neler ö rendik? bölüm özeti...vi Preface Dear Students, This is the first volume of a two-volume...

3

neler öğrendik?bölüm

özeti

Turkish Foreign Policy I

CHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4

Editors

Prof.Dr. Nejat DOĞAN

Prof.Dr. Ahmet SÖZEN

Authors

Prof.Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

Asst.Prof.Dr. Seçkin Barış GÜLMEZ

Asst.Prof.Dr. Hakan ÖZDEN

Dr. Betül DİCLE

Dr. Fatma Fulya HİSARLIOĞLU

Dr. Mehtap KARA

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Muharrem EKŞİCHAPTER 7CHAPTER 6CHAPTER 5

Director of Center for Research andDevelopment in Learning Technologies

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Alper Tolga Kumtepe

Textbooks Production CoordinatorLecturer Erdem Erdoğdu

Graphic and Cover Design Assoc.Prof.Dr. Halit Turgay Ünalan

Instructional Design CoordinatorLecturer Orkun Şen

Instructional DesignerLecturer Orkun Şen

Assessment EditorLecturer Özlem Doruk Şahin

Language Writing ConsultantsLecturer İlknur CivanLecturer Ayla Balcı

Typesetting and CompositionBeyhan Demircioğlu

Gül KayaZülfiye Çevir

Kader Abpak ArulSelin Çakır

Burak ArslanGizem Dalmış

T.C.ANADOLU

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATION

NO: 3944

FACULTY OFOPEN EDUCATION

PUBLICATION NO: 2733

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY I

E-ISBN: 978-975-06-3643-1

Copyright © 2019 by Anadolu University

All rights reserved.

This publication is designed and produced based on “Distance Teaching” techniques.

No part of this book may be reproduced or stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any

means of mechanical, electronic, photocopy, magnetic tape, or otherwise, without the written permission of Anadolu

University.

All rigghts of this book belong to ANADOLU UNIVERSITY

ESKİŞEHİR, Ekim 2019

3327-0-0-0-1909-V01

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Contents

CHAPTER 1Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

Introduction .................................................. 3Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy .... 3

Structural Determinants .................... 3Conjunctural Determinants ................ 11

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1919-1939 .......................................... 12

Republicanism ..................................... 13Secularism ............................................ 13Nationalism ......................................... 13Other Characteristics of the National Independence Struggle ....................... 14

Turkey’s Cold-War Policies, 1945-1980 ....... 14Determinants of Turkey’s Cold War Policies, 1945-60 .................................. 15External Factor: Meeting the Soviet Threat ................................................... 15Democracy, Economic Development, and Foreign Policy .............................. 16Turkish Foreign Policy in the Inter-Coup Period, 1960-1980 ...................... 17Détente and Turkish Foreign Policy ... 17Effects of Pluralist Democracy ........... 17Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Determinant ........................................ 18Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s ..................................................... 21

Foreign Policy Setting at the end of the Cold War, 1980-2000 ................................... 23

Foreign Policy Setting at the End of the Cold War, 1980-2000 ................... 23Challenges of the Post-Cold War Era and Ensuing Changes since 2000 ...... 25

CHAPTER 2

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Years, 1923-1938

Introduction ................................................... 37The Main Features of Turkish Foreign Policy During the Atatürk Era ...................... 37The Treaty of Lausanne ................................ 39The Mosul Problem ....................................... 42The Italian Threat and the Quest for International Partnerships ............................ 44Critical Foreign Policy Issues in the Late 1930s: The Turkish Straits and the Sanjak Issue ..... 47

The Montreux International Straits Convention ........................................... 47The Accession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay) .......................... 50

An Assessment of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Years of the Republic ................ 52

CHAPTER 3

Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War, 1939-1945

Introduction ................................................... 67Relations Between Turkey and theWarring Partıes.............................................. 67

The Interwar Period and the Legacyof Atatürk ............................................. 67Relations With Germany and Signing the Alliance Agreement With Britain and France ............................................. 68Declaration of “Non-Belligerency”by Turkey .............................................. 69

Maintaining Turkey’ S Neutrality ............... 71Getting Closer with Germany ............. 71Balancing the Relations ....................... 71Hard Times, 1941-1942 .......................... 72

The Rapprochement Between Turkey andThe Allied Powers: The Year ofConferences, 1943 .......................................... 73

The Casablanca and Adana Conferences .......................................... 74Further Pressure on Turkey to Enterthe War ................................................. 75

Turkish Foreıgn Policy in the Final Yearsof the War: 1944-1945 .................................. 77

Change in the Turkish StrategyToward the Germans ........................... 77The Soviet Demands ............................ 78

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CHAPTER 4

Turkish Foreign Policy During the Cold War, 1945-1990

Introduction ................................................... 89The Early Cold War Years and Relations With the West: 1945 - 1962 .................................... 89Relations With the Middle East and the Balkans Between 1945 and 1962 .................. 92

Turkey and the Middle East ................. 92Turkey and the Balkans ........................ 94The Cyprus Problem .............................. 94

From the Heyday of the Cold War to Détente: Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1962 and 1980 ................................ 96

Détente .................................................. 96The 1960 Coup in Turkey ..................... 96Deteriorating Relations With the United States: The Jupiter Missile Crisis ...................................................... 97After the Dust Settled: Relations with United States, Greece, and the Soviet Union ..................................................... 98

Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1980 and 1990 ......................................................... 100

The 1980 Military Coup ........................ 100Turkish –American and Turkish-Greek Relations After 1980 .................. 100Turkish-Bulgarian Relations ................. 102Turkey and the Middle East After 1980 ............................................. 102Turkish-Iranian Relations ..................... 103Turkish-Syrian Relations ...................... 104Turkey and Europe After 1980 ........... 104

CHAPTER 5

Turkish Foreign Policy and the Politics of Europeanization, 1990-2007

Introduction ................................................... 115Turkish-Eu Relatıons in the Post-ColdWar Context................................................... 116

Customs Union: An Alternative Framework for Cooperation ................ 116The European Integration Processand Turkish-EU Relations in theEarly 1990s ............................................ 117

From the Luxembourg Summit to theHelsinki Summit: Explaining the Ups andDowns in Turkish-Eu Relations .................... 120

The 1997 Luxembourg EuropeanCouncil: The Source of a New Tensionin Turkish-EU Relations ........................ 120The 1999 Helsinki European Council:Another Turning point in Turkish-EURelations ................................................ 121Understanding the Ups and Downsin Turkish-EU Relations During the1990s ...................................................... 122The Changing Security Environment .. 122Turkish-Greek Relations ...................... 123The Cyprus Issue ................................... 124European Politics .................................. 125

Post-Helsinki Relations: A New Page inTurkish-Eu Relations ..................................... 126

The Reform Process ............................. 126The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey’s EUAccession ............................................... 127Turkey’s Compliance with theCommon Foreign and Security Policy . 130

Accession Negotiations and the AdditionalProtocol Crisis ................................................ 130

A Problematic Accession:Understanding the Deadlock in thePost-2005 Era ........................................ 133

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CHAPTER 6

Turkish Foreign Policy Between 2007 and 2017: The Strategic Depth

Introduction .................................................. 147The Strategic Depth Doctrine ..................... 147

Principles of the New Turkish Foreign Policy ...................................... 148Methodological Principles ................... 148Operational Foreign Policy Principles ............................................... 149

Bilateral Relations of Turkey Under the Strategic Depth Doctrine and the Paradigm Shift Debate ................................. 152

Turkish-Syrian Relations ..................... 152Turkish-Iranian Relations .................... 153Turkish-Russian Relations ................... 154Neo-Ottomanism ................................. 155The Paradigm Shift (the Axis Shift) Debate in Turkish Foreign Policy ....... 155

Implications of the Arab Spring for Turkish Foreign Policy ............................................... 157

Opportunities: The Turkish Model ..... 157Challenges: Threats to Turkish National Security ................................. 158

Bilateral Relations of Turkey in the Post-Arab Spring Period ............................... 159

Turkish-Syrian Relations ..................... 159Turkish-American Relations ................ 160Turkish-Russian Relations ................... 162

CHAPTER 7

Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Recent Turkish Foreign Policy

Introduction ................................................... 177Public Diplomacy and Soft Power:Two Components of The New TurkishForeign Policy ................................................ 177Public Diplomacy and The Restructuring of Some State Institutions in Turkey ............... 179

The Reorganization of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs ...................................... 180The Office of Public Diplomacy .......... 182

The Yunus Emre Institute as Part of Turkish Public Diplomacy and Turkish Soft Power .. 183

The Yunus Emre Institute andCultural Diplomacy ............................... 183The Turkish Cultural Centers Aroundthe World ............................................... 183The Scope of the Yunus Emre Institute .. 184The Projects of the Yunus EmreInstitute ................................................ 185The Yunus Emre Institute’s Initiative ofScience Diplomacy ................................ 187The Yunus Emre Institute’s Initiative of Public Diplomacy ................................. 187

The New Turkish Institutions on DiasporaDiplomacy, Foreign Aid, and HumanitarianDiplomacy ...................................................... 188

The Presidency for Turks Abroad andRelated Communities .......................... 188YTB and Diaspora Diplomacy .............. 189The Turkish Cooperation andCoordination Agency ........................... 190The Policy of Benefactor Country ...... 190Humanitarian Diplomacy ..................... 191

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Preface

Dear Students,

This is the first volume of a two-volume text-book on Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP). In this first volume, we aimed at giving a historical review of TFP from the early 1920s up until today. The second volume of the project is planned to cover major issues in TFP ranging from the Cyprus issue to energy, from security concerns to Turkey’s place in the international system.

The textbook opens with a chapter on “the determinants of TFP”- a chapter that not only provides a general review of TFP but also exp-lains what kind of factors have been effective in the TFP decision-making. Prof. Dr. Musta-fa Aydın first looks at the structural determi-nants of TFP, including geography, history, and culture, and then he reviews the conjunc-tural determinants of TFP. As he succinctly summarizes the need for a multi-dimensional analysis: “in order to understand the long-term dynamics of Turkish foreign policy, it is important to determine the fundamental pa-rameters that affect its policymaking as well as factors that limit its foreign policy choices.”

The historical overview of TFP starts with a chapter authored by Assistant Prof. Dr. Seç-kin Barış Gülmez on the early Republican era, which coincides with the presidency of Mus-tafa Kemal Atatürk. “Turkish foreign policy from the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 to the onset of WWII in 1939,” Prof. Gülmez argues, “was primarily guided by the foreign policy unders-tanding of Atatürk, the founder of Modern Turkey. Starting with the Lausanne Treaty, Turkish foreign policy during this period ma-inly aimed at actualizing complete political and economic independence, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts through multilateral diplomacy.”

Chapter 3, penned by Assistant Prof.Dr. Hakan Özden, moves on to analyzing TFP during the Second World War. Although there has been much debate on Turkey’s position in the Se-cond World War, Turkey and the Turkish le-aders of the era are generally considered to have followed a clever and skillful diplomacy

that was instrumental in keeping Turkey out of war. “Being cognizant of its military and poor economic conditions, Turkey joined with Britain and France to form a coalition to ba-lance the Axis powers.” Although Turkey had somewhat good economic relations with Ger-many between 1940 and 1943, the relations gradually deteriorated and the international developments made it necessary for Turkey to declare war on Germany and Japan on Febru-ary 23, 1945.

In Chapter 4, Dr. Betül Dicle, drawing on her studies at the Louisiana State University, sum-marizes the developments in TFP during the Cold War. Stretching from 1945 to the late 1980s, the Cold War not only strained the re-lations between states belonging to different ideological camps but also imposed a security-oriented approach on all states, making the na-tional security the primary objective in foreign policy making. “Accordingly,” Dr. Dicle expla-ins, “Turkey prioritized external factors in its foreign policy making over domestic concerns during the Cold War years. In this period, mem-bership to NATO, alliance with the US, and pos-sible European Union membership were at the center of Turkish foreign policy making.”

The fall of the Berlin Wall caught almost all states off guard in foreign policy making. Soon the states became aware that the Cold War had provided a direction in foreign policy. Turkey, as a country located at the crossroads of conti-nents and civilizations, found an anchor in fo-reign policy in the early 1990s: the ever-increa-sing European integration and becoming a full member of the European Union. In Chapter 5, Assistant Prof.Dr. F. Fulya Hisarlıoğlu explains the developments in TFP in this rather turbu-lent era. “From late 1950s onwards,” she writes, “Turkey’s modernization process has been asso-ciated with integrating with the EEC. Therefo-re, Europeanization, which is the endgame of adapting both politically and economically to the EEC legal-institutional framework, provi-ded the basis for Turkish political elites’ moder-nization agenda.”

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In Chapter 6, Dr. Mehtap Kara discusses the ma-jor developments in Turkish foreign policy from the early 21st century up until today. Ahmet Da-vutoğlu left his stamp on Turkish foreign policy in this era through both his academic studies and the governmental posts he held. Therefo-re, the chapter carries the subtitle: “the Strate-gic Depth.” However, Dr. Kara writes, “the Arab uprisings of 2011 and particularly the Syrian civil war became the most significant threat to both Turkish foreign policy and the strategic depth doctrine.”

Building on this chapter, Chapter 7 further ref-lects on the recent governments’ conduct of TFP, especially through public diplomacy and soft-power tools. Associate Prof.Dr. Muharrem Ekşi, drawing on his extensive research on the subject, argues that there were two key dynamics behind the governments’ active public diplomacy in this

era: “the first is the Justice and Development Party’s policy of presenting itself as a model to the world, especially to the Middle Eastern co-untries; secondly, the high commercial/economic performance of Turkey, which was the 16th big-gest economy in the world in the 2000s.”

It is our hope that by closely reading these chap-ters, you will not only learn and be able to dis-cuss all the historical developments in TFP but also use this knowledge toward studying foreign policy from a critical perspective and proposing policies and objectives for the future Turkish fo-reign policy.

Editors

Prof.Dr. Nejat DOĞAN

Prof.Dr. Ahmet SÖZEN

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Chapter 1After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

Chapter OutlineIntroductionDeterminants of Turkish Foreign Policy Turkish Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1919-1939Turkey’s Cold-War Policies, 1945-1980Foreign Policy Setting at the End of the Cold War, 1980-2000

Key Terms• Turkish Foreign Policy • Structural Determinants • Conjunctural Determinants • Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy• Strategic İmportance • The Middle East • Mandate• The Ottoman Empire • Cyprus• The Turkish Straits• The First World War• The Second World War• The Cold War • Nationalism• Nation-State• Pluralist Democracy

Lear

ning

Out

com

es

Analyze Turkey’s Cold-War policies within the context of structural and conjectural determinants.

Explain the structural and conjunctural determinants of Turkish foreign policy.

Identify the determinants of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period.

Describe the policy setting at the end of the Cold War and the effects of structural and conjectural determinants on the Turkish foreign policy making. 3

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Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

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INTRODUCTIONAlthough Turkey is not one of the great powers,

its geographical location, historical connections, and careful foreign policy has allowed it to play more influential role in world politics than otherwise possible. As it is located along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Mediterranean, it is not easy to fit Turkey into any neat geopolitical category. Since this veritable geography also means that it connects with various geographies with their differing cultural, political, economic, and historical developments, it is equally difficult to fit Turkey in any cultural, political, or economic category either. Therefore, in order to understand the long-term dynamics of Turkish foreign policy, it is important to determine the fundamental parameters that affect its policymaking as well as factors that limit its foreign policy choices.

Accordingly, this chapter will first look at the structural determinants including geography, history, and culture, and then we will review the conjunctural determinants formed mainly by the shifts in domestic and international politics.

DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Structural and Conjunctural Determinants terminology is the one that the author developed in his PhD dissertation (Aydın, 1994) and later published in the work titled Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis (2004). These determinants remind us of James Rosenau’s (1971) time continuum in which he puts the sources that incline to change slowly at one end as well as the sources that endure rapid change at the other end. The systemic aggregation is also included in his categorization involving systemic, societal, governmental, idiosyncratic sources.

Structural Determinants Structural Determinants are continuous and

static variables that shape a country’s foreign policy. They are not directly related to the international political developments and current issues in international politics. They can have long term impact on the determination of foreign policy such as geographical position, historical experiences, and cultural background.

In the early years, the Ottoman Empire followed a military-offensive approach in its foreign relations. However, after the late 17th century, with the beginning of the imperial decline, its main foreign policy objective shifted to preserving the status quo by all military and diplomatic means in an attempt to slow down the loss of territory. Thus, Ottoman Empire adopted the concept of ‘balance of power’ as a strategic behavior (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 201).

Although the international environment radically changed with the dissolution of the Ottoman, Russian, and Austria-Hungarian Empires in the early 20th century as well as with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the strategic value of Turkey’s geographic location, which lies at the heart of the former Ottoman territories, has not fundamentally changed. Nevertheless, Turkey’s relative importance to other states has varied over time. The Turkish Republic has the continuous role of serving as both a land bridge and a fortress between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. From the eighteenth century onwards, the attempts of various powers to gain control of, or influence over, the Turkish Straits and other powers’ endeavor to stop them have been informing Turkish foreign policy. Thus, the geographical importance and the perceived threats related to the country’s location retained their position for the Turkish decision makers.

At the beginning of the 20th century, as a newly established nation-state, Turkey had no desire for territorial conquests. However, it needed a realistic foreign policy to keep what it was able to salvage at the end of its War of Independence. From this perspective, and with the end of the imperial period, the expansionist perspective of the Ottoman Empire was left behind. The main concern of the country’s decision makers now was to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the state with few available resources. Along the way, it became clear that the historical experiences based on the imperial past, the struggle for survival and independence, the play of realpolitik in the international arena, and the cultural heritage left strong marks on the national identity of Turkish people as well as on Turkish foreign policy decision makers.

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Historical Experiences The First World War resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This also meant that the Turkish

imperial history came to an end. After three years of national struggle, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, established the new Turkish nation-state. The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Peace Treaty of Sevres, which the Republican Turkey had never signed, and Turkey asserted its complete sovereignty over its current territory with the exception of Hatay (the district of Alexandretta), which finally (re)united with the motherland in 1939. Despite few restrictions on the Turkish Straits and some commercial and judicial privileges, the Treaty of Lausanne has served as the international recognition of the Turkish National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), which had been adopted in 1920 by the Meclis-i Mebusan, the Ottoman Parliament.

The National Pact (Misak-ı Milli):After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the Associations for Defense of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri), the local patriotic leagues, were formed in various cities in Anatolia and Thrace throughout 1918. Their main aim was to protect territorial integrity of the Turkish homeland against the foreign occupiers. While their original aims were relatively local, Mustafa Kemal, after his move to Anatolia from Istanbul as the Inspector General of the 9th Army, attempted at bringing them together in a unified front. With his call, two congresses met in Erzurum and Sivas with representatives from various Associations. As a result of these congresses, the nationwide Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia was formed and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the head of its permanent representative committee. Various decisions taken during these congresses regarding the principles of struggle against the occupying powers. They were later combined under six decisions and approved as the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) by the last Ottoman Parliament, meeting in Istanbul in 1920. Altogether, these principles defined the nationalist struggle for independence that was about to start. The National Pact included the following provisions:• The future of the territories populated by theArabmajority at the time of the signing of the

Armistice of Mudros (Mondros Ateşkes Anlaşması) would be determined by a plebiscite. Meanwhile, unoccupied territories inhabited by Turkish majority would continue to be the homeland of the Turkish nation.

• ThestatusofthecitiesofKars,Ardahan,andBatummightbedeterminedbyaplebiscite.• ThestatusoftheWesternThracewouldbedeterminedbyaplebiscite.• Theprotectionof Istanbul andMarmara shouldbeprovided.Turkey and theother concerned

countries would decide for transport and trade on the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. • Therightsofminoritieswillbeprotectedontheconditionofreciprocity.TherightsofMuslim

minorities in neighboring countries should be protected.• Unconditional full independence and sovereignty of the country, including the removal of all

restrictions on political, judicial, and financial development, should be recognized. Source: (Oran 2014: 105-107).

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Despite the fact that the Turkish Republic was born out of the Ottoman Empire, there are significant differences between the two states:

• Turkeyisanation-state;itisnotanempirelike the Ottoman State.

• The political regime of Turkey is notan autocracy or theocracy but was a parliamentary democracy between 1923 and 2017, and it has been presidential republic since then.

• TheTurkishRepublichasnotfoundedonexpansionist principles of an empire, but it has aimed mainly to maintain the status quo toward building and preserving a stable nation within its boundaries.

• While the Ottoman Empire was amultinational, multi-racial, and multi-religious state, the Turkish Republic has more or less a homogenous society based on a specific understanding of constitutional “Turkish nation.”

Nevertheless, despite the differences, Turkey cannot but help to be affected by its imperial past. Although, after the establishment of the Republic, its political leaders broke with the imperial past and discovered new foundational virtues for the Turkish nation, the Turkish Republic inescapably inherited some of the fundamental features of the Ottoman Empire that would help us to understand the background to Turkish foreign policy.

Historical experiences of any country in general can be divided into two categories: a) the constructive legacies that enhance and enrich policy making with historical experiences, and b) the problematic legacies that hinder the policy making with negative examples from the past and with after-effects of undesirable precedence.

Constructive Legacies Turkey inherited the central geography of

the Ottoman Empire with its blessings and complications. First of all, this geography provides Turkey with a larger role in world politics to play than its size, population, economic strength, and military power would signify. This will be further elaborated in the next section.

In addition to its central geographic position, Turkey also inherited most of its bureaucratic

elites from the Empire. This relatively experienced bureaucracy was an important value for the Turkish Republic in the post-empire period. Due to the Westernization movement in such areas as administration and education in the 19th century, an educated official class had emerged. Later during the one-party regime, this elite group served as the core of Turkey’s modernizing elite with the guidance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In this way, the revolutionary changes could be implemented. In fact, and they eventually transformed the traditional social and cultural underpinnings of the society into a secular and modern state. Moreover, having an experienced elite in governing was a blessing, because the country did not waste time in the intricacies of the state-building effort while the nation desperately needed to move on with its political economic, and social development. Therefore, in the Turkish case, the inherited elite provided a material connection between the Empire and the new Turkish Republic, easing the way forward.

Another important continuity in Turkish politics is the Western orientation of the country’s elite. The Ottoman Empire and then Turkey fought against the Western powers during the First World War. However, following the national independence Turkey decided to embark on full Westernization, which at the time was equated with modernization. Turks, of course, have had close relationswiththeWestforsometimenow;firstasaconquering superior and enemy, then a component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and finally as a follower and ally. The beginning of this connection is shrouded in history as the Ottomans, in the wake of the Mongol invasion of Anatolia, settled in the Valley of Karasu, where they were in direct contact with the Byzantine Empire. Before they became an oriental power, the Ottomans had first been an empire based largely in the Balkans (the South-East Europe today). Not only did Europe have influence on the Ottoman Empire, but also the Ottoman Empire was a key actor within the European system by way of establishing alignments with one or more of the European powers against others. However, the Ottoman Empire, though contradictory, had been alienated from Europe throughout the eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth century until the Paris Congress of 1856, where it was officially (re)admitted into the European state system.

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Even though serving the cause of Islam was an important element behind some of the Ottoman conquests, a kind of secular state system developed in time. Even, the regular use of title ‘caliph’ by the Ottoman rulers started only after the non-Muslim subjects continuously dissolved in the 19th century. Sultan Abdülhamid II supported the idea of Pan-Islamism in order to prevent the disintegration of the Empire’s Muslim subjects. There was no institutionalized religious authority in the Empire that was independent from the state. This allowed the Sultans to make peace with the ‘infidels’ and even ask for Western help whenever needed. Taking this into consideration , one may conclude that establishing a Western-oriented secular state in 1920s did not contradict with the historical experience of the Turkish people.

The realistic stance of the Ottoman diplomacy adopted during the nineteenth century against the overwhelming power disparity with its enemies has also had historical significance for Turkey. Although the Ottoman Empire was relatively weaker than the Western powers for most of the 18th and 19th centuries, it was able to maintain much of its territorial integrity through a policy of playing one great power against another. While the contemporary international system was based on the “balance of power,” the Ottoman Empire was capable to adapt its foreign policy to the international system’s characteristics. Thus, the Empire’s decline took three hundred years and its final collapse came only with a world war. Making use of the advantages of the international system has been an important foreign policy tool for the Turkish Republic as well. Atatürk as a student of this remarkable diplomacy was able to exploit the differences between England, France, and Italy at the end of the First World War as well as between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Similarly, after the Second World War, Turkish leaders could successfully shape their foreign policies so as to benefit from the all-out struggle between the Eastern and Western blocs. However, the emergence of the Cold War with its strict bloc politics somewhat limited this. Eventually, when the Cold War ended, Turkish diplomacy turned again to its age-old track.

Problematic LegaciesTogether with the constructive elements,

Turkey also inherited some characteristics from its Ottoman past that still have implications for Turkish foreign policy. First of all, although it was eventually replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Treaty of Sevres had posed some challenges to the Turkish independence and its territorial integrity. According to the Sevres Treaty, the European territory of the Ottoman Empire (except the Straits), İzmir, and its hinterland in Anatolia were to be transferred to Greece. A sovereign Armenian state and an autonomous “Kurdistan” were to be established in Eastern Anatolia. France, Italy, and Britain were allowed to form “spheres of influence” in the rest of Anatolia. Only a small part of the central Anatolia was to be kept by the Turks with some restrictions. Together with the disruption of the territorial unity, capitulations were to be restored and the Straits were to be governed by an international regime.

Although the Treaty of Sevres was still-born thanks to the National Struggle, it continues to affect Turkish attitude in various areas. First of all, because the sovereign rights and the independence of Turkish people were threatened by the Entente Powers in the Treaty and the Turks were forced to fight to regain their independence and save their homeland, this left a lasting impression on the psyche of the ordinary Turk. This eventually gave way to the rise of what may be termed as the Sevres Syndrome.

Second, the displacement (tehcir) of Armenians during the First World War in the Ottoman Empire resulted in the subsequent Armenian claims on some Turkish territory in the Sevres Treaty. The arguments and counter-arguments regarding the Armenian question still have implications and repercussions for contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

Third, although most of the Kurdish tribes had sided with the Turks against the invading powers during and after the First World War and the Kurdish identity was primarily based on religion rather than on ethnicity, the Sevres Treaty also recognized the “Kurdish separate ethnicity,” allowing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region with possible independence later on.

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A related aspect of history that serves as a source of caution and skepticism in Turkish foreign policy is the issue of minorities. Because the Ottoman Empire was constantly exposed to the propaganda attacks and aggression by the self-appointed protectors of its minorities ever since the empire had started to grow weaker as well as the empire collapsed through a series of national uprisings and a world war, the message was clear as far as the Turkish Republic was concerned: no fifth column would be allowed to exist in the Republic.

The Ottoman State did not interfere in the affairs of its subject peoples so long as they paid their due taxes and did not rebel against the empire. The selected heads of millets (religious communities) were entrusted with the authority to administer their people in such areas as religion, education, and tax collecting. They were not even pressured to learn the Ottoman Turkish language. In the Ottoman Empire, therefore, the non-Muslim communities had managed to preserve their separate religious

identitiesandlinguisticdifferences;however,thesecommunities were naturally affected by the spread of nationalist and separatist ideas in the nineteenth century. As the European attention on these communities grew stronger, the Western powers continuously involved in the domestic affairs of the Ottomans in a way to abuse the communities for their own political objectives. While the millet system had once served as a brilliant instrument of government, it triggered the self-destruction of the Empire. Especially, the abuse of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would later have reverberations for Turkish foreign policy such as creating problems with Greece over minority issues and with Armenia over “genocide claims.” Even, labelling the European Union as a “Christian Club” may be tied to the Western interference in domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire through its Christian minorities.

The Sevres Syndrome or Sevresphobia:The conviction that the “external world and their internal collaborators are trying to weaken and divide Turkey” (Mufti 1998: 43). The term was originated from the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, which split most of the Ottoman territories among the occupying powers, creating an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan as well as a Greek presence in the Eastern Thrace and on the West coast of Anatolia. Despite the fact that the Treaty was stillborn and never entered into force, the perception of foreign forces wishing to divide and destroy Turkish homeland has remained as an underlying concern in Turkish society and among the decision-makers.Source: (Aydın, 2003: 347).

“Millet” and the “Millet System”:The term “Millet” refers to a “religious community” or to certain “people” in the Ottoman Turkish language. In the Ottoman Empire, it was used for organizing different religious communities with limited administrative power under a religious leader with authority over their co-religionists. The system allowed each community to regulate their own affairs under the supremacy of the Ottoman administration.Onlythe“religionofthebooks”(kitapehli)wererecognizedasmilletinthesystem;thus, originally there were Orthodox Christian and the Armenian millets, which later joined by the Jews and Catholic Armenians. Empire’s Muslim population (the Ummah) was not considered as part of the Millet system. Source: Oxford Bibliographies.

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Not only the interference in domestic affairs through minorities but also the financial control of the Empire by the European powers through the establishment of the Public Debt Service (Duyun-u Umumiye) in 1881 created severe trauma for the Turks. In the years of decline, the Ottoman Empire had almost lost its political independence and opened a way for foreign interventions by bestowing privileges upon, and grating capitulations to, foreigners. Consequently, the new Republic was very sensitive about infringements upon its sovereignty through economic restrictions. This suspicion resulted in not only tight controls over foreign companies that run business in Turkey but also strict rules for financial governance. This is also observable in modern-day Turkey in the discussions on relations with international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, with their lending conditions that limit Turkey’s room for maneuver to decide how to disperse its revenues whenever the country needs financial aid.

Another problematic legacy is the “sense of greatness” in the common Turkish mind. Belonging to a nation that established a powerful Empire, which had straddled three continents, is a source of pride for all Turks. On the other hand, the Turks are also somewhat frustrated because Turkey is mostly considered a second-rate power in contemporary international politics. This contradiction between the feeling of supremacy over its neighbors and its dependence upon the great powers to be influential even in its own region creates discontent among the Turks.

In addition, Turkey’s neighbors show certain reactions to this perceived Turkish haughtiness. The neighboring countries, which were part of the Ottoman State for some five centuries, still nurture some of the bitter experiences they once had with the Ottoman Turks and this poses challenges to contemporary Turkish diplomacy. For example, the hostility between Greece and Turkey that seemed to emerge in the mid-1950s has a historical background - the clashes between the Greek nationalism and the policies of the Ottoman Empire. Greece was the first nation-state in the Balkans that gained its independence from the empire as a result of the nationalist movements in the nineteenth-century Europe. In return, the Turks had to fight against the Greeks between 1919 and 1922 to regain their political

independence, because Greece, with the support of the United Kingdom, had occupied the Western Anatolia following the end of the First World War.

Similarly, the distrust between the Turks and the Russians had been one of the factors that shaped Turkish security policy for most of the 20th century. However, its roots date back to the 17th century, when the Tsarist expansionist policies posed a continuous threat to the northern borders of the Ottoman Empire and later to Turkey. Since Tsar Nicholas I described the Ottoman Empire as the ‘sick man of Europe’ and proposed to the British to divide the Ottoman Empire in 1853 (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 483), first the Ottomans and later the Turks have been trying to counter that threat through allying with other powerful nations. The ally of the Ottomans was either the UK, France, or Germany in the 19th century, whereas Turkey has allied itself with NATO and the US following the end of the Second World War.

Finally, the centuries-long hostilities with the neighbors forced the Ottoman Empire to be cautious about, and suspicious of, its political environment as well as other powers’ intentions. Coupled with the Empire’s relative weakness in the last two centuries of its existence, this cautious policy led to the adoption of a diplomatic strategy that may be described as playing powers off against each other for survival. This diplomacy also required not to trust any state and to be ready to fight other powers at any given time.

Geographical Setting Modern Turkey has a very important geo-

strategic location with borders in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. This geography provides the Turkish state with an opportunity to play a greater role in world politics than its size, population, and economic strength would otherwise dictate. On the other hand, it is historically located on one of the most coveted pieces of territory in the world, because it includes the routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus mountains to the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn connects to the Fertile Crescent. Not only Turkey is at the crossroads of major air, land, and sea routes that connect the industrially advanced lands of Europe with the petroleum-rich lands of the Middle East, but it also possesses most of the

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water irrigating lands as far as the Persian Gulf. Located in such a sensitive part of the Mediterranean, Turkey was, during the Cold War, on the line of conflicts between the superpowers and their respective alliances. Both superpowers tried to expand their spheres of influence and counterbalance each other through this territory.

Figure 1.1 Turkey and Environs

Sitting at the crossroads of land connections makes Turkey a Balkan, a Caucasian, a Mediterranean, and a Middle Eastern country, all at the same time. While this geographical position increases the geostrategic importance of Turkey, it also makes Turkey more sensitive to international developments and to changes in international and regional political and security balances. It is a historical fact that while all states established in Anatolia had carried considerable importance for its neighborhood, they also witnessed not only migrations from the east but also invasions from both the east and the west that exacerbated the feeling of insecurity.

Due to its physical characteristics, the Anatolian peninsula is considered a strategic region from the military point of view. While the seas on both sides and the fortress-like mountainous terrain in the east make natural boundaries for Turkey, the Straits and the Thrace are difficult to defend as well as they are vulnerable to attacks. Nevertheless, possessing the Straits brings political and military advantages to Turkey, elevating it from being a local power to one having crucial international influence.

Another geographical concern for Turkey is the Aegean Islands. If these islands are controlled by a hostile power, Turkey would lose the connection of its two principal harbors (Istanbul and Izmir) to international waters. In this case, so long as Cyprus has a friendly government, access to international waters could still be maintained from the Eastern Mediterranean. However, if the ideology of Enosis (the union of the Cyprus Island with Greece) were realized, Turkey would be totally cut off from the open seas. This was why Turkey has resisted such designs as Enosis in the Eastern Mediterranean since the 1950s. The same security concern played a role in Turkey’s declaration of casus belli against the Greek claim of twelve-mile territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. In this way, Turkey can keep all open-sea exits from the Aegean Sea through its territorial seas.

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The bordering neighbors with different national characteristics, political regimes, ideologies, and aims can be counted as another geographical insecurity for Turkey. It is natural that the relations between Turkey and its neighbors may not always be peaceful. In particular, given the almost constant instability in the Middle East, there may occasionally be different forms of armed clashes that might spill over into Turkey or might affect it in such ways as the refugee influx, cross-border smuggling, and instability along its borders.

Borders may create weaknesses or strengths for the respective country. This depends on the length of borders, the number and intentions of the neighbors, and relative power available to the affected parties. Whereas in the early years of the Republic, Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Great Britain (mandate in Iraq and possession of Cyprus), France (mandate in Syria), and Italy (possession of the Dodecanese Islands) were borderingTurkey;intimeIraq,Syria,andCyprusbecame independent states as well as the Soviet Union became a nuclear power.

In the interwar years, Turkey enjoyed good relations with its neighbors. However, it had problems with Britain because of the Mosul issue and with France because of Hatay/Alexandretta. At the time, Iraq was under the British mandate whereas Syria was under the French mandate. Moreover, after the 1930s, because of the imperial ambitions of Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was cautious against Italy. After the Second World War, with the departure of mandatory powers, the number of Turkey’s neighbors decreased tosix;however,thatnumberincreasedagainafterthe collapse of the Soviet Union that paved the way for the independence of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan on Turkey’s northeastern border.

In order to reduce the sense of insecurity and to counterbalance potential rivals, Turkey has joined the existing alliances at the time or it allied with regional states and outside powers. For this reason, Turkey, between 1920 and 1955, signed a number of friendship declarations with the neighbors and bilateral agreements with the USA. In an attempt to feel more secure, Turkey joined the Balkan Pact (1953), the Balkan Alliance (1954), and the Baghdad Pact (1955). Nevertheless, Turkey’s adherence to NATO in 1952 was the biggest step in terms of securing its borders.

Controlling the only seaway that links the Black Sea with the Mediterranean (that is the Turkish Straits) is another geographically important fact in Turkish foreign policy. Throughout its history, the effective control over the vital waterways has created advantages as well as conflicts for Turkey, in particular with Russia. Not only the waterways but also the historic rivalry between the Russians and the Turks were in the center of Turkish-Soviet relations. In the first decades of the Republic, Turkey received political and material support from the Soviet Union, and this relationship was reinforced by the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression of 1925. Notwithstanding, following the end of the Second World War, the Soviets unilateral denounced the 1925 Treaty and raised demands over the Turkish territory and bases on the Bosporus. Therefore, the mutual understanding and good neighborly relations came to an end in the mid-1940s. As a reaction to the Soviet demands, Turkey joined NATO on February 18, 1952 and took an explicit place in the Western defense system. Although the relations were somewhat repaired after Stalin’s death, Turkey has preserved its membership in NATO.

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Finally, the loss of the oil-rich Arab lands after the First World War perfectly demonstrates the significance of geography for Turkey. After having lost these oil-rich territories, Turkey has become dependent for energy imports, which in the long run paved the way for its financial dependence on the West and for repeated economic crises. Furthermore, this led Turkey in the 1970s to become sensitive about the seabed in the Aegean, where it hoped to find substantial oil resources. Turkey did not only insist on its claims to the Aegean seabed but also risked military confrontation with Greece over the possibility of finding energy resources in the Aegean. Similarly, the recent discussion regarding the possible gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean seabed has the hallmarks of the same conditionality.

Apart from the natural resources, the Middle East has also an important place in Turkish security understanding. After the First World War, the Middle East has always been an unstable region. The region witnessed, among others, four Arab-Israeli wars, the unending Palestine problem, the Lebanese civil war, the Suez crisis, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf war, the invasion of Iraq by the USA, the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war. All these developments and involvements by the outside powers in the region have taken place within the vicinity of Turkish

borders and they increased the security concerns of Turkey to an even more heightened level.

Conjunctural DeterminantsConjunctural Determinants are dynamic

variables that can change depending on the domestic and international developments. They can be considered as the changes in the international system, shifts in balance of power in world politics, dramatic changes in domestic politics, economic factors.

Despite frequent internal changes, the structural determinants provide a significant degree of continuity in Turkish foreign policy. Due to the strong influence of structural determinants, Turkish foreign policy has benefited from its rationality, sense of responsibility, long-term perspective, and realism. Nevertheless, besides the structural factors, international and domestic changes have affected Turkish foreign policy decisions. Different from the structural factors, dynamic and changeable character of the conjunctural determinants had influence especially on the implementation of foreign policy.

Since the international and domestic changes are numerous, it is important to select the major conjunctural factors that have affected Turkish foreign policy in terms of its implementation,

Figure 1.2 The Bosporus Strait

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or more importantly, its foundation. From this perspective, one of the most important international developments is the transition from the Cold War to détente. The Cyprus issue has been another important factor since it has long been a concern for Turkish foreign policy makers. Other important issues are related to Turkey’s attitude to certain groups of states, the constitutional and political changes in Turkey as well as economic and social developments.

While Turkey’s foreign policy in the interwar period (1923-1939) was mainly shaped by the structural factors and determined by Mustafa Kemal’s principles, the second period (1945-1960) was dominated by the dependence on Western powers. This period was followed by the late détente that caused rapprochement efforts with the Third World in 1960-1970. In addition to this, the 1970s were mainly affected by the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and Turkey’s efforts to take part in the international arena as a friendly nation.

The end of the Cold War was another major turning point not only because of the transformations in the international system but also because of the dramatic changes that took place in political, economic, social, and cultural life in Turkey. Finally, the international developments after 9/11 and Arab uprisings in 2011 have largely affected the international system and Turkey as well. Moreover, the revisionist policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) caused main transformations in the decision-making process of Turkish foreign policy.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1919-

1939The Republic of Turkey gained its independence

at a time when the world was passing through a systemic change. It was Mustafa Kemal’s influence at that moment that set the course of Turkish foreign policy in much of the 20th century. His foreign policy approach, like his political views, represented a break with the past. While the grand ideas of the late Ottoman Empire (i.e. Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism) were discarded, he insisted on replacing them with the principles of republicanism, secularism, and nationalism, all of which had major impacts on the country’s foreign policy, in addition to its domestic policy.

From this perspective, there was a vital connection between foreign and domestic policies of the country, and Atatürk’s foreign policy was essentially an extension of his domestic policy. As understood from his famous motto ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, he was connecting internal stability with the international peace and order. In order to have peaceful foreign policy and a stable country, it was necessary to deal with the domestic politics first.

Figure 1.3 Mustafa Kemal with Amanullah Khan, King of Afghanistan, 1928

Source: http://picdeer.com/ataturkvideo

Explain how structural and conjunctural determinants affect the foreign policy making of a country.

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Republicanism As the base of Mustafa Kemal’s thinking,

‘Republicanism’ embraces the notions of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality before the law. It was against the revisionist and imperialist conceptions of the Ottoman Empire as well as totalitarian tendencies. The new Turkish Republic was not based on a dynasty, but was a nation-state founded by the nation. In this sense, the Republicanism was more than a change in the governingsystem;itwasalsoaturningpointinthepolitical philosophy of the Turks.

Since the Kemalist principles were based on the equality of the citizens, it was expected to avoid creating conflicts among them and to maintain stability and internal peace. According to this ideology, international peace and order should be based on the internal stability and peace. Thus, his famous motto, “Peace at home, peace in the world,” put the internal milieu up front.

Secularism Secularism, as an essential component of

modernization, covers not only the political and governmental life but also the whole social and cultural life. However, in the context of foreign policy, it refers to more than the process of separating religion from the state. The main struggle for Kemalist secularists was focusing on the difference between democracy and theocracy. If government were a theocratic one, the Islamist state would be obliged to be in a continuous struggle with Christian powers, who would be deemed as “infidels.” However, the new Turkish Republic aimed at having peaceful relations with Western Christian countries. At the time, this could have only be achieved with a secular understanding of government.

Another impact of secularism on Turkish foreign policy could be seen in the rejection of the idea of Pan-Islamism. While Pan-Islamism was one of the grand ideas in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, aiming to unite different Muslim nations under one common name and cause with equal rights, the new Republic would not wish to have a role defined as “protecting the realm of Islam” or “conquering infidels.” Otherwise, it would put the existence of the state at a risk.

Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, the contemporary great powers were interfering in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire by abusing the Millet system, such as setting up separate courts for different religious minorities. The new State could not allow this to continue, nor could it provide any excuse with the winners of the First World War through which they could intervene in its domestic affairs.

Nationalism Nationalism was instrumental in the

disintegration of the Empire’s Christian subjects in the Balkans and the Muslim Arabs in the Middle East. It also influenced the Turks deeply when they faced the risk of losing their heartland, which is Anatolia. It became clear early on in the independence movement that in order to create a unified front, it was necessary to have a common goal and to raise the public awareness of the nation’s historical role. Along the way, Turkish nationalism grew stronger and replaced the old loyalties and identities of Turkish people.

The ambitions of the Turkish nationalist movement were limited to the national borders. This was first declared in the National Pact of 1920 and legalized by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Since nationalism was a new idea to the Turkish people, the way to define the national identity would have implications for the future trajectories of the country. It was Mustafa Kemal who rejected the ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in order to create a national identity. Eventually, Turkish nationalism was defined in terms of common citizenship, not in terms of religion or race. Moreover, it did not have any expansionist aims. Therefore, one can conclude that the creation of a European style nationalism in the Turkish territories became successful. From this perspective, various ethnic groups in Turkey were accepted as the “building blocks of the nation” that form the national culture. Therefore, the demands of ethnic groups for any positive discrimination were considered contradictory with the legalistic approach of the Turkish nation.

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Other Characteristics of the National Independence Struggle

The Turkish independence struggle had different characteristics from the anti-imperialist movements that emerged after the Second World War. In post-1945 period, African and Asian peoples were in a struggle against the colonial powers in political, economic, and social realms. Even though the Turkish independence movement had an anti-imperialist agenda, there was still a cultural and political Westernization side to it. Thus, despite the fact that Turkey fought against the West for its independence, its leaders preferred to stay in the Western political sphere after the war. The Western orientation in Turkish foreign policy was the extension of the understanding of civilization and modernization and the political rejection of the East in general.

The main concern of the early Republican foreign policy was to achieve and protect the complete independence of the state after the National Struggle. Therefore, the ideas of accepting the mandate or protectorate of a foreign power was rejected from the beginning. However, this principle was not regarded as a barrier against forming alliances or signing political and military agreements with other countries. As such, it was Mustafa Kemal who spearheaded the establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Saidabad Pact in 1937.

Similarly, the idea of complete independence included not only political but also economic independence and the new Republic rejected the idea of preserving the late-Ottoman economic privileges of the foreign powers (i.e. capitulations and financial restrictions of the Duyun-u Umumiye). However, this does not mean to isolate the country fromtheoutsideworld;theleadersofthecountrywere ready to cooperate economically even with the capitalist West when it was on an equal footing, as was demonstrated with the Izmir Economy Congress, which took place in early 1923 while the National Struggle was still underway.

After the final national borders were drawn by the National Pact and confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey did not have any intention to expand its borders. Because, at the time it would be a political maneuver that would risk its existence. Mustafa Kemal’s main foreign policy strategy was to focus on protecting the status quo rather than leading an adventurous path. The various moves of

the interwar period such as renouncing the claims on Mosul and the Western Thrace can be better understood when considered together with his realistic foreign policy approach.

TURKEY’S COLD-WAR POLICIES, 1945-1980

While Turkey was busy in the 1930s with its nation building and state building processes as well as shaping its international relations, the world was heading toward another world war. After Mustafa Kemal had passed away, İsmet İnönü became the president of both the Republican People’s Party and the Republic of Turkey. Under the one-party political system, İnönü, to a great extent, followed the policies of the previous governments.

Early in this period, the main concern of Turkey became to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the coming world war. What shaped the policies of the Turkish decision-makers throughout the war were the threats they perceived from various actors. It was mainly the Italian threat before the war and during most of the firstyearthatinformedtheirchoices;subsequentlythe possibility of a German occupation took over until the Battle of Stalingrad. However, it was the constancy of the threat perceived from the Soviet Union from 1941 onwards that determined Turkey’s policies during the war. This perceived threat also sealed Turkey’s post-war engagements. These threats were sometimes so intertwined that it became difficult to choose between them - such as the fear between 1941 and 1944 of either getting occupied by Germany or getting liberated by the Soviet Union (Aydın, 2019b).

Eventually, Turkey was able to avoid the war and most of its destructive aspects thanks to the realistic and pragmatic policies of the then decision makers, by aligning Turkey with France and Great Britain in 1939 and by concluding treaties of alliance and/or non-aggression with all the belligerent parties, except Italy and Japan.

Discuss the political legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

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Determinants of Turkey’s Cold War Policies, 1945-60 World War II constituted an important watershed for Turkey’s foreign and security policies as well

as its domestic political and economic development. Although the modernization process had started in the 1930s before the war, it was still an unfinished business when the war broke out. Similarly, economic reforms were still in progress in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Substantial social transformation had been achievedunderMustafaKemal’sguidance;however,somecriticalpoliticalreformswerestillwaitingtobeinstituted. There was also a distinct reluctance in terms of economic and political dependency on the West, though the relations with the West as well as with the East were considerably expanded. All these needed to be re-examined after the war and the renewed reform process needed to realign Turkey with international developments. However, the resulting attempt at accelerating the modernization process (which meant Westernization at the time) quickly turned into a dependency relationship with the Western powers as the interwar years’ multipolar international system transformed into a bipolar one. Thus, both systemic factors and domestic developments pushed Turkey toward a Western-dependent stance in international relations and accompanying Western-leaning foreign policy.

External Factor: Meeting the Soviet Threat In terms of the systemic factors, the transformation of the international system into a bipolar structure

forced Turkey to choose a side. Compared to the previous periods, now Turkey did not have the option to adopt a policy of neutrality. As explained by Aron (1973: 125-127), “a policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geopolitically important area.” Secondly, the Soviet Union became a superpower with some territorial demands from Turkey. Therefore, Turkey’s Western alignment occurred as a result of both the Soviet pressures and the demands of the bipolar international system.

Bipolar vs. multipolar world systemsBipolar system can be defined as a system of world order in which the distribution of power is held between two states. In this context, these two states control most of economic, military, and cultural impact factors at the international level and/or regional level. In a bipolar system, spheres of influence may develop. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (1947-1991) is the most known case for a bipolar system. Multipolar system is a system of world order in which power is distributed between more than two states that have varying degree of military, cultural, and economic impacts; but no one state candominate the system alone. Maintaining the balance of power among the poles is important to achieve stability in this system.According to the classical realist theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems since great powers gain power through alliances. The “Concert of Europe”, the period between the end of Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War in 19th century is an example of this system. In contrast, neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that the bipolar system is more stable because its parameters are clear and foreseen. Moreover, there is a certainty of association based on the ideologies defended by the powerful states in the bipolar system, while the alliances can be changed freely and quickly in the multipolar system that brings uncertainty.Source: (Cox, 2016: 47-49).

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Taking into consideration that controlling the Turkish Straits was one of the bargaining issues at the secret German-Soviet negotiations in November 1940 and that the Soviets also brought their demands on Turkey to Yalta and Potsdam Conferences at the end of the Second World War, Turkey was alarmed by the Soviet intentions for its territorial integrity. Finally, a note delivered by the Soviet foreign minister to its Turkish counterpart on 7 June 1945 clearly remunerated the Soviet demands in order for the Soviets to renew the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression of 1925. As Turkey refused these demands and the Soviets increased the pressure, Turkey tried to involve the US and the UK against the Soviet Union. However, in the post-war international situation, the UK and the US were still seeking to develop their cooperation with the Soviets. Moreover, Turkey’s neutral stance during the war left Turkey alone in the post-World War environment to face the Soviet threat alone, though this allowed it to avoid the damages of the war.

As a result, the Soviets were able to obtain the support of the Allies at the Potsdam Conference (17 July- 2 August) with regard to the future of navigation through the Turkish Straits. Although the Conference ended without any concrete resolution regarding the Straits, it was nevertheless agreed in principle that the Montreux Convention of 1936 would be revised. After the Potsdam Conference, however, as the leaders of the US and the UK gradually noticed that the Soviets had further ambitions not only over the Turkish Straits but also over the Balkans and Iran, the Western attitude gradually changed toward the Soviets and Turkey found itself in alignment with the Western powers against the Soviet Union.

Finally, Turkey’s post-war isolation ended with the declaration made by Great Britain in March 1946. Great Britain announced that the 1939 Treaty of Alliance was still in force and that it was obliged to help Turkey in case of any aggression. Even though the Soviets repeated their demands several times, the Allied states sided with Turkey in opposing them.

However, as the UK decided that it could not cope with its international commitments in the wider world in the post-war atmosphere, its position was gradually filled by the US in Europe and the Middle East. Thus, with the declaration of

the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948, Turkey’s connection with the US was established, leading to Turkey’s Western dependency in 1950s and beyond.

The final point of Turkey’s Western connection in security and military terms was its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the context of post-world war environment, in order to meet the perceived Soviet threat on its borders, Turkish leaders did not see any other alternative but to join the western alliance system. The then ruling party, the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes, also concluded that it would be difficult to establish a liberal economic system and support the development of democracy in Turkey without connecting it to the West. What is more, also thanks to its participation in the Korean War, Turkey finally joined NATO in 1952.

Democracy, Economic Development, and Foreign Policy

Alongside the transformations in the international system, there were also major changes in domestic policies of Turkey. After the one-party political system, Turkey adopted a multiparty political system at the end of the Second World War, which also contributed to its willingness to pursue closer relations with Western democracies.

Turkey’s economic needs at the end of the war also directed it toward a Western-dependent foreign policy. Turkey had substantial gold and foreign exchange reserves at the end of the war due to good weather and earlier favorable prices for agricultural products. However, in the face of heightened political tension and especially because of a possibility of conflict with the Soviets, Turkey did not want to use these reserves. As a result, in order to keep its army intact and to further modernize it, Turkey needed international loans, which were only available from the US at the time. Eventually the American aid started to arrive via the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948) with various restrictions on their use that went unnoticed at the time. Those restrictions, however, would pose problems for Turkey in the long term.

Turkey did not only receive international aid to develop its economy and modernize its military in the 1950s, but also took part in institutions to formalize its ties with the Western world. As a

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result, in 1948 Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (which is the forerunner of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD. In 1950, Turkey also became one of the founding members of the Council of Europe. Taking part in these European institutions was important for Turkey’s economic and political needs at the time.

Relying on foreign aid for economic development and modernization of military had started with the Republican People’s Party in the post-worldwarera;however,itcontinuedwithanincrease during the Democratic Party governments. As Turkey adopted a free enterprise economy and a foreign-investment-induced development program, its dependence on foreign aid increased. However, Turkey came to the brink of bankruptcy in 1958 because of economic mismanagement, increased foreign trade deficit, and uncoordinated development policies. As a result, the Menderes government had to accept a stabilization program enforced by an international consortium comprised of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, the European Payments Union, and the International Monetary Fund. In return, Turkey’s debts were rescheduled and new aid packages were offered to Turkey. In this way, Turkey’s domestic economic and political development were tied to its Western connection in international affairs as well as to its Western-leaning foreign policy.

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Inter-Coup Period, 1960-1980

The Turkish-American relationship and Turkey’s Western attachment that started with the 1939 Turkey-UK-France Alliance and grew stronger with the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and Turkey’s membership in NATO began to cool down during the 1960s and deteriorated in the 1970s. With the change in the international environment, domestic political changes as well as the rise of anti-American sentiment in Turkey, Turkish foreign policy moved into a phase of re-evaluation during the 1970s. Even though the 1964 Cyprus crisis and the related developments were the turning point for the Turkish-American relations, various domestic and international developments led to a perceivable shift in Turkish foreign policy.

Détente and Turkish Foreign PolicyThe tension between the two blocs gradually

softened in international relations during the 1960s, which came to be known as the détente period. Also in this period, the interdependence in international relations increased as well as the developing world occupied a relatively crucial role in international politics. Thus, global politics moved from a strict bipolar balance toward a relatively complex and multidimensional configuration, where secondary powers (including Turkey) became much more independent in their policymaking and in building relations with each other, bypassing the bloc lines.

Because of the rising economic consciousness of the global South or the so-called “Third World” countries, not only the inter-bloc relations changed during the détente but also new actors were introduced to the world political stage. While the Group of 77 came to represent the economic changes in global scale, the Non-aligned Countries became the representative of the changes on the political scene. They introduced new concepts on economic development and also initiated cross-alliance relations that led to an interdependent world. With the slowing down of the rivalry between the two blocs, the smaller members of the alliance systems started to have economic and political relations with the opposing-bloc members.

These changes in global politics inevitably affected Turkey’s international position and foreign policy. While Turkey in the 1950s had tried to develop its relations only with the Western bloc, it had to move to expand its relations to the new centers of economic, political, and military power in the 1970s in order to employ its full potential in international relations.

Effects of Pluralist DemocracyThe Democratic Party period ended with a

military coup on May 27, 1960. The military government established after the coup did not make any immediate foreign policy changes. However, with the adoption of the ‘liberal’ constitution of 1961, a relatively free political atmosphere followed in the rest of 1960s that had a crucial impact on Turkey’s domestic and, consequently, foreign policy.

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First, until the early years of 1960s, Turkish foreign policy-making was under the control of a small elite as an exclusive privilege. Foreign policy was considered a bipartisan issue, and the public criticism of government on foreign policy issues was not welcomed. The authoritarian characteristics of single-party politics of the 1930s and the 1940s continued almost in a similar fashion during the two-party system of the 1950s. Domestic politics aside, the governing party did not consult with the opposition party on foreign policy matters. For example, sending troops to the Korean War, the first military move by Turkey in its international affairs following the national independence, was consulted neither with the opposition party nor with the Turkish Grand National Assembly, despite its monumental importance.

The 1961 constitution, however, designed a new political system that promoted a relatively pluralistic polity through recognizing fundamental human rights, basic freedoms, multi-party politics, and public involvement in the policymaking process. These changes allowed hitherto undiscussed foreign policy topics to be open to public discourse, which ultimately affected Turkey’s foreign policy and international standings on various issues.

Another important development in this period was the reorientation of Turkey’s foreign policy in a way to establish closer relations with the newly emerging non-aligned countries as well as with the Arab-Muslim world. This occurred mainly because of Turkey’s perceived aloofness in international relations when the Cyprus issue came to a vote in such forums as the UN.

Moreover, the military government of 1960 and the following civilian governments also tried to renegotiate a number of bilateral agreements signed with the US during the 1950s in order to align them more closely with Turkish national interests. Several incidents in the early 1960s involving American soldiers showed that some of these agreements were signed without the specific approval of the Turkish Parliament (because they were classified as technical agreements or addendums to the earlier agreements approved by the Parliament). Some of the agreements also contained clauses that granted certain extraterritorial rights to the US personnel stationed in Turkey that brought to mind the earlier examples of judicial capitulations given to the great powers by the Ottoman Empire.

Another contribution to the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy came from the emergence of smaller parties representing hitherto fringe political interests. The establishment of the Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi- TİP) with its socialist identity and the publication of the weekly Yön in 1961 were important in this context as they both were against the American presence on the Turkish soil and launched anti-American campaigns. Even though this campaign attracted attention only from the intelligentsia at the time, with the emergence of the Cyprus issue from 1964 onwards, the anti-American rhetoric of the TİP received support from the public.

Eventually, with the emergence of a relatively free political atmosphere during the inter-coup period and the development of student activism all around the world, Turkish youth started to develop radicalism during the late 1960s and this grew stronger in the 1970s. What started as peaceful student demonstrations in late 1960s quickly polarized and turned into armed clashes between the left-wing and right-wing student groups during the 1970s. Although they had common ground on anti-imperialism, the leftists attacked Turkey’s alliance with the US whereas the rightists strongly opposed a possible “Communist threat” to the political regime.

Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Determinant

The new domestic political structure created by the 1961 Turkish constitution led to further fragmentation of parties and the party system. The new political atmosphere also helped discuss and criticize foreign policies of the government. This gradually helped Turkey to adopt a relatively independent stance in its international affairs. However, this tendency had remained limited to a small circle of politicians and intellectuals until the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis, which served as a catalyst for the public to get involved in foreign policy issues and pushed the policymakers to reconsider their decisions.

For many reasons, Cyprus was vital for Turkey. First, because of its geographical position, Cyprus was strategically very important. Since it is located in the Eastern Mediterranean, the channels from Turkey to the open seas would be cut off if it were

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to fall into the hands of a hostile country. For this reason, starting from the 1950s, Turkey resisted to the Greek designs on the island. Secondly, because of the presence of a large Turkish community on the island, the Cyprus issue was perceived emotionally and in the context of a national pride. The Greek plan of Enosis was considered as the first step for the Megali Idea. Thus, when violent clashes started between the two communities on the island at the end of 1963, Turkey, governed by a fragile coalition government, immediately found itself involved in the crisis.

Enosis is a political movement that aims at the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The movement was an outcome of the nationalist awareness among the Greek-Cypriots between 1882 and 1960. After World War II, with the anti-colonial movement against the British Empire, the idea of enosis became a way for independence from the British rule. From 1955 onwards, the EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston), conducted a campaign against the British rule on the island and promoted enosis with Greece that lasted until 1959. In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was established with two communities. After the independence, President Makarios III declared its support for an independent state instead of enosis. However, in 1971, EOKA-B, a pro-enosis paramilitary group, was formed and attempted to overthrow Makarios in 1974 through a coup d’état organized by the Cypriot National Guard with the support of the Greek government. Following this attempt at changing the constitutional structure of Cyprus, Turkey militarily intervened to prevent the enosis.Megali Idea is a concept of Greek nationalism that aims at founding a Greek state that would include all historically ethnic Greek populated areas. The Southern Balkans, Anatolia, and Cyprus are said to be included in this area. The concept has roots dating back to the Eastern Roman Empire to establish a Greek state that would have territories in two continents (Europe and Asia) and five seas (the Ionian, Aegean, Marmara, Black, and Libyan seas). The Megali Idea was a dominant idea in Greek foreign policy between the War of Independence in the 1820s and the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. Later on, the island of Cyprus witnessed the idea and the political movement of enosis.Source: (Yellice, 2012: 14-16).

At the beginning of the conflict, Turkey asked support from the NATO. However, other NATO members, in particular the US, were hesitant to get involved in a so-called local disagreement between the two members of the Alliance. In addition, the US did not want to alienate either Greece or Turkey by imposing any solution in Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkey had certain expectations from the US, but it failed to calculate that the international political circumstances had changed. The conjuncture was different from that of the 1950s. While both countries were dependent on the American aid in the 1950s, both countries, however, were feeling less compelled by the Cold-War milieu in the 1960s. Besides, due to the association of Greece with the European Economic Community, the US had relatively less economic leverage on Greece. Finally, becoming an independent state in 1960, Cyprus was taking a separate position from Greece.

