New Dilemmas of Turkish National Security Politics Old and New Security Concerns and National...

8/3/2019 New Dilemmas of Turkish National Security Politics Old and New Security Concerns and National Development in th

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New Dilemmas of Turkish National Security

Politics: Old and New Security Concerns and

National Development in the Post-1980 Era

Gkhan YcelDepartment of Politics and Int. Relations

Oxford University

(Paper prepared for presentation at the Fourth Kokkalis Graduate Student

Workshop at JFK School of Government, Harvard University)

8-9 February 2002

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Abstract

This paper attempts to highlight the nature of the interaction between Turkeysnational security and national development in the light of internal security issues. Indoing so, a public debate subsequent to Deputy Prime Ministers criticism on nationalsecurity is analyzed. The participants of the public discussion are categorized in three

groups: (i) pro-Yilmaz (ii) pro-military and (iii) moderates. To observe the gapbetween public and official conception of national security, several sources of Turkish


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national security doctrine are also taken into consideration. In closing, a generalconclusion on what makes the national security process a zero-sum game is offered.

Security is development and without development there can be no security 1

Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security

Mustafa Kemals country is of course the classical torn country which since the1920s has been trying to modernize, to westernize and to become part of the West.2

Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations

Introduction

On 4 August 2001, Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Mesut Yilmazs speech to the

seventh Motherland Party (ANAP) convention contained contentious issues that had

never before been addressed so bluntly. Having advocated what the ANAP can do for

the future of the country in order to foster political and economic development3

, his

1McNamara, R., The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968): 149.

2Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone

Books, 1998): 138.3

Mr. Yilmaz proclaimed that Motherland Partys roadmap for creating a stronger Turkey targets a

more peaceful country where all the world citizens would adore living on with the least level ofinflation ratio in the world, augmented GNP per capita to 10.000 USD and durable communalconsensus. Those targets are due to the 100t h anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, which is the year


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address focused on a hypersensitive sphere of Turkish political life, namely national

security 4. First he revealed his self-defined threat perceptions encompassing ethno-

political issues and growing regime disputes, and compared them to a dark slippery

pathway. He also admitted that the full-scale measures taken vis-a-vis those threats

had occasionally violated human rights. Next he related the violation of civil liberties

to the emergence of the low quality of the life in Turkey with special reference to

undemocratic distribution of political, economic and social wealth. According to

Yilmaz, this is an unwelcome development, which has led to consequences such as

the collapse of the economy, the low-quality democracy5, a human and economic

capital flow out of the country, the crumbling of state services, the violation of law in

the public sphere in general and among the unrestrained state and non-state actors in

particular, and most importantly escalating tensions with the European Union.

Given his commitment to EU membership Yilmaz sees national security as

an obstruction to national development. This refers to one of the questions at hand

whether Turkey is ready to pay the full cost of entering the EU. Taken together, in

DPMs words, this political puzzle is overwhelmingly deriving from a syndrome6, the

so-called national security syndrome. Furthermore national security is , again in his

words, a taboo that everyone more or less knows about, yet which nobody dares to

deal with because it is a hear no evil, see no evil, and speak no evil subject. Hence

EU membership, which must be soon fulfilled for the sake of national development, is

a prerequisite to cure this pain in the neck in his understanding. Before I proceed,

Yilmazs viewpoint should not remain incomplete inasmuch as it is the departure

point of this paper:

[..]National security is an essential paradigm, which ultimately aims topreserve the survival of a state. Yet the practice of this concept today [in todays

Turkey] seems to work quite the contrary. The term national security has become aconundrum that thwarts every single step to enhancing the future of this country.Turkey could have been the only country, which could manage to utilize such a term

to cut off all the vital veins of the state [] and so did it happen. The key for change

2023. The full text of Mesut Yilmazs speech can be found at the website of the ANAP(http://www.anap.org.tr).4

Those who criticized Yilmaz asserted that he did this intentionally in the wake of a lost of supportfrom ANAPs former voters, and keeps his eye on pro-Islamist and Kurdish votes as a way out. Inaddition to this some also argue that Yilmaz and his party have been surrounded by graft charges as

part of the White Energy operation conducted by paramilitary forces and which has forced his EnergyMinister Cumhur Ersumer to resign and national security syndrome debate was an attempt to cover upthe graft allegations surrounding his party (Turkish Daily News, 7 August 2001).5

See Annex 5.6

Syndrome: (1) a set of concurrent things; (2) a characteristic combination of opinions, behavior; (3)symptoms in a disease (Oxford English Dictionary).


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is hidden in the term national security. However it has been virtually impossible totake steps in the attempt of reinforcing the survival and increasing the welfare of our

state, repeatedly with reference to national security. If Turkey wants to makeprogress, she has to overcome the national security syndrome. The content andcircumstances of national security should be opened to public debate. The true key

and requisite for turning our face to Europe and hence change is to redefine the limitsand boundaries of the national security. National security deals with the whole nation

and so should the nation do with it.

7

The main goal of this paper is to answer the question whether national security

is a true conundrum as far as Turkey is concerned. First I will deal with a sample of

public reactions to Yilmazs statement. Prior to the scrutiny of the definition in the

official documents this will lead us to see how other people and institutions

understand the term national security. I will consider Mr. Yilmazs speech as an

example of what Legro terms a shock that provides to observe whether subsequent

experience is socially desirable8, in the form of undermining an existing orthodoxy

and enabling a society to reach the necessary conditions for radical change. Peoples

first reactions are therefore deemed important here since many of them revealed their

opinions and standpoints for the first time on such a delicate matter.

Secondly this paper will outline the content and context of the national

security definition in a number of official papers. Depicting the official definition of

the term will help to work out what constitutes the gap between the official State

ethos of national security and the national security syndrome. 9 In so doing, the

comparative theoretical approaches regarding national security and development arealso taken into consideration, particularly in the context of the developing world. I

will then explore whether Turkish national security fits into any particular model that

explains the interaction between national security and development.

