Negotiating in the global village: Four lamps to illuminate the table

Book Review

Negotiating in the Global Village: Four Lamps to Illuminate the Table

Brian Groth

Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991). 193 pp. Trenholme J. Griff"m and W. Russell Daggatt, The Global Negotiator: Building Strong Business Relationships Anywhere in the World (New York: Harper Business, 1990). 198 pp. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Making Global Deals: Negotiating in the International Marketplace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1991). 193 pp. Russell B. Sunshine, Negotiating for International Development: A Practitioner's Handbook (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990). 294 pp.

The 1980s can justifiably be described as the decade for negotiation literature. The decade began auspiciously with Fisher and Dry's (1981) now legendary Getting to YES. An immediate bestseller - worldwide sales have recently passed two million - Getting to YES, more than any other book, put negotiation on the professional and academic map. In the words of Max Bazerman (1987), it is "a landmark in the history of the study

of negotiation." The following year gave us Howard Raiffa's (1982) equally important work, The Art and Science of Negotiation. This book became an immediate classic within negotiation literature - a position it still occupies today.

And, from this promising opening, the decade went on to produce other rich offerings. Lewicki and Utterer's (1985) Negotiation, though modestly titled, poorly marketed, and boringly

Brian Groth is Assistant Professor at the Norwegian School of Management, Postboks 580, 1301 Sandv}ka, Norway.

074S4526/92/07()().()241$06.50/0 © 1992 Plenum Publishing Corporation Negotiation journal july 1992 241

packaged - the cover would put insomniacs to sleep - has established itself as the textbook by which all its competitors should be judged. Another highlight of the mid-eighties was Lax and Sebenius's (1986) The Manager as Negotiator, which provided new insights, useful advice, and general words of wisdom to a far wider audience than the narrow business market suggested by the title.

Yet, for all that, something was missing. In these four books - and, with a very few notable exceptions -in all the other negotiation books of the 1980s, virtually no mention of the international dimension to negotiation can be found.' You can search long and hard through the pages of the above quartet and rarely find a reference to "culture," "cultural aspects," "intercultural negotiating," and the like. Only Raiffa (1982) refers to international negotiation, and then but fleetingly. It seems almost as if the reader was meant to infer that negotiations and negotiators were the same the world over and thus, the advice given was universally applicable.

Europeans, at least, never accepted this. Though we realize we now live in the global village, there are still many houses in that village. And no house is identical to the other. Teachers, students, and practitioners here - and I suspect in most other countries as well - know that negotiating with people from other countries is, quite simply, different and have long lamented the dearth of literature acknowledging this fact and addressing it.

But, the 1990s are beginning to look like the era that will change all that. The decade has at least begun with a flourish - four books in two years all examining in one way or another "cross-cultural," "international," or "global" negotiation. Two

242 Brian Groth Negotiating in the Global Viliage

of the four, The Global Negotiator and Making Global Deals, were written for wide audiences: "both novice and experienced international negotiators;' in the case of the former, and "business executives, lawyers and government officials;' in the case of the latter. The other two books, Negotiating Across Cultures and Negotiating for International Development, appear to be aimed at a more limited readership. Negotiating Across Cultures is for those interested in "diplomatic negotiation." Negotiating for International Development is "a 'how to' guide for international development negotiators."

The Global Negotiator The Global Negotiator is, in short, a snazzy, snappy book. It is all that one associates with these adjectives: lively and energetic, stylish and attractive. The dustjacket is striking, featuring bold, eye-catching colors; the anecdotes, proverbs, and quotes the authors employ are amusing, and often memorable. I defy anyone to top their P. G. Wodehouse excerpt about distributive bargaining, for example.

However, this book's strength is also its ultimate weakness. In their eagerness to keep their writing lively, Griffin and Daggatt have fallen into what might be termed the "overdoingthe-anecdotes" trap. They simply use too many of them. And, because they add a plethora of quotes and proverbs, the overall effect is substantially blunted.

Even more serious is the fact that the techniques meant to illustrate and highlight points on negotiation often seem more important than the overall design and thrust of the book. In other words, the anecdotes, quotes, and proverbs - the "pictures;' as it were - frequently seem to take over at the expense of the "words." This means

that the general flow of an argument is often sacrificed as the writers introduce an anecdote or quote and then go off on a tangent to comment on it. The result is a jerky, somewhat rambling book, sometimes devoid of logical progression. Griffin and Daggatt reveal a liking for the educator Maria Montessori and her belief that "people understand images more easily than words and that showing is more effective than telling." This concept can be carried too far, however, as evidenced in The Global Negotiator.

This having been said, the book does offer much information and advice on negotiation that is useful, though little that is new. Along with the normal introductory and concluding chapters, and a short appendix on illegal and unethical practices in international business, The Global Negotiator is divided into two other chapters, which constitute the body of the book. One is entitled "Building Global Bridges," the central message of which is "build relationships, don't do deals." The other is a long chapter (at more than 100 pages, it is more than half the book), "Winning Strategies and Tactics in International Negotiations." Though the authors in their introduction take exception to what they term "laundry lists," this is basically what they give us here. By and large, the list is composed of items that have appeared earlier, in other books - e.g., the importance of preparations and patience, persuade rather than coerce, high-risk tactics and how to deal with them, etc.

