Neuroethics Beyond Genethics EMBO/EMBL Nov 3-4, 2006 Adina Roskies Dartmouth College and Sydney...

Neuroethics Beyond Genethics

EMBO/EMBL Nov 3-4, 2006

Neuroethics Beyond Genethics

EMBO/EMBL Nov 3-4, 2006

Adina RoskiesDartmouth College

andSydney University

Adina RoskiesDartmouth College

andSydney University

Neuroethics:Neuroethics:

The ethics of neuroscience The ethics of practice

Ethical implications of neuroscience

The neuroscience of ethics

The ethics of neuroscience The ethics of practice

Ethical implications of neuroscience


Ethics ofNeuroscience

Neuroscience Of Ethics

Early thoughts on neuroethics

Early thoughts on neuroethics

““The question at issue here is how far the The question at issue here is how far the knowledge that we have about our brain gives knowledge that we have about our brain gives us a new conception of ourselves, a different us a new conception of ourselves, a different representation of our ideas, our thoughts and representation of our ideas, our thoughts and the dispositions that intervene when we make the dispositions that intervene when we make judgments. With regard to moral judgments, in judgments. With regard to moral judgments, in fact, it is fundamental. The knowledge that we fact, it is fundamental. The knowledge that we are now in the process of piecing together are now in the process of piecing together about the human brain ought to allow us to about the human brain ought to allow us to have a clearer idea -- I am perhaps overly have a clearer idea -- I am perhaps overly optimistic -- of the direction in which we optimistic -- of the direction in which we wish to see human society develop…”wish to see human society develop…” ----J.P. ChangeuxJ.P. Changeux

““The question at issue here is how far the The question at issue here is how far the knowledge that we have about our brain gives knowledge that we have about our brain gives us a new conception of ourselves, a different us a new conception of ourselves, a different representation of our ideas, our thoughts and representation of our ideas, our thoughts and the dispositions that intervene when we make the dispositions that intervene when we make judgments. With regard to moral judgments, in judgments. With regard to moral judgments, in fact, it is fundamental. The knowledge that we fact, it is fundamental. The knowledge that we are now in the process of piecing together are now in the process of piecing together about the human brain ought to allow us to about the human brain ought to allow us to have a clearer idea -- I am perhaps overly have a clearer idea -- I am perhaps overly optimistic -- of the direction in which we optimistic -- of the direction in which we wish to see human society develop…”wish to see human society develop…” ----J.P. ChangeuxJ.P. Changeux

Is neuroethics a distinct field?Is neuroethics a distinct field?

Is neuroethics a discipline in its own right?

Do the problems it raises differ from those in genethics?



The ethical spaceThe ethical space

neuroethics genethics

access

treatmentconsent

discrimination

normalcy and disease

enhancement

futuregenerationspersonhood

and the self

consciousness

decision-making and freedom

moral cognition

distributive justice

OverlapOverlap


access

treatmentconsent

discrimination


enhancement


and the self

consciousness


moral cognition


Genethics beyond neuroethics

Genethics beyond neuroethics


access

treatmentconsent

discrimination


enhancement

futuregenerations

personhood and the self

consciousness


moral cognition


Neuroethics beyond genethics



access

treatmentconsent

discrimination


enhancement


and the self

consciousness


moral cognition


Finding the neural correlates of consciousness

Finding the neural correlates of consciousness

MCS and PVSMCS and PVS

MCS: minimal awareness of self

PVS: no awareness of self

Even PVS patients may appear somewhat normal

MCS:112,000-280,000 in USA

PVS: 14,000-35,000(Embo

reports,2005)

MCS: minimal awareness of self

PVS: no awareness of self

Even PVS patients may appear somewhat normal

MCS:112,000-280,000 in USA

PVS: 14,000-35,000(Embo

reports,2005)

Schiavo caseSchiavo case

PVS Support eventually terminated

Public focus Autopsy revealed massive irreversible damage

PVS Support eventually terminated

Public focus Autopsy revealed massive irreversible damage

Metabolism in normal and vegetative stateMetabolism in normal and vegetative state

normalnormal PVSPVS PVS after PVS after recoveryrecovery

Laureys, 2006Laureys, 2006

Preserved brain activity in MCSPreserved brain activity in MCS

Schiff et al (2005): 2 men in MCS show brain activity to familiar audio track, but many differences

Case 1Case 1 Case 2Case 2 normalsnormals

Brain damage and consciousness

Brain damage and consciousness

Lots of brain activity activity occurs during sleep, without awareness etc.

Despite this:“The findings show that some people that doctors had previously declared to be in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) are still conscious.” (commentary on the web)

Lots of brain activity activity occurs during sleep, without awareness etc.