Another factor that changed for Turkey in the 1960s was about the perception of its strategic importance by other countries. Due to its geographical position, Turkey was relatively more important than Greece for the US strategic thinking at the time. Nevertheless, after developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, the US did not need Turkish bases to manage the nuclear balance of power. What further affected the American policies was the presence of a large and well-organized Greek-American community in the US as well as the Christian protests against the restrictions brought by Turkey on the activities of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul (Ülman and Dekmejian, 1967).

Against the neutral approach of the US and NATO to the incidents on the island, there was a public outcry in Turkey. Following a decision by the Cypriot parliament in June 1964 to establish general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defense forces, Prime Minister İnönü decided for a unilateral intervention. However, the US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter (the so-called Johnson Letter) to İnönü to prevent him from launching a military operation in Cyprus.

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When Johnson’s letter was partially leaked to the press, it had a shocking effect on Turkey with regard to the trustworthiness of its ally. President Johnson remarked that “NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.” Johnson added that “the United States cannot agree to the use of any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.” Although İnönü replied that “there are wide divergences of views” between Turkey and the US with regard to “the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance,” the Turkish leaders concluded that the Turkish national interests were not identical with those of the US and of other Western allies.

Aside from the Cyprus issue and the Johnson letter, there were other problems in Turkish-US relations. The anti-American sentiment in Turkey had been growing even before the Cyprus crisis broke out. Among others, this was because of the American presence at the military bases in Turkey, the misuse of US installations in Turkey, the CIA activities, the suspicion regarding the US involvement in domestic policies, the abuse of the status of forces agreements, and the decrease in U.S. military aid. Besides, the Cuban missile deal in 1962 and the adoption of the flexible response strategy by NATO created further concerns among the Turkish leaders.

Figure 1.4 Johnson’s Letter in Turkish Press.

Source: Hürriyet

The Flexible Response Strategy is a military strategy adopted by NATO in 1967 and formalized in NATO Military Committee Document 14/3, entitled “The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area.” It includes mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical, and conventional levels that give the wider capability other than nuclear weapons to respond the aggression by the Soviet Union. It had three stages: Direct defense in case of a conventional Soviet attack (non-nuclear), deliberate escalation (limited use of nuclear weapons), and general nuclear response (mutual assured destruction scenario). Source: (Duffield, 1991: 132-133).

The Cuban missile deal, where the US bargained away Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey in return for the Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba without actually consulting Turkey, was particularly troublesome for Turkey. As a result of the Cuban crisis, Turkey became aware that an urgent crisis might even escalate into a war without any early warning. Second, Turkey realized that it might become a target for a Soviet nuclear attack because of the American bases on its soil. Third, taking into consideration Kennedy’s unilateral action during the Cuban crisis, the US could and would act in its own interest without consulting with its allies. The Turkish public opinion was disturbed that national interests could be negotiated away so easily by the US. All these prompted Turkey to reconsider its relations with the US and its role in NATO.

There were also attempts by Turkey to break its isolation in the international arena and to find support for its Cyprus policy. One of the most important changes in the late 1960s was the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Even though bilateral relations had softened starting from 1959 because of economic considerations and the reverberation of the American actions during the Cyprus issue, Turkey and the

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Soviet Union became closer after 1964. Besides the Cyprus crisis, other factors were also effective in this process such as the decrease in the American economic and military aid, the role of the political opposition, and the growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey.

Turkish policymakers thought that the rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union would urge the US and NATO to accept a favorable solution for Turkey in the Cyprus issue. They were also aiming at receiving the support of the Communist Bloc in the UN for the Turkish position on Cyprus. Finally, even if Turkey might not win the support of the Soviets for its position, it at least wanted to secure the neutrality of the Soviets. Thus, diplomatic talks and visits intensified between Turkey and the Soviet Union after 1965. The bilateral dialogue covered not only the Cyprus issue but also other subjects concerning mutual interests. The increase in reciprocal trade and the beginning of a Soviet aid program may be considered as a turning point for Turkey’s foreign policy.

Together with the rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Turkey also tried to expand its relations with the non-aligned countries, in particular with the Middle Eastern countries. The idea to become a bridge between the East and the West and the commercial opportunities in the Arab market triggered a shift in Turkish foreign policy. However, the Turkish-Third World relations in the 1960s were strained because of such issues as Cyprus. In fact, despite all its efforts, Turkey failed to receive support from the Third World during the UN vote on Cyprus in 1965.

Nevertheless, Turkey continued with its new multi-faceted foreign policy in the 1960s. The position that Turkey took during the Arab-Israeli conflict serves as an example for its new policy. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Turkey changed its hitherto neutral position, and voted in the UN for the Yugoslav resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. However, to balance its new position with the West, Turkey did not go so far as to sign the Soviet resolution that labelled Israel as an “aggressor.”

Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s

Starting from the end of the 1960s, Turkey had to focus on its internal economic and political problems rather than o international politics. This, however, resulted in relative passivity on foreign policy. After the 1971 military intervention, the period of caretaker governments was marred by the lack of foreign policy initiative. One internal and one external development occurred, however, that had an impact on Turkish-American relations specifically and Turkish foreign policy in general.

Turkey’s major problem with the US between 1966 and 1974 was the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey. The US imposed strict controls on Turkey in 1968 to prevent illegal trafficking of opium. The American officials claimed that illegal trafficking of opium from Turkey constituted 80% of the heroin illegally consumed in the US. By 1970, the US Congress began to take an interest and required the President “to suspend all military sales, aid (and) economic assistance” to governments that could not prevent the production of narcotics in their countries from reaching to the US. These pressures paid off as the caretaker government in Turkey after the 1971 intervention announced a ban of the poppy cultivation in Turkey. There was an outrage in the country, though, when the US asked India to increase its opium production to meet the worldwide shortage forecasted by the International Narcotics Board.

The ban continued until July 1, 1974, when the Republican People’s Party-National Salvation Party coalition government abolished it. The US Congress responded harshly to this act, and various members of the Congress proposed several draft resolutions to impose embargoes on Turkey. Although Resolution 507 concerning the termination of all assistance to the Turkish government was approved by the Congress, it did not push the President to implement the resolution. Instead the Congress decided to support the arms embargo favored by the Greek lobby and “the rule of law” opponents after the second Turkish intervention in Cyprus on August 14, 1974. This understandably outraged theTurkishpublic and the government; the trustbetween the two countries reached a very low point.

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Meanwhile, there was another important development in the Republican People’s Party that had crucial effect afterwards on Turkish foreign policy. Bülent Ecevit replaced İsmet İnönü as the Party Chairman in 1972 by promoting a left-of-the-center political approach. According to Ecevit, in contrast to İnönü, Turkey could afford adopting a relatively assertive foreign policy against the superpowers. He was in favor of acting more independently within the NATO alliance and pursuing national interests.

In addition to these, the Cyprus issue again became a catalyst for a dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s. The 1974 crises did not only increase the antagonism between Greece and Turkey, but also strained Turkish-American relations to the breaking point. At the same time, due to Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviets in late 1960s and détente, the threat of Soviet intervention dissipated and the Soviet Union kept its silence when Turkey intervened in the island in 1974. Turkey’s isolation in the UN was also diminished as its relations with the Soviet Bloc and Third World countries became friendlier.

Figure 1.5 The island of Cyprus and the TRNC.

Source: www.turk-dunyasi.cokbilgi.com/kibris-kktc-haritasi/

Thus, as the Turkish army was able to control about forty percent of Cyprus by August 1974 and, in return, the US imposed arms embargo on Turkey in February 1975. Then, Turkey decided to suspend all activities at the American bases in Turkey, except the NATO bases. The fact that, in contrast to the Congress, other actors such as the US President, the US State Department, and the American military opposed the embargo, it was possible for Turkey to maintain its relations with the US at a certain level.

Moreover, the Cyprus issue did not only affect the bilateral relations with Greece and the US but also underlined Turkey’s diplomatic isolation. When the UN General Assembly voted on a draft resolution on Cyprus in 1976, it was 94-1 against Turkey with 27 abstentions. Thus, after 1974, Cyprus has become both a main problem for, and a major determinant of, Turkish foreign policy.

In the 1970s, alongside the Cyprus issue, economic factors also played an important role in Turkish foreign policy. While implementing the “Five-Year Development Plans,” Turkey committed itself to a massive economic modernization. In addition, as a consequence of its NATO commitments and its competition with Greece, Turkey had to maintain a high degree of military preparedness. However, the economic circumstances in Turkey and in the international arena made it rather difficult for Turkey to strike a balance among these objectives.

Both the worldwide energy crisis of the mid-1970s and the American embargo in connection with the Cyprus issue severely affected the Turkish economy. While Turkey needed foreign credits and loans, foreign creditors required serious austerity measures as a prerequisite to extending further loans.

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Alternatively, Turkey wanted to expand its relations with the Soviet Union, oil-rich Arab countries, and the European Economic Community (EEC). However, the relations with European countries were tense because of the preferences given by the EEC to the former colonies of its member states and to several Mediterranean countries. In addition, the restrictions imposed on Turkey’s textile exports made Turkey to become suspicious of the EEC’s objectives. Finally, the probability of Greek accession to the EEC increased Turkey’s concerns even more, because the EEC Council had the unanimous voting rule and Greece could use its veto power against Turkey on issues brought before the Council, including the Cyprus question and the problems in the Aegean Sea.

FOREIGN POLICY SETTING AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR,

1980-2000Because of the issues and impacts summarized

above, foreign policy inclinations of Turkey changed during the inter-coup period, that is, between 1960 and 1980. However, Turkey did not change the foundations of its foreign policy. While still maintaining the principles of identification and alliance with the West, the pursuit of national interests in foreign policy and the increasing independence in making its foreign policy choices became Turkey’s priorities.

To summarize, the Cuban missile crisis and the removal of the Jupiter missiles, the American attitude toward the evolving Cyprus issue, the formation of the EEC, the NATO’s new flexible response strategy, and the isolation of Turkey in the UN with regard to the Cyprus issue had nudged Turkey to change its policies. Their effects were aggravated by a series of events such as: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the oil crises, the deterioration of Turkish-American relations, the opium dispute, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the tension

between Turkey and Greece because of both Cyprus and the Aegean problems, the disappointments about the EEC, and the lack of support for Turkey in the UN after the Cyprus intervention.

Foreign Policy Setting at the End of the Cold War, 1980-2000

Along these international problems, there were also serious complications in domestic politics of Turkey; mainly resulted from the aggravatedpoliticization and polarization of the Turkish people as well as economic difficulties. In addition to all these domestic problems, the weaknesses of the coalition governments contributed to the ineffective and passive foreign policy approach that was not able to find comprehensive and effective solutions to Turkey’s major problems in foreign affairs such as Cyprus, the Aegean, and the relations with the US. Thus, by the end of 1970s, both the domestic and international stage was ready for Turkey to start a soul-searching in its foreign policy.

The military coup d’état of September 12, 1980 became, in the longer run, an important watershed as it brought about fundamental changes to the domestic politics, sociology, economics, and consequently foreign policy of Turkey. The major transformations that Turkey had to go through as a result of, or connection with, the coup, in the 1980s had considerable impact on its international relations as well. Thus, at the end of the decade, Turkey was a transformed country and the impetus for change was still visible.

During the 1980s, Turkey experienced various political models: the multi-party democracy at the beginning of the decade, the direct military rule between September 1980 and November 1983, a quasi-democracy afterwards, and a further democratization process following 1983. The problems concerning the democratization, restrictions on freedoms and human rights, as well as the continued influence of the military on political life created tensions mostly in relations with Europe. Therefore, as a result of the criticism levelled against the country from Europe, Turkey gradually isolated itself politically from Europe in the 1980s. The political distance from Europe also affected Turkey’s economy as the European countries constituted the biggest market for

Comment on the impact of the 1974 “Peace Operation” in Cyprus on Turkish foreign policy.

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Turkish products. As a result, in order to balance its political isolation from Europe and to alleviate its economic effects, Turkey increasingly turned to the Middle East in the 1980s.

At the same time, the shift toward a liberal economy with the January 24, 1980 decisions made it necessary for Turkey to prioritize its economic needs in its external relations, because the new economic model required sustained foreign currency inflows and ever-increasing exports. Further integration of Turkish economy with the global economy naturally pushed the Foreign Ministry to become more interested and involved in obtaining foreign loans, opening up new markets for Turkish goods, and making deals with foreign governments to bring foreign investments into the country. Therefore, Turkey’s opening toward the Middle East in the 1980s and toward Eurasia in 1990s had solid background in its economic policy.

The 1980 coup did not only result in political and economic changes in Turkey but also had far-reaching social effects. First, the repression of the liberal and left-of-the-center intelligentsia during the 1980s and the abuse of religious issues by the military as an antidote to extremism paved the way for a growing visibility of Islam in the Turkish society. Similarly, many influential members of the Motherland Party (ANAP- Anavatan Partisi) were classified as “Islamist” by the secular intelligentsia. Even though it is hard to distinguish the possible influence of religion from other motivating values on the Motherland-Party governments during the 1980s, it was still clear that the “Islamic faction” within the party was locked in a power struggle against the “idealist” and “liberal” factions throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

Furthermore, with the onset of all-out globalization, Turkey started to experience increased importance of hyper-identities in politics, specifically wider religious, historical, and ethnic bonds among its citizens. These attachments gained further ground especially in the 1990s and urged successive governments to be wary during various international crises such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Caucasus and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in the Balkans. As the historical and religious bonds became vital in determining public reactions during these conflicts, the governments had to be cautious to

avoid any military entanglements in these conflicts as public demanded.

As the Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Turkey felt a certain degree of relief from its colossal northern neighbor in centuries, there emerged new conflict zones on three sides of Turkey: the Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus, Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkans, and Kuwait-Iraq in the Middle East. While Turkey was pushed to take sides and to follow an active foreign policy in all these conflicts, it was more willing to promote the positive aspects of the creation of newly independent states and tried to encourage them to craft peaceful policies.

In particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 triggered an enormous transformation in Eurasia that had serious impact on Turkish foreign and security policies. With the emergence of six independent Muslim states to its northeast and the presence of 150 million Muslim Turkic-speakers in these countries, Pan-Turkist ideas started to be circulated in Turkey. However, it soon became clear that Turkey had limited capacity in terms of its economic, political, and social characteristics to meet the overwhelming needs of these newly independent countries. Nevertheless, Turkey was able to energize its various historical, ethnic and religious connections with these countries in order to build a special relationship with them, however, at the same time keeping in mind that the opportunities came with some potential risks.

While Turkey had been able to structure its foreign and security policies around its NATO alliance during the Cold War, the end of the Cold War opened up discussions on the relevance of NATO in the newly emerging international system. This discussion, taking place especially in Europe, shook the foundations of Turkish security thinking and pushed it to re-evaluate its post-Cold War positioning and to look for new openings wherever they are. Thus, in time, Turkey was able to develop a greater role for itself in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The growing role of Turkey at that time in its neighborhood was also favored by the West and hesitantly by Russia as a counter against disruptive influences of radical Islam and/or Iran. Thus, Turkey was promoted especially by the US as a model to be emulated by the countries in the region. Benefiting from this conducive international environment and vibrant

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economy, Turkey in the 1990s was able to add the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans as new components to its foreign policy, but at the same time keeping its Western connection intact.

Challenges of the Post-Cold War Era and Ensuing Changes since 2000

Many characteristics of the twentieth-century Turkish foreign policy were shaped under both the pressures of the Cold War and the constant turmoil in its neighborhood. Despite the changes in the regional context and geopolitical realignments, Turkey continued to follow most of its long-practiced principles in the 1990s. However, with the emergence of relative political tranquility and economic prosperity in the 2000s as well as the emergence of a multipolar international system, different quarters of Turkish society started to question these characteristics.

What followed was a period of pro-active foreign policy with extensive international engagements. However, with the onset of the Arab uprisings from 2011 onwards, Turkey faced renewed instability in its neighborhood and had to make difficult choices. In the end, it had to choose between either continuing its new line of policy that would bring further changes to its regional and global positioning or returning to its older certainties.

There were two major international developments, ten years apart, that affected Turkey’s international standing and foreign policy in the 2000s: the terror attacks on the US in September 2001 (the 9/11 incidents) and the Arab uprisings in 2011. Both had fundamental effects on the international system. Due to the influence of the globalization and the increase in communication, most of the borders and limitations became less certain and disputed. In the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the overarching superpower with an objective to remodel the world. This policy opened the way to worldwide resistance and conflicts. Further, the Arab uprisings opened the floodgates in Turkey’s neighborhood.

Besides the international developments, Turkey was going through another domestic transformation, in fact challenging its own transformations in the 1920s-30s and 1980s. This change led to a redefinition of its neighborhood

from a new Turkey-centered regional perspective. Turkey could open up its eyes to its environs and look beyond its borders at the end of the Cold War. Now, Turkey desired to benefit from these regional and global changes in order to devise new cooperation forums such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Caucasus Stability Pact, and the Levant Quartet. In addition, thanks to the expanding economic capabilities through deeper integration with global economy and the EU-economic area, Turkey was able to follow new policy lines.

As mentioned above, Turkey had focused on Central Asia and the Caucasus during the 1990s, and on the Balkans and the Black Sea region during the 2000s. With the new changes, Turkey focused on building stronger relations with the Middle East during the 2010s. Both security/strategic reasons and ideological/political choices played a part in this policy shift, because there was an increasing threat perception from the region, including a number of US interventions and the continuing threat of terrorist organizations.

While Turkey’s geopolitical reach was expanded and Turkey was provided with new opportunities in the Eurasia and the wider Middle East during the 2000s, its history was re-interpreted by a combination of neo-liberal, neo-Ottoman, and political Islamist views. Its Ottoman past was employed as a cultural determinant and justification for a new hegemonic drive in its neighborhood. Thus, the Ottoman Empire became an important linkage to its neighborhood with the process of reinterpretation of the history. From the perspective of the positive aspects of the imperial unity, Turkey’s surroundings were considered as areas of influence, in particular the Middle East.

Together with the re-evaluation of its geography and history, Turkey’s governing philosophy was also affected by this transformation. Kemalism was confronted with a reassessment and challenge. Along with the rising influences of neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism, and neo-fundamentalism, Turkey experienced a growing effect of its formerly underprivileged classes from Anatolia. As they were exposed to a more conservative culture, identificational uncertainties, local/regional visions, and political and economic preferences of these newly empowered classes became more dominant in Turkish politics. In

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terms of international relations, they were in favor of opening to new regions, in particular to the wider Middle East.

This renewed look at the Middle East brought a series of new policy initiatives. Abolishing visas, creating free-trade zones, high-level cooperation councils, joint cabinet meetings, and wide-ranging political, economic and social openings to the region can be counted as examples of Turkey’s new policy stance. In this context, Ahmet Davutoğlu developed several motto-like principles. His various conceptualizations such as “zero problem with neighbors,” “rhythmic diplomacy,” “strategic depth,” and “region-based foreign policy” were presented as constituting a new approach to foreign policy in contrast to the traditional way of foreign-policy making in Turkey (Aydın, 2019a).

The government had prioritized, at this conjuncture, the improvement of Turkey’s international image through solving its various long-standing international problems such as Cyprus, playing a mediator role in several international problems, and building an area of influence around Turkey with its soft-power assets. While moving to implement these policies, the government’s rhetoric and domestic political concerns started to dominate the action in the international fora.

Since the traditions were perceived as restraints slowing down Turkey, the result-oriented processes were replaced by an action-oriented approach. Activity in foreign relations was seen as effectiveness. Thus, Turkey gradually started to get involved in conflicts within its neighborhood either as a mediator or a player. In this way, one of the cardinal rules of traditional Turkish foreign policy concerning non-intervention in neighboring countries was broken. Nevertheless, with the Arab uprisings and especially the civil war in Syria, all

these new thoughts and positions were severely put to test. In time, the concept of “zero problem with neighbors” and its related principles were suddenly replaced by a rhetoric of “order building” in the Middle East. This policy put emphasis again on Turkey’s hard power instruments. After the failure of the implementation of the new policy line, Turkey’s near and far connections were damaged.

Not only the new policy line but also the foreign policy decision-making structure has changed remarkably since 2002. While there was strict control of the bureaucracy within the foreign ministry with the inputs from military, presidency, and prime ministers earlier, the roles for the foreign-ministry bureaucracy and the military diminished in the last 20 years. Instead, the prime minister first and later the president became the dominant actor in the foreign policy decision making process. In addition, the inputs started to flow more frequently from a wider security bureaucracy including the National Intelligence Organization. Furthermore, the foreign ministry’s traditions on recruitment, employment, and promotion have changed. Finally, the presidential system adopted with the 2017 referendum and confirmed with the June 2018 Presidential Elections has consolidated the decision-making powers in the Presidency. The effect of these changes on Turkish foreign policy making and country’s long-term international relations will no doubt be an important conjunctural factor in the coming years (Aydın, 2019a: 373-374).

Explain the impact of the governing philosophy on Turkey’s foreign policy during the 2000s.

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Sum

mary

LO 1Explain the structural and conjunctural determinants of Turkish foreign policy.

Structural determinants are continuous and static variables that shape a country’s foreign policy. Since they do not depend on the international political developments and current issues in foreign politics, they have a long-term impact on the determination of foreign policy. In the Turkish context, historical experiences, cultural background and geographical position have large impact on its foreign policy. While some historical experiences, such as the presence of experienced bureaucratic elites, western orientation of the country’s elites and Ottoman diplomacy, can be characterized as constructive legacy, some other historical experiences, such as the Sevres Syndrome and centuries-long hostilities with neighboring countries, can become problematic. Conjunctural determinants, on the other hand, are dynamic variables that can change quickly depending on the domestic and international developments. In this sense, transition from the Cold War to détente, the various stages of Cyprus issue, the end of the Cold War and 9/11 have been important factors that have influenced Turkish foreign policy in different time periods.

LO 2Identify the determinants of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period.

923-1939) was mainly influenced by the structural factors and determined by Mustafa Kemal’s principles. The grand ideas of the late Ottoman Empire (i.e. Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism) were replaced with the principles of republicanism, secularism, and nationalism. These ideas had major impact on the country’s foreign policy, as well as its domestic policy during the interwar period. From this perspective, there was a fundamental connection between foreign and domestic policies of the country, and Atatürk’s foreign policy was essentially an extension of his domestic political views. His famous motto ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ shows us how he was connecting internal stability with the international peace and order. An important strategy of the Turkish foreign policy at this time was the maintenance of the status quo after the achievement of the National Pact with the signature of Lausanne. Instead of pursuing a more adventurous and dangerous path, Turkey tried to preserve what it achieved with the War of Independence.

LO 3Analyze Turkey’s Cold-War foreign policies and explain its main determinants.

Turkey’s international standing during the Cold War could be classified as Western-dependent due to both systemic factors and domestic developments. First of all, the transition from a multipolar to bipolar world system forced Turkey to choose a side as it was a middle-range power with geopolitical importance to bloc leaders. Considering the Soviet pressure on Turkey for territorial adjustments and its westernization process, Turkey preferred the Western camp at the end of the Second World War. Parallel to the transformation in the international system, Turkey’s domestic politics also experienced major changes moving into a multiparty system. The political desire for democratization also contributed to Turkey’s move to closer relations with the Western democracies. Turkey’s economic needs at the end of the War and extensive requirements for economic and military foreign aid also exacerbated its western dependency. Last but not least, Cyprus problem became a crucial foreign policy determinant starting from early 1960s.


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LO 4Describe the policy setting at the end of the Cold War and the effects of structural and conjectural determinants on the Turkish foreign policy making.

Parallel to changes in the international system, Turkey was going through serious domestic political changes at the end of the Cold War. Particularly, the aggravated politicization and polarization of the Turkish people as well as economic difficulties had impacts on policy making processes. The coup d’état of September 12, 1980 particularly led to vital changes in domestic politics, as well as the sociology, economics, and consequently foreign policy of the country. In addition, Turkey’s major international problems such as Cyprus, the Aegean, and the relations with the US remained unsolved because of the inability of the successive weak coalition governments to implement comprehensive solutions. Furthermore, the shift in economic policy towards liberalization pushed Turkey to open up toward the Middle East in the 1980s and towards Eurasia in 1990s. Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, new markets adapting to capitalist economy emerged in Eurasia, benefiting Turkey. Thus, in the 1990s, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans became new components of Turkey’s foreign policy, while its Western connections remained mostly intact.

Sum

mar

y


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1 Which of the following statements is true about the structural determinants of foreign policy?

a. They are directly related to the daily issues in international politics.

b. They are dynamic variables.c. They are continuous and static variables that

shape foreign policy.d. They are formed by the personalities of specific

decision-makers.c. They are characterized by the shifts in the

world’s present balance of power.

2 Realpolitik refers to ---

Which of the following options correctly completes the sentence above?

a. Politics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals.

b. Politics based on ideals and norms.c. Politics based on collective principles.d. Politics planned by the international

organizations.e. Diplomatic approach followed by the US

during the Cold War.

3 --- can be considered as a problematic legacy in Turkish foreign policy.


a. The central geographic situationb. The realistic Ottoman diplomacy during the

19th centuryc. The Sevres Syndrome d. The Westernization movemente. The organizational structure of the foreign

ministry

4 --- is an approach followed during the inter-war period in Turkey’s foreign policy.


a. Pan-Ottomanismb. Pan-Turanism c. Turkish-Islamic Synthesisd. Peace at home, peace in the worlde. The strategic depth

5 Problem of Alexandretta was solved ---


a. By the end of the First World War.b. With the Treaty of Sevres.c. With the mediation of the United Nations.d. By partitioning Syria.e. 16 years after the Treaty of Lausanne.

6 A multipolar system is ---


a. Never seen in the international system. b. A system of world order in which the

distribution of power is held between two states.

c. A system that emerged during the Cold War.d. A more stable system according to realist

theorists such as Morgenthau and Carr.e. A system in which one state can be predominant

in the international arena.

Test Yourself


30

7 The Flexible Response Strategy ---


a. Is related to the prohibition of nuclear weapons.b. Includes a massive retaliation for any attack on

the NATO allies.c. Lacks any defensive value.d. Is a military strategy that provides alternative

capabilities to NATO countries other than nuclear weapons to defeat a possible aggression by the Soviet Union.

e. Is a military strategy followed by the Group of 77 during the Cold War.

8 Which of the following statements is true about the Cuban missile deal?

a. It was concluded between Cuba and Soviet Union.

b. It is a multilateral treaty to regulate the use of nuclear weapons.

c. It brought the end of the Cold War.d. It made Turkey realize that it might become a

target for a Soviet nuclear attack. e. It caused Turkey to become isolated in the

international arena.

9 In which of the following countries did the 9/11 attacks occur?

a. France b. The United Statesc. The United Kingdomd. Norwaye. New Zealand

10 Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War was not influenced by ---


a. The terror attacks around the worldb. The Arab Uprisings in 2011c. The Justice and Development Party’s foreign

policy approach d. The US interventions in the Middle Easte. The Johnson Letter

Test

You

rsel

f


31

Suggested answ

ers for “Your turn”

Explain how structural variables affect the foreign policy making of a country.

your turn 1Experience and tradition over time - in combination with basic values and norms - create a set of relatively inflexible principles. What affects the process of formation of these principles varies from state to state. Yet, while looking at the elements that shape the foreign policy of any country, one can see, with some degree of over-simplification, the interplay of two kinds of variable. One kind, which may be called “structural variables,” are continuous, and rather static. The other, which may be termed “conjunctural variables,” are dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and foreign developments. The structural factors are not directly related to the international political medium and the daily happenings of foreign politics. They can exert a long-term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of other nations, and long-term economic necessities would fall into the category of “structural variables”.

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Structural Determinants” section.

1. C If your answer is incorrect, please review the “External Factor: Meeting the Soviet Threat” section.

6. D

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Problematic Legacies” section.

3. C If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Determinant” section.

8. D

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Structural Determinants” section.

2. A If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Determinant” section.

7. D

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Determinants of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period” section.

4. D

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Historical Experiences” section.

5. E

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Foreign Policy Setting at the End of the Cold War, 1980-2000” section.

9. B

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Challenges of the Post-Cold War Era and Ensuing Changes since 2000” section.

10. E


32

Comment on the impact of the 1974 “Peace Operation” in Cyprus on Turkish foreign policy.

your turn 3

The Cyprus was a catalyst for a dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s. The 1974 crises did not only increase the antagonism between Greece and Turkey, but also brought Turkish-American relations to a breaking point. While Turkey’s first intervention in July 1974, following the Greece-inspired coup that toppled elected president of the Cyprus Republic and threatened the safety of the Turkish community, was largely accepted by the international community, the second intervention that started in August 1974 and ended with Turkish Army controlling about one/third of the Island generated international reactions, including a US arms embargo in February 1975. In response to the US embargo, Turkey decided to suspend all activities at the American bases in Turkey, except NATO-related operations. These mutual reactions led to worsening relations between Turkey and the US, and forced Turkey to reassess its western-leaning foreign policy approach. Moreover, the loneliness in which Turkey found itself in the international arena when the Cyprus issue came up to debate forced Turkey along the same lines and widened its international connections, starting with opening to the Middle Eastern and Eastern Bloc countries.

Discuss the political legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

your turn 2

Turkey’s foreign policy has been influenced by the following goals and principles laid down by Atatürk: the establishment and preservation of a national state with complete independence conditioned bymodernTurkish nationalism;thepromotionofTurkeytothe levelofcontemporarycivilization;andtheattachment to realistic and peaceful means in foreign policy actions. Mustafa Kemal aimed at renunciation of three strains that had been important during Ottoman times: the imperial-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turanism. Policies which could break these strains were Republicanism, Secularism, and Nationalism respectively. Ataturk’s foreign policy was an extension of his domestic policies as he recognized the connection between the internal organization of the new Republic and its foreign policy. He also realized that a peaceful foreign policy was needed in order to achieve far-reaching reforms in Turkey. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that in his famous motto – ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ - connected internal stability with international peace and order. Atatürk did not want to see the Turkish nation as a foreign or hostile community set apart from the nations of the world and did not want the nation to belong to a group holding such views. He wanted Turkey to be a part of the civilized world.


33

Test YourselfA

nswer K

ey for “Test Yourself”S

umm

ary

Explain the impact of governing philosophy on Turkey’s foreign policy during the 2000s.

your turn 4

Along with the rising influences of neo-conservatism, neoliberalism, and neo-fundamentalism, Turkey experienced growing influences of its formerly underprivileged classes from Anatolia during the 2000s. Kemalism was confronted with a reassessment and challenges from rising religious and ethnic identities. While the newly empowered classes were more conservative in culture, their identificational uncertainties and local/regional visions as well as political and economic preferences became dominant in Turkish politics. In terms of international relations, they were in favor of openings to new regions, mainly in the wider Middle East. This brought a renewed attention to the Middle East, leading to a series of new policy initiatives including abolishment of visas, creation of free trade zones, establishment of high-level cooperation councils, joint cabinet meetings, and wide-ranging political, economic and social openings to the region. In this context, several motto-like principles were developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister and later Foreign Minister and finally Prime Minister. His various conceptualizations such as ‘zero problem with neighbors’, ‘rhythmic diplomacy’, ‘strategic depth’, and ‘region-based foreign policy’ were presented as constituting a new approach to foreign policy in contrast to the traditional way of foreign policy making.


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Aron, R. (1973). Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, New York: Anchor & Doubleday.

Aydın, M. (1994). Foreign Policy Formation and the Interaction Between Domestic and International Environments; A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1980-1991. Lancaster University, Unpublished PhD Thesis.

Aydın, M. (2000). “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” Sylvia Kedourie (Ed.), Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic, London: Frank Cass, pp. 152-186.

Aydın, M. (2003). “Security Conceptualisation in Turkey”. Hans G. Brauch et all (eds.), Security and Environment in the Mediterranean; Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts, Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag.

Aydın, M. (2004). Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM Papers, No.1, Ankara: SAM.

Aydın, M. (2019a). “Turkish Foreign Policy, 1923-2018”. Alpaslan Özerdem and Matthew Whiting (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics, Abington, New York: Routledge.

Aydın, M. (2019b). “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Chaos of War, 1939-1945”, William Hale (ed.), Special Issue on “Britain, Turkey and World War Two;Alliance,Conflict andNeutrality”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, forthcoming.

Cox, M. (2016). Introduction to International Relations: Undergraduate study in economics, management, finance and the social sciences, University of London. Retrieved from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50243/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_Cox_Cox_Introduction_%E2%80%8Citernational_relations_2012_Cox_Introduction_international_%20relations_2012.pdf.

Duffield, John S. (1991). “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation”, Security Studies, Vol.1, No. 1, pp. 132-156.

Karaosmanoğlu, A. (2000). “The Evolution of National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey”, Journal of International Affairs, No. 54, pp. 199-216.

Mufti, M. (1998). “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy”, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 32-50.

Oran, B. (2014). “Dönemin Bilançosu; KurtuluşYılları, 1919-1923”. Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olaylar, Olgular, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980, 14th ed. Ankara: İletişim Yayınları.

Oxford Bibliographies, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0231.xml

Rosenau, James N. (1971). “The Study of Foreign Policy” in James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin H. Boyd (eds.), World Politics: An Introduction, New York: Free Press, pp. 15-35.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel K. (1977). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, London: Cambridge University Press.

Ülman, H. and Richard H. Dekmejian (1967). “Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967”. Orbis, No. XI/3, pp. 772-785.

Yellice, G. (2012). “1878’den 1931’e Kıbrıs’ta Enosis Talepleri ve İngiltere’nin Yaklaşımı”, Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies, No. XII/24, pp. 13-26.

Further Reading

Demirağ, Y. (2005). “Pan-ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: from Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism.”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. XXXVI. http://www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/yearbookdizin/dosyalar/MMTY/36/6_yelda_demirag.pdf

Erhan, Ç. (2014). “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”. BaskınOran (ed.),TürkDışPolitikası;Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olaylar, Olgular, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980, 14th ed., Ankara: İletişim Yayınları.

Fırat, M. and Kürkçüoğlu, Ö. (2014). “Sancak (Hatay) Sorunu”. Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olaylar, Olgular, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980, 14th ed. Ankara: İletişim Yayınları.

Stojanovic, R. (1981). “The Emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement: A View from Belgrade”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol 13/3, pp. 443-450.

References

36

Chapter 2

Lear

ning

Out

com

es

Recognize the importance of the Mosul Problem

Discuss the main issues in TFP in the late 1930s, including the Turkish Straits and the Sanjak issue

Discuss the main features of TFP during the Atatürk era

Identify the significance of the Treaty of Lausanne

Analyze the reasons behind the Italian threat and the quest for international partnership

Give an assessment of TFP in the early years of the Republic

35

1 246

Chapter OutlineThe Main Features of TFP during the Atatürk EraThe Treaty of LausanneThe Mosul ProblemThe Italian Threat and the Quest for International PartnershipCritical Foreign Policy Issues in the late 1930s: The Turkish Straits and the Sanjak IssueAn assessment of TFP in the Early Years of the Republic

Key Terms• Atatürk• Status Quo• Westernism• Pragmatism• Multilateralism• Diplomacy• Lausanne• Soft Revisionism• Irredentism• Mosul• Turkish Straits• Montreux• Alexandretta

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Years, 1923-1938

37

2Turkish Foreign Policy-I

INTRODUCTIONTurkish foreign policy from the Lausanne Treaty

of 1923 to the onset of WWII in 1939 was primarily guided by the foreign policy understanding of Atatürk, the founder of Modern Turkey. Liberating Anatolia from European occupation, Atatürk was the mastermind behind Turkey’s War of Independence and was adamant in raising a new republic from the ashes of the defunct Ottoman Empire. Starting with the Lausanne Treaty, Turkish foreign policy during this period mainly aimed at actualizing complete political and economic independence, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts through multilateral diplomacy. Turkish resoluteness in denying anything short of full independence during the Lausanne conference highlights the foreign policy priorities of Atatürk’s new Turkey. Moreover, attachment to multilateral diplomacy was another key feature of Turkish foreign policy in this era. Especially from 1930 onwards, Turkey concentrated its foreign policy activism on the resolution of bilateral issues through multilateral diplomacy. Therefore, independence was the primary goal and diplomacy was the primary method of Atatürk’s foreign policy.

This chapter is organized into six parts. First, the main features of Atatürk’s foreign policy will be discussed in detail. Second, the Treaty of Lausanne and its significance for Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed. Third, the Mosul problem will be in close scrutiny. In the fourth section, the chapter will turn to the 1930s with a focus on the rising Italian threat and Turkey’s quest for regional and international partnerships against it. The fifth section will focus on the Montreux International Straits Convention, while the final part will discuss the Hatay dispute. Both parts will emphasize Turkey’s attachment to multilateral diplomacy for the resolution of disputes as a key foreign policy method in Atatürk’s Turkey.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ATATÜRK ERABaskın Oran (2001a: 46) stresses two defining

features of Turkish foreign policy laid down by Atatürk; namely, Status quoism and Westernism. Status quoism means attachment to and preservation of existing order. Contrary to revisionism that implies an ambition to change the existing order,

status quoism is favoring the continuation of the existing order. Following Atatürk’s motto “Peace at home peace in the world,” Turkish foreign policy from the very beginning of the Republic was against expansionism or making war with neighboring states to regain lost territory.

As a newly established Republic, Turkey refrained from adventures in foreign policy and sought to preserve its borders and develop friendly relations with neighbors and other countries as long as they do not threaten Turkey. In this sense, it was similar to the US Monroe Doctrine of 1823 that advocated non-interference in the US internal affairs by other states. Of course, unlike the US, Turkey did not necessarily isolate itself from rest of the world. It was neither geographically nor politically possible for Turkey to detach itself from the outside world. Therefore, Turkish Status quoism attached value to non-interference without necessarily isolating from the rest of the world, and prioritized friendly relations with almost every country that respect Turkey’s borders. In addition, Turkish foreign policy was traditionally geared towards maintaining the existing balance of power. Accordingly, despite its Western orientation, Turkey established friendly relations with the Soviets both during Turkey’s War of Independence and during the early Republican period until WWII.

According to Oran (2001a: 47), there were four main reasons behind the status quoist foreign policy understanding of Turkey during the Atatürk era. First, it was a newly-established state lacking economic and military capabilities to pursue pro-active foreign policy. Hale’s (2000: 67) statement for explaining Turkey’s position in the 1930s, which is “sacrificing guns for butter,” was also applicable to the early years of the Turkish Republic that devoted an entire decade to recovery from the War of Independence. Second, Oran (2001a: 47) claims that the existence of the Soviet Union as Turkey’s Eastern neighbor always kept Turkey alarmed and prevented Turkish decision makers from taking pro-active foreign policy decisions. Third, pan-Turkism was considered a utopia having a potential to disable Turkey and its neighborhood. Finally, according to Oran (2001a: 47-48), Atatürk knew where to stop in foreign policy. His main objective was to establish and preserve an independent nation state, and once he achieved his goal, he sought to maintain it rather than expand it.

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2 Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Years, 1923-1938

The second feature of Atatürk’s foreign policy, according to Oran (2001a: 49) was Westernism. Turkish foreign policy makers traditionally perceive the West as an important center of power in world politics providing a set of important standards for cultural and social modernity, economic advancement, scientific development, political stability and democracy. Turkey’s aspiration for the West started in the Ottoman era in the context of the nineteenth century- policies of Tanzimat (Reorganization) and Islahat (Reform). Westernism in Turkish elites continued until recently. Turkish governments often adopted policies that reflected a pro-American, pro-NATO and pro-EU attitude. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Turkish foreign policy decisions were exclusively pro-Western. Turkish policy-makers also developed affinity with the non-Western world and enjoyed close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Atatürk’s Westernism did not dictate complete obedience to the West. On the contrary, it was “Westernism in spite of the West”. Turkey’s War of Independence was won against Western powers. The Treaty of Sevres was forced upon the Ottoman Empire by major Western powers including Britain, France and Italy. Sevres dictated the division of Turkish lands into several zones under Western control. In Lausanne, Turkey abrogated Sevres and reclaimed its independence from the West. Therefore, Atatürk was the last person to encourage full attachment to the West. Atatürk’s was selective Westernism or Westernism is à la carte.

Atatürk definitely did not trust the Western powers, against which he fought many years. Nevertheless, adopting Western-led legal system, diplomacy and science was necessary for the establishment of modern Turkey. On the other hand, Atatürk never pursued a pro-Western foreign policy. He rather believed in the pragmatism of balance of power in order to preserve and protect Turkey’s vital interests. Especially in the 1930s, despite the criticisms of Western powers, Atatürk developed partnership with Germany and the Soviets at the same time. Therefore, in addition to the two main factors of Turkish foreign policy during the Atatürk era; namely, Status quoism and Westernism highlighted by Oran (2001a), we also need to emphasize the pragmatism and multilateralism of Atatürk’s foreign policy.

Turkey’s pragmatism stemmed from the search for the preservation of status quo in its tumultuous neighborhood and beyond. The National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was in line with the pragmatic and realistic vision of Turkey’s borders. Turkish foreign policy-makers had realistic expectations about the demarcation of the national borders of the new Turkish Republic. Defying adventurism in foreign policy, they acted in line with the motto “Peace at home Peace in the world” which was not an idealist or moral statement but mainly a pragmatic statement about the foreign relations of a young republic. Giving the message that Turkey would not pursue aggressive foreign policy unless attacked, Atatürk sought to increase the international recognition of Turkey as a legitimate player in the international system.

The pragmatism of Turkish foreign policy also meant that Turkish decision makers sometimes compromised their Status quoism. Accordingly, Turkey acted against the status quo in a number of times throughout the 1930s. For example, in order to revise the Regime of the Straits and gain full Turkish control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Turkey pursued “soft revisionism” using non-violent foreign policy tools, such as multilateral diplomacy to change the status quo. Therefore, “multilateralism” could be highlighted as the final feature of Atatürk’s foreign policy since Atatürk adamantly refrained from unilateral acts that would destabilize Turkey and its neighborhood. Instead, he worked for Turkey’s adhesion to international organizations such as the League of Nations and regional pacts including the Balkan and Sadabad pacts. Turkey religiously devoted its efforts to resolve disputes through multilateral diplomacy rather than use of force. Atatürk’s confidence in multilateralism was evidenced by his willingness to establish partnership with every major power in Europe as well as many other countries in different geographies.

Overall, Atatürk’s foreign policy was defined by four main features: Status quoism, Westernism, Pragmatism and Multilateralism. These features were more or less applicable to Turkey both in the early Republican years and the 1930s until the WWII. While Turkey maintained a rather low profile in the 1920s due to its pro-western transformation and economic recuperation, the 1930s witnessed a rather assertive Turkey but

39


remaining mostly loyal to the four main features of Turkish foreign policy. To begin with, the Treaty of Lausanne, the founding document of the Turkish Republic, was the first foreign policy action of new Turkey upon which these four features have been established.

THE TREATY OF LAUSANNEThe Lausanne Peace conference of 1922-1923 was organized to formally end WWI after Turkish

victory over Greece in Anatolia. The main players in the Lausanne Peace conference negotiations were Turkey and Britain. For their part, France and Italy joined for economic reasons. Greece was too weak to have an effect on the outcome of the negotiations. The Soviet Union participated in the conference for strategic reasons. It was invited by Turkey in order to counter-balance Western European influence on the negotiations. Japan attended the conference due to its interest regarding the Straits. The US was an observer to the peace negotiations in Lausanne as it was not part of the War of Independence. Hence, it never signed the Lausanne Treaty that consolidated Turkey’s sovereignty at the end of the conference. Yet, the US leadership’s vision about national self-determination was influential on the conference participants and the US was seen as a potential ally by Atatürk due to a shared concern and resentment against European imperialism in Turkey and the US.

Both the Istanbul government and the Ankara government were invited to the Lausanne Peace Conference. This meant that both governments would be seen as representative of Turkey; therefore, other parties at the Conference would have the advantage of playing the two governments against each other for a desired

outcome (Hale 2000: 45). This would also create a sovereignty vacuum on the part of Turkey reflecting a deep uncertainty on which government would be really in charge. There was also another problem that the Istanbul and Ankara governments had diametrically opposite positions. While the Istanbul government led by the Sultan was willing to compromise for the survival of the throne and the Empire, the Ankara government would accept nothing less than complete independence and sovereignty over Anatolia.

Atatürk therefore announced the abolition of the Sultanate on November 1, 1922. The defunct Sultan had already been seen in the public eye as a puppet of Britain especially after the invasion of Istanbul. The abolition of the Sultanate served to unify Turkish representatives under Atatürk’s leadership during the Lausanne Peace conference. According to Hale (2000: 45), Atatürk had already been looking for a way to abolish the Sultanate and the Lausanne Conference offered the perfect opportunity for it. The defunct Sultan Vahdettin left Turkey on a British warship on November 17, 1922, leaving the seat of the Caliphate to his cousin Abdulmecid.

The main issues negotiated at the Lausanne Peace Conference include territorial and military issues, foreigners’ rights and capitulations, as well as economic issues and the Ottoman debts. Britain was a leading actor in the negotiations over territorial and military issues. In particular, British representatives sought to have a say in the fate of the Straits and the oil-rich region of Mosul. France was mostly interested in the payment of the Ottoman debts to French nationals. As the oldest dealers of capitulations (Venice and Genoa), Italians took an active part in the negotiations over foreigners’ rights and capitulations in Turkey.

Explain why Atatürk’s Westernism did not foresee a pro-Western foreign policy.

1

Figure 2.1. Lausanne.

40


The Lausanne Peace negotiations proved extremely difficult as the basis of negotiation was different for the participants. While the Entente powers led by British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon took the Mudros armistice of 30 October 1918 as the basis of the Lausanne Peace negotiations, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was referring to the Mudanya armistice of 11 October 1922. Besides, the Turkish delegation had orders from Ankara that peace could only be achieved if the Entente powers accepted the borders of the new Turkey based on the National Pact (Davison 1953: 196).

Accordingly, the Entente powers were not willing to confirm Turkey’s victory on the battlefield treating it as a defeated nation, while Turkey was decisive to make them officially accept its victory on the battlefield (Davison, 1953: 200). Hence, the Lausanne Peace Conference negotiations witnessed the clash of visions between Lord Curzon (Diplomat) who tried to dictate the Entente powers’ terms to Turkey as much as he could, and İnönü, the military commander, who sought to successfully dictate Turkey’s independence and sovereign equality. İnönü had no prior diplomatic experience but as an established field commander, he secured complete loyalty to Atatürk and the Ankara government. Therefore, his relentless patience during the deliberations and resolve to report every tiny detail of the negotiations back to Ankara constituted the foundations of Turkish diplomatic strategy in Lausanne (Davison, 1953: 200-204).

The Turkish perspective in Lausanne was as follows: The recognition of the independence of new Turkey was the top priority. Besides, the Turkish leadership had two main priorities during the negotiations. First, it sought to prevent the Western powers from establishing a puppet Armenian autonomous entity in Anatolia that would violate the National Pact and undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Second, Turkey aimed to consolidate its political and economic independence by lifting the Capitulation regime privileging Westerners in Turkey since the 16th century. The Turkish delegates were open to negotiate anything but these above points. Especially, they decided to leave the negotiation table without even consulting the Ankara government if the Europeans insisted on the continuation of the Capitulations.

On the other hand, Britain had different expectations from the Conference. Nevertheless, the British delegates admitted the fact that it was no use in treating Turks as a defeated nation and expecting their compliance (Hale, 2000: 39). Hence, the British leadership saw no point in assisting the Greeks who lost the war in Anatolia. British Prime Minister Lloyd George had resigned after Turkish victory. This granted much more liberty to British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon who represented Britain in the Lausanne Peace Conference. Lord Curzon supported Turkish independence as a buffer zone against the Soviets. Britain’s main interests in the Lausanne Peace Conference were securing the passage of British warships through the Straits and attaching the oil-rich region of Mosul to British rule (Hale, 2000: 46).

The negotiations of the Lausanne Peace Conference were held in two rounds. The first round took place between 21 November 1922 and 4 February 1923. It revealed the participant states’ disagreement over Capitulations, the Straits, and the Ottoman debts. After a stalemate of two and a half months, the second round started on 23 April 1923 and concluded on 24 July 1923 with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne.

The Stalemate was overcome and the parties agreed to reconvene the Conference after the positive and collaborative messages conveyed by the Ankara government through the İzmir Congress of Economics (17 February - 4 March 1923). First, the Congress stated that the new Turkish state would be a Western state following Western models instead of communist ones. This was important, because the Soviets had been supportive of Turkey’s War of Independence and participated in Lausanne as a counter-balance to the Entente powers. However, the Ankara government made it clear at the Congress that despite friendly relations with the Soviets, it would not be Communism, but Westernism that the new Turkey’s political and economic strategy would take as a model. Second, it emphasized that Turkey would neither consent to capitulations nor make a compromise on its economic independence. Turkey’s message to the Entente powers was clear: Turkey would join the Western camp on its own terms as an independent state.

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Turkish delegates to the Lausanne Peace Conference used diplomacy to consolidate their military victory and receive international recognition. First, they strongly insisted on the National Pact in demarcating the borders of the new Turkish state. They relied on Ankara government’s decision that the Turkish Grand National Assembly would not ratify any deal that would not comply with the National Pact. They were successful in having the National Pact observed by the other powers at the Lausanne Peace conference. The only exception was Mosul. They had to compromise on the Mosul issue and consented the exclusion of Mosul from the National Pact.

Second, they announced their commitment to Westernism in terms of adopting Western-style secular laws and regulations, including the Civil code and Penal code among others. Emphasizing their willingness to adopt reforms in the new Turkish state based on Western rules and norms, they sought to justify their demands to lift the Capitulations and privileges to foreigners. There was no need for capitulations or privileges to foreigners in the new Turkey as everybody would be treated equally.

At the end of the negotiations, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed at the Palais de Rumine in Lausanne, Switzerland on 24 July 1923. The Treaty dealt with five main issues; namely, Turkey’s borders, straits, capitulations, minorities and debts. It delimited Turkey’s borders except for Mosul and Hatay that remained under the control of Britain and France, respectively. The Treaty stipulated that the Istanbul and Gallipoli Straits would be under the jurisdiction of an international committee led by Turkey. The centuries long capitulation regime in Turkey was abolished. Besides, the Treaty officially guaranteed the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Finally, it was decided that the Ottoman debts were to be paid by the successor states proportionate to their borders. Turkey therefore only promised to pay the Ottoman Debts involving Anatolia. Turkey paid the last instalment of the debts in 1954.

Regarding the question of Mosul, British and Turkish had a clash of interests. Britain sought to claim sovereignty over the oil-rich region of Mosul as a defensive barrier against Turkey. The British government rejected the inclusion of Mosul into

Turkey’s National Pact arguing that Mosul was largely populated by Kurds. The Turkish delegate insisted that Kurds had supported the Turkish War of Independence and they were no different than other citizens of Turkey. The question of Mosul remained unsettled, but both the British and the Turkish sides pledged to solve it within 9 months after the Treaty of Lausanne. The Şeyh Sait rebellion in Mosul that took place in 1925 led to the consolidation of British rule over Mosul in 1926. According to Oran (2001b: 223), Turkey gave Mosul to Britain not in 1926 but at Lausanne in 1923. The 9 months period stipulated by the Lausanne Treaty was intentionally issued by the Entente powers providing Britain enough time to apply to the League of Nations for a decision in its favor. Oran (2001b: 223) claims that Atatürk was aware of this trick but he was unwilling to restart war with Britain over Mosul.

The Straits was another hot topic during the Lausanne Peace negotiations. The Treaty of Lausanne brought two restrictions on Turkish sovereignty. First, it imposed the demilitarization of the Straits, which jeopardized the security of Istanbul, and left Turkey exposed to a possible attack from the Balkans (Oran, 2001b: 232). Second, the Treaty decreed the formation of an independent international committee for the Straits. This was to deny Turkish sovereignty over the Straits since Turkey would not be the only party to decide who would pass through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles (Oran, 2001b: 234). The Treaty of Lausanne forced Turkey to have only partial sovereignty over the Straits and allow free passage through straits and the Marmara Sea. Turkey had to consent to unrestricted passage of civilian (or neutral) ships even during war. Accordingly, it did not have the right to close the Straits in times of war. Both restrictions were lifted after the Montreux Convention was signed in 1936 recognizing Turkey’s full sovereignty over the Straits.

Another matter of disagreement was the Capitulations regime consisting of bilateral agreements conferring extraterritorial rights and privileges to European citizens who resided and/or traded in the Ottoman territories. They not only enjoyed social and economic privileges involving tax reductions and religious freedoms, they also enjoyed legal autonomy. When European

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merchants committed a crime against an Ottoman citizen and/or on the Ottoman lands, they were judged according to their own national laws. Capitulations were first issued by the Ottoman Sultan to Venetian and Genoese merchants in the 15th century. France was the first state to enjoy Capitulation in the Ottoman Empire with an agreement signed in 1535. Capitulations were then extended to other European nationals. Despite the efforts of the Entente powers, Turkey managed to have the abolition of capitulations inserted in the Article 28 of Lausanne Treaty. In return, Turkey reiterated its commitment to respect the existing contracts concluded with foreign firms before 1914 and kept the 1916 Ottoman policy of low tariffs which became defunct after the Great Depression of 1929 (Hale, 2000: 47).

The Ottoman Debt was another problematic issue. The Ottoman war debt was around 170 million British Pounds. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the debts were divided among the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey agreed to pay only its own share that included 63% of the Ottoman debts issued before 1912 and 72% issued after 1912. Total payment made by Turkey amounted to £78 million (84.8 million TL). The last instalment was paid by Turkey in 1954, which led to the lifting of the Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye) in Yıldız Palace (Istanbul) that was responsible for the management of the debt repayment since 1881 (Hale 2000: 47-48).

Finally, the Lausanne Peace Treaty decided for a population exchange (mübadele) between Greece and Turkey in order to increase the homogenous character of the Turkish and Greek nation-states after the War. Around 900.000 Greek residents of Anatolia were forced to move to Greece while 400.000 people of Turkish origin living in Greece had to leave their homes for Turkey (Hale, 2000: 48). The population exchange provoked criticisms and it ended the peaceful coexistence between the two communities. Many Anatolian Greeks felt segregated in their new home. As an exception, the Treaty of Lausanne allowed 120.000 Greeks living in Istanbul to stay in Turkey and guaranteed their rights. Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate remained in Istanbul. While non-Muslims constituted the 20% of the Anatolian society in the 19th Century, their share dropped to only 2% in the 20th Century.

The Treaty of Lausanne had three major consequences for Turkey. First, it ensured Turkey’s sovereign equality before international law. The new Turkish state would be internationally recognized as an independent nation state enjoying equal sovereign rights respected by others. Second, the Treaty guaranteed Turkey’s economic independence by lifting the Capitulations and arranging the payment of the Ottoman debts. The Ankara government determined economic independence as indispensable for the new Turkish state and denied any offers for a compromise from it. By lifting the Capitulations and paying the Ottoman Debts, Turkey would make sure that it would never fall into the orbit of any external power. Finally, the Treaty consolidated Turkey’s political independence by extending international recognition to the new Turkish state. Unlike other post-WWI treaties, the Treaty of Lausanne was achieved through diplomatic negotiations. It is the only post-WWI treaty that is still valid today. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish policy-makers shifted their attention from international recognition of their newly established state to the reconstruction of the state and economy. They continued to emphasize the importance of the motto “Peace at home, Peace in the world”.

THE MOSUL PROBLEMThe Mosul problem could be seen as the only

major issue for Turkish foreign policy during the rest of 1920s. After Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey was established on 29 October 1923. Turkey thereafter initiated a pro-Western transformation process by adopting the European legal system, reforming its education system based on the West-inspired scientific methods, embracing a European style dress code and adopting Latin alphabet. During this transformation period, Turkey rather took a low profile in its foreign policy mainly remaining loyal to its status quoism. Therefore, we do not observe much foreign policy

What are the main consequences of the Treaty of Lausanne for Turkish foreign policy?

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developments on Turkey’s part. The only notable exception was Mosul, which was left unsolved in Lausanne. Mosul was still an Ottoman territory when the Mudros armistice was signed; however, from 3 November 1918 onwards the British troops started to occupy the region. Mosul was important for Turkey in terms of security of both Turkey and the Turkoman subjects living in Mosul. There was also the issue of oil resources. For Turkey, the loss of Mosul meant the abandonment of the National Pact (Hale, 2000: 50). For Britain, it was strategically crucial as it constituted a passage to the British dominions in India. Moreover, the oil resources of Mosul were the only source of income for Iraq to stand on its feet.

Right after Lausanne, the two governments met in Istanbul in 19 May 1924 for Mosul to no avail. Britain claimed that the land was overwhelmingly populated by Kurds and demanded that Turkey had no jurisdiction over Mosul, while Turkey insisted that Kurds was one of the founding subjects of Turkey- one, which is inseparable from Turks. After the failure of the talks, Britain took the matter to the League of Nations on 20 September 1924. The League committee visited Mosul and controversially came to the conclusion that Kurds in the region did not wish to be under the rule of the Turkish Republic. Based on the recommendation of the Committee, the League Council decided that Mosul was to remain as a part of Iraq under the British mandate.

Figure 2.2. Mosul.

The Sheikh Said rebellion allegedly triggered with the British support was influential in the League’s decision. Turkey’s main argument was that Turks and Kurds were living in harmony and they were inseparable. The rebellion was contrary to what Turkish decision makers were claiming. The Sheikh Said rebellion was considered by the European powers as a religious as well as a nationalist movement, reflective of the preoccupations of the Kurdish tribes to protect their “national and religious” identities against the Republic (Olson 1989). According to Olson and Tucker (1978: 197), the rebellion also constituted the source of a long-standing anti-British sentiment in Turkey due to the Turkish conviction that the rebellion was encouraged by Britain. Turks, especially Atatürk, believed that “the British, seeking the oil deposits of Mosul, had roused anti-Turkish feeling among the Kurds hoping to use this as a means of pressuring Turkey in relinquishing Mosul” (Olson and Tucker, 1978: 197).

The League decision was unfavorable to Turkey due to the fact that Britain was a League member and Turkey was not. Therefore, Turkey could not effectively lobby its cause in the League Council. Moreover, especially after the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey could not prevent the narrative that Britain so cunningly constructed in front of the League Council which led to a favorable decision for the British.

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Although Turkey declared that it would not recognize the League’s decision, Turkish government then consented to the decision through a bilateral agreement with Britain in 1926. Despite its protests, Turkey was aware that it was not militarily and economically ready to fight the British for Mosul (Hale, 2000: 51). Signed in 5 June 1926 in Ankara, the agreement confirmed Turkey’s withdrawal from Mosul and the payment to Turkey 25% of the local oil revenues for 25 years.

THE ITALIAN THREAT AND THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL

PARTNERSHIPSThroughout the 1930s, Turkish decision-

makers increasingly felt threatened from Italy’s offensive intentions in its foreign policy and aimed to form international partnership and enter into regional alliances to prevent an Italian aggression into Turkish territories. After the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, the Italian-Turkish relations entered into a period of thaw. Italy even provided military and financial assistance to Turkey in the late 1920s. However, following the Great Depression, Italy started to exercise an aggressive foreign policy. It refused to be bound by international agreements it had signed, remilitarized the Dodecanese islands, and invaded Ethiopia and Albania. Italy’s revisionist foreign policy ambitions in the 1930s were alarming for Turkey (Hale, 2000).

The 1933 “Four-Power Pact” proposal of Benito Mussolini to form an alliance among Italy, Britain, France, and Germany led Turkish policy makers believe that Italy sought dominance in international relations through great power alliance (Barlas and Güvenç, 2002: 146). Besides, Mussolini’s speech at the Fascist Congress in March 1934 was a turning point in Turkish-Italian relations that led Turkey to seek partnerships against Italy. Mussolini claimed in his speech; “Italy’s historic objectives lie in Asia and Africa”.

According to Turkish decision makers, this speech demonstrated Mussolini’s desire to invade Anatolia (Deringil, 1989: 7). Italian embassy in Ankara concentrated its efforts on convincing Turks that Italy had no such aggressive intentions against Turkey. The Italian Ambassador Signor Lojacono reassured Turkish officials that Turkey should have no doubts about Italy’s friendship since Italy would never pursue adventurist policies in the Eastern Mediterranean (TCBCA, 1934). He instead claimed that Italy’s primary concern was not Turkey but the Western Mediterranean and Western Europe. However, Italian reassurances did not help decrease Turkish concerns, because Italy continued its aggressive foreign policy practices.

Figure 2.3. Mussolini.