The Global Negotiator is what the British call "a good read," ideally suited for the longish international flight the authors tell us they often undertake. You won't be bored by their book, and if you haven't read much in the way of negotiation literature before, you will even learn a

thing or too. But, before you rush out to your nearest airport bookstore to buy a copy, read on.

Making Global Deals Making Global Deals shares the word "global" in its title with the Griffin and Daggatt book and is almost the same length. There the similarities end. In The Global Negotiator, the reader must pan patiently to find things of value, while the Salacuse book offers a rich lode of information and advice on virtually every page.

The raison d'etre Salacuse gives for writing the book is that two contradictory, but equally fallacious, attitudes toward international business negotiation are widespread among managers. One is that every deal is different, so that experience gained in one country is useless in the other. The other is that global dealmaking is simply an extension of domestic business, and that negotiations are fundamentally the same the world over, whether they take place in Peoria or Peking, Wangaratta or Warsaw. Salacuse argues that both these views are wrong: international dealmaking is shaped by many common forces but is fundamentally different from that of the domestic arena.

Salacuse then condenses these similarities and differences into what he terms "seven elements in a global deal:' The author bases the remainder of the book on a discussion of these elements. He devotes one chapter to each factor, which, together with an introduction and a concluding chapter (pertinently entitled "Paddling the Same Canoe"), make up the nine chapters of the book. In addition, the author includes two appendices - an extensive list for further study and a checklist of 68 points "as a guide to preparing for and conducting your negotiations."

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Here, then, are the seven elements that are central to Making Global Deals and the chapters in which they are introduced and discussed:

1. Negotiating environment: "Making Deals in Strange Places";

2. Culture: "Coping with Culture"; 3. Ideology: "Ducking Ideologies"; 4. Foreign bureaucracies and organi

zations: "Bucking Foreign Bureaucracies";

5. Foreign laws and governments: "Dealing with Foreign Governments and Laws";

6. Currency Variations: "Moving Money"; and

7. Instability and sudden change: "Renegotiating Deals:'

The observant reader will notice that the gerunds that begin each chapter title tend to become more positive as the book progresses. Mere coincidences or Freudian slips? More on this later.

Making Deals in Strange Places. At the beginning of his book, Salacuse promises us "formulas not strategies." He certainly remains true to his word in the chapter in which he examines the first element of global dealmaking, the negotiating environment. Somewhat like a jeweler holding up a stone to the light, the author looks at the pros and cons of negotiating on home ground, on the other party's ground, or in a neutral venue. The same approach is adopted toward time; the language to negotiate in; whose draft, if any, to base negotiations on; and the composition of the team, in the sense of whether to mirror the other party in the size and roles of the team.

In each area, the "strategies not formulas" method is adhered to. No "one-way-only-way" formula is prescribed. Rather, it is a "if-you-do-it-thisway-this-might-happen" approach, where no strategy is totally rejected.

244 Brian Groth Negotiating in the Global Village

This is a thread that runs through the book and one that certainly appeals to this reviewer, long a convert to the belief that negotiating internationally is an extremely complex process -"like trying to put shoes on an octopus;' as a Norwegian friend from the fishing industry once described it.

This is not to say that Salacuse refrains from offering advice as to what one should do. On the contrary, one of the many strengths of Making Global Deals is that such advice is always forthcoming, and usually wise. But what the author refuses to do is to prescribe or proscribe. What he does, in effect, is to attach risk levels to various strategies. Some involve higher risks than others, but he never claims that any strategies are no-risk.

Coping with Culture. My dictionary associates the verb "to cope" with "difficulties" and "unpleasant situations." Yet, surely, "culture" is much richer, exciting, and full of potential than something that one must merely "cope with." And, from the 30 pages or so he devotes to the subject, Salacuse would broadly seem to share the same view. Perhaps, therefore, something like "Meeting the Cultural Challenge" would have been a better title for this chapter - the regular pattern of gerunds would even have been retained, although the alliteration would have been lost.

But, this is a niggling detail in a chapter full of original insight and sound advice. Particularly interesting, though tantalizingly brief, is the section "The Negotiator's Three Cameras," in which Salacuse counsels readers to be aware of three key factors throughout a negotiation: your own words and actions, the meaning that the other party gives to these and the other party's words and actions. Important advice for any negotiation; doubly important when negotiating

with people from another culture than one's own.

Interesting, too, is the presentation and discussion of 10 ways culture affects negotiations. The 10 ways are also listed as negotiator traits, related to what the author calls "Type ll' and "Type B" negotiators. These are useful classifications - but in no way defmitive, as Salacuse is quick to point out. Indeed, throughout the chapter he cautions strongly about oversimplification in regard to cultures, as well as warns us about stereotyping people because of their nationalities. "No one is a cultural robot ... you should learn as much as possible about your counterpart as a person [his emphasis], not just as a representative of a particular culture" (p. 57). Three, or even four, cheers for that advice, especially coming, as it does, not from a psychologist or sociologist, but from a lawyer!

Ducking Ideologies. This is one of the briefer chapters in the book, possibly because it essentially makes only two points: ideology is a deadly serious business, potentially threatening to the negotiation process, and global dealmakers should try to avoid it at the negotiating table. Salacuse develops both points in some detail and once again, he offers much useful advice. Despite the general wariness about ideologies that pervades this chapter, it is encouraging that it closes on a positive note by pointing out that ideology may not always be a barrier to good negotiating and can even be a beneficial force in some instances.