Many Faces of Turkish National Security

Mesut Yilmaz does not enter into a new political dispute with the military by

attacking the ethos of national security. In the 1990s he claimed to distinguish spheres

appropriate for military scrutiny and national security from spheres of governance

7Translated by the author.

8Cited in Farrell, T., 'Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Irelands

Professional Army, European Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 7 (1), 2001:82.9

At this point the year 1980 provides a fairly good benchmark that then the military took over power; anew constitution was drafted under the supervision of the military and thus the former socio-political

coalition crumbled. For the new and old division of labor between the state elites and the politicalelites, see Heper, M., and Evin, A., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (DeGruyter: Berlin, 1988).


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appropriate for civilian government oversight. The Turkish General Staff (TGS)

warned that no one, for the sake of their personal ambitions, could confuse the

national security determination to fight separatist or fundamenta list activities10.

Likewise, the earliest reaction to him came as no surprise from the military in August

2001. The TGS, believing that Yilmazs words were targeting them, issued a press

release on 7 August 200111. By stating that matters related to the existence, well-being

and prosperity of the Turkish nation should only be discussed at serious platforms, the

TGS regarded a political party convention as unserious in the lengthy release. [] If

political stability cannot be achieved because of personal ambitions, to blame all of

the problems on a concept of national security is unreasonable and unjust, the

militarys statement said.

In this case it is evident that when Yilmaz used the words national security

syndrome he did not refer to Turkeys external security within the Middle East, the

Balkans and the Caucasus or the Turkish-Greek rivalry. Quite the contrary in his

judgment, the term syndrome implied a concept of national security concept, that

involves a struggle with movements directed against territorial integrity and

secularism, and prevents Turkey from fully complying with EUs membership

criteria. Relations between Turkey and the EU have changed recently with the

historical decision taken at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 to grant Turkey

candidate status. Yet, the more difficult part of Turkeys candidacy is to satisfy the

acquis communautaire of the EU concerning democracy and human rights12.

To counter the argument of the deputy prime minister, who portrayed all

existing negative issues in Turkey as by-products of the national security concept and

argued that the progress of the country was being hampered by such a syndrome, the

TGS contended that the national security calculus had been developed in

consideration of threat/risk factors as well as social, economic and military

parameters13. The military also indicated that the ultimate objective of national

security has been imposed to defend at home a democratic, secular and unitary

10Cited in the web version of Yaphe, J., Turkeys Year of Living Dangerously (National Defense

University, Institute for Strategic Studies Occasional Papers. No.155, January 1999).11

TGS Press Release, 7 August 2001, No: 17.12

According to the EU sources, this is a sine qua non condition for the membership of Turkey. Formore about Turkeys progress towards accession, see The European Commission, Regular Report onTurkeys Progress Towards Accession (November 1998, November 1999, November 2000, November2001). The EU Accession Partnership Documents have made it clear that the withdrawal of the militaryfrom the political arena is one of the prerequisites of Turkeys accession.13 Turkish Daily News, Domestic News, 12 August 2001.


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republic and externally to defend the supreme interests of the Turkish state and nation.

The military statement thus criticized Yilmaz that his opinions could make the social

and political environment favorable for the Islamists and separatists, and in turn

could require concessions and compromises on national security. On 16 August,

Turkish Land Armed Forces Commander Gen. Hilmi Ozkok reiterated that the

Turkish military had a serious responsibility to protect the secular regime.

Since 4 August 2001, several representatives of other institutions have voiced

their views on following both Yilmazs and militarys statements. The polarization of

the debate thus gave birth a fairly open public medium. Hence one of the main

objectives of the DPM has been achieved. On the whole one could categorize those

entering the discussion into three groups; (1) pro-military, conservative, pro-status

quo (2) pro-Yilmaz, liberal, reformists, activists and (3) moderates.

Pro-military camp- Arguably this uniform makeup of their national security

attribution turns out to be a good indicator of the characteristic constant as far as

contemporary Turkish politics is concerned. In this camp, the point that has most

disappointed Yilmaz is the involvement of his coalition partners. Prime Minister and

Democratic Left Party (DSP) leader Bulent Ecevit and Deputy Prime Minister and

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, among others, did not

back him in this issue. Bahceli said this kind of a discussion was a waste of time. As a

follow up to Bahceli, MHP deputy leader Ismail Kose said, Turkey is a single

country, with a single official language, with a single flag [] national security

cannot be altered. Our policy of security against those who would take up arms

against the state in the name of religion or ethnicity will never change.14

The Prime Minister had difficulties in understanding why his junior coalition

partner opened such a debate. He mainly criticized both Yilmaz and to a far lesser

extent the attitude of the military. Regarding Yilmazs point, he mentioned that his

coalition partner was aware of the new security policy document, which once again

concentrated in internal threat perceptions on one hand. On the other hand his

discontent was the generalization of the military that admonished the politicians as the

main cause of the economic downfall and for losing out on globalization. Also in the

pro-military cluster, True Path Party (DYP) leader and former prime minister Tansu

14 Turkish Daily News, Domestic News, 11 August 2001.


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Ciller, the DYP deputy leader Nevfel Sahin and Hayri Kozakcioglu, Chairman of the

Ankara Chamber of Trade (ATO) Sinan Aygun and former President of the Republic

Suleyman Demirel were recorded as critics of Yilmazs opinions and determined

them controversial, not serious and subjective. The ATO president Sinan Aygun, for

instance, agreed with TGS remarks that globalization had become a process of

surrender15. Accordingly Suleyman Demirel said that he chaired 260 national security

meetings during the course of his presidency. Turkey has never been harmed because

of its national security concept; nor is there a problem with the military, he added. 16

This latter citation is,per se, a good summary of the overall thoughts of this camp.