Despite this:“The findings show that some people that doctors had previously declared to be in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) are still conscious.” (commentary on the web)

More recent studiesMore recent studies

Owen et al., 2006Owen et al., 2006

Ethical implicationsEthical implications

Methods to assess awareness in brain-damaged patients

Methods can be developed to communicate with patients physically unable to respond

May provide patients with more autonomy, but leaves us with ethical choices to make, nonetheless

Methods to assess awareness in brain-damaged patients

Methods can be developed to communicate with patients physically unable to respond

May provide patients with more autonomy, but leaves us with ethical choices to make, nonetheless




access

treatmentconsent

discrimination


enhancement


and the self

consciousness


moral cognition


What is a person?What is a person?

Personal identity Neuroessentialism (“We are our brains”)

Psychological or brain-based criteria seem important

Do alterations in brain function alter personal identity?

The self What is the representation of ‘self’? Is the self an illusion?

Personal identity Neuroessentialism (“We are our brains”)

Psychological or brain-based criteria seem important

Do alterations in brain function alter personal identity?

The self What is the representation of ‘self’? Is the self an illusion?

PersonhoodPersonhood

On the basis of philosophical disputes and neuroscientific data, Farah and Heberlein (AJOB Neurosciences, forthcoming) argue against personhood as a natural kind

On the basis of philosophical disputes and neuroscientific data, Farah and Heberlein (AJOB Neurosciences, forthcoming) argue against personhood as a natural kind

Naturalizing personhoodNaturalizing personhood

“The real contribution of neuroscience to understanding personhood may be in revealing not what persons are, but rather why we have the intuition that there are persons… instead of naturalizing the concept of personhood by identifying its essential characteristics in the natural world, neuroscience may show us that personhood is illusory, constructed by our brains and projected onto the world” (Farah & Heberlein, AJOB Neurosci, forthcoming)

“The real contribution of neuroscience to understanding personhood may be in revealing not what persons are, but rather why we have the intuition that there are persons… instead of naturalizing the concept of personhood by identifying its essential characteristics in the natural world, neuroscience may show us that personhood is illusory, constructed by our brains and projected onto the world” (Farah & Heberlein, AJOB Neurosci, forthcoming)

Our person-intutionsOur person-intutions

2 different networks Person-network (the social brain): Automatic, fast, based on simple perceptual features, issues in yes/no judgments

Object-network: More abstract, analytical, higher cognitive areas; issues in graded judgments

Suggest abandoning the concept of personhood for ethics

2 different networks Person-network (the social brain): Automatic, fast, based on simple perceptual features, issues in yes/no judgments

Object-network: More abstract, analytical, higher cognitive areas; issues in graded judgments

Suggest abandoning the concept of personhood for ethics

What is a person?What is a person?

An important ethical concept Doesn’t have to be a natural kind

Neuroscience can help put it in perspective; we can choose what criteria we think are more important

An important ethical concept Doesn’t have to be a natural kind

Neuroscience can help put it in perspective; we can choose what criteria we think are more important




access

treatmentconsent

discrimination


enhancement

futuregenerations


consciousness


moral cognition


Decision-making in nonhuman primates

Decision-making in nonhuman primates

Reward circuitry Midbrain dopaminergic system

VMPFC codes primary reinforcers and reward associations in changing circumstances

Integrative areas in DLPFC and parietal cortex

Reward circuitry Midbrain dopaminergic system

VMPFC codes primary reinforcers and reward associations in changing circumstances

Integrative areas in DLPFC and parietal cortex

Neurobiology of rewardNeurobiology of reward

Similar areas are active in humans in neuroimaging of

decision-making tasks

Similar areas are active in humans in neuroimaging of

decision-making tasks Reward/Emotional circuitry:

VMPFC/OFC: associating outcomes with reward; integrate sensory and limbic signals

Striatum: critical component of dopaminergic reward system

Amygdala: predictive of bad outcome Insula: associated with risk, punishment ACC: conflict monitoring, risk

‘Cognitive’ regions: DLPFC: online manipulation and integration of decision-relevant information

Posterior parietal cortex: calculation

Reward/Emotional circuitry: VMPFC/OFC: associating outcomes with reward; integrate sensory and limbic signals

Striatum: critical component of dopaminergic reward system

Amygdala: predictive of bad outcome Insula: associated with risk, punishment ACC: conflict monitoring, risk

‘Cognitive’ regions: DLPFC: online manipulation and integration of decision-relevant information

Posterior parietal cortex: calculation

The problemThe problem

Decisions, choices, actions are generally thought to be freely willed

Science reveals them, or threatens to reveal them, to be mechanistically or physically intelligible.

This mechanistic view challenges our intuitions about freedom and its conceptual partner, moral responsibility.

Decisions, choices, actions are generally thought to be freely willed

Science reveals them, or threatens to reveal them, to be mechanistically or physically intelligible.

This mechanistic view challenges our intuitions about freedom and its conceptual partner, moral responsibility.