Bucking Foreign Bureaucracies. To the European reader, the word "bureaucracies" is often synonymous with "government bureaucracies." Salacuse does not use the word in this narrower sense, since this chapter concerns itself with dealing with foreign organizations of all forms. Thus,

though the author obviously isn't exactly enamored of bureaucracies, "Bucking Foreign Bureaucracies" is not the diatribe against civil servants that some readers might expect from its title.

Central to the chapter is a discussion of "the other team": its composition; "clout," which is here defmed as meaning not only legal authority, but also the power to persuade one's own bureaucracies to accept a deal that has been negotiated; who's in charge; whether the team is likely to remain the same; how to manage if the team changes; the team's organizational and personal agenda; and, finally, how to handle demands for bribes from the other team. This last point does not evolve smoothly from those that precede it; rather, it seems somewhat tacked on. In any case, at fewer than two pages, this is an all-too-cursory examination of an area that many international negotiators regard as one of the most problematic in global dealmaking. Faced with the veritable mine field of international business ethics, the author elects to try to skate over it.

Dealing with Foreign Governments and Laws. In this and subsequent chapters, the author returns to firmer ground. In fact, this and the two chapters that follow it are possibly the strongest of the book. Here, Salacuse, the professor and practitioner of international law, really comes into his own, and the reader feels guided by a very sure hand. Concentrating on the legal aspects of negotiating internationally, the author groups the problems into three categories: the "black box;' i.e., the apparent incomprehensibility of foreign laws; the "squeeze;' in which companies can find themselves caught between the laws of the various countries involved in a deal; and "hometown justice," whereby companies

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may be unfairly treated because they are foreign. Salacuse examines each of these problems in some detail, and as usual, the advice he offers is sound and realistic.

In addition, this chapter provides excellent discussion on the role of governments in the international negotiation process, whether their representatives are actually sitting at the negotiation table, or through governmental legal and regulatory systems, they are present as a sort of "ghost" negotiator. A bonus is a handy guide to the various mechanisms for international arbitration.

Moving Money. My only criticism of this otherwise excellent chapter is its rather inadequate title. In fact, probably the best section of "Moving Money" is that entitled "Immovable Money." This contains as good a general summary of the various forms of countertrade (barter, counterpurchase, offset, and buyback) as you're likely to find. And, as always, the author's advice given is of a high standard.

Of course, this chapter also treats the question of foreign exchange risk when negotiating abroad, and though thorough, Salacuse's treatment of this area contained little that I hadn't read before.

Renegotiating Deals. like old soldiers, the final chapters of many books on negotiation tend simply to fade away. Very little new material is introduced - instead, information presented earlier is merely regurgitated or summarized. This is certainly not the case with Making Global Deals. In fact, in my opinion, Salacuse saves some of his most original and insightful points for this his penultimate chapter. In it, he examines the vitally important but woefully neglected topic of renegotiation - a


topic made even more important and timely by the breakup of Eastern Europe. Though this book was written before those momentous events occurred, there seems little doubt that its shrewd analysis and advice on renegotiation will prove invaluable to all those renegotiating deals with the newly emerging nation states of Eastern Europe - deals that were originally made with Soviet puppets.

Yet again, the topic is divided in three - by now one can almost talk of the Salacusian trinity - namely, postdeal renegotiation, intradeal renegotiation, and extradeal renegotiation. I won't reveal much more - the intention is, after all, that you should buy the book - but suffice it to say you'll need plenty of note paper when reading "Renegotiating Deals."

All in all, Making Global Deals is a fine book that definitely meets an important need. Reservations? Not many and not major.

Occasionally, the author offers information or advice that seems so obvious that it need not have been stated. For example, we are told that it takes a very long time to learn another culture properly and that negotiators have personal as well as organizational goals. Such statements of the obvious do not occur frequently, but they do annoy when made, especially in light of the fact that they take up space that could well have been devoted to expanding on other material. This is particularly applicable to the first half of the book: for instance, the complex area of the role of language in international negotiations is all too briefly examined. Similarly, the section entitled "The Negotiator's Three Cameras" is far too short and, as noted earlier, so, too, is that on international business ethics.

Now to return to our gerunds-atthe-beginning-of-chapters puzzle. It

does seem as if the author is more tentative and less comprehensive in the three chapters whose titles begin with the problematic words "coping," "ducking," and "bucking." Perhaps Salacuse, an international lawyer, is warier of less tangible topics such as culture, ideologies, and foreign bureaucracies than of issues such as where to negotiate, foreign legal systems, dealing in international currencies, and the like. Put another way, he does seem somewhat more at home with contracts than with culture, and the "coping," "ducking," and "bucking" chapters shine a little less brightly than the rest of the book. But, these are minor flaws in an otherwise excellent achievement. Making Global Deals will achieve a wide readership and fmd its way onto the reading lists of courses in international negotiations all over the world.

Negotiating Across Cultures Negotiating Across Cultures deserves popularity and recognition similar to Making Global Deals, for it is an interesting book containing much worthwhile information. However, given its subtitle - "Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy" and the specialist-sounding title of its publisher (United States Institute of Peace Press), I fear readership may be largely limited to the rarified circles of the international diplomatic set. This would be a shame, for Cohen - the only non-American author of the books here reviewed - offers much of universal interest.

Based on the United States' dealings with five countries - China, Egypt, India, Japan, and Mexico -Cohen examines the part played by cultural factors in these dealings. In other words, American culture is the one against which the other five are compared and contrasted. By focusing

on "the field of American diplomatic negotiations with selected non-western states;' Cohen "hopes to demonstrate that the effects of cross-cultural differences - although not always malign, by any means - have been pervasive and consequential" (p. 6).