Pro-Yilmaz camp- Mesut Yilmazs statements were backed by activists, reactionaries,

liberals and reformists who seek to execute a radical change, which claims to

encompass a power shift within the community and to construct a new consensus

around democratic norms. Most of the representatives of this camp agree that opening

a national security debate is a prerequisite towards this end. They gained a decent

appearance of freedom of expression within the debate caused by the instant shock

in the wake of Yilmazs address. That is probably one of the main reasons that the

whole debate was short-lived. When the shock lost its effect and intensity, the actors

became reluctant to express their views saliently. Nevertheless, in the midst of the

debate, pro-Yilmaz acclaims were as harsh as the pro-military declarations, having a

coherent line of reasoning based on unive rsal and normative democratic rights. The

vast majority of the adherents of this argument were most likely to be those -labor

unions, human right activists, journalists- who have identified themselves as having

suffered from the national security regime in the country.

The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People

(MAZLUMDER) issued a statement effectively supporting Yilmaz in broaching the

subject of national security. Its statement mentioned that the notion of national

security syndrome, which had been opened for debate for the first time in Turkey,

was turned into a taboo because of the militarys perception of national security. 17 In

the same statement, MAZLUMDER argued that human rights and basic freedoms

were treated as luxurious in the country primarily due to national security policy,

which is dictated from above. Another advocate of the national security syndrome

15Turkish Daily News, Domestic News, 9 August 2001.

16Ibid, 17 August 2001.

17 Ibid., 9 August 2001.


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statement, Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP), approached the issue in a fashion

similar to MAZLUMDERs point of view18. HADEP leader Murat Bozlak said that

the only way to bring assurance to national security could be the institutionalization of

the democracy and the provision of social peace19. On the liberal side of the political

spectrum, the Liberal Democrat Party leader Besim Tibuk heavily criticized the

preponderance of the military in national security management saying, concepts such

as freedom and debate might be foreign to them (the military) and that they might

misinterpret the Constitution and laws and take it upon themselves to dictate

policy20.

By the same token, the General Secretary of the Confederation of

Revolutionary Workers Union (DISK), Murat Tokmak, complained that national

security had been applied arbitrarily and in accordance with the immediate interests

and the daily policies of those in government. The Turkish Industrialists and

Businessmen Association (TUSIAD), known as the Patrons Club and an enthusiastic

devotee of EU membership, backed Yilmazs move to open the national security

issue. Expectedly, their primary concern is economic success, which is sustainable

best under conditions of harmony and stability. The TUSIAD also urged in one of its

latest reports for the adaptation of the military dominated NSC to EU standards while

also calling for Kurdish education21. At the peak of the debate, a pro-Yilmaz

columnist summarizes the standpoint of this camp in two pillars. Given that the

Turkish national security concept is based on internal and external enemies, he

argues that this very concept gives a paranoid outlook to the country.22 To him,

externally, the concept is suspicious of neighbor states that they are trying to dig

Turkeys grave; of the West that they want to either weaken or divide her; and of the

EU that they will never accept the membership application. Internally the state is

over-suspicious of its own citizens.

18For a close advocate of this viewpoint stating, violating basic human rights, have further endangered

the personal security of individual citizens and induced a state of insecurity, see Turkey: no securitywithout human rights (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1996): 1-9.19

Turkish Daily News, 9 August 2001.20

Ibid., 11 August 2001.21

"Trkiye' de Demokratikleme Perspektifleri" ve "AB Kopenhag Siyasal Kriterleri" No.2 : Dncezgrl, (Istanbul: TUSIAD, Eylul 2001).22

Ulsever, C., Will Turkey demolish her fundamental taboo? The role of the army, Turkish DailyNews, 14 August 2001.


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Moderates- Their approach to the issue was based on a search for a middle way. They

did not prefer to be seen at either pole. For instance, Defense Minister Sabahattin

Cakmakoglu of the MHP spoke on neither Yilmazs statement nor the militarys

statement and stressed vaguely that they all had a duty to treat the issue such a way

that the TGS did not feel obliged to issue statements regarding them.23

The Happiness

Party (SP) leader Recai Kutan implicitly implied that politicians determine the

national security concepts in democratic countries. He rather preferred to stay apart

from the discussion since his party would be relatively vulnerable in the center of

such a sensitive issue. Federation of Turkish Labor Unions (Turk-Is) and Turkish

Exporters Assembly (TIM) statements called on the necessity of discussing the

economic dimension of national security as Turkey has been struggling through a

heavy economic crisis. On this basis Turk-Is asserted that failure to implement social

and economic measures in a certain part of the country has resulted in separatist

terrorism, ethnic nationalism, and other movements. 24

The Association of Autonomous Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD),

known as the club of devout businessmen, and Association of Turkish Young

Businessmen (TUGIAD) compromised on the point that such a discussion was out of

place at that particular period when there was need for political stability and

confidence to overcome the economic crisis 25. Given this, an intelligence report sent

to the National Security Council (NSC) warned that although the 28 February process

dealt regressive faith-based activities a severe blow, the prevailing economic and

social problems have caused these groups to become active once again 26. In short

those who focus on increasing economic deprivation address the role of national

security in it.

At the end of the day, even the efforts of President Necdet Sezer in arbitrating

the debate were not satisfactory. Not surprisingly, the establishment of Tayyip

Erdogans new political formation named Ak Party (AP) on 14 August 2001

superseded the national security syndrome debate. The waters calmed when it was

reported that Mesut Yilmaz and the military members of the NSC had a civilized

discussion in the NSC meeting.27

23Turkish Daily News, 11 August 2001.

24Ibid.

25Ibid., 13 August 2001.

26Ibid., 10 August 2001.

27 Ibid., 23 August 2001.


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As noted earlier, Yilmazs statement is thus far taken as a shock to see many

faces of Turkish national security concept. Liberals think that it is a taboo 28 whereas

the military and pro-military actors treat it as an ethos 29, in which the utmost reason

of the survival of the state is embedded. Given that, I will next look at the definition

and context of national security as seen from the angle of the State.

Official Definition of Turkish National Security Concept: Actors30

, Issues and

Process

A very short case study of national security syndrome crisis exhibits that the

meaning of national security is first and foremost related to threats to state identity,

core national values and ability to protect state sovereignty, to preserve territorial

integrity and to maintain autonomy as far as the pro-military camp is concerned. This

point stems from an official definition of national security towards the essential goal

of protecting regime security. So what makes Turkish national security concept a

regime security is argued below.