Especially, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 was a major indicator for Turkey that Italy would not cease its offensive intentions. Therefore, there was no guarantee that Italy would not eventually attack Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was remarkably alarmed with the remilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands by Italy. The islands were very close to the Anatolian mainland covering the entire Aegean Sea. It would be considerably difficult to defend the mainland against a coordinated attack from those islands. The fortification of those islands would give a definite advantage to Italy against Turkey in time of war. Therefore, according to the Turkish government, this act evidenced Italy’s objective to invade Anatolia.

Why did the League of Nations make an unfavorable decision for Turkey concerning Mosul?

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The Italian ambassador Lojacono tried to persuade Turkish officials that the fortification was not aimed against Turkey. He even claimed that the fortifications were defensive measures to intimidate France (Gülmez, 2017). However, he failed to persuade the Turkish government. According to Italian officials, the Turkish fear of an Italian invasion was absurd, but Turks really believed in such a possibility (BUSTA 29/1939/1 A1.3, p.1). Similarly, the British diplomatic sources confirm that the Turkish concerns against Italian revisionism were genuine. According to the British Ambassador in Ankara Percy Loraine, Turks definitely did not trust Italians and considered a possible Italian friendship even more dangerous than Italian enmity (FO 954/28A/49, p.6).

The final development that alarmed Turkish policy makers was the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939. Turkish officials were highly concerned that the invasion of Albania would be followed by the invasion of Anatolia (BUSTA 29/1939/1 A1.3, p.1). After the invasion, Britain and Turkey signed a joint declaration on 12 May 1939 to stand against a possible aggression in the Mediterranean. According to the Italian Embassy in Ankara, the declaration was signed particularly against Italy since the occupation of Albania was considered by Turks as the last straw (BUSTA, 28/1: p.5). Therefore, the Turkish-British accord was a turning point for Turkish Republic that had been preserving its neutral status since its establishment, and this neutrality was abandoned because of Italy (BUSTA, 28/1: p.2).

The Great Depression badly affected Turkish economy. Therefore, Turkey was not in a position to invest on heavy armament as a response to the rising Italian threat. There was no foreign direct investment in the horizon and this led to a remarkable decline in foreign trade. This forced Turkey to adopt statist economic policies launching its first five-year industrialization plan (1934-1938). The focus on economic recovery through statist reforms prevented Turkey from investing on military. The share of defense expenditure in state budget remained as low as 23% in 1932-1933 (Hale 2000: 64). Turkey had outdated weaponry and lagged behind in its air and naval capabilities. Therefore, as Hale (2000: 64) rightly explains, Turkey ‘sacrificed guns for butter’ by giving priority to economic recovery over military.

Deprived of strong military capabilities, Turkish decision-makers aimed to establish regional partnerships and sought the friendship of powerful European states to prevent a possible Italian aggression over Anatolia. According to Atatürk, Italy proved to be an important threat to international peace and security. He claimed that Mussolini of Italy aimed to re-establish the Roman Empire by invading the entire European continent and beyond (FO 954/28A/49, p.4.). Therefore, Atatürk called for the containment of Italian revisionism through a decisive bloc involving major European powers (Bilgin and Morewood, 2004: 57).

Turkey entered into two regional partnerships against the rising Italian threat, the Balkan Entente in 1934 to establish a solidarity network among Balkan countries, and the Sadabad Pact in 1937 to secure support from the Middle East against Italy. The Balkan Entente was signed among Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia on 9 February 1934. This pact was particularly important for the consolidation of bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece, former enemies. The World Economic Crisis led both governments to bury the hatchet and seek partnership. Therefore, Turkish-Greek hostility during the War of Independence started to be replaced with dialogue and friendship in the 1930s. Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos visited Ankara on 30 October 1930. This visit was reciprocated by the visit of Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to Athens in October 1931. The blossoming friendship between Turkey and Greece was further evidenced through the joint signature of the Balkan Entente.

The Entente aimed to recognize and protect the territorial sovereignty of the participant states in the case of a possible aggression perpetrated by regional revisionist powers including Bulgaria and Italy (Barlas and Vlasic, 2016: 1011). By nature, it was anti-revisionist and therefore considered by scholars as contributing to the general European system of collective security (Türkeş, 1994: 127). The signatories to the Entente considered it as a security guarantee against any revisionist demands over the Balkans (Barlas and Vlasic, 2016: 1011). Moreover, Turkey even signed individual military conventions with Yugoslavia and Romania on 5 June 1934. The conventions dictated the signatories to extend military support to each other in the case of an attack by Bulgaria and/or Italy (Türkeş, 1994: 139).

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Turkey’s second regional partnership was established in the Middle East through the Sadabad Pact on 8 July 1937 with the participation of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Turkey’s threat perceptions towards Italy which were exacerbated after the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy directed Turkey to secure a non-aggression pact with Middle Eastern countries (Hale 2000: 55). Turkey had already established close relations with Iran from the early 1930s onwards. Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran visited Turkey for 27 days in 1934. Atatürk’s pro-Western reforms became an inspiration for the Shah who was willing to initiate a similar reform process. The Sadabad Pact hence evidenced the consolidation of the burgeoning Turkish-Iranian partnership in the 1930s. Moreover, according to some scholars, the pact also evidenced Turkey’s willingness to exert itself as a regional leader by extending its pro-Western reforms to the Middle East (Palabıyık, 2010: 174). The Sadabad Pact was the first agreement in the Middle East which was not forced upon by European great powers (Bilgin, 2016: 42). It was the region’s own countries that deliberately came together to sign a non-aggression pact for the security of the Middle East. Therefore, as a pioneer of the Sadabad Pact, Turkey not only secured a regional partnership against a possible Italian aggression, but also declared itself as a regional leader.

Turkey not only focused on forming regional partnerships, but also aimed for developing relations with major European powers to withstand the Italian threat. The statist economic policies especially helped Turkey to develop partnership with the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as an intimidation factor against Italy. Turkey’s statist policies were inspired by the Soviet centralized economic model. Turkey’s economic plan was based on the Soviet 5-year industrial plans. This helped Turkey and the Soviets to develop economic partnership. Moscow granted Turkey a loan of 8 million US dollars to enable the smooth functioning of its economic plan. The Soviets also helped Turkey with the construction of textile plants in Anatolia by both providing technical and financial assistance. Turkey’s economic statism also helped develop partnership with Germany. Turkey’s five-year economic plan was also supported by German money and expertise. The trade volume between Turkey and Germany rose exponentially

above 40% both in exports and imports in late 1930s (Hale, 1981: 72).

Although Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy formed an Axis bloc in mid 1930s, Turkey continued to develop partnership with Germany. Unlike Italy, Germany did not pose a serious threat to Turkey. While Turkish officials were alarmed with the revisionist acts of Italy, they did not feel threatened by the German revisionism, including the incorporation of Saarland into Germany, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the annexation of Austria (Koçak, 2013: 110). Turkish policy makers believed that Germany’s main interests lied exclusively in expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe (FO 954/28A/98: 1). Therefore, Turks claimed that Germany had no interest in invading the Mediterranean and certainly not Turkey.

Turkey’s economic partnership with the Soviet Union and Germany was instrumental to intimidate Italy. However, for the sake of resisting a revisionist power such as Italy, Turkey did not want to be over-dependent on another revisionist power such as Germany. Turkish decision-makers knew that economic dependence on Nazi Germany would eventually bring political dependence as well (Gülmez, 2017: 42). Therefore, Turkey chose to develop relations with Britain in order not to be too heavily dependent on Germany. Britain and Turkey were former enemies in the First World War. The Turkish War of Independence and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic were very much on the contrary to the British interests of the time. The relations were further strained after the Mosul crisis and led to the British opposition to Turkey’s entry into the League of Nations until 1932.

From the mid-1930s onwards, both Britain and Turkey looked for potential allies against rising threats. For Britain, the rise of Nazi Germany was a crucial threat for the stability of Europe and the maintenance of British authority in world politics. For Turkey, Italian revisionism over the Mediterranean posed an existential threat to Turkish independence. Despite having different threat perceptions, Britain and Turkey managed to develop close relations since they feared of losing each other to opponents (Barlas and Gülmez, 2018). Britain feared that Turkey would go into the

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German orbit, while Turkey was concerned about the possibility for Britain to form an alliance with Italy. Therefore, both states realized that they were better off as friends rather than enemies (Barlas and Gülmez, 2018: 836).

Especially in the mid-1930s, Turkish-British relations started to flourish. With the personal efforts of Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador to Ankara, Turkey and Britain forgot their old rivalry and focused on heightened economic and political cooperation (Gülmez, 2019). During this period, Britain provided considerable economic support for Turkey’s industrialization. This helped decrease Turkey’s dependence on German economic might. For instance, Brassert, a British construction company was authorized to build a coal and steel factory in Karabük, although the German Krupp company offered Turkey a more profitable deal. Another British company, the Alexander Gibb & Partners constructed the naval dockyard at Gölcük and contributed to the remilitarization of Istanbul and Gallipoli straits following the Montreux Convention (Gülmez, 2019: 73-74). Britain also gave Turkey a loan of £16 million to be used for both economic recovery and military build-up. The economic partnership between Turkey and Britain progressed into a political partnership especially after the King of England Edward VII visited Turkey in September 1936.

Turkey not only sought partnership in its neighborhood as well as across Europe against a possible Italian aggression, but also resorted to diplomacy to settle its disputes with other countries. Since unilateral action and the use of force were the most popular state practices in world politics, Turkey’s attachment to diplomacy and international law received widespread support from most European countries and this facilitated the resolution of Turkey’s disputes peacefully. It is notable that while many states considered the deteriorating international system as an opportunity to justify unilateralism and use of force, Turkey benefitted from the same insecure international environment to seek a negotiated settlement in disputes with other countries. The restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the international straits and the accession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey are the two most prominent examples of Turkey’s diplomatic successes during the 1930s. In both cases, Turkey

applied to the League of Nations for an equitable resolution and managed to settle the disputes within the confines of diplomatic practice.

CRITICAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE LATE 1930s: THE TURKISH STRAITS AND

THE SANJAK ISSUEThe Turkish Straits and the future of the

Sanjak of Alexandretta were among the critical issues in the late 1930s that would have posed a threat to both its relations with big powers at the time and the relative security and stability in the region. We will review both issues in some detail below.

The Montreux International Straits Convention

The straits of Gallipoli and Istanbul are not only crucial passages enabling transportation between Europe and Asia, but also function as important trade routes and natural security corridors across several regions. Therefore, any changes in the political status of the straits might have a direct impact on the security and economy of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire had governed the straits undisputedly over 300 years until 1774 when Russia was given commercial access to the straits. Especially, following the First World War, the Ottomans lost control over the straits since the provisions of the Sevres Treaty in 1920 enforced a strict international jurisdiction over the straits. The Sevres Treaty was never realized since Turkey won the War of Independence and signed the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. However, the administration of the straits was still under the authority of an international committee of the League of Nations.

The newly established Republic of Turkey aimed to regain its full sovereignty over the straits. However, this was not possible throughout the

Explain what sort of partnerships Turkey tried to build to deter Italy.

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1920s. Right after the proclamation of the Republic, Turkey went into a process of restructuring its political and economic system through pro-Western reforms. Besides, international political environment was not ripe for Turkey to raise demands over the straits. Especially, the disagreement between Britain and Turkey over the legal status of Mosul in northern Iraq increased tension in the mid-1920s. The British opposition prevented Turkey from becoming a member of the League of Nations until 1932. It was only after the Great Depression that Turkey found an opportunity to raise claims over the sovereignty of the straits. As previously pointed out, the world economic crisis had important impact on world politics. Radical political actors gained popularity along with use of force and unilateral action in foreign affairs. Especially Turkish policy-makers were alarmed by Italy’s revisionist policies.

Figure 2.4. The Bosphorus.

Turkey applied to the League to reclaim its sovereignty over the straits in 1936. Turkish government made its case with reference to the principle of rebus sic stantibus that means obligations of treaty are terminable in the case of a fundamental change of circumstances. Turkey claimed that the circumstances of the Lausanne Treaty were altered so much that the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerning the status of the straits were no longer applicable. Turkey put forward several key issues that compromised the League’s capability to protect the Straits against a potential aggression. First, the aggressive policies of revisionist powers including Germany and Italy along with the general process of rearmament across Europe resulted in an intensive ‘feeling of general insecurity’ (E 2024/26/44). Second, Italy changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean by remilitarizing the Dodecanese islands. Turkish decision-makers considered this act as a direct threat against Anatolia. Moreover, international system became more insecure especially after Italy and Japan rejected to be bound by international norms and treaties. Finally, Turkey argued that the unilateralism of Germany, Italy and Japan encouraged unilateral actions and repudiation of international agreements in other parts of the world. Overall, Turkey argued with reference to the principle of rebus sic stantibus that the secure environment at the time of the Lausanne Treaty disappeared and Europe became considerably insecure. Therefore, Turkish government claimed that the straits committee under the League of Nations had no longer the capability to maintain the straits’ security, and asked for the revision of their legal status.

Turkey’s application received support from most of Western European states. Turkey’s insistence on a diplomatic solution rather than unilateral action generated sympathy among Europeans towards Turkey’s cause (Fenwick, 1936: 701). Not only prominent Western European states including Britain and France,

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but also the Soviet Union were among the supporters of Turkey’s application. Britain and France were mainly concerned about maintaining their authority over their dominions, and therefore the security of the straits would be of utmost importance for them. The support of the Soviet Union not only stemmed from the Soviet strategic outlook to spread influence in the Mediterranean, but also from its security concerns. The straits were the only maritime way out of the Black Sea for the Soviet fleet. As long as the straits were governed by multiple actors, it would be very much difficult for the Soviets navigate out of the Black Sea towards the Mediterranean and beyond. For the Soviets, it would be more acceptable to seek Turkish endorsement for the usage of the straits rather than being at the mercy of European powers. That is why Turkey easily secured the Soviet support.

Figure 2.5. The Dardanelles / Gallipoli Peninsula.

Ten participant states including Australia, Britain, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, Turkey, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia joined negotiations in the Montreux International Straits Conference from 22 June 1936 until 20 July 1936 when the Montreux International Straits Convention was signed by all participants. The Convention gave Turkey full sovereignty over the straits. It authorized Turkey to fortify the straits and conferred the right to close the straits to foreign warships in time of war. The Convention provisions helped Turkey remedy two important gaps concerning the straits. The first was the security gap because of the demilitarization of the straits and the second one was the sovereignty gap due to the existence of international straits committee. According to the Lausanne Treaty, there should be no army of any kind around the straits since the straits were considered as international waters not under the sovereignty of any nation. However, this was very problematic for Turkey, because the straits were going through the biggest Turkish city, Istanbul. The lack of proper fortifications of the straits created a serious vulnerability for Istanbul since it would be defenseless against a foreign attack. Not only Istanbul, but also the entire Marmara region would be under threat in the case of war. Rampant practice of aggressive foreign policies in world politics and, in particular, the rising Turkish concerns over a possible Italian aggression against Anatolia necessitated protective measures over the straits. Therefore, by remilitarizing the straits, Turkey solved an important security problem.

The second gap was the international straits committee authorized by the Lausanne Treaty. This committee composed of multiple European nations was the only authority governing the straits. This created a serious sovereignty gap for Turkey, since the straits were passing directly through the Turkish

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territory. Turkey could never become a fully sovereign state unless it had a complete control over its entire territory. Having no jurisdiction over the straits therefore created a serious sovereignty gap for Turkey. The Montreux Convention abolished the straits committee and recognized Turkey’s full sovereignty over the straits.

There are at least four important results of the Montreux Convention for Turkey as well as for international politics. First, Turkey restored the security of the straits and addressed a key security gap in its borders. The restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the straits helped Turkey regain its historical role as the armed guardian of the straits. Second, the renewal of Turkish authority in the straits granted Turkey a liberty to close the straits to foreign warships during a war. This increased Turkey’s strategic value in international arena forcing European powers to seek its friendship and avoid its enmity. Third, Turkey’s attachment to multilateral diplomacy helped Turkey gain a peaceful image internationally.

Turkey won a good name with the signature of the Convention, because rather than using force, it respected international norms, applied to the League of Nations for the resolution of a dispute and gained the consent of almost all of the parties to the Straits Convention. Western press praised Turkey for its contribution to international peace. The New York Times (20 July 1936, p. 14) in particular made a striking claim that Turkey would no longer be remembered as ‘Terrible Turks’, since the Montreux Convention granted Turks a peaceful image. Finally, the Montreux Convention won a good name for multilateralism and diplomacy that had been discredited through the revisionist policies of aggressive powers. The Convention constituted the first formal revision of a postwar treaty by peaceful means in the 1930s (Howard, 1936: 201).

The Accession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay)

The Sanjak of Alexandretta, which had been under the Ottoman sovereignty for a long time, was transferred to the French mandate as part of Syria following the First World War. France and Turkey agreed to give a special status to

Alexandretta within the French Syria. This special status helped secure the cultural and social rights of the local Turkish community. In 1936, France decided to recognize the independence of Syria and Lebanon. Turkey was concerned about the political status of the Turkish community in Alexandretta. Therefore, just like in the case of the straits, the Turkish government applied the League of Nations in order to maintain the special status of the local Turks. An agreement under British mediation was achieved in 24 January 1937 and the Sanjak of Alexandretta was granted autonomy within Syria.

Western press praised Turkey for its attachment to multilateral diplomacy. For example, a British daily, The Times (27 January 1937, 15), stated this diplomatic success showed that Turkey did not have a “territorial ambition in asking for guarantees for fellow-Turks over the border” since the Turkish government sought a negotiated solution through the League of Nations. Turkish and French officials too praised the settlement as an important step for the maintenance of peace in the Near East (The Times, 31 May 1937, p. 13).

Figure 2.6. Hatay.

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However, the agreement failed to prevent tensions over the Sanjak. The officials of the League of Nations in the area disagreed with their Turkish counterparts over the registration of voters for the upcoming plebiscite that would determine the administrative structure of Alexandretta. The League committee registered voters based on their mother tongue and religion according to which Turks would not hold a clear majority over other ethnic groups. Turkey instead defended citizens’ right to be registered based on self-declaration. Turkey pressurized France in response to the disagreement with the League officials. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras publicly announced that Turkey’s future partnership with France depended mainly on the resolution of the Alexandretta dispute. There were even allegations in the French press that Turkey would use force to settle the problem (Kinross, 1964: 482). According to Kinross (1964: 483), Atatürk was confident that “a country [France] which had refused to fight for the Rhineland was unlikely to fight for Alexandretta”, but he dismissed the use of force option, because Turkey needed to secure French partnership against the Italian threat.

Turkish diplomatic pressures eventually forced France to accept Turkey’s terms. France consented to the composition of the Sanjak’s new parliament with a Turkish majority (22 seats out of 40) in return for a mutual assistance pact with Turkey against a possible German aggression. With the Turkish majority in the assembly, Alexandretta declared independence as the Republic of Hatay under the leadership of Mr. Tayfur Sökmen in 12 September 1938. However, Europe was going into an all-out war and the Republic was too weak to protect itself in such an insecure international environment. The Hatay government, given the threatening situation in Europe, decided to join Turkey as the 64th city of the Turkish Republic in 30 June 1939, only a week after the signature of the mutual assistance pact between Turkey and France.

Turkey’s policy toward Hatay could be considered as an act of irredentism by diplomacy. Turkish government never officially declared its intention to add Hatay into its territories. However,

Atatürk, the President of the Turkish Republic had been decisive to protect the rights and liberties of local Turks in the region. Turkey unquestionably aimed to protect the local Turks from foreign domination in Alexandretta. However, unlike other actors of the time, Turkey fulfilled its irredentist aims through a series of multilateral and bilateral diplomatic maneuvers. Turkey applied to the League of Nations. This clearly shows Turkey’s willingness for a multilateral solution to the Alexandretta dispute. The League of Nations had already been helpful to settle the straits issue on an equitable basis with international blessing.

The success in Montreux encouraged Turkish government to believe in the capability of the League to settle the Alexandretta issue on equitable terms. However, Turkish government lived through serious disagreements with the League officials over citizen registration. This prevented Turkey’s aspirations for a settlement through multilateral diplomacy. In response, Turkey resorted to bilateral diplomacy with France for a settlement in Alexandretta. Turkish government used coercive diplomacy to force France into its terms. Atatürk, despite his illness, personally attended the military parades in Mersin and Adana, two Turkish cities at the vicinity of Alexandretta during 20-24 May 1938 to send a strong message to France about Turkey’s resoluteness over Alexandretta.

Turkey’s coercive diplomatic strategy became successful in convincing the French government for the re-establishment of Turkish sovereignty in Alexandretta in return for a mutual assistance pact in 23 June 1939 against the rising German and Italian threats across Europe. Just like in the straits problem, Turkey once again benefited from the deteriorating international conditions to convince European actors for a settlement in its favor, this time in Alexandretta.

Discuss the main consequences of the Montreux International Straits Con-vention for Turkish foreign policy.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC

Overall, this chapter discussed the main undertakings of Turkish foreign policy during the Republican period. Atatürk’s foreign policy was defined by four main features: Status quoism, Westernism, Pragmatism and Multilateralism. As a newly established republic, Turkey aimed to preserve its independence and sovereign equality in international arena by avoiding use of force and resorting to diplomatic practice. During the first decade, Turkey mainly focused on the pro-Western reform process at home and therefore Turkish government reflected a low profile in its foreign relations. The only remarkable developments in Turkish foreign policy during the 1920s were the Treaty of Lausanne that won Turkey its independence and the Mosul problem with Britain regarding the status of Northern Iraq. During the second decade, Turkey was much more assertive in its foreign policy. The primary reason for this was the world economic crisis that considerably altered the post-First World War international order. The world economy went into a high degree of recession forcing liberal economies to adopt protectionist policies. The victors of the war including Britain and France heavily suffered from the economic crisis and lost their primacy in world politics, while extreme political formations gained ground in Germany, Italy and Japan, and they pioneered aggressive foreign policies. Therefore, the economic crisis changed the fabric of world politics undermining the liberal world order. This led to a multipolar international structure where there emerged multiple power centers including the emerging aggressor powers, namely, the Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union and the Fascist Italy challenging the existing major status quo powers such as Britain, France and the United States. This anarchical international structure in the 1930s forced states to undermine international law and diplomacy. Instead, unilateral action and use of force became highly popular among states and this laid the foundations of an international chaos that culminated into the Second World War.

The chaotic multipolar international system triggered by the Great Depression enabled Turkey

to take a step back from status quoism and conduct a more assertive foreign policy remaining loyal to Westernism, multilateralism and pragmatism. It is true that Turkey suffered economically from the Great Depression and “sacrificed guns for butter” concentrating on economic recovery at the expense of military build-up. Nevertheless, the crisis and the anarchical world politics afterwards provided Turkey with a unique position in international politics. Turkey developed close relations with both the aggressor and the status quo powers at the same time without having to establish formal alliances with either of them. Oran (2001b) associates Turkey’s advantageous position with “relative autonomy” since the international structure in the 1930s helped Turkey to pursue a foreign policy comparably autonomous from the great powers of the time. This advantageous position is called in the international relations discipline as “Holder of Balance” enabling a state to make an impact upon international balance of power without choosing sides (Gülmez, 2017: 43). Not being part of the existing balance of power, it has a potential to change the balance if it joins either side. Therefore, states in dispute develop a fear of losing the holder of balance to the other side. Hence, a holder of balance becomes a non-aligned third party benefiting from the disputes of two blocs. The chaotic international structure following the world economic crisis gave Turkey the status of holder of balance as well (Gülmez, 2017: 44).

The multipolar international structure created after the world economic crisis intensified the “fear of abandonment” among states, that is, the fear of losing an ally to an enemy (Snyder, 1984: 466). Major European powers experienced a fear of losing Turkey to their rivals and this enabled Turkey to enjoy the privileged status of holder of balance. This is why Turkey was able to develop friendly relations with almost every major state in Europe including both aggressor and status quo powers. Using the economic crisis in its favor, Turkey developed economic partnerships with Germany, the Soviet Union and Britain. The adoption of the Soviet’s planned economic models in Turkey and the rising trade volume with Germany are the clear indicators of Turkey’s plan to turn the economic crisis into an advantage. From the mid-1930s onwards, Turkish-British partnership developed as well. Britain provided financial and

53


military assistance to Turkey. The Turkish-British mutual understanding helped the establishment of partnership between Turkey and France resulting in the signature of tripartite agreement in the late 1930s. Major European powers also raced into providing financial assistance to Turkey since they feared of losing Tukey to each other. Both Britain and Germany issued financial credits to Turkey respectively, in order not to lose it to the other side.

The status of holder of balance not only enabled Turkey to form partnerships with almost every major European power, but also facilitated the settlement of Turkey’s disputes through diplomacy. This explains the diplomatic successes in Montreux and Alexandretta. European powers feared of losing Turkey to rivals and therefore supported Turkey’s efforts in both cases. Britain feared that if Turkey was forced to regain the administration of the straits through use of force, then it would eventually join the dark side under the German influence. Germany did not necessarily protest the outcome of the Montreux straits convention in order not to push Turkey into the hands of Britain and France. Similarly, in the case of Alexandretta,

Britain and France consented to a settlement in Turkey’s favor since they were concerned that denying Turkey’s rights over Alexandretta would mean to hand it over to Germany. Even Germany supported the accession of Alexandretta to Turkey with the hope that it would constitute a precedent for the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia to join Germany. Therefore, Turkey’s position as the holder of balance between the aggressor and the status quo powers in Europe helped Turkish government settle its international disputes through multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. Turkey’s Holder of Balance status helped Turkey remain loyal to its pragmatism, multilateralism and Westernism. Turkey mostly remained loyal to Status quoism as well during the 1930s. However, when the opportunity materialized, the Holder of Balance status helped Turkey go beyond the status quo and settle its disputes through diplomacy.

Atatürk was the mastermind behind Turkey’s successes in foreign policy throughout the 1930s. His foreign policy vision fit perfectly into the role of holder of balance. He refrained from joining any blocs and establishing formal military alliances. He instead aimed to form partnership with almost every major European power including Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. He even developed personal friendship with major leaders including British King Edward VIII, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and Iranian Shah Pahlavi. Atatürk also refrained from unilateralism and use of force, and this increased the credibility and international prestige of Turkish foreign policy. He always sought Turkish attachment to multilateral diplomacy both in the auspices of the League of Nations and through regional partnerships such as the Balkan and the Sadabad pacts. Even in the Alexandretta problem where multilateral diplomacy failed, he persistently conducted bilateral diplomacy to force the French government into recognizing the independence of local Turks in return for Turkey’s partnership against the German-Italian Axis. Atatürk’s genius which elevated Turkey into “a valuable and progressive member of the European body politic” was highlighted by a mainstream British daily The Times on 11 November 1938 mourning Atatürk’s passing:

The foreign policy which he always inspired and sometimes directed brought Turkey into the comity of Western nations, and made new

Figure 2.7. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

54


friends of old foes. The prudent maintenance of friendly relations with Soviet Russia did not prevent Turkey from establishing excellent relations with Great Britain; from entering into an understanding with Greece –once the hereditary enemy- that ripened into an alliance; and from concluding pacts with the neighboring states of the Balkans and Western Asia. Under his auspices, Turkish diplomacy has won success after success. The Montreux Conference of 1936, where Turkey won back by negotiation what had been lost in war, was a triumph for conciliation. More recently, an ingenious combination of new diplomatic method and old has to all intents won back the Sanjak of Alexandretta; and the interest with which President Atatürk followed this question was shown by the visit that he paid last summer to the border when he was already suffering from the illness which eventually proved fatal. From a state which had once been regarded as an intruder in Europe, Turkey has become under his leadership a valuable and progressive members of the European body politic.

Discuss how Turkey used diplomacy effectively to settle the Hatay dispute.

6


55

LO 1 Discuss the main features of TFP during the Atatürk era

Atatürk’s foreign policy was defined by four main features: Status quoism, Westernism, Pragmatism and Multilateralism. First, Turkish Status quoism attached value to non-interference without necessarily iso-lating from the rest of the world, and prioritized friendly relations with almost every country that respect Turkey’s borders. Second, Turkish foreign policy makers traditionally perceive the West as an important center of power in world politics providing a set of important standards for cultural and social modernity, economic advancement, scientific development, political stability and democracy. Third, Turkey’s prag-matism stemmed from the search for the preservation of status quo in its tumultuous neighborhood and beyond. The National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was in line with the pragmatic and realistic vision of Turkey’s borders. Turkish foreign policy-makers had realistic expectations about the demarcation of the national borders of the new Turkish Republic. The pragmatism of Turkish foreign policy also meant that Turkish decision makers sometimes compromised their Status quoism. Multilateralism could be highlighted as the final feature of Atatürk’s foreign policy since Atatürk adamantly refrained from unilateral acts that would destabilize Turkey and its neighborhood. Instead, he worked for Turkey’s adhesion to international organizations such as the League of Nations and regional pacts including the Balkan and Sadabad pacts. Turkey religiously devoted its efforts to resolve disputes through multilateral diplomacy rather than use of force. Atatürk’s willingness to establish partnership with every major power in Europe as well as in its neighborhood demonstrated his confidence in multilateralism.

Sum

mary

LO 2 Identify the significance of the Treaty of Lausanne

The Treaty of Lausanne had three major consequences for Turkey. First, it ensured Turkey’s sovereign equality before international law. The new Turkish state would be internationally recognized as an inde-pendent nation state enjoying equal sovereign rights respected by others. Second, the Treaty guaranteed Turkey’s economic independence by lifting the Capitulations and arranging the payment of the Ottoman debts. The Ankara government determined economic independence as indispensable for the new Turkish state and denied any offers for a compromise from it. Lifting the Capitulations and paying the Ottoman Debts, Turkey would make sure that it would never fall into the orbit of any external power. Finally, the Treaty consolidated Turkey’s political independence by extending international recognition to the new Turkish state. Unlike other post-WWI treaties, the Treaty of Lausanne was achieved through diplomatic negotiations. It is the only post-WWI treaty that is still valid today. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish policy-makers shifted their attention from international recognition of their newly established state to the reconstruction of the state and economy. They continued to emphasize the importance of the motto “Peace at home, Peace in the world”.


56

Sum

mar

y

LO 3 Recognize the importance of the Mosul Problem

Mosul was important for Turkey in terms of security of both Turkey and the Turkoman subjects living in Mosul. There was also the issue of oil resources. For Turkey, the loss of Mosul meant the abandonment of the National Pact. For Britain, it was strategically crucial as it constituted a passage to the British do-minions in India and also the oil resources were the only source of income for Iraq to stand on its feet. Britain was a League member and Turkey was not. Therefore, Turkey could not effectively lobby its cause in the League Council. Moreover, especially after the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey could not prevent the narrative that Britain so cunningly constructed in front of the League Council which led to a favorable decision for the British. Signed in 5 June 1926 in Ankara, the agreement confirmed Turkey’s withdrawal from Mosul and the payment to Turkey 25% of the local oil revenues for 25 years.

LO 4 Analyze the reasons behind the Italian threat and the quest for international partnership

Following the Great Depression, Italy started to exercise an aggressive foreign policy. It refused to be bound by international agreements it had signed, remilitarized the Dodecanese islands, and invaded Ethi-opia and Albania. Italy’s revisionist foreign policy ambitions in the 1930s were alarming for Turkey. Italian leader Benito Mussolini’s “Four-Power Pact” proposal in 1933 to form alliance with Britain, France, Italy and Germany led Turkish policy makers believe that Italy sought dominance in international relations through great power alliance. Besides, Mussolini’s speech at the Fascist Congress in March 1934 was a turning point in Turkish-Italian relations which led Turkey to seek partnerships against Italy. Mussolini claimed in his speech; “Italy’s historic objectives lie in Asia and Africa”. According to Turkish decision makers, this speech evidenced Mussolini’s desire to invade Anatolia. The Great Depression badly affected Turkish economy; therefore Turkey was not in a position to invest on heavy armament as a response to the rising Italian threat. Turkey ‘sacrificed guns for butter’ by giving priority to economic recovery over military. Deprived of strong military capabilities, Turkish decision-makers aimed to establish regional partnerships and sought the friendship of powerful European states to prevent a possible Italian aggression over Anatolia.


57

Sum

mary

LO 5 Discuss the main issues in TFP in the late 1930s, including the Turkish Straits and the Sanjak issue

Turkey applied to the League to reclaim its sovereignty over the straits in 1936. Turkish government made its case with reference to the principle of rebus sic stantibus which means obligations of treaty are termi-nable in the case of a fundamental change of circumstances. Turkey claimed that the circumstances of the Lausanne Treaty were altered so much that the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerning the status of the straits were no longer applicable. The Convention gave Turkey full sovereignty over the straits. It authorized Turkey to fortify the straits and conferred the right to close the straits to foreign warships in time of war. The Convention provisions helped Turkey remedy two important gaps concerning the straits. The first was the security gap because of the demilitarization of the straits and the second one was the sovereignty gap due to the existence of international straits committee.Turkey’s policy towards Hatay could be considered as an act of irredentism by diplomacy. Turkish go-vernment never officially declared its intention to add Hatay into its territories. However, Atatürk, the President of the Turkish Republic had been decisive to protect the rights and liberties of local Turks in the region. He had already declared in early 1920s that Alexandretta was a land of Turks for forty centuries. However, unlike other actors of the time, Turkey fulfilled its irredentist aims through a series of multi-lateral and bilateral diplomatic maneuvers. Turkey applied to the League of Nations. This clearly shows Turkey’s willingness for a multilateral solution to the Alexandretta dispute. The League of Nations had already been helpful to settle the straits issue on an equitable basis with international blessing. The suc-cess in Montreux encouraged Turkish government to believe in the capability of the League to settle the Alexandretta issue on equitable terms. However, Turkish government lived through serious disagreements with the League officials over citizen registration. This prevented Turkey’s aspirations for a settlement through multilateral diplomacy. In response, Turkey resorted to bilateral diplomacy with France for a settlement in Alexandretta. Turkish government used coercive diplomacy to force France into its terms.

LO 6 Give an assessment of TFP in the early years of the Republic

Atatürk’s foreign policy was defined by four main features: Status quoism, Westernism, Pragmatism and Multilateralism. As a newly established republic, Turkey aimed to preserve its independence and sovereign equality in international arena by avoiding use of force and resorting to diplomatic practice. During the first decade, Turkey mainly focused on the pro-Western reform process at home and therefore Turkish government reflected a low profile in its foreign relations. The only remarkable developments in Turkish foreign policy during the 1920s were the Treaty of Lausanne that won Turkey its independence and the Mosul problem with Britain regarding the status of Northern Iraq. During the second decade, Turkey was much more assertive in its foreign policy. The primary reason for this was the world economic crisis that considerably altered the post-First World War international order. Major European powers experienced a fear of losing Turkey to their rivals and this enabled Turkey to enjoy the privileged status of holder of balance. This is why Turkey was able to develop friendly relations with almost every major state in Europe including both aggressor and status quo powers. Using the economic crisis in its favor, Turkey developed economic partnerships with Germany, the Soviet Union and Britain. This status of holder of balance also helped Turkey settle its bilateral problems including the Straits and the Alexandretta issues through a series of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy.


58

1 Which of the following is not one of the main features of Turkish foreign policy during the Atatürk era?

a. Status quoism b. Revisionismc. Westernism d. Pragmatisme. Multilateralism

2 Which of the following states never signed the Treaty of Lausanne although it participated in the Lausanne Peace Conference as an observer?

a. The Soviet Union b. Francec. Italyd. The United Statese. Great Britain

3 Which of the following themes was not on the agenda of the negotiations at the Lausanne Peace Conference?

a. The management of Bosporus and Dardanelles b. Foreigners’ rights and minority rights c. Ottoman debts and Capitulationsd. The status of Mosule. The annexation of Hatay

4 Which of the following statements is false about the Treaty of Lausanne?

a. It decided that the Straits would be run by an international independent committee led by Turkey.

b. It fully observed the National Pact while demarcating the new Turkish state’s borders.

c. It dismissed the Ottoman capitulations regime.d. It officially guaranteed the rights of non-Muslim

minorities in Turkey. e. It split the Ottoman debts among the successor

states.

5 Which of the statements below is false for the Mosul problem?

a. Mosul was crucial for its natural gas resources.b. The safety of Turcomans in Mosul was important

for Turkey.c. Mosul was a gateway to the British colonies.d. The Sheikh Said rebellion was influential in the

League’s decision.e. Britain accepted to pay 25% of Mosul’s oil

revenues to Turkey for 25 years.

6 Turkey joined the 1934 Balkan Entente and the 1937 Sadabad Pact against the revisionism of ---


a. The Soviet Union b. Germanyc. Italyd. Great Britaine. Iran

7 Which of the following is an example of the skillful use of diplomacy in the 1930s?

a. The restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the city of Kirkuk

b. The accession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay) to Turkey

c. Turkey’s participation in the Korean War d. Turkey’s intervention in the island of Cyprus e. The acquisition of the city of Mosul

8 Which of the following is not among the consequences of the Montreux Convention of Straits?

a. Turkey restored the security of the straits.b. Turkey gained the right to close the straits to

foreign warships in the event of war. c. Turkey’s reputation in the international arena

improved.d. Turkey allowed an international committee to

govern the Straits.e. Multilateralism and diplomacy proved

successful in a time of aggressive revisionism.

Test

You

rsel

f


59

9 France gave its consent to the annexation of Hatay by Turkey because ---


a. France did not give any importance to Hatay. b. The US put pressure on France.c. Britain decided to rule Hatay. d. France aimed for alliance with Turkey against

Germany and Italy.e. France aimed to prevent the rule of the USSR in

Hatay.

10 Which of the following did not help Turkey’s “relative autonomy” in the 1930s?

a. The Great Depression b. The rise of a multipolar system c. The competition for power between the

European powersd. The Italian invasion of Albania e. Atatürk’s foreign policy of making Turkey the

“holder of balance” in power relations

Test Yourself


60

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Main Features of Turkish Foreign Policy during the Atatürk Era” section.

1. b If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Italian Threat and the Quest for International Partnership” section.

6. c

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Treaty of Lausanne” section.

3. e If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Critical Foreign Policy Issues in the late 1930s” section.

8. d


2. d If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Critical Foreign Policy Issues in the late 1930s” section.

7. b


4. b

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Mosul Problem” section.

5. a

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Critical Foreign Policy Issues in the late 1930s” section.

9. d

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “An assessment of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Years of the Republic” section.

10. d

Ans

wer

Key

for

“Tes

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urse

lf”


61

Explain why Atatürk’s Westernism did not foresee a pro-Western foreign policy.

your turn 1

Because Atatürk’s Westernism was “Westernism in spite of the West”. Turkey’s war of independence was won against Western powers. The Treaty of Sevres was forced upon the Ottoman Empire by major Western powers including Britain, France and Italy. Sevres dictated the division of Turkish lands into several zones under Western control. In Lausanne, Turkey abrogated Sèvres” and reclaimed its independence from the West. Therefore, Atatürk was the last person to encourage full attachment to the West. Besides, Atatürk was a pragmatist. Atatürk never pursued a pro-Western foreign policy. He rather believed in the pragmatism of balance of power in order to preserve and protect Turkey’s vital interests.

What are the main consequences of the Treaty of Lausanne for Turkish foreign policy?

your turn 2

The Treaty of Lausanne had three major consequences for Turkey. First, it ensured Turkey’s sovereign equality before international law. The new Turkish state would be internationally recognized as an independent nation state enjoying equal sovereign rights respected by others. Second, the Treaty guaranteed Turkey’s economic independence by lifting the Capitulations and arranging the payment of the Ottoman debts. The Ankara government determined economic independence as indispensable for the new Turkish state and denied any offers for a compromise from it. Lifting the Capitulations and paying the Ottoman Debts, Turkey would make sure that it would never fall into the orbit of any external power. Finally, the Treaty consolidated Turkey’s political independence by extending international recognition to the new Turkish state.

Suggested A

nswers for “Your Turn”

Why did the League of Nations make an unfavorable decision for Turkey concerning Mosul?

The League decision was unfavorable to Turkey due to the fact that Britain was a League member and Turkey was not. Therefore, Turkey could not effectively lobby its cause in the League Council. Moreover, the Sheikh Said rebellion allegedly triggered with the British support was influential in the League’s decision. Turkey’s main argument was that Turks and Kurds were living in harmony and they were inseparable. The rebellion was contrary to what Turkish decision makers were claiming. Especially after the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey could not prevent the narrative that Britain so cunningly constructed in front of the League Council that led to a favorable decision for the British.

your turn 3


62

Explain what sort of partnerships Turkey tried to build to deter Italy.

your turn 4

Turkey first pioneered regional partnerships including the Balkan pact and the Sadabad pact to guarantee that no neighbor would threaten its borders and they would not assist Italy against Turkey. Regional dealings were not enough to deter Italy though. Turkey sought partnership with every major European power including the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Britain. Turkey’s economic partnership with the Soviet Union and Germany was instrumental to intimidate Italy. However, for the sake of resisting a revisionist power such as Italy, Turkey did not want be over-dependent on another revisionist power such as Germany. Therefore, Turkey also sought the partnership of Britain against Italy.

Discuss the main consequences of the Montreux International Straits Convention for Turkish foreign policy.

your turn 5

There are at least four important results of the Montreux Convention for Turkey as well as for international politics. First, Turkey restored the security of the straits and addressed a key security gap in its borders. Second, the renewal of Turkish authority in the straits granted Turkey a liberty to close the straits to foreign warships in the event of war. This increased Turkey’s strategic value in international arena forcing European powers to seek its friendship and avoid its enmity. Third, Turkey’s attachment to multilateral diplomacy helped Turkey gain a peaceful image internationally. Turkey won a good name with the signature of the Convention, because rather than using force, it respected international norms, applied to the League of Nations for the resolution of a dispute and gained the consent of almost all of the parties to the Straits Convention. Finally, the Montreux Convention won a good name for multilateralism and diplomacy that had been discredited through the revisionist policies of aggressive powers.

Turkey solved the Hatay dispute in its favor through a series of multilateral and bilateral diplomatic maneuvers. Turkey applied to the League of Nations. This clearly shows Turkey’s willingness for a multilateral solution to the Alexandretta dispute. The League of Nations had already been helpful to settle the straits issue on an equitable basis with international blessing. The success in Montreux encouraged Turkish government to believe in the capability of the League to settle the Alexandretta issue on equitable terms. However, Turkish government lived through serious disagreements with the League officials over citizen registration. This prevented Turkey’s aspirations for a settlement through multilateral diplomacy. In response, Turkey resorted to bilateral diplomacy with France for a settlement in Alexandretta. Turkish government used coercive diplomacy to force France into its terms. Atatürk, despite his illness, personally attended the military parades in Mersin and Adana, two Turkish cities at the vicinity of Alexandretta during 20-24 May 1938 to send a strong message to France about Turkey’s resoluteness over Alexandretta.

Discuss how Turkey used diplomacy effectively to settle the Hatay dispute.

your turn 6

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Books and Articles

Barlas, D. and Güvenç, S. (2002). To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade-1929-32, Middle Eastern Studies, 38:4, 143-169.

Barlas, D. and Vlašić, A. (2016). The Balkan Entente in Turkish–Yugoslav Relations (1934–41): the Yugoslav Perspective, Middle Eastern Studies, 52:6, 1011-1024.

Barlas, D. and Gülmez, S. Barış (2018). Turkish–British Relations in the 1930s: From Ambivalence to Partnership, Middle Eastern Studies, 54:5, 827-840.

Bilgin, Mustafa S. and Morewood, S. (2004). Turkey’s Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey against Soviet Demands-1943–47, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:2, 24–57.

Bilgin, Mustafa S. (2016). İki Savaş Arası Dönemde Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası, [Turkey’s Policy In The Middle East during The Interwar Period], Gazi Akademik Bakış, 9:18, 33-44.

Davison, Roderic H. (1953). “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne” in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.) The Diplomats: 1919-1939, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 172-209.

Deringil, S. (1989). Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fenwick, C. G. (1936). “The New Status of the Dardanelles”, The American Journal of International Law, 30:4, 701-706.

Gülmez, S. Barış (2017). Turkish Foreign Policy as An Anomaly: Revisionism and Irredentism through Diplomacy in the 1930s, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44:1, 30-47.

Gülmez, S. Barış (2019). Do Diplomats Matter in Foreign Policy? Sir Percy Loraine and the Turkish-British Rapprochement in the 1930s, Foreign Policy Analysis, 15:1, 65-82.

Hale, W. (1981). The Political and Economic Development of Turkey, London: Croom Helm.

Hale, W. (2000). Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000, London: Frank Cass.

Howard, Harry N. (1936). The Straits After the Montreux Conference, Foreign Affairs, 15:1, 199-202.

Kinross, L. (1964). Ataturk: The Birth of a Nation, Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother.

Koçak, C. (2013) Türk-Alman İlişkileri (1923--1938), [Turkish--German Relations (1923--1938)], 2nd ed, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Olson, Robert W. (1989). The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Olson, Robert W. and Tucker, William F. (1978). The Sheikh Sait Rebellion in Turkey (1925): A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism, Die Welt des Islams, 18:3/4, 195-211.

Oran, B. (2001a). “Giriş: Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği” [Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Turkish Foreign Policy] in Baskın Oran (ed.) Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar [Turkish Foreign Policy: Events, Documents, Comments from the Independence War to Present], Istanbul: İletişim, 17-94.

Oran, B. (2001b). “Lausanne Barış Antlaşması” [The Lausanne Peace Treaty] in Baskın Oran (ed.) Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar [Turkish Foreign Policy: Events, Documents, Comments from the Independence War to Present], Istanbul: İletişim, 215-238.

Palabıyık, M. Serdar (2010). “Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme” [Sadabad Pact (8 July 1937): An Analysis Based on Alliance Theories], Ortadoğu Etütleri, 2:3, 147-179.

Snyder, Glenn H. (1984). The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics, 36:4, 461-495.

Türkeş, M. (1994). The Balkan Pact and its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States, 1930–34, Middle Eastern Studies, 30:1, 123-144.

References


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Diplomatic Archives

BUSTA 29/1939/1 A1.3, Rapporti italo-turchia [Italian Reports on Turkey], 4 May 1939.

BUSTA 28/1, Rapporti Politici: Accordo Turco-Britannico [Political reports: Turkish-British accord], 16 May 1939.

E 2024/26/44, Loraine to Eden, 10 April 1936.

FO (British Foreign Office) 954/28A/49, Loraine to Eden, 12 April 1936.

FO 954/28A/98, Loraine to Eden, 27 March 1937.

TCBCA (1934) T.C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri [The Archives of Turkish Prime Ministry], ‘İtalya Büyükelçisi Mösyö Lojacono’nun ziyareti’ [The visit of the Italian Ambassador Mr. Lojacono], D.2/964-218, 22 May 1934.

Newspapers

The New York Times, 20 July 1936, p.14.

The Times, 27 January 1937, p.15.

The Times, 31 May 1937, p.13.

The Times, 11 November 1938, p.15.

Further Reading

Ataöv, T. (1961). Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1938, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 2:1, 103-14.

Barlas, D. (1998). Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, 1929–1939: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, Leiden: Brill.

Barlas, D. (2004). “Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-1936”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36, 231-252.

Barlas, D. (2005). Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s, Journal of Contemporary History, 40:3, 441–464.

Gönlübol, M. and Sar, C. (2013). Atatürk ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (1919-1938), [Atatürk and Turkish Foreign Policy (1919-1938) ], 3rd edition, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre.

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Chapter 3

Lear

ning

Out

com

es


Analyze the rapprochement between Turkey and the Allied Powers.

Discuss the relations of Turkey with the warring parties.

Explain how Turkey was able to maintain its neutrality in the war.

Evaluate Turkish Foreign Policy in the final years of the war.3

1 24

Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, 1939-1945

Chapter OutlineIntroductionRelations between Turkey and the Warring PartiesMaintaining Turkey’s NeutralityThe Rapprochement between Turkey and the Allied Powers: The Year of Conferences, 1943.Turkish Foreign Policy in the Final Years of the War: 1945-1946

Key Terms•WorldWarII•Turkey•Great Britain•Germany•Soviet Russia•Italy•non-belligerency•neutrality•non-aggression

pact

•İsmet İnönü•Şükrü Saraçoğlu•Von Papen•the Casablanca

Conference•the Adana

Conference•the Cairo

Conferences•the Yalta

Conference

67

3Turkish Foreign Policy I

INTRODUCTIONBetween 1939 and 1945, World War II created

a new paradigm of political dynamics and realities. World War II has been by far the most devastating, traumatic, and violent of the armed conflicts. In particular, the Second Great War pushed the states to pursue new strategies in the international arena. As the war expanded to the extent that even the farthest corners of the world were threatened, it transformed into yet another World War. The minor and comparatively insignificant or weaker states helplessly strived to preserve their sovereignty by resorting to whatever international maneuvers they could implement: some formed alliances with the warring parties, while others signed treaties of mutual assistance and friendship.

Situated at the geo-political and geo-strategic center of the world, Turkey, some fifteen years after World War I, found herself in a multilateral dilemma. Turkey, as a new Republic founded in 1923, was yet again on the razor’s edge; it was forced to make the crucial but possibly fatal decision between remaining as a fully neutral country such as Switzerland, developing some internationally acceptable discourse to maintain a form of neutrality, or establishing some type of alliance with the warring parties.

The relations between Turkey and the Allies, particularly Great Britain, need to be reconsidered from a more realistic perspective because there is substantial evidence that Turkey was a “non-belligerent ally” during the first (1939-1941) and the last phases (1943-1945) of the war, particularly with respect to its interactions with Britain. By contrast, the second phase of the war, from 1941 to 1943, marks a period in which the belligerent parties were mainly balanced.

RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE WARRING PARTIES

The years between 1939 and 1945 corresponded to the Second World War, an extremely destructive period in which many countries were divided into two camps: the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. Against the rise of German and Italian Fascism, the Western democracies of Britain and the USA formed an alliance with the communist Soviet Union.

The Ottoman Empire had experienced the trauma of the First World War and collapsed in the early 1920s. Therefore, the Ankara Government had to fight the War of Independence after the country had experienced an invasion by international forces. The Republic of Turkey was founded on the principles in line with those of Western democracies, but the country was lacking adequate military equipment and economic resources and had resolved not to take part in war unless its territorial integrity came under threat, a threat that became serious during the Second World War. The New Republic aimed basically to survive and maintain the nation’s territorial integrity.

Figure 3.1 World War II Flag Set.

Source: illustration ID:1018199944

The Interwar Period and the Legacy of Atatürk

To determine which side of the warring nations Turkey was closer to during World War II, an accurate assessment of the period of the War of Independence and the subsequent interwar period would be helpful. In addition, Atatürk’s legacy in Turkish foreign policy must be examined thoroughly because the cadres that governed Turkey during World War II were deeply affected by the principles of Atatürk and remained loyal to his legacy. As Cooper describes:

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3 Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War, 1939-1945

In many ways, the most significant institution in Turkey is Atatürk himself. The founder of modern Turkey died in November 1938, but his image was quite literally on every office wall and there is little evidence to suggest that the influence of his views over the political priorities of the Turkish state has weakened. The image of the man remains a powerful symbol of the enduring principles on which he built the modern republic (Cooper, 2002: 118-123).

At the core of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s foreign policy lay the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world,” which was his own maxim. The cadres that founded the Republic of Turkey and, most notably, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk cooperated closely with Western democracies and defined the priorities of Turkish foreign policy. They aimed to protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey and the Republican regime by establishing good relations with great powers and the neighboring countries. In short, during the prewar period, the focus of Turkish foreign policy was on maintaining the status quo. Turkey had to go through a war of independence and national struggle between 1919 and 1923 and had remained prudent after the early 1920s in its dealings with the countries such as Germany and Italy that had wanted a revision in Turkey’s policies.

The most concrete example of Turkey’s anxiety is the meeting held between Atatürk and the English Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine in 1936. During this meeting, while they talked about the aggressive and revisionist policies of Italy and Germany, Atatürk expressed his anxiety over the policies pursued by these two countries and suggested strict measures to handle them, particularly Italy’s expansionist policies in the Mediterranean. The memorandum also reveals that Mustafa Kemal agreed that the fascist dictatorships were a common threat to world peace and order (FO 954/28). Thus, it would be accurate to claim that Turkey, on the eve of the Second World War, sided with Great Britain in supporting the status quo.

Relations with Germany and Signing the Alliance Agreement

with Britain and FranceIt is obvious that the Turkish decision makers

had deemed it a mistake to ally with Germany during World War I and they did not want to repeat this mistake in World War II (Güçlü, 1997: 77). When World War II broke out, the Turks presumed that the Allied nations would triumph and they therefore had built their foreign policy principles on this assumption. However, this is undoubtedly insufficient to understand the basics of Turkish foreign policy during the war as well as the period leading up to the war.

For example, the aggressive policies of the Axis Powers, particularly those of Italy, in the Eastern Mediterranean were highly disturbing to the Turkish government. This pushed Turkey to cooperate with Britain. During the same period, the Turkish decision makers also became extremely suspicious of the policies pursued by the Soviet Union and they were concerned about the likely occupation of the Turkish territory as a result of a German-Soviet alliance. Furthermore, the expansionist policies of Germany toward the Balkans led Turkey to show great resolution in its relations with Germany. Consequently, these developments and the resulting anxiety pushed Turkey into a closer cooperation with the Allied nations in the beginning of the war. Being cognizant of its military and poor economic conditions, Turkey joined with Britain and France to form a coalition to balance the Axis powers. In fact, this coalition was established through the following separate agreements: the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement of May 12, 1939; the Franco-Turkish Mutual Aid and Defense Agreement of June 23, 1939; and the Turkish-English-French Declaration of Agreement of October 19, 1939.

Although Turkey developed economic, military, and diplomatic relations with both Britain and France, it acted very carefully to avoid harming its relations with Germany. For example, Turkish

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decision makers defined Germany as a “friendly country” at every opportunity and never abstained from expressing this view openly in public. Turkey had strong economic and cultural reasons to avoid a hostile relationship with Germany.

From the beginning of the Second World War, Turkey had been developing stronger economic relations with Germany. Moreover, most of Turkey’s leaders, such as Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of the General Staff, were in favor of a pro-German attitude. During the 1930s, economic relations between the two countries increased, and by 1938, 44 percent of Turkish exports were bought by Germany and 11 percent of Turkish imports came from Germany. Turkey exported agricultural commodities and chromite, an ore used in artillery production, to Germany and imported machinery, machine parts, manufactured goods, and armaments from Germany. However, the volume of trade between the two countries fell by 10-15 percent in the aftermath of Turkey’s alliance with Britain in 1939. The Allies were reluctant to purchase the surplus exports, and thus the prices of Turkish exports fell. The increasing scarcity of imports resulted in shortages and the closure of factories. Thus, to find new customers for exports, Turkish leaders sought to revive trade relations with Germany. By 1943, for example, 28-38 percent of Turkey’s imports came from Germany and 23-25 percent of its exports went to Germany (Vanderlippe, 2001: 64).

However, Turkey stayed away from signing an alliance agreement with Germany and established its relations only on the basis of “friendship.” The first breaking point in Turkey’s relationship with Germany occurred in 1939when alliance agreements were signed between Turkey and Britain. In addition, Turkey’s termination of chrome exports to Germany and its decision to sell all its chrome to Britain as of October 1943 played a major role in the deterioration of her relations with Germany.

Therefore, one may argue that the idea that Turkey pursued a balanced policy between Britain and Germany in 1939 is not well founded. Turkey actually became closer to Britain in 1939 than she had been since the proclamation of the republic. For example, the convergence of Turkey and Britain

in 1939 resulted in the suspension of all military aid by Germany to Turkey, and on the same date, Britain began to provide significant economic and military aid to Turkey. In addition, Turkey always felt the immediate Soviet threat, and this threat pushed Turkey to return to its traditional foreign policy that had been pursued for almost 150 years: British political and diplomatic support against the Soviet threat.

Undoubtedly, Turkey’s perceived threats were not confined to the Soviet Union and Germany. As mentioned above, Italy was also a threat to Turkey. In particular, Italy’s intention to gain naval control in the Eastern Mediterranean and the concessions it claimed regarding the Aegean Sea worried the Turkish decision makers. This perceived threat had a great effect on the Turkish-British alliance. Italy threatened not only the interests of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean but also those of Britain concerning the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

Figure 3.2 Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler.

Source: www.pbslearningmedia.org

Declaration of “Non-Belligerency” by Turkey

Despite the cooperation and collaboration established with Britain, Turkey declared its non-belligerency on the same day that Italy entered the war in 1940. However, as per the agreement with Britain in 1939, Turkey was bound to render to Britain and France all assistance in her power. Although some historians and researchers claim

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that Turkey’s declaration of non-belligerency caused serious harm to its relations with Britain, Britain often justified Turkey’s policy. The full extent of the damage done by France’s collapse was well known at the time, and Britain’s position in the Middle East and India was also threatened. Therefore, having Turkey as a friendly neutral power at the crossroads of war fronts was greatly appreciated by British foreign policy makers.

Moreover, the British came to understand that Turkey’s position was precarious. On July 17, Major General Cornwall-Evans estimated that the Germans could conquer Turkey and reach the Iraqi border in 16 weeks. “Once the Germans were across the Straits, the Turks,” he said, “could mount little resistance.” The British stated that they had hardly expected Turkey to do otherwise when Turkey declared non-belligerency and fully recognized the difficulties in which it found herself. The treaty was valuable as a potential rather than an actual asset. It was feared that any other attitude would force Turkey to throw herself into the arms of Germany (Deringil, 1982:43). The British Ambassador to Ankara, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, somewhat grudgingly admitted on August 21, 1940 that “Turkey at this stage would prove more of a liability than an asset” (Deringil, 1982:43). In addition, Turkey generally informed Britain of its decisions in advance, and thus it would be incorrect to state that such an important decision was made without the consent of the British government.

What was likely the most important event confirming the robustness of Turkish-British alliance occurred in 1940 following the invasion of France by Germany. The critical question was whether the French defeat would destroy the delicate balance of power in the Mediterranean. Turkey was particularly worried about the French fleet: if they were to be in the service of the Axis, Turkey would be gravely threatened from the sea. Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen reported on June 25, 1940 that there was no change in the Turkish attitude, and he admitted that there were two questions that were being asked continually: a) what would happen to the French fleet and b) whether the British air power was strong enough to address the expected attacks.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu told Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen that if the

French fleet surrendered to the Axis, it would be the greatest mistake in history. A Foreign Office minute dated July 1, 1940 and written by Sir O. Sargent underlined:

the enormous importance the Turks attach to the issue [of French Navy]. It is in fact, abundantly clear that on the answer to the question of whether or not we are to lose the French fleet, we may be able to argue that it was not our fault. But this will not cut much ice with the Turks. The Turks may well take the loss as finally disposing of our sea power in the Mediterranean, and as depriving us of any value as an ally. It might even afford them the occasion to make terms with the Germans (Deringil, 1982:36-37).

The Foreign Office was also worried that Turkey would decide that Britain could no longer protect her against Russia and would thus turn to Germany. The Foreign Office wondered

What means [the British] have of convincing Turkey that it is in her own interest to continue to collaborate with us? The first thing is clearly to convince her that if she refuses to compound with Germany and Italy she is safe from being attacked by sea. It all depends, therefore on whether we can assure her that the Germans and Italians will not be able to use the French fleet to establish a complete preponderance in the [Eastern Mediterranean] (Deringil, 1982:37).

Selim Deringil, the prominent Turkish scholar who has widely researched Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War, stated that “securing Turkey’s loyalty was a major factor in the British decision to destroy the French fleet” (Deringil, 1982:37). In fact, the bombing of the French fleet by Britain in an effort to “secure Turkey’s loyalty” actually verifies how cordial the Turkish-British alliance was at the time.

However, in 1940, Germany invaded France and Romania, Italy attacked Greece, and the outstanding successes of the Axis powers on almost all fronts caused public opinion in Turkey to increasingly criticize the İsmet İnönü government. Even Kazım Karabekir asked Saraçoğlu what the meaning of joining a war on the losing side would be, because Italy had joined the Axis Powers and

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the Allied Powers now seemed to be losing the war. The same anxiety was also deeply felt by İnönü and his government. Therefore, it may be concluded that Turkey gradually started to balance Britain in the mid-1940, not in 1939.

Do some research on the strategy of fighting Hitler from the periphery.