This goal is stated in the prelude to the book. The author seeks to achieve it by first defming diplomatic negotiation and then examining the nature of culture and intercultural relations with their attendant problems. We are introduced to the methodology that forms the core of this book. Using "a loose conceptual framework of a process model of negotiation (preparatory phase, opening moves, intermediate phase, and final rounds)," Cohen examines "the encounter and interplay of contrasting negotiating styles in the light of detailed historical examples" (p. 14).

Hardly a sentence, you might say, that makes the reader feel impelled into reading eagerly on. And, certainly the brief description of the "historical examples" on offer don't exactly help matters either. The cases to be examined were selected on only one criterion, "availability of evidence;' while "any negotiation that could be reconstructed in sufficient detail to bear historical analysis was deemed worthy of inclusion" (p. 14). Buckle up your seat belts, fellow passengers; it seems like we're in for a long, hard read. And, what does the author promise us at the end of the journey? Nothing more than "suggestive tendencies -hypotheses for further research;' since "no exaggerated claim of definitiveness is made for this book" (p. 15).

But, if one can survive this early, dry air turbulence, as it were, and continue reading, it is well worth the effort. Admittedly, the reconstructed negotiations are, as promised, duly analyzed in considerable detail. But, in


so doing, the author also works in information, insight, and advice that give ample reward for sifting through the intricacies of the 1957 U.S.-Mexico air transport agreement, the Okinawa air bases negotiations of the 1960s between the United States and Japan, the 1981-1982 talks on the supply of American nuclear fuel to India, and the like.

True to his process model, Cohen takes us through its various phases and devotes a chapter each to prenegotiation, opening moves, and what he calls the "end game:' The middle phase is examined in two chapters: one concentrating on tactics and players, the other on what is termed "sounds, signals and silence."

Until recently, the prenegotiation phase was a neglected aspect of negotiation, both in the literature and in teaching. As Cohen points out, this is now changing, and his chapter on the subject not only adds to our knowledge of prenegotiation, but also underlines its importance. A central place in his comparison of the varying ways the United States and his selected five countries approach negotiation is given to Edward T. Hall's (1976) well-known classification of cultures as low-context or highcontext. Discussed in some detail in the preceding chapter, entitled "Intercultural Dissonance," Hall's cultural divide is now used to argue that lowcontext American negotiators tend to use their preparation time in problemsolving exercises aimed at finding "joint solutions." On the other hand, high-context negotiators - including those from the book's other five countries - are "predominantly relationship oriented" and, thus, give greater emphasis to "attending to a relationship" (p. 51) than solving problems, although this aspect certainly is not ignored.


The chapter goes on to underline the importance of reputation and honor in high-context cultures and to show how this often results in negotiators from such cultures doing all they can in their preparations to ensure no loss of face will occur during the negotiation itself. Cohen holds that the Japanese are especially noteworthy in this respect, and he presents examples from diplomatic negotiations to show how they pursue risk-aversion strategies in their preparations. He implies that Americans, and by extension negotiators from other low-context countries, should spend more time in cultivating relationships in the preparatory phase. And, on a concluding note - made highly topical by President Bush's January 1992 visit to Japan - Cohen comments on, and warns about, the "Anglo-Saxon tradition" in the prenegotiation period of laying great stress "on creating the conditions for an equitable contest" using, in the process, "a whole vocabulary, redolent with approval, to describe this state of affairs: fair play, level playing field, rules of the game, due process and so on" (p. 62). Words that defmitely ring a bell for those of us who remember the presidential sound bytes from Tokyo in early 1992 as Mr. Bush headed for his negotiations with Japanese leaders. I personally can vouch for two "level the playing field" utterances and one about "fair play." When we recall the lack of success the negotiations in question achieved, Cohen's warning seems all the more timely.

In the next chapter, "Let the Contest Commence," the author moves on to consider the opening moves in diplomatic negotiations. Once again, he observes clear differences between the high-context, "individualistic" American negotiators and their more "interdependent," low-context coun-

terparts. Americans are seen to emphasize immediate issues rather than long-term relationships and to treat all members of the opposing team as equals. They also set out their opening positions as clearly, and often as forcefully, as possible. Cohen sees resemblances here to the adversarial style of an American court of law or high school debate and estimates that showing one's hand early in this way can often put the American side at a severe tactical advantage.

On the other hand - and this is one of the strengths of this book -Cohen is largely evenhanded in his assessments, so he also points out that the opening moves of negotiators from other cultures may also damage their position. For example, from the outset of the Camp David conference in 1978, Egypt's Anwar Sadat adopted the role of supplicant in his negotiations with Jimmy Carter, relying on the American president's munificence. According to Cohen, when President Carter was forced to choose between the Egyptians and the intransigent "ultra-low context" Israelis, the U.S. president stayed on his own side of Hall's great cultural divide and leaned on Egypt, "the more pliable party" (p. 71). Japanese and Mexican diplomats are also shown to have a penchant for playing the weaker party in negotiations, though they often have achieved more successful results than the Egyptian president did.

This chapter also examines another opening move that can create immediate difficulties in a negotiation. It occurs when one of the countries presents itself as the morally injured and, thus, the superior party, deserving of redress. India and China are mentioned in this respect, while it is claimed the Mexicans also use this tactic in their dealings with the United States. Clashing as it does with the

American desire for negotiators to be equals, this tactic is fraught with risk.