The military and national security - Turkish Armed Forces have had a guardian role

from the beginning of the republican rule. As Jenkins puts it, it sees itself as having

an almost sacred duty to protect an indigenous ideology, namely Kemalism.31 Thus

the Kemalist ideology and military guardianship ethos as its by-product are the

fundamental norms that have determined the survival of all state and non-state

institutions in varying degrees. In this sense, Kemalist ideology is a particular

arrangement of political and social concepts, through which the latter obtain specific,

uncontested meanings.

The military plays a dominant role in the NSC. The NSC, which is an

institution in the heart of Turkeys national security management, had been composed

of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Ministers of

28

Taboo: []to a particular person or persons; inviolable, sacred; forbidden, unlawful; also said ofpersons under a perpetual or temp orary prohibition from certain actions (Oxford English Dictionary).29

Ethos: the genius of an institution or system (Oxford English Dictionary).30

See Annex 2.31

Jenkins, G., Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics (London: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001) p.7. More about the military factor in Turkish politics, see also Heper and Evin(1988); Hale, W., Turkish Politics and Military (London: Routledge, 1994); Lerner, D., and RobinsonR., Swords and Ploughers: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force, World Politics 1960-61,Vol.13, pp.19-44; Heper, M., and Guney, A., The Military and Consolidation of Democracy: The

Recent Turkish Experience, Armed Forces and Society, Vol.22 (4): 619-642; Sakallioglu, U.C., TheAnatomy of the Turkish Militarys Political Autonomy, Comparative Politics , Vol.29 (2): 151-168.


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Interior, National Defense and Foreign Affairs and the Commanders of the Army,

Navy, and Air and the Gendarmerie Forces prior to the latest constitutional

amendments that were held in October 2001. Since then the Deputy Prime Ministers

and Minister of Justice have also constitutionally participated in the NSC meetings.

Depending on the agenda, related ministers and bureaucrats may occasionally be

requested to attend the council meetings for their particular views.

The NSC was established in 1961 in order to recommend to the Council of

Ministers the necessary basic guidelines regarding the co-ordination and the taking of

decisions related to national security.32 The 1982 Constitution retained the previous

composition of the NSC. Article 118 had obliged the Council of Ministers to give

priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the

measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and

independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace

and security of society.33 However according to the October 2001 amendment to the

article, the Council of Ministers does not have to give priority considerations to the

decisions of the National Security Council.34 Although -as a result of the amendment

to Article 118- the civilian members are now numerically superior in the council, it

has been a well-known fact that military views normally dominate the decisions of the

NSC, whose recommendations have always become national policies. 35

Issues, sources and process of Turkish national security- The National Security Law

of 198336 defines national security in such broad terms that it could, if necessary, be

interpreted as covering almost the entire policy arena. 37 The law also states that

national security means the defense and protection of the state against every kind of

external and internal threat to the constitutional order, national existence, unity, and to

all interests and contractual rights in the international arena including in the political,

social, cultural and economic spheres.38 Furthermore article 2b of the National

Security Council Law defines national security as, the policy which seeks to ensure

32Article 111of the 1961 Constitution. The former Turkish constitutional texts were edited in Kili, S.,

and Gozubuyuk, S., Turk Anayasa Metinleri (Istanbul: Is Bankasi Yayinlari, 2000): 20 6-207.33

Ibid., Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, p.304.34

Article 118 was amended on 3 October 2001.35

Makovsky, A., Turkey: Constitutional Challenge Rocks Regime (Washington DC: The WashingtonInstitute Policy Watch, Occasional Paper Number 482, 28 August 2000).36

The National Security Council Law, No: 2945, ratified on 9 September 1983.37

Jenkins, 2001. p.46.38 National Security Law, no: 2945.


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national security and the achievement of national goals, covering the fundamental

principles of the way in which internal, foreign and defense policy is implemented as

determined by the Council of Ministers, taking into consideration the opinions

expressed by the National Security Council.' 39 Article 3 of the law, wherein the

emphasis is on the national unity, integrity, ideal and values around the Kemalist

thought, principles and reforms, specifies nine fundamental duties, which determine

the necessary measures and objectives in national security management 40. It is the

same law that underlines Ataturks principle of Peace at Home, Peace in the World.

According to the law, with this principle Turkey determined her national goals as to

establish peaceful principles, to provide stability and to realize socio-economic

development in an environment of peace in her region.41

More importantly, the two documents that specify and formulate the national

security priorities and national interests are the National Security Policy Document

(NSPD) and the White Paper of the Ministry of National Defense. The Council of

Ministers is not involved in the preparation of the NSPD, which identifies the main

concerns of national security and sets the guidelines for security policies. The

institutions that take part throughout preparing the document are the General Staff, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Organization under the

coordination of the NSC General Secretariat. Most interestingly, the NSPD is not

supposed to be ratified by the parliament and hence only NSC members can see it. It

is deemed as important as a secret constitution and was first drawn up in 1963. 42

When necessary, it is amended due to urgent developments and shifts concerning

main national security concerns.

Very recently, the NSPD was amended in 1997, 1999 and 2001. The two main

concerns were emphasized in these documents; (i) foreign threats -Greece, Syria and

Iraq- and (ii) domestic threats -Fundamentalism, Separatism and Organized Crime-.

Concerning the domestic issues, economic crisis, organized crime and Turkeys lack

of good image abroad were added as new security concerns in January 1999. In May

2001 the deterioration of the economic crisis, which might lead to a social explosion,

was a deep concern in the monthly NSC meeting. However an almost 100-page new

security document was said not to have mentioned the economic crisis as an internal

39Ibid.

40See Annex 1.

41National Security Law, No: 2945, Article 3.

42 Jenkins, p.47.


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threat. Regarding new economic developments, the NSC decided to establish a new

economy-working group under the General Secretariat of the NSC.

