin the Soviet Union are not required tomeet that noble standard.

Moreover, the Soviet Union-whichhas the third largest Jewish communityin the world-is the only country with aJewish population in which there is nota single approved Jewish school or ameans for teaching Jewish history andtradition. Jewish history is deleted fromSoviet elementary and secondary schooltextbooks. The private teaching ofHebrew is outlawed, while the officialstudy of the language is restricted to avery few non-Jews. In recent months,over eighty Jewish teachers of Hebrew,in Moscow alone, received threats ofpersecution and banishment should theycontinue their instruction.

There are many more instances ofblatant government-condoned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, accom-

panied by harassment and imprison-ment of Jewish leaders: discriminationagainst Jews in education and employ-ment; active and frequently violent in-terference with the study of Hebrew andthe possession of articles of prayer; adrastic reduction in the number of Jewsbeing allowed to escape this pervasiveanti-Semitism through emigration.

There should be no room for anti-Semitism in a society that professes itscommitment to the teachings of Marx, aJew. The early roots of socialism wereidealistic. They had their philosophicjustification in a commitment to humanbrotherhood and to the dignity of theindividual. Where there is anti-Semitism, there is a corruption of thoseideals.

The Soviet Union is a society that islarge and powerful and has existed formore than sixty years. There is no needfor that society to crush human beings,small and insignificant as they may ap-pear in the broader perspective ofhistory. There should be no need tostimulate hatred among peoples.

It is time for that society to develop astronger faith in itself and in the innerstrength of its people. The world wouldwelcome a Soviet decision to mobilizeits resources and its people constructive-ly to help meet its internal problemswithout the use of diversionary hate tac-tics. This is the only way we can everhope to achieve the spirit of understand-ing mandated by the Helsinki FinalAct that we all seek and that eludes us.

RDF Commander: 'We'll Move With What We Have'Reprinted by permission of

"Defense Weekly"Strategic warning of a threat develop-

ing in the Middle East or SouthwestAsia is the key to timely transport of theheavy equipment without which theRapid Deployment Force would beweak and vulnerable, according to itsleader.

Army Lt. G(en. Robert C. Kingston,commander of the Rapid DeploymentJoint Task Force, said one deficiency ofthe current force is that the troops mayget to their objective faster than muchof their equipment. "But we will get theairborne division and tactical fightersquadron in the area and move withwhat we have," he said. "We canpostulate and have all types of threats,and in a worst case basis, we go in withair first and then we follow up with theairborne or air assault forces that wecan get in to project and extend ourpower,"

The subject came up last week at aPentagon briefing in which Kingstongave high marks to Bright Star '82, aseries of RDF exercises conductedacross four countries-Egypt, theSudan, Somalia and Oman-from Nov.9 to Dec. 16.

In the event of a real war, Kingstonsaid, he expects U.S. intelligence to givehim a warning of at least four or fivedays to allow his force to mobilize. Withenough warning to assemble an airlift,Kingston added, "I should have an air-borne brigade on the ground in 48hours. I could have an airborne divisionwithin 10 to 14 days.

The general, who claimed to be "veryfamiliar" with Soviet capabilities, saidRussia could not project a force of the

size deployed in Bright Star and couldnot sustain it for a similar time. Pressedon the matter, though, Kingston said hewas referring to what another militaryforce could do over similar distance,meaning more than 7,000 miles.

He also noted that his troops neednew long-range communications equip-ment to deal with distances in thedeserts.

In the joint exercises, the JRDF raninto some problems because it had lessthan 100 Americans who spoke Arabic."I would need several hundred [inter-preters] if we're going to [worktogether] over extended periods oftime," Kingston said. "I would likethem down to company and battalionlevel."

He wants to set up a forward head-quarters of 150 to 200 persons some-where in the area. In a list passed on tothe Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kingstonnamed seven locations in five countriesranked by his preference. He didn'tdisclose them, but candidates men-tioned so far include Egypt, the Sudan,Somalia, Oman, Saudi Arabia andKenya.

The general's other observations:* U.S. infantry need a weapon that

can reach out farther than the M-16,particularly in open spaces. He has not,however, recommended a replacement.

* He wants to go back to "realdesert" in summer weather. All of thecountries involved in Bright Star invitedthe RDF back for exercises next year.

* The new desert camouflage uni-forms worked out well, except that darkbrown in the color scheme shows up incertain parts of the desert utinder aerialobservation.

US helicopters pass over the Great Pyramids on the outskirts of metropolitan Cairo during the Bright Star II exer-cise. (US Army Photograph, reprinted by permission of Army Magazine.)