Another cultural conflict highlighted here is the American preference for treating specifics. This collides with the high-context preference for first achieving agreements on axioms and philosophical principles. At the very end of a chapter long on problem illumination but somewhat short on advice, Cohen counsels us that one way to avoid this contradiction would be "to combine the two: to agree on practical steps under a canopy of general principles that meets the other side's psychological needs" (p. 81).

The next section of Negotiating Across Cultures is divided into two chapters ( "On Tactics and Players" and "Sounds, Signals, Silence") and looks at what Cohen terms the "middle game" in a negotiation. While noting that for some cultures, e.g., Japanese and Chinese, the distinction between opening and middle phases is an artificial one, he justifies treating them as discrete because the middle phase is such an important one for negotiators from the United States. In this period, between opening proposals and the final resolution of the negotiation, Americans tend to assume a certain process of give-andtake governed by rules of the game.

Cohen then makes a number of interesting points about this phase which, from the American side at least, is characterized by bidding and bargaining. It appears that even in cultures where these activities are common in commercial life, Egyptians and Hong Kong Chinese are here singled out, bidding and bargaining are rather looked down upon in diplomatic negotiations. On the other hand, Indians and Mexican diplomats are held to enjoy it and seem to be more competitive than Americans. At the other end


of the scale, Japan is revealed as the culture that finds give-and-take negotiating the least congenial.

The second half of "On Tactics and Players" is a detailed discussion, with examples from diplomatic cases, of the influence of culture on political norms and conduct. Though it's a little unclear exactly how this topic follows logically from what has preceded it, the author does advance an important argument. This is that the insight of social anthropology, largely and somewhat surprisingly ignored in most negotiation literature, can make significant contributions to understanding what goes on during the negotiation process.

This is in line with recent trends. More and more people are realizing that negotiation is such a multifaceted process that it no longer remains the exclusive domain of American lawyers, as it originally appeared. Negotiation is now being studied with meaningful results by linguists, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and social anthropologists. Participants and papers at recent negotiation conferences and seminars confirm this trend.

Exactly why the "middle game" section is divided into two chapters is something of a mystery. Only length seems to argue against combining them. Certainly, their content is obviously linked. We see this as "Sounds, Signals, Silence" discusses whether the tactics of using logic and persuasion are as important to non-Western cultures in the middle period of negotiation as they are to Americans. Hall's high-context/low-context model continues to be employed as Cohen states, "In the middle phase of negotiations, then, the distinction between the American, problem-oriented approach versus the Western, relationship-oriented approach toward nego-

250 Brian Groth Negotiating in the Global ViUage

tiation reasserts itself" (p. 106). Not surprisingly, Cohen finds that highcontext cultures are not always convinced by logic and persuasion, especially if the relationship between the parties is wrong. However, the reluctance of high-context negotiators to say "no" often means their low-context counterparts fail to see that logic and persuasion aren't working. Cohen gives examples of where Americans have mistaken what is merely politeness or a certain indirectness of reply for agreement.

Fair enough. However, on the evidence presented, the usually tentative Cohen can hardly be justified in stating so categorically that "for high-context individuals, it is always easier to agree than disagree" (p. 115). This smacks a little too much of the cultural stereotyping and generalizing that this and the other three books wisely counsel against.

The "middle game" section of the book concludes with an examination of nonverbal communication. For Cohen, nonverbal communication "embraces a vast area of human behavior, including facial expression, gestures, body contact, movement, use of space, costume, ceremony and so on" (p. 124). Much of what is written here has been written before, though the central role of ceremony in high-context cultures is highlighted in an interesting way. Again, however, one is tempted to take issue with Cohen's overly dogmatic claim that the United States "has relegated ritual to the sidelines of public life" (p. 125). For example, are the ritualistic ceremonies connected with the homecoming of American troops from the Gulf, or, for that matter, a Superbowl Sunday only "on the sidelines" of American public life?

I am more critical, however, of the absence of any discussion as to how

nonverbal communication might be used tactically - especially by those from high-context cultures - to achieve negotiation advantage. By dividing the "middle game" into two chapters and calling the first "On Tactics and Players," the author seems largely to have precluded himself from discussing tactics in the second. A pity!

No such regrets about "Bright Honor," the chapter where the conclusion of the negotiation, "the end game;' is discussed in one tidy place. The author highlights three interesting areas here. One is the issue of face -i.e., the need to present accord in a way that meets both parties' intangible needs. Another is the American tradition of "signing a deal" - i.e., resolution by contract, contrasted with those cultures who rely on the "my word is my bond" approach that emphasizes ties by sentiment and obligation. Finally, he discusses the varying concepts of time, ranging from the U.S. view that "Time is Money" (apparently almost an Eleventh Commandment in American business) to that of some non-Western cultures which hold that "Time is an Endless River." Cohen notes that American negotiators' impatience and "habits of urgency" can often place them at a disadvantage when confronted with non-Western "patience and persistence" (p. 145). Granted; but isn't he then a little harsh on U.S. insistence on deadlines? Surely deadlines in negotiations aren't always a bad thing?

