Negotiatingwiththeenemy?

Internationalenemies

•  Enemies are persons, groups, or countriesperceived to be threatening or harmful,whether or not that perception is based onfactoraprojectionoffears

– «Low-salient»enemies– «Highsalient»enemies

InternationalVillains

•  Countriesthatsponsorterrorism•  Drug-producingand/ordrug-transitingcountries•  Countries with which diplomatic relations havebeenbrokenunilaterally

•  Countries that develop and export weapons ofmassdestruction

•  Countries that have demonstrated majorviolationsofhumanrightsofitsowncitizenry

3optionsforthedesignator

1.  Escalatethesanctions2.  Takelimitedstrategicmilitaryaction.3.  Negotiatewiththevillain.

•  Czechoslovakiawasacountrycreatedbythehated(byGermany)TreatyofVersailles,1919

•  Amongstitspopulationwerenearly3millionGermanspeakingpeoplewholivedintheSudetenlandarea.

•  Italsocontainedvariousothernationalitieswithinitsborders

The“Munichstereotype.”

TheMunichAgreement1938•  AfterHitler’sthreatofwartheleadersmetonthe28thSeptembertotryandavoidwar

•  MussolinichairedameetingwithChamberlainandHitlerinMunich

•  Czechoslovakiawerenotinvited•  AtMunich,HitlergotwhathewantedatGodesberg•  HewouldtaketheSudetenlandon1stOctober•  TheallieswouldprotectCzechoslovakianindependence

•  Hitlerstatedthiswouldbehis“lastterritorialclaiminEurope”(!!)

The“Munichstereotype.”

•  "Appeasement" is the generally acceptedterm to describe the Western powers’responsetoNaziGermanyintheyearsleadinguptotheSecondWorldWar.

•  Walter Lippmann (1966) pointed out howrelianceonthisstereotypehadrepeatedlyledvarious world leaders tomake serious policyerrorsinhigh-levelnegotiations.

•  USPresidentshaverepeatedlycitedthegreatlessonofthe1930s—namely,thatforceshouldbeusedearlyanddecisivelyagainstrisingsecuritythreats—tojustifydecisionsforwarandmilitaryintervention;

•  SomepresidentshavecomparedenemyleaderstoHitler.

•  Theunderlyingassumptionoftheso-calledMunichanalogyisthatthedemocraciescouldandshouldhavestoppedHitler(therebyavoidingWorldWarIIandtheHolocaust)bymovingagainsthimmilitarilybefore1939.

The“Munichstereotype.”

Diverginginterpretationsofappeasement

•  “Therewasneverawarinallhistoryeasiertopreventbytimelyactionthantheonewhichhasjustdesolatedgreatareasoftheglobe.Itcouldhavebeenpreventedwithout the firing of a single shot, but no onewouldlisten.”(WinstonChurchill,1946)

•  “Appeasement in itselfmaybegoodorbadaccordingto the circumstances. Appeasement from weaknessand fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement fromstrengthismagnanimousandnoble,andmightbethesurest and only path to world peace.” (WinstonChurchill,1950)

DestructuringtheMunichstereotype

•  First,shouldChamberlainevenhavetalkedtotheNazi?

•  Second,shouldhehaveagreedtothesubstantiveagreementhedid?

•  Third,wouldHitlerhavebeenstoppedbyanon-agreementatMunich?

•  Fourth,theinternationalcontext:USinisolationandSovietUnionthreat

Compromise(AvishaiMargalit)

•  Categoricallyprohibited:with“inhumaneregimes”(crueltyplushumiliation)

•  Case-bycaseor“retail”basis(compromisesneededforhumanaction,butnotwithoutlimits)

•  Compromiseon:– Process:“Shouldwetalktorottenregimes?”– Outcome:“Whenshouldweactuallyconcludedealswithrottenregimesorparties?”

Compromise(AvishaiMargalit)

•  Warning: Moral judgment on compromises difficult to formulate. “Historicalcontingency”.

•  Examples: A rotten compromise with a rotten regime to end or mitigate agenocideisnotnecessarily“bad”.

•  Compromiseisbydefinitiona“non-idealformofhumaninteraction”

WithoutConditions

DeepakMalhotra

Theabilityofextremiststoderailnegotiationsthroughviolenceandbelligerencepresentspolicymakerswithahigh-stakesdilemma:–  Shouldthemarginalizationofextremismbesetasapreconditiontonegotiations

–  orshouldnegotiationsbeinitiatedinordertoreducesupportforextremism?

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•  ThecessationofviolenceisperhapsthemostcommonpreconditionButitisfarfromtheonlyone:–  The Israeli government suggested that it would only negotiate with

the Palestinian Authority (PA) if it formally recognized Israel as aJewishstate.

–  U.S.diplomatsdebatedwhetherWashingtonshoulddemandthatIranfreeze its uranium-enrichment program as a precondition tonegotiations.

–  Participantsinthesix-partytalksconsideredtheextenttowhichNorthKoreashouldbeforcedtoadheretoprioragreementsbeforethenextroundofnegotiationscouldbegin.

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WithoutConditions

DeepakMalhotra

The“conditionsforpreconditions”:–  First,istheothersidecapableofmeetingthedemand?–  Second, will agreeing to the precondition significantlyreducetheotherside’sbargainingpower?

Preconditions are appropriate only when they satisfy bothcriteria:a)  theopponentiscapableofmeetingthem,andb)  doingsowillnotweakenitsfutureleverage.

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WithoutConditions

DeepakMalhotra

•  Engagingwithextremists:–  Governmentsoftensetlimitsontheirownbehaviorbyrefusingtotalktogroupswithtiestoterrorists.

–  TheU.S. StateDepartment, forexample,publicly states that itwill«makenoconcessionstoterroristsandstrikenodeals.»