Page 3

January 1982

Armed Forces(Continued from page 1)

THE INTERIMThe next major exercise took place in

December 1977. In the interim, theSaudis polished their combat perfor-mance and the Syrian Armed Forcesunderwent a revolution. The ArmedForces had been under operationalstrain as a result of their involvement inLebanon, and readiness was strainedfearing an Israeli attack. This did not in-terfere with their massive buildup andthe absorption of sophisticated weaponsystems; however, it created a drain onquality manpower in Syria. With all theSyrians directed to combat commandpositions, the Soviets gradually tookover maintenance and support duties.Eventually the Soviets undertook theentire maintenance operation of thesystems, their advisors were integratedinto the Syrian Armed Forces, and inspecific high technology components(such as intelligence and Ground Con-trol of aerial activities) the Soviets car-ried out the entire range of activities.

By 1976, the components of theSyrian Armed Forces deployed againstIsrael exceeded the size of the entireSyrian Armed Forces prior to the YomKippur War. Their equipment wasmodern and up-to-date. In that period,the Syrian Air Force brought its firstMIG 23 air regiment up to operationalstatus and the MIG 21 inventory wasmodernized. Additional air defensesystems, particularly SAMs, were ab-sorbed.

THE SECOND REHEARSALIn this exercise in December 1977, an

integrated Army-level General Staff andHeadquarters operated and directed themilitary operations of all the forces. Asbefore, the offensive moved along threeaxes with the Saudis and the Jordanianscomprising the southern axis. While thesame Saudi expeditionary force was in-volved in the war game, its role hadchanged; the Jordanian contributionwas more limited and fully integratedinto the Saudi force. In 1975, Syrianforces operated at the division level. TheSaudi forces, at brigade level,represented the full size and capabilityof the Saudi contribution. In 1977, onthe other hand, the Syrians operated inArmy-level forces, coordinating thrustsof several divisions along a unified axis(according to the Soviet Breakthroughprinciple). The Saudi-Jordanian"force" was still at brigade level, but itwas allocated a section of the front thesize of each of the two Syrian sections.The number and ranks of Jordanianand Saudi officers involved anrid their in-tegration into the senior HQ did not fita brigade-sized contribution. The Saudibrigade appears to have simulated theoperation of a far larger Saudi-Jordanian expeditionary force thatwould deploy to Syria in case ofemergency.

For the Saudis and the Jordanians,the exercise again proved their ability toconduct military operations relying on aJordanian infrastructure with majorback basing provided by Tabuk in SaudiArabia. It also indicated the validity ofthe lessons learned in major exerciseseven if only skeletons of the units wereactually involved in the "fighting".This, coupled with mounting USpressure, convinced the Saudis towithdraw most of their units fromSyria. However, the HQ representativesand logistical and administrativeechelons have remained in Syria since1978.

The growing US presence in the Mid-dle East, and the developing peace pro-cess, alarmed the Soviets more than themembers of the newly created Stead-

The Mi(;23 carries 2,000-8,000 kilograms of bombs, rocks and guided munitions, and has a radius of 350-1,500kilometers.

fastness and Confrontation Front. Withthe majority of the Arab world willingto assist the Soviet penetration into thearea, the Russians accelerated their in-volvement, particularly when it becameclear that the Saudis not only did notobject, but were willing to finance largeportions of it.

THE SOVIET POSITIONSupplying offensive capabilities to a

foreign country has always been a verycomplicated issue for the Soviet Union.Their reluctance to upgrade the offen-sive capability of a client has in manycases cost them a political price. TheSoviets always attempt to maintain in-dependent external control over theability of their allies to initiate a militaryadventure of their own. Soviet MilitaryScience defines an Offensive Thresholdas a quantitative and qualitative rela-tionship between the various com-ponents of the Combined Arms Offen-sive. An imbalance in these componentswould prevent the armed forces of anyone country from launching a successfuloffensive.

In the Middle East, particularly afterthe Yom Kippur War, the Soviets re-garded the Eastern Front as a combined

much-demanded SCUD battalion andthe initial batch of MIG 23s. TheSoviets also promised to supply his AirForce with the unarmed reconnaissanceversion of the MIG 25. Despite growingSoviet control over the Syrian ArmedForces, the Soviets supplied adownward version of the MIG 23, witharmament identical to that of theveteran MIG 21. At the same time, theSoviets insisted upon supervising andcarrying out the maintenance of theseaircraft, securing the operability of theaircraft and maintaining strict controlover their use. There was a practical aswell as a political rationale for this in-sistence: Syrian pilots, despite morethan a year of training in the USSR,caused a huge rate of aircraft attritiondue to flying accidents and pilot error.The Soviets did not want to replace air-craft lost to mechanical failure as well.In less than a year, Syrian pilots hadcrashed 13 of the initial 50 MIG 23sreceived from the USSR.