Unlike the NSPD -the so-called red booklet- , the White Paper of Ministry of

National Defense is drawn up annually and is an open source information. Similar to

the NSPD, it arranges the guidelines of security issues to make peace and stability

permanent.43 Part three and part four elaborate particularly Turkeys national secur ity

and military strategy. Those parts of the document brief the national security

chronology of Turkey since 1933 when the Supreme Defense Council General

Secretariat was formed by decree. 44 Up until 1961, when the NSC became a

constitutional institution, the milestone in Turkeys defense policy had been the

preparation of the National Defense Policy in 1949.

Therefore the best sources to determine the official issues of Turkish national

security, as seen from the State perspective, are the NSPD and the White Papers of the

Ministry of Defense. The number one concern in the NSPD in the 1960s -when it was

first drawn up- was the potential aggression from the USSR. 45 With the outbreak of

the low intensity war as from the end of the 1960s and especially after the ASALA46

attacks on Turkish diplomats abroad along with the American arms embargo on

Turkey in the mid 1970s as a backlash to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus,

these priorities of threats and risks to national security began to change 47.

Domestic and international issues became even more complex. The ultimate

goal of the 1960 and 1971 military intrventions was to preserve secularism and the

legacy of Ataturk. An earlier draft of the 1961 Constitution accentuated that, the

Menderes government threatened the national existence of the Turkish state.48 The

main reason of 1971 soft-coup derived from the rising tide of violence, fragmentation

of political parties and weak government. Also in the ensuing years of 1971 military

intervention, the extreme left and right groups wanted to change the system based

upon their ideological loyalties. There were massive outbreaks of communal conflict

43

The White Paper of the Ministry of National Defense can be found at www.msb.gov.tr.44Part Three, The White Paper of National Defense, Ministry of National Defense, Ankara, 2000.

45Jenkins contends that the main foreign threat was still the Former Soviet Union in 1992. Jenkins,

p.48.46

The acronym ASALA stands for the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. During

the period of time between 1975 and 1982 dozens of Turkish diplomats and a lot of installations ofTurkish and Western interests had been the target of Asalas militant activities.47

Boll, M., Turkeys New National Security Concept, Orbis , Fall 1979: 610-620.48

See Kili, S., Turk Anayasa Metinleri, 1924 Tarih ve 491 Sayili Teskilati Esasiye Kanunun BaziHukumlerinin Kaldirilmasi ve Bazi Hukumlerin Degistirilmesi Hakkinda Gecici Kanun, K. Ta.12.6.1960.


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in several provincial cities marked by an ominous emergence of inter-ethnic and inter-

sectarian cleavages. As a result , the military returned to politics in 1980. By 1980 a

military takeover was seen as an urgent impetus to restore law and order, national

security, and hence reinstate the authority of the State. The ruling military council

banned all the pre-existing part ies and most of the trade unions. During the military

ruling years, the establishment of political parties and their participation in the 1983

elections were under surveillance of the NSC too. Following the military coup,

especially after PKKs49 replacement of ASALA since the mid 1980s, separatist and

religious fundamentalism occupied the first rank in national security policy.

The PKK is defined in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) White Paper 2000 as a

terrorist organization that has adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology and aims to

weaken and divide Turkey with actions based on violence and aims to establish a

Marxist Kurdish State in Turkey. The MoD White Paper says that Turkey has

obtained significant successes in recent periods against the PKK, with which she has

been fighting for over 15 years. The founder and chief of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan,

was captured on 16 February 1999 and taken to Turkey.

Religious fundamentalism has taken an increasingly prominent place in

contemporary Turkish politics. The politicization of Islam in Turkey began with

Adnan Menderes populist policies and the same tradition was conveyed via the

Justice Party, the National Salvation Party, the National Order Party, the Welfare

Party, and the Virtue Party. Today the Saadet Party and Ak Party represent the

Islamic constituencies in the parliament. Alongside the political Islam, the threat of

radical Islamist terrorist groups such as IBDA-C and Hizbullah50 were literally

palpable in the 1980s and 90s. In addition to those, many othe r groups, such as

Fethullah Gulens hizmet cemaati, which is one of the most well-organized

movements with remarkable financial assets, have desired to infiltrate to

governmental posts with the purpose of an unseen revolution according to military

intelligence reports. 51 In the early days of 2002 it is stated that most of the anti-regime

49The acronym PKK stands for the Kurdistan Workers Party. The PKK was identified as one of the 30

main terrorist organizations in the world by the US Secretary of State in October 1997, and it was alsodescribed in the same way in US State Department "Patterns of Global Terrorism" reports.50

On Hizbullah see Human Rights Watch Press Release, What is Hizbullah?, 16 February 2000.51

Several reports that were prepared by the Secretariat of the NSC and its sub-committees such as BatiCalisma Grubu. See also Irtica Raporu: Kadrolasma Engellendi, Hurriyet, 02.01.2002.


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activities have been surpassed since the 28 February Process has started in 1997 with

the pursuit of curbing the growth of political Islam in Turkey. 52

This shows that the role of non-state actors in Turkeys national security

culture is awkward. In fact, even political parties are occasionally perceived as serious

threats to the national security53

. The 28 February 1997 resolutions are the best

example when the NSC issued a memorandum to the government led by the Welfare

Party to curb the growth of their regressive activities in all spheres of public and

political life in the country. As a policy continuation of the 28 February 1997 NSC

resolutions, the Constitutional Court outlawed the Welfare Party (WP) in January

1998. The Virtue Party (VP), the successor of the WP was also abolished on the basis

of its anti-regime and anti-secular attitudes 54.

Similarly, a state of emergency55 has been operating in southeast Turkey due

to the armed conflict lasting for nearly two decades with the PKK. This has involved

curtailment of several democratic freedoms for the local population by militarizing

the efforts aimed at sustaining of law and order 56. According to the 1982 constitution,

alt hough the state of emergency is a temporary measure, it has become permanent and

causing disparities between regions in terms of economic, social and political

development 57. This also leads to varying degrees of the democratic conditions in

different regions within the country.