At the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, South Korea the official slogan was "Peace, Friendship and Harmony:' For Westerners, nothing is surprising about the first two of these words. The third, however, is unusual. "Harmony" is not a word in great currency in the West. Interesting, then, that the

concluding chapter of Negotiating Across Cultures should be entitled "In Search of Harmony." For Cohen, crosscultural harmony involves "careful attention to the other side's psychological needs" (p. 157). He goes on to point out that this should be beneficial to negotiation, "and indeed it has proved true" (p. 157). However, since he has earlier devoted a 14-page chapter to "intercultural dissonance;' and almost all his examples show the harmful results of this dissonance, this lonely statement sounds a bit hollow.

The concluding chapter reiterates the argument that two distinct paradigms of negotiation exist: the lowcontext one of the United States and the high-<:ontext paradigm of the nonWestern states examined. Once again, Cohen shows his fundamental evenhandedness by stating his belief that neither Americans nor their non-Western partners have "a monopoly of wisdom when it comes to negotiation" (p. 160). He maintains both approaches can be enlightening, and together they can generate a richer number of alternatives.

As if to prove his essential neutrality, Cohen concludes the book by offering ten recommendations for the intercultural negotiator. These span the two models. Thus, we are advised in recommendation number two to "try to establish a warm, personal relationship with your interlocutors;' but also, in number eight, "where haggling is called for, leave yourself plenty of leeway. Start high, bargain doggedly, and hold back a trump card for the final round" (p. 161).

The reader is left with a major question on finishing this book: Do the two models adequately explain and predict the negotiation behavior of the cultures presented? Are all American negotiators so thoroughly "low-context" and their Japanese

NegoUationjournal july 1992 251

counterparts correspondingly "highcontext"? Aren't some of the countless millions of Americans who negotiate with foreigners interested in giving priority to building relationships? Surely Japanese diplomats, government officials, and businessmen exist who put problem solving first and willingly indulge in a bit of giveand-take? Certainly Ambassador Samuel ]. Lewis, president of United States Institute of Peace, seems to have his doubts. In a foreword to the book, he states that the clear distinctions drawn by the two models are "obviously ... over-simplified" (p. xii). Yet, Lewis goes on to praise the book and warmly recommends it. And so do I. Oversimplified models or not, Negotiating Across Cultures contains so much of value that it deserves to be read.

Negotiatingfor International _ Development Negotiating for International Development was written "primarily for developing country negotiators" (p. xiv), though the author, Russell B. Sunshine, hopes it will also prove useful to negotiators from industrialized country governments or international organizations. He calls it a "how to" handbook of operational guidelines and recommendations for conducting international negotiations effectively. It is not aimed at those who have never negotiated, while the author nevertheless claims that "negotiation veterans" may find much of the material elementary. Sunshine hopes to appeal to a target readership between these two groups.

The handbook is divided into six chapters. The introductory chapter places negotiation in its special international development context. The second chapter looks at the impact of culture on negotiating behavior. The

252 Brian Groth Negotiating in the Global ViUage

third chapter proposes a systematic approach to effective preparation for negotiation. The fourth and ftfth chapters focus on negotiation techniques for individual and team negotiators respectively. The sixth chapter reviews negotiation documents and their use. In addition, the author includes a brief epilogue, which offers a unifying theme to draw all of the book's material together.

In the author's preface, Sunshine promises the book's fust chapter will place negotiation in its international development context. This it does, characterizing such negotiation by three features: a subject matter that directly affects the economic or social development of one or more developing countries; parties who comprise one or more developing-country institutions on one side and one or more foreign institutions on the other; and the goal - Sunshine calls it function - which is dealmaking, dispute resolution, or policymaking.

Of particular interest in the subsequent discussion is the author's claim that deal-making and dispute-resolution negotiations are generally bilateral, while policy-making ones, such as treaty and trade-agreement negotiations, can be both bilateral and multilateral. At best, this is an unsubstantiated point of view presented as fact. Much more contentious, however, is the consequence of this view: Sunshine elects to emphasize bilateral deal-making and dispute-resolution negotiations in his strategy and tactics discussions. This means he virtually ignores multilateral negotiations, preferring bilateral ones "for simplicity's sake" (p. 12).

This is a serious omission given the prevalence of multiparty negotiations in the international development arena and the considerable number of differences between multiparty and

bilateral negotiations described in the literature and by "negotiation veterans." But for this omission, common multiparty strategies and tactics such as bridging coalitions, blocking coalitions, inclusion, and ostracizing might have been taken up in the two later chapters of the book set aside for strategic and tactical discussion. Even more reason to regret excluding multiparty negotiations is that the book, to its credit, emphasizes again and again how important internal negotiations are between the various interest groups on one side of the table in an international development negotiation.

Otherwise, the opening chapter is useful in indicating how international development negotiations differ from domestic ones. It is perhaps a little obvious that the three key distinctions are the international dimension, development orientation, and complexity of such negotiations. Within these three areas, however, it is interesting to read about aspects such as the various currencies involved, the multijurisdictional scope, and the high degree of political visibility of such negotiations, especially in the developing countries.

Interesting, too, and pedagogically useful, is the way the author divides his "skill-building" agenda into "specialized" skills for international negotiations and "generic" skills, useful for domestic negotiations, as well. I would, however, take issue with the listing of "internal negotiating" as a "specialized" skill. Can there be any doubt that it belongs in the "generic" column?