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MAINTAINING TURKEY’ S NEUTRALITY

In 1941 and 1942, Turkey clearly followed a policy of balanced relations with the warring nations. For example, in January 1941, Britain suggested that Turkey declare war on Italy. This was followed by another request to wage war against Germany if Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were invaded by the German troops. This suggestion is thought to have been articulated during a visit to Turkey by the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and General Sir John Dill. However, Turkish decision makers refused to enter the war because of Russia’s attitude and Turkey’s inadequate military equipment at the time.

Getting Closer with Germany Having been both impressed and perturbed by

the military success of Germany, Turkey decided to revise her close relations with Britain in 1941 to protect her national interests without frightening Germany. Thus, in 1941, Turkey was content to act in accordance with the permanent and enduring interests of the state that were mainly based on survival and the territorial integrity.

Italy’s entry into the war on the side of Germany and the perceivable effects of the war on the borders of Turkey resulted in the creation of a physical survival strategy. At this point, instead of following an aggressive policy to meet the threat coming from the West, Turkey preferred to establish good relations with the states that were potential threats. To this end, the Non-Aggression Pact was signed with Bulgaria on February 17, 1941.

From this moment on, the word “non-belligerency” was replaced by the word “neutrality” in diplomatic circles. Rothstein explains why some states wanted to be neutral as follows: “One reason is that small powers tend to rely on the hope that they can be protected by their own insignificance. If they can appear detached and disintegrated enough and if they can convincingly indicate that they are too powerless to affect the issue, they hope the storm will pass them by” (Rothstein, 1968: 26).

Moreover, Turkey made it clear to Britain that it would not declare an Axis attack on Greece, a casus belli. Britain remained silent about the Non-Aggression Pact signed between Turkey and Bulgaria, but found Turkey’s timid statement regarding Greece to be quite odd. For example, the British had very much tried to convey to the Turkish government that “in light of recent developments, a more positive policy on declaring war than the Turkish government had hitherto followed would best serve the interests of Turkey herself and the Allies” (FO 195/2469).

However, these were the days that pushed Turkey to remain aloof from the Allies. In other words, the national interests of Turkey did not permit it to act with Britain. In particular, the German offensive in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia starting in the spring of 1941 seemed to confirm Turkey’s worst fears. Even when Britain offered Turkey the opportunity to invade Chios, Mytilene, and Lemnos temporarily, Turkey, considering the possible results, did not see this as an opportunity and it preferred to decline such offers. The only objective of Turkey was to protect Turkey and the Turkish nation from a likely destruction at all costs. Having influenced Turkey for almost two years under the pretext of the German and Italian threats, even Britain lost its power after the letters of good mission addressed to İnönü and written by Hitler on March 4, 1941.

Balancing the Relations The most intriguing issue is that, after having

been allied with Britain against the German and Italian threats in 1939, Turkey started to balance the two great powers surprisingly well in 1941. In other words, being a balancer was a significant role to play for some states such as Turkey that were strategically located (Choi 1995:23): neighboring

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the Balkans; having a coastal border with the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea; and acting as a strategic and cultural bridge between the continents. Given such hard times when the world was polarized into the Allied and Axis powers, Turkey’s ability to succeed in treating each party equally is an issue that needs to be examined closely.

Balancing the great powers: For example, “Colonel Beck of Poland between Germany and Russia, Tito of Yugoslavia between the West and the East, Sadat of Egypt between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Kim II Sung of North Korea between China and the Soviet Union. All these politicians understood and utilized the environment by trying to hold the balance between the two opposing great powers” (Choi, 1995: 24).

At this point, a critical question arises: “Did İnönü follow a passive policy during World War II?” In the following sections of the analysis, a more detailed answer to this question will be provided. Nevertheless, Turkey’s lack of economic and military resources in 1941 is enough to refute this criticism. In the early 1940s, entering the war would be like an acrobat walking on a tightrope without a net.

The Turks built the balance so skillfully that they took steps to please the British while winking at the Germans. For example, after the invasion of Bulgaria by Germany, they promised to help the British with Greece, but signed the Treaty of Friendship (Non-Aggression Pact) with Germany on June 18, 1941. Despite all the efforts of Turkey, the Non-Aggression Pact signed with Germany was enough to frighten the British. The Non-Aggression Pact led the British to doubt Turkey’s loyalty, and it impaired Britain’s prestige, particularly in the Muslim world. Moreover, Turkey diverted the immediate peril toward its historic enemy, and it demonstrated a tendency to insist that at no time did Turks ever regard Russia as anything but their primary enemy (FO 195/2469). Only then did the British start to call Turkey a “neutral” state rather than a “non-belligerent ally” (FO 195/2469).

Hard Times, 1941-1942Of course, the policy of balance pursued

by Turkey during this period had another aim. Turkey expected that Germany would beat Russia whereas Great Britain would beat Germany (FO 195/2469). While balancing Germany and Britain on her own, Turkey expected her traditional enemy, Russia, to lose the war. However, by the end of April 1941, the Nazis had invaded all of Europe, and the Axis had even entered the islands around Turkey, while Rommel had advanced rapidly in North Africa. Therefore, Turkey anticipated that it might be the next target; Germany could attack Turkey through Iraq and Iran or even the Caucasus. Because Turkey had temporized during the negotiations on the friendship agreement, it had weakened its defense against the Germans in several ways (Fox 1967: 27-28).

Another pair of events in 1941 that must be emphasized are Rashid Ali’s coup, which took place in Iraq, and the invasion of Iran by Britain and the Soviet Union. These two developments are important for better evaluating Turkish-British relations. In 1941, the German troops were continuously victorious, and the Allies suffered heavy losses on almost all fronts. In such a challenging period of the war, the Allies could not risk the occupation of Iran or Iraq by the Germans. In Iraq, Rashid Ali’s coup that supported Germany was repressed within a month, and Iraq was invaded as soon as it was understood that it had fallen under the influence of the Germans.

Therefore, two critical and related questions are the following: (1) when did German-Turkish relations reach its peak, and (2) why did the Allies leave Turkey untouched? In fact, the answer is quite clear and simple. The Turkish decision makers calculated very well when to stop and when to act, and they repeatedly emphasized the smooth continuation of the Turkish-British alliance. The following words by Şükrü Saraçoğlu in 1942 best describe the situation: “Our treaty of alliance with Great Britain continues to show its results in the interests of both parties. The Anglo-Turkish alliance is the expression of reality itself and constitutes a fundamental factor of the political system which I have just set forth” (The Times, 1942: 3).

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The year of 1942 was also a fluctuating period in the internal and external policy of Turkey. When the British and the Soviets signed the Mutual Assistance Agreement on May 26, 1942, the Turks thought that a secret agreement might have also been signed regarding the future of Turkey. Ultimately, the possibility of the Soviets dominating Eastern Europe alarmed Turkey after the United States had entered the war whole-heartedly and joined Britain in supporting the Soviets (Deringil, 1989:137).

This anxiety made the anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments stronger in Turkey. It was believed that in a short period of time the views of Pan-Turkist movement would get materialized with the defeat and the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Germans. Ignoring the Turkish government’s policy of neutrality, Pan-Turk publications urged Turkey to join the war (clearly against the Soviet Union). These publications, though not always very clear, were certainly meant to encourage President İsmet İnönü to come to the aid of Turkey against the Soviet Union (Landau, 1995: 112). However, both President İsmet İnönü and the Turkish officials approached such calls with prudence. It is true that the Turkish government wanted the removal of the Soviet threat, but as Şükrü Saraçoğlu said, “Turkey has sought no adventures beyond her frontiers” (The Times, 1942: 3). Moreover, the Turkish government did not reveal any irredentist plans (Landau, 1995: 115). The crucial exception to this policy, as argued by some historians, was the Varlık Vergisi, which was levied by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on November 11, 1942.

Figure 3.3 More than one million soldiers perished in Stalingrad after Adolf Hitler’s march into the Soviet

heartland.

Source: www.telegraph.co.uk

Late 1942 was another breaking point in relations between Turkey and Britain as well as Turkey and the Soviets. Turkey faced increased pressure from the successful counter-offensive of Britain at El Alamein and the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad in November 1942. Turkey was now considered a means for shortening the war. Because Turkey could not block the Axis’s way to the Middle East, it found herself in a very difficult position. Turkey emphasized its shortage of all essential war materials and insisted that in case Germany won a victory over the British, this would make the country an ideal target for the Germans (Deringil, 1989:141). Moreover, the Turkish entry into the war could serve as a pretext to a Soviet invasion in the name of protecting its national interests against the Germans (Vanderlippe, 2001: 68). Therefore, Turkey again refused to get involved in the war, but the outstanding success of the Allies on almost all of the fronts triggered the third and last phase of the war, and Turkey became closer to Britain again. The Turkish expectation that Germany might beat Russia was not realized, and starting in 1943, Turkey once again had to face the Russian threat.

Do some research on the details of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

2

THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE ALLIED POWERS: THE YEAR

OF CONFERENCES, 1943In his thesis titled “Small States and the

Balance of Power,” Choi (1995) states that “with some degree of exaggeration, one might argue that geography decides the fate of a state” (p. 19) To some extent, this is an accurate designation of the Turkish case in World War II. When a strong power is also a sea power, a “block” may lie directly between its territory and the territory of a land power or merely between the land power and the sea, access to which would bring the land power into conflict with the sea power. This was the case for Turkey during the nineteenth and

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early twentieth centuries, and in World War II, particularly in the last phase of the war when Great Britain supported keeping İstanbul and the Straits out of Russia’s hands (Spykman and Rollins, 1939a: 407). It was an extremely difficult task for the British to moderate the endless requests of the Russians about the Straits while trying to convince Turkey to become involved in the war.

The Casablanca and Adana Conferences

The objectives of this task were discussed at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. Winston Churchill came to Casablanca having prepared plans for possible Turkish entry into the war. He intended to fully support Turkey by providing military equipment. Safeguarding the southern part of Turkey against any Italian aggression was his second strategy. Getting access to the Turkish air bases and air space to provide full protection was his third strategy. By the end of the Casablanca Conference, Churchill had taken what he had wanted very much: full authorization by great powers in executing his strategies concerning Turkey. At the conference, the British decided that they must convince the Turks to enter the war by exploiting their fear of the Russians, who might violate Turkey’s territorial integrity after the war.

Figure 3.4 Allied leaders: (from left) French General Henri Giraud, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, French General Charles de Gaulle, and British Prime

Minister Winston Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, January 1943.

Source: www.britannica.com

After the Casablanca Conference, Churchill, armed with the full authorization of the Americans concerning the Turkish involvement in the war, decided to initiate negotiations with the Turkish authorities. Although Churchill was very hopeful that his pressure on Turkey would be fruitful, he was also aware that Turkey would not reveal a positive attitude, which would hurt Britain’s prestige. Yet Churchill was sure that he would obtain something substantial from the Turkish representatives, whom he knew had many reservations.

Wishing to address these reservations, Churchill told the Turkish President İsmet İnönü at the Adana Conference on January 30, 1943, that Turkey would be able to judge for herself any situation that might arise. He added that there might even be a moment in 1943 that Turkey would be strong and ready for entering the war, and Great Britain would have her strategic plans ready. However, Churchill asked for no engagement, but in his view it was very important for Turkey to be among the victors and to have a seat at the meeting that would determine the future of the world after the war and make arrangements to prevent states from initiating any war of aggression. He stated that Turkey should decide for itself what to do and that the call for a decision might come in about six months. He then added that, in 1918, the German collapse had come before it had been expected (CAB 66/34/14).

Churchill went on to say in Adana that the post-war Russia might not be the same Russia as before and that it might be even more imperialistic. He also said that the best protection for Turkey lay in an international arrangement, perhaps accompanied by special guarantees for Turkey. Russia and possibly the United States were ready to give these guarantees, he added. He then said that things would not always turn out as badly as they were expected, but if they did, it would be better for Turkey to be strong and closely associated with the United Kingdom and the United States. Lastly, he said that he would never propose that Turkey enter the war if it was not ready, nor would he suggest that Turkey should do so in any way that

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would involve the exhaustion of its resources. The moment, he said, would come when one push would be important: allowing Britain to attack Ploiesti/Romania from the Turkish bases (CAB 66/34/14).

In Adana, Churchill conducted negotiations with the Turks very skillfully, and while he induced fear of the Russians in the Turks, he left the final decision to the Turks as to whether to enter the war. However, at the very end of the negotiations, Churchill also stated that “if Turkey voluntarily entered the war, she would make the fourth armed power. This would be a great opportunity for Turkey to take her due place and to come to the Peace Conference relatively unweakened as one of the four victorious Powers. That afforded the best prospects for her security”(CAB 66/34/14).

Figure 3.5 İnönü and Churchill meet in Adana/Turkey, January 30, 1943.

Source: www.cnnturk.com

Further Pressure on Turkey to Enter the War

The Casablanca and Adana Conferences revealed how important the possible Turkish involvement in the war was for Britain. The impartial stance of Turkey hampered the Anglo-Soviet plans that aimed to end the war as soon as possible and quickly defeat the Germans in the Balkan and Mediterranean theaters of the war. For this reason, Churchill decided to push Turkey to take Britain’s side in the war. Eliminating all possible allegations that might be used against the interests of Britain and Turkey in the post war era by the Soviets was one of the reasons that Churchill associated the British interests with those of Turkey. Preventing the possibility of any Soviet progress

toward the Balkans with the help of Turkey was another reason for Churchill’s policy (Bilgin and Morewood, 2004: 28).

When the Allies began to raise the question of belligerency, the Turks were less perilously situated than they had been earlier. In 1943, the Allies were gaining the upper hand, and Germany was clearly on the losing end. Nevertheless, there were still possible dangers, since “Germany was being defeated in the East by a great power known to be hostile to Turkey. The Nazis were still on Turkey’s border and capable of inflicting serious damage. Furthermore, the Allies were divided as to whether to pursue strategies and tactics involving Turkey, and their policies were changing rapidly with the change on the battleground. The post war plans being prepared by the winning partners would certainly affect Turkey, particularly because of Russia’s traditional desire to control the Turkish Straits” (Fox, 1967: 36).

In addition, Russia sought to persuade Britain and the United States that it was essential to make changes in the Montreux Convention in a way that the new straits regime would satisfy Moscow. The Soviets resorted to different tactics to carry the Straits question to the allied conferences. At first, the Russians hid their eventual target and pretended that their goal was only to revise the Convention, but they increasingly turned toward the objective of making Turkey a satellite state. When the Russians asked whether the Allies needed Turkey’s participation in the war at the Moscow Conference in October 1943, the British replied, “There was no disagreement between them as to the desirability of bringing Turkey into the war” (Weisband, 1973: 169).

Following the Moscow Conference, however, at the First Cairo Conference (November 22-26, 1943), the British gave a warning to the Turks that they had to join the war immediately. Moreover, the Teheran Conference (November 28-December 1, 1943) marked a turning point in the allied nations’ strategy toward the Turkish position. Now not only the British but also the Soviets insisted on Turkey’s joining the war. The Soviets believed that the war would come to an end sooner with the participation of Turkey. This was obviously a Soviet strategy to push Turkey into yielding to a common Allied decision (Rubin,

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1980: 33). By this time, Churchill was also anxious to have the Turks engaged; he took the lead at the Second Cairo Conference (December 4-6, 1943) in trying to persuade President İnönü to enter the war on the side of the Allied nations.

Figure 3.6 Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at the Tehran Conference.

Source: www.nvlchawaii.org

The Americans acquiesced to this move, although, like some of Churchill’s own compatriots, they thought that the chance of Turkey’s agreeing to join the war was slight and that it was not “worth diverting” any effort from more important fronts in Western Europe and the Pacific (Fox, 1967: 33). The discussions between Churchill, Roosevelt, and İnönü at the Second Cairo Conference in December 1943 mainly failed to yield any positive results. There were “hard and sometimes bitter discussions, and each maintained his own point of view, but the prevailing feature was an outstanding frankness” (Açıkalın, 1974: 486).

The minutes of the Second Cairo Conference demonstrate the arduousness and toughness of the negotiations. Churchill clearly stated to the Turkish decision makers that the Allies wanted Turkey to enter the war on the Bulgarian front. He also added that Stalin had promised to help Turkey if it entered the war. Many political historians who have studied World War II claim that at the Second Cairo Conference, İsmet İnönü used the military deficiency argument as an excuse to avoid entering the war. However, it should be noted that the military deficiency argument was not only an

excuse but also a fact. For example, when Churchill said that the Turks had not taken full advantage of the school and tuition opportunities offered to them and this had affected their ability to absorb the available material, İnönü replied as follows:

Newly arrived Hurricane (warplanes) were no longer regarded as the most modern. They were in fact out of date. No doubt, imperative considerati-ons had made it impossible to supply better planes. Moreover, the Turks had asked several times for aero planes and tanks but these had often been refused (Department of State, 1961: 692-695,713,714).

It is not surprising that Churchill did not offer any satisfactory explanation in his defense. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the lack of military equipment was a strong reason for the Turks to disagree with the British and the Americans. In fact, Churchill had written a personal letter to President Roosevelt saying that the British, in fact, had no weapons to supply to meet Turkey’s demands (FO 954/28).

Figure 3.7 Roosevelt, İnönü, and Churchill at the Second Cairo Conference, December 1943.

Source: İnönü Vakfı

By the end of the summer of 1944, the Soviets still expected Turkey to join the war. When the Soviet Ambassador in London, Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, gave an enclosed aide-memoire to Anthony Eden wishing that Turkey would join the war, Eden explained to him that the expected breaking off of relations between Turkey and Germany would at least be a long step toward the entry of Turkey

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into the war and that once Turkey had committed herself, the British, Americans, and Russians could then consider whether they wished Turkey to take the next step and, if so, whether they were prepared to pay any price in order to induce it to do so. He added that the advantage of inducing it to break off relations was that the Allies could get this at once without any of the long haggling about the supply of air squadrons and war materials, and military co-operation, which would certainly ensue if and when they asked Turkey to actually go to war. However, the rupture of relations would, they hoped, produce an important moral effect throughout the Balkans.

Eden also warned Ambassador Gusev that they must face the fact that if the Turkish Government were asked to come into the war, the Allies, in view of their commitments in Italy, would be unable to give the Turks an appreciable amount of assistance in either men, aircraft, or war materials, and it was these circumstances that might indeed lead to disappointing results (FO 954/28). Indeed, the British arguments that were used against the demands of the Soviets and the Americans demonstrate how İnönü’s strategy was sound at the Cairo Conference.

President Roosevelt declared “the Allied doctrine of unconditional surrender” at the Casablanca Conference. Discuss the implications of this strategy for the Axis powers’ war effort.

3

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FINAL YEARS OF THE

WAR: 1944-1945After the second Cairo Conference, the British

assumed “an attitude of unusual coolness” toward Turkey. They cancelled their military mission and limited the war supplies early in 1944. They warned Turkey in April 1944 that they would impose an embargo like those imposed on other impartial nations if Turkey insisted on sending strategic materials to Germany. The British were

not alone in this warning; the United States also agreed with the British strategy (Fox, 1967: 37). This was the moment that Turkey feared economic breakdown because of her tough resistance to meeting the demands of the Allies. Furthermore, the major concern of Turkey was that the Soviet Union was getting stronger each day, and the support of the Western Allies was its main hope for protecting itself against a strong Soviet Union (Fox, 1967: 38-39).

Change in the Turkish Strategy toward the Germans

Because of changes on the battleground, Turkey reviewed its foreign policy strategy toward the Germans. In April 1944, Turkey declared that it would stop exporting chrome ore to Germany. The Turks then started to attempt to better understand the Soviets’ purposes and to nurture better relations with Russia at the Cairo meeting (Weisband, 1973: 228). For example, a secret organization of the Pan-Turkist movement was officially revealed and prosecuted (Fox, 1967: 39). To satisfy the Soviet Union in particular, the Turkish Government deemed it necessary to dismiss some Nazi sympathizers from their duties. Fevzi Çakmak was forced to resign from the post of Chief of General Staff by İnönü, followed by Numan Menemencioğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In accordance with this new strategy, on March 15, 1944, the wealth tax (Varlık Vergisi) was repealed, and all related penalties were abolished.

Moreover, after the passage of some small German warships disguised as commercial vessels had been protested by the British, Turkey agreed that the Straits would be closed to all German ships. Early in April 1944, two merchant ships that were likely to be used for the evacuation of German soldiers from Crimea were prevented from departing from İstanbul. In June 1944, the German barges that were not armed were forbidden from entering the Aegean; in the same month, Saraçoğlu took over as the Foreign Minister after the resignation of Numan Menemencioğlu, who was suspected of enabling the passage of German transport vessels that carried hidden holds full of guns, mines, and munitions. In addition, Saraçoğlu assured that Turkey would not do anything further to help the Germans (Macfie, 1989: 245; Fox, 1967: 39).

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Finally, when the Americans and the British demanded that Turkey end all diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany, Turkey made the crucial decision to do so on August 2, 1944 (Hakkı, 2007: 59). However, the German ambassador to Ankara, Franz Von Papen, warned Turkey by saying that “in very serious terms that such a breaking of relations as is planned under pressure of the United Kingdom would deprive Turkey, finally, of her freedom of action which up to now has been jealously guarded by her as a proud nation. The United Kingdom undoubtedly means that this step shall force Turkey to enter the war, as demanded by Britain, which would bring with it momentous consequences for the country” (The Times 1944: 3).

The Soviet Demands The increased Soviet hostility toward Turkey was

readily apparent in the summer of 1944. For example, in July 1944, the Russians complained about the Western Allies’ proposal that Turkey’s merely breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany was not in conformity with the agreement earlier arrived at Moscow. It was stated that without the Russian consent, the British had broken an agreement and it was not a responsibility of the Soviet Union any longer to act jointly with the Western Powers regarding Turkey. All counter offers to an obvious announcement of war came too late, and Turkey was to be left on its own by the Russians (Fox 1967: 38). In particular, Stalin was also against Turkey’s having the power to decide upon the closure of the Straits during the threat of war (Macfie, 1989: 245). What precisely the Russians wanted regarding the Straits was a revision of the Montreux Convention.

It was time for both the British and the Turks to stand against the Soviet demands. In June 1944, the Chief of Staff of Britain reported that when the war ended, the Russians would be the main land power in both Europe and Asia. He also stated that crucial British strategic interests after the war could be endangered by the Soviets. These interests included oil supplies from the Middle Eastern countries of Iraq and Persia, British communications in the Mediterranean over Turkey, and important sea communications. Thus, he thought that to guarantee the US support against such threats in the region, the British policy should be reconsidered (Bilgin and Morewood, 2004: 31).

Moreover, the Joint Intelligence Committee believed that post-war Russia would try to preserve the Black Sea as a “Russian lake” and control the navigation through the Straits in order to protect the Ukrainian and Soviet interests. Only the expansion on either side of the Straits and of the military bases controlling the sea routes through the Aegean could guarantee full control. Although the Foreign Office still attributed those ambitions to German propaganda, Molotov had sought those bases in 1940. The British were also suspicious about whether the Russians needed to have such a large territory for security reasons if it had already air and naval dominance over the Black Sea and if Turkey did not have any close relations with any other power. Turkey was also threatened in a similar way by the Soviet bases in Bulgaria (Tamkin, 2009: 169,170).

In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union started to express its demands about the Straits more strictly. Stalin was now stating that it should not be Turkey’s decision to let the Russian ships pass through the Straits and that a new system similar to the one for the Suez Canal should be constituted (Macfie, 1989: 245).

Figure 3.8 The Turkish Straits.

Source: www.krcagency.com

In response, Churchill explained that Britain sympathized with the revision of the Convention and added that the British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not depend on a narrow exit. However, he proposed that the matter be taken up at the following meeting of foreign ministers. He also suggested that the Turks be informed that this issue was being considered and that they

79


be given assurance that their independence and integrity would be respected. With regard to the proposal that they immediately inform the Turks of what was being diplomatically discussed, Stalin remarked that it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be openly expressed (Department of State, 1955: 904, 910, 916). Finally, it was agreed that the revision of the Montreux Convention should be discussed in London at the first meeting of foreign ministers (Bilgin and Morewood, 2004: 31).

Another matter to which Stalin drew attention was the admission of states into the newly proposed organization of the “United Nations.” President Roosevelt proposed that the status of an Associated Nation should be given to only those nations that had already declared war on Germany, and he suggested a deadline, March 1945, for those that had not yet decided whether to declare war. Stalin approached Turkey’s situation by saying that some nations “hesitated and speculated on being on the winning side.” Churchill supported Turkey by saying that if a declaration was made by a large group of uncommitted nations at the time, Germany would be affected morally. Churchill insisted that Turkey had agreed to ally with them at a very troubling time, but after the war had broken out it decided that it would not keep up with the necessities of a modern war. Turkey’s attitude had been friendly and cooperative, even though it had not taken the opportunity given a year ago to join the war. Stalin said that if by the end of February Turkey declared war on Germany, it was to be invited to the conference that would establish the United Nations. Churchill accepted this proposition (Weisband, 1973: 299-300; Department of State 1955:774).

On February 20, 1945, Sir Maurice Peterson informed the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka of the decision reached at the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) that March 1 was the deadline for a declaration of war on the Axis if Turkey was to be invited to the United Nations Conference. Accordingly, on February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan. The actual reasons behind this decision were being able to participate in the United Nations Conference that would be held in San Francisco and appeasing the victorious Allied nations (Weisband, 1973:303). Soon after Yalta, it became obvious that the Soviet demands were not limited to the revision of the Montreux

Convention: the Soviets also demanded that Kars and Ardahan be returned to the Soviet Russia. The cities of Kars and Ardahan (as well as Batum) were ceded to the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and came under the domination of the Republic following the negotiations in 1921.

However, almost immediately after the war, the British and the Turks narrowed their differences. The British Government discussed whether the “explicit promises” given by Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 toward respecting the territorial integrity of Turkey were remised by the Russians. As such, the fear of the Turks that its interests might be sacrificed by Great Britain in an attempt to divide Europe with the Russians into spheres of influence did not materialize. Given the Soviet purposes, the British increasingly supported Turkish interests.

The disagreements about their national interests and policies between the Soviets on the one side and the Americans and British, on the other resurfaced at the Potsdam Conference, held between July 17 and August 2, 1945. “By the time the Truman Doctrine was enunciated, Greece and Turkey had become the focal point of East-West confrontation” (Weisband, 1973: 318). The United States had to play the leading role toward protecting Western interests against the Soviet expansionism. These aims were very clear regarding Turkey. Although a “hand with the Turks” was demanded and received at Casablanca by Churchill, now there was no one except the Americans to play this role (Weisband, 1973: 316-318).

Indeed, the goal of Great Britain was simple and clear: preventing the Russian expansionism. “Within two hundred years, Russia fought no less than seven wars with Turkey in an attempt to reach the Mediterranean by way of İstanbul; but, when Turkey was not strong enough to oppose Russia, England came to her aid” (Spykman and Rollins, 1939b: 599). The historical mission of Great Britain, once again, continued with a firmer realism.

Discuss the implications of the end of World War II for the Allied and Axis powers. In other words, how did the war affect the relative position of these states in the international system in the 20th and early 21st centuries?

4


80

Sum

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y

LO 1 Discuss the relations of Turkey with the warring parties

Being cognizant of its military and poor economic conditions, Turkey joined with Britain and France to form a coalition to balance the Axis powers. In fact, this coalition was established through the following separate agreements: the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement of May 12, 1939; the Franco-Turkish Mutual Aid and Defense Agreement of June 23, 1939; and the Turkish-English-French Declaration of Agreement of October 19, 1939. Although Turkey developed economic, military, and diplomatic relations with both Britain and France, it acted very carefully to avoid harming its relations with Germany. Yet Turkey stayed away from signing an alliance agreement with Germany and established its relations only on the basis of “friendship.” Despite the cooperation and collaboration established with Britain, Turkey declared its non-belligerency on the same day that Italy entered the war in 1940. However, as per the agreement with Britain in 1939, Turkey was bound to render to Britain and France all assistance in her power.

LO 2 Explain how Turkey was able to maintain its neutrality in the war.

In 1941 and 1942, Turkey clearly followed a policy of balanced relations with the warring nations. Having been both impressed and perturbed by the military success of Germany, Turkey decided to revise her close relations with Britain in 1941 to protect her national interests without frightening Germany. The most intriguing issue is that, after having been allied with Britain against the German and Italian threats in 1939, Turkey started to balance the two great powers surprisingly well in 1941. In other words, being a balancer was a significant role to play for some states such as Turkey that were strategically located. The Turks built the balance so skillfully that they took steps to please the British while winking at the Germans. The Turkish decision makers calculated very well when to stop and when to act and repeatedly emphasized the smooth continuation of the Turkish-British alliance.


81

LO 3 Analyze the rapprochement between Turkey and the Allied Powers

In Adana, Churchill conducted negotiations with the Turks very skillfully, and while he induced fear of the Russians in the Turks, he left the final decision to the Turks as to whether to enter the war. The Casablanca and Adana Conferences revealed how important the possible Turkish involvement in the war was for Britain. The impartial stance of Turkey hampered the Anglo-Soviet plans that aimed to end the war as soon as possible and quickly defeat the Germans in the Balkan and Mediterranean theaters of the war. For this reason, Churchill decided to push Turkey to take Britain’s side in the war. In 1943, the Allies were gaining the upper hand, and Germany was clearly on the losing end. In addition, Russia sought to persuade Britain and the United States that it was essential to make changes in the Montreux Convention in a way that the new straits regime would satisfy Moscow. The minutes of the Second Cairo Conference demonstrate the arduousness and toughness of the negotiations. Churchill clearly stated to the Turkish decision makers that the Allies wanted Turkey to enter the war on the Bulgarian front. He also added that Stalin had promised to help Turkey if it entered the war. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the lack of military equipment was a strong reason for the Turks to disagree with the British and the Americans. In fact, Churchill had written a personal letter to President Roosevelt saying that the British, in fact, had no weapons to supply to meet Turkey’s demands.

LO 4 Evaluate Turkish Foreign Policy in the final years of the war

Turkey reviewed its foreign policy strategy toward the Germans. In April 1944, Turkey declared that it would stop exporting chrome ore to Germany. After the passage of some small German warships disguised as commercial vessels had been protested by the British, Turkey agreed that the Straits would be closed to all German ships. Finally, when the Americans and the British demanded that Turkey end all diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany, Turkey made the crucial decision to do so on August 2, 1944. The increased Soviet hostility toward Turkey was readily apparent in the summer of 1944. In July 1944, for example, the Russians had complained about the Western Allies’ proposal that Turkey’s breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany was not in conformity with the agreement earlier arrived at Moscow. On February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan. The actual reasons behind this decision were being able to participate in the United Nations Conference that would be held in San Francisco and appeasing the victorious Allied nations. However, almost immediately after the war, the British and the Turks narrowed their differences. The British Government discussed whether the “explicit promises” given by Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 toward respecting the territorial integrity of Turkey were remised by the Russians. As such, the fear of the Turks that its interests might be sacrificed by Great Britain in an attempt to divide Europe with the Russians into spheres of influence did not materialize. Given the Soviet purposes, the British increasingly supported Turkish interests.

Sum

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82

Test

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rsel

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1 In the period leading up to the Second World War, the political principles and legacy of --- mostly affected the course of Turkish foreign policy.


a. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk b. İsmet İnönüc. Şükrü Saraçoğlud. Numan Menemencioğlue. Fevzi Çakmak

2 With which of the following countries did Turkey sign the Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement on May 2, 1939?

a. The United States b. Germanyc. Italy d. Great Britain e. France

3 When the war broke out in 1939, Turkey declared its….


a. neutrality b. active neutrality c. non-belligerency d. alliance with the Allied powerse. alliance with the Axis powers

4 Which of the following states was not one of the Allied powers during the Second World War?

a. The United States b. Great Britain c. France d. The Soviet Unione. Italy

5 With which of the following nations did Tur-key sign a non-aggression pact on June 18, 1941?

a. The United Statesb. Germanyc. Great Britaind. The Soviet Union e. France

6 At which war theater was the Soviet counter-offensive especially successful against the Nazis in 1942?

a. The Mediterranean b. The Middle Eastc. Berlin d. Stalingrad e. El Alamein

7 In January 1943, Winston Churchill and İs-met İnönü met at the ---

Which of the following options correctly comple-tes the sentence above?

a. Adana Conferenceb. First Cairo Conferencec. Second Cairo Conferenced. Casablanca Conference e. Yalta Conference

8 Who served as the German Ambassador to Ankara during World War II?

a. Anthony Edenb. Franz Von Papen c. Fedor Tarasovich Gusevd. Percy Loraine e. Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen

9 On which of the following states did Turkey declare war in 1945?

a. Japan b. The United Statesc. Great Britain d. Francee. Bulgaria

10 The “Turkish Straits” consist of---


a. The Sea of Marmarab. The Black Seac. The Sea of Marmara and the Black Sead) The Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of

Marmarae) The Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and the Black

Sea


83

Answ

er Key for “Test Yourself”

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Relations between Turkey and the Warring Parties” section.

1. a If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Maintaining the Turkish Neutrality” section.

6. d


3. c If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Final Years of the War” section.

8. b


2. d If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Rapprochement between Turkey and the Allied Powers” section.

7. a


4. e

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Maintaining the Turkish Neutrality” section.

5. b

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Final Years of the War” section.

9. a

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Final Years of the War” section.

10. d

Suggested answ

er for “Your Turn”

Do some research on the strategy of fighting Hitler from the Periphery

your turn 1

“As Mawdsley puts it, Britain and France now embarked on a strategy ‘that with hindsight [seems] incomprehensible and even ridiculous’. If anything this is an understatement, since the ‘peripheral strategy’ doctrine was believed in as much by Winston Churchill throughout the conflict as by the disastrous Neville Chamberlain and French leader Edouard Daladier in 1939–40. Rat-her than attack Germany direct (on land or by air), they decided on building up alliances on the edges of German-controlled territory, principally in the Balkans but also, if possible, in Scandinavia as well. At one stage, the Allies even thought of going to war with the USSR to protect Finland, a neutral country that the Soviets invaded, but which the Red Army was not able fully to conquer. There were also plans to bomb the Baku oil fields in the Caucasus, in order to prevent Soviet oil from reaching Germany under the Nazi–Soviet Pact. The Turks were able to stop this folly from occurring, since the best route for Allied bombers was over Turkish soil, and that government refused overf-light rights. Then in April 1940, Hitler began his invasion of Western Europe, and the day of reckoning that Britain and France had for so long sought to postpone truly came at last” (Catherwood, 2014: 37-38).


84

Do some research on the details of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

your turn 2

“On August 23, 1939, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Publicly, this agreement stated that Germany and the Soviet Union would not attack each other and that any problem that might arise between the two countries was to be handled amicably. Terms of the pact included the provision that if Germany attacked Poland, the Soviet Union would not come to its aid. Thus, if Germany went to war against the West (especially France and Great Britain) over Poland, the Soviets were guaranteeing that they would not enter the war. This would block the opening of a second front for Germany. In addition to the agreement, Ribbentrop and Molotov added a secret protocol to the pact—a secret addendum whose existence was denied by the Soviets until 1989. The secret protocol held an agreement between the Nazis and the Soviets that greatly affected Eastern Europe. In exchange for the Soviets pledging to decline engagement in the imminent war, Germany gave the Soviets the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), leaving Poland to be divided between the two along the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers. The territory restructuring provided the Soviet Union a level of protection from a Western invasion via an inland buffer. It would need that buffer in 1941. When Nazis attacked Poland on the morning of September 1, 1939, the Soviets stood by and watched. Two days later, World War II began with the British declaration of war on Germany. Soviets rolled into eastern Poland on September 17 to occupy their “sphere of influence” as designated in the secret protocol. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact effectively barred the Soviet Union from joining the fight against Germany, thus affording Germany success in its attempt to safeguard its borders from a two-front war. The Nazis and the Soviets kept the terms of the pact and the protocol until Germany’s surprise attack and invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941” (www.thoughtco.com).


your turn 3

“The Allied doctrine of unconditional surrender declared unilaterally by Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference in 1943 has turned out to be one of the most controversial decisions of the war. It has been widely blamed for stiffening Axis resistance, and for encouraging the Germans to fight on to the bitter end. Had the doctrine not existed, critics argue, then for example, the July 1944 plotters against Hitler could have tried to surrender both conditionally and to the West only. Unconditional surrender meant that the Allies would not repeat their mistake of 1918 with Germany and allow the Germans to surrender on the basis of agreed terms. Germany had to surrender totally and unconditionally and be seen to be defeated. Further, in reality, given the nature of the Nazi regime, and the fact that the July plot failed as much for lack of internal support as external factors, the idea of a conditional surrender for a regime as barbaric as the Third Reich was surely unthinkable. And since the July plotters wanted to keep many of the Hitler-conquered territories for their new regime, their terms would have in any case been

Sug

gest

ed a

nsw

er fo

r “Y

our

Turn

”


85


your turn 3

unacceptable to the Allies. Unconditional surrender also prevented Stalin from being tempted to make a deal with Hitler (which he contemplated at some of the worst moments in the war) since he knew that the Western Allies were going to fight the Germans to the very end. And it also meant that Germany was unquestionably destroyed in 1945 – no one could argue for a ‘stab in the back’ as in 1918. When the Third Reich was conquered by May 1945, its demise was undisputed and unquestionable. In effect, in agreeing to preserve the emperor system, the Allies did agree to a conditional surrender with the Japanese in 1945, so they were able, in reality, to jettison their own doctrine to save the lives of millions of Allied servicemen who would otherwise have died in capturing the Japanese main island” (Catherwood, 2014: 116-117).Aaaaa

Discuss the implications of the end of World War II for the Allied and Axis powers. In other words, how did the war affect the relative position of these states in the international system in the 20th and early 21st centuries?

your turn 4

“The USSR and the USA… emerged as the two superpowers as a result of the war. They became the principal protagonists of the Cold War that followed and which lasted all the way down to 1989/91. For a while after 1991, the USA was called the hyperpower and the era of 1991–2001 was called the uni-polar moment, once the bipolar US–Soviet age of 1945–91 was over. America became the world’s policeman in 1945. Britain was bankrupt and began to abandon its empire from 1947. France was defeated in Vietnam and then Al-geria, and in 1991 the Soviet Union was dissolved, after their failure to control not just Afghanistan but their de facto empire in Central Europe. But now, in the twenty-first century, even American predominance looks much overstretc-hed. Japan and Germany, however, with no post-1945 imperial possibilities opened to them, have done well, Japanese stagnation in more recent years notwithstanding. They have no expensive overseas military costs to bear, since their constitutions understandably ban the use of international armed force. While predictions of Japanese superpower status in the 1980s have proved exaggerated, neither Japan nor Germany is facing the very real loss of power that now confronts the USA. Germany has become a leader in the European Union and both Japan and Germany are members of the G8 club of richest nations. Russia now has borders in Europe narrower than it has had since the eighteenth century – since 1721. Long term it is heavily dependent on the price of its natural resources. China, the country that suffered so appal-lingly during the war, may become the superpower of the second half of the twenty-first century. In which case, the world in which future generations will inhabit will be a very different one from the Western-dominated world of the twentieth century. And as for the future international status of the USA, only time will tell. But from 1945 it was the indispensable power, and in 1941–5 it rescued the world.” (Catherwood, 2014: 176-177).

Suggested answ

er for “Your Turn”


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Açıkalın, C. (1947). Turkey’s International Relations, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), No. 23/4: 477-491.

Bilgin, M. S. and Morewood, S. (2004). Turkey’s Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey against Soviet Demands, 1943-1947, Middle Eastern Studies, No. 40/2: 24-57.

Catherwood, C. (2014). World War II: A Beginner’s Guide, London: One World.

Choi, I. (1995). Small States and the Balance of Power, Naval Post Graduate School Monterey, California (Unpublished master’s thesis).

Cooper, M. (2002). The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy Making, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), No. 78/1: 115-128.

Department of State (1955). Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

Department of State (1961). Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943, Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

Deringil, S. (1982). The Preservation of Turkey’s Neutrality during the Second World War: 1940, Middle Eastern Studies, No. 18/1: 30-52.

Deringil, S. (1989). Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fox, A. B. (1967). The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II, 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Güçlü, Y. (1997). Turco-British Rapprochement on the Eve of the Second World War, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi.

Hakkı, M. M. (2007). Surviving the Pressure of the Superpowers: An Analysis of Turkish Neutrality during the Second World War, An Electronic History Journal, No. 3: 44-62.

Landau, J. M. (1995). Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, 2nd ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Macfie, A. (1989). The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45, Middle Eastern Studies, No. 25/2: 238-248.

Organski, A.F.K. (1960). World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Rothstein, R. L. (1968). Alliances and Small Powers, New York: Columbia University Press.

Rubin, B. (1980). The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947: The Road to Cold War, London: Frank Cass.

Silverson, R. M. and Tennefoss, M.R. (1984). Power, Alliance and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965, American Political Science Review, No. 78/4: 1057-1069.

Spykman, N. J. and Rollins, A.A. (1939a). Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy I, The American Political Science Review, No. 33/3: 391-410.

Spykman, N. J. and Rollins, A.A. (1939b). Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy II, The American Political Science Review, No. 33/4: 591-614.

Tamkin, N. (2009). Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940-45: Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The Times (1942). Editorial, Turkey and the War, Maintenance of Independence: Fight to the Last Man, August 6: 3.

Vanderlippe, J. M. (2001). A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War 2, The Historian, No. 64/1: 63-80.

Weisband, E. (1973). Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wight, M. (1978). Power Politics (ed. Hedley Bull and Carstern Holbraad), New York: Holmes and Meier.

Archive Documents

Cabinet Office:

CAB 66/34/14

Foreign Office:

Microfilms of 1936-1945: FO 954/28, Diplomatic Papers.

1941: FO 195/2469

References

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Chapter 4

Lear

ning

Out

com

es

Chapter OutlineIntroduction The Early Cold War Years and Relations With the West: 1945-1962 Relations with the Middle East and the Balkans Between 1945 and 1962From the Heyday of the Cold War to Détente: Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1962 and 1980Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1980 and 1990

Key Terms• The Cold War• World War I• World War II• The Treaty of Sèvres• The Treaty of Lausanne• Balance of Power• Alliance• The Marshall Plan• The Truman Doctrine• Cultural duality• Geopolitics• The Middle East• Iran• Israel• Europe


31

Analyze the changes in the international structure in the early 1960s and TFP between 1962 and 1980.

Discuss the beginning of the Cold War and TFP between 1945 and 1962.

Evaluate TFP toward the Middle Eastern and Balkan countries in the early Cold War years.

Summarize the issues in TFP between 1980 and 1990.

24

Turkish Foreign Policy During the Cold War, 1945-1990

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INTRODUCTIONGeopolitics has been a fundamental factor in

determining the course of Turkish foreign policy since the Ottoman times (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000). According to Hale (2000), geopolitics is the link (in terms of continuity and consistency) between the Ottoman and Turkish foreign policy. “While its geographical situation increases Turkey’s international weight, it also raises the prospect of an attack by any of the great powers with ambitions in these regions” (Hale, 2000).

According to Gallois (1990) and Boniface (2000), “geopolitics is the study of the relationships between the implementation of power policies internationally and the geographical context in which they occur.”

Turkey is located in both Europe and Asia, a trait shared only with Russia. Geographically, it is a Balkan, Black Sea, and Mediterranean country. The Balkan and Black Sea regions are vital for strategic relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially through its ethnic, religious, and cultural ties. The Mediterranean region is imperative for relations with the Arab world, Israel as well as Europe. While Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, considering its historical ties to the region (Mango, 1996; Aydın, 2004; Hale, 2002; Kirisci, 1997), it is also a bridge between the Middle East and Europe as well as between the Middle East and Central Asia. Accordingly, the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Dardanelles, and the Marmara Sea) carry significant strategic importance. Turkey’s proximity to the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans both illustrates its geopolitical importance and contributes to the range of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, Turkey’s location in the tumultuous Middle Eastern region creates significant security concerns.

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire followed a foreign policy agenda based on ‘the exploitation of balance of power’ between major European powers. With the advance of foreign affairs institutions in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire sought ‘flexible alliances’ based on the strategic needs at the time (Okman, 2004). The new republic in 1923 led to a period of

transformation from old Ottoman values to new Turkish Republic values. The Ottoman foreign policy based exclusively on external factors (for security and development) was reshaped into a policy that accounted for domestic factors along with external factors. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a powerful state after the Second World War as a threat to the Western alliance allowed Turkey to form permanent alliances with the Western powers. Accordingly, Turkey prioritized external factors in its foreign policy making over domestic concerns during the Cold War years. In this period, membership to NATO, alliance with the US, and possible European Union membership were at the center of Turkish foreign policy making. Reprioritization of domestic factors occurred after the end of Cold War, especially with Turkey’s losing much of its appeal for Western powers as an ally against a less powerful Russia.

THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS AND RELATIONS WITH THE

WEST: 1945 - 1962A bipolar balance of power prevailed in the

international system after the Second World War. As a response to structural changes in the international system, Turkish foreign policy was reshaped accordingly.

Aydın (2000) notes that “in such a structure, as Aron’s paradigm states, a policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible at all for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geographically important area.”

In an effort to modernize the Turkish society and the state, Turkish governments followed po-licies to balance domestic realities with external realities (Karpat, 1975). With the Soviet Union’s becoming an increasing threat to Turkey’s integ-rity and security, Turkey turned to the West to establish a permanent alliance. Okman (2004) argues that “such a decisive shift also signifies Turkey’s continuous sensitivity toward systemic-structural alterations” since Turkey’s alignment with the West was a result of the perceived Soviet threat (Aydın, 2000).

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4 Turkish Foreign Policy During the Cold War, 1945-1990

Close military, political, and economic cooperation with the West became a fundamental principle in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War period (Bağcı and Bal, 2004; Aydın, 2000). Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries were secondary to Turkey’s relations with the West (especially with the US). Any Turkish attempt to improve cooperation in the region (e.g., the Baghdad Pact) met with Arab states’ suspicion. Turkey was considered not as a trustworthy partner, but rather as a Western-oriented country in the midst of Muslim countries. Moreover, Turkey’s closer ties with the Balkans, based on ethnic and religious affinities (especially with Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria), took a back seat in the determination of Turkey’s Balkan policy. As long as these populations remained within the borders of the Soviet satellite states, Turkey’s attempts to improve its relations with these nations remained limited.

Turkey remained a one-party system from its independence in 1923 until 1946. The governing party was the Republican People’s Party - RPP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP), which was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues. Because of the change in the balance of power after WWII, Turkey joined the Western alliance and appreciated the importance of establishing a democratic and multi-party political system for its Western allies’ continued support. The first multi-party election was held in 1946. In the 1950 general elections, the Democrat Party won 52.3 percent of the vote and the election results led to the first change in the governing party since 1923 (Alkan, 1998). The process of establishing a multi-party system was in line with Turkey’s closer alliance with the Western powers.

In terms of its relations with the United States (US), Turkey was included in the Truman Doctrine (1947) and received the American financial support that continued with the Marshall Plan (1948). The level of economic assistance with the Truman Doctrine was about $22.2 million. This figure increased to $236 million in 1949 and, later in 1950, it peaked at $510 million. With the Marshall Plan, the US military aid to Turkey also commenced. However, the level of the military aid was considerably higher than that of the economic aid. For the first year of the Plan, Turkey received $497 million in military aid compared to about $24 million in economic aid.

Figure 5.1. President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State George C. Marshall.

Source: www.wisconsinhistory.org

“The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947.With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts. In light of the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the appearance of Soviet meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs, the withdrawal of British assistance to Greece provided the necessary catalyst for the Truman Administration to reorient American foreign policy. Accordingly, in his speech, President Truman requested that Congress provide $400,000,000 worth of aid to both the Greek and Turkish Governments and support the dispatch of American civilian and military personnel and equipment to the region. Truman argued that the United States could no longer stand by and allow the forcible expansion of Soviet totalitarianism into free, independent nations, because American national security now depended upon more than just the physical security of American territory” (www.history.state.gov)

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In 1948, Turkey joined the OECC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation; which later became the OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) as one of the founding participants.

At this point, the US considered Turkey’s membership (along with Greece) as a strain on NATO’s resources and more responsibility than they could carry. Moreover, NATO was initially considered as a defense organization for the North Atlantic countries. Turkey was located outside of this geographic definition and was not considered a proper candidate (Brown, 2008). While Turkey’s application to the Council of Europe was accepted in August 1949, its application for NATO (alongside with Greece) was declined in 1950. Because the Turkish governments considered it vital for Turkey’s security, Turkey remained intent on NATO membership in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The North Atlantic Treaty (establishing the organization of NATO) was signed in 1949 in order to sustain the containment of the Soviets.

Meanwhile, the Turkish economy had experienced a period of growth with increased private investments, along with the mechanization of agricultural production. Due to the Korean War, agricultural products also enjoyed favorable prices (Alkan, 1998). However, the Democrat Party governments failed to produce economic policies to sustain economic growth in the long-term. With the decline in agricultural prices after the Korean War, the positive trend in the Turkish economy reversed. The Turkish government viewed the Korean War as an opportunity to signify Turkey’s importance for the US Cold War plans and to secure the US economic aid. Between 1950 and 1953, the American economic aid to Turkey was about $400 million a year whereas the military aid was about $1 billion a year.

The Korean War changed the American perceptions about a Soviet threat. Evidently, the Soviet Union was willing to use its satellite states to expand its sphere of influence. It also proved

that Turkey would be an asset rather than a liability for NATO. Through the Eisenhower Doctrine, the US reevaluated Turkey’s geopolitical position (Brown, 2008). Accordingly, Europe became a bottleneck with the Soviets at the wide end. Flanks were crucial in order to stop a possible Soviet attack on Europe. With its location in the southern flank, Turkey’s strategic importance once again became evident.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, and Congress approved it in March of the same year. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism” (www.history.state.gov).

With its new role in the Cold War, Turkey (along with Greece) was granted NATO membership in 1952, following its participation in the Korean War (Israeli, 2001; Lippe, 2000; Criss and Bilgin, 1997). Hence, Turkey guaranteed its alliance with the West and the accompanying military and economic benefits (Brown, 2008; Hale, 2000; Isyar, 2005; Aydın, 2004). In 1954, the American military aid to Turkey reached its highest level ever.

Discuss the changes in the international structure that shaped Turkish foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War.

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RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE BALKANS BETWEEN 1945 AND 1962

Geopolitical and cultural duality has always been a determining factor in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. Islam, as a major common denominator, has brought affinities in relations. On the other hand, four hundred years of Ottoman rule left a negative image on Arab minds as ‘the suppressor of Arab nationalism” and had long-term impact on Turkish–Arab relations (Jung, 2005). Besides, the Arab cooperation with the British during WWI was construed as a betrayal by the Turks (Jung, 2005; Bengio and Özcan, 2001; Aras and Köni, 2002). Suspicion and distrust prevailed in relations and as a result, many regional initiatives, such as the Baghdad Pact, failed. With the new Turkish Republic, the transformation of the society based on certain principles reinforced already negative Arab perceptions. Arab states also believed that Turkey had abandoned its Ottoman-Islamic heritage (Aydın, 2003; Jung 2005).

The new Turkish Republic’s foreign policy toward its Balkan neighbors was based on the idea of ‘unchanging borders.’ After many destructive wars such as the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 in the region, Turkey was now experienced enough to realize the conflict-prone nature of the ethnic composition in the Balkans (Turan and Barlas, 1999). Accordingly, Turkey followed a foreign policy encouraging stability in the region and it carefully avoided involvement in any ethnic or religious conflicts. Considering the long Ottoman presence in the Balkans and the consequent ethnic and religious ties, Turkey had to avoid any message that might be perceived as expansionist.

Turkey and the Middle EastThe territorial problems over Mosul and

Hatay (Alexandretta) contributed to already tense relations in the Middle East. In 1925, the oil-rich city of Mosul, a former Ottoman Vilayet, was annexed by the British mandate Iraq. Meanwhile, the French mandate Hatay (Alexandretta) was ceded to Turkey, following a plebiscite in 1939. Nevertheless, these provinces continued to be a source of tension in Turkish-Arab relations. Turks

perceived Syrian claims over Hatay (Alexandretta) as Arab expansionism (Bengio and Özcan, 2001). The Turkish–Israeli relations further complicated Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Besides, Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel on March 28, 1949 and to establish diplomatic relations in 1950 by sending its charge d’affaires. Middle Eastern states often criticized Turkey for its recognizing Israel (Israeli, 2001; Inbar, 2005).

Figure 5.2. The Middle East.

Until WWII, Turkey had followed a foreign policy based on the principles of non-intervention and non-involvement in its relations with the Muslim states in the Middle East (Hale, 1992; Robins, 2007). Turkish foreign policy, at the time, was a result of Turkey’s new Western orientation based on Republican principles. Accordingly, Turkey had no intention to involve itself in the domestic problems of Muslim countries. The new Turkish state aimed to create a modernized and Westernized society based on a secular worldview. It chose to disregard the Ottoman heritage in its relations with Muslim states (Evered, 2005; Martin, 2000).

In the Cold War period, Turkey’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries was shaped by its alliance with the West and its fear of communist expansion in the region. Turkey’s close ties with the West, its recognition of Israel, and its memberships in the Western security and cooperation organizations (such as NATO and the Council of Europe) led Arabs to consider Turkey as a West-oriented nation. Nevertheless, Turkey made efforts for closer cooperation in its relations with the Middle Eastern countries as a Western ally in the region.

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In 1954, Britain signed an agreement with Egypt declaring its withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone. Instead of a direct presence, Britain planned to build up an alternative alignment in order to defend Western interests in the region. Accordingly, the idea of a Middle East Defense Organization came up in the early 1950s. Arab states viewed it as a Turkish-assisted “new instrument of Western imperialism” and, therefore, opposed the project.

In 1954, a military assistance agreement was signed between Iraq and the US that consequently produced the Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq on February 24, 1955 for mutual defense and security. Pakistan, Iran, and Great Britain also joined this pact. However, the Baghdad Pact further infuriated the Arab states and the rift in Turkish-Arab relations grew. Egypt voiced the Arab opposition and accused Iraq of ‘betraying Muslim brethren and establishing alignment with Zionists’ (Hale, 1992; Hale, 2000; Bengio and Özcan, 2001; Bishku, 2006). The Egyptian reaction to any Western development in the region and Nasser’s strong pro-Soviet and anti-Western rhetoric reinforced suspicions on the Turkish side about the Soviet influence and communist expansion. Turkish concerns about the communist expansion in the region led to the deployment of thousands of Turkish troops to the Syrian border when the communist party came to power in Syria in 1957 (Evriviades, 1998).

Figure 5.3. The Baghdad Pact, 1955.

Source: www.historysshadow.wordpress.com

What is more, the Suez Crisis erupted in 1956. The British, French, and Israeli forces began occupying the Canal zone. Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel under the increasing pressure from its Arab neighbors, especially from Iraq. The members of the Baghdad Pact met in Tehran and called for an immediate end to the occupation of the Canal zone. Finally, the Eisenhower administration, which was also concerned that the Soviets might intervene in the conflict, pushed Britain and France to accept a United Nations ceasefire on November 6, 1956.

A further blow to the Baghdad Pact occurred on July 14, 1958, when a coup d’état ousted the pro-western regime in Iraq. This substantially damaged the Baghdad Pact and ultimately led to the Iraqi withdrawal from the alliance in March 1959 (Evriviades, 1998; Hale, 2000).

On August 19, 1959, a new alliance was formed between Great Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran: the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) that mainly functioned as an organization to guarantee the US military and financial aid to the region (Hale, 2000).

Geographical distance and the lack of serious disputes between the members made this organization long-lived in comparison to the Baghdad Pact. CENTO maintained its unity until 1979. Following the Iranian revolution, Iran withdrew from the organization and CENTO was officially dissolved in September 1979.

According to Hale (2000), Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East was “misconceived and counter-productive;” the Baghdad Pact was the result of such a policy. While Turkey was taking initiatives to strengthen its alliance with the West, the Arab states had no desire to develop such cordial ties. Consequently, Turkey’s efforts were met with suspicion by the Arab states, and negative perceptions about Turkey’s intentions were intensified. Any attempt to increase the level of cooperation was doomed to fail.

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Turkey and the BalkansThe Cold War period divided the Balkans along

ideological lines. This prevented Turkey from seeking closer relations with the countries in the region. While Greece and Turkey joined in the Western alliances, Yugoslavia and Albania remained non-aligned, and Romania and Bulgaria became the Soviet Union’s satellite states. As a result, ethnic and religious issues, with a high potential for conflict, were frozen in time. In this sense, “the bipolar world system brought peace to the Balkans” (Turan and Barlas, 1999). This, though, enabled Turkey to follow policies encouraging stability and cooperation in the region. A second Balkan Pact (after the one established in 1934) was created in 1954 between Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. This was a major step in the direction of broader cooperation for the security in the region. However, the pact became ineffective a few months after its creation. The increasing impact of the Soviet Union on Yugoslavia as well as the problems between Turkey and Greece prevented this cooperation from flourishing.

The Cyprus ProblemWith its strategic importance and close

proximity to Turkey, Cyprus has always been an important item on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. A sizeable Turkish population on the island creates solidarity between Cyprus and Turkey. Moreover, Cyprus is located about 40 nautical miles away from Turkish shores; its proximity to the Turkish mainland creates a security concern for Turkey in case of an annexation of the island by any power, especially by Greece (Suvarierol, 2003; Turan and Barlas, 1999; Adamson, 2001). Apart from these factual circumstances, Cyprus is considered as a national cause for both sides of the Aegean Sea (Suvarierol, 2003).

Historically, Cyprus remained under the Ottoman rule from 1571 to the late 19th century. However, as a condition of the Cyprus Convention in 1878, it was placed under the British control in return for the British support of the Ottoman Empire in the Ottoman–Russian war. Great Britain announced the annexation of the island at the beginning of WWI. After the war, neither Greece nor Turkey attempted to change the

status quo, although neither country was pleased with the status of the island. Turkey’s anxiety about Cyprus coincided with the escalation of the idea of Enosis among the Greek population of Cyprus and Greece.

Enosis the idea of uniting the island of Cyprus with the motherland Greece. EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters): armed Greek-Cypriot forces whose aim is to achieve Enosis.

By the mid-1950s, ethnic conflicts resurfaced between the Turkish and Greek populations of Cyprus. EOKA initiated a series of attacks on the Turkish-Cypriot population living on the island. With the escalation of violence, Britain invited all parties to the London Conference to resolve the conflict, but participants failed to produce a viable solution. At the onset of the conflict, both the Turkish government and the Cypriot Turks favored the continuance of the British rule, which was considered an equally fair administration. The Cypriot Greeks and Greek government insisted on the imposition of Enosis. Consequently, Turkey changed its policy of preserving the status quo and started supporting the policy of partitioning of the island along the lines of population (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000; Adamson, 2001; Kalaitzaki, 2005).

The tension continued to mount between the Greeks and the Turks until 1959, when the British government announced that Britain did not need Cyprus as a military base in the Mediterranean. Following the British announcement, Greece and Turkey agreed to form a united Cyprus under one constitution and one flag (rather than Enosis or partitioning the island). The Zurich and London conferences paved the way for a constitution based on bi-zonal and bi-communal parties with equal rights. Subsequently the Republic of Cyprus was founded in August 1960 (Kalaitzaki, 2005; Hale, 2000; Aydın, 2000; Adamson, 2001).

The Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Britain, Turkey, and Greece in 1960, was added to the Cypriot constitution. As a result, Britain, Turkey,

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and Greece became the guarantor states for the security and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The fourth article of the treaty provided each guarantor state with the right to consult with each other in case of any violation of the treaty provisions. Moreover, it gave each guarantor state the right to unilaterally take action if a concerted intervention would not be possible at all.

The treaty and its implementation by the signatory states became problematic in the ensuing decades. Following its establishment in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus became a source of tension in Greek-Turkish relations.

The Cypriot Greeks and the Greek government continued to press for the reunification of Cyprus with Greece. Though all parties avoided an open fight, in 1963 the Cypriot President Makarios came up with a plan of constitutional amendment to strip the Cypriot Turks of their constitutional rights. An armed struggle broke out between the Turkish and Greek population on the island (Ladbury and King, 1982; Goktepe, 2005). The Cypriot Turks turned to Turkey for help as their protector, and Turkey turned to the support of its allies in finding a viable solution on the island. Great Britain called for a conference in London with other guarantor states. However, this effort proved to be futile.

While NATO-led peacekeeping efforts were rejected by the Makarios administration, both the Cypriot Greek administration and the Greek administration found ample support for their case at the United Nations. For example, only Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Albania voted in favor of Turkey while 26 Muslim countries abstained from the voting on the U.N. resolution 2077 concerning Cyprus, on December 18, 1965 (Jung, 2005). Turkish efforts to obtain any support, even from its immediate Muslim neighbors, failed. It was argued that this lack of support was due to Turkey’s unconditional loyalty to the West. Over the years, so the argument goes, Turkey considered allying with the West as its ultimate and unconditional goal, while ignoring criticism from countries of the non-aligned movement, the Middle Eastern countries, and the Communist bloc (Jung, 2005).