However, as the Soviets became morefirmly ensconsed in the Syrian AirForce, they upgraded its equipment andintroduced new types to the arsenal.Between 1978 and 1980, the Syrian Air

for that front.THE SYRIAN-SOVIET TREATYThe growing cooperation between

Syria and the Soviet Union reached animportant stage on 9 October 1980,when the two countries signed the"Syrian-Soviet Friendship andCooperation Treaty" in Moscow,outlining areas of cooperation and coor-dination of efforts. The political sectionincluded explicit mention of Zionism asa form of racism and a tool of im-perialism and the signatories affirmed"(heir resolution to open a tirelessstruggle against (it)." The mostelaborate and detailed part of the treatywas military/strategic. It included anovert section stating that "The partieswill continue to develop cooperation inthe military field." Far more significantwas the secret appendix, detailing theprocess of cooperation. In this section,the Soviets guaranteed Syria very widebacking in its struggle against Zionismand Western Imperialism (read Israeland the United States). It detailed theextent of the Soviet buildup of Syrianmilitary infrastructure and combatcapabilities, the degree of direct Sovietinvolvement in a Middle East war, and

effort of the Iraqi and Syrian ArmedForces at the core of a military opera-tion. This was pursued systematically,despite periodic rifts between the twocountries. The Soviets upgraded andsupplied both countries in such a waythat they could pass the OffensiveThreshold only when they combined ef-forts and unified their moves.

There was another guideline in theSoviet arms supply policy toward theArab world, based upon Soviet reluc-tance to become involved in suddencrises and uncontrolled escalations.Providing countries such as Syria withbeyond-visual-range kill capabilitywould allow them to deliver a demon-strative, yet militarily insignificant,strike against Israel which might involvethe Soviets at a time of their choosing.This policy applied primarily to the sup-ply of sophisticated aircraft andsurface-to-surface missiles.

When Assad went to Moscow in April1974, the Soviets supplied Syria with the

Force received MIG 21bis and MIG 23S,both equipped with interceptioncapability beyond visual range. This wasa drastic change in Soviet export policy,and would not have been done withoutensuring Syrian reliability. The Syrianinterceptor capability was lateraugmented with the supply of the firstsquadron of the interceptor version ofthe MIG 25 with long-range AAMs. TheSyrian Air Force deep-strike ability wasupgraded dramatically, first with thesupply of the MIG 23BM with limitedperformances, and later with the MIG27 (a simplified version of the SovietFA). The quality and sophistication ofthe Su 20/22 models in the arsenal hasbeen constantly improving. The SyrianAir Defense system has seen an increasein the number of SAM batteries from 75in mid-1980 to 90 in late 1981. In otherwords, the deployment of missiles toLebanon did not come at the expense ofthe SAM deployment elsewhere inSyria, but new batteries were supplied

the Syrian contribution to variousSoviet moves in the region. Soviet uscofinstallations in Syria was also agreedupon.

Committed as they were, the Sovietshad no intention of financing all thenew equipment the Syrian ArmedForces would need in their new regionalrole. In fact, Iraq and Saudi Arabiahave become the primary financiers.Despite overt Syrian military assistanceto Iran, Iraq reaffirmed its October1978 mutual defense pact with Syria andannounced that it would honor its com-mitments related to the war against theZionist entity. Iraq continued to pay forthe majority of the Syrian purchasesbetween 1978 anrid 1980. In 1980, withthe anti-US role becoming more promi-nent, Saudi Arabia announced its will-ingness to finance new arms deals forSyria with the USSR. Moreover, theSaudis agreed to pay higher prices inhard currency to speed supply. TheSaudis also announced an increase intheir contribution to the Palestiniancause, enabling the PLO to purchase ad-ditional heavy equipment from theSoviet Union. The Saudis contributedadditional US-made equipment directlyto the PLO.

With a unified Arab world as far asanti-Israel goals were concerned, andwith an explicit Soviet commitment,Syria upgraded its preparations for thenext round. Beginning early in 1981, allthe partners in the Steadfastness andConfrontation Front joined in thesepreparations, making the overall threatvery credible. The Syrian-Pl.O buildupin Lebanon received a temporary set-back during the crisis early in the sum-mer; however, since the US-imposedceasefire they have not only been able tocatch up, but even to upgrade theircapabilities. Under protection of theceasefire, "Fatah" has finally succeed-ed in building a credible conventionalforce in Lebanon and even in mountingexercises. (Ed. note: See September/October issue of JINSA Newsletter for

full details of the PLO buildup after theceasefire.)