The second chapter addresses the impact of culture on negotiating behavior. It opens with a survey of general principles which is largely a survey of well-plowed ground, including Hall's low-context/high-context

dichotomy and how cultural values affect the perspective and negotiating style of participants. More interesting to this reviewer was the attention drawn to the ritual nature of negotiation, including the stylized nature of greetings, introductions, and opening statements, as well as the physical arrangements such as venue and placement of participants - echoes of Cohen's section on "ceremony." Also interesting is Sunshine's division of a negotiation into four main stages: climate-setting, presenting, midpoint bargaining, and closing; nothing new in viewing a negotiation in a chronological way, but well worth including in a handbook of this nature. The use of the term "climate-setting" instead of the more common and impersonal "opening" is especially worth noting.

To illustrate the scope of culture's impact on negotiation, the author offers two examples of negotiating styles, namely, those of the United States and Japan. The choice of these two countries, though predictable, would seem justified given their bilateral and multilateral relations with developing countries as trading partners, foreign investors, and aid donors.

The survey of the U.S. style which follows is thorough, although relatively brief. It is also summarized in a handy, two-page table. All the main points are there, including an interesting description and discussion of the relative merits of the win/lose and win/win approaches. Debatable, however, is an assertion that "U.S. negotiators will probably consider it inappropriate to socialize with their counterparts" (p. 41). A lot depends on what the author means by "socializing" (he doesn't elaborate), but, nevertheless, it seems a somewhat surprising statement to make about a culture that invented both the "busi-


ness lunch" and the "business breakfast."

The Japanese style of negotiation is similarly surveyed and summarized in a table. Once again, the main characteristics are well-covered, this time with no surprises. Aspects noted are Japanese group orientation, patience, subtlety and sensitivity in communication, and their suspicion of lawyers at the negotiating table. The author also remarks on the significance Japanese attach to "decorum," a rich, comprehensive term encompassing politeness, good manners, formality, protocol, ceremony, respect for rank and personal dignity, and last but not least, appropriateness. This section is completed by other tables, where American and Japanese styles are compared and contrasted.

The chapter goes on to offer suggestions to international development negotiators to help them negotiate with Americans and Japanese - useful advice that does not, in any way, suggest that the developing countries' negotiators adopt a "cultural cringing" posture toward their powerful counterparts. On the contrary, though some modifying of normal conduct is recommended, one is urged to remain true to one's integrity and not to negotiate in any way that "betrays your own cultural values and principles" (p. 66). Sunshine presents and discusses a 12-point checklist of general principles for cross-cultural negotiating. An interesting supplement is another checklist, with discussion that looks at members of four professions often represented in international development negotiations, i.e., engineers, lawyers, economists, and "politicians" (Sunshine's quotation marks) and views them as cultures that cut across national boundaries. Thus, for example, it is argued that all engineers have a precise and quantita-

254 Brian Groth Negotiating In the Global Village

tive communication style, while the style of "politicians" is to be cautious and self-protective - sweeping generalizations, to be sure. A lot of people would argue that more divides American and Japanese lawyers, for example, than can ever unite them. On the other hand, this is a fascinating and different angle from which to view cultural differences. In any case, Sunshine claims only "some degree of validity" for this approach.

Along with virtually every book on negotiation I have ever read, Negotiating for International Development stresses the importance of preparation in the negotiation process. Sunshine's third chapter is devoted entirely to discussing such preparations and makes the telling claim that inadequate preparation is often the weakest part in the performance of developing countries' negotiators. A fairly standard guide to preparation, comprising eight tasks, follows the chapter which is definitely enhanced by an illustrative case study of 21 pages. This study shows how the eight tasks were performed. We see how the recommended approach to systematic planning was applied to an actual negotiation, and the author evaluates how well it worked. How much more interesting it becomes when the picture of a real negotiation is put into the frame of a set of guidelines.

The fourth and fifth chapters of Negotiating for International Development examine strategies and tactics for conducting negotiations. Sunshine first gives advice to the individual and then to the individual as part of a team. Again, much of this is advice can be found in earlier books on negotiation - though it is well worth repeating - but a few additions should be noted. One concerns "strategies and tactics for the disadvantaged" (p. 153) and includes "deal-

ing with your inferior power" (p. 154). Another is a strong warning about telling jokes. My own observations allow me to vouch for the fact that a badly chosen joke can explode like a bomb in a negotiation and destroy it. Even the Swedes and the Norwegians - two cultures close enough for much of the world to often refer to them as if they were one people, "Scandinavians" - must exercise extreme caution in making fun of each other. How much extra care, therefore, should be taken by Japanese and Zambians, for example.

The concluding chapter of Sunshine's book takes a look at negotiation documents. He considers six main documents, three that are almost always confidential and four that are shared. The confidential ones are Preparation Papers, Detailed Negotiating Notes, and Final Memorandum to the Negotiation File. The shared documents are the Draft Agenda, Draft Agreement (if any), Memorandum of Agreement (or Aide Memoire) - a sort of "progress report" apparently quite common in international development negotiations - and Final Contract or Agreement (if any). Obviously, these documents are written at varying stages of the negotiation process. Sunshine emphasizes the powerful influence documents can have on a negotiation. In this respect, a Draft Agenda is potentially the most powerful. The chapter leaves us with three pieces of advice in regard to negotiation documents: they should be drafted clearly, promptly, and if possible, by you.

A brief four-page epilogue completes the book. Much of it summarizes what has already been said, but Sunshine adds a new word and new advice at the very end. This word is "flexitivity," an amalgam of "flexibility" and "creativity." It is in a spirit of

"flexitivity" that Sunshine urges international negotiators to approach the table. In this way, they can be receptive to new, and perhaps unexpected, developments. They may then be able to generate the creative imagination to benefit from these developments.