Cyprus gradually became one of the determinants of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War period. Turkey was willing and ready to take military action for Cyprus in both the 1964 and 1974 crises, which meant an open military conflict between Turkey and Greece- both of which are NATO members. In spite of the US efforts to prevent such a conflict in the southern flank of NATO, Turkey refused to give up its rights over Cyprus and eventually intervened militarily in 1974. In response to the Turkish intervention, the US imposed an economic embargo on Turkey until 1978 (Lesser, 2000).

During the first phase of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was based primarily on external factors, with Cyprus as a clear exception. While Cyprus held strategic importance for Turkey, the military intervention was strongly opposed by the West. Given the fact that the Western alliance was central to Turkish foreign policy making, with this act, Turkey seemed to have violated its basic foreign policy approach. Turkey intervened in the island because of not only the threat facing the strategically important island of Cyprus, but also Turkey’s concern for its own survival.

The 1974 crisis made it clear for Turkey that its Western alliance came at a substantial cost. Turkey failed to sustain any support for its cause from any non-aligned or Muslim country at the U.N. The Cyprus War also signified a shift in Turkish foreign policy, from external factors toward a consideration of domestic factors (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000; Adamson, 2001; Suvarierol, 2003; Kalaitzaki, 2005).

Explain the problems that prevented Turkey from developing meaningful cooperation with Middle Eastern countries in the early Cold War years.

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FROM THE HEYDAY OF THE COLD WAR TO DETENTE:

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1962 AND 1980

In the first phase of the Cold War, between 1945 and the early 1960s, Turkish foreign policy was fundamentally shaped as a reaction to external threats to Turkey’s security and territorial integrity. The NATO membership alleviated these concerns of Turkey to some extent and allowed it to continue its domestic efforts for transforming the society. Turkey’s security concerns coincided with those of the US, especially in terms of the need to struggle with the Soviet Union within the Cold-War context. The US considered Turkey as a useful ally for the containment of the Soviets and, therefore, included Turkey in the Marshall Plan (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000; Aydın, 2000).

DétenteDuring the 1960s the bipolar balance of power

between the two superpowers experienced a détente period, which also meant the relaxation of a Soviet threat to Turkey. On the one hand, the decreased threat provided Turkey with leeway to pursue more active policies in its region. On the other hand, the Soviet threat had served as the foundation of Turkey’s leverage in relations with the West. As long as Turkey was useful in the struggle with the Soviets, economic and military aid continued to flow. As the Cold War tensions relaxed between the superpowers through the détente process, however, Turkey gradually lost its relative strategic importance for the United States.

Détente is the antithesis of ‘Cold War’ and an historical period subsequent to it. The Cuban Missile crisis is usually regarded as the key turning point and, rather crudely, the period since 1962 is labelled accordingly. Détente is ‘widely viewed as the end of the Cold War, or at the very least, a substantially tempered phase of it (White 1981: 165).

The détente process provided Turkey with an opportunity to improve its relations with both the communist bloc and the non-aligned movement. Since the early years of the Cold war, the communist bloc countries and the non-aligned movement had opposed Turkey’s close ties with the West (Aydın, 2000; Hale, 2000). The détente process allowed new powers to emerge as global powers. The rise of France and China signaled the emergence of a multi-polar system. Such a change in the international system increased the interdependence and interaction between the countries both politically and economically (Aydın, 2000).

Figure 5.4. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and the US President J. F. Kennedy at the Vienna Summit,

1961.

Source: www.historycentral.com/Europe/ViennaSummit.html

The 1960 Coup in Turkey A critical domestic development should be

briefly noted in terms of its effects on Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish military ousted the civilian government as a result of a coup d’état on 27 May, 1960. The military regime did not seek a fundamental change in Turkish foreign policy. Along with Turkey’s Western alliance, the regime was in favor of improved relations with the Middle East and the non-aligned movement (Aydın, 2000). However, the 1960 coup d’état had more substantial effects on foreign policy through its effects on domestic politics. The new

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constitution of 1961 established the foundation of a plural society, and as a result, new interest groups appeared on the domestic scene. It guaranteed freedoms of speech, conscience, and association. The new electoral rules also created opportunities for the representation of small parties.

Along with the new constitution, new political movements, both nationalist and religious, also resurfaced. Prior to the 1960 coup d’état, nationalistic and religious parties were not allowed in Turkish politics. The new electoral system further encouraged these movements to organize as political parties since they were allowed to be represented at the Parliament. These developments also paved the way for shaky coalition governments, resulting in political chaos in the 1970s. The political polarization also limited the ability of the coalition governments to follow a coherent foreign policy agenda since no political party had enough electoral support to implement its own political (domestic or foreign) agenda. It is argued that this deficiency was one reason why Turkey felt isolated and inactive in the international system during the 1970s (Aydın, 2004). Furthermore, Hale (2000) notes that “as a result, Turkish foreign policy became a prisoner of chronic domestic instability and economic crisis, making effective planning very hard to achieve or implement.”

Deteriorating Relations With the United States: The Jupiter Missile Crisis

In 1959, the Menderes-led Democrat Party government signed an agreement that allowed the US administration to install Jupiter missiles in Turkey with medium range nuclear warheads. These missiles became outdated even before their installation, but the Turkish government considered this an opportunity to display the strength of its alliance with the US. Under the mounting Soviet protests, however, the US administration cancelled the installation, and met with the Turkish refusal to withdraw from the agreement. The Turkish government emphasized the importance of the missiles for Turkey’s security, at least until they were replaced with Polaris submarines. It is argued that Khrushchev’s decision to install the Soviet missiles in Cuba was the retribution for the US-Turkish missile cooperation (Hale, 2000; Aydın, 2004).

Consequently, in 1962, the Cuban missile crisis erupted, and the Jupiter missiles in Turkey became a bargaining chip for the Soviets. The reciprocal removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and the Soviet missiles from Cuba was proposed by the Soviets. Although the US administration refused to confirm such a deal, the Kennedy administration unilaterally removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963.

Figure 5.5. A spy photo of a medium range ballistic missile base in San Cristobal, Cuba, with labels detailing

various parts of the base, displayed October of 1962.

Source: www.theatlantic.com

The missile crisis was a wake-up call for the Turkish government. It was the first time since the beginning of the Cold War that Turkey had felt the change in the balance of power. However, as the tension between the US and the Soviet Union relaxed, Turkey’s strategic importance was reduced. Turkey was acting under the misconception that it was indispensable in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Turkey also suddenly realized that the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil could threaten its security even more than their absence. Additionally, the US administration’s unilateral decision to remove the missiles from Turkey meant that the US, if necessary, would disregard Turkey’s security concerns during crises. Yet the missile crisis led to a relaxation period in Turkish-Soviet relations. After the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles, a Turkish delegation consisted of members of the Grand National Assembly visited Moscow for the first time since 1932 (Hale, 2000).

By June 1964, as circumstances were deteriorating for the Cypriot Turks, under the increasing pressure from public, and without any international support

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for its case, the Turkish government decided to intervene militarily under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Article 4 of the Treaty provided each guarantor state with the right to unilaterally take action if cooperative action would not be possible. However, before any official announcement of the intervention plan, the Turkish government was informed by the US President Johnson that there was no consensus among the NATO allies concerning their obligations to guarantee Turkey’s security against the Soviet Union. President Johnson noted in his infamous letter that if the Turkish act would result in a Soviet intervention, American weaponry could not be used in the military operations on Cyprus. Consequently, the Turkish government noted the wide divergence of the views of Turkey and the US as to the nature and basic principles of NATO (Aydın, 2004).

After the missile crisis, the Cyprus issue made it clear to Turkey that unconditional allegiance to the West could be costly for its own security. NATO support could be conditional upon political circumstances and Turkey could not rely on NATO in time of a crisis. The Cyprus crisis also increased negative public sentiments toward the US. In 1964, the U.S. military aid to Turkey was also decreased to $637 million, compared to $971 million in the previous year.

In the 1964 Cyprus crisis, the U.S. administration assumed that the NATO members Turkey and Greece had to solve this problem peacefully. Thus, the U.S. administration underestimated the Turkish autonomy and the role of the government of Cyprus in a possible solution. The US administration also failed to understand that Cyprus was a more important issue for both Turkey and Greece than the NATO alliance, hence backing off was not a viable option for the two states in a stalemate situation (Kalaitzaki, 2005). With the crises in 1963 and 1964 and the subsequent Cyprus War in 1974, domestic factors started to play a bigger role in Turkish foreign policy making.

After the Dust Settled: Relations with United States, Greece, and the Soviet Union

In order to break off its isolation in the international system, Turkey decided to adopt a multi-faceted foreign policy, which projected

improved relations with the Middle East, the communist bloc as well as the non-aligned movement. NATO had replaced its policy of massive retaliation with a flexible response strategy in case of a Soviet attack. This was a clear signal for Turkey that necessary steps had to be taken to adjust its foreign policy to the newly emerging security environment.

According to the massive retaliation strategy, any nuclear attack from the Soviets would be met by an automatic massive nuclear response from NATO. With the flexible response strategy, however, an attack from the Soviets would not necessitate an automatic nuclear response (Aydın, 2000; Hale, 2000).

The first results of this policy shift were apparent in Turkish–Soviet relations. The Soviet government had previously sought to improve bilateral relations after Stalin’s death. Therefore, Turkey’s efforts were welcomed by the Soviet administration. In addition, the economic relations between the two countries experienced a swift rise. In 1967, Turkey received a 200-million-US Dollar credit from the Soviet Union for seven industrial projects (Hale, 2000). Turkey’s trade with the Communist bloc improved as well. Their share in the Turkish trade balance increased from 7 percent in 1964 to 13 percent in 1967 (Aydın, 2000). However, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the increasing Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean revived Turkey’s concerns for its security despite the flourishing relations.

Meanwhile, the Greek armed forces staged a coup d’état and ousted the civilian Greek government. This damaged the dialogue between Turkey and Greece for a possible solution in Cyprus. The Turkish and Greek delegations met at the Turkish-Greek border on 9-10 September, 1967 to negotiate the future of Cyprus. The Greek delegation refused any solution short of Enosis. Thus, negotiations failed to produce any consensus. In November 1967, the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked two Turkish Cypriot villages, killing several people. The incident sparked an immediate public reaction in Turkey. The protests and demonstrations were held, and

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volunteers organized brigades in order to fight on the side of the Turkish Cypriots. U Thant, the Secretary General of the UN at the time, noted, “Greece and Turkey are now on the brink of war.” The Turkish Parliament approved the government’s request for taking military action if necessary. In the 1967 crisis, Britain insisted on peaceful talks between the parties and refused any involvement in military action. The US, on the other hand, tried to prevent a war between the two NATO allies. The American administration sent a special envoy and was actively involved in negotiations. Finally, the Turkish and Greek governments reached an agreement. Greece agreed to disband the Greek Cypriot National Guard and withdrew the Greek troops exceeding the limits of the 1960 Treaty. The result was hailed as a victory for the Turks.

The improved relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were also instrumental to this favorable outcome. The Soviet Union withdrew its support from the Greek Cypriots and the Greek government and instead backed Turkey in the 1967 crisis. The anti-communist attitude of the Greek military junta also affected the Soviet decision to support Turkey. Under the circumstances, the US administration wished to avoid any situation where the main beneficiary would be the Soviets and, therefore, backed the Turkish demands during the negotiations.

In the late 1960’s, the cultivation of opium also became a source of tension in Turkish-American relations. In order to control the heroin traffic, the US administration asked the Turkish government to adopt tougher laws against illegal trafficking. Turkey banned all opium production in the country in 1971 due to its humanitarian obligations. However, when the US administration subsequently asked India to increase its opium production, the anti-American sentiment reached its peak in Turkey (Aydın, 2000; Isyar, 2005).

On March 12, 1971, because of the increasing ideological polarization and the consequent political turmoil, the Turkish military gave an ultimatum to the government without ousting it from power. While the political chaos continued, the following caretaker governments continued to enforce the ban on opium production until 1974. A new coalition government after the 1974 general election revoked the ban on opium.

Meanwhile, the military junta in Greece announced that they would unite Cyprus with Greece, effective immediately. Britain, with its continuing need for a military base in the Mediterranean, enforced the parties to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. As one of the de facto parties, the US administration was dealing with the Watergate scandal at home and the Arab-Israeli conflict abroad (the 1973 war). Belated diplomatic talks among Great Britain, the US, Greece, and Turkey failed to bring about a peaceful solution. On July 20, 1974, the Turkish armed forces were deployed to the island under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. On July 23, the military junta collapsed in Greece, and diplomatic talks resumed between the parties. A stalemate in negotiations increased the tensions. The Turkish armed forces started implementing the second phase of the Peace Operation on August 14, 1974.

Figure 5.6. A stamp issued by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

The American Congress decided to impose an arms embargo against Turkey. In 1974, the U.S. economic assistance fell to $19 million (from $86 million in 1973) and the U.S. military assistance fell to $671.5 million (from $904 million in 1973). The US military aid to Turkey continued to decrease along with the economic aid. However, while there was no economic aid for 1976 and 1977, the military aid never fell below $335 million. The independence of the Turkish Federated State

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of Cyprus was announced in 1975 (Isyar, 2005; Aydın, 2004). Turkey froze the military activities of the American bases in Turkey, except for any possible NATO use. This affected the American intelligence activities over the southern part of the Soviet Union. However, the American arms embargo against Turkey was partially and then fully lifted in 1975 and 1978, respectively (Isyar, 2005; Hale, 2000; Aydın, 2000).

In an effort to bring diversity to its foreign policy agenda, Turkey signed a ‘Declaration of Principles of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation’ with Bulgaria in 1975. Turkey’s trade with Bulgaria increased approximately 400 percent. Turkish–Romanian relations also witnessed a period of revival in this period (Bishku, 2003).

Discuss the implications of the Jupiter missiles’ presence in, and removal from, Turkey for both Turkish foreign policy and the super-power relations.

3

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990

Some domestic and external factors pushed Turkey to follow a pro-American foreign policy and to be cautious toward the Soviets in this era. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution ousted the pro-American Shah regime in Iran, and the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan to support the Communist government of Afghanistan in its fight with the Islamist Mujahedeen. Statements from the fundamentalist Iranian government about the export of their Islamic regime throughout the region created concerns for Turkey about a possible spillover into its own territory.

The 1980 Military CoupDomestically, the mounting economic and

social problems, along with the political instability resulted in a coup d’état on September 12, 1980. Consequently, Turkey remained under a military regime until 1983. Unlike the 1960 coup d’état,

the 1980 military intervention banned all political activities and prevented any development toward a civil society. The military intervention in Turkey drew the most severe criticism from the European countries. Aydın (2004) argues that “the crucial factor in this connection has been Turkey’s receptivity towards external, i.e. European, pressures due to the existence of its political, economic, military and ideological links with Europe. While these links enabled Europeans to pressure Turkey on certain aspects of her internal politics, especially over her human rights record and democratization process, Turkey’s own identification with Europe made her more susceptible and responsive to such pressures.”

In 1983, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP) won the first general elections following the 1980 coup d’état. Both the 1980 coup d’état and the Motherland Party governments signaled a dramatic shift in domestic politics. Subsequently, the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy increased. In this sense, the Turgut Özal period (1983 – 1991) should be briefly examined.

Turgut Özal was a pro-American politician with strong religious tendencies. Moreover, it is argued that until the Özal period, foreign policy decision making had always displayed a monolithic structure in Turkey with close cooperation between decision makers. State officials acted as a monolithic front, ‘speaking with one voice, holding one view, and having one set of goals.’ For the first time, conflicts between state officials came to the surface and caused a disturbance during both Özal’s premiership and his presidency. Chief of Staff Full General Necip Torumtay resigned from his office due to his disagreement with Prime Minister Turgut Özal over Turkey’s involvement in the first US occupation of Iraq in 1991. Özal wanted Turkey to participate in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, whereas the armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly opposed Özal’s plans (Heper and Çınar, 1996).

Turkish –American and Turkish-Greek Relations After 1980

Turkey and the US signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 1980. With this agreement, Turkey guaranteed the continued American support of its economy.

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In addition, the American administration assisted with efforts to modernize Turkish armed forces. In return, Turkey allowed the US to use its airfields and intelligence facilities. Turkey also purchased fighter jets (F-16s) from the US and co-produced F-16s with the US (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Hale, 2000; Isyar, 2005; Athanassopoulou, 2001).

In the years that followed, Turkey received the third largest share from the American international military aid, after Israel and Egypt. The American military aid levels during this period were the highest ever, except for the Korean War era. However, both economic and military aid from the US started to decrease in 1984. The loans by the Arab states to Turkey peaked to an all-time high of $477 million ($17 million in 1979). The amount of loans from the Arab states remained high throughout 1981 ($399 million) and 1982 ($229 million). After 1982, the level of loans never again reached such levels. On the European Community side, the loans were at peak levels during 1980 ($809 million) and 1981 ($1 billion). The level of loans by the European Community states also never reached such levels after 1981.

The improved Turkish-American cooperation and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan slowed Turkish-Soviet Union political and economic relations in the 1980s. Strained relations continued until Mikhail Gorbachev became the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985. Under the Gorbachev administration, Turkish-Soviet political and economic relations improved significantly, especially in the second half of the 1980s. Between 1987 and 1990, the trade volume between the two nations increased from $476 million to $1.8 billion (Hale, 2000). Natural gas gradually became an important aspect of Turkish-Russian economic relations after the end of the communist regime in Russia.

Relations with Greece after 1980 continued to be a source of tension for Turkey and for Turkish-US/NATO relations. Despite Turkey’s claims for the demilitarization of the Aegean islands (based on the Lausanne Treaty and the Montreux Convention), Greece continued to militarize them. Turkey considered this effort of Greece a security threat, and it established the Aegean Army (also known as the fourth army) in 1975 for the defense of its Aegean shores. The political and military

tension in the Aegean resulted in an arms race between Turkey and Greece. The uncertainty and a lack of genuine trust between the two NATO allies reinforced the security concerns on both sides (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000).

Figure 5.7. The Turkish Aegean Army, 1975.

Source: www.tr.wikipedia.org

Territorial waters were also another problematic area. Greece wished to expand its territorial waters from its current level at 6 miles to 12 miles. This, if realized, would almost cut Turkish vessels off from the Aegean Sea without Greece’s permission, considering the number of Greek islands. Turkey declared that any Greek attempt to expand its territorial waters to 12 miles would be considered casus belli (Turan and Barlas, 1999; Hale, 2000). Similarly, the limitation of the continental shelf also continued to create tensions between Turkey and Greece in this period. The limitation of airspace posed another problem between Turkey and Greece. While Greece was claiming that its airspace extends 10 miles from its shores, Turkey continued to recognize the Greek airspace to be only 6 miles, which is also the established practice of the Turkish Air Force.

While these problems were waiting for a solution, Turkey, under the military regime, lifted its veto on Greece’s participation in NATO’s military command structure in 1980 (Kalaitzaki, 2005). Bilateral and multilateral talks for a

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solution on Cyprus continued between the Greek and Turkish sides, all of which failed. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Another possibility of an open conflict appeared between the two NATO members in 1987, when the conflict over the continental shelf reached its highest point. Diplomatic talks averted the crisis, and the tension in relations seemed to relax. However, diplomatic efforts failed to go beyond rhetoric. Despite the short-lived improvements in bilateral relations, by the end of 1980s conflict and tension prevailed in Turkish–Greek relations (Kalaitzaki, 2005; Hale, 2000).

Turkish-Bulgarian RelationsAn unexpected crisis erupted between Turkey and

Bulgaria in 1984, when the Bulgarian government imposed a forced assimilation campaign upon its Turkish minority. The Bulgarian Turks were forced to abandon their religious practices and change their names. The Bulgarian government imposed a ban on Turkish language, Turkish music, and any cultural activities. Domestic public reaction was severe, especially considering the large population of the Bulgarian-descendent Turks in Turkey. The Bulgarian government refused to open talks on the assimilation problem with Turkey, arguing that this was an “internal matter” (Bishku, 2003).

While Turkey gained international support on this issue, it failed to exert significant pressure on the Bulgarian government. In 1989, the Zhivkov regime decided to expel the Bulgarian Turks, resulting in over 300,000 thousand Bulgarian-Turks moving to Turkey by the end of August 1984. The crisis was resolved after the collapse of the communist regime, and many refugees returned to Bulgaria. Restrictions on their political rights were lifted, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria (Haklar ve Özgürlükler Hareketi) became an advocate for the rights of Bulgarian Turks. This party later joined in coalition governments and proved to be a prominent political movement in the democratization process of Bulgaria.

Turkey and the Middle East After 1980

Turkey shaped its relations with the Middle Eastern countries based on its Western alliances. Despite the severe criticism from the Middle Eastern countries, the Turkish governments continued with pro-U.S. policies in the region and started several initiatives such as the Baghdad Pact in order to contribute to the US policy of containing the Soviets in the 1950’s. Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 and its diplomatic relations with this newly established state in 1950 sealed its image among Arab states as a Western-oriented country. Turkey’s pro-U.S. policies proved to be costly when it later sought the Soviet support over the Cyprus issue.

However, the 1963 Missile Crisis and the 1964 Johnson Letter encouraged Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy toward Arab states. Turkey was the co-founder of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1962, partnering with Pakistan and Iran. Turkey also viewed the 1967 Arab-Israeli War as an opportunity to further develop its relations with the Arab states. Turkey backed the Arab states and voted in favor of a resolution for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories. Turkey also refused to allow the US to use American bases in Turkey for delivering support to Israel in the 1967 War, while permitting the Soviets to use Turkish airspace in order to help the Arabs (Bishku, 2006; Altunışık, 2000; Bölükbaşı, 1999; Israeli, 2001; Aras and Bicakci, 2006).

The 1967 war with Israel diminished Egypt’s power in the Arab world. Nasserist, Socialist Baathist and Pan-Arabist policies (with Egypt in the center) in the region shifted toward relatively pro-American policies (with Saudi Arabia in the center). A weakened Egypt was an advantage for Turkey since Nasser’s Egypt displayed avid opposition to Turkey’s pro-American policies. Following the vote in the UN against Israel, the tension between Turkey and the Arab states were significantly reduced (Bengio and Özcan, 2001).

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Figure 5.8. An Israeli tank unit crosses the Sinai, heading for the Suez Canal.

Source: www.historynet.com

The improved relations with the Arab states proved to be beneficial for Turkey during the 1970s. The oil crisis following the 1973 Arab–Israeli War as well as the Cyprus crisis in 1974 increased the economic and political importance of good relations with the Arab states. Foreign oil dependency and the American arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus crisis further encouraged Turkey to improve economic ties with the Arab world. Despite the slow takeoff at the beginning, Turkey’s trade with the Arab states significantly improved. Imports rose from $64 million in 1970 to $2.8 billion in 1985, and exports rose from $54 million to $3 billion (Hale, 2000). Between 1980 and 1982, loans granted to Turkey by the Arab states exceeded the loans granted by the U.S.

Turkey became a de facto member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1975. Full membership in the OIC was in contradiction to the secular principles of the Turkish constitution that prohibited membership in any religion-based organization. Faced with a dilemma, the Turkish governments chose to emphasize the economic dimension of the OIC rather than its religious structure (Bölükbaşı, 1999).

In 1975, Turkey voted along with the Arab states in favor of a resolution that denounced “Zionism as a form of Racism”. In 1976, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was also recognized by Turkey as the representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO opened a representative office in Ankara. The OIC granted observer status to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and announced a pro-Turkish resolution on Cyprus in 1979 (Bengio and Özcan, 2001; Bölükbaşı, 1999).

The declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the Israeli Parliament, Knesset, in 1980 pushed Turkey to close down the Turkish Consulate General in Jerusalem in August 1980 (Piccoli, 1999). After the 1980 coup d’état, the military regime maintained good relations with the Arab states due to common economic interests. General Kenan Evren, head of the military regime, became the first Turkish President who participated in the OIC’s meetings and attended the fifth conference of the OIC in 1987. During the 1980s, Turkey continued its support of Palestinian self-determination. However, the PLO continued to support the Greek policies regarding Cyprus and the forced assimilation policy of the Bulgarian Turks under the Zhivkov administration (Bölükbaşı, 1999).

Turkish-Iranian RelationsThe Economic and political competition has

been a critical factor in Turkish-Iranian relations since the Ottoman times. The Sunni-Shiite tension also contributed to this competition, given the predominantly Sunni population of Turkey and mostly the Shiite population of Iran. Both countries suffered disintegration and foreign occupation following the First World War but chose different paths for modernization and Westernization after their independence - Turkey established a Republican regime whereas Iran a monarchy. After the Second World War, Turkey and Iran regarded communism a common threat to their security and, therefore, allied themselves with the Western bloc. They became the founding members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. Both countries gained from the détente process in the 1960s and improved their relations with the Soviet Union. In 1962, they co-founded the Organization of Regional Cooperation Development (RCD), which aimed to develop close cultural and economic ties between its members. Their close cooperation continued until the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979.

The Shah tried to transform Iran into a regional power during the 1970s. Iran had profited greatly from the oil crisis in 1973, and expanded its military spending as a result. Although Iran’s growing military power initially concerned Turkey, Iran’s main focus was the Persian Gulf. Thus, Iran’s regional ambitions did not slow down the

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pace of cooperation between the two countries. They remained as pro-American allies that did not threaten each other’s security (Calabrese, 1998). However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran shook the foundation of Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkey remained neutral during the Iraq-Iran War and refused to participate in US-led sanctions on Iran. Turkey gained from its neutral stance during the Iran–Iraq War and improved its trade with both Iraq and Iran. Iran became the second biggest oil supplier to Turkey, only after Iraq (Aydın and Aras, 2005). During the mid-1980s, Iran’s support for the PKK terrorist organization created tension in relations. Turkey accused Iran of allowing the PKK to use its territory to launch terror attacks on Turkey (Aydın and Aras, 2005; Calabrese, 2005).

Turkish-Syrian RelationsAs to relations with Syria, Hatay (Alexandretta)

and the use of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (the so-called water problem) remained as sources of conflict between Turkey and Syria. The conflict on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers stemmed from the conflicting views of Syria and Iraq on one side and Turkey on the other. Syria and Iraq have regarded the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as international waters, and they have demanded an equal share. Turkey, on the other hand, has considered itself the sole authority over the use of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, since both rivers originate in Anatolia. In the 1980s, Iraq and Syria made objections to the launch of the South Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi - GAP) by Turkey. Although Turkey signed a protocol guaranteeing the flow of 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria, the tension remained unresolved. The Syria’s support of the PKK terrorist organization also damaged Turkish-Syrian relations. Despite several bilateral security treaties with Turkey, Syria continued its support for the PKK as a bargaining chip against Turkey in its water problem.

Turkey and Europe After 1980 Turkish and European identities have been

shaped by mutual antagonism resulting from a centuries-old struggle between the European states and the Ottoman Empire. Turks have been considered as the “other” that had to be stopped by the Europeans since the Ottoman times (Aydın,

2003; Eralp, 1994). The Ottoman Empire expanded its territories and influence in Europe for many centuries. The siege of Vienna by the Ottomans in 1529 and again in 1683 created perpetual images on both sides. Eralp (1994) suggests that the Ottomans constituted the opposite of “Europeanness” from its start. Centuries-long conflicts resulted in opposite identifications on both sides.

Leaders of the new Turkish state, most notably Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, considered the Western values of democracy and secularism as essential tools to transform and modernize the Turkish society. The new Turkish state created a new Turkish identity based upon Western values. In light of the Ottoman efforts to become a part of Europe since the Gülhane Decree (Tanzimat Fermanı), Atatürk’s desire for Westernization may be considered as the continuation of the reform policies. Upon closer inspection, the Ottomans used Westernization to build strategic alliances with Western powers in order to pit them against each other. On the other hand, Atatürk and his colleagues employed the policy of Westernization as part of the Turkish modernization movement (Hale, 2000). Therefore, their desire to transform the nation and the state was genuine. Accordingly, they introduced a series of reforms, starting with the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923.

Turkey kept its distance from Europe in the period between the two World Wars. The struggle to create a nation with a viable economy and society was the focal point of the governments between 1923 and 1939. Turkey followed an independent and well-balanced foreign policy in the period between the two world wars. After the end of WWII, Turkey joined the Western alliance against possible communist expansion and accordingly improved its relations with Europe.

The European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957. Following Greece, Turkey applied to the EEC in 1959 for full membership. The Ankara Agreement was signed with the EEC in 1963. From the Turkish perspective, the Ankara Agreement was the “recognition of Turkey as a part of Europe at last.” On the European side, however, Turkey’s European identity was quite questionable, but security concerns of the Cold War overcame Europe’s reluctance (Wood and Quassier, 2005; Hale, 2000; Eralp, 1994). Bilateral relations, then, were basically shaped by the security concerns

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against a common threat. Both sides chose to downplay cultural, political, and social differences with the aim of creating a mutual defense system.

The 1963 Ankara Agreement was an economic agreement that laid out the principles for Turkish accession to the EEC. The agreement set timetables for Turkey’s accession to the EEC in three steps: the preliminary stage from 1964 to 1973, the transition stage from 1973 to 1980 (the earliest) or 1995 (the latest), and the final (possible accession) stage, once Turkey met the conditions of the Ankara Agreement (Cicekli, 1997; Hale, 2000).

In spite of the economic nature of the Ankara Agreement, political arguments shaped Turkish–European relations in the decades that followed the Agreement. Moreover, despite its initial economic character, the EEC gradually evolved into a political entity. Therefore, Turkey’s domestic issues and political developments increasingly affected the EEC’s approach toward Turkey. During the same period, the US administrations preferred to overlook Turkey’s domestic problems for the sake of its role in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Greece was permitted to join the EEC immediately after its civilian government replaced the military junta in 1981. Since its accession to the EEC in 1981, Greece used its veto power in the EEC to corner Turkey in problematic areas such as the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. Meanwhile, the EEC also set the resolution of bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece as a precondition for Turkey’s membership (Hale, 2000; Eralp, 1994).

Another issue in Turkish–European relations has been the status of Turkish workers in European countries. Following the labor shortage after WWII, a bilateral agreement was signed between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 for Turkish “guest workers.” Initially, this was planned as a short-term solution for the labor shortage. However, many worker families chose to stay in Europe. Turkey signed similar agreements with other European countries such as Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), Netherlands, France, Switzerland, and Sweden (Wets, 2006). By the mid-1970s, the number of Turkish workers reached approximately 600,000 and their remittances to Turkey were calculated to be approximately $1 billion per year (Hale, 2000).

In 1970, an Additional Protocol, which regulated the transition stage of Turkey to full membership, was signed between the EEC and Turkey. This protocol also aimed to formalize the free movement of Turkish workers. Meanwhile, the unemployment numbers climbed in European countries because of the 1970 energy crisis. The free movement of Turkish workers was thought to have affected the domestic workforce in a negative way. When the due date of the protocol arrived in 1976, the EEC members opted for limited improvements for Turkish workers (who were already working in the EEC countries) (Barnard, 2004; Cicekli, 1997; Hale, 2000). The EEC also imposed restrictions on the free movement of Turkish workers. In 1978, the Ecevit government suspended Turkey’s responsibilities emanating from the Additional Protocol. Under Demirel’s premiership, Turkey resumed its responsibilities in 1979. However, Turkish–European relations witnessed a deterioration following the 1980 coup d’état (Hale, 2000; Aydın, 2004).

Military interventions met severe criticisms from the European countries. In fact, the Council of Europe suspended Turkey’s membership after the 1980 coup d’état. Turkey, under the military rule, called back its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Diplomatic relations were normalized after 1983, when democratic elections were held and Turkey returned to civilian rule.

The fourth financial protocol between Turkey and the EEC was signed in 1981. The Economic aid was frozen after the 1980 coup d’état, and the EEC conditioned the release of funds upon Turkey’s return to democracy. Democratic elections were held in 1983; however, the promised funds were never released due to the repeated Greek veto. Under Turgut Özal’s premiership, Turkey applied to the EEC in 1987 for full membership. The EEC turned down Turkey’s application in 1989, emphasizing the economic gap between Turkey and the EEC as well as the problems with Cyprus and Greece.

How did internal factors balance and/or challenge the effects of external factors in forming Turkish foreign policy after 1962?

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LO 1 Discuss the beginning of the Cold War and TFP between 1945 and 1962.

World War II changed the balance of power in the international system and forced Turkey to re-evaluate its foreign policy. Faced with the Soviet threat to its security, Turkey abandoned its neutral stance and sought permanent alliances to balance Soviet threats. As a result of its proximity to the U.S.S.R., Turkey was considered an asset for the U.S. in its struggle with communism. Until the transition to multi-party democracy in 1960, an elite group, with no eye to domestic policy, carefully handled Turkish foreign policy. The structural characteristics of the international system were of the utmost importance in the determination of Turkish foreign policy between 1945 and 1960.

LO 2 Evaluate TFP toward the Middle Eastern and Balkan countries in the early Cold War years.

Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries were secondary to Turkey’s relations with the West (especially the U.S.). Any Turkish attempt to improve cooperation in the region (e.g., the Baghdad Pact) met with Arab states’ suspicion. Turkey was considered not as a trustworthy partner, but rather a Western spy in the midst of Muslim countries. In addition, Turkey’s closer ties with the Balkans, based on ethnic and religious affinities (e.g., in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria) took a back seat in the determination of Turkey’s Balkans policy. As long as these populations remained within the borders of the U.S.S.R. satellite states, Turkey’s attempts to improve its relations remained limited.

LO 3 Analyze the changes in the international structure in the early 1960s and TFP between 1962 and 1980.

Turkey learned several lessons during the Cold War about its Western alliance. After the Jupiter Missile Crisis in 1963 and Cyprus Crisis in 1964, Turkish governments realized the necessity of a more diversified foreign policy agenda. Despite the international opposition, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus (1974) was clear evidence for its inability to ignore the domestic public pressure, even when the foreign policy was exclusively based on external factors. Accordingly, a ‘multi-faceted foreign policy’ was adopted as a strategy to bring diversity to Turkish foreign policy. The dissolution of U.S.S.R. and the consequent end of Cold War caused structural shifts in the international system.

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LO 4 Summarize the issues in TFP between 1980 and 1990.

Turkey and the US signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 1980. With this agreement, Turkey guaranteed the continued American support of its economy. In addition, the American administration assisted the efforts to modernize Turkish armed forces. The improved Turkish-American cooperation and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan slowed Turkish-Soviet Union political and economic relations in the 1980s. Strained relations continued until Mikhail Gorbachev became the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985. Relations with Greece after 1980 continued to be a source of tension for Turkey and for Turkish-US/NATO relations. Despite Turkey’s claims for the demilitarization of the Aegean islands, Greece continued to militarize them Turkey considered this effort of Greece a security threat, and it established the Aegean Army in 1975 for the defense of its Aegean shores. Territorial waters were also another problematic area. Greece wished to expand its territorial waters from its current level at 6 miles to 12 miles. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The 1963 Missile Crisis and the 1964 Johnson Letter encouraged Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy toward Arab states. Turkey viewed the 1967 Arab-Israeli War as an opportunity to further develop its relations with the Arab states. Although Iran’s growing military power initially concerned Turkey, Iran’s main focus was the Persian Gulf. Thus, Iran’s regional ambitions did not slow down the pace of cooperation between the two countries. As to relations with Syria, Hatay (Alexandretta) and the use of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (the so-called water problem) remained as sources of conflict between Turkey and Syria. In spite of the economic nature of the Ankara Agreement, political arguments shaped Turkish–European relations in the decades that followed the Agreement. Moreover, despite its initial economic character, the EEC gradually evolved into a political entity. Therefore, Turkey’s domestic issues and political developments increasingly affected the EEC’s approach toward Turkey.

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1 Which one the following countries was not a member of the Central Treaty Organization?

a. Great Britain b. Turkeyc. The United States d. Pakistane. Iran

2 Which of the following policies did the Ottomans follow in the 19th century?

a. The policy of isolationb. Beggar the neighbor policy c. Allying with the United States d. Allying with Germanye. The exploitation of balance of power

3 Through which of the following doctrines did Turkey receive substantial financial aid after WWII?

a. The Eisenhower doctrineb. The Carter doctrinec. The Truman doctrined. The Wilson doctrinee. The Kennedy doctrine

4 Which of the following states was a signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 regarding the constitutional status of Cyprus?

a. The United Statesb. Great Britainc. The Soviet Union d. Germany e. France

5 Which of the following strategies did NATO follow in the 1950s?

a. Flexible Response b. The New Strategic Concept c. Massive Retaliation d. Isolatione. No-First use of nuclear weapons

6 With which of the following countries did Turkey have problems in the 1980s over the use of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers?

a. Egyptb. Israelc. Greece d. Bulgariae. Syria

7 Which of the following states imposed an assimilation policy on its Turkish minority in the early 1980s?

a. Syriab. Iraqc. Irand. Bulgariae. Lebanon

8 Which of the following was an economic agreement that laid out the principles for the Turkish accession to the EEC (European Economic Community)?

a. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement

b. The Washington Treaty c. The Baghdad Pact d. The Central Treaty Organizatione. The Ankara Agreement

9 In which year was the independence of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus announced?

a. 1959b. 1960c. 1964d. 1974 e. 1975

10 In which year did Turkey become a member of NATO?

a. 1949b. 1952c. 1963d. 1976e. 1981

Test

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If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Relations with the Middle East and the Balkans between 1945 and 1962” section.

1. c If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish Foreign Policy between 1980 and 1990” section.

6. e

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Early Cold War Years and Rela-tions with the West: 1945-1962” section.

3. c If your answer is incorrect, please review the “From the Heyday of the Cold War to Détente: Turkish Foreign Policy between 1962 and 1980” section.

8. e

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Introduction” section.

2. e If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish Foreign Policy between 1980 and 1990” section.

7. d

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Relations with the Middle East and the Balkans between 1945 and 1962” section.

4. b

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “From the Heyday of the Cold War to Détente: Turkish Foreign Policy between 1962 and 1980” section.

5. c

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “From the Heyday of the Cold War to Détente: Turkish Foreign Policy between 1962 and 1980” section.

9. e

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “The Early Cold War Years and Relations with the West: 1945-1962” section.

10. b

Answ


Discuss the changes in the international structure that shaped Turkish foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War.

your turn 1

A bipolar balance of power prevailed in the international system after the war. Great Britain lost its status as the international system’s hegemon, and the US and the USSR took over the post as two new hegemonic powers on the opposite sides of the political spectrum. With the USSR becoming an increasing threat to its integrity and security, Turkey turned to the West to establish a permanent alliance.

Explain the problems that prevented Turkey from developing meaningful cooperation with Middle Eastern countries in the early Cold War years.

your turn 2

Geopolitical and cultural duality has always been a determining factor in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. Islam, as a major common denominator, has brought affinities in relations. On the other hand, four hundred years of Ottoman rule left a negative image on Arab minds as ‘the suppressor of Arab nationalism” (Jung, 2005) and had long term impact on Turkish-Arab relations. The Arab cooperation with the British during WWI was construed as a betrayal by the Turks. Suspicion and distrust prevailed in relations, and as a result, many regional initiatives (e.g., the Baghdad Pact) failed. The territorial problems over Mosul and Hatay (Alexandretta) contributed to the already tense relations. The Turkish–Israeli relations further complicated Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel (on March 28, 1949) and establish diplomatic relations in 1950 by sending its charge d’affaires.

Suggested answ

ers for “Your Turn”


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Discuss the implications of the Jupiter missiles’ presence in, and removal from, Turkey for both Turkish foreign policy and the super-power relations.

“Although Ankara wanted to retain the Jupiter missiles, Turkey’s “very survival” was invested in the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, which likewise ended well for Turkish interests. As predicted, Turkey felt it was “being informed rather than consulted” about its national security and foreign policy matters and abhorred its imbalanced relationship with the United States, but the removal of the Jupiter missiles did not cause any serious discord in the Turkish-American relationship. When the Turks agreed with NATO in 1959 to receive the Jupiter missiles, Ankara and Washington shared desires to establish the nuclear bases, so American-Turkish negotiations were easy for the Eisenhower administration. However, four years later, Kennedy experienced a Turkish government very reluctant to remove its new armaments, and negotiations were much tougher. Despite Ankara’s reluctance to concur at first, the removal of the Jupiter missiles brought benefits to Turkey as well. More than two thousand sorely needed Turkish technicians were freed for other projects. Turkey also enjoyed the Jupiter missiles’ substitution for the coveted Polaris submarine, which had “27 percent better reliability, 25 percent greater accuracy, a 65 percent less destructive warhead, [and a] 100 percent better survivability without warning” when compared to the Jupiter missiles it had made obsolete. The Jupiter missiles - like many other events in the Cold War- manifested reciprocity. As the presence of American missiles in Turkey caused Soviet missiles to arise in Cuba, so too did their removal cause a mutual withdrawal of Soviet armaments. The Cuban missile crisis surprisingly benefitted the different states involved. Cuba was promised to not be invaded by the United States again. Turkey received stronger protection via ICBMs. The Soviet Union no longer needed to fear nuclear missiles coming from Turkey. Likewise, the United States no longer needed to fear nuclear missiles coming from Cuba. The situation took relations between the Soviet and American heads of state to a high and fostered mutual understanding between the two leaders; both states had been willing to grant concessions in favor of the other, perhaps opening a new doorway to the mollification of American-Soviet relations” (Fuelling, 2017).

your turn 3

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How did internal factors balance and/or challenge the effects of external factors in forming Turkish foreign policy after 1962.

During the 1960s, the bipolar balance of power between the two superpowers experienced a détente period. As the tensions between the US and the USSR relaxed, Turkey’s strategic importance for the US decreased. The détente process also meant the relaxation of Soviet threat to Turkey. This provided Turkey with an opportunity to improve its relations with both the communist bloc and the non-aligned movement. The Turkish military ousted the civilian government as a result of a coup d’état in 1960. The new constitution of 1961 established the foundation of a plural society, and as a result, new interest groups appeared on the domestic scene. These developments also paved the way for shaky coalition governments, resulting in political chaos in the 1970s, since it was harder to form a majority government under the new rules. The political polarization also limited the ability of coalition governments to follow a coherent foreign policy agenda since no political party had enough electoral support to implement its own political (domestic or foreign) agenda. It is argued that this deficiency was one reason why Turkey felt isolated and inactive in the international system during the 1970s.

your turn 4

Suggested answ


Adamson, Fiona B. (2001). “Democratization and Domestic Resources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.116/2: 277-303.

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Chapter 5

Lear

ning

Out

com

es

Discuss the reform process in Turkey between 1999 and 2004.

Identify the core debates regarding the European Integration process in the post-Cold War context.

Explain the ups and downs in Turkish-EU relations between the 1997 Luxembourg Summit and the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

Recognize the reasons behind the deadlock in Turkey’s accession process after the start of the accession negotiations.3

1 24


Turkish Foreign Policy and the Politics of Europeanization, 1990-2007

Chapter OutlineIntroduction Turkish-EU Relations in the Post-Cold War ContextFrom the Luxembourg Summit to the Helsinki Summit: Explaining the Ups and Downs in Turkish-EU RelationsPost-Helsinki Relations: A New Page in Turkish-EU RelationsAccession Negotiations and the Additional Protocol Crisis

Key Terms•Europeanization•TheCopenhagen

Criteria•Conditionality•Acquis

Communautaire•Euroscepticism•Deepeningand

Widening•TheSingleEuropean

Act•TheMaastrichtTreaty•CustomsUnion

•TheAdditionalProtocol

•TheAgenda2000•The1999Helsinki

European Council•TheCyprusConflict•EUHarmonization

Process•Accession

Negotiations•Privileged

Partnership•AbsorptionCapacity

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INTRODUCTIONTurkey’s EU odyssey is perceived as part of

both the country’s long-run mission and the modernization process. Since the 19th century, modernization for Turkey has been synonymous with Westernization, which can be conceptualized as economic and political convergence to Western legal-institutional structures. The process of Westernization accelerated in the post-World War II era when Turkey began to take part in post-war institutions including NATO, the OECD, and the World Bank. In line with this vision, various Turkish governments declared that Turkey’s European Economic Community (EEC) membership would provide required incentives and leverage for the modernization of the country. From late 1950s onwards, Turkey’s modernization process has been associated with integrating with the EEC. Therefore, Europeanization, which is the endgame of adapting both politically and economically to the EEC legal-institutional framework, provided the basis for Turkish political elites’ modernization agenda.

By expressing its interest and willingness to become a member of the EEC, Turkey made an official application to the organization in 1959. Upon Turkey’s application, an Association Agreement, which was named the “Ankara Agreement,” was signed in 1963. With an additional protocol signed in 1970, Turkish-European relations became stronger. The Protocol foresaw the achievement of economic integration and targeted establishing a customs union in three stages by the end of 1995. The 1980 military take-over in Turkey had been the most significant factor that affected Turkey’s relations with the EEC in

the early 1980s. Due to domestic political reasons in Turkey, the EEC partly suspended its relations with Turkey. With the strengthening of civilian political structures in the mid-1980s, however, Turkish-European relations revitalized. In April 1987, following the Mediterranean enlargement of the Community, the Özal government applied for full membership on the basis of Article 237 of the Rome Treaty. In the eyes of Turkish political elites, Turkey’s EEC membership would contribute to the political development in the country and facilitate Turkey’s economic integration with the outer world.

Upon Turkey’s application, the Commission stressed its support for Turkey’s economic and political liberalization process in the context of Customs Union (CU) as well as supported strengthening bilateral relations; however, it declared that from an economic and political perspective Turkey did not qualify for membership. Structural disparities in critical sectors (including agriculture and industry); worsening macroeconomic imbalances; the high level of industrial protectionism; and the shortcomings in the social protection system were declared the key parameters that would jeopardize economic integration with the EC in the short run. With respect to the political situation in Turkey, the Opinion Paper underlined that although there had been developments in the human rights situation, these did not yet reach the level that was expected by the EC (Commission of the European Communities, 1989). The domestic political situation in Turkey accompanied by structural anomalies became a burning issue in Turkey’s relations with the EU during the 1990s. Apart from this, the Commission pointed out that the continuation of the status quo in Cyprus and the ongoing problems in bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece were the challenges that Turkey would face in its relations with the EC. For the first time the EC expressed that there was a linkage between Turkey’s membership aspiration and the resolution of the ongoing disputes in the Mediterranean region. In the early 1990s, it was obvious that the ongoing adversities in Turkish foreign policy as well as Turkey’s prolonged economic and political problems would affect the prospect of Turkey’s integration with Europe.

The concepts of both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) refer to the European Union. Up until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union), the organization was named EEC and EC.

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5 Turkish Foreign Policy and the Politics of Europeanization, 1990-2007

TURKISH-EU RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR

CONTEXTThe Commission’s Opinion on Turkey’s

bid for full membership caused a new wave of distrust in Turkey concerning its relations with the EC. The Opinion alienated the Turkish public opinion, for the EC had not reciprocated Turkey’s determination and endeavor to become a member of the organization. During the 1990s, the member countries of the EC had a common position toward Turkey: they would not make any commitment for the future and would not accelerate the integration process with Turkey. In this sense, until the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the European Community continued its relations with Turkey in the framework of establishing a customs union. These diverging positions poisoned the already strained relations between Turkey and the Community during the 1990s and the early 2000s.

Customs Union: An Alternative Framework for Cooperation

Under these circumstances, upon the recommendation of the Council, the Commission published a Cooperation Program with Turkey aiming at the finalization of a customs union with Turkey. European Commissioner Abel Matutes (responsible for relations with the Mediterranean Countries) prepared a program, known as the Matutes Package, which suggested the completion of a customs union by the end of 1995. The program also proposed the resumption of the fourth financial protocol, which had been blocked in the aftermath of 1980 military coup, and clarified the terms and conditions for the implementation of the Community’s common external tariff regime in trade with the third countries. The establishment of a free trade zone between Turkey and the EC member states meant that Turkey would eliminate all customs duties and other charges with equivalent effect and that it would abandon export subsidies that might harm fair competition. Although the Matutes Package could not be implemented due to the Greek veto on financial and technical assistance to Turkey, the approach of further cooperation in the framework of a future customs union by the end of 1995 became the priority for Turkish policy makers (Nas and Özer, 2017: 30).

The Community’s strategy toward Turkey followed a continuous pattern: partial and conditional concessions, but without making any further commitment for full membership, to avoid any estrangement in strategic relations (Uğur, 1996).

The introduction of the customs-union regime in Turkey in 1995 may be considered as a sign of this strategy. Therefore, as opposed to Turkey’s approach, the EC did not treat the customs union as part of a pre-accession strategy. Rather the customs union was an end in itself or an instrument for the EC for further economic cooperation with Turkey. In addition, “it is worth noting that while the EEC was negotiating the completion of the CU with Turkey, it had already started its next wave of enlargement to include the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe” (Nas and Özer, 2017: 34). The Union’s different attitude toward former Communist Central and Eastern European Countries’ membership applications, which were almost synchronous with Turkey, illustrated that the option of a privileged partnership status for Turkey was on the table even in the early 1990s.

Acknowledging the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world order and the level of integration with Europe as well as the pressures for reform, the completion of a customs union with the EC was the lesser-of-two-evils option (integration without membership perspective or a privileged membership status) to maintain Turkey’s dialogue with the Community. As Uğur (1996: 13) mentioned,

“the drive towards the establishment of a customs union would enable both parties to play the same tunes as before: the EC would try to ensure that it functions as a substitute to membership in the medium term while Turkey would interpret it as another stepping stone in the process of externalizing the cost of modernization.”

Privileged partnership provides a special form of cooperation with the European Union without becoming a full member. The EU has offered privileged partnership as part of a strategy to manage its relations with the third countries.

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In addition to this, according to the Turkish government, Turkey’s integration with European markets would have positive effects on Turkish domestic politics. This was considered as an important political leverage and a good strategy to receive the backing of both Euro-supportive groups and representatives of the export sector (Uğur, 1996). Given the pre-accession benefits such as technical and financial support by the Community agencies and its potential contribution to the domestic political situation, Turkish governments in the early 1990s prioritized integration with the EC without losing a full membership perspective.

Upon the decision taken at the meeting of Turkey-EU Association Council on March 6, 1995, the transitional process defined by the Additional Protocol ended. Accordingly, by January 1996, Turkey would have to terminate all remaining customs duties and other relevant charges such as quantitative limitations and other equivalent barriers on industrial imports from the EC member countries. This final stage of trade liberalization was especially supported by Turkish textile and clothing industries. Because the EC would also eliminate all trade barriers applicable to Turkish textile and clothing industries that were previously excluded from the early open-market strategies of the EC during the transition process. It was also stated that in five years’ time, Turkey was expected to transform its legal system toward eliminating all technical barriers to international trade (EC-Turkey Association Council, 1995). This issue was important in the sense that it illustrated that the regime of free movement of goods between Turkey and EC was not only about quantitative and economic criteria but also about qualitative standards. The implementation of the Articles 2 and 35 of the Additional Protocol was another crucial matter that strained bilateral

relations. Although both the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol foresaw the free movement of workers, the EC did not liberalize its visa process for Turkish workers. While the free movement of goods was achieved in early 1996, the debate about visa liberation and free movement of workers is still underway.

Figure 5.1 Visa information for Turkish citizens.

The European Integration Process and Turkish-EU Relations in the Early 1990s

Another significant issue in the 1990s that would deeply affect Turkey’s journey to EU membership was the widening and deepening debates in the European integration process. In the late 1980s, European integration was revitalized to strengthen the European Single Market toward competing with both the world’s economic giants as well as the emerging markets. The idea of full economic integration (which includes a single market and a monetary union) that would eventually lead to a political integration was gradually supported by the member countries. In line with this agenda, the Commission underlined in its Opinion on Turkey that the ultimate priority of the Commission is to secure the process of economic integration and, therefore, any premature step toward enlargement without setting up institutional and legal mechanisms that could assess the eligibility of potential candidates might create serious consequences for the Community. Especially because of its economic and political development level, Turkey was not in a position to meet the criteria of the EEC framed by the Single European Act.

For the chronology of Turkish-EU Relations, visit www.ab.gov.tr/files/5%20Ekim/chronology.pdfFor a documentary on Turkish-EU relations, watch the video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEQxU86PfS4

internet

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These developments took place at a time when the European policy makers decided that the economic success of European integration could be extended to other policy areas. Although the idea of establishing a political union has been considered as the end game, European integration followed a “step-by-step approach,” targeting a sector-specific cooperation in each phase of the integration process. In fact, the seeds of a political union were planted during the early 1990s when the success of economic integration became apparent. In December 1991, during the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference, the heads of state and government of the Community member states agreed on introducing a monetary union as well as some other significant reforms in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (the CFSP) and certain issues under Justice and Home Affairs.

The Maastricht Treaty, known as the Treaty on the European Union, was finally signed in February 1992, which entered into force in late 1993. The organization of “European Union” owes its name and its political status to the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty also defined the key principles of and the institutional framework for the CFSP that would become the third pillar of the European Union. Contrary to its other forums of cooperation, the CFSP aimed at establishing a global Union that would speak with one voice in world affairs.

The introduction of the European security identity under the CFSP created further problems for Turkey’s accession process. Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that members of the Western European Union (WEU), which was established as a collective security and defense mechanism in 1948 prior to the formation of the EC, would be integrated into the EU structure. The WEU would develop the operational capacity of the EU while defining the organization’s security identity. The WEU as an organization that “took on a new role in the 1980s as a bridge between the EC and NATO in the context of efforts to forge a European security and defense identity” would be legally and institutionally integrated into the EU (Bache et al, 2015: 107). The proposed arrangements on the WEU, whose operational capacity would be somehow depended on NATO assets, aimed at strengthening the “European pillar” in the NATO alliance.

The Maastricht Treaty also offered the status of associate membership to those NATO members that would not take part in the WEU (TEU, Declaration on WEU). This meant that Turkey might apply for an associate membership status in the CFSP. However, this status would not allow Turkey to take part in the decision making structure of the CFSP. This dramatic change in the definition of European security became another source of tension between Turkey and the EU during the 1990s (Açıkmeşe and Dizdaroğlu, 2013).

The debates on deepening Europe went hand in hand with discussions about possible future enlargement scenarios. After the collapse of the Communist bloc, Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) adopted agendas prioritizing economic and political liberalization and took steps toward market economy and parliamentary democracy. For many CEECs integration with the European Union (EU) emerged as the fundamental political goal to transform their state-controlled economy to a free market economy and to transform their political systems to liberal democracies. At the same time, the EU pursued eastern enlargement as a foreign policy strategy to prevent possible destructive political and economic impacts of the transition period for the wider Europe.

Deepening vs. Widening

These concepts refer to a longitudinal debate on the future of the EU. Based on the related articles of the founding treaties of the Union, the idea of deepening was promoted in line with the approach of “ever closer union.” The notion of deepening refers to the intense integration of the EU and consolidation of the supranational structure of the Union. The EU’s transition toward economic and monetary union and the introduction of a single currency, the euro overtime, are considered as the manifestations of the EU deepening process. According to the supporters of widening, the EU should expand beyond its borders through new accessions. This notion of an enlarged EU aims at contributing the EU’s becoming a strong actor in regional and global issues. The EU managed to become from a 15-member organization in 2004 to a 28-member organization in 2013.

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Enlargement emerged as a foreign policy goal because it was believed to provide security in the EU’s eastern neighborhood through promoting stability and achieving peaceful transformation in the CEECs. The project of Eastern enlargement would also contribute to the EU’s normative power and common foreign and security policy identity. As noted by the former member of the EU Commission responsible for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, enlargement of the Union toward the Central and Eastern Europe was an historic opportunity in that it would end the ideological and political division of Europe and help the EU become a world power (Verheugen, 2001). Therefore, enlargement of the Union was considered to be one of the core pillars of common foreign policy in the organization’s milieu. Through its enlargement strategy the Union would be the new agenda setter and political as well as economic norm builder of the emerging order in the post-Cold War Europe (Noutcheva et al, 2013: 43).

With this respect, the EU member countries agreed on supporting the transformation processes in CEECs through pre-accession strategies, including with financial and technical support. Toward this objective, the European Council, with the decisions taken at the 1990 Rome European Council, introduced a financial aid package for the economic recovery of CEECs (Rome European Council, 1990). The 1993 Copenhagen Summit decisions on the EU’s enlargement strategy manifested again the Union’s willingness to expand both its borders and political role in the larger Europe.

The Copenhagen European Council became a crucial step toward underlying that CEECs would take part in the European family of nations as long as they meet the membership criteria and shoulder the responsibilities emanating from the acquis communautaire. Possible candidates were

expected to complete their political and economic transformation so as to maintain the harmony in the Union. In line with this vision, the 1993 Copenhagen Summit specified the accession criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria, which became the backbone of the European conditionality mechanism in its conduct with candidate countries.

European Conditionality: Conditionality in its broadest sense refers to the use of economic, political or regulative conditions attached to the delivery of benefits such as aid, trade and economic privileges, technical assistance, and debt relief. It is a mechanism applied by the donor country or organization to induce reform and transform political economy of the recipients. The EU applies conditionality in conducting economic and trade relations and for the allocation of aid with the third countries and regions. Since the early 1990s, the European Union laid down certain political conditions to regulate its negotiations with the aspiring member states. Based on this structure, in order to launch accession negotiations with the EU, a country must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (political criteria). In addition to this, to become an EU member, the candidate country should fulfill all components of accession criteria (the Copenhagen criteria) and transform its legal-institutional structure to comply with the EU’s legal framework (acquis communautaire).

The Copenhagen Criteria/Accession Criteria: refers to essential conditions to become a full member of the EU. These conditions were specified by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council. Based on these criteria, countries wishing to join the EU need to have:

• stableinstitutionsguaranteeingdemocracy,therule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (political criteria);

• afunctioningmarketeconomyandthecapacityto cope with competition and market forces in the EU (economic criteria);

• theabilitytotakeonandimplementeffectivelythe obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (administrative criteria).

Acquis communautaire refers to the legal framework of the EU. It contains accumulated legislation including the EU-wide court decisions, regulations, legal acts, and best practices. The Acquis has 35 chapters, specialized on different policy issues from fishery to justice to home affairs.

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FROM THE LUXEMBOURG SUMMIT TO THE HELSINKI

SUMMIT: EXPLAINING THE UPS AND DOWNS IN TURKISH-EU

RELATIONSContrary to Turkey’s expectations, domestic

political conditions in Turkey as well as the Cyprus conflict dominated the discussions on Turkey in the 1990s. The EU’s attitude toward Turkey became clear in the European Commission’s report known as the Agenda 2000, issued in July 1997.

The 1997 Luxembourg European Council: The Source of a New Tension in Turkish-EU Relations

The Agenda 2000 revealed the EU’s pre-accession strategy and it reiterated possible contribution of an enlarged EU to regional peace and security. About the status of Turkey, the Agenda 2000 pointed out that Turkey would be treated by the same standards and criteria as other applicants and that Turkey was eligible for EU membership. Yet there were serious economic and political disparities between the EU member countries and Turkey at the time. While CEECs and the Southern Cyprus Administration were declared as the countries that would be included in the coming enlargement round, the completion of a customs union with Turkey was underlined as an important step that would support further dialogue between Turkey and the EU. In addition, the Union stated that strengthening relations with Turkey under the EU’s Mediterranean policy (more specifically the

MEDA program- financial support mechanism of Europe-Mediterranean partnership) might be an option (Bulletin of the EU, July 1997). The Union’s attitude toward Turkey and the country’s exclusion form the enlargement process became a source of disappointment for Ankara.

The Agenda 2000 was fully adopted in the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council. The Council reaffirmed the pre-accession strategy framed in the Agenda 2000 and decided to launch the accession process with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the so-called “Republic of Cyprus.” With regard to the state of relations with Turkey, the Council declared that bilateral relations were dependent on the political and economic liberalization of the country and Turkey’s positive efforts concerning a political settlement of ongoing border disputes with Greece and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict under the UN aegis (Luxembourg European Council, 1997).