TIHE KADDAFI CONNECTIONIn late August 1981, Libyan Col.

Muammar Kaddafi and sotie of hissenior officers visited Damascus and

Eventually, the Soviets undertook the entiremaintenance operation of the systems (suppliedto Syria), their Advisors were integrated into theSyrian Armed Forces, and in Specific hightechnology components, the Soviets carried outthe entire range of activities.

The Fatah will receive 250 of the Soviet T-62 tank early in 1982.

Page 4

January 1982

discussed working arrangements for theresupply of weapons and manpower toSyria in case of a war. Arrangements in-cluded establishing a unified Head-quarters, which included representativesof the PLO. HQ would control the useof unified and separate national forcesand coordinate their efforts againstIsrael. In addition, a process wascreated for supplying Syrian forces withweapons drawn from the arsenals ofLibya. As understood, the arrangementcalls for Syrian resupply first from Lib-yan stocks and only later from Sovietforward basing equipment on Syriansoil. In order to increase the rate ofresupply, Saudi Arabian transport air-craft, both military and civilian, wouldparticipate in an airlift. Currently,Saudi transports carry out training

force was 30 miles wide, but within afew days narrowed to 20 miles-theSoviet standard, The armoured columnpenetrated some 50 miles deep intoenemy territory, crossing a river on theway. The width of the Golan Heights is15 miles, while Haifa is 50 miles fromQuneitra.

In addition to the main thrust, theflank forces were activated by skeletonsof the headquarters of forces earmarkedfor operations in the event of a real war.As in previous dress rehearsals, Syrianforces comprised the northern forcewhile Saudi-Jordanian forces comprisedthe southern. The large Saudi"observer" presence in Syria during theexercise was actually the skeleton HQcomponent of the exercise. The skeletonof the northern force included, for the

(In the last exercise) the initial front...narrowedto 20 miles-the Soviet standard. The armouredcolumn penetrated some 50 miles into enemyterritory... The width of the Golan Heights is 15miles while Haifa is 50 miles from Quneitra.

The Soviel main battle tank, the T-72. was used by the Syrian Army in rehearsals for invasion of Israel.

missions on an irregular basis.Although there was no explicit an-

nouncement at the end of the Kaddafi-Assad meeting, it seems likely that inthis conference they agreed to worktoward acquiring a war-fightingcapability against Israel by the spring of1982.

THE LAST DRESS REHEARSAl.Accelerated Soviet supplies since the

Syrian-Soviet Treaty have been im-pressive in quantity and quality. Forthe first time, the Syrian Armed Forceshave an independent offensive capabili-ty that would enable them to launch amajor war against Israel. The equip-ment and the Syrian ability to use itwere tested in the largest dress rehearsalto date: late September through earlyOctober, 1981.

In this exercise, the Syrians and theSoviets tested a modernized centralforce, while the secondary flank forceswere represented by skeleton com-ponents. It is clear that the Syrian Frontis still based on a 3-axis assault, with themain thrust being an Army-levelbreakthrough. Its spearhead was a T-72tank division and included all the com-ponents of the most sophisticatedSoviet breakthrough. The thrust waspreceded by a massive artillery barrageof SPGs. Assault helicopters and tac-tical aircraft flew a huge number of at-tack and interdiction missions, in-eluding what seemed to be attacks onthe "enemy" rear. Following thebreakthrough itself and the establish-ment of a rapidly advancing armouredcolumn, heliborne commando unitswere landed in various key points alongthe expected axis of advance while otheranti-tank helicopters (French-madeGazelles) attacked the enemy rein-forcements. A paratroop force, pro-bably an entire regim ent, was droppedfrom 11-76T transports into the rear ofthe enemy to secure key areas, enablingthe armoured column to accelerate andcontinue further.

Throughout the exercise, helibornecommando units repeatedly struck inthe immediate rear, creating havoc inthe enemy areas of command andreorganization. A large number ofSPGs provided the advancing force withmassive fire support. Large units ofmechanized infantry cleared "fortifiedsettlements" as well as military objec-tives along the axis of advance.