It is appropriate that Sunshine should end on this positive note, since of the four books reviewed here, his is probably the one that gives the most emphasis to the opportunities presented when people from different cultures meet to negotiate. Admittedly, the other three authors do see the bright side of international negotiations, but I think it is fair to say that problems tend to loom larger for them than possibilities.

Negotiating for International Development meets a need in the literature. Its target market now has a product well worth buying. And those "negotiation veterans" can also benefit from reading about negotiation from the international development perspective, in general, and from that of developing countries' negotiators in particular. Admittedly, the "veteran" may not find every one of the book's nearly 300 pages original reading, but he or she will rarely want to skip over large chunks of text.

And, talking of "he or she" allows me to air a minor, but nagging gripe about Sunshine's somewhat special use or these two pronouns. In an attempt to be nonsexist and reflect the growing presence of women at the negotiating table, the author has "adopted the convention of alternating third-person gender references in successive chapters" (p. 22) and eschewed the more obvious "he or she" usage. The intention is praiseworthy; the result is annoying. Just as we get used to the "he/his" usage, along comes the next chapter with


"she/her," and then to and fro, thus, from chapter to chapter. It sometimes feels as if one is reading two different books.

Sunshine seems to be a bit unlucky in his alternation, too. For example, in the fourth chapter (a "she" chapter), we get the following description of the archetypal "Dirty Tricks" negotiator:

She may be rude, repeatedly mispronouncing your name, interrupting or correcting your presentations, or failing to pay attention when you are speaking. She may show a lack of respect; for example, by mocking sarcastic laughter or even mimicry. In a team situation, she may gossip with a colleague while you are speaking, and give the impression that you are the target of their remarks. She may boast about her superior resources and display them ostentatiously. Her manner and remarks may be belligerent and insensitive. She may lie about facts and figures or otherwise distort the record. She may make commitments at the bargaining table, only to later disavow or break them (p. 199).

Quoted out of context, this passage could appear vehemently sexist and achieve the exact opposite effect the author intended in alternating the pronouns in his book. And at the risk of sounding sexist myself, I would say that the type of negotiator described above is all the things the vast majority of women negotiators are not. The fact that most women are so diametrically different from this description is, for me, their great strength as negotiators.

Another minor complaint is that the book is limited to looking at American and Japanese negotiating styles. In the international development context, clearly a case exists for including


something about the Nordic and EC countries. There again, from my geographical position, I could be accused of being biased.

My major complaint is that the question of negotiation ethics is ignored. Where Salacuse skates over the issue, Sunshine detours completely around it. And, correct or not, it is in negotiations with developing countries that problems with bribery and corruption are rumored to loom largest.

It would be wrong, however, to end any review of Negotiating for International Development on a negative note. On the contrary, and in the words often used by a doctor friend of mine, "the good news far outweighs the bad."

Conclusion That same diagnosis could, in fact, be applied to all four books considered here. In its own way, each contributes to a greater understanding of the processes involved in international negotiations. Each serves as a lamp, helping to illuminate that table where negotiators from an ever-increasing number of countries and cultures are taking their seats.

If the books share one serious defect, however, it is that they do not give enough emphasis to the fact that those negotiating internationally can be enriched, both materially and psychologically, by the exercise. Or to use a key concept from Lax and Sebenius's The Manager as Negotiator (1986), insufficient attention is devoted to how international negotiators can utilize cultural differences to "create value" (as distinct from merely "claiming value").

And at the risk of belaboring the point, I must stress that the virtual absence of any discussion of ethical questions connected with negotiating

internationally is a serious omission. Only Griffin and Daggatt in The Global Negotiator warrant partial exoneration in this respect, since they do give us an appendix on the subject. At just over six pages, though, it is an all-too-cursory examination of a complex and complicated issue. As always, however, their introductory proverbs (p. 171) are superb:

A greased mouth cannot say no. -Italian Proverb

Few men have virtue to withstand the highest bidder. - George Washington

Thought-provoking and witty, yes ... though hardly conducive to enhancing the reputation of ItalianAmerican negotiators!

Yet ali-in-all, the good news does far outweigh the bad. And if I might be permitted to return to medical analogy a final time, it will serve as my summing up of the four books I have reviewed. On the evidence here presented, the patient - international negotiation literature - having long suffered from undernourishment and neglect, has now been given a goodly measure of excellent treatment. Its condition is, thereby, much improved.

NOTE

1. An outstanding exception is Fisher, 1980. All four of the books reviewed herein give Fisher the credit he richly deserves.

REFERENCES

Bazerman, M. (1987). "Getting beyond Yes: Where negotiation is now and where it should go." Dispute Resolution Forum (published by the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C.) May 1987: 8.

Fisher, G. (1980) International negotiation: A cross-cultural perspective. Chicago: Intercultural Press.

Fisher, R. and Ury, W. L. (1981) Getting to YES: Negotiating agreement without giving in. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Hall, E. T. (1976) Beyond culture. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday. Lax, D. A. and Sebenius, J. (1986) The manager as negotiator. New York: The Free Press. Lewicki, R. L and Utterer, J. L. (1985) Negotiation. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin. Raiffa, H. (1982) The art and science of negotiation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.


Negotiating in the global village: Four lamps to illuminate the table

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