In response to the Council declaration, Ankara announced its decision to unilaterally suspend its relations with the EU. The Turkish government delivered a declaration pointing out that (i) Turkey was not evaluated through the same framework and objective criteria as other candidates; (ii) The Council made partial and prejudiced assessment on Turkish domestic politics as well as on Turkey’s foreign policy approach including the Cyprus conflict. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997) Therefore, the 1997 Luxembourg Summit decisions constituted a critical juncture in Turkish-EU relations, which were seriously damaged as a result of the rejection of Turkey’s official membership status by the EU and the inclusion of the so-called Republic of Cyprus in the enlargement process. Atila Eralp (2000: 20) suggests that “the decisions of the Luxembourg Summit gave Turkey a special status with a long lead time to full membership. The critical word for Turkey was ‘the candidate’: eleven countries, including Cyprus, were characterized as candidates and Turkey was not.” The Luxembourg Summit decisions triggered the rise of “anchor-credibility dilemma” as the leading psychology of Turkish policy makers.

In the post-Cold War context, debates on whether widening or deepening the European integration process dominated the agenda. Discuss how this might have affected Turkish-EU relations.

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The 1999 Helsinki European Council: Another Turning point in Turkish-EU Relations

The Cardiff, Vienna, and Cologne European Councils, which were held in the post-Luxembourg era, were not able to improve the strained Turkish-EU relations. Although the Union continued its traditional stance on Turkey (close cooperation without full-membership perspective) in the process from the Luxembourg Summit to the Helsinki Summit, it softened its discourse on Turkey. In addition, EU officials refrained to openly intimidate Turkey. Some positive improvements included providing financial resources to implement the European strategy while “avoiding mention of sensitive political issues such as Cyprus and human rights and refraining from using the phrase ‘eligibility for membership’” (Eralp, 2000: 22). Additionally, in March 1998, the EU Commission prepared a document, called the “European Strategy for Turkey,” specifying the areas of bilateral cooperation that would help strengthen the customs union (Commission of the European Communities, 1998). In the 1999 Progress Report, published by the European Commission on Turkey’s compliance with both the EU legal framework and the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission reiterated domestic economic and political problems and drew attention to the need for comprehensive reforms. In the section on

political criteria, the Commission stressed its full support for certain positive steps taken in 1998.

However, it was also underlined that the Turkish government was to adopt a more comprehensive reform process on human rights and civil-military relations. Therefore, it is possible to argue that domestic politics in Turkey continued to pose a significant barrier in Turkey’s integration with the European Union. Meeting the political criteria constituted an important dimension of the pre-accession process since these criteria provided a benchmark for the EU to start accession negotiations with a potential candidate. Although it was underlined that Turkey could not fully meet the commitments under the political criteria, the Turkish government had achieved a great success in the issue of completing the customs union. The EU Commission recommended the EU Council that in order to support the Turkish government’s efforts and Turkey’s overall progress, it would be plausible to include Turkey in EU’s pre-accession partnership program that had been adopted for candidate countries. Under these circumstances, Turkey’s political and civilian circles boosted their lobbying activities to get a positive conclusion on Turkey’s further integration with the EU in the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

At the Helsinki European Council meeting held in December 1999, Turkey was officially declared as a candidate destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states. Turkey would also benefit from the pre-accession strategy like other candidate countries (Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999). Turkey would have access to EU pre-accession programs and institutional arrangements. Moreover, Turkey would benefit from financial aid packages to improve its technical and institutional structure. The Council urged the Commission to prepare an accession partnership document that would specify principles, objectives, priorities, and conditions for harmonizing Turkish legislation with the EU acquis.

Turkey’s prospective full EU membership was dependent on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria as well as on the issues stated in Paragraphs 4 and 9 of the Council presidency conclusions. Paragraphs 4 and 9 were on the good neighborly relations, peaceful resolution of border conflicts,

Anchor-credibility dilemma: refers to the decreasing openness and credibility of rewards or punishments by conditionality mechanisms in the accession process (Uğur, 1999). Students of Europeanization are mainly concerned with “conditionality-based” models, which suggest that the EU membership status (as being the ultimate end game of the accession process) is the anchor for reform in candidate countries’ domestic politics. To Epstein and Sedelmeier, “EU conditionality has been particularly effective when the EU offered a credible membership incentive and when incumbent governments did not consider the domestic costs of compliance threatening to their hold on power” (2008: 795). Under these circumstances success or failure of Europeanization processes are explained by the effectiveness and credibility of incentives.

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and the ongoing situation in Cyprus. With this respect, the Council urged candidate countries to support mechanisms for good neighborly relations and peaceful resolution of border conflicts and suggested that candidate countries bring their cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) before 2004. It continued with the specific situation in Cyprus by expressing the Union’s full support for the UN initiative to end the ongoing conflict in Cyprus. Council also urged all parties to contribute to this process. Moreover, the Council underlined “a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors” (Helsinki European Council, 1999).

Turkey negatively reacted to these decisions and suggestions because the Union wanted to impose new criteria on Turkey (to resolve the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus Conflict) that would create further pre-conditions for Turkey’s accession. Upon Turkey’s reaction, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen penned a letter of guarantee saying that those paragraphs causing anxiety in Turkey were not pre-conditions for Turkey’s accession and the Union would consider all relevant factors treating Turkey’s and Cyprus’s EU accession. As such, Turkey’s EU membership was linked with Turkey’s support for the UN resolution process in Cyprus and resolving the disputes with Greece.

Understanding the Ups and Downs in Turkish-EU Relations During the 1990s

After years of stagnation, the Helsinki European Council conclusions marked the beginning of golden years (1999-2005) in Turkish-EU relations. The EU leverage triggered reforms in domestic politics and it led to fundamental changes in Turkey’s discourse and attitude vis-à-vis long-run foreign policy issues. Before discussing post-Helsinki developments, it would be useful to review the EU’s changing perception toward Turkey between the Luxembourg and the Helsinki Summits.

The Changing Security EnvironmentIn the early post-Cold War era, as the threat from the Soviet bloc disappeared Turkey’s strategic importance

for the West also began to be questioned. Yet this skepticism turned out to be not well founded because of a rapid change in the post-Cold War security environment. The ethnic clashes in the Balkans in the early 1990s heralded a new security environment in which the regional security threats were becoming transnationalized (Rubin and Kirişçi, 2001). The European Union began to better appreciate the role of enhanced relations with strategic partners to manage regional security challenges. Turkey’s strategic position, which had been a crucial asset for the West during the Cold War years, became important in the light of regional developments. The position of Turkey as a bridge between the East and the West as well as Turkey’s impact on regional politics would contribute to the CFSP (Diez, 2005). In addition to this, stability in the EU area was dependent on the stability of neighboring countries. Turkey, as being a pivotal regional country, which had been struggling with terror in a conflict driven regional security environment, was a crucial security partner that was not to be isolated. From this perspective, Turkey as being a politically and economically fragile country in Europe might pose a potential threat to the regional security. Therefore, an EU membership perspective for Turkey would contribute to the democratic transition of Turkey as well as consolidate its stability.

For the 1999 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, visit www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm

internet

Figure 5.2 Paavo Lipponen, former prime minister of

Finland.

Source: en.wikipedia.org

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While conflicts were becoming internationalized, international security organizations such as the UN were operationally unsuccessful. The debates on the role of international organizations in maintaining peace and security opened a room of maneuver for the NATO alliance. While the post-Cold War status of NATO was being questioned, the Atlantic Alliance’s intervention in the Kosovo War in 1999 revitalized NATO’s and America’s role in international security. This development occurred when the EU was planning to consolidate its self-defense capacity under the European security and defense identity. Yet the complexity of the post-Cold War security environment and the transnationalization of security threats forced the EU to support the European pillar of the NATO alliance rather than establishing an independent security community. In this sense, Turkey, as being a powerful member of NATO, had the operational and legislative power in shaping NATO Council decisions. Throughout the discussions on Turkey’s compliance with the CFSP, Ankara had reiterated that the CFSP could only be actualized if Turkey were allowed to take a part in the decision-making processes of an expanded WEU. In the light of these developments, Turkey’s place in the defense of Europe as well as its changing role in the CFSP framework, which the EU aimed to consolidate in cooperation with NATO, became manifest in the late 1990s.

Turkish-Greek Relations Greece became a full member of the EC in

1981. This added a new dimension to the EC’s attitude toward Turkey’s membership. The use of veto power by Greece over the issues related to Turkey became an important game changer. In the 1980s, the Greek governments adopted a strategy of internationalizing its disputes with Turkey such as the Cyprus conflict and the disputes in the Mediterranean and the Aegean to promote its national interests (Tsakonas, 2010). According to Greek political elites, the EU membership was an important platform to mitigate regional conflicts in its neighborhood, balance Turkey’s power as well as enforce Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to make concessions toward a settlement in Cyprus. Unanimity principle in the voting procedure strengthened Greece’s hand with a veto power over Turkey’s further attempts for EU accession.

It is essential to touch upon the impact of strained bilateral relations in the aftermath of the Kardak (Imia) crisis in the Aegean on the decision of Greece to veto Turkey’s EU candidacy in the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Both countries’ claim to sovereignty over a rocky islet called Kardak/Imia brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war. For the Greek decision makers, Imia crisis proved that neither NATO nor the EU would be a security provider or could play an active role in a crisis between Turkey and Greece. Following the Kardak crisis, Greece vetoed Turkey’s EU candidacy in the Luxembourg European Council, along with Luxembourg and Germany.

Figure 5.3 The Kardak islet.

Source: tr.wikipedia.org

However, the Kardak crisis also triggered a significant change in Greece’s attitude toward Turkey. For the Simitis government, adopting a realist policy against its threat perception vis-à-vis Turkey was getting costlier for Greece. Considering the added value of the emerging security identity of the EU in the post-Maastricht era, the Greek foreign policy elites now noticed that isolating Turkey from the international community would not be sustainable in the long run due to its increasing political cost. Therefore, “the stance vis-à-vis Turkey’s oft-declared European option had been to move away gradually from a strategy of conditional sanctions and towards one of conditional

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rewards” (Couloumbis, 2003: 36). In this sense, the consent of Greece to any positive contribution regarding Turkey’s road toward the EU membership became conditional on Turkey’s compromise over bilateral relations and the Cyprus question. In the late 1990s, then, Greek policy makers adopted a brand new political strategy and attached country’s national preferences with regard to the disputes with Turkey to the EU political conditionality.

However, the tragic earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey in 1999 facilitated a rapprochement between the two countries. Under the disaster diplomacy triggered by the tragic events, a new climate of cooperation and dialogue emerged and both Turkish and Greek officials visited each other after many years of stalemate. By acknowledging that Europeanization of Turkey through a positive conditionality mechanism would contribute to security in this conflict-driven region, Greece, who resisted Turkey’s candidacy in 1997 Luxembourg European Council, became the doorkeeper for Turkey’s EU membership process since the 1999 Helsinki European Council.

The Cyprus Issue The ever-increasing integration between the

so-called Republic of Cyprus and the EU in the late 1990s became a source of tension between Turkish foreign policy makers and their European counterparts. Although in the early 1990s, the EU adopted an even-handed approach toward the Cyprus issue in order to preserve the balance between Turkey and Cyprus, with Greece’s strategy to link Turkey’s EU accession process to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, the EU’s involvement in the conflict damaged its credibility as a non-belligerent actor and an objective broker. The Greek Cypriot government during the Presidency of Vassiliou applied for the full EC membership in July 1990. The EC hesitated to take a quick decision due to the fact that the Union’s priority was the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty (the European deepening process) and the northern enlargement. Additionally, the de facto division of the island was a serious concern for the EC (European Commission, 30 June 1993). However, in this phase of the EC involvement in the Cyprus issue, the EC kept its “disinterested third-party position” (Eralp and Beriker, 2005:

181). The EC endeavored to avoid any direct involvement in the conflict and emphasized the linkage between a peaceful settlement of the dispute and the membership of Cyprus in the EC. The same approach of the EC applied equally to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community. However, starting from the mid-1990s, the balance in the EU’s relations with Turkey and Cyprus began to be tilted toward Cyprus. The issue of Cypriot accession was treated in a way to satisfy the interests of the EU and the EU members. Greece’s successful strategy to Europeanize the Cyprus issue and its disputes with Turkey went hand in hand with the EU’s foreign policy and security interests, which were largely associated with the EU’s northern and eastern enlargement.

Figure 5.4 The UN buffer zone, Lefkoşa/Cyprus.

At this juncture, the strategic decision of Greece to lift its veto over the establishment of a customs union with Turkey tremendously affected the process. This policy change was a product of Greece’s bargaining strategy. In return of the EU accession of Cyprus, Greece agreed not to block establishing a customs union with Turkey. Greece also threatened the EU to block the Union’s eastern enlargement if the EU had not given guarantees on the EU accession of Cyprus. “In this period, the EU increasingly began to resort to the strategy of linking together progress on Cyprus’s and Turkey’s relations with the Community. Greece lifted its veto in March 1995 only after the EU offered Greece the side-payment of pledging to start membership negotiations with Cyprus” (Rumelili, 2008: 103). Following Greece’s bargaining strategy, in the 1994 Corfu and Essen European Council meetings, the EU gave the first signals that EU would set

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up cordial relations with Cyprus. Following the completion of the customs union with Turkey, in the final declaration of the Madrid European Council, it was announced that negotiations would start with Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

From the early stages of the EU integration process of Cyprus, Turkey did not recognize the EC/EU as the suitable international platform where the Cyprus conflict could be discussed. According to the Turkish thesis, there were two equal political communities living on the island and “the authorities of one party could not represent the other.” Following the Greek Cypriot Administration’s EU membership application in 1990, Turkey declared the application as “illegal.” Because the application violated the 1960 Constitution, which acknowledged the political equality of the two communities (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990). Turkey’s insistence on persuading the EU for simultaneous EU membership of Cyprus and Turkey constituted the second pillar of Turkey’s official policy toward Cyprus’s EU accession process. In line with this policy, Turkey asserted a legal framework based on the 1960 Treaties.

In June 1997, Tansu Çiller, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, wrote a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain. In her letter, Çiller underlined that, according to the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus could never be an EU member since the Treaty prohibited the membership of Cyprus in any international organization unless both Greece and Turkey were already members of the same organization. Turkey’s emphasis on the Treaty of Guarantee is crucial because it reiterated that Turkey would never be supporting any settlement that might jeopardize its guarantorship rights attained by the 1960 arrangements, which have ensured that the interests of Greece and Turkey be carefully balanced (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). This approach was also based on the idea that the 1960 arrangements targeted at not only preserving the balance between Turkish and Greek Cypriots but also preserving the regional-international balance between Turkey and Greece. According to this approach, even if a just and lasting peace were reached in Cyprus without Turkey’s EU membership, Cyprus could never be a part of the EU family of nations, as provisioned by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

Since 1994, the EU’s approach toward the Cyprus conflict has turned out to be rather pro-Greek. The official declaration of the so-called Cyprus Republic as an EU candidate state (although there was not any sign of a peaceful solution to the conflict and the EU’s non-recognition of Turkey as a candidate state) resulted in the breakdown of Turkish-EU relations. After the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, Turkey adopted a new strategy, which was reactive and somewhat coercive. This new strategy was structured on the idea that any attempt of the Greek Cypriots to unite with the EU would be reciprocated with further political integration between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As part of this strategy, a joint declaration was made by Süleyman Demirel and Rauf Denktaş, the presidents of Turkey and the TRNC, respectively. In the declaration they pointed out that each step the Greek Cypriot administration might take on the road to EU membership would accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). Therefore, the increasing involvement of the EU in the Cyprus question and the changing regional and domestic security environment of Turkey added a new dimension to the Turkish policy makers’ assessment of Turkey-EU relations.

Figure 5.5 Süleyman Demirel and Rauf Denktaş.

Source: www.aa.com.tr

European PoliticsThe mid-1990s witnessed governmental shifts

in the core EU members. In assessing Turkish-EU relations in the late 1990s, one needs to

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take into account the electoral success of social democratic political parties in the EU members such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Notably in Germany, the electoral success of the Social Democrats-Green Party coalition resulted in a significant change in the discourse of the German government toward the third countries. The political vision of a multi-ethnic and multicultural Europe, supported by the social democratic circles, became dominant in an era when the debates on European identity and Turkey’s Europeanness hit the headlines. As Öniş underlined “their (German Social Democrats and Greens) understanding of multicultural citizenship constituted the key element which tended to distinguish them from their Christian Democratic or conservative counterparts, whose vision was much more in the direction of an ethnically homogenous Europe, a Europe conceived of as a Christian Club, hence, a Europe with fairly definitive natural boundaries” (2000: 471). In order to differentiate their position from the conservative right-wing political parties, German Social Democrats supported the vision that Europe was the melting pot of various cultures. The German pro-Turkish groups’ support for Turkey’s inclusion in the pre-accession strategy was a component of this domestic rivalry between German political parties and elites.

POST-HELSINKI RELATIONS: A NEW PAGE IN TURKISH-EU

RELATIONSThe 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions

on Turkey’s candidacy breathed new life into Turkey’s EU aspirations. In order to manage the process of EU harmonization, the Turkey-EU Association Council meeting, held in April 2000, published an Accession Partnership Document. The document aimed to set the principles,

conditions, short-run objectives and timetables to organize and monitor Turkey’s EU harmonization process. In line with the Accession Partnership Document, the Turkish government published a National Program, which reaffirmed that the Turkish government would work on adopting the EU acquis. In fact, the Turkish government adopted a comprehensive constitutional amendment in October 2001.

The Reform Process Having a concrete membership perspective,

Ankara prompted a remarkable reform process in many issue areas. External incentives supported by the EU conditionality mechanism turned out to be effective and the Turkish government adopted EU harmonization packages regarding highly sensitive political issues, including the abolition of death penalty in times of peace, non-Muslim minorities’ religious property rights, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and normalization of civil-military relations. In addition, the introduction of the EU harmonization packages by a politically fragmented and polarized coalition government in the early 2000s illustrated that despite the sharp ideological difference among the leaders of the ruling coalition government, there was a relatively high support for the deepening of relations between Turkey and the EU. The October 2001 Constitutional amendments became a turning point both in Turkish politics and Turkey’s EU harmonization process. It expanded cultural and civil rights and brought about fundamental changes to the use of certain rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. By the amendment, capital punishment was limited to certain categories of crime, including terror activities. In the progress report published by the European Commission in 2001, the Commission acknowledged the constitutional amendment package as a positive step that contributed to Turkey’s democratization and the EU accession process (European Commission, 2001).

On November 3, 2002, a recently established political party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) won the parliamentary elections and formed a majority government. During the election campaign, party leaders declared their

Discuss why the 1999 Helsinki European Council is considered a turning point in the history of Turkish-EU relations.

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commitment to Turkey’s EU membership and the party established itself as a vibrant supporter of EU harmonization reforms that were projected as a catalyst of Turkey’s modernization and democratization. For the newly elected government, obtaining a start date for EU accession negotiations in the 2002 European Copenhagen Council was a primary foreign policy goal. Party leaders also expressed that government would welcome any positive step that would cement Turkey’s EU membership perspective. Even if Turkey were not to obtain a start date for accession negotiations in the Copenhagen European Council, the government would not make any concessions with respect to its political and economic agenda to comply with the EU standards (Milliyet, November 21, 2002). In the early days of Abdullah Gül government, one of the party leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, paid visits to the EU capitals and lobbied in an attempt to obtain an accession date prior to the 2002 Copenhagen European Council. In line with the previous government’s commitment to the reform process, between 2003 and 2006, Gül and Erdoğan governments ratified seven EU harmonization packages. These packages included the extension of political rights and civil liberties, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, freedom of press and expression, social security, civil-military relations, and State Security Courts.

Date The Legal Act

October 2001 Constitutional Amendment

February 2002 1st Harmonization Package

April 2002 2nd Harmonization Package

August 2002 3rd Harmonization Package

January 2003 4th Harmonization Package

February 2003 5th Harmonization Package

July 2003 6th Harmonization Package

August 2003 7th Harmonization Package

May 2004 Constitutional Amendment

July 2004 8th Harmonization Package

April 2006 Reform Package

Figure 5.6 EU Harmonization and Reform Packages between 2002- and 2007.

Source: Açıkmeşe and Hisarlıoğlu, 2013.

This reform process also influenced the institutional framework of the foreign policy making process. For example, the 2001 constitutional amendments were fundamental in shaping civil-military relations in Turkey, for the article on the composition and the role of the National Security Council (NSC) was amended. Accordingly, the number of civilian members in the Council increased while “the decisions taken in the Council were diminished to the level of recommendations for the government” (Keyman and Gümüşçü, 2014). The new version of the article suggested that “the NSC submits to the Council of Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that have taken and ensuring the necessary coordination with regard to the formation, establishment, and implementation of the national policy of the state” (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004: 39). In addition to these changes, the legal reforms under the “Seventh Harmonization Packages” dramatically influenced the structure of civil-military relations. With the Seventh Harmonization Package, the Secretary General of the Council shall either be a high-ranking military officer or a high-level civilian bureaucrat. However, in the original text before the 2003 amendment, the Secretary General could only be appointed from a high-ranking military personnel.

The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey’s EU Accession

Turkish policy makers in the early 2000s acknowledged that the ongoing foreign policy issues, especially the Cyprus conflict, would pose a challenge to the Turkey’s accession process. In 2001 such developments as the probability of the Cyprus’s EU access, Greece’s threat to vote the eastern enlargement without the Cyprus’s integration and strong international leverage on Turkey to reformulate its Cyprus policy pushed Ankara to reconsider its Cyprus strategy. Gradually it also became obvious that Cyprus would be an EU member state in the next round of EU enlargement. This demonstrated that Ankara’s strategy to persuade the EU to accept Turkey’s position that Turkey’s EU membership and Cyprus conflict were two different issues and Cypriot accession had to be postponed pending on a viable and just settlement bore no fruits. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership took a new step to revitalize

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direct negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question before 2004. In November 2001, the head of the TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, invited the head of the Greek Cypriot Administration Glafkos Clerides to face-to-face meetings without any preconditions (UNSC, 2003).

An agreement was reached to resume the negotiation talks starting in January 2002. The two leaders agreed on all issues that would be on the negotiation table. This meant that nothing would be agreed until everything was agreed; parties were to continue to negotiate until a comprehensive settlement was reached. However, the meetings continued until mid-February 2002 without reaching any common ground on sensitive issues including territory, sovereignty, governance, and security. On May 14, 2002, the UN Secretary General and Kofi Annan visited both sides and expressed his belief that there would be a significant progress until the end of June 2002. At this point, the UN timetable to reach a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question was attached to the delicate EU enlargement agenda and the ultimate objective of the early 2002 talks was to reach a settlement before or at the Copenhagen European Council on December 12-13, 2002.

The Turkish side’s diplomatic maneuver to balance the international pressures and EU-level developments bore fruits, and the 2002 Seville European Council supported Turkey’s prospect to start accession negotiations with the EU. Regarding the next phase of Turkey’s candidacy, the EU Council stated that “new decisions could be taken in Copenhagen in the light of developments in the situation between the Seville and the Copenhagen European Councils, on the basis of the regular report to be submitted by the Commission in October 2002” (Seville European Council, June 12-13, 2002). The Seville Council decisions thus opened the door ajar for Turkey to start accession negotiations. However, the Council also highlighted that this was not an automatic process.

With regard to the EU aspirations of Cyprus, the Council reaffirmed that if the progress in negotiations and reforms were maintained, the Union was determined to conclude the negotiations with Cyprus by the end of 2002, along with other nine candidate states. Thus, it was

once more confirmed that the so-called Republic of Cyprus would become a full member regardless of a political settlement in Cyprus. The preferred date for a settlement of the Cyprus question was announced to be the end of accession negotiations, that is, by December 2002.

Tocci, who approaches the issue in line with the EU-driven factors, evaluates Turkey’s approach to the EU’s involvement in the Cyprus conflict at the time in her 2007 study. She argues that the “Turkish establishment did not believe that the EU would accept a divided island into its fold. Many in Ankara failed to appreciate that, by 1999, the European choice was not between Turkey and Cyprus, but rather between Turkey and the fifth enlargement” (Tocci, 2007: 46). With this respect, the EU accession of Cyprus, as being a part of EU eastern enlargement policy, was inevitable in the sense that possible exclusion of Cyprus would block the whole enlargement process. Thus, the Seville European Council decisions gave a clear message to Ankara that the eastern enlargement was the short-run priority of the Union and any attempts by Turkey to block or delay this process would not help Turkey’s EU membership bid.

The Council also underlined its preferred position concerning the structure of a re-unified Cyprus state. The emphasis on “to speak with a single voice” suggested that the resolution process should provide a lasting peace that would enable

Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (The Annan Plan)

In the final version of plan, a loosely centralized federal system is prescribed to define the true character of the potential “United Cyprus Republic”. The United Cyprus Republic was described as an independent and unitary state with a federal government single international legal personality and two equal constituent states. The establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal central Republic was aimed to satisfy the need that Cyprus had to be represented by a unified legal entity in the international platforms, was introduced as a response to the EU’s determination to integrate with a unified Cyprus.

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Cyprus to act like a single political entity (read it as a federation) as it was the case for all EU member states. Besides, the EU’s strong support for the UN Secretary General’s initiative strengthened the good offices mission of Kofi Annan. Following the European Council conclusions, Annan briefed the UN Security Council on July 9, 2002 concerning the direct talks in Cyprus between the two parties. Following this briefing, the members of the UN Security Council “welcomed the support given to the talks and the Secretary General’s efforts by the heads of State and government of the EU meeting in Seville on 21-22 June (UNSC, July 9, 2002). It was clear that the EU was the most crucial party with its strong position that could offer incentives to overcome the status quo on the island.

Figure 5.7 Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General.

Source: www.yahoo.com

Having been encouraged by the UN and the

EU initiatives, Annan started a new process; he held meetings with the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots in Paris on September 6, 2002 and in New York on October 3-4, 2002. In a press statement after two-day negotiations, Annan announced that the two leaders agreed to approach the core issues pragmatically and they decided to establish bilateral technical committees with the pursuit of making recommendations on technical matters including the treaties and laws of a future common state (UN Secretary General, October 4, 2002). While the Greek Cypriot side appointed the members of the technical committees, the Turkish

side delayed in appointing its members because of Denktaş’s heart surgery in New York after the talks. On November 11, 2002, to catch up with the delicate agenda, Annan presented his plan named the “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.” The plan proposed that, with the assistance of the UN, the two leaders would sign a document confirming that they committed themselves to finalize negotiations for the “Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” (known as the Annan Plan) by February 28, 2003. After a revision process, the final version of the plan would be submitted to separate referenda on March 30, 2003. Annan stated that “this would have allowed a new state of affairs to come into being and reunited Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession to the European Union on April 16, 2003” (UNSC, April 1, 2003). Secretary General Annan prepared the final version of the Annan Plan during the negotiations held in Bürgenstock on March 31, 2004. The final version of the plan would be presented to the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, and there would be separate simultaneous referenda on April 24, 2004.

The two political developments (that is, the EU accession of both Cyprus and Turkey, and the resolution of the Cyprus conflict) continued to dominate the foreign policy agenda of the Turkish government. Under the pressure of EU-level developments, Ankara adopted “one step ahead policy” regarding the ongoing peace negotiations on Cyprus. In cooperation with the newly elected President Mehmet Ali Talat and his pro-reform government, the Turkish government declared its strong support for the approval of the final version of the Annan Plan in the referendum. As scheduled, the separate referenda took place on April 24, 2004 simultaneously. 64.9 percent of Turkish Cypriots (that is, citizens of the TRNC who were registered as electorates in the December 2003 elections) voted in favor of the Plan and expressed their will to be a part of the EU as a reunified island. However, 75.8 percent of the Greek Cypriot electorates voted against the Plan. Yet, one week after the rejection of the Annan Plan, the so-called Republic of Cyprus joined the EU along with another nine aspirant states.

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Turkey’s Compliance with the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Turkey’s compliance with the CFSP is treated under the acquis conditionality. In the progress reports under the chapter covering foreign policy, the Commission defines this form of conditionality as the “candidate country’s alignment with decisions, resolutions and declarations of EU contributions with common actions and positions.” In the post-Helsinki era, Turkey increasingly aligned itself with the EU’s common policies. Turkey’s opposition to the war in Iraq can be considered as the manifestation of this “Europeanization” of foreign policy. Despite the American pressures and diplomatic maneuvers, the Turkish Grand National Assembly did not approve the “March 1 motion.” if the motion were accepted it would have allowed the US troops to use the Turkish territory to open a northern front in the Iraqi war. In the 2003 Progress Report, the EU Commission acknowledged that Turkey’s diplomatic efforts had contributed to a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi crisis. Especially Turkey’s call on multilateralism and diplomacy by way of organizing meetings with Iraq’s neighbors was appreciated by the Union (European Commission, 2003).

In the same vein, the Commission welcomed Turkey’s alignment itself with the Union’s diplomatic endeavors to push Iranian government to conclude and implement the international regimes on non-proliferation and disarmament. Turkey’s support for multilateralism and diplomacy in many regional crises including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the reconstruction of Afghanistan were also regarded as positive steps toward Turkey’s alignment with the CFSP (European Commission, 2004). Besides, the EU’s leverage over Turkey’s EU accession played a significant role in Turkey’s alignment with the position of the EU with respect to many foreign policy issues and regional developments. The emphasis of Turkish foreign policy makers on multilateralism, diplomacy, trade, and other soft-power mechanisms coupled with mediation efforts were treated by the EU as a sign of Turkey’s alignment with European multilateralism. In the post-Helsinki era, at the cost of worsening strategic partnership with the United States, Turkey followed “a balanced hands-off approach” (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007: 274).

Apart from these, regarding Turkey’s position toward the EU, the most dramatic change took place in the area of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In 2003, Turkey began to contribute to the EU-led military operations under the ESDP. The EU members and NATO members by signing the Berlin Plus Agreement in early 2003 had proposed close cooperation and dialogue between the EU and NATO in international crises. The EU now might use NATO’s military assets toward managing international crises. Accordingly, Turkey lifted its veto regarding the use of the NATO assets by the EU and started actively contributing to the development of the ESDP and ESDP crisis operations in the Balkans.

ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL

PROTOCOL CRISISIn December 2002, the European Copenhagen

Council declared that the so-called Republic of Cyprus had concluded accession negotiations with the EU together with other nine candidate countries and it would become an EU member state on May 1, 2004. This meant that the solution of the Cyprus conflict was not a precondition any longer for Cyprus to become a full EU member (Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002). Regarding Turkey’s progress toward

The Berlin Plus Agreement refers to a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in early 2003 between the EU and the NATO allowing the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (www.eufp.edu).

Given the Europeanization process, discuss the fundamental reforms that triggered the civilianization of Turkish politics Europeanization.

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the EU membership, the Council welcomed the determination of the Turkish government to take further steps to meet the Copenhagen criteria. However, rather than offering an early date for the start of accession negotiations, the Council stated “if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” (Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002). As such, Turkey did not get a date for the start of accession negotiations with the EU. Despite its diplomatic contacts and lobbying, even the second best option for Ankara (to get a date for the date to start accession negotiations) did not get realized.

However, in October 2004 the European Commission published its regular report on Turkey’s progress toward the EU membership and its advisory opinion on the initiation of the accession negotiations with Turkey. Concerning the start of accession negotiations with Turkey, the Commission declared that “in view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings into force the outstanding legislation, the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened” (European Commission, 2004). The Commission also urged Turkey to sign the draft protocol. According to the protocol, Turkey was to extend the Customs Union to the EU’s 25 member states, including the so-called Republic of Cyprus.

At this juncture, the historic European Council Summit of December 16-17, 2004, convened in Brussels. Based on the Commission’s recommendation, the European Council stated that:

Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations provided that it brings into force these specific pieces of legislation. It invited the Commission to present to the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations with Turkey, on the basis set out in paragraph 23. It requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005 (Brussels European Council, December 16-17, 2004).

Figure 5.8 The European Parliament says “Yes” to Turkey.

Source: www.ab.gov.tr

Despite its positive assessment, the Council raised two conditions that were essential to start the negotiation process. First, Turkey was to adopt six additional pieces of legislation. Second, the Council reiterated the essentiality of the signing and implementation of the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Treaty, extending Turkey’s Customs Union to all EU member states before setting a date to open the accession negotiations. For the Greek Cypriots and the opponents of Turkey’s membership, the EU institutions might not permit the accession of a candidate country that did not diplomatically recognize an EU member state and fulfill its obligations based on the EU acquis. The precondition of signing the Additional Protocol created a diplomatic crisis between the Turkish mission in Brussels and European leaders. However, with the efforts of pro-Turkish political leaders, especially of Tony Blair and Silvio Berlusconi, the European Council softened its demands on the Additional Protocol and allowed time for Turkey to sign the protocol and accepted Turkey’s verbal assurance as sufficient (Müftüler-Baç, 2008).

In the meantime, based on Turkey’s insistence, the Dutch Prime Minister made a declaration emphasizing that Turkey’s signature on the Additional Protocol would not mean the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus. On the other hand, Ankara had to make a compromise to secure its EU integration process. Therefore, on behalf of the Turkish government Erdoğan declared “the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of accession

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negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalizing the adaptations which are necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union” (Brussels European Council, December 16-17, 2004). Regardless of the debates on the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus, Turkey’s declaration affirmed that Turkey accepted the condition of signing the Additional protocol before October 3, 2005 by acknowledging that this condition was based on the acquis conditionality.

Figure 5.9 Enlargement of the European Union.

Source: www.ec.europa.eu

The Council’s call for Turkey to sign the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement, which extended Turkey’s Custom Union to 25 EU member states, was a reaction against the decree published in the Official Gazette in May 2004. It acknowledged that Turkey extended its Custom Union with the new EU member states excluding Cyprus. On October 2, 2004, Turkish President Necdet Sezer signed an additional decree that extended the Turkey’s Customs Union to all EU member states including Cyprus in order to eliminate any crisis that might risk obtaining a date for accession negotiations. Simultaneously, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration saying this decision “is an administrative act emanating from our relations with the EU as well as reciprocal legal obligations under the Customs Union. The amendment of our internal legislation as such does not imply in any way the recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration by Turkey” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 October 2004). Turkey also reiterated its commitment to its special

relationship with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as well as its obligations emanating from this special relationship. Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül finalized the debates on Turkey’s recognition of Cyprus by stating that Turkey would not recognize Cyprus without guaranteeing a permanent and just peace on the island (Cumhuriyet, 3 December 2004).

As it was agreed at the Brussels Summit, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol on July 29, 2005, and extended the Ankara Treaty to all EU member states including Cyprus. On the other hand, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration stating that Turkey would continue to acknowledge “the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 29, 2005). Ankara also reiterated that Turkey’s signature did not refer to the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus; the signature would not mean Turkey’s abandonment of its rights and obligations emanating from the 1960 Treaties (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 29, 2005). With this declaration, Ankara made a differentiation between the two Greek Cypriot demands: the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the Additional Protocol. As such, for the Turkish government, acknowledging the principle of “reciprocity,” which means the simultaneous lifting of all restrictions, could not be considered as the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus.

Upon Turkey’s declaration, the EU issued a counter declaration stating that “The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol” (European Commission, September 21, 2005). In the meantime, the EU reiterated that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depended on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations and the failure to fulfill its obligations in full was to affect the overall negotiation process. Another critical statement of the EU was about the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus. The EU stressed that members of the

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EU recognized only “the Cyprus Republic as a subject of international law.” The Union also underlined that the recognition of Cyprus and the normalization of Turkey’s relations with all member states was a component of the accession process. Upon the EU’s counter-declaration, the spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Namık Tan, made a press statement expressing Turkey’s disappointment in that the EU’s emphasis on the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus was political in nature and it might undermine the UN settlement process on Cyprus. Namık Tan’s statement also reiterated Ankara’s position: the first and foremost step of all relevant parties was to be simultaneous lifting of all restrictions on the Northern Cyprus (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

In the shadow of these debates, on October 3, 2005, the European Council published and announced the Negotiation Framework Document for Turkey. In the Framework Document, the EU pointed out that the advancement of negotiations with Turkey was dependent on the following points: Turkey’s further reform performance toward fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria; the obligations of the acquis; the ratification and the complete implementation of the Additional Protocol; Turkey’s progress on the resolution of the Cyrus conflict; and the normalization of its relations with its neighbors and with all EU member states (Council of the European Union, 2005). The Framework Document further stated that “in accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Union’s capacity to absorb Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and Turkey.” Thus, the EU emphasized that in order to sustain and promote European integration after the Eastern enlargement, the Council would consider and make required assessments on the capacity of the Union’s absorption. This assessment on Turkey’s potential accession made it clear that the Union now was suffering from enlargement fatigue. Yet this approach of the EU was criticized by Turkish policy makers. For Turkish policy makers, the EU’s statement (that even if Turkey fulfilled all the requirements for the accession the Commission’s assessment on the Union’s absorption capacity

would determine the final outcome of the process) was another form of discrimination against Turkey. On the eve of a new era in Turkish-EU relations, it was obvious that Turkey’s accession process would suffer due to the unresolved problems dominating the Turkish foreign policy agenda and the EU-driven factors in the post-2004 enlargement era.

A Problematic Accession: Understanding the Deadlock in the Post-2005 Era

The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey did not end the debates on the Additional Protocol. George Lillikas, the spokesperson of the Greek Cypriot government, said that “if Turkey continues not to implement the European acquis communautaire, its path towards the European Union will end” (Cyprus Mail, 18 February 2006). In the meanwhile, during his visit to Turkey, the French Foreign Minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, urged Turkey to recognize the so-called Republic of Cyprus and implement the Additional Protocol if Turkey was determined not to weaken its membership prospect (Cyprus Bulletin, February 2006). Moreover, the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee published the first draft of its report urging the Turkish government to recognize the so-called Republic of Cyprus and to implement the Additional Protocol.

The report of the Foreign Affairs Committee was harshly criticized by both the Turkish government and the Turkish opposition parties. However, Germany’s reactions against Turkey’s policy toward Cyprus were in line with the declarations made by the French Foreign Minister and the European Parliament. In October 2006, the newly-elected German chancellor, Angela Merkel communicated with Turkey that the complete implementation of the Additional Protocol was standing as a pre-condition and “this issue must be resolved for the continuation of (membership) talks” (Deutsche Welle, October 5, 2006). Upon Merkel’s call for opening seaports and airports to the so-called Republic of Cyprus, Erdoğan replied that Turkey would not open its seaports and airports to the Southern Cypriot use if the policy of isolating the TRNC from the international community did not come to an end. On November 8, 2006, in its Progress Report underlining the slowdown

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in the EU harmonization process, the Union urged Turkey to take necessary steps for the implementation of the Additional Protocol. The Commission reiterated that implementing the Additional Protocol was a legal obligation and an acquis conditionality and there existed no connection between the EU’s observance of its commitments with respect to the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey’s fulfillment of its responsibilities (European Commission, 2006).

The Commission report on Turkey’s progress was also criticized by the Turkish government. Abdullah Gül declared that Turkey’s position regarding the implementation of the Additional Protocol would not change and that the recognition of Cyprus could not be a precondition for Turkey’s EU integration. At this point, it is essential to underline that in the post-2005 era the approach of the JDP government to the Cyprus issue in the context of Turkey’s EU membership was mainly driven by the assessment that the implementation of the Additional Protocol would be conditional to the simultaneous lifting of all restriction on both Cypriot communities.

In November 2006, the Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn made a speech on Turkey’s accession to the EU and presented the Commission’s opinion. He said that despite the Presidency’s constructive efforts, Turkey did not change its position on the Addition Protocol (Rehn, 2006). On November 29, on behalf the Commission, Rehn presented his recommendation to the Council regarding Turkey’s accession. The recommendation stated that:

The Intergovernmental Conference on Accession with Turkey should not open negotiations on chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey’s restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments. These chapters are: Chapter 1 free movement of goods, Chapter 3 Right of establishment and freedom to provide services, Chapter 9 Financial services, Chapter 11 agriculture and rural development, Chapter 13 fisheries, Chapter 14 transport policy, Chapter 29 customs union, and Chapter 30 external relations (European Commission, 2006).

The Commission’s recommendation did not propose an official freezing of Turkey’s accession process. Because the EU was aware that the exclusion of Turkey would have political consequences for the EU-Turkey strategic partnership. In the press release, Olli Rehn underlined that “in the light of the strategic importance of EU-Turkey relations today we confirm that these negotiations continue, although with a slower pace” (Rehn, November 27, 2006). Based on the Commission’s recommendation, on December 11, 2006, the European General Affairs and External Relations Council decided to suspend negotiations on eight chapters concerning Turkey’s relations with Cyprus. The Council stated that until Turkey fulfill its commitments under the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement, the EU would not open new chapters. In addition, the European General External Relations Council stated that the Council’s conclusion on the suspension of eight chapters would be revised until the end of 2009 based on Commission’s future recommendations and Turkey’s progress in fulfilling its responsibilities emanating from the Additional Protocol (European General External Relations Council, December 11, 2006).

In the post-2006 era, the Cyprus conflict had repercussions on Turkey’s EU accession negotiation process. Although the suspension of negotiation in eight chapters did not seriously damage Turkish-EU relations, it further strained bilateral relations because of the effect of the Cyprus conflict on the Turkey’s accession process. While the deadline by which Turkey had to implement the Additional Protocol was approaching, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership increased their pressure and urged the UN Secretary-General to increase his leverage on the Greek Cypriots to speed up the process of inter-communal negotiations on the island. At this juncture, Turkey gained a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2008-2010. This raised the expectations that Turkey through its UN Security Council membership would have an opportunity to inflict more pressure on the Greek Cypriots and that the balance might change in favor of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. However, Turkey’s UN Security Council membership was not that effective in mobilizing the UN to end the isolation of the TRNC.

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Moreover, Turkey’s EU membership became a matter of domestic politics in many EU capitals. The decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey turned into a domestic political issue for many EU member states. Under the increasing domestic pressure, the French President, Jacques Chirac, who was considered as a pro-Turkish political figure, on October 2004 announced that he would ask the French people regarding the final

decision of France on Turkey’s EU membership. As such, Turkey’s EU membership was not an automatic process, in case of any setback in Turkey’s reform process Paris would exercise its veto over Turkey’s accession. Austria also had raised concerns on Turkey’s further integration with the EU and it proposed a “privileged partnership” with Turkey instead of a full membership perspective. On October 11, 2004, the EU foreign ministers meeting with the Austrian foreign minister called for the EU to “honestly discuss the problems [with Turkey’s application] that are still open”(Financial Times, October 12, 2004).

The German chancellor Gerhard Schröder was under the same pressure of German groups who opposed Turkey’s EU accession. The chairperson of the Christian Democrat Union Party, Angela

Figure 5.10 Situation in Accession Negotiations.

Source: https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/birimler/kpb/katilim_muzakerelerinde_mevcut_durum_karti-_08072019-_en.pdf

For further information on the current status of Turkey in the accession process, visit: https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/current-status-742

internet

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Merkel, followed a conservative campaign against Turkey’s EU accession by supporting the “privileged membership” status for Turkey. The ultimate motivation behind this discourse for many EU member states was the negative attitude of the EU electorate toward further enlargement. In the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda on the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty, the negative results of the referenda were interpreted as the European electorates’ open rejection of the EU enlargement in general and the integration with Turkey in particular (Eurobarometer, 2005). Moreover, the election victory of conservative politicians in both Germany and France in the post 2004 enlargement era was also associated with the raising anti-enlargement feelings in the European public opinion. According to the survey conducted by the Eurobarometer between April and May 2007, immediately after the French Presidential elections in which conservative candidate Nicolas Sarkozy who followed a campaign against Turkey’s EU membership and against further enlargement of the Union, a significant majority (68 %) of French people rejected further enlargement of Union (Eurobarometer, 2007).

Turkey’s success in taking steps toward promoting fundamental rights and freedoms, reforming its judicial and economic systems as well as finding a peaceful solution on Cyprus did not convince those European leaders who opposed Turkey’s EU membership. For the anti-

Turkish European circles, Turkey’s population rate, economic and political level of development, level of Europeanness,” religious and cultural orientation as well as its geographical distance to Europe were main sources of anxiety. On the other hand, for pro-Turkish circles in the EU, Turkey was an indispensable strategic partner, a crucial regional power and an increasing economic actor whose membership would enrich the cultural diversity in the EU and provide the member states with a great opportunity to reach to the Islamic world. For the proponents of Turkey, opening the accession negotiations was a matter of reputation that would consolidate the credibility of the Union for further enlargement prospects. Yet, in the post-2005 era, the civil wars in Turkey’s close neighborhood posed a threat to Turkey’s EU accession process. The civil wars in Iraq and Syria and the destabilizing impacts of the Arab uprisings revived the long-lasting debates on stability at the borders of Europe.

Another aspect that had a critical impact on the Turkish governments’ approach to the EU is the diminishing public support for EU membership. The Euro-skepticism prevalent among the public is a reflection of the discontent of the Turkish people with respect to the EU’s dubious commitments for Turkey’s EU membership and, especially in post-2004 era, the Union’s non-fulfilment of its commitments to the Turkish Cypriot community (Hale, 2013). Under these circumstances, as skepticism became prevalent among the public, Turkish government tried to refrain from facing serious political costs in its EU harmonization process.

The Eurobarometer program was launched in the early 1970s as a bi-annual public opinion survey (“repeated cross-section”) in all member states of the European Union on behalf of the European Commission. During the 1990s the program expanded considerably in topics, frequency, and instruments. Special topical modules enlarged the classic Standard Eurobarometer, establishing (multi-)topical add-on surveys under each wave (www.gesis.org).

Regarding Turkish-EU relations, discuss the alternative scenarios designed by some European circles to the full membership prospect.

4


137

Sum

mary

LO 1Identify the core debates regarding the European Integration process in the post-Cold War context.

The Union’s long-run strategy vis-à-vis Turkey’s status began to be structured in the post-Cold War context in the light of debates about the future of the European project. The Community’s strategy toward Turkey followed a continuous pattern: partial and conditional concessions, but without making any further commitment for full membership to avoid any estrangement in strategic relations. It included a close cooperation on the basis of economic relations by not offering a clear membership perspective due to alleged deep political and economic disparities between the member countries and Turkey. However, Turkish policy makers reiterated that the only acceptable approach for Turkey was the EU’s offering a full membership status. The debates on the future of the European project dominated the Union’s enlargement strategy during this era. In order to secure the success of the European project, the Union adopted a comprehensive enlargement strategy in which the accession process was dependent on the candidate countries’ performance to adopt the accession criteria and the EU acquis.

LO 2Explain the ups and downs in Turkish-EU relations between the 1997 Luxembourg Summit and the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

After being excluded from the enlargement process at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. The 1999 decisions constituted a significant turning point for Turkey’s EU membership prospect. There were a few factors that triggered a change in EU’s attitude regarding Turkey’s status in the late 1990s. The Union began to have a better appreciation of the role of enhanced relations with strategic partners toward managing possible impacts of the regional security challenges. In addition, stability in Europe was dependent on the stability of the neighboring countries. Turkey, as being a pivotal regional country that had been struggling against terror activities in a conflict-driven security environment, was a crucial security partner that was not to be isolated. The mid-1990s witnessed government changes in the core EU member states. The mid-1990s witnessed governmental shifts in the core EU members. In assessing Turkish-EU relations in the late 1990s, one needs to take into account the electoral success of social democratic political parties in the EU members such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Notably in Germany, the electoral success of the Social Democrats-Green Party coalition resulted in a significant change in the discourse of the German government toward the third countries. The political vision of a multiethnic and multicultural Europe, supported by the social democratic circles, became dominant in an era when the debates on European identity and Turkey’s Europeanness hit the headlines.


138

Sum

mar

y

LO 4Recognize the reasons behind the deadlock in Turkey’s accession process after the start of the accession negotiations.

The start of the accession negotiations in October 2005 opened a new page in Turkey’s EU membership process. In the post-2005 era, due to the disagreement between the EU and Turkey on the implementation of the Additional Protocol and the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus, increasing doubts about Turkey’s accession process began to be expressed by the EU. Moreover, the case of Turkey’s EU membership became a matter of domestic politics in many EU member states. Turkey’s success in taking steps toward promoting fundamental rights and freedoms, reforming its judicial and economic systems as well as finding a peaceful solution on Cyprus did not convince those European leaders who opposed Turkey’s EU membership. The Chairperson of the German Christian Democrat Union Party Angela Merkel and the French President Nikolas Sarkozy offered Turkey “a privileged membership.” Another aspect that had a critical impact on the Turkish governments’ approach to the EU is the diminishing public support for EU membership. The Euro-skepticism prevalent among the public is a reflection of the discontent of the Turkish people with respect to the EU’s dubious commitments for Turkey’s EU membership and, especially in post-2004 era, the Union’s non-fulfilment of its commitments to the Turkish Cypriot community. Under these circumstances, as skepticism became prevalent among the public, Turkish government tried to refrain from facing serious political costs in its EU harmonization process

LO 3 Discuss the reform process in Turkey between 1999 and 2004.

The EU’s leverage over Turkey’s EU accession played a significant role in Turkey’s alignment with the position of the EU with respect to many foreign policy issues and regional developments. The emphasis of Turkish foreign policy makers on multilateralism, diplomacy, trade, and other soft-power mechanisms coupled with mediation efforts were treated by the EU as a sign of Turkey’s alignment with European multilateralism. In the post-Helsinki era, at the cost of worsening strategic partnership with the United States, Turkey followed “a balanced hands-off approach”. Furthermore, the asymmetries in Turkey’s and Cyprus’s accession process created the possibility that Turkey’s long-run EU accession process might have been blocked or interrupted due to the Greek Cypriots’ veto power. Having calculated the high cost of continuing Turkey’s long-run Cyprus strategy (objecting to any linkage between Turkey’s EU membership and the solution of the Cyprus conflict), the Turkish government adopted a “one-step-a head” policy. With this respect, the JDP’s Cyprus policy was structured within the political context of Turkey’s EU membership prospect.


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Test Yourself

1 In response to Turkey’s EEC membership application in 1987, European Commission stated that ---


a. Turkey was a consolidated democracy eligible for membership.

b. Turkey completed its transition to a market economy and therefore it was eligible for full membership.

c. The ongoing situation in Cyprus would not challenge Turkey’s integration with Community.

d. Due to the economic and democratic disparities between Turkey and the EC member states, Turkey was not eligible for membership.

e. Turkey would rather accept the privileged partnership offer.

2 More than half a century elapsed from the signing of the Ankara Treaty, however the debates on the ---


a. visa liberation and free movement of workers continue.

b. free movement of goods continue.c. tariff barriers continue.d. reduction of duties continue. e. efforts to establish a customs union continue.

3 Since the early 1990s, the European Union attached conditions to regulate its negotiations with the aspiring member states. These conditions are known as the ---


a. Helsinki criteriab. Luxembourg criteriac. Copenhagen criteriad. Brussels criteriae. Seville criteria

4 At which of the following EU Council meeting, was Turkey officially declared an EU candidate destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states?

a. 1993 Copenhagen Summit b. 1997 Luxembourg European Councilc. 1999 Helsinki European Councild. 2003 Seville European Councile. 2005 Brussels European Council

5 Which of the following is false about the reason of a change in the EU’s approach to Turkey’s status in the mid-1990s?

a. Changes in the regional security environmentb. The Turkish-Greek rapprochementc. Political changes in EU member states d. Social democratic parties’ coming to power in

Europee. The referenda in the Netherlands and France

6 Based on the Commission’s recommendation, on December 11, 2006, the European General Affairs and External Relations Council decided to ---


a. suspend negotiations on eight chapters relevant to pending issues with Cyprus.

b. suspend Turkey’s EU accession process.c. offer a privileged partnership status to Turkey. d. open all chapters of the accession negotiations. e. offer an associate membership to Turkey in the

WEU.

7 Which of the following concepts explains the decreasing openness and credibility of rewards or punishments by the conditionality mechanisms in the EU accession process?

a. Accession negotiationsb. EU conditionalityc. Anchor-credibility dilemmad. Political conditionality e. Fundamental rights


140

Test

You

rsel

f

8 The EU legal framework, consisted of 35 chapters on various policy issues from fishery to justice and home affairs, is known as the ---


a. acquis communautaireb. Copenhagen criteriac. acquis conditionalityd. accession criteria e. absorption capacity

9 In November 2006, which of the following EU representatives made a speech on Turkey’s accession to the EU and presented the Commission’s opinion?

a. Paavo Lipponenb. Gerhard Schröder c. Angela Merkel d. Olli Rehne. Abel Matutes

10 In addition to the fulfilment of the political criteria, the 1999 European Helsinki Council urged Turkey for ---


a. contributing to good neighborly relations and resolving its disputes with Greece.

b. contributing to the European CFSP.c. revising its counter-terrorism law.d. extending the additional protocol. e. increasing the number of members in the NSC.


141

Answ

er Key for Test Yourself

Suggested A

nswers to “Your Turn”

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish-EU Relations in the Post-Cold War Context” section.

1. D If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Accession Negotiations and the Additional Protocol Crisis” section.

6. A


3. C If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Accession Negotiations and the Additional Protocol Crisis” section.

8. A


2. A If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Turkish-EU Relations in the Post-Cold War Context” section.

7. C

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “From the Luxembourg Summit to the Helsinki Summit” section.

4. C


5. E

If your answer is incorrect, please review the “Accession Negotiations and Additional Protocol Crisis” section.

9. D


10. A

In the post-Cold War context, debates on whether

widening or deepening the European integration

process dominated the agenda. Discuss how this

mighthaveaffectedTurkish-EUrelations.

your turn 1

Acknowledging the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world order and the level of integration with Europe as well as the pressures for reform, the completion of a customs union with the EC was the lesser-of-two-evils option (integration without membership perspective or a privileged membership status) to maintain Turkey’s dialogue with the Community. For the Turkish government, the completion of a customs union would provide financial and technical assistance needed for the transformation of the country. This would externalize the costs of economic and political transformation. In addition, for the governments at the time, Turkey’s integration with the European markets would have positive effects on Turkish domestic politics. This was considered an important political leverage and a good strategy to get support from pro-EU groups and the representatives of the Turkish export-oriented sectors. Considering the pre-accession benefits (such as technical and financial support by the Community agencies) and its potential contributions to produce and maximize benefits in domestic politics, the Turkish governments in the early 1990s prioritized Turkey’s integration with the Common Market without losing Turkey’s full membership perspective.


142

Discuss why the 1999 Helsinki European

Council is considered a turning point in the

history of Turkish-EU relations.

your turn 2

At the Helsinki European Council meeting, held in December 1999, Turkey was officially declared as a candidate country destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states. Turkey would also benefit from the pre-accession strategy like other candidate countries. Turkey would also have access to the EU pre-accession programs and institutional arrangements. Moreover, Turkey would benefit from financial aid packages to make improves in its technical and institutional structures. The EU Council urged the Commission to prepare an Accession Partnership Document that would specify the principles, objectives, priorities, and conditions for harmonizing Turkish legislation with the EU acquis.

GiventheEuropeanizationprocess,discuss

the fundamental reforms that triggered the

civilianizationofTurkishpolitics.

your turn 3

The 2001 constitutional amendments were fundamental in shaping civil-military relations in Turkey. The article on the composition and the role of the National Security Council (NSC) was amended. Accordingly, the number of civilian members in the Council increased while “the decisions taken in the Council were diminished to the level of recommendations for the government”. The new version of the article suggested that “NSC submits to the Council of Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that have taken and ensuring the necessary coordination with regard to the formation, establishment and implementation of the national policy of the state.” In addition to these changes, the legal reforms under the “Seventh Harmonization Packages” dramatically influenced the structure of civil-military relations. With the Seventh Harmonization Package, the Secretary General of the Council shall either be a high-ranking military officer or a high-level civilian bureaucrat. However, in the original text before the 2003 amendment, the Secretary General could only be appointed from a high-ranking military personnel.

Regarding Turkish-EU relations, discuss the

alternativescenariosdesignedbysomeEuropean

circles to the full membership prospect.

your turn 4

The decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey also turned into a domestic political issue for many EU member states. German Chairwoman of the Christian Democrat Union Party, Angela Merkel and French President Nikolas Sarkozy offered Turkey “a privileged membership”. It is a special form of cooperation with the EU without a full member prospect. Offering a privileged partnership was employed by the Union as a strategy to manage its relations with third countries, which they thought were not eligible for a full EU membership status. With this approach, the EU aimed at strengthening bilateral economic and social ties with Turkey as a partner country rather than offering it a say in the Union’s decision-making structures and procedures.

Sug

gest

ed A

nsw

ers

to “

Your

Tur

n”


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Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (June 17, 1997) Letter By The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Republic Of Turkey To The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of United Kingdom Concerning The Greek Cypriot Application To The EU.

U.N. (2003). Press Statement by Security Council President on Cyprus, Press Release SC/7961. 18 December 2003.

Uğur, M. (1996). Customs union as a substitute for Turkey’s membership? A re‐interpretation of EU‐Turkey relations, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 10/1: 11-29.

Uğur, M. (1999). Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye- Bir Dayanak/İnandırıcılık İkilemi, Istanbul: Everest.

UN Secretary General- SG/SM/8414, October 4, 2002.

UNSC- S/2003/398, April 1, 2003.UNSC- SC/7444, July 9, 2002.Yazıcı, S. and Özbudun, E. (2004). Democratization

Reforms in Turkey (1993-2004), Istanbul: TESEV.

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Chapter 6After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

Chapter Outline

IntroductionThe Strategic Depth DoctrineBilateral Relations of Turkey under the Strategic Depth Doctrine and the Paradigm Shift DebateImplications of the Arab Spring for TFPBilateral Relations of Turkey in the Post-Arab Spring Period

Key Terms• StrategicDepth• Soft-Power• CentralCountry• Vision-Oriented• SystemicFramework• RhythmicDiplomacy• DiplomaticDiscourse• Multi-Dimensional

• Multi-Track• ZeroProblemWith

Neighbors Policy• PreciousLoneliness• TurkishModel• Paradigm/axisShift• Neo-Ottomanism• ArabSpring

LearningOutcomes

Discuss the implications of the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war for TFP

Describe the strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy (TFP)

ExaminebilateralrelationsofTurkeyunderthestrategic depth doctrine

Summarize bilateral relations of Turkey in the post-Arab Spring Period3

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INTRODUCTIONTurkish foreign policy has gone through a

major transformation during the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) rule. The AKP policy makers implemented radical foreign policy principles. However, these foreign policy principles were challenged by both domestic and international developments and eventually led to the disintegration of the strategic depth doctrine proposed by Ahmet Davutoğlu.

In this chapter, the important events and concepts in Turkish foreign policy during the period between 2017 and 2019 will be described and examined. Particular attention is given to the strategic depth doctrine and foreign policy principles as well as challenges to these principles in the international context. The Arab uprisings of 2011, particularly the Syrian civil war, became the most significant threat to both Turkish foreign policy and the strategic depth doctrine. Since the beginning of the recent regional transformation in the Middle East and the North African (MENA) region, Turkey redefined its relationship with the countries in its immediate neighborhood as well as its relations with the global powers. The chapter aims to explain the transformation of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP governments and discuss the rise and fall of the strategic depth doctrine.

THE STRATEGIC DEPTH DOCTRINE

Since 2002 there have been significant changes in Turkey’s foreign policy formation through a new set of foreign policy principles. Under the AKP leadership, Turkish foreign policy has become more proactive in regional issues. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s appointment as the Foreign Minister in May 2009 confirmed Turkey’s new proactive and assertive stance in international relations. Davutoğlu began his political career as the chief advisor of the Prime Minister, a position he held from 2002 to 2009. During these years, he was even described as the “secret foreign minister” (Şeker, 2009). When he became Foreign Minister, he was able to implement his new foreign policy vision presented in his book titled Strategic Depth (Davutoğlu, 2001). Davutoğlu is widely accepted as one of the strongest figures in the Turkish foreign policy literature and as the main architect of important policies, which

have had a global influence. He was ranked as one of the 100 global thinkers in 2010 by Foreign Policy magazine “for being the brains behind Turkey’s global reawakening” (Foreign Policy, 2011).

In his book, Davutoğlu describes a new strategic vision for a potential increased role for Turkey in the international system by reassessing Turkey’s strategic position in the context of the systemic transformation of world politics after the end of the Cold War. This new approach, strategic depth, aims to establish regional integration with Turkey’s neighboring countries which share with it a long common history. Davutoğlu puts emphasis on enhancing Turkey’s foreign policy capabilities by bringing a fresh look to its history and geography to underscore its true potential in global affairs.

Davutoğlu underlines that the strategic depth approach “calls for integration of the regions neighboring Turkey, since all people living in this wide region share the same destiny, based on their long common history. Thus, my book is a call for developing a new strategic mind-set and foresees a strong role for Turkey to play toward this end. The role that Turkey is advised to play is one of promoting security for all, enhanced political dialogue, increased economic interdependence as well as cultural harmony and mutual respect” (Papachelas, 2011: 6).