52 For a good analysis and assessment of the 28 February Process, mainly its impact on the legal

framework see Gunay. N., Implementing the February 28 Recommendations: A Scorecard(Washington: Washington Institute, Research Note: 10, May 2001).53

Some 15 political parties were outlawed between 1980 and 2001. At the time being, according toCourt of Cassation Chief Judge Sabih Kanadoglu the HADEP and Tayyip Erdogans AKP are both the

very threats to the secular and republican regime in todays Turkey.Hurriyet, Kanadoglu: AKP veHADEP Ulke Butunlugune Tehdit, 02.01.2002. The Constitutional Court is still discussing the case ofabolishing the HADEP according to Articles 68, 79, 80, 81 and 82 of the constitution.54

Both the WP and the VP were outlawed on account of Article 68 of the 1982 Constitution.55

The chronology of the state of emergency in the region is as follows: martial law (1984-1987), stateof emergency in 13 provinces (1987-1990), inclusion of Batman and Sirnak in the state of emergency

(1990), state of emergency in Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Sirnak and Tunceli; provisional state of emergency

in Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Mardin, Mus, Siirt and Van (2000 -).56From the mid 1990s onwards, there has been an enormous increase in the number of files opened,

applications registered and applications declared in the European Human Rights Court with regards tohuman rights violations in southeast Turkey. Most of those applicants asserted that their villages wereevacuated and devastated by the military forces; people were tortured, raped and disappeared in

custody. Turkey has accepted to pay a sum totaling a substantial amount of money on an ex gratiabasis, covering the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages caused by the state of emergency in theregion. In 2001, Turkey was sentenced to pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage compensation in

329 cases. For detailed statistics of the cases, see Survey of Activities of the European Human Rights issued by the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg: 1998, 1999, 2000).57 1982 Constitution: Article 119.


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It is also a fact that Turkey has spent about $7 billion a year on the war with

the PKK. By 1997 Turkey has claim to the largest army with 820.000 soldiers in

Western Europe, 4% of world armed forces and 27% of Western Europes 58.

Although 4-5% of GNP and 14-15% of CGE have been allocated for military

expenditures annually over the last two decades, average GNP growth rate was 3.6

between 1988 and 199959. Despite this fact, war-related political and financial

instability has discouraged direct foreign investment in the country to a striking

extent60. Above all, the question whether worlds sixth largest army holds back

economic development needs further empirical elucidation which is beyond the scope

of this paper 61.

Rethinking Turkish National Security in the Developing World Context

A growing body of scholarly writing discusses the interaction between national

security and national development. It is widely accepted that national security is a

Western, largely American concept, that emerged in the post World War II era. 62 In

the late 1940s, the necessity of institutionalizing the concept evoked to integrate

military, diplomatic, intellectual, technological, economic and other diverse data at

the top of American decision-making. With growing interest in the developing world

since the end of the bi-polar world there are different realms of inter-disciplinary and

intra-disciplinary interests as far as the interconnectedness of development and

national security subjects is concerned63. The narrow definition of national security

58U.S. Department of State Bureau of Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and

Arms Transfers, with country rankings for 172 countries by variables (Washington, DC: USGovernment Printing Office, April 2000): 2-22.59

Military expenditures statistics are compiled from The Military Balance, 1980 -2000 published by theInternational Institute of Strategic Studies (London). Growth rate statistics are adapted from TheTurkish Economy 2000published by The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens Association(Istanbul): 22.60

Gabelnick, T., Turkey: Arms and Human Rights, Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol.4 (16), May 1999: 1-

3.61See Annexes 3 and 4.

62Azar E. E., and Moon, C.,Rethinking Third World National Security in Azar and Moon, eds,

National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1988): 1. For the American context, see Alison, G., et. al.Rethinking

Americaa security: beyond Cold War to new world order (New York: Norton, 1992).63

Particularly on the globalization impact on the national security state see Paul, T.V., Globalizationand the National Security State: Assessing the Uneven Impact of Global Social Forces (Paperpresented at the American Political Science Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, August2001), and about the human rights regimes and their approach to national security see Tyagi, K.T.,

Human Dignity, National Security, and International Responsibility, International Studies, Vol.30 (4)


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concentrates on material capabilities, the use and control of military forces whereas

the broader definition takes into account the distinctions among military, political,

economic, social, and environmental security issues that not only affect state actors

but also groups and individuals, as well as non-state actors64. Further, it is commonly

argued that a pure militaristic definition of national security is outmoded and apart

from the traditional definition, the well being of nations and their individual citizens

depend as well as on economic vitality, social justice and ecological stability65.

However, given the basic assumption here is that national security has a

meaning, -and that meaning is related to threats to core national values and the ability

to protect state sovereignty, to preserve territorial integrity and to maintain autonomy-

the literature has not sufficiently dwelled on the importance of political culture and

policy-making fragility, economic and technological underdevelopment, ethnic,

religious and social cleavages in the ever expanding populations and the severe eco-

political pressures affecting the Third World.66 Among those who study national

security in the developing world, it is a common belief that a number of phenomena

as indebtedness, ethnic nationalism, crises of civil-military relations, state-building

and problems of political legitimacy have caused massive social and political

upheaval in this context. As Sayigh points out, the process of development is itself a

destabilizing force 67.

Thus, at the most general level the focal points are the questions of security

for whom? and security of what? Unlike the cases in many Third World countries

the security of a nation state is the aggregation of homogeneous individual

securities68 in Western societies. In other words it is the security of individual

citizens who share a common destiny through extended nation-building and political

1993: 381-409; On a history of the interaction between national security and economics see Craufurd,D.G., eds, Economics and National Security, Annual Supplement to Volume 23, History of PoliticalEconomy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).64

Katzenstein,P.,The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York:Columbia University Press, 1996): 8.65

Renner,M.,National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimension (Washington D.C.:Worldwatch Institute, World Watch Paper 89, May 1989): 6.66

Ibid., p.2. For more about this line of argument see Moon and Azar (1988); Job, L. B., eds, TheInsecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1992); Sayigh, Y., Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries (Oxford: NuffieldPress for IISS Adelphi Paper 251, Summer 1990); and als o Korany, B., Noble, P., and Brynen, R., eds,

The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World(London: Macmillan, 1993).67

Sayigh, p.6.68 Ibid., p.279.