Syrian forces demonstrated theirability to carry out a majorbreakthrough according to the Soviettextbook. The initial front of the central

first time, elementto coordinate theSyrian drive andPLO drive in Leb

A large numbiwere present dursome took anl activthe exercise for evcapabilities. At lewith General raamong the largeSoviet officers wh

THE INCRIThe Syrian rehe

series of events aiindicating the spreparations forfuture. Under thceasefire in Lebanried out regimercises of its convethem in an areaUNIFIL) in whic

Table: Incrca

aircraft

MiG 17

Su 7Su 20/22MiG 23/27

MiG 25MiG 21

total

nized elements ca"Zionist fortifiedcupied Galilee."

softheFatah in order and IFVs, 500 122mm SAU-122 and 200 military city of Tabuk. The mostefforts between the 152mm SAU-152 SPGs. With some 200 ominous sign of Saudi intention is the

the expected Syrian- T-72 tanks supplied during 1981, there recent transfer of Pakistani units toanon. is no need for an additional supply. The Tabuk IThese are expert units ine r of Soviet officers rapid growth of the Syrian Air Force is maintenance and armament, and haveing the exercise and the most worrisome trend, with a jump been working on upgrading and prepar-ve part. Others viewed from 395 to 635 combat aircraft within ing units already in Tabuk. Currentlyaluation of the Syrian two years. Because the Libyans are sup- there are two reinforced brigades in theast 15 Soviet officers plying supplements and replacements city, a tank brigade and a mechanizeda nk were identified for losses due to operational exercises infantry brigade. Also, there are two aire number of senior and combat activity, the purchases from defense battalions operating HAWKo viewed the exercise. the USSR are net growth. (See chart) batteries and other equipment and aux-

In addition, the Soviet Union agreed iliary and commando components. TheE ASE IN ARMS to supply Syria with two TU 126 air- Pakistani troops have also begun toarsal was the first in a craft, the Soviet AWACS. This is large- prepare the installations for the arrival:ross the Middle E ast ly a political move, designed to of a third brigade and artillery bat-seriousness of Arab demonstrate Soviet commitment to the talions. In addition, there are convoysa crisis in the near Arab cause and the treaty. However, of weapons and trucks of equipment

ie protection of the despite the fact that the MOSS is con- parked in special logistic centers inon, the Fatah has car- sidered inferior to the US E-3A, India Tabuk, being readied by the Pakistanisit/brigade-level exer- made good use of lie MOSS it leased for movement.ntional units (one of from the Soviet Union during the 1971 The Air Force section olf Tabuk, builtunder the control of war with Pakistan. At that time, a single around one of the largest air bases inC h tanks and mecha- aircraft with a Soviet crew directed the Saudi Arabia, has been upgraded as

well. The Lightning Squadron (No. 2Sqn.) has increased its activity, and twosquadrons flying F-5Fs from Taif (par-ticularly No. 3 Sqn.) have increased

se in the Size of the Syrian Air Force. their rate of periodic deployment toTabuk as their first leg north. Largequantities of equipment have beenairlifted to the base by the C-130s of

mid-1980 mid-1981 mid-1982 Squadrons 4 and 16 flying from Jeddah,

No. a/c Sqn No. a/c Sq n and there has been increased activity inile two helicopter squadrons in Taif(No. 12 and No. 14 Sqns.), althoughthus far the activity has not been ir-

20 1 20 1 20 1 regular. Tie other F-5E squadrons (No.

30 2 45 3 105 7 10 Sqn.) based in Khamis in th e

60) 4 9( ( 6 120 8 southwestern part of Saudi Arabia,

25 I 45 3 90 6 hasn't been moved, although thesquadron took part in earlier

r 200 I 240 16 240 16 deploymi ents to Jordan. It appears thatthe Saudi Air Force is initially placing

395 23 500 33 635 42 emphasis on improving its rapid reac-

tion and deployment capabilities, andonly later will it move th e secondechelon of aircraft earmarked for the

ptured and destroyed bulk of the operation of the Indian Air Golan Front.settlements in the oc- Force deep in Pakistant. Even with POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTSAs a reward for the limited performance, the Soviet-Syrian Behind the military maneuvers stands

performance of the Fatah units, Libyaannounced it would purchase 250 T-62tanks and additional APCs from theSoviet Union for them. The equipmentis to be supplied early in 1982.

Saudi Arabia joined the Arab massivepurchases, volunteering hard currencyto finance a new Syrian-Soviet deal. TheSaudis agreed to pay extra to secure tihedelivery of goods in the first half of1982. In the purchase, tile Syrian AirForce is to receive 4 Nanuchkasquadrons of MIG 25s and 4 squadronsof SU 22s. The Army will get 800 APCs

AWACS will enhance the capabilities ofcommand and control.