Davutoğlu’s vision of strategic depth aims to “place Turkey right at the center of many geopolitical areas of influence” by exploiting the country’s historical and geopolitical importance (Murinson, 2006: 947).

Figure 6.1 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Source: www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmetdavutoglu.tr.mfa

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In his book, Strategic Depth, Davutoğlu underlines that Turkey needed a new strategic approach at the end of the Cold War to establish good relations by adapting the changing variables of the international conjectures. Based on his statements, new policies were expected to have new diplomatic and practical policies compatible with the necessities of the dynamic international system. Davutoğlu focused on Turkey’s embedded potential in world politics. In this new vision, Turkey, as both a secular and a Muslim nation state, would be able to play a greater role in regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey’s geostrategic position connects it to all major regions in all directions: the Balkans, the MENA, the Caucasus, Europe, and Central Asia. In this way “strategic depth is all about overcoming the old animosities and deepening and widening a strategic horizon through new geopolitical imagination” (Kalın, 2011: 52). Hence, it is not an understatement to say that Davutoğlu’s vision guided Turkish foreign policy for more than a decade.

Davutoğlu puts emphasis on Turkey’s increasing regional role. In this regard, Turkey’s multiregional foreign policy aimed to transform itself into a regional and eventually a global power (Davutoğlu, 2001: 501-57). To a certain extent, Davutoğlu’s policies represent an emancipation of Turkish foreign policy from the security-oriented policies, inherited from both the Ottoman period and the early Republican era. In his book, Davutoğlu rejects Turkey’s role as a “bridge country,” which implies that Turkey simply connects the continents. He identifies Turkey’s new role as a central country. According to him (2008: 78-79), the “bridge” analogy refers to a passive role for Turkey. Instead, historical transformation of the international system and Turkey’s unique geo-political location between multiple regions makes Turkey a candidate for a central country. As the argument goes, Turkey is located in the middle of a vast region including the Middle East, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea.

Davutoğlu sets Turkey’s important foreign policy goals as part of his strategic depth doctrine. These foreign policy goals are: to become an EU member by 2023, to promote regional cooperation in security and economy related issues, to play a significant role in regional conflicts, to participate

in global platforms, to be one of the top ten largest economies, and to play a determinant role in international organizations (Davutoğlu, 2010a).

Principles of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

Davutoğlu (2001) formulated a set of foreign policy principles to exploit Turkey’s geopolitical and historical strategic depth. He underlined that its historical and geographical richness would turn Turkey into a global actor in this century. He had established the AKP’s new foreign policy principles even before he became the Foreign Minister, and his policies started to be implemented by the foreign policy makers since the early years of the AKP rule.

The following part describes three main methodological principles of the new Turkish foreign policy under the AKP leadership; vision-orientedness, systemic framework, and soft power (Yılmaz, 2009: 6). Along with these methodological principles, the following part explains five operational principles set forth by Davutoğlu:

• balance between freedom and security, • zeroproblemwithneighbors, • diplomaticdiscourse, • multidimensionalandmulti-trackpolicies, • rhythmicdiplomacy.

Methodological PrinciplesThe first methodological principle is “vision

orientedness.” At the end of the Cold War, Turkey abandoned its crisis-oriented policies. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s new vision should be based on multiculturalism through dialogue, mutual respect, stability, peace, and prosperity (Yılmaz, 2009: 6). In fact, in the 2000s, the country became a diplomatic asset through its policies in the Middle East.

The second methodological principle is to use a “systemic framework.” This principle focuses on the consistency and continuity of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP leadership along with the vision-oriented approach. Davutoğlu notes that the AKP established vision-oriented policies toward all regions by establishing good relations with both the Western countries such as the U.S and the EU countries and the Eastern countries such as Iran,

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Iraq, and Russia. In fact, Turkey’s relationship with any region is complementary to its relationships with other regions.

The third methodological principle is based on a new style of political rhetoric through the instrument of “soft power.” Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004: 5). The concept refers to the means of persuasion in international relations and a peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Davutoğlu underlines that in regional and international politics, Turkey has increasingly adopted a soft-power rather than a hard-power approach by following the EU’s footsteps (Yılmaz, 2009: 7). In this way, Turkey was accepted as a rising power in the region mainly because of its rising soft-power capability. Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, cultural diversity, democratic values, and historical ties to the surrounding region became the sources of its soft power (Papachelas, 2011: 6).

Operational Foreign Policy PrinciplesMethodological principles are the basis of

Turkey’s new vision for international platforms, and they are complemented by five new operational foreign policy principles. These assertive foreign policy principles aim to establish a new style in the Turkish foreign policy making. Davutoğlu established a new set of foreign policy principles based on the normalization of Turkish foreign policy in an attempt to change the security perceptions embedded in the national political culture (Aras and Karakaya, 2008). With these policies, Davutoğlu aimed to reintegrate Turkey into its immediate neighborhood. The AKP foreign policy makers operationalized these five foreign policy principles and put them into practice. They believed that these principles would not only serve Turkey’s national interests but also create an international environment based on cooperation and dialogue in all regions.

Balance Between Freedom and Security

The balance between freedom and security refers to the balance between citizens’ freedom and national security. Davutoğlu (2010b) underlines that since the AKP came to power, the primary

goal of the government has been to increase civil liberties without undermining national security in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since the 9/11 terror attacks, anti-terror policies have restricted individual freedoms to increase national security in global scale. Accordingly, Turkish policy makers wanted to diversify Turkey’s policies in the age of terror. They wanted to make sure that Turkish policies did not limit people’s freedom because of security-based policies. In fact, military operations toward the PKK terrorist organization in Iraq in 2007 did not create any negative impact on people’s liberties in cities such as Ankara, İstanbul, Diyarbakır, or Van (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

During the fight against terrorism, people continued their normal life without any government restrictions on civil liberties. Davutoğlu (2010b) believed that the AKP administration successfully settled the balance between democracy and security-related issues. For example, there was not any emergency case or any postponement of elections, nor was there any threat to national security. In order to strengthen national security, Turkish policy makers believed in the necessity for the normalization of Turkish foreign policy with its neighbors. Turkey’s new perception of its neighbors created new areas of cooperation. In this way, Turkey provided more freedom to its citizens without any immediate concerns about its national security.

The Policy of Zero Problem with Neighbors

This principle aimed to improve Turkey’s relations with all neighbors. According to Davutoğlu, the “zero problem with neighbors” policy has a deeper meaning than simply resolving problems or improving Turkey’s relations with all neighbors. He claims that this policy aims to create a historical transformation in Turkey’s unstable and problematic neighborhood through establishing a milieu of friendship and cooperation that would serve the interests of all countries in the region (Cairo Review, 2012). As such, Turkey could contribute to international stability and security in the regional context. Turkey sought for maximum cooperation with its neighboring countries through economic interdependence. To this end, Turkey

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established high strategic council meetings with countries with which it previously had problems such as Russia, Greece, Syria, and Iraq. Through the policy of zero problem, Turkey wanted to increase its regional collaboration by abolishing visa requirements for its neighboring countries such as Syria and Russia (Davutoğlu, 2010a).

The AKP foreign policy makers believed that Turkey’s increasing trade relations with its neighboring countries is a result of its zero problem with neighbors policy, which is a win-win for all regional actors. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish premier at the time, outlined Turkey’s increasing trade volumes with the neighboring countries between 2002 and 2009 as follows: “In 2002, our exports to Syria were $ 267 million; by the end of 2009 it reached $ 1.4 billion. In 2003, our export to Iraq was $ 829 million, by the end of 2009, it rose to $ 5 billion. In 2002, our export to Russia was 1 billion 172 million dollars, and at the end of 2009, it reached $ 3 billion. In Greece, the exports volume was $ 590 million in 2002, in 2009 it reached 1.6 billion” (Erdoğan, 2011).

With this policy, Turkey succeeded to improve its relations with Syria through a free trade agreement as well as with Iran thanks to its efforts in the nuclear talks. Davutoğlu (2008: 80) believed that Turkey’s achievement to solve the problems with its neighbors proved that Turkey was able to build its relations on substantial trust. Undoubtedly, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) and Turkish Airlines (THY) played an important role in Turkey’s active engagement in its neighborhood and beyond. The TIKA provided development assistance especially to the Turkic countries as part of Turkish foreign policy expansion. Turkey provided only 52 million Dollars in assistance to the Caucasus and Turkic countries during 1992 - 2002 (TBMM, 2010). After the AKP came to power, however, TIKA’s assistance increased to 128 million Dollars from 2003 to 2009 (TBMM, 2010). Compared to 2002, the number of Program Coordination Offices increased from 12 to 25 in 2011, and to 33 in 2012 (TIKA, 2019). Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 2006 to 2009 was around 700 million US Dollars, and by 2010, it had provided 996 million US Dollars to 131 countries (MFA, 2010b). These development assistances increased Turkey’s visibility in world

politics by establishing good relations especially with the developing countries.

Diplomatic Discourse This principle aims to develop relations with

neighboring countries and beyond through mediation and political dialogue. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey does not have the luxury to adopt a wait-and-see policy in international crises and has to respond to emerging conflicts in the region. He argued that this principle refers to an active rather than a reactive foreign policy approach. Through diplomatic discourse, Turkey has to take preventive steps to maintain international peace and security.

By using proactive peace diplomacy, Turkish policy makers aimed to engage in conflict resolution in all regions, ranging from Afghanistan to the Balkans and from the Caucasus to the Middle East. In this regard, the following cases maybe singled out: involving in the Russo-Georgian war; supporting the Minsk Process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, actively engaging in the Cyprus issue during the 2004 Annan Plan period, facilitating the participation of the Sunnis in the 2005 Iraqi parliamentary election, mediating in peace talks between Israel and Syria as well as acting as a broker in the talks on Iran’s nuclear program (Davutoğlu, 2010a). During the Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, Turkey also became an active player in the Balkans together with NATO, the EU, and the United States. Additionally, Turkey did not take sides in the Shia and Sunni division in Iraq but instead, thanks to its active policy, Turkey developed good relations with both the Shia-backed Maliki government in Iraq and the Sunni opposition group. It also had good relations with both the Shia opposition and the Sunni groups in Lebanon (Davutoğlu, 2008: 82). Turkish policy makers believed that through diplomatic discourse, Turkey might be able to extend its influence in many regions.

Turkey’s mediator-integrator role located Turkey at the center of Afro-Eurasia. Placed at the center of global security issues, Turkey, in fact, should play a proactive role in conflict resolution. Therefore, under the AKP governments, Turkey has acted as a facilitator in conflicts by arranging meeting points to enable conflicting parties to resolve their

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problems. As a credible partner, Turkey fostered dialogue to achieve reconciliation and cooperation between the parties to reach peaceful agreements. In its region and beyond, Turkey was actively engaged in conflict resolution to establish reconciliations in Iraq, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan, reached two separate trilateral agreements with Serbia and Croatia to broker peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, established a trilateral cooperation mechanism with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and launched a resolution process between the conflicting parties in Somalia (MFA, 2010b).

Turkey also launched the “Mediation for Peace” initiative with Finland in 2010 that was later adopted as a United Nations General Assembly resolution (UNGA, 2010). Turkish policy makers have acted as a facilitator between Iran and the West as well as the mediator between Iran and the 5+1 Group (five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany). Iran’s acceptance of Turkey’s mediation role was considered as the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations and of a close relationship that would end the distrust between the two countries (Bonab, 2009: 161).

Davutoğlu (2009) bears in mind Atatürk’s motto “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” and claims that in order to have peace at home, Turkey needs to be active in its region in an attempt to solve the existing conflicts, something which every nation can benefit from. In fact, the international community rewarded Turkey’s new vision based on soft power and political dialogue: the United Nations elected Turkey as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2009-2010 term.

Multi-Dimensional and Multi-Track Policies

The multi-dimensional policy refers to moving beyond security related issues and adding economic, cultural, and political values in policymaking processes to promote cultural coexistence. The AKP foreign policy makers claim that Turkey’s relation with global actors such as NATO, the EU, and the U.S is complementary to its relations with other actors such as Russia and countries in the Middle East region. In a multi-dimensional policy context, Turkey aimed to establish good relations with many countries both at the cultural and

economic levels beyond security-oriented policies. In fact, Davutoğlu (2010a) had to underline that increasing relations with Russia is not an alternative to Turkey’s relations with the West.

Therefore, through multi-dimensional policies, Turkey aimed to establish regional cooperation between the West and Russia without undermining its alliance with the U.S. Turkey’s historical responsibility in all regions is accompanied by multi-dimensional foreign policies. Davutoğlu underlined that Turkey’s trade relations between 2002 and 2012 increased from 13 billion Dollars to 86 billion Dollars; Turkey’s trade volume with Iran was 1.2 billion Dollars in 2002, but in 2012, it became 16 billion Dollars; with Russia, it increased from 6 billion Dollars to 30 billion Dollars (Davutoğlu, 2012a).

Multi-track policies emphasized moving beyond a state-centric understanding toward plurality in policymaking. With multi-track policies, Turkish business groups/actors started to play an increasing role in Turkey’s booming trade relations. Therefore, these groups began to affect Turkey’s foreign policy making by encouraging the establishment of economic and diplomatic relations with all regions to strengthen Turkey’s presence in the international context (Head, 2011). Thus, during the AKP rule, Turkish private business groups such as the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) helped move beyond single-track and state-centric policies. In this new period, Turkey was called a ‘trading state’ (Kirişçi, 2009), which was the result of the zero problem with neighbors, multi-track, and multi-dimensional polices. In this regard, through its trade partnership with Iran and Russia, Turkey abandoned its security oriented single-dimensional foreign policies and promoted its relations especially with its immediate neighbors.

Rhythmic Diplomacy This principle encouraged Turkey to play a

more active role in global and regional matters at the international platforms. Turkish foreign policy makers, by following soft-power strategies and implementing vision-based consistent foreign policy principles, increased Turkey’s representation

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in international organizations. Turkey became a part of many regional and international organizations. Besides having full member status in such organizations as the Group of 20 (G-20), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Turkey served as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council for the 2009-10 term. It was also granted the observer status at the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League. Through the policy of rhythmic diplomacy, Turkey became more visible in international platforms. Its contribution to the UN budget tripled during the 2013-2015 period.

Turkey has also been committed to help developing countries as a responsible actor in world politics. For example, it has provided financial aid to the Pacific island states through the TİKA. Turkey also contributed to the African countries by providing humanitarian and technical assistance in many areas including agricultural development, energy, and education. It “cooperates with 37 African countries through the TİKA toward contributing to the development of African countries. While the TİKA’s financial aid was only 3 million Dollars until 2005, by the end of 2011, it reached 156 million Dollars” (Erdoğan, 2013). Turkey’s support for developing countries through the TİKA increased between 2002 and 2011. In 2002, the foreign development aid was 86 million US Dollars, but by 2011 this amount reached 2 billion 363 million US Dollars (Erdoğan, 2012).

Discuss the strategic depth doctrine and the principles of the new Turkish foreign policy.

1

BILATERAL RELATIONS OF TURKEY UNDER THE STRATEGIC

DEPTH DOCTRINE AND THE PARADIGM SHIFT DEBATE

The AKP policy makers focused on Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) during between 2002 and 2007. The EU membership became the center of discussion in Turkish foreign policy during these years. With the stalemate on the EU process, Turkish policy makers aimed to diversify Turkey’s external relations especially in its neighborhood. Turkey’s new foreign policy principles (especially the zero problem with neighbors policy) as well as diplomatic discourse and multidimensional policies led to a rapprochement with countries such as Syria and Iran. Following the financial crisis of 2008-09, this diversification process speeded up, and the Middle East region became an alternative to the European market for Turkey. Turkey’s export to the Middle East was $3.4 billion in 2002, and this number increased to $42.4 billion by 2012 (Öniş and Kutlay, 2013).

Turkey’s historical, geographical, and cultural ties with the MENA region helped develop strong economic and political relations with the regional countries. Turkey, as an assertive regional actor, diversified its relations successfully especially with the Muslim and Arab world as well as with Russia. This part of the chapter describes bilateral relations of Turkey in the light of the strategic depth doctrine with Syria, Iran, and Russia. It also introduces the concept of neo-Ottomanism and the paradigm shift debate in Turkish foreign policy as well as criticism levelled against both the AKP’s new foreign policy vision and Davutoğlu’s strategic depth doctrine.

Turkish-Syrian RelationsTurkey and Syria have involved in relations

based on conflict and cooperation. Turkey and Syria had problematic relations during the 1980s and 1990s because of such issues as the water dispute, Syria’s support for the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) terrorist organization, and the dispute about

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Hatay. In fact, the two countries came to the brink of a war because of Syria’s increasing support for the PKK. However, on October 20, 1998, the two countries signed the Adana Agreement and established a joint agenda to fight the PKK and improve their political, economic, and security relations. Accordingly, the Syrian authorities expelled the head of the terrorist organization, Abdullah Öcalan, from Syria and declared that they stopped supporting the PKK. During the AKP era, the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations gradually became more important. Turkey and Syria began to establish a relationship based on free economic activities and the free flow of people and goods. Political visits between Turkey and Syria were initiated by Erdoğan’s trips to Syria in 2004. In January 2005, Assad travelled to Turkey, which was the first high-level official visit from Syria to Turkey since Syria’s independence. After the Adana Agreement, Turkey saw Syria no longer as a threat to its national security but as a neighbor to develop close economic and political relations.

Syria and Turkey signed the Association Agreement on December 22, 2004, which entered into force on January 1, 2007. The trade volume between the two countries rose from $796 million in 2006 to $2.5 billion in 2010. In December 2009, they signed the Joint Political Declaration on establishing the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) and fifty other agreements about cooperation in various fields such as security, politics, environment, transportation, agriculture, and water (MFA, 2011). Until the 2000s, Turkey perceived its Muslim neighbors, particularly Syria, as a threat to its national security. However, once the AKP came to power in 2002, these perceptions started to change, and Turkey’s historical ties became a source of cooperation rather than conflict.

AKP policy makers also argued that Syria was a gate opening to the region, which was the most important export area for Turkish economy. The elimination of visa requirements in September 2009 was another important element toward the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations (Bengio, 2011: 626). In 2002, the number of Syrian tourists visiting Turkey was 126,323. This increased to 899,494 in 2010. The number of Turkish tourists visiting Syria in 2002 was 467,648 and this increased to 1,664,209 (including daily visits) in 2010 (Turkish MFA, 2011).

However, the intensification of the civil war in Syria strained the relations. As new actors involved in the civil war, the threat to Turkey also intensified. Because the diplomatic efforts of almost a decade did not create a security environment that would alleviate Turkey’s security concerns, Turkey initiated the Operation Peace Spring in Syria on October 9, 2019.

Turkish-Iranian RelationsSince the 1979 Islamic revolution, Turkish-

Iranian relations have been shaped by the implications of the Islamic revolution on Turkey’s secular identity and the Turkish concern about Iran’s possible support for the PKK terrorist organization. In July 1996, Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan concluded a $23 billion deal for natural gas from Iran over 25 years (Larrabee, 2007). In February 1997, however, relations between the two countries deteriorated after Turkish decision makers criticized Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Reza Baqeri for supporting an Islamist rally in Ankara’s Sincan district (Aras and Karakaya, 2008: 505). In the 1990s, Iran was also believed to have provided transportation and shelter to the PKK terrorist organization. These two issues were the driving forces behind the Turkish foreign policy behaviors toward Iran at the time. However, after the capture of the head of the PKK in 1999, Turkish-Iranian relations have undergone a significant change.

The 2003 Iraq war further improved relations through security cooperation between the two countries against the PKK terrorist organization and its Iranian offshoot “Free Life Party of Kurdistan” (PJAK). In 2007, Turkey and Iran initiated joint operations in the fight against terrorism in the northern part of Iraq (Bengio, 2011: 626). Under the zero problem with neighbors policy, and as a result of the normalization of relations, both states have signed several agreements on economic and security issues, mainly about cooperation on counter-terrorism activities, including a July 2004 agreement to protect each other’s borders (Larrabee, 2007). These developments show both countries’ desire to move away from previous hostilities and distrust by building a new friendship based on security cooperation. In fact, the bilateral relationship is described as being based on “the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs, mutual respect and good neighborliness” (Turkish MFA, 2014).

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Besides, Turkey was among a few countries that supported Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, and it maintained that Iran had a right to produce nuclear energy. Erdoğan described Iran’s nuclear program as “an energy project with peaceful, humanitarian purposes,” (Aljazeera, 2010) and tried to persuade Western powers for revising their biased approach to Iran. Turkey’s positive view on Iran’s nuclear plans and facilities was a concrete step in normalizing Turkish foreign policy toward Iran. Since 2006, Turkish decision makers have acted as a facilitator between Iran and the West. For example, on May 17, 2010, Iran signed a uranium exchange deal (1200 kg low-enriched uranium) with Turkey and Brazil. Following this deal, as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Turkey and Brazil voted against Resolution 1929 with regard to imposing further economic sanctions on Iran (the UNSC, 2010).

Figure 6.2 May 17, 2010 – Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pose for a picture after signing the uranium exchange deal.

Source: www.insightturkey.com

Energy is an important factor behind the increasing relations between Turkey and Iran, which is the second-largest energy (natural gas) supplier to Turkey after Russia. Increasing trade and energy cooperation brought a new dimension to Turkish-Iranian relations during the AKP governments. In fact, Turkish foreign policy makers tried to minimize the problems with Iran to achieve a stable and peaceful environment in the Middle East (Aras and Karakaya, 2008: 507).

Turkish-Russian RelationsTurkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy principle helped move away from security-oriented single-

dimensional policies. With this vision, Turkey adopted the post-Cold War realities and further improved its relations with Russia. In this new period, AKP foreign policy makers pursued a rapprochement with Russia without undermining Turkey’s relations with its Western partners. Both countries shared neighborhood in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and Turkey cooperated with Russia in supporting maritime security in the Black Sea. Turkish policy makers decided to develop Turkey’s relations with Russia despite the Western countries’ harsh reactions to the deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations and the escalation of the South Ossetian conflict in 2008.

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In 2009-2010, Turkey and Russia reached agreements on establishing a High-Level Cooperation Council and creating a visa-free regime as well as on launching large-scale projects including the agreements on the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, and the Turkish Stream pipeline (Shlykov, 2018: 109). Following the establishment of the High-Level Cooperation Council, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (2010) described Turkish-Russian relations as “reaching the level of full-scale strategic partnership.”

Russia is still a key ally of Armenia whereas Turkey has strong political, economic, and military ties with Azerbaijan. However, despite diverged interests and policies in the Southern Caucasus, Russia and Turkey have been able to establish strong relations. They have followed agreeable policies on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and on bringing a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Russia is the main energy (natural gas) supplier to Turkey and became one of the most important trade partners during the AKP administration. Therefore, Turkish policy makers aimed at maintaining good relations with Russia based on Turkey’s new strategic vision. During these years, due to its energy dependency, Turkey avoided to be involved in any confrontation between its Western partners and Russia (Aliriza and Aras, 2012: 14).

Neo-OttomanismThe AKP’s proactive foreign policy agenda

received some criticism. For example, the neo-Ottomanism discourse has been a source of criticism. According to the critics of the active foreign policy agenda, the AKP policy makers aimed at re-connecting Turkey with former Ottoman territories, especially through the zero problem with neighbors policy. Neo-Ottomanism is the idea of Turkey’s projecting power over its traditional Ottoman sphere of influence.

However, AKP policy makers did not identify the new foreign policy with neo-Ottomanism because this concept might carry imperialist implications.

Davutoğlu emphasized that Turkey’s new policies were not based on the Ottoman legacy but on the zero problem with neighbors principle. He pointed out that Turkey’s engagement with its neighbors did not mean a revival of historical and political relations, but was the result of inescapable factors such as Turkey’s geography and history (Baran, 2013: 117). He believed that the new Turkish foreign policy principles were not to be linked to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire because Turkey had no choice but follow certain policies, as it was impossible to change neither Turkey’s history nor its geographical position.

The Paradigm Shift (the Axis Shift) Debate in Turkish Foreign Policy

Some circles considered Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy principles and Turkey’s re-engagement with the Middle East region, especially the rapprochement with Syria and Iran, as a paradigm shift (or an axis shift) in Turkish foreign policy making (Oğuzlu, 2008; Çağaptay, 2009; Kanat, 2009). Some scholars argued that the AKP’s foreign policy activism especially in the Middle East region was shifting Turkey away from the Western alliance and that Turkey was getting closer to the East (Fischer, 2010; Babacan, 2010; Çandar, 2010).

The paradigm shift discussion alludes to the overall change of Turkish foreign policy direction under the AKP governments. A series of events triggered the paradigm shift argument in Turkish foreign policy making. One such event was Turkey’s position during the Iraq war in 2003. The Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected a bill on March 1, 2003, which proposed allowing the American troops to use the Turkish territory for conducting a military operation in the northern part of Iraq. However, Turkey did not look favorably at this plan, because Turkish policy makers were concerned about the national security and believed that further instability in Iraq could provoke some problems in Turkey.

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Figure 6.3 January 29, 2009 – Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan clashed with Israeli President Shimon Peres over the Israel’s offensive in Gaza and stormed out from the World Economic Forum Summit when the moderator

curtailed his response to remarks by President Peres in Davos, Switzerland.


There were some other developments in Turkish foreign policy that ignited a paradigm shift debate such as Turkey’s worsening relations with Israel. The first major crisis between Turkey and Israel in this era emerged during the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos. Erdoğan stormed out of the meeting after having a clash with Israeli President Simon Peres over the Gaza blockade. Turkey has not participated in this forum since 2009. The second major crisis between the two countries took place on May 31, 2010, which is known as the flotilla crisis (the Mavi Marmara incident). The Mavi Marmara was the largest boat of a flotilla consisted of six boats carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza. During the Israeli operation to stop the humanitarian aid, nine activists were killed and over thirty activists were wounded. After this incident, relations between Turkey and Israel further deteriorated.

Moreover, Turkey’s commitment to promote its relations with Syria and Iran were interpreted as redirecting Turkish foreign policy toward Muslim states. Turkey’s closer relations with these countries raised concerns among Turkey’s Western partners especially when Turkey voted against a UN Security Council resolution that authorized economic sanctions on Iran (United Nations, 2010). As a response to the paradigm shift debate, Davutoğlu strongly emphasized that “Turkey’s relations with the Western partners is the main direction of Turkish foreign policy” (Yılmaz, 2009). According to Turkish policy makers, the EU and NATO still act as the basis for Turkish foreign policy making, and Turkey’s new regional and global vision is not a departure from its previous policies and commitments to its allies. They believe that changes in Turkish foreign policy is simply an adaptation to the changing international system in the post-Cold War world and the post 9/11 era.

Discuss whether or not the strategic depth doctrine constitutes a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SPRING FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The AKP’s active foreign policy agenda and its implementation of the new foreign policy principles were interrupted by popular uprisings that erupted across the MENA region in 2010 and 2011.

The Arab Spring started in Tunisia in December 2010 because of growing political and economic dissatisfaction of people with the country’s leadership. The unrest spread to other countries in the region including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. The popular uprisings known as the “Arab Spring” in the MENA region had a significant impact on Turkish foreign policy. Until this political earthquake, proactive foreign policy principles had successfully positioned Turkey as a rising power in the region. This part of the chapter examines both the opportunities and the challenges of the Arab uprising for Turkish foreign policy. The popular uprisings, particularly the Syrian civil war, became an important challenge to Turkish foreign policy and the strategic depth doctrine.

Figure 6.4 Cairo, Egypt - November 21, 2011: People on Tahrir square are gathering around a protester. He and the rest of the crowd are demanding a stop of the military rule in Egypt.

Opportunities: The Turkish ModelTurkish policy makers believed that Turkey could promote democratic values without compromising

its national interests or its commitment to regional development and peaceful conflict resolution (Davutoğlu, 2012b: 3). With this perspective, the Arab uprisings provided new opportunities for Turkey. Turkey successfully reconciled its Muslim identity and Western values, followed a somewhat independent foreign policy, and achieved economic growth. These positive developments made Turkey a model and a source of inspiration for the states in the region that were undergoing political transformations (Dal and Erşen, 2014). Turkey was first proposed as a “model” in the early 1990s and “the model” metaphor was applied to the Turkic world in the former Soviet space. Second, in the 2000s, the Bush and the Obama

“The Arab Spring: wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes” (Encyclopedia Britannica).

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administrations referred to Turkey as a model, an example, and a source of inspiration for the Muslim Middle East after Turkey had been declared an EU candidate state. Third, during the Arab uprisings, the U.S and the EU promoted the Turkish Model to establish friendly political structures in the region. In this context, the worsening Turkish-Israeli relations and Turkey’s stand against Israel to defend Palestinians’ rights increased Turkey’s popularity among the Arab nations and promoted the idea of the Turkish model. Davutoğlu underlined that “if needed, Turkey remains ready to share her own democratic experience with all interested countries” (Cairo Review, 2012). Turkish foreign policy makers avoided promoting Turkey as a model, but they proposed that Turkey could possibly be an inspiration by helping to provide those nations who desire it with the Turkish political and economic experience. In short, Turkey’s political and economic transformation through the globalization process and the AKP’s proactive policies helped increase the popularity and credibility of Turkey in the region.

Challenges: Threats to Turkish National Security

Since the Arab uprisings, Turkey’s regional policy has gone through a transformation as the Middle East region occupied the center stage of Turkish foreign policy. For example, Turkish leaders were among the first to call for Hosni Mubarak’s resignation on February 2, 2011. However, as popular uprisings uncontrollably spread across the region, Turkey’s economic and political interests in the region were challenged. These challenges tested Turkey’s assertive regional policy vision. Turkey’s response became more complex in Libya and Syria mostly because of its economic investments and political relations with the Libyan and Syrian regimes.

Turkey had $15 billion worth investments in Libya, and over 25,000 citizens were living in Libya (Tocci et al., 2011: 3). Due to concerns about the safety of the Turkish citizens and future of economic investments, Turkish decision makers were relatively more cautious about the Muammar Gaddafi regime. Although, they followed a non-interventionist policy toward the Libyan civil war, Turkey later changed its policy and supported the NATO-led operation in Libya.

As regards to Syria, Turkey developed strong economic and political relations with the Assad regime under the leadership of the AKP. However, the popular uprisings and the Assad regime’s resort to violence against the civilians brought Turkish-Syrian relations to a stalemate. Turkey adopted a wait-and-see policy during the early phase of the Syrian crisis. The situation in Syria not only posed economic problems for Turkey but also exacerbated Turkey’s security concerns” (Tocci et al., 2011: 3).

Both in Libya and Syria, due to strong political and economic relations with those regimes, Turkish policy makers acted cautiously and refrained from calling the regimes to step down in the early phases of the uprisings. Davutoğlu visited Syria several times after the beginning of the Syrian unrest in March 2011 in an attempt to convince Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to take steps to implement certain urgent reforms (Cairo Review, 2012). Turkish policy makers relied on Turkey’s soft power capacity and initiated bilateral diplomacy with Syria. When their attempts failed, Turkey revised its relationship with the regime, supported the Syrian opposition group (the Free Syrian Army, FSA), and closed its embassy in Syria. As explained above, Turkey had to initiate the Operation Peace Spring in Syria on October 9, 2019.

On July 3, 2013, General Abdelfattah al-Sisi toppled Egypt’s democratically elected government. Turkish policy makers opposed to the overthrow of the democratically elected Morsi government because of the AKP’s political roots, the solidarity with Muslims around the world as well as the party’s traumatic experiences of multiple coup attempts in its history. The Syrian crisis and the military intervention in Egypt as well as the differences of opinion with Iran and Russia over the Syrian crisis weakened Turkey’s prestigious zero problem with neighbors policy. In this new period, as a result of increasing tension between Turkey and its neighbor, Turkey’s zero problem with neighbors policy was ironically called by critics an “only problems with neighbors” policy or a “no neighbors without problems” policy (Çandar, 2013).

Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy adviser, İbrahim Kalın, responded to these claims and evaluated Turkey’s position as “precious loneliness” (değerli yalnızlık). Walker evaluates Turkey’s loneliness and concludes that “Turkey may now believe it is better

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to be ‘preciously alone’ than to have friends like Assad and the Egyptian military.” Uncertainties and political transformation in the MENA region pushed Turkish policy makers to revise Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. In this new era, a precious loneliness discourse has become the main rhetoric to address Turkey’s isolation in the region.

Figure 6.5 Syrian people in a refugee camp in Suruç/Turkey (April 3, 2015).

Increasing instability and increasing number of refugees in Syria turned into another challenge for Turkey. Due to its humanitarian open-door policy for Syrian refugees and its support for the Free Syrian Army (officially known as Syrian National Army), Turkey was exposed to cross-border terrorist attacks. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the refugee problem has reached a critical point for Turkey. According to a UNHCR report on Syria Regional Refugee Response, as of July 2019, the official number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is recorded as 3,614,108 (The UN Refugee Agency, 2019).

BILATERAL RELATIONS OF TURKEY IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING PERIOD

Turkey’s policies toward the Syrian regime shaped Turkey’s relations with the US and other regional actors including Russia and Iran. This part of the chapter evaluates the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in Syria following the Syrian civil war and the implications of these policies for Turkish-U.S and Turkish-Russian relations.

Turkish-Syrian RelationsThe Syrian crisis became the most important challenge to Turkish foreign policy. It has affected and

shaped Turkey’s relations with other actors including Iran, Russia, and the U.S. Turkey’s Syria policy was interrupted by the Syrian civil war. As the crisis deteriorated in Syria, Turkish policy makers underlined that Turkey desired a democratic rule in Syria. After several unsuccessful attempts to convince the Assad

Discuss the opportunities and challenges of the Arab Spring for TFP.

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regime to implement credible reforms, Turkey’s relations with Syria shifted from cooperation back to conflict.

In this new period, Turkish foreign policy makers perceived Syria as a threat to Turkey’s national security. Turkey imposed sanctions against the Syrian regime in November 2011. Following Syria’s shooting down of a Turkish jet in 2012, Turkey changed its rules of engagement toward the Syrian regime. As a result of the Syrian violation of the Turkish airspace, Turkey shot down a Syrian helicopter and a Syrian war plane on September 16, 2013 and March 23, 2014, respectively. It then requested the deployment of NATO Patriot missiles on its territory to deter possible missile attacks from Syria. The U.S, German, and Dutch Patriot missiles were deployed in Adana, Kahramanmaraş, and Gaziantep provinces (NATO, 2013). However, these missiles were removed in August 2015.

The increasing military activities and incidents on the Turkish-Syrian border escalated the tension between the two countries. Turkish policy makers called for military intervention in Syria, but the intervention in Syria and the removal of Bashar al-Assad were strongly opposed by Russia and Iran. While Turkish policy makers underlined that the Assad regime was a threat to Turkish national security, Turkey’s Western partners focused on the elimination of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (the ISIS) from the region. On October 2, 2014, with 298 votes in favor, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized military action in Syria and Iraq to protect Turkish interests. From 2016 to 2018, the Turkish Armed Forces launched two large-scale military operations in Syria: the Operation Euphrates Shield (the OES) on August 24, 2016 and the Operation Olive Branch (the OOB) on January 20, 2018. “Both the OES and the OOB were carried out on the basis of international law, in accordance with Turkey’s right of self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as well as in full respect for Syria’s territorial integrity” (Turkish MFA, 2019). The Turkish Armed Forces announced that the OES ended in March 2017. However, Turkey had to initiate the Operation Peace Spring in Syria on October 9, 2019, due to increasing terror threats.

Turkish-American RelationsTurkish-American relations have soured over the clash of interests during the Syrian civil war,

particularly during the conflict in Ayn el-Arab (Kobani). On September 11, 2014, the U.S established a coalition with some Arab countries in the Middle East region to fight against the emerging jihadist group, the ISIS, in Iraq and Syria.

Figure 6.6 The battery, provided by the United States, is located outside the city of Gaziantep. The final of six Patriot missile batteries deployed to Turkey was declared operational under the NATO command and control on Friday, 15

February 2013.

Source: www.nato.int

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Turkish policy makers emphasized that Turkey’s involvement in the coalition would be possible only under certain circumstances: a comprehensive intervention in Syria beyond Ayn el-Arab, the establishment of a no-fly zone and a safe haven, and the removal of the Assad regime. Turkey’s security priorities in Syria became clearer during the clash in Ayn el-Arab. The U.S decision makers underlined that the military campaign was against the ISIS not the regime. Later, the Turkish policy shifted to cooperating with the U.S through opening a passage for the Kurdish Peshmerga from northern Iraq to cross into Ayn el-Arab. Turkey agreed to ‘train’ and ‘equip’ the moderate Syrian opposition to prevent the fall of Ayn el-Arab.

On September 19, the ISIS captured more than 20 Kurdish-controlled villages in the Ayn el-Arab area, causing about 60,000 Syrian-Kurdish people to flee to Turkey (The Telegraph, 2014). After this development, the U.S decided to cooperate with Syrian Kurdish groups to fight against the ISIS and shifted its resources from the Syrian opposition to these groups, mainly to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The U.S. decision was perceived negatively by Turkey, because these Kurdish groups in Syria were an extension of the PKK terrorist organization, against which Turkey has had to fight for the last 40 years. Therefore, the U.S decision to cooperate with the Kurdish groups in Syria led to the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the U.S. While Turkey’s priority was to prevent any possible terror act in the region, the U.S’s priority was to defeat the ISIS.

The July 15 failed coup attempt was an important turning point for Turkey’s relations with the U.S. On July 15, 2016, there was an attempt for a coup d’état in Turkey to overthrow the democratically elected government and President Erdoğan. The AKP government held the Fethullah Gülen (FETÖ) terror organization responsible for the attempted coup. Gülen, a pseudo cleric, currently lives in the U.S. His followers held influential positions in Turkish institutions from the military to the police, from the secret service to the judiciary. After the failed coup attempt, the AKP government initiated a “cleansing operation” to eliminate the Gülenist establishment from all government institutions.

Figure 6.7 Damaged buildings at the mountain resort town of Zabadani in the Damascus countryside.

Source: https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-airstrikes-syria-1.4121860

Figure 6.8 Military coup attempt plunged Turkey into a long night of violence and intrigue on July 16, 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey.

Source: www.tccb.gov.tr/faaliyetler/15temmuz/

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In the post-failed coup period, the U.S refused to extradite Gülen. As a result of the Gülen issue and the U.S support for the Kurdish groups in Syria, the Turkish-American strategic partnership has been severely damaged. On May 9, 2017, despite Turkey’s opposition, the U.S approved to supply weapons to the YPG to be used in the fight against the Islamic State (Stewart, 2017). Following this, Turkish policy makers communicated that Turkey would launch another operation in Syria if necessary. On January 20, 2018, the Turkish military forces launched the second large-scale military operation, the OOB, in the northern Syrian city of Afrin as an act of self-defense against the separatist terrorists.

On the other hand, since the failed coup attempt, Turkish-Russian relations improved in economic, political, and military fronts. The most significant development of this new alliance is the S-400 missiles deal. In September 2017, Turkey signed a deal with Russia to buy Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles (BBC News, 2017). Turkey concluded this deal after the U.S. declined its request to buy Patriot missiles. As a response to the deal, the U.S senate approved a bill to limit the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey (S.2781, 2017). With this move, the U.S aimed to convince Turkey to cancel its S-400 deal with the Russians. Toward this end, the U.S. government also doubled the tariffs on steel and aluminum. The Turkish lira crushed and lost almost 45 percent of its value during the summer of 2018. On December 19, 2018, the U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the ISIS had been defeated and the U.S would withdraw from Syria gradually and was ready to sell Patriot missiles to Turkey. Despite the increasing tension due to the S-400 deal, Turkey and the U.S continued to discuss the establishment of a safe zone in northern Syria. With the Operation Peace Spring, however, bilateral relations entered a new phase in October 2019.

Turkish-Russian RelationsTurkey’s relation with Russia initially

deteriorated in the mid-2010s due to the Syrian crisis. On November 24, 2015, Turkish authorities shot down a Russian jet over Turkish territory. This incident negatively influenced Turkish-Russian

relations; the two countries cut their political, economic, and military ties. However, following the failed coup attempt on July 15, relations between the two countries improved relatively quickly. In the post-failed coup period, when the U.S refused to extradite Gülen, Turkish policy makers aimed to restore Turkey’s relations with Russia. Both countries reached an agreement on several issues including the Syrian civil war. Although Turkey and Russia have had disagreements about the future of the Assad regime, both countries agreed on maintaining the territorial integrity of Syria.

President Erdoğan visited Russia on August 10, 2016, and on the same day NATO announced that Turkey’s membership in NATO was crucial for the organization. In order to avoid questions of Turkey’s NATO membership due to Turkish-Russian rapprochement, the NATO spokesperson was quoted as saying “Turkey is a valuable ally,” and as stressing “Turkey’s NATO membership is not in question. Turkey can count on the support of NATO” (NATO, 2016). Following Erdoğan’s visit, on August 24, the Turkish Armed Forces launched the first large-scale military operation in Syria to fight the terrorist networks. The Turkish forces initiated a military operation in Jerablus to eliminate the PKK’s terrorist Kurdish extension in Syria, the YPG, as well as to block the formation of an autonomous “Kurdish region” in Syria.

The normalization of Turkish-Russian relations continued even after the assassination of the Russian ambassador, Andrei Karlov, in Ankara on December 19, 2016. Both countries showed a united front during the funereal by “insisting that the killing of Moscow’s ambassador in Ankara would not affect bilateral relations, or cooperation over Syria” (The Guardian, 2016). The Euphrates Shield Operation ended on March 29, 2017. However, Turkish officials made it clear that Turkey would launch operations if necessary.

Turkish policy makers employed military strategies to manage threats from Syria but also believed that being a part of peace talks could be an opportunity for the resolution of the conflict in Syria. For this reason, Turkey played an active role in Astana peace talks which were initiated by Russia, Turkey, and Iran in in Astana, Kazakhstan in January 2017 to create conditions for reconciliation to end the Syrian civil war. As a result of the Astana

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peace talks, on September 15, 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, signed a deal to establish de-escalation zones across Syria, including Syria’s northwest province of İdlib (Aljazeera, 2017). As a result, Turkish troops started setting up observation posts to provide security in İdlib and to prevent another wave of migrants toward Turkey.

Figure 6.9 Presidents Vladimir Putin, Hassan Rouhani, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan discuss the progress made in the Syrian settlement process in Sochi, Russia ( November 22, 2017).


Turkish policy makers did not step back from the S-400 deal despite the U.S’s disapproval and warnings, and the first delivery of the missiles arrived in Turkey in mid-July 2019 (Fraser, 2019). This development would threaten Turkey’s F-35 program. However, Turkish policy makers are still committed to develop strong military ties with Russia toward strengthening Turkey’s national security.

Discuss Turkey’s Syria policy and its implications for Turkish-American relations.

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LO 1 Describe the strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy

Ahmet Davutoğlu proposed significant changes in Turkey’s foreign policy formation through a new set of foreign policy principles. With these policies, Turkey adopted a new proactive and assertive stance in its international relations. In his book, Strategic Depth, Davutoğlu (2001) describes a new strategic vision for a potential increased role for Turkey by exploiting Turkey’s geopolitical and historical depth. With this new vision, the AKP policy makers pursued to establish regional integration with Turkey’s neighboring countries which share with it a long common history. Davutoğlu argued that Turkey needed a new strategic approach at the end of the Cold War in order to adapt to the changing variables of the international system. The strategic depth doctrine aimed to reveal Turkey’s embedded potential in world politics by playing a greater role in other regions, such as Eurasia and the Middle East. In this new period, the AKP policy makers aimed to reposition Turkey in world politics by engaging all regions and overcoming the old security-oriented policies. Davutoğlu believed that through the successful implementation of strategic depth doctrine, which was based on vision orientedness, a systemic framework, and soft power principles, Turkey’s multiregional policies would make Turkey first a regional power and then a global power. The strategic depth doctrine rejects Turkey’s long-established image as a “bridge country,” while identifying its new role with a central country.

LO 2Examine bilateral relations of Turkey under the strategic depth doctrine

In 2007, the AKP policy makers shifted Turkey’s foreign policy priority from the EU membership to the Middle East region due to the stalemate in the EU process and the global financial crisis of 2008-09. To diversify its foreign policy and trade relations, the AKP policy makers aimed to normalize Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. Davutoglu’s strategic depth doctrine and the new foreign policy principles helped achieve this goal. Through the zero problem with neighbors policy, the diplomatic discourse policy, and the multidimensional policy, Turkey successfully developed economic and political relations with countries that it had problems with previously. In this new era, Turkey’s historical and geographical depth as well as its Muslim identity became the basis of its bilateral relations in the region.


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LO 2Examine bilateral relations of Turkey under the strategic depth doctrine

Turkey’s relation with Syria was mostly overshadowed by Syria’s support for the terrorist PKK organization and the dispute over Hatay. The normalization process between the two countries was initiated after the capture of Öcalan and the signing of the Adana Agreement in late 1990s. Further improvement was achieved by the AKP policy making elite in both economic and political relations. During the AKP administration, both countries had mutual high-level visits, established economic relations based on the free flow of people and goods, and signed the Association Agreement in 2004. In 2009, Turkey and Syria established the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council and came to an agreement to cooperate in areas including security, politics, environment, transportation, agriculture, and water. The trade volume between the two countries reached $2.5 billion in 2010 which was $796 million in 2006. With these developments, Turkey emancipated its previous enemy perception of Syria and established friendly relations with the Syrian regime, and the relations between the two countries were transformed from conflict to cooperation during 2000s.Turkey’s Middle East policy and rapprochement with countries such as Syria, Iran, and Russia raised concerns among Turkey’s Western partners. The AKP’s proactive foreign policy agenda prompted Turkey to reconsider its relations with the Middle Eastern countries. However, this was interpreted by the West as a paradigm shift (overall re-directing of Turkish foreign policy) in Turkish foreign policy making (Oğuzlu, 2008; Çağaptay, 2009; Kanat, 2009). According to this argument, the AKP’s foreign policy activism is shifting Turkey away from the Western alliance (the U.S, NATO, and the EU), and Turkey is getting closer to the East. The paradigm shift argument was triggered by not only Turkey’s increasing relations with Syria, Iran, and Russia but also the following series of events: the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the bill on March 1, 2003, to allow American troops to be deployed on the Turkish territory for the invasion of Iraq; Erdoğan’s storming out from the World Economic Forum in Davos after having had a clash with the Israeli President Simon Peres over the Gaza blockade; the flotilla crisis (the Mavi Marmara incident) with Israel; and Turkey’s support for Iran’s peaceful nuclear program at the UN Security Council. Turkish policy makers rejected the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy and characterized Turkey’s changing policy as an adaptation to the changing international system and to the new realities without undermining Turkey’s commitment to the Western partners.

LO 3Discuss the implications of the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war for TFP

Turkish foreign policy has gone through a transformation as the Middle East region was the center of its foreign policy agenda. Turkey supported the democratic transition process in Tunisia and Egypt by calling the authoritarian regimes to step down. In this new period, Turkey was proposed as a model or source of inspiration for countries that were going through transition. The Western countries pointed out Turkish experience as a model due to the successful reconciliation of its Muslim identity and Western values, following independent foreign policy and achieving economic growth. Turkey’s increasing influence in the region challenged with the Libyan and Syrian cases. Turkey’s response became more complex especially in these countries as a result of its economic investments and political relations. Especially Syrian civil war became main threat to Turkey’s security interests. Turkish policy makers were motivated by “the fear of instability along the 877 kilometer Turkish-Syrian border and of the sectarian ramifications of the Syrian uprising” (Tocci et al., 3). Moreover, the increasing instability and the increasing number of refugees in Syria turned into another challenge for Turkey due to its ‘open door’ policy for Syrian refugees.


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LO 4Summarize bilateral relations of Turkey in the post-Arab Spring Period

Turkey’s worsening relations with regional actors such as Egypt and the Syrian regime ended Davutoğlu’s zero problem with neighbors policy and raised a new discourse, “precious loneliness,” on Turkish foreign policy. The Syrian conflict changed Turkey’s relations with both the U.S. and Russia. Turkey’s differences of opinion with the U.S. over the future of the Syrian regime strained Turkish-American relations. To defeat the ISIS, the U.S. decided to cooperate with some Kurdish groups, especially the YPG, which is an offshoot of the PKK terrorist organization However, Turkey’s priority was to prevent any possible terrorist act in the region. The U.S support for the YPG and its refusal to cooperate on the Gülen case increased the Turkish mistrust of the U.S. Therefore, Turkish policy makers aimed to improve Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran and cooperate with these two countries on the Syrian issue to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria. Despite the differences of opinion about the Syrian regime, Turkey, Russia, and Iran launched the Astana Peace Talks to resolve the Syrian conflict. The Turkish-Russian rapprochement and decision to arm the Turkish military with the S-400 anti-aircraft missiles became the main source of conflict between the U.S and Turkey. The Operation Peace Spring may affect Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and allies.


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Test Yourself

1 Below are the AKP’s new foreign policy principles except ---


a. zero problem problems with neighborsb. balance between freedom and securityc. neo-Ottomanismd. diplomatic discoursee. rhythmic diplomacy

2 Which of the following politicians introduced the Strategic depth doctrine?

a. Ahmet Davutoğlub. Recep Tayyip Erdoğanc. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlud. Abdullah Güle. İbrahim Kalın

3 What does neo-Ottomanism refer to?

a. Departure from the strategic depth doctrineb. Re-connecting Turkey with the U.Sc. Developing a nuclear programd. Fighting with the PKKe. Re-connecting Turkey with the former

Ottoman territories

4 Where did the Arab Spring start?

a. Syriab. Egyptc. Israeld. Tunisiae. Libya

5 What does the Rhythmic diplomacy refer to?

a. Moving beyond security related issuesb. Balancing between freedom and securityc. İmproving relations with all neighborsd. Being a mediator in international conflictse. Being active in the international platforms

6 After the Syrian civil war had started, the AKP administration took all of the following measures and decisions against the Syrian regime except--- .


a. deploying the NATO Patriot missiles b. establishing the High-Level Strategic

Cooperation Council c. imposing sanctions against the Syrian regime d. launching military operations in Syria e. supporting the Syrian opposition group

7 According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, strategic depth doctrine does not attempt to--- .


a. move Turkey away from the Western alliance and get closer to the East

b. adapt to the changing variables of international conjectures

c. transform Turkey into a regional and eventually a global power

d. exploit Turkey’s geostrategic position e. establish regional integration between Turkey

and its neighbors

8 The following events and incidents triggered the Paradigm shift debate in Turkish foreign policy except---


a. the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the bill on March 1, 2003

b. the voting against a UNSC resolution that authorized economic sanctions against Iran

c. Erdoğan’s storming out of a panel at the Davos Summit

d. the flotilla crisis e. the Carter Doctrine


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9 Which of the following is the Syrian extension of the PKK terrorist organization?

a. The Free Syrian Armyb. The ISIS c. The YPGd. Boko Haram e. El Kaida

10 What does the Turkish Model refer to?

a. Being an inspiration by providing the Turkish experience to those who desire it

b. Protesting NATOc. Improving relations with the Western Bloc d. Serving as the mediator between Iran and

Brazil e. Cutting all political relations with the European

Union


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Answ


Suggested answ


If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Strategic Depth Doctrine.”

1. C If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Bilateral Relations of Turkey in the Post-Arab Spring Period.”

6. B

If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Bilateral relations of Turkey under the Strategic Depth Doctrine and Paradigm Shift Debate.”

3. E If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Bilateral relations of Turkey under the Strategic Depth Doctrine and Paradigm Shift Debate.”

8. E


2. A If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Strategic Depth Doctrine.”

7. A

If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Implications of the Arab Spring for TFP.”

4. D


5. E

If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Bilateral Relations of Turkey in the Post-Arab Spring Period.”

9. C

If your answer is incorrect, review the section on “Implications of the Arab Spring for TFP.”

10. A

Discuss the strategic depth doctrine and the principles of the new Turkish foreign policy.

your turn 1

Ahmet Davutoğlu introduced radical foreign policy principles based on his new foreign policy vision for Turkey. His new vision was re-assessing Turkey’s strategic position in the context of the systemic transformation of world politics in the aftermath of the Cold War. His new approach, strategic depth, aims to establish regional integration with Turkey’s neighboring countries, which Turkey shares a long common history with. In this new era, Turkey’s history and geography became the main source of its foreign policy making. With the strategic depth doctrine, Davutoğlu aimed to reintegrate Turkey in world politics through new policies. His proposed policies were based on three principles: the vision oriented principle about abandoning crisis oriented policies in the post-Cold War period and having a new vision for dialog and stability and mutual respect; the systemic framework principle about consistently establishing the vision oriented policies in all regions based on having good relations; the soft power principle about using Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, cultural diversity, democratic values, and historical ties to the surrounding region. In this new period, policy makers changed the security perceptions embedded in the country’s political culture (Aras and Karakaya, 2008).


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Discuss whether or not the strategic depth doctrine constitutes a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy.

your turn 2

Turkish policy making was dominated by the Europeanization during the period 2002-2007. With the decreasing - enthusiasm for the EU membership and the 2008-09 global financial crisis, Turkish policy makers aimed to diversify Turkey’s economic and political relations in its immediate neighborhood. In this new period, the Middle East region became the center of Turkish foreign policy making. However, Turkey’s re-engagement with the Middle East region, especially rapprochement with Syria and Iran, was perceived as a paradigm shift (or axis shift) in Turkish foreign policy. There were certain events that prompted the paradigm shift debate. These events are: the Turkish Parliament’s rejecting the bill on March 1, 2003, Erdoğan’s storming out from Davos Summit after having a clash with Israeli President Simon Peres, the flotilla crisis with Israel, and voting against a UN Security Council resolution that authorized economic sanctions against the Iranian regime. All these events raised the concern that Turkey was getting closer to the East as it was moving away from the Western alliance. What does paradigm shift refer to? It refers to “a time when the usual and accepted way of doing or thinking about something changes completely” (Cambridge Dictionary). In order to call the changes in Turkish foreign policy a paradigm shift, there should be a complete departure from its previous policies. Turkey is a member of the NATO and still pursue the EU membership. Although there have been setbacks for the EU membership desire from time to time, it has never been abandoned. Turkey’s engagement with all regions and its difference of opinion especially in the Syrian conflict raise questions about Turkey’s commitment to the Western alliance. However, Turkey is still a NATO member and Turkish policy makers define NATO and the EU as the main axis of Turkish foreign policy.


your turn 3

The Arab Spring or the popular uprisings in the MENA region provided both opportunities and challenges for Turkey. One of the most important opportunity was the Turkish model. The U.S and the EU proposed Turkey as a “model” to the regional countries, which were going through political transition. Turkey’s increasing economic influence, independent foreign policy acts, democratization as well as successful reconciliation of its Muslim identity and Western values have made the country a center of attraction. Moreover, Turkey’s stand against Israel on the Palestinian issue increased Turkey’s popularity in the region. Turkish policy makers offered sharing the Turkish experience with the countries in the region.


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Suggested answ



your turn 3

Turkey’s Middle East policy gradually changed as the Arab uprisings started to challenge its national security. Turkey supported democratic transformation in the region and called on the authoritarian regimes to step down. In Egypt, Turkish policy makers called on Hosni Mubarak to resign. However, in Libya, they acted cautiously and adopted a “wait and see policy” because of Turkey’s $15 billion worth investments and over 25,000 Turkish citizens living in the country. Later, Turkey’s policy changed, and Turkey supported the NATO-led operation in Libya. In Syria, Turkey’s response became more complex because the Syrian civil war further threatened not only Turkey’s economic and political interests but also the national security. Turkey shares its longest border with Syria and any instability in Syria could trigger further problems in the region. As a result of its economic, political, and security interests, Turkish policy makers aimed to convince the Assad regime for credible reforms instead of calling him to step down. However, as the situation worsened in Syria and diplomatic channels failed, Turkish policy makers adopted policies to support democratic movements against the Assad regime. Following the military coup d’état in Egypt in July 2013, it became impossible to maintain the “zero problem with neighbors” policy in the region, and Turkish policy makers adopted the “precious loneliness” rhetoric, by pointing out that being alone is more precious than having friends such as Assad and the Egyptian military establishment.

Discuss Turkey’s Syria policy and its implications for Turkish-American relations.

your turn 4

During the AKP administration, normalization of relations with the Syrian regime became more significant. Turkey and Syria promoted economic and political cooperation. With new policies, Turkey saw Syria no longer as a threat to its national security, but as a neighbor with which it could develop good relations. Following the popular uprisings, the unrest in Syria also deteriorated. After all successful attempts to convince the Syrian regime to implement certain reforms, Turkey’s relations with Syria shifted back from cooperation to conflict. Instability in Syria posed a security threat to Turkey. In addition, the Syrian crisis affected Turkey’s relations with the U.S., especially the disagreement over terrorist acts and security threats. While Turkish policy makers insisted on a regime change in Syria, the U.S. priority was to fight the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (the ISIS). After the U.S. decided to cooperate with certain Kurdish groups, mainly the YPG terrorist organization, the tension between Turkey and the U.S. increased. Turkish foreign policy in the post-failed coup attempt environment further deteriorated Turkish-American relations. Turkey normalized its relations with Russia, participated in the Astana Peace talks along with Iran and Russia, launched a large-scale military operation in Syria, and signed the S-400 deal with Russia.


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Chapter 7

Lear

ning

Out

com

es

Summarize the activities of the Yunus Emre Institute.

Discuss public diplomacy and soft power as the components of the new Turkish foreign policy.

Review the restructuring of some state institutions in Turkey in line with the new foreign policy approach.

Evaluate the activities of the new Turkish institutions with regard to diaspora diplomacy, foreign assistance, and humanitarian diplomacy.3

1 24

Chapter OutlineIntroductionPublic Diplomacy and Soft Power: Two Components of the New Turkish Foreign Policy Public Diplomacy and the Restructuring of Some State Institutions in TurkeyThe Yunus Emre Institute as Part of Turkish Public Diplomacy and Turkish Soft PowerThe New Turkish Institutions on Diaspora Diplomacy, Foreign Aid and Humanitarian Diplomacy

Key Terms•PublicDiplomacy•SoftPower•TheJusticeand

DevelopmentParty(JDP)

•CulturalDiplomacy•DiasporaDiplomacy•DonorCountry•ForeignAid•Humanitarian

Diplomacy

•TheTurkishProficiencyExam(TYS)

•TheYunusEmreInstitute

•ThePresidencyforTurksAbroadandRelatedCommunities

•TheTurkishCooperationandCoordinationAgency


Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Recent Turkish Foreign Policy

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INTRODUCTIONThis chapter explores the role and impact of

public diplomacy within the framework of softpowerinstitutionsinrecentTurkishforeignpolicyunder the Justice andDevelopment Party (JDP)governments. The concept of public diplomacywasfirstusedinitsmodernsensebyEdmundA.Gullion,theformerDirectoroftheUSInformationAgency(USIA)in1965.

Twomainfactorsarecriticallyimportantinpublicdiplomacyinglobalpolitics.Thefirstoneisthatstateshavemadegainingthesupportofpublicopinionaforeignpolicyaimduetotheimportanceofthesocialdimensioninglobalpolitics.Inthiscontext,gainingthesupportofpublicopinionreferstoastate’shavingandexertingsoftpower.Thisisbecausetheincreasingimportance of societies has made it necessary forstates to win the public opinion, along with therepresentatives of states, for their cause. In classicaldiplomacy,onlywinningtherepresentativesofstateswouldbeseenasadequatefortheircause.

Secondly, the visualization of everyday life bythe information and communication technologieshas brought about the phenomenon of visibilityin foreignpolicy. Inglobalpolitics, thishasmadeitnecessaryforstatestopresenttheirpolicieswithan attractive visual image in an attempt to carrythemoutsuccessfully.Moreover,ithasbroughtthenecessityofpresentingnotonlythepoliciesbutalso

the actors themselves with an attractive image tothepublicandtheinternationalcommunity.Whatbecamegraduallyimportantisnotthesuccessfulnessofastate’sforeignpolicy,buttheexecutionofthispolicyandtheconceptsitcommunicatesaswellastherepresentationoftheseconceptsininternationalpress and socialmedia.As these twomain factorsincreased the importance of public diplomacyin global politics, especially in the 2000s, statesintensifiedtheirpublicdiplomacypractices.