“By monitoring the signals produced by appropriate neurons, an experimenter can predict and even influence what a monkey will choose…Ethics, not theory, would preclude an investigator from obtaining the same relationship with a human agent. Can this ability to predict and influence be reconciled with a belief in freedom and responsibility?”

• Schall, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2001

“By monitoring the signals produced by appropriate neurons, an experimenter can predict and even influence what a monkey will choose…Ethics, not theory, would preclude an investigator from obtaining the same relationship with a human agent. Can this ability to predict and influence be reconciled with a belief in freedom and responsibility?”

• Schall, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2001

Free will:Free will:

Rethinking freedom and responsibility

Rethinking freedom and responsibility

The old view: Freedom is Ability to do otherwise Absence of constraint

The old view: Freedom is Ability to do otherwise Absence of constraint

Moral responsibilityMoral responsibility

We have intuitive senses of when people are appropriate objects of reactive attitudes of praise, blame, respect, etc. for their actions.

The intuitions seem to involve a conception of free action

We have intuitive senses of when people are appropriate objects of reactive attitudes of praise, blame, respect, etc. for their actions.

The intuitions seem to involve a conception of free action

The regress of being able to do otherwiseThe regress of being able to do otherwise

To be free is to be able to: Act otherwise Choose to act otherwise Our brains (not our selves) do the choosing

But Our brains are our selves We must become comfortable with mind as mechanism

To be free is to be able to: Act otherwise Choose to act otherwise Our brains (not our selves) do the choosing

But Our brains are our selves We must become comfortable with mind as mechanism



Recasting freedom as self-governance: What mechanisms underlie our ability to control our actions; what failures undercut that ability?

Can we make sense of freedom as self-regulation?

Recasting freedom as self-governance: What mechanisms underlie our ability to control our actions; what failures undercut that ability?

Can we make sense of freedom as self-regulation?

The neurobiology of responsibility

The neurobiology of responsibility

Cognitive demand: Appropriate representation of moral facts Representation of self as rational agent? An intentional agent?

Control demand: Appropriate motivational structures When a person is in control of his actions, his actions depend on his motivational states Appropriate links between cognitive and motivational structures

Effective mechanisms of inhibition

Cognitive demand: Appropriate representation of moral facts Representation of self as rational agent? An intentional agent?

Control demand: Appropriate motivational structures When a person is in control of his actions, his actions depend on his motivational states Appropriate links between cognitive and motivational structures

Effective mechanisms of inhibition




access

treatmentconsent

discrimination


enhancement

futuregenerations


consciousness


moral cognition


Neuroimaging resultsNeuroimaging results

Overlap with areas involved with general decision making

Activity in regions implicated in emotion, especially in ‘personal’ moral judgments

Overlap with areas involved with general decision making

Activity in regions implicated in emotion, especially in ‘personal’ moral judgments

Greene et al., 2001

Difficult - easy personal dilemmas

Difficult - easy personal dilemmas

High RT(counter-intuitive) - low RT (intuitive) ‘personal’ judgments

Override emotional bias with more abstract thought

High RT(counter-intuitive) - low RT (intuitive) ‘personal’ judgments

Override emotional bias with more abstract thought

Greene et al., 2004

What does this say about the nature of

morality?

What does this say about the nature of

morality? Mechanistic? Does it correspond to something out in the world?

Our intuitions don’t necessary track morally-relevant features of situations

An artifact of how we are wired up? Do blame and punishment make sense? Retributivism vs. utilitarianism.

Mechanistic? Does it correspond to something out in the world?

Our intuitions don’t necessary track morally-relevant features of situations

An artifact of how we are wired up? Do blame and punishment make sense? Retributivism vs. utilitarianism.

Is neuroethics a distinct field?Is neuroethics a distinct field?

Do the problems neuroethics raises differ from those in genethics?

Is neuroethics a discipline in its own right?



Yes, distinct enoughYes, distinct enough Neuroethics raises some novel questions Even when questions are similar, they have distinctive aspects

To some extent, disciplines are socially constructed

Neuroethics deals with sophisticated methodologies and a complex body of data and theory, and requires people trained in both neuroscience and ethics to adequately assess the evidence

Nonetheless, we shouldn’t overlook the debt neuroethics has to bioethical thought that precedes it.

Neuroethics raises some novel questions Even when questions are similar, they have distinctive aspects

To some extent, disciplines are socially constructed

Neuroethics deals with sophisticated methodologies and a complex body of data and theory, and requires people trained in both neuroscience and ethics to adequately assess the evidence

Nonetheless, we shouldn’t overlook the debt neuroethics has to bioethical thought that precedes it.

Neuroethics Beyond Genethics EMBO/EMBL Nov 3-4, 2006 Adina Roskies Dartmouth College and Sydney...

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Transcript of Neuroethics Beyond Genethics EMBO/EMBL Nov 3-4, 2006 Adina Roskies Dartmouth College and Sydney...