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In Search of Eisenhowers Extended Audience:

Atoms for Peace, the Cold War Rhetoric, and the Japanese Nuclear Crisis of 2011

Satoru Aonuma (Tsuda College; [email protected])

Mark H. Wright (Tsuda College; [email protected])

*A paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Convention,

Orland, FL, November 15-18, 2012.

Introduction

One and half years have passed since the 3