EdmundA.Gullion,theformerDirectoroftheUSInformationAgency(USIA),firstusedtheconceptofpublic diplomacyinitsmodernsensein1965.AccordingtoGullion,“Publicdiplomacydealswiththeinfluenceofpublicattitudesontheformationandexecutionofforeignpolicies.Itencompassesdimensionsofinternationalrelationsbeyondtraditionaldiplomacy;thecultivationbygovernmentsofpublicopinioninothercountries;theinteractionofprivategroupsandinterestsinonecountrywithanother;thereportingofforeignaffairsanditsimpactonpolicy;communicationbetweenthosewhosejobiscommunication,asdiplomatsandforeigncorrespondents;andtheprocessofinterculturalcommunications”(www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org).

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER: TWO COMPONENTS OF THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Theimplementationofmodernand institutionalpublicdiplomacy inTurkish foreignpolicyandtheinstitutionalizationofpublicdiplomacytookplace for the first timeunder theJusticeandDevelopmentParty (JDP)governments in the2000s.Thereare twokeydynamicsof this: the first is theJDP’spolicyofpresentingitselfasamodeltotheworld,especiallytotheMiddleEasterncountries.Secondly,thehighcommercial/economicperformance ofTurkey,whichwas the16th biggest economy in theworld in the2000s,allowedtheapplicationofapublicdiplomacy,whichrequiresahighlevelofspending.Althoughpublicdiplomacyisbaseduponsoft-powertools,itsimplementationrequires“hard dollars.” In this context, for the first time, Turkeybuilt andpromotednew institutions andnewpolicies forthesakeofinternationalpublicpolicy.First,theYunusEmreInstitutewasestablishedin2007inordertocarryoutculturaldiplomacyasaformofpublicdiplomacy.In2010,thePrimeMinistry Coordinating Office of Public Diplomacy wasestablished.Alsoin2010,thePresidencyforTurksAbroadandRelatedCommunitieswereestablishedtocarryoutthediasporadiplomacy.All theseeffortsandaccomplishmentshavebeenmadepossiblebywhatisknownassoft power.

Theconceptofsoft powerwasfirstdevelopedbyJosephS.Nye,aHarvardUniversityProfessor,inhisarticle“SoftPower”publishedinForeignAffairsin1990andinhisbook,Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.AccordingtoNye,softpoweris“theabilityofacountrytopersuadeotherstodowhatitwantswithoutforceorcoercion.”

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7 Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Recent Turkish Foreign Policy

Nye developed the concept of soft powerto counter the claim that American power hasweakenedsincethe1970sandthat,infact,ithasalreadybeguntodecline.AccordingtoNye,firstofall,thepoweroftheUSAshouldnotbeconsideredonlyinmilitarysensebutalsoineconomicsense.Themainhegemonicpowerof theUSoriginatesfromitssoftpower.HeclaimsthatthesoftpoweroftheUnitedStatesconsistsofitsuniversalvalues,attractive lifestyle, institutions, policies, culture,andideology.

Figure 7.1 Joseph S. Nye.

Source: www.chathamhouse.org

According to Nye, “soft power is the abilityto affect others to obtain the outcomes onewants through attraction rather than coercionor payment. A country’s soft power rests on itsresourcesofculture,values,andpolicies.Asmartpower strategy combines hard and soft powerresources.Publicdiplomacyhasalonghistoryasameansofpromotingacountry’ssoftpowerandwasessentialinwinningtheColdWar”(Nye,2008).

According to Nye, then, the concept of softpowerrefers toacarrotpolicy,notastickpolicy.Itconsistsofattraction,seduction,andcountries’being envied and taken as an example. As such,Nyeseparatessoftpowerfrommilitary-economic power,whichisbasedonthreatsandwhichfounditsexpressionintheconceptofhardpower.

Nye builds the concept of soft power onvalues and ideas, rather than on physical andmaterial components of hard power. He likenstheattractivenessandseductionsideofsoftpowerontologicallytopersonalrelations.Heclaimsthatthe complex analogies of psychological facts offascination, exemplary behavior, and attractionbetweenpeoplealsotakesplaceamongtheactorsof international relations. Nye also assumes thatculture, values, and diplomacy of a state thatattract other states are the sources of soft powerandthatsoftpowerworksiftheseareadmiredandexemplifiedintheinternationalarena.

Soft power, which became a trendy conceptduring the 2000s inTurkish foreign policy, wasmostlyusedinthecontextofMiddleEastpoliticsand as a euphemism for Turkey’s being a rolemodel to be followed in the region. Since theuse of the concept of “Turkishmodel”might beperceivednegativelybysomestatesandinterpretedas an expansionist policy in the Middle East,Turkey’s Middle East policy was mainly definedand launchedthroughtheconceptof softpower.Moreover, unlike previous eras, in the 2000s,Turkey tried to execute itsMiddleEast initiativeonsocio-culturalandpolitical-economiclevels.

Turkeyhas implemented itspublicdiplomacybyway of various institutions such as theYunusEmre Institute, the Turkish Cooperation andCoordination Agency, the Presidency for TurksAbroad and Related Communities (YTB), thePresidency of the Office of Public Diplomacy,theDeputyGeneralforCulturalDiplomacy,andtheDirectorate of PublicDiplomacy and PublicCommunication. During the JDP governments,Turkeyhasactivelyimplementedpublicdiplomacythroughsoftpowerdiscourse.

The soft power capacity and the theoreticalbackgroundoftheJDPgovernments’foreignpolicyhasderivedfromhistory,culture,Islamicreferencesof the ruling elite, the geography (the OttomanEmpireregion),andmorestrictlyspeaking,formerMinister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu’sformulationofforeignpolicy,whichissometimesreferredtoasthe“newOttomanism”(Ekşi,2018:266). The ruling elite has been implementingTurkey’ssoftpowerstrategyandpublicdiplomacyby promotingTurkish history, culture, language,and values abroad toward becoming not only

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a regional power but also a strong global actor.Moreover,theJDP’saimofpublicdiplomacyhasbeen to build and emphasize a positive IslamicimagewithintheMuslimworld(Ekşi,2016:71).ItisarguedthattheJDP’seffortforreachingtheArabMiddleEasternnationsthroughsuchpoliciesaddsuptoaculturalshiftfromthetraditionalWestern-orientedTurkish foreignpolicy.Recently thishasbeendiscussedinforeignpolicycirclesthroughtheconceptof“axisshift.”

Turkey, under the JDP governments, hasimplementedassertivepoliciesinthelastdecadeandstrivedtobecomeaglobalactorandaleaderoftheIslamicworldintheinternationalarena.Towardthisend,Turkeyhasdeployedsomesoftpowertools inpublicdiplomacyratherthanconductingtraditionaldiplomacy.AhmetDavutoğlu,asthearchitectofthispolicy vision, used the discourse of a “multi-trackforeign policy” to define his approach in foreignpolicy (Davutoğlu, 2008: 82). In fact, this multi-dimensionalityduringtheJDPgovernmentshasbeengeographicallyobservedintheactivitiesinAfricaaswellasinthedevelopmentofmorevibrantrelationswith the Middle Eastern countries. In addition,it can be observedmainly in the diversification ofthe foreignpolicyagendaand theestablishmentofnew soft-power institutions such as the Office ofPublicDiplomacy(KDK),theYunusEmreInstitute(YEI), and the Presidency for Turks Abroad andRelatedCommunities. As being the new actors inforeign policy, these institutions have come to theforefrontintheperspectiveofpublicdiplomacy-softpowernexus. Indeed, themostoriginalperspectiveof the recent governments’ foreignpolicyhasbeenincorporatingculturalandhistoricalelements,civilianorganizations,public/culturaldiplomacyinstitutions,andsoft-poweractorsintoTurkishforeignpolicy.Thepublic diplomacy approach of recent governmentshasreflectedboththediversificationoftheissuesandactorsinTurkishforeignpolicy.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOME

STATE INSTITUTIONS IN TURKEYPublicdiplomacyinstitutionsarethenewactors

inTurkishforeignpolicyandtheyhaveservedasthe new channels and mechanisms for definingand implementing the recentpolicies.ThesenewinstitutionshaveestablishedthecivilianaspectofTurkish foreign policy that helps conduct publicdiplomacy through soft-power activities froma social perspective rather than through policypractices of a hard-power approach (Büyüktanır,2018, 75-77). The newly established publicdiplomacy institutions are also a product of therestructuringoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.

Hence these institutions work in cooperationwiththenewunitsestablishedwithintheMinistryofForeignAffairsinordertoadaptTurkishforeignpolicy to the international milieu. The Ministryof Foreign Affairs has been reorganized withinthe framework of public diplomacy, which alsohasaimedtomaketheMinistrycompatiblewiththeredesignedforeignpolicyformulationandthechanging global system. These transformationswithintheMinistryandinTurkishforeignpolicyhavebeenbroughtaboutsubstantiallybytheJDPanditspoliticalvision.

Compare and contrast hard power and soft power in the conduct ofinternationalrelations.

1

Forfurtherinformationonpublicdiplomacy,seethebookauthoredbyMuharremEKŞİ,The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy during JDP: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Muslim world,LapLambertAcademicPublishing,2016.

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The Reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs UndertheJDPgovernments,theMinistryofForeignAffairshasbeenrestructuredinordertomake

itmorecompatiblewiththenewlydefinedforeign-policyobjectivesandthechangingglobalsystem.TheMinistryofForeignAffairshasbeenreorganizedwiththelatestamendmentofitsorganizationalactthatwasadoptedonJuly13,2010(TheMinistryofForeignAffairs,2013).Withthisactandthenewsoftpolicyaims,tennewgeneraldirectorateswereinauguratedwithintheMinistry.Amongthese,theGeneralDirectorateofInformation,theGeneralDirectorateofOverseasPromotionandCulturalRelations,andtheDeputyGeneralDirectorateofCulturalDiplomacymaybesingledoutbecauseoftheirimportanceandrelevancetopublicdiplomacy.

Figure 7.2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.

Source: www.avim.org.tr

The General Directorate of InformationcoordinatestheinteractionbetweentheMinistryandthenationalandinternationalmediaorganizationsonforeignpolicyissuestowardinformingthepressandthepublic(TheMinistryofForeignAffairs2012ActivityReport,2013:107).Inthiscontext,Facebook,Twitter,andYouTubeaccountsinvariouslanguageswereopenedtoparticipateintheglobalsocialmedia.ThisindicatesthattheMinistryhasadapteditselftothenewtoolsofpublicdiplomacy.Moreover,itmakesuseof the social-media tools fororganizingpressmeetings.TheMinistryofForeignAffairs, then,hasfocusedontheinformational-communicationalaspectofpublicdiplomacy.

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The General Directorate of Overseas Promotion and Cultural Relations and the Deputy General Directorate of Cultural DiplomacywereestablishedastheunitstopromotetheculturaldiplomacyofTurkey.TheMinistryconsidersculturaldiplomacyasoneofthemajorcomponentsofthemultidimensionalforeignpolicy,anditengages inculturalactivitiesabroad.Inthiscontext, theGeneralDirectoratehasbeenassignedtoconductbilateralculturalrelationsandculturalexchangeprogramssoastoachievethegoalsofculturalpolicy.Thispolicyhas resulted innewculturalcooperationandexchangeagreements

Figure 7.3 Organization Chart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.

Source: www.mfa.gov.tr

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with 29 countries during the JDP governments(TheMinistry of Culture andTourism, CulturalAgreements in Effects 2014). These agreementsareanexplicit indicatorofeffortsofrevivingandstrengthening cultural and political relations ofTurkey with the world at large. In addition, theDirectorateorganizesandsupportsculturaleventsinvariouscountriesonaperiodicalbasis.

The Office of Public Diplomacy The Public Diplomacy Coordination Office

of the Prime Ministry waslaterrenamedthe Office of Public Diplomacy. The Coordination Officewasestablishedwithapresidentialmemorandumon January 30, 2010, under the PrimeMinistryof Turkey for the purpose of influencing andguidingtheinternationalcommunity(PresidentialMemorandum,2010).ThestructureoftheOfficeconsistsofsuchunitsastheMediaWorks,PoliticalCommunication, Cultural Works, CorporateWorks, and Project Development. The primaryactivities of theOffice include organizing publicdiplomacy panels, foreign policy promotionprograms, foreign policy workshops, and youthprograms in Turkey (Prime Ministry Office ofPublicDiplomacy,2014).

Figure 7.4 İbrahim Kalın, the founding coordinator of the Public Diplomacy Coordination Office.

Source: www.hurriyet.com.tr

Organizing public diplomacy panels can beconsideredasanactivityforpromotingJDP’sforeignpolicyagendatosomecircles,includinguniversitystudents and academicians. Communicationactivitiesofpublicdiplomacyareorganizedunder

various formats and names, including countrymeetings, wise people conferences, Europeanmeetings, panels, and Istanbul Global Forum.Therefore,communicationactivitiesareconsideredas a political communication activity limitedto the academic aspect of public diplomacy.Country meetings bring together experts of thethink tanks and researchers around world withtheir counterparts in Turkey. Moreover, thesemeetings aim to build a ground for systematiccommunicationandconnectionamonglocalandforeign researchers, academicians, journalists,andpoliticians.However, thescopeof theOfficehas almost been narrowed to inward-orientedactivities.Besides,onemayargue that theOfficehas an approach to public diplomacy in a waytopresent itself asmerely a tool to influence theinternationalcommunity.

It is necessary to emphasize that the JDPgovernments have supported public diplomacymorestronglythaneverinTurkishforeignpolicy.ThispolicychoicecanbeconsideredasastrategiconeintermsofJDP’sMiddleEastpolicy.TheJDPhas engaged inMiddleEastpoliticswith itsnewapproachtopolitics,whichaimedatreshapingandreinventing the historical legacy of theOttomanEmpire. The JDP has pursued a foreign policyso as to influence the international communityin general and the Muslim world in particular,throughpromotingthecountry’sIslamistidentityand sharing the Ottoman legacy and culturethrough public diplomacy. Accordingly, the JDPhasadoptedasoftpowerstrategytowin both the hearts and mindsofthepublicopinioninIslamiccountries. Hence, the establishment of variouspublic diplomacy institutions in Turkey is aconsequence of the policy perspective under theJDPgovernmentsandsuchapolicychoicecouldbecharacterizedasacultural shiftinTurkishforeignpolicy.

On the other hand, the Office of PublicDiplomacy presented a certain public diplomacyperspectivebyeffectivelyexplainingthenewstoryof Turkey, engaging with diverse groups, andfulfillingoperationsofmultisidedcommunication.As such, theOffice, as anorganization in chargeof public diplomacy, limits the Turkish publicdiplomacytotheactiontopromotethenewstoryofTurkeytotheglobalpublicinthemosteffectiveandcomprehensiveway(Kalın,2011).Therefore,

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itmaybearguedthattheOfficeinterpretsTurkey’spublicdiplomacyfromaverynarrowperspectiveinthattheyaimatexplainingthecountry’spositionbut not listening to others and that its activitiessomewhat neglect the cultural, foreign aid, andlobbyaspectsofinternationalpublicdiplomacy.

THE YUNUS EMRE INSTITUTE AS PART OF TURKISH PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY AND TURKISH SOFT POWER

As explained above, public diplomacyinstitutionsare thenewactors inTurkish foreignpolicy and theyhave served as thenew channelsand mechanisms for defining and implementingthe recentpolicies.Amongother institutions,wecansingleouttheYunusEmreInstituteandshoulddevote some space in this chapter to its mostimportantactivities,includingthoseaboutculturaldiplomacy,teachingTurkishasaforeignlanguage,sciencediplomacy,andpublicdiplomacy.

The Yunus Emre Institute and Cultural Diplomacy

TheYunusEmreInstituteisarelativelyyoungorganization compared to its counterparts insome other countries. For example, the Alliance Française was established in 1883, the British Council in 1934, and the Goethe Institut in1951. The Yunus Emre Institute (YEI), as thefirst Turkish organization to conduct culturaldiplomacy,wasestablishedin2009.TheInstituteaimsatexpandingtheculturalinfluenceofTurkeyin theBalkans,Africa, and theMiddleEast.TheInstitute tries to achieve theseobjectives throughintroducing and promoting Turkish language,history, culture, and art around the world.Although theYunusEmre Institute operates as a

non-governmentalorganization(NGO)accordingtoitsby-laws,itisaffiliatedwithboththeMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheMinistryofCulture.Thismakes it a government-sponsored organizationratherthanan independententerprise.Moreover,thePresidentofTurkeyisthehonorarychairoftheBoardofTrustees.

In the International Relations literature,cultural diplomacyisdefinedasnurturingmutualunderstanding between states and their peoplesthroughtheexchangeofideas,knowledge,art,andother components of culture. More specifically,culturaldiplomacyistheuseofculturalactivitiesfordiplomaticpurposes.Itistheconceptualizationofculturalrelationsbetweenstatesinthecontextofpublicdiplomacyattheindividualandsociallevel.Sincecultureandarthavebeenusedasa toolofforeignpolicythroughouthistory,itisunderstoodthatculturaldiplomacyisnotanewphenomenon.What is new today is the fact that the use ofcultural activities to generate soft power throughpublicdiplomacybecomesmuchmoreimportantdue to globalization as well as the advent ofinformationandcommunicationtechnologies.Inshort,culturaldiplomacyhasbecomeacomponentofinternationalpublicdiplomacy.

Figure 7.5 Logo of the Yunus Emre Institute.

Source: www.yee.org.tr

The Turkish Cultural Centers Around the World

The Yunus Emre Institute opened its firstcenter in Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 17,2009,underthename“The Sarajevo Yunus Emre

Given the tools of public diplomacy, discussthe relationbetween thepolitical leadership inTurkey andTurkey’s relative popularity in theworld.

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Turkish Cultural Centre.”TheYEI’s strategy toopenits firstcenter inSarajevoindicatesthattheInstitute’spivotalregionofinterestistheBalkans.Accordingly, the Institute launched its secondcultural center inTirana, the capital of Albania,onDecember11,2009.Asof2014,theInstituteestablished 11 centers in the Balkans. Later on,the Institute opened its first Middle-East centerin Cairo, the capital of Egypt, in March 2010,and opened seven centers in total by 2014.TheYunusEmreInstitutewasoperating37centersin33countriesasof2015.Inaddition,theInstitutelaunched its office in theWashington D.C., theUS,in2017anditisalsoplanningtoopenculturalcenters in cities such as New York, Boston, andHouston.

Theoverseasorganizationof theYunus Emre Institute Turkish Cultural Centers has beenstructured under three different models. Thefirst model is to open centers under the Turkish Embassyinthehostcountry.Inthismodel,centersare established with a status affiliated with theembassy, but they act autonomously afterhavingbecome operational. In this model, as of 2015,therewere28centers.However,thestatusofthesecenters may be changed from a state-affiliationinstitutiontoan independentNGO,aspreferredby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by signing“cultural centers agreement”withthehostcountries.Accordingly, the second model is the “culturalcenters agreement” that authorizes the openingof a cultural center as an NGO by signing anagreementinlinewiththelocallegislationofthehost country. The Institute planned to establishsixcentersasNGOsinBelgium,theNetherlands,Hungary, Japan, Britain, and Nicosia/TRNC.The thirdmodel is toopen cultural centers at the universitiesinthehostcountries.

Threemethods are critical indetermining thelocationtoopenaculturalcenter.First,dependingon the demand from the local people, TurkishNGOsandgovernmentsdetermine thecountriestoopenthecenters.Thesecondmethodissubjectto the priorities of Turkish foreign policy basedonstrategicplanning. Forinstance,theMinisterofForeignAffairsAhmetDavutoğlustatedinhisaddress in the inaugural ceremony of the centerinSarajevothat“openingthe firstculturalcenterinSarajevo isnot a coincidence, but a consciousdecision which we have deeply thought upon”

(YunusEmreBulletin,2009:3).Thisdemonstratesthat the locations of centers are decided uponaccordingtotheprioritiesofTurkishforeignpolicy,andtheopeningofthesecenterstakesplaceunderthesupervisionoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Thirdly,culturalcentersmayalsobeopenedbyanorder issuedbytheTurkishPresident.TheYunusEmre Institute has opened 58 centers in a totalof48countriesasofthebeginningof2019.TheInstitute aims to open 100 cultural centers by2023,whichcoincideswiththe100thanniversaryofthefoundationoftheTurkishRepublic.

The Scope of the Yunus Emre Institute

ThefieldsofactivityoftheYunusEmreInstitutecan be divided into two groups: educationalactivities based on teachingTurkish as a secondlanguage,andculturalandart-relatedactivities.

Teaching the Turkish language has graduallybecomethemaindutyandfunctionofthecenters.ThisisinlinewiththeobjectiveofmakingTurkishaworld languageand,infact,thisstrategyispartofTurkey’saspiration tobecomeaglobalactor.Theactivityof teachingTurkishas a foreign languagebegan in 2009 at the Sarajevo center with 45studentsand3instructors.Currentlythereare99instructorsworkingin27countriesand,asof2012,the total number of students learningTurkish atthe centers reached 3459 (YunusEmre Institute2012ActivityReport,2013:77).The institute isplanned to be the only institution qualified forteachingTurkishtoforeignersaroundtheworld.

Besides the activities mentioned above, theInstitute organizes Turkish Summer Schools invariouscountriesonanannualbasis.Thetraineesat the cultural centers as well as the successful

“Turkish Proficiency Exam” (TYS):TheInstitutehasdevelopeda“TurkishProficiencyExam”(TYS)similartotheTOEFLandIELTSexams.ThisdemonstratesthattheInstitute’sTurkishexamhasbecomeaninternationally-recognizedexaminationandcertificationprocess.ThefirstinternationalTYSexaminationwasconductedonMay24,2013,in10countries.

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studentsstudyingtheTurkishlanguageatforeignuniversities through the protocols signed undertheTurkology project attend the summer schoolevents. Between 2010 and 2012, 667 studentsfrom57 countries attended theTurkish SummerSchool and the Institute paid all the expenses ofthese activities (Turkish Summer School 2012).Studentsarealsogiven thechance toexplore theAnatolian culture by visiting different cities ofTurkey on guided tours, and they attend variouscultural and art-related activities. In addition,culturalcentersperiodicallyorganizesymposiums,panels, colloquiums, and fairs; and hold culture-artfestivalsinsuchareasasfilm,food,traditionalart, poem recitals, painting, writing, traditionalTurkishhandcraft,music,folkdance,anddrama.

The Projects of the Yunus Emre Institute

The Yunus Emre Institute conducts thefollowingprojects:

• theprojectofTurkology,• theprojectofTurkishasaForeignLan-

guage,• theprojectofTurkishasanelectivecourse

inforeignschools,• theprojectofrebuildingculturalheritage

intheBalkans,• theprojectofrevivingthetraditional

TurkishhandcraftintheBalkans,• theprojectof100Turkishlibraries,• theprojectoftranslating100Turkish

books,andtheprojectofjointpaintingexhibitions.Moreover, theYEI developed various projects

suchastheTurkishbookstore,theprojectofhistoryonsite,theprojectofTurkishcafe,theprojectofTurkisheducationtoTurkishchildreninEurope,andtheprojectofdistanceTurkisheducation.

The Project of Rebuilding Cultural Heritage in the Balkans

Theprojectofrebuildingcultural heritage intheBalkansisoneofthemostsignificantprojectsof theYunus Emre Institute.This project is alsosupported by the Central Bank of the Republicof Turkey. Under the project, several activitiesin seven Balkan countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Macedonia,Albania,Kosovo,Serbia,Montenegro,and Croatia) were implemented including therestoration and maintenance of the culturalheritage sites and digitalizing those manuscriptsthatweredamagedduring thewars (Balkanlar’daGeleneksel Türk El Sanatlarının İhyası Projesi).Theproject that started inNovember2011 aimsto revive theTurkish culture and history in theBalkansandtostrengthenthehistorictiescreatedin,andhavesurvivedsince,theOttomanperiod.Theproject also aimsat strengthening thebondswiththepeopleoftheregion,especiallyintoday’sxenophobicenvironment,andbuildingtheculturalandhistoricalgroundforfuturerelationsofTurkeywiththeBalkancountries.

The Turkology ProjectThe Turkology Projectwas initiated in1999

by the Turkish Cooperation and CoordinationAgency(TürkİşbirliğiveKoordinasyonBaşkanlığı- TİKA) to strengthen the relations especiallywith the countries in the Balkans, Caucasia,and theMiddleEast.However, later this projectwas transferred to the Yunus Emre Instituteon September 20, 2011. The Institute signedprotocolsandexpandedthegeographyforTurkishteaching abroad to Africa and Southern Asia. Inline with the newTurkish foreign policy vision,thisprojectaimedatincreasingthepopulationofTurkish speakers in this vast geography. By thisproject,Turkeywantedtoestablishcloserelationsnotonlybetweenitselfandthecountriesintheseregions,butalsobetweenindividualsandsocieties.Thisapproachisbasedonthethesisthatacommonlanguage provides a cultural commonality thatwouldpromotetherelationsbetweenTurkeyandcountries in the aforementioned regions and thereciprocal peoples and extendTurkey’s influencearoundtheworld.

It is expected, then, that the cultural exchangewith other countries would increase and culturalproximity would be established by way of theTurkology project. For example, to achieve itsobjectives, the Institute signed protocols with 22countries and sent 36 lecturers to the universitiesabroad for the academic year of 2012-2013. In2013-2014, this number increased to 48 lecturersin25countries(TheCatalogofTurkology,2013:9).

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The Project of Teaching Turkish as a Foreign Language

Yunus Emre Institute also follows a strategytoteachTurkish as an elective foreign languagein the schools of the countrieswhere its culturalcentersarelocated.Forexample,theInstituteaimsat teaching Turkish as a foreign language in 59primaryandsecondaryschoolsinthreecantonsoftheBosniaHerzegovinaFederation.Theministriesof education of the Hersek-Neretva, Bosnia-Podrinye, and Zenitsa-Doboy cantons decidedto teachTurkish as a second foreign language inprimary and secondary schools fromGrade 6 to13intheschoolyearof2012-2013(YunusEmreBulletin2013:8).Asaresult,sixthousandstudentsstarted learning Turkish as an elective foreignlanguagefrom50teachersinthesameschoolyear.Moreover, theMinistryofNationalEducationofGeorgia permitted the school administrations toselect a second foreign language besides English.Thisallowed400studentstostartstudyingTurkishin54Georgianschools.TurkishisalsotaughtasaforeignlanguageinJordanandRomaniathrough

special agreements with these countries. Whatis more, in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia,andAlgeria, the talkswith the authorities are inprogress to teach Turkish as a foreign language.OnemayconcludethatthisprojectpavedthewayforTurkishtocompetewiththeWesternlanguagestobecomeaworldlanguage.ThiswaspartoftheJDP’spolicy in that it allowedTurkey to reassertits influence in the region through the revival ofcultural and linguistic ties with the neighboringcountries.

The Revival of Traditional Turkish Handcraft in the BalkansThisprojectaimstorevivethecraftsthattendtodisappearortobeforgottenintheBalkans.Withthisproject,theInstituteaimsatpromotingthecommonculturalelementsintheBalkansdatingbacktotheOttomaneraand,therefore,reestablishinghistoricalandculturaltieswiththepeoplesandcountriesoftheregion.(YEIActivityReport,2013:66).

The Project of 100 Turkish Libraries Thisproject,whichwasfundedwithabudgetof2.5millionTLbytheTurkishZiraatBank,tookeffect

incompliancewithaprotocolsignedonApril11,2012.Eachoftheselibrariesistocontain2000booksthatcanbeconsideredasworksofclassicalTurkishliteratureforadultsandchildrenaswellasthoseworksthatmaybeessentialforpeopledoingresearchonTurkey.Theprojectisexpectedtobeimplementedinvariousgeographies,includingtheMiddleEast,Africa,theBalkans,Caucasia,CentralAsia,Russia,theBalticcountries,Europe,theUS,theFarEast,andChina.OnehundredTurkishlibrariesareexpectedtobecompletedintwoyears,andtheyareplannedtobefunctionalin16citiesintheMiddleEastandAfrica,

Figure 7.6 The Center of Turkish Studies, a joint project of the Kazan Federal University and the Yunus Emre Institute.

Source: www.realnoevremya.com/articles/604

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27citiesintheBalkans,15citiesinCaucasiaandCentral Asia, 13 cities in the Baltic countries,18 cities in Europe, and in 11 cities in otherimportantcenters.Asof2013,twenty-fivelibrarieswerealreadyopenedand50morewere plannedfortheyear2014(ActivityReport,2012:69).Inlinewiththeobjectiveofimprovingvisibilityandactive diplomacy, the project aimed at meetingtheincreasingdemandoninformationonTurkey,promoting interaction with other countries, andbuildingresourcecentersonTurkeyabroad.

The Yunus Emre Institute’s Initiative of Science Diplomacy

Science diplomacy is an instrument ofpublic diplomacy, and scientists are consideredto be the practitioners of public diplomacy. Infact, Nye considers science as a source of softpower. Science diplomacy is defined as buildingrelationshipsthroughscience,developingrelationswith international scientific communities and, assuch,establishingdialogueandtiesbetweenstatesand the international community. Not only thecountriesthathavegainedtheupperhandinthefieldofscienceandtechnologybutalsomanyothercountries pursue a policy of science diplomacytoward engaging more actively in scientificresearch and becoming a center of attraction forpeoplesaroundtheworld.

Science diplomacy was introduced in Turkeyin2012. Initially, the activities startedunder theauspicesoftheMinistryofScience,Industry,andTechnologyandcontinuedthroughtheinitiativesoftheYunusEmreInstitute.InMarch2012,theMinistry launched the first scientific diplomacyinitiativeinWashingtonD.C.with520scientistsattending the 5th annual conference of theTurkish American Scientists and Academicians Association (TASSA). In addition, the Ministryplanned to open four centers in San Francisco,Boston,Tokyo,andGermanytofurtherpromoteitssciencediplomacy(Dünya,2012).

The Yunus Emre Institute launched theAcademic and Scientific Cooperation Project of Turkey(TABIP)asasciencediplomacyprojectunder the auspices of the Turkish Presidencyin 2017 (TABİP, 2019). With this project,Turkeyaimsatcreatinga scientificandacademicinteractioncontextand,asaresult,beingableto

monitortheacademic,scientific,andtechnologicaldevelopments around the world. IntroducingTurkey’sscientificactivitiestotheworldisthemainobjectiveandthefirstpriorityofthisproject.Thisproject is believed to eventually increaseTurkey’srecognitionintheacademicfieldandhelpTurkeybecomeoneofthecountriesthattakepartinthedecision-making processes in the internationalscientific arena. Besides the TABIP, the YunusEmreInstituteundertakesanotherprojectknownas the Point of Contact Fellowship Program(PoCFP), which aims to provide fellowships forPhD candidates and post-doc researchers. Inaddition,asummerschoolprogramisconductedby theTABIP inorder toprovideundergraduateand graduate students with an opportunity toincrease their knowledge on certain importantTurkishcompanies.

The Yunus Emre Institute’s Initiative of Public Diplomacy

The Global Public Diplomacy Network(GPDNet) was established by the public andcultural diplomacy institutions of nine countries(The Philippines, Sweden, Korea, Hungary,Nigeria,Poland,Portugal,Singapore,andTurkey)in Seoul, the capital of South Korea, in 2014(GPDNet,2019).WiththeinclusionofHungary,the number of members increased to ten. Thisnetwork was established by the representativesof the institutes by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on Global Public Diplomacy Institutions in order to promote informationsharing in theoretical and practical fields and

“PoCFPforPhDstudentsallowsthestudentstocarryoutlong-termgoals.ApplicantscanbenativeorinternationalbutshouldliveinacountryotherthantheRepublicofTurkey.PhDstudentsandalsoPost-Docresearchersofallnationalitiesanddisciplinesmayapplytothe‘PointofContactFellowshipProgramme’atanytime.ThePoCFPgrants10fellowshipsperyear.PoCFPoffersthestudentsamonthlyallowanceof1000EUR,foramaximumdurationof10months,renewableannually”(www.tabipacademy.com/programs/).

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prepare bilateral andmultifacetedprojects in thefieldofculturalandpublicdiplomacyindifferentregionsoftheworld.

The Yunus Emre Institute served as the termpresidentbetween2016and2019.Inthisprocess,asGPDNetactivities, theInstituteorganizedboththe Anatolian Civilizations Tour in Turkey andtheTales for Everyone Festival (YEE2017).TheAnatolianCivilizationsTouraimedatinternationallycommunicating that different civilizations livedin Anatolia. At The Tales for Everyone Festival,fairytalenarratorsfromdifferentgeographieswithdifferent socioeconomic backgrounds told talesin their native languages. The Festival, as such,demonstratedthatitispossibleforthenationsandpeoples to live together with different languagesandculturesforacommonpurpose(suchaspeace),regardless of their cultural background. Throughtheseactivities,theInstitutehastakenconcretestepsto realize its vision that the “world is greater thanfive,”whichreferstothepermanentfivemembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil.

THE NEW TURKISH INSTITUTIONS ON DIASPORA

DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN AID, AND HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACYTwo further concepts should be introduced

regarding a state’s public diplomacy: diasporadiplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy. Thecommunities living outside their home countriesarecalleddiasporas.Diasporadiplomacyisbasicallytheuseofdiasporacommunitiesasaforeignpolicyinstrument.Statesaimatturningthemintoeffectivepolitical actors in their host countries by followingthe policy of developing relations with diasporacommunities.Thediasporadiplomacy,then,referstoactivitiesandincentivesofastatetoorganizediasporacommunitiesasNGOsandhelpthembecomeactiveactorsinthepoliticallifeoftheirhostcountries.As

such, through strongdiaspora, statesmayhave thepoweroflobbyingthepoliciestobepursuedtowardhost countries and have leverage on their foreignpolicies.InthecaseofTurkey,diasporadiplomacyasdiscussedearlierundertheconceptofForeignTurks,began to be applied as public diplomacy with theestablishmentofthePresidencyofTurksAbroadandRelatedCommunitiesAbroadin2010.ThenameoftheinstitutionhasbeenpreferredastheTurksAbroadand Related Communities, since the concept offoreignTurksmightgivetheimpressionthatTurkeyhadexpansionistambitions.

Thedevelopmentassistanceandhumanitarianaidofstatestocountries inneediscalledforeignaidandhumanitariandiplomacy.Itiscalledforeignaid diplomacy or humanitarian diplomacy whenstatesprovideemergencyhumanitarianaidincasesofnaturaldisasterssuchasearthquakesorfloods.However, the difference between humanitariandiplomacy and humanitarian foreign policyshould not be overlooked.Humanitarian foreignpolicyreferstostateinstitutions’aid(developmentassistance andurgenthumanitarian aid),whereasin humanitarian diplomacy, there is immediatehumanitarian aid to the victims by sub-state ornon-stateorganizations.Humanitariandiplomacyis mostly carried out through informal relationsin armed conflicts, while humanitarian foreignpolicyiscarriedoutbydiplomatsandgovernmentofficials. In short, themost distinctive feature ofhumanitariandiplomacyisitsciviliannature.

Belowwewillreviewinsomedepthtwoimportantinstitutions throughwhichTurkey implements itsdiaspora diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy:The Presidency for Turks Abroad and RelatedCommunities and the Turkish Cooperation andCoordinationAgency,respectively.

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YurtdışıTürklerveAkrabaToplulukları Başkanlığı - YTB) is one of the newinstitutionslaunchedbytheJDPgovernments.Itwasestablishedasanagencyunder thePrimeMinistryonMarch 24, 2010.TheYTBwas established toperformfunctions related toTurkishcitizens livingabroadandtofindsolutionstotheirproblemsaswellas tocarryoutactivities todevelopsocial,cultural,

ThemostimportantpublicpolicyinstitutionofTurkeyisnamedafterYunusEmre.Whatmightbethereason/sforthis?Discuss.

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andeconomicrelationswiththecognateandrelatedcommunities.Article62oftheConstitutionoftheTurkish Republic provides a legal ground for theYTB. The target groups of the YTB are Turkishcitizensaswellascognateandrelatedcommunitiesliving abroad. Its vision is “wherever our relativeis, wherever our citizen is,Turkey will stay aside”(YTB2012ActivityReport).ThisisconsideredtobethemottooftheYTBthataspirestofindsolutionstoproblemsoftheTurks,kincommunities,andrelatedcommunities living abroad toward strengtheningtheir relationswithTurkey andhost countries andmaintainingtheirculturalvalues(Artı90,2012:1).

YTB and Diaspora DiplomacyThenameoftheYTBremindsonetheconcepts

of“external Turks,”ascommonlyusedpreviously,andTurkishcitizensaswellascognateandrelatedcommunities living abroad. In this sense, it ispossible tocharacterize theYTBas the“Ministry of Diaspora”thataimsatbuildinganinternationallobby to address certain problems and meet theneeds of these communities.Accordingly, formerDeputyPrimeMinisterBekirBozdağ referred totheOverseasCitizensAdvisoryBoard,whichwasestablishedbytheYTB,asthe“Turkish Diaspora Assembly”(Artı90,2012:1).

Figure 7.7 YTB’s Turkish Diaspora Assembly Meeting with the Turkic Council.

Source: www.ytb.gov.tr

ItmaybeassumedthattheYTBaspirestotransformthispotentialofrelationsintoanorganizeddiasporalikethatofIsraelandArmenia.Infact,theestablishmentoftheYTBisasignshowingthatTurkeystartedtodevelopapolicyfordiasporaandlobbyingthathasbeenneglectedforalongtimeinTurkishforeignpolicy.ThispolicyofbuildingaglobaldiasporacommunityispartoftheJDP’spoliticalstrategyrepresentingtheMuslimsaroundtheworldandstrengtheningthepoliticalphilosophyofdemocraticIslam.Moreover,thepolicyofdiasporamayalsobeconsideredaspartoftheJDP’sgrandstrategyofturningTurkeyintoaglobalactor.Inaddition,promotingadiasporadiplomacyisimportantwithrespecttoTurkey’spublicdiplomacy,and it contributes to gaining a leverage in international relations, especially in the Islamicworld. It isobviousthatTurkeyneedsadiasporacommunitythatwouldserveasalobbygroupandasabulwarkagainstthepseudo-genocidedraftsofsomecountriesthatmightdamagetheimageofTurkey.

Therefore,theYTBorganizescertainactivitiesandprovidesassistancetosomeNGOstowarddevelopingNGOcapacitiesandcapabilities.Towardthisend,theYTBincreasedthenumberofitsoverseasagenciesto219by2013andplannedtoincreasethisnumbertoaround230by2015(YTBKurumsalMaliDurumveBeklentilerRaporu,2012:14).

GiventheYTB’sdiasporapolicy,itmaybeassumedthatTurkeyfollowsapolicytowardstrengtheningtiesbetween thediaspora andhomeland throughhistorical andcultural interactionswith theoverseascommunities.Thus,bywayofYTBactivities,Turkeyisintheprocessofbuildingadiasporacommunityabroad in order to achieve its policy of becoming a global actor. The YTB organizes these overseas

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communitiesmainlyasNGOsandmakessurethat theyhavethepowerto influencedecision-makingmechanisms in theirhost countries.Therefore, theYTBencourages theTurkish citizens living abroadto strengthen their relations with the political parties in their host countries and to participate indomesticpoliticallife.TobuildadiasporacommunityforconductinglobbyingactivitiesisthoughttobeinstrumentalforTurkey.Currently,therearemorethan800electedrepresentativesofTurkishorigininvariouscountries.

TheYTBalsoaimsatcreatingorganizationssuchastheinternationaldiasporamediaplatformandaEuropeanDiasporaCouncil/Congress,as itcanbe inferredfromtheworksof theOverseasCitizensAdvisoryBoard.Thispotential is clearly symbolizedby the fact that there aremore than500Turkishmediaorganizationsaroundtheworld(BYEGM,BirBakıştaTürkMedyası,2013).

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency TheTurkishCooperationandCoordinationAgency(TİKA)wasestablishedin1992asanorganization

affiliatedwith theMinistry of ForeignAffairs to provide technical assistance to countries inCaucasiaand Central Asia that gainedindependence after the collapseof the Soviet Union. The Agencywas reorganized in 2001 underthe Turkish Prime Ministry toconduct cooperation projectsand programs in the economic,commercial, technical, social,cultural, and educational areaswith the neighboring countriesand Turkish communities wherethe Turkish language is spoken.However,theTİKAwasreorganizedin2011undertheJDPgovernmentsso that the Agency might performits coordination function moreeffectively through the use of soft-powertoolsandpublicdiplomacy.

InaccordwiththeexpansionofTurkishforeignpolicytonewregions,theTİKAstartedtofunction,forinstance,inAfrica,forwhichtheassistancesurpassedthatgiventoCentralAsiancountries.Withrespecttoregionalaids,Africaranksfirstwith31.37percent,followedbytheSouthandCentralAsiaby29,17percent,theBalkansandEasternEuropeby22,81percent,andtheMiddleEastby15,48percent(TİKABulletin,2011).Accordingtothe 2012 Activity Report, Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, Sudan,Tunisia, Palestine,Kazakhstan,andBosniaHerzegovinawereamongthetoptencountriesthatreceivedthehighestaidfromtheassistanceprograms.Thispointsout to theprioritygivenby theJDPgovernments to theMuslimworld(TİKAActivityReport,2012:24).

The Policy of Benefactor Country TheJDPgovernmentsattemptedtomakeTurkeyabenefactorcountry(donorcountry)intheworld

thoughitspublicdiplomacy.Theobjectivetoreachabenefactorcountrystatusthroughforeignaidsisa consequenceof the JDPgovernments’policy toelevateTurkey to the statusof aglobal actor in the

Figure 7.8 TİKA’s project for access to clean drinking water.


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internationalsystem.TheJDPgovernmentsinitiatedapolicyofbuildinganimageforTurkeyasacountryprovidingeconomicandtechnicalassistanceratherthanacountryreceivingforeignassistance.Assuch,theJDP governments aimed at layingthe groundwork for becoming notonly a regional power but also aglobalactor.

A country that providesdevelopment assistance or urgenthumanitarianaidtothecountriesinneediscalledadonor country.Ontheonehand, suchcountriesbuildanattractiveimagethroughforeignaid,and,ontheotherhand,theyaimatincreasingtheirinfluencebothinthecountriestheyprovideassistanceandinmanyothercountriesaroundtheworld.Inthissense,theforeignaid and humanitarian diplomacypolicyimplementedthroughforeignaid enable a country to have thestatus of a donor country. Indeed,Turkey, according to the 2013Global Humanitarian AssistanceReport, became the 4th largestdonorcountry.

Becomingaglobalpowerdoesnotonlyconsistofbeingabenefactor(donor)country.However,thedonorcountrystatusiscriticalinthatitreferstothecapacitytousethesoftpowertoolsatbothregionalandgloballevels.TheJDPgovernmentshavesupportedthepolicythatTurkeyattainabig-powerstatusin the international system. Itmade this, amongother things, by giving aids andpromotingTurkey’simageofabenefactorcountry.TurkishexternalaidsintotalexceededsevenbillionDollarsbetween2004and2012.ThisdemonstratedthesoftpowerdimensionofTurkishforeignpolicyandtheprestigeTurkeygainedrecentlyintheworld.ForeignassistancemayalsobeconsideredasoneofthemostsuccessfulandpromisingfacetoftheJDPgovernments(AcilİnsaniYardımlar,2014:14).

Humanitarian DiplomacyUndertheJDPgovernments,thetotaldevelopment assistanceofTurkeyreachedmorethanthree

billionU.S.Dollars(TİKADevelopmentAid,2013:5).WhilethebudgetoftheOECD-DACmembercountriesallocatedforofficialdevelopmentassistancedecreasedby4percentin2012comparedtothepreviousyear,Turkeyincreaseditsexternalassistancebynearly100percenttoatotalof2billionand533millionU.S.Dollars(AidReport,2013:3).Forexample,theassistanceofTİKAbetween2002and2012wasincreasedbyseventimescomparedwiththeperiodof1992-2002.ThebenefactorcountrypolicyandtheobjectiveofbecomingaglobalactormayhelpexplainTurkey’svolumeofexternalassistance.Asoneofthesoftpowertoolsofforeignpolicy,theexternalassistanceisexpectedtopromoteTurkey’sperceptionasanattractivecountry,whichisacandidateforglobal-powerstatus.Fromthisperspective,itmaybearguedthattheactivitiesoftheTİKAareakeytooltofurtherempowerTurkey.

Figure 7.9 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivers a speech at a TİKA event.

Source: www.haber7.com

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TheTİKAhashelpeddiversifyTurkishforeignpolicyandaugment it throughthesoftpowertoolsand societal-cultural activities. It hasnotonly established a cooperation structure forTurkeywith thebeneficiary countries (those countries that have received the Turkish assistance) but also promotedhistorical, cultural and social linkswith these countries.Essentially, the infrastructureprojects such asbuildingschoolsandhospitalslaidthefoundationforcloserelationswiththebeneficiarycountriesandcreatedapositiveatmosphereforthefutureimportantpoliciesthatTurkeywantstoimplement.

Figure 7.10 Turkey ranks among world’s top aid donors.


DosomeresearchontheTİKA’sapproachtoSouth-Southcooperationinworldpolitics.

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LO 1 Discuss public diplomacy and soft power as the components of the new Turkish foreign policy.

TheimplementationofmodernandinstitutionalpublicdiplomacyinTurkishforeignpolicyandtheinstitutionalizationofpublicdiplomacytookplaceforthefirsttimeundertheJusticeandDevelopmentParty(JDP)governmentsinthe2000s.Therearetwokeydynamicsofthis:thefirstistheJDP’spolicyofpresentingitselfasamodeltotheworld,especiallytotheMiddleEasterncountries.Secondly,thehighcommercial/economicperformanceofTurkey,whichwasthe16thbiggesteconomyintheworldinthe2000s,allowedtheapplicationofpublicdiplomacyrequiringahighlevelofspending.Althoughpublicdiplomacy isbaseduponsoft-power tools, its implementationrequires“harddollars.” In thiscontext,-Turkeybuiltandpromoted,forthefirsttime,newinstitutionsandnewpoliciesforthesakeofinternationalpublicpolicy.First,theYunusEmreInstitutewasestablishedin2007inordertocarryout cultural diplomacy as a formof public diplomacy. In 2010, thePrimeMinistryCoordinatingOfficeofPublicDiplomacywasestablished.Alsoin2010,thePresidencyforTurksAbroadandRelatedCommunitieswasestablishedtocarryoutthediasporadiplomacy.AlltheseeffortsandaccomplishmentshavebeenmadepossiblebyacertaintypeofpowerofTurkeywhichisknownassoftpower.

LO 2 Review the restructuring of some state institutions in Turkey in line with the new foreign policy approach.

UndertheJDPgovernments,theMinistryofForeignAffairshasbeenrestructuredinordertomakeitmorecompatiblewiththenewlydefinedforeign-policyobjectivesandthechangingglobalsystem.TheMinistryofForeignAffairshasbeenreorganizedwiththelatestamendmentofitsorganizationalactthatwasadoptedonJuly13,2010.Withthisactandthenewsoftpolicyaims,tennewgeneraldirectorateswereinauguratedwithintheMinistry.Amongthese,theGeneralDirectorateofInformation,theGeneralDirectorate ofOverseas Promotion andCulturalRelations, and theDeputyGeneralDirectorate ofCulturalDiplomacymaybesingledoutbecauseoftheirimportanceandrelevancetopublicdiplomacy.The General Directorate of Information coordinates the interaction between the Ministry and thenationalandinternationalmediaorganizationsonforeignpolicyissuestowardinformingthepressandthepublic.TheGeneralDirectorateofOverseasPromotionandCulturalRelationsand theDeputyGeneral Directorate of Cultural Diplomacy were established as the units to promote the culturaldiplomacy ofTurkey. The Public Diplomacy Coordination Office of the Prime Ministry was laterrenamedtheOfficeofPublicDiplomacy.

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LO 4Evaluate the activities of the new Turkish institutions with regard to diaspora diplomacy, foreign assistance, and humanitarian diplomacy.

Twofurtherconceptsshouldbeintroducedregardingastate’spublicdiplomacy:diasporadiplomacyandhumanitariandiplomacy.Diasporadiplomacyisbasicallytheuseofdiasporacommunitiesasaforeignpolicy instrument. States aim at turning them into effectivepolitical actors in their host countries byfollowingthepolicyofdevelopingrelationswithdiasporacommunities.Thedevelopmentassistanceandhumanitarianaidofstatestocountriesinneediscalledforeignaidandhumanitariandiplomacy.Turkeyhas recently implemented its diaspora diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy through two agencies:ThePresidency forTurksAbroadandRelatedCommunities (YTB),andtheTurkishCooperationandCoordinationAgency(TİKA).ThePresidencyforTurksAbroadandRelatedCommunitiesisoneofthenewinstitutionslaunchedbytheJDPgovernments.ItwasoriginallyestablishedasanagencyunderthePrimeMinistryonMarch24,2010.TheYTBwasestablishedtoperformfunctionsrelatedtoTurkishcitizenslivingabroadandtofindsolutionstotheirproblemsaswellastocarryoutactivitiestodevelopsocial,cultural,andeconomicrelationswiththecognateandrelatedcommunities.Ontheotherhand,theTurkishCooperationandCoordinationAgencywasestablishedin1992asanorganizationaffiliatedwiththeMinistryofForeignAffairstoprovidetechnicalassistancetocountriesinCaucasiaandCentralAsiathatgainedindependenceafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.TheTİKAwasreorganizedin2011undertheJDPgovernmentssothattheAgencymightperformitscoordinationfunctionmoreeffectivelythroughtheuseofsoft-powertoolsandpublicdiplomacy.

LO 3 Summarize the activities of the Yunus Emre Institute.

UndertheJDPgovernments,theMinistryofForeignAffairshasbeenrestructuredinordertomakeitmorecompatiblewiththenewlydefinedforeign-policyobjectivesandthechangingglobalsystem.TheMinistryofForeignAffairshasbeenreorganizedwiththelatestamendmentofitsorganizationalactthatwasadoptedonJuly13,2010.Withthisactandthenewsoftpolicyaims,tennewgeneraldirectorateswereinauguratedwithintheMinistry.Amongthese,theGeneralDirectorateofInformation,theGeneralDirectorate ofOverseas Promotion andCulturalRelations, and theDeputyGeneralDirectorate ofCulturalDiplomacymaybesingledoutbecauseoftheirimportanceandrelevancetopublicdiplomacy.The General Directorate of Information coordinates the interaction between the Ministry and thenationalandinternationalmediaorganizationsonforeignpolicyissuestowardinformingthepressandthepublic.TheGeneralDirectorateofOverseasPromotionandCulturalRelationsand theDeputyGeneral Directorate of Cultural Diplomacy were established as the units to promote the culturaldiplomacy ofTurkey. The Public Diplomacy Coordination Office of the Prime Ministry was laterrenamedtheOfficeofPublicDiplomacy.

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1 Which of the following scholars firstdevelopedtheconceptofsoftpower?a.HansMorgenthaub.RobertKeohanec. JosephNyed.EdwardH.Carre. FriedrichNietzsche

2 Which of the following is not one of theinstitutionsofpublicdiplomacyestablishedinthe2000sbyTurkey?a.The Prime Ministry Public Diplomacy

CoordinationOfficeb.The Presidency forTurks Abroad and Related

Communitiesc.TheYunusEmreInstituted.ThePrimeMinistryofTurkishCooperationand

CoordinationAgencye.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Deputy

GeneralDirectorateofCulturalDiplomacy

3 WhichofthefollowingdimensionsdidpublicdiplomacymainlyaddtoTurkishforeignpolicy?a.Militaryb.Cybersecurityc. Sociald.Defenseindustrye. Technologicalinfrastructure

4 Which of the following is not one of theinstitutions established at the Turkish ForeignMinistrytowardpromotingpublicdiplomacy?a.The Deputy General Directorate of Cultural

Diplomacyb.TheGeneralDirectorateofInformationc.TheGeneralDirectorateofOverseasPromotion

andCulturalRelationsd.ThePresidencyofDiplomacyAcademye.TheGeneralDirectorateofProtocol

5 WhywasthePublicDiplomacyCoordinationOfficeestablished?a. Toinfluenceandguideinternationalcommunityb.Toattracttouristsc. Toattractforeigninvestmentd.Toincreasethevolumeofcommercee. Toinfluencedomesticpublicopinion

6 WhichofthefollowinginstitutionsismainlyresponsibleforconductingtheculturaldiplomacyofTurkey?a.TheTİKAb.TheYTBc.TheYunusEmreInstituted.TheMinistryofForeignAffairse.TheMinistryofCultureandTourism

7 TheYTBmainlyconducts---Which of the following correctly completes thesentenceabove?a. Economicdiplomacyb.Digitaldiplomacyc.DiasporaDiplomacyd.CulturalDiplomacye. ReligiousDiplomacy

8 Which of the following is provided by theTİKAtoimproveTurkey’simageofadonorcountry?a. TrainingandEducationalaidb.Technicalassistancec.Militaryaidd.Developmentalassistancee. Foodaid

9 TheTİKAismainlyconcernedwith---Which of the following correctly completes thesentenceabove?a. SocialMediaDiplomacyb.ScienceDiplomacyc.DiasporaDiplomacyd.CulturalDiplomacye. ForeignAidandHumanitarianDiplomacy

10 ThePointofContactFellowshipProgramisconductedby---Which of the following correctly completes thesentenceabove?a.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsofTurkeyb.TheTİKAc.TheYunusEmreInstituted.TheTurkicCouncile.ThePublicDiplomacyCoordinationOffice

Test Yourself


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If your answer is incorrect, review the section “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Two Components of the New Turkish Foreign Policy.”

1. c If your answer is incorrect, review the section “The Yunus Emre Institute as Part of Turkish Public Diplomacy and Turkish Soft Power.”

6. c

If your answer is incorrect, review the section “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Two Components of the New Turkish Foreign Policy.”

If your answer is incorrect, review the section “The New Turkish Institutions on Diaspora Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, and Humanitarian Diplomacy.”

8. d


2. d If your answer is incorrect, review the section “The New Turkish Institutions on Diaspora Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, and Humanitarian Diplomacy.”

7. c

If your answer is incorrect, review the section “Public Diplomacy and the Restructuring of Some State Institutions in Turkey.”

If your answer is incorrect, review the section “Public Diplomacy and the Restructuring of Some State Institutions in Turkey.”


If your answer is incorrect, review the section “The Yunus Emre Institute as Part of Turkish Public Diplomacy and Turkish Soft Power.”

3. c

4. e

5. a

9. e

10. c

your turn 1

Compare and contrast hard power and soft power in the conduct of international relations.

“Tounderstandtheimportanceofsoftpower,onehastoknowthelimitationsofhardpower,asscholarsseeit.Whilehardpowerhasbeenoneofthemostprevalent forces in thehistoryof international relations, thosewhobelievethathardpowerisindecline,inturn,advocatetheemphasisonsoftpower.There aremany reasons that somehave suggested hard power (ormilitarypower)isnotasimportant,andnotasused,asitmayhavebeeninthepast.For example, while there is a history of military power (which still existstoday), some such as JosephNye (1990) say that “today the direct use offorce for economic gain is generally too costly and dangerous formoderngreat powers. Even short of aggression, the translation of economic intomilitarypowerresourcesmaybeverycostly.”Furthermore,evenwithastatethatwantstoensureitssecurityandmaintainits influenceininternationalrelations, theway to do thatmay not be to invest inmilitary power, butrathertodevelopformsofsoftpowersuchas“communications,organizationsand institutional skills” (Nye,1990:157-158).Moreover, as statesbecomemoreinterdependentononeanothereconomically,militaryoptionstoresolveconflictsarelesspossible,andmuchlessofanoption.Andthus,becauseofthedeclineinhardpowerininternationalrelations,andbecauseoftheabilitytousesoftpowerfactors,advocatesofsoftpowerhavesaidthatstatesmustadapttotheirideasofpower,noteliminatingthemilitary,accordingtosome,butrathertoinvestintheseotherissuesofsoftpower(Nye,1990)(https://internationalrelations.org/soft-power/).

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your turn 2

Given the tools of public diplomacy, discuss the relation between the political leadership in Turkey and Turkey’s relative popularity in the world.

“HowisitpossibletoexplaintherisingpopularityofTurkey–especiallyintheMiddleEast?Theanswer lies inErdoğan’sbehaviors and speeches thatare closely followed and widely appreciated by certain foreign audiencespredominantly in Muslim countries. As the 2011 PEW Global Attitudessurveyshows,variouspublicsintheregionexpresshighlevelsofconfidencein Erdoğan (PewGlobal Attitudes Project, 2011). After his heated debatewithIsraeliPresidentShimonPeresatDavos,hewasgreetedwith“HeroofDavos”signsinTurkey,andpeopleacrosstheArabworldcarriedhispicturesandTurkishflagsinstreetdemonstrationstoshowtheirsupport(Steinvorth,2009). Despitehis initialhesitation,hepubliclyvoicedhis support to theprotestorsintheArabSpringcountries,earninghimandhiscountrymorecredibility and popularity (Diab, 2011). He made a high-profile visit toSomalia–apredominantlyMuslimcountry–andtriedtosharetheneedsofthiscountrythathadbeenstruckbydroughtandfamineintheinternationalsphere (Erdogan, 2011). He sanctioned a visit to Myanmar to help theMuslim minority in the country (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012). Erdoğan,withhisrhetoricandactions,portraysthepictureofa brother thatisreadyto answer thedistress calls coming fromMuslimsallover theworld.” (EfeSEVIN,https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/05/bridge-no-more-turkish-public-diplomacy-and-branding-under-the-akp-government/).

your turn 3

The most important public policy institution of Turkey is named after Yunus Emre. What might be the reason/s for this? Discuss.

“The main institute of Turkey in the field of public policy “was namedafterYunusEmre,whowas anAnatolianSufi living in the13thand14thcenturies.Hismostimportantfeatureisthatheisasymbolofhumanvalues,humanlove,andsocialpeace.Thus,theInstituteaimstopromoteTurkey’scultureandarttotheworldandworkforamorepeacefulworld,whereoneunderstandstheotherwiththemostcompetent,polite,anduniquelanguageofthecivilization.Inordertoachievethisgoalandshowthat(theTurks)haveasaytothewholeworld,(theTurks)shouldfirsttellabout(themselves)and(their)culturalvaluesinthemostproperway.ItisnotacoincidencetochoosethenameofYunusEmrefortheInstitute,whichfollowsapeople-orientedapproach.Thisgreatperson,withhisphilosophybuiltonuniversalhumanvalues,notonlycontributedtothedevelopmentofTurkishwithhispoems,but also gave messages about living in peace and within common valueswithoutmakinganydiscriminationbasedonreligion,language,andrace.ItisanobjectivesetbytheYunusEmreInstitutetomaintainthisbasicphilosophyinallitsactivities”(www.yee.org.tr/en/corporate/why-yunus-emre).

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your turn 4

Do some research on the TİKA’s approach to South-South cooperation in world politics.

“TurkeyhasbeenpursuingSouth-SouthCooperationmodalitiesoverdecades,inordertoenhancepeersupportthetechnicalcooperationamongdevelopingcountries.Turkey first started to provide development cooperation in the1920sinAfghanistaninthefieldsofhealthandeducationandlauncheditsfirstprogrambasedtechnicalcooperation in1985forSub-SaharanAfricancountriesbytheStatePlanningOrganization.FollowingthePost-ColdWarera,TİKAwas established in1992 andbecame active inCentralAsia andSouth Caucasus and Balkans in its immediate neighborhood or countrieswithcommonhistoricaloriginandclosecultural, languageties.This trendhasbeensucceededbyarapidtransformationintherecentperiod,resultingin a much wider geographical coverage of development partnerships,enclosing countries in theMiddleEast,Africa andAsia, Pacific andLatinAmerica. TİKA operates through 61 coordination offices located in 59countries and implements projects and programs in 150 countries.TİKAconsiders entiretyof itsdevelopmentcooperationportfolioasSouth-Southcooperation and its main thematic areas encompasses education, health,watersanitation,agriculture,goodgovernance,privatesector,energy,media,disaster management, transportation, promotion of cultural heritage, andhumanitarian assistance.TİKA’s tailor-fit and demand-driven activities areundertakenby thewayof capacity-buildingprograms,dispatchof experts,donation of equipment and financing infrastructure and constructionprojects. (TİKA is) engaged inactivities concerninghuman life frombirthtodeathandevenforthenextgenerations.ThereisamultitudeofTurkishpublic institutions, nongovernmental organizations that are involved inthe implementation ofTurkish development cooperation.However,TİKAundertakesanessentialroleinTurkey’sdevelopmentcooperationpolicyandisresponsibleforimplementationincollaborationwithTurkishinstitutions,international organizations and bilateral donors, as well as collecting,compilingandreportingitsODAdatatotheOECDonvoluntarybasisandpublishingitsActivityReportannually”(www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/Expo_Brosur_web.pdf ).

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