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socialization.69 Yet it is regime, communal and state security with that of a ruling

regime that represents a segment of social or communal interests in most cases of the

developing world. In view of this, security of what question finds its answer

embedded in those communal, ideological or class-based interests in a typical case of

the Third World.

Is Turkey a Third Word country then as far as national security is concerned?

Given the main characteristics of a Third World national security state, starting with

yes may underplay the remarkable extent of haves in the Turkish case. Yet the

ethos of preserving the secular and republican regime security seems to neglect

multiple dimensions of national security in terms of asymmetry between increasing

population and available resources70, a widening gap between rich and poor and

environmental issues such as landscape erosion. With regard to the latter issue, it is

reported that if Turkey does not take some sound measures soon, a large part of her

agricultural lands will become arid regions in 55 years 71. Seen from the military and

political elites perspective those multidimensional issues are not necessarily perceived

as a national security concern.

Conclusion

This paper painted a picture in which the Turkish public and political opinion are still

contested. This conclusion is drawn on the basis of the national security syndrome

debate. The lesson taken from this debate seems to be that the Turkish political

establishment needs to set and maintain harmony among key state institutions and

civil society organizations. Otherwise, as was shown in the national security

syndrome crisis, the issues are mounting from time to time partly due to ideological

restraints and partly due to lack of adequate level of coordination among several

actors in the national security management. Hence a deep state with special

reference to internal security issues is indeed created. When national security begins

to act as a firewall in pursuit of protecting the secular regime, the internal others

emerge. In the national security syndr ome debate internal others turn out to be the

strongest supporters of Yilmazs argument. They generally believe that the political

69Ibid.

70For an article on the demographic aspects of national security see Eberstadt, N., Population Change

and National Security, Foreign Affairs, Vol.7 (3), Summer 1991: 115-131.71

Cited inHurriyet, Yilda Bir Milyon Ton Toprak Kaybediliyor, 10.01.2002. For more about thedanger of erosion in the Turkish landscape you can see TEMAs homepage at www.tema.org.tr.


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involvement of the military in day-to-day politics in various fashions gives no room

for civilian solutions.

The abovementioned dilemma of Turkish politics has been a subject of

concern for a long time, perhaps in more tangible terms since the transition to multi-

party politics in the 1940s and 1950s. Thus the military factor in domestic politics is a

substance of democratic consolidation and also a matter of how to create a stable

legitimate system. In this sense the pro-Yilmaz camp argues that the official state

ideology is an obstruction vis-a-vis national development as far as political

liberalization and democratic consolidation are both concerned. In this respect

incompleteness of democratization and exclusion of internal others from the political

arena induce security threats. In this case it becomes a vicious cycle in which

yesterdays answers are given to tomorrows national security issues. This aspect is

clearly evident in the match of both political Islam v. official state ideology and

Kurdish problem v. official state ideology.

To a certain extent, even Turkeys EU candidacy alone is likely to be a

security concern in many respects. The EU candidacy and its requirements pose at this

time an external shock given the fact that they await a certain extent of

approximation to the EU standards at the expense of national security. Even in the

process of pre-accession integration, the autonomy of the state is diminished. To this

end the supervision of a national security firewall inevitably ought to be reconsidered.

If this is the case, it is most likely that this asymmetrical relation may, in the short run,

render Turkeys EU candidacy the newest security concern in the eyes of national

security guardians. Therefore pro-Yilmaz camp claims EU membership as a panacea

for the political liberalization whereas national security concerns are wary of each

step taken in the course of this process.

To conclude, in the Turkish case regime security is above all the essence of

national security management. The argument is that both the military, political and

civilian elites do not worry much about global technological competition,

environmental problems, education, population rise and even the economic

dependency. In fact those concerns are the starting place of many internal problems in

Turkey over the last two decades. The main conclusion is twofold. First it is difficult

to judge that the regime survival based on the national security concept is the only

obstacle to national development. This is primarily due to other potential causes that

may induce underdevelopment and they are mostly excluded in this essay. Besides it


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is clear that the relation between national security and national development,

especially as seen from both pro-Yilmaz and pro-military camps, is a zero-sum game.

The official state identity assumes that it loses an extent of political authority

inasmuch as the internal others gain democratic political success. Then this gives

birth a co-habitation crisis involving the internal others and national security

guardians. The emergence of the 28 February Process is the example of such a

development. Finally it is yet to be answered whether the EU may bridge the gap

between the military-focused national security and society-focused national security.

Annex 1.The Duties of the National Security Council

In the Law No. 2945, the duties of the NSC are summarized as follows:

1. It determines an opinion on the subjects of making decisions related to thedesignation, determination and application of the national security policy of the stateand provision of the necessary coordination.

2. It determines the measures related to the realization of the national objectives

determined in the direction of the national security policy of the state and the nationalplan and programs prepared.

3. It continuously monitors and evaluates the national elements of power tha t canaffect the national security policy of the state and the political, social, economic,

cultural and technological conditions and developments. It determines the basicprinciples to provide for strengthening in the direction of the national targets.

4. It determines the measures deemed necessary on the subject of the preservation ofthe existence of the state, her independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of

the country and the peace and security of the society.


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5. It determines the necessary measures preserving the constitutional order, providingfor national unity and integrity, orienting the Turkish Nation around the national ideal

and values by uniting around the Kemalist Thought, Atatrk's Principles and Reforms.

6. It determines views for state of emergency, martial law, mobilization or war.

7. It determines the necessary principles for measures related to total defense, nationalmobilization and other subjects to fall upon the public and private institutions andorganizations and the citizens in cases of ordinary conditions during wartime,

conditions necessitating war and post-war conditions and for providing for theinclusion of funds in the development plans, programs and annual budgets.