Currently, the Syrian Armed Forceshave some 3000-3700 tanks, 2000 Ar-moured Personnel Carriers, 8(X) artillerypieces and 90 SAM batteries. Approx-imately 2200 tanks are deployed be-tween Damascus and the Israeli border.

THE SAUDI ROLEFollowing the decisions of late 1981,

Saudi Arabia has substantially increasedth e buildup and reorganization of itsforces in the northwest region of thekingdom, most particularly in the

a backdrop of political activity begin-ning with the Arab Summit in Fez. Dur-ing the Summit, Syrian Foreign MinisterHaddam emphasized the Syrian conm-mittment to a imilitary solution of theArab-Israeli problem. He said that Syriawould invite Soviet troops to fill gaps inthe regional buildup if any Arab coun-try withdraws, and Arab sources havequoted him saying that Syria hasalready obtained Soviet agreement.

In early December, a high-level (prob-ably ministerial) summit of defense andforeign senior officials of the Gulf

Countries took place in Kuwait. Theydiscussed tile situation in the MiddleFast as related to OPEC and the cartel'scontribution to the Arab cause. Ap-parently Assad, then in Kuwait, tookpart in at least some of the discussions.The participants recommended that inview of Egyptian President Mubarak'stilt toward the Arab world, a majorcrisis should be avoided until after April1982 and the final Israeli withdrawalfrom Sinai. At that point, Mubarakwould be able to join the unified frontagainst Israel. They also concluded thatthe oil countries would benefit by a ma-jor crisis of a war, particularly in tileMiddle East. Such a war would givethem justification for a sharp increase inoil prices (punishing tile West) and atthe same time cause an erratic increasein the purchase of oil both trends im-proving the current weak market.

On 13 December, in an interview withthe Kuwaiti newspaper Al Rai Al Aam,Assad is quoted as saying, "Syria rejectsit (the Fahd plan) because recognition ofIsrael is out of the question. Even if thePLO recognizes Israel, Syria will not beable to recognize it." (Su ch a move bythe PI.O is unlikely. On 24 Decemberthe PLO Central Secretariat held anemergency session and declared that theonly solution to the Palestinian problemis tile liquidation of tile Zionist entity. Itemphasized that no short cuts, such asrecognition of Israel, are possible.)

Reviewing the accelerated builduparound Israel, the sharp and ominoustones calling for a new round, and thefear of an unknown Egyptian reactionto a post-April war, the Israeli govern-ment annexed the Golan Heights on 14December. Bound by the US-imposedcease-fire in Lebanon, this was an at-tempt to keep pre-emption at a low, yetneaningful level.

Muted Egyptian reaction gives hopethat Mubarak might refrain from join-ing the next round. The rest of the Arabworld is already heavily committed to amilitary solution, and the annexationdid not provide them with a new incen-tive to go to war. As has generally beenthe case, the key to violence in theregion is the Soviet Union. Had the USreaction to the annexation been mild,the Soviets might have limited their in-volvement in the next round to avoid amajor confrontation with the US in ad-dition to Poland. The sharp US reactionmight have in fact encouraged theSoviets and the Arabs to go oil, increasetheir pressure, and expect the US to savethem from an Israeli victory at the lastmoment.

Page 5

January 1982

News Briefs(Continued from page 1)

Use of this fuel would be sufficient toallow the reactor to serve as the researchand training center France and Iraqclaim it is designed to be, but falls wellbelow the recognized requirement forthe production of nuclear weapons. It isunclear whether Iraq will accept Frenchsafeguards, or if it will look elsewherefor fuel. There are indications that Iraqwill approach Italy if unable to get thereactor and fuel it seeks from France.

Arab Threats: The Arab LaborOrganization ended a conference inDamascus with a resolution calling for"a popular Arab action against US em-bassies and other interests throughoutthe Arab world," and similar "strikes atthe interests and embassies of otherEuropean nations, whose stands aresimilar to those of America and en-courage Israel." Syrian President HafezAssad said, "The resolutions are in ac-cordance with our views regarding therole the Arab working class should playin the struggle against the Zionistenemy."

Security for Arafat: According to theParis-based pro-Iraqi weekly al Watanal-Arabi, there have been a number ofattempts planned on the life of YasserArafat, at least one of which seems tohave been backed by Syria. Thenewspaper notes that Arafat's suspi-cions about Syria's intentions have beenreflected in the added security precau-tions he has been taking during his rareand increasingly short visits to theSyrian capital. Despite the current trucein Syrian-PLO relations, there remainsa fear in the Fatah that Damascus wantsto replace Arafat with someone moreamenable to its dictates.