•  This position has the virtue of ideological purity but theviceofimpracticality.

•  Wheneveryoneatthetablehascleanhands,governmentsare unlikely tomake progress on what is often themostimportantissue:thecessationofviolence.

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WithoutConditions

DeepakMalhotra

Conclusions:–  The appetite for preconditions is not matched by anadequate supply of reasoned analysis and nuanceddebateaboutthem.

–  This approach has been so detrimental that even theeliminationofallpreconditionstonegotiationswouldyieldbetterdiplomacythanwhathasprevailedinrecentyears.

–  Awise foreign policy errs on the side of negotiation andremovesasmanyimpedimentstodiplomacyaspossible.

–  Carelessly conceived preconditions remain among thegreatestbarrierstoachievingnegotiatedpeace.

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WithoutConditions

DeepakMalhotra

''WeDon'tTalktoTerrorists'':theRhetoricandPracticeofSecretNegotiations

•  In thesummerof1993, IsraeliprimeministerYitzhakRabinwentonIsraelitelevisionandbrushedasidetheprospectofnegotiationsbetween himself and leaders of the Palestine LiberationOrganization(PLO),saying,«Forgetaboutit».

•  Butmeanwhile, thousands ofmiles to the north in a century-oldmansion in a forest in Norway, Israeli officials were secretlymeeting with PLO leaders to negotiate the terms of a peaceagreementthatwouldcometobeknownastheOsloAccord.

•  Rabin was fully aware of these negotiations when he went ontelevision, yet he continued to condemn the prospect ofnegotiationswiththePLOevenastheywerebeingundertaken.

Denouncingandnegotiating

•  Actors decide whether to issue public‘‘denounciations’’oftheideaofnegotiatingwiththeircounterparts;

•  subsequently, actors then choose whether toenter into a processof secretnegotiationswithoneanother.

•  Actors’ decisions are not constrained to bepubliclyconsistent, inthesensethat (likeRabin)actors are free to denounce counterparts withwhomtheynonethelesschoosetonegotiate.

AModelofSecretNegotiations

1.  In the first stage, both actors simultaneously choosewhether tomake a public pronouncement denouncing theideaofnegotiatingwiththeircounterpart(d,shorthandfordenounce)ortorefrainfrommakingsuchadenouncement(dd,shorthandfordon’tdenounce)

2.  Next,inthesecondstage,bothactorssimultaneouslydecidewhether they are willing to engage their counterpart in aprocess of secret negotiations (n, shorthand fornegotiations) orwhether they are notwilling to engage insuchsecretnegotiations(nn,shorthandfornonegotiations).

3. Whetherplayproceedstoathirdandfinalstagedependsonthechoicesmadebyactorsduringthesecondstage.–  Specifically,ifboth actorschosen inthesecondstage,

play continues, and the third-stage process of secretnegotiationsbegins.

–  Ifinsteadatleastoneactorchosenn,playends,secretnegotiations do not take place, and relations betweenthetwoactorsremainatthestatusquo.

AModelofSecretNegotiations

SecretNegotiationsDecisionTree

YD

NNN

DD

XDDD

NNN

SN

Secretnegotiations:audiencecostsandbargainingpower•  Intheequilibriaofthemodel,actorsmayormaynotchoose

todenounceoneanotherinadvanceofsecretnegotiations.•  In that framework, rhetoric of this kind affects actors’

audiencecostsand,throughthis,thespecificoutcomesactorscouldexpecttoachieveduringsecretnegotiations.

•  An actorwhomakes a public commitment not to negotiatewithacounterpartitconsiderstobebeneathdiplomacy,butwho then subsequently does so, is especially motivated toensurethatnegotiationsdonotfail.

•  Thismotivation,naturally,reducesherownbargainingpower.

RogerFisher,WilliamUryGettingtoYes

HarvardProgramonnegotiation

•  Oneshouldalwaystalkiftalkispossible.•  “The notion that negotiation is risky,” says Fisher,“comesfromtheideathatnegotiationisaboutmakingconcessions. This iswrong.Negotiation is talking andlistening, understanding what the other side wantsandhavingachancetopersuadethem.”

•  Ineffect,Fishersaysthatthereisamoraldutytotalk— if only through a back channel or a neutralintermediary—unlesssuchtalkisimpossible.

RobertMnookin

BargainingwiththeDevil:WhentoNegotiate,WhentoFight

1.  First,evilexists.Labelingpeoplewhorepeatedlyseektodousgrievousharmwithoutadequatejustificationasdevilscanbeperfectlyacceptable.

2.  Second, faced with evil counterparts, cost–benefitanalysismay often counsel against bargaining withthem.

3.  Third,thereareafew,relativelyrareoccasionswhenprinciplealone is sufficient justification for refusingtotalktoanevilcounterpart.

Mnookin–NegotiationTraps

Principlesandnegotiation

•  Getting to Yes implies thatwe should always negotiate ifthere is even a remote chance that we could gainsomethingfromengagingindialoguewithourenemies.

•  Mnookin posits a theoretical exception to that approach:whenouradversary isevil, thensometimes it iswrong tonegotiateevenifwehavesomethingtogainfromdoingso.

•  WhereasGettingtoYesgivesusa“principled”approachforconducting the negotiation process, Bargaining with theDevil presents principles for deciding whether, inmorallycompellingsituations,wecanwalkawayfromnegotiationsaltogether.

Ethicalpragmatism

•  The experience teaches that leaders need topracticeanethicalpragmatisminnegotiation.

•  On one hand, such a policy implies an ethicalperspective based on humanistic precepts thatplace the saving of lives and the cessation ofbloodshedasthehighestpriority.

•  On the other hand, ethical pragmatismemphasizes a business-like approach to solvingconflicts