8. It determines the necessary principles for providing the inclusion of measures andfunds related to financial, economic, social, cultural and other subjects necessitated bythe matters envisaged by the national security policy of the state and services relatedto the society and services necessitated by total defense to be included in thedevelopment plans, programs and annual budgets.

9. It determines views concerning the international agreements made or to be made onsubjects included in the scope of National Security. The NSC informs the Council ofMinisters in the form of a council decision of the views, measures and principles ithas determined and carries out other duties given to it by the laws.

Annex 2.Organization of the National Security Establishment

President

National Security CouncilPresident (Chairman)Prime MinisterDeputy Prime Minister(s)Chief of the General StaffMinister of National Defense

Minister of InteriorMinister of Foreign AffairsMinister of JusticeCommander of the Army

Commander of the NavyComm. of the Air ForceComm. of the Gendarmerie

Supreme Military Council

Prime Minister (Chairman)Commander of the Gen. StaffCommander of the ArmyCommander of the NavyCommander of the Air Force

Other Senior Generals

Chief of

theGeneral

Staff

Ministry of

National

Defense

Ministry of Interior

ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE GENDARMEIRE*

Co-ordination

Line of command Policy and direction *Under army command in war

and in martial law areas.

PM


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ArmedForces(Thousand)

GNPMillion($)

CGEMillion($)

PeopleMillion

ME/GNP(%)

ME/CGE(%)

ME/Capita(%)

ArmedForces/1000people

GNP/Capita($)

France 475 1.400.000 651.000 58.6 3.0 6.4 708 8.1 24.000

Denmark 28 168.000 71.500 5.3 1.7 3.9 529 5.5 31.700

Belgium 46 246.000 116.000 10.2 1.5 3.2 363 4.5 24.200

Germany 335 2.080.000 699.000 82.2 1.6 4.7 401 4.1 25.400

Greece 206 120.000 40.100 10.6 4.6 13.8 521 19.4 11.300

Italy 419 1.130.000 557.000 57.5 2.0 4.1 395 7.3 19.700

Luxemb. 1 16.600 NA 0.04 0.8 NA 3.9 2.4 39.600

Netherlan.

57 363.000 107.000 15.6 1.9 6.4 437 3.6 23.200

Annex 3.Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and

Population (NATO, EU and Eastern European Countries)


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Norway 33 152.000 67.700 4.4 2.1 4.8 739 7.5 34.600

Portugal 72 101.000 40.800 9.9 2.4 5.9 241 7.2 10.200

Spain 107 524.000 127.000 39.1 1.5 6.0 196 2.7 13.400

Turkey 820 194.000 52.900 63.5 4.0 14.7 123 12.9 3.050

UK 218 1.290.000 494.000 58.8 2.7 7.1 600 3.7 21.800

USA 1.530 8.300.000 1.700.000 267.9 3.3 16.3 1.030 5.7 31.000

Canada 61 588.000 NA 30.3 1.3 NA 257 2.0 19.400

Sweden 60 2.190.000 1.020.000 8.9 2.5 5.4 626 6.8 24.700

Ireland 17 63.100 22.500 3.6 1.2 3.3 206 4.7 17.500

Austria 48 206.000 96.700 8.1 0.9 1.9 221 5.9 25.300

CzechRep

55 107.000 34.000 10.3 1.9 5.8 193 5.3 10.400

Hungary 50 70.800 30.700 10.2 1.9 4.3 129 4.9 6.920

Poland 230 247.000 99.300 38.6 2.3 5.6 145 6.0 6.390

ME AF AI GN

P

CG

E

ME/

GNP

ME/

CGE

AI/

TI

GNP

/

POP

CGE

/

POP

CGE/

GNP

Belgium 31 76 39 21 12 117 148 109 13 6 12

Denmark 40 95 40 26 20 109 145 81 5 3 23

France 4 11 36 5 3 60 111 117 14 7 16

Germany 7 17 16 4 2 110 134 105 10 12 55

Greece 24 27 14 34 34 30 50 25 30 30 56

Italy 8 14 24 7 5 94 142 102 20 8 8

Luxembo. 102 160 67 77 70 160 157 72 1 1 32

Netherlan. 19 66 22 16 13 100 110 97 15 17 74

GNP: Gross National Product, CGE: Central Government Expenditure, ME: MilitaryExpenditure, Source:U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Global

Data of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998, released in January2000.

Annex 4.Country Rankings in 1997 by variable (NATO, EU and Eastern European

Countries)


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Norway 38 92 37 28 22 89 131 68 3 2 17

Portugal 42 51 54 38 33 76 116 91 33 28 31

Spain 18 39 25 11 11 121 115 87 27 33 103

Turkey 17 6 7 25 27 41 42 20 67 73 90

UK 6 26 4 6 8 67 100 70 17 14 34

USA 1 2 8 1 1 55 37 104 6 18 122

Canada 16 58 30 10 9 131 121 108 21 26 108

Sweden 23 61 32 22 15 70 123 79 12 5 13

Ireland 73 105 75 50 42 138 147 119 22 19 49

Austria 55 75 43 24 18 157 161 96 11 4 10

Czech

Rep.

51 68 47 37 36 102 117 77 32 32 69

Hungary 61 72 57 48 38 101 140 78 42 34 20

Poland 22 25 46 20 16 80 119 85 43 38 30

ME: Military Expenditure, AF: Armed Forces, AI: Arms Imports, GNP: GrossNationalProduct, CGE: Central Government Expenditure, POP: Population, TI:Total Imports, Source: U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Global

Data of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998 , released in January2000.

Annex 5.

Turkey's Freedom House Record (1972-1999)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000

Years

Score

PoliticalRights

CivilLiberties

Free

Not

Free

Source: Freedom House Surveys. Those that whose ratings average 1-2.5 aregenerally considered "Free," 3-5.5 "Partly free," and 5.5-7 "Not free." The

dividing lines between "Partly free" and "Not Free" usually falls within the groupwhose ratings numbers average 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating

of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6for civil liberties, could be either "Partly Free" or "Not free."

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