Support for Israel: A November Galluppoll of American adults indicates strongsupport for Isracl. In response to aquestion about countries that constitutea vital interest for the US. 81%7o of therespondents named Israel, an increaseof 3 percentage points over a similarsurvey in 1978. In a hypothetical warbetween Israel and one or more of herArab neighbors, only about I in 8 wouldsympathize with Israel's opponent, butmore than I in 3 would not chooseeither side.

Aid for Israel: Administration sourceshave said the Pentagon has recommend-ed $1.7 billion in arms sales credits tforIsrael in fiscal year 1983. This representsa boost of about $300 million over thisyear's total. A Defense Departmentspokesman said the US continues "to bestrongly committed to Israel'ssecurity." Defense officials said that theproposed $1.7 billion is "not a greatamount considering the size of the forcethe Israelis must maintain and the cruelinflation suffered by Israel."

Business As Usual: France expressedsupport for the PLO and joined Egyptin calling for the establishment of aPalestinian state and the inclusion of thePLO in negotiations. French ForeignMinister Claude Cheysson said at thesame time, that France would not ex-tend diplomatic recognition to the PLO.

Related: French Defense MinisterCharles Hernu said in Cairo that Francehas agreed to supply Egypt with Mirage2000 fighter bombers, but indicated thatthe number will be short of the 40-60planes Egypt is seeking.

US Trucks in Libya: In 1977 the Libyangovernment purchased 400 heavy-dutytrucks produced by the Oshkosh Truck

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Corporation. Under the terms of the USembarbo of military equipment toLibya, the Libyan government providedwritten guarantees that the vehicleswould be used for agricultural purposesonly. In spite of the State Department'sopinion that modification of the trucksfor military purposes would be difficultand expensive, all 400 trucks have beenrebuilt and are today hauling Soviet-made tanks in Libya. The informationwas provided by the State Departmentand Canadian mechanics who recentlyreturned from servicing the vehicles.State Department officials said they hadblocked all sales of similar equipment toLibya after learning of the modifica-tions and have ordered Oshkosh not tosupply spare parts to Libya, but admitthere is little they can do in the way ofpunishment. An unnamed official said,"The deal was made in good faith. In acase like this, there arc no teeth. Whatcan you do? Go over and destroy thetrucks?"

Hostage "Rescue": A mock rescue of100 persons from a simulated US Em-bassy was staged on San ClementeIsland beginning on 7 January. Sixteenwarships with over 12,000 sailors andmarines, including an air and groundtask force, took part in the exercise,which was termed a success.

JINSA BRIEFSStrategic Relations: General MenachemMeron, Military Attache of the Em-bassy of Israel, invited approximately30 members of JINSA to the Embassyon 6 December to discuss Israeli-American strategic relations. Thediscussion format allowed our membersto express their opinions and concerns,as well as to learn from the General.

Security: A somewhat smaller groupmet with Colonel Amos Gilboa of theEmbassy of Israel on 7 January for anin-depth look at the security problemson Israel's northern frontier.

JINSA Programs: JINSA BoardMember Cecile Landrum addressed ap-proximately 150 members of Congrega-tion Kodimah in Springfield, MA on 17January. She had an enthusiastic recep-tion for her presentation entitled "JIN-SA Programs and the Pentagon."

Chicago B'Fast: Colonel LelandHolland, US Army Intelligence, ad-dressed the first JINSA breakfastmeeting in Chicago on 19 January. Thiswas Chicago's second JINSA activity inthree months. In November, ClemCaditz and Herschel Auerbach of ourBoard hosted Major General GeorgeKeegan (Ret.) at a fundraising meeting.

Coming Up: Our 1982 Washington,D.C. Breakfast Series will commence on25 February. Speaking at the NationalLawyers Club will be Colonel LelandHolland, US Army Intelligence.

Under the sponsorship of JINSA,Congregation Tifereth Israel in GlenCove, NY will hear Joseph Lehman ofthe Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency on 28 February. Mr. Lehmanwill address the subject of nuclear dis-armament.

Equality of the Sexes: (Jordan Timescommenting on Ambassador JeanneKirkpatrick's interview on Israel Radio)"Those of us who believe in the equalityof the sexes should perhaps thank Mrs.Jeanne Kirkpatrick...for her interview.She has demonstrated as vividly andconclusively as possible that Americanwomen are blessed with the samecapacity for ignorance and self-deception as arc American malepolitical leaders. Is she already runningfor the Senate seat from New York, andtherefore, like equally loquacious anddistempered predecessors at the UNwho also aspired for a Senate seat, suchas the very sorry Patrick Moynihan, hasdecided to open her campaign withmandatory spiritual strip-tease and self-flagellation in front of the Israeli lobby?(She) reminds us that where thePalestine issue is concerned, cheapnessand political blindness are not exclusive-ly male traits among American politi-cians. The ladies can also get right downthere in the gutter and grovel along withthe rest of the folks." (24 Jan.)

The Chairman Speaks (Sen. CharlesPercy, Chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee): "Peace in theMiddle East cannot be achieved unlessthe legitimate right of the Palestiniansto live in peace in an independent state isguaranteed, provided Israel lives withinpeaceful and secure borders. I told theIsraelis this fact six years ago andreiterated it to them a week ago." (10Jan.)

On the Pipeline (Francois Mitterand.President of France on France's deci-sion to buy natural gas from the SovietUnion): "France is on a road frontwhich no one will make it deviate-thatof the construction of an independentpolicy guaranteeing its security and acondition of its action for peace andfreedom." (26 Jan.)

Anti-Semitism Rejected (Lech Walesa,Solidarity l.eader, on anti-Semitism inPoland): Said Solidarity would reject allattempts to make anti-Semitism an issuein Poland, and that overtly anti-Semiticstatements were "absolutely steered andmanipulated by certain people", whomhe did not specify. "Not only do theyspeak about Jews, they even call peopleJews who are not Jewish. There is nograssroots support for it...We won'tbecome divided on this issue, nor willwe allow anything evil to be said aboutthis social group. The fate of the Jewishnation is very similar to ours, if muchworse. Thus there cannot be even talkabout anti-Semitism." (Dec., in his lastformal interview before martial law.)

The Communist Threat (Mayif Ibn'Abd-AI 'Aziz, Saudi Arabian InteriorMinister): Referring to some Iranianpilgrims this year who raised slogansagainst the US and Israel, he said, "Is itcorrect to only say that the enemies ofIslam are the United States and Israel?

Why didn't they say anything about theSoviet Union? Why didn't they sayanything about communism? We excusethe Iranians, for they may have their in-terests, and (for them) to say anythingabout the Soviet Union or anyone else istheir own affair. However, as Muslimswe should not ignore the enemies ofMuslims, whoever they may be." (20Dec.)

On The Golan Annexation(Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of

Israel): "The Syrians turned the lives ofthousands of these people (residents ofthe valley below the Golan) into hell.Heeding the call of their abysmalhatred, they would open fire from theGolan Heights on our settlements. Theywould spread bloody terror on all of us.They would hit, murder and injure men,women and children. On no condition,will we allow those days to be forgotten.It was then said we are giving birth to airshelter children. Can anyone conceivethat Israel would ever agree to a possiblerecurrence of such a situation?" (14Dec.)

(Moshe Arens, incoming Ambassadorfrom Israel to the US): "There havebeen quite a few cases in history inwhich negotiations were held and a ter-ritory was transferred from onesovereignty to another and the fact thatthe territory was not run by a militaryadministration but by a civilian ad-ministration was not a reason to preventnegotiations. If the day comes whenthere is somebody with whom we cantalk in Syria, I am confident thattoday's step will not be the one to pre-vent the negotiations with that day'sSyrian government." (14 Dec.)

(Hafiz AI-Assad, President of Syria):"If we wanted to regain the Golan inAs-Sadat's way, we would have done soyears ago like As-Sadat. However, wedo not want to regain our land orany part thereof through capitulation,although you (the interviewer) termed itpeaceful means. Although we Arabs donot like to talk about the dead, I wouldlike to say that As-Sadat capitulatedrather than made peace. He did notachieve peace, but capitulation. He didnot liberate Sinai from its bonds but fet-tered all of Egypt. We did not marchalong this road in the past and will notdo so in the future. (15 Dec.)

(Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, SyrianMinister of Information): "We are con-sidering all measures to get our territoryback. Israel will never return part of theterritory it occupied by force. Thehistory of the Arab-Israeli conflictproves that not an inch of Arab soil hasbeen returned to the Arabs as a result ofnegotiations with Israel. It will be onlyby force, military force that Israel willbe forced to withdraw from the oc-cupied territories." In response to thesuggestion that As-Sadat had receivedterritory by negotiation, he said, "Inreturn, all of Egypt has had to submit tothe Israelis." (21 Dec. Per Spiegel)

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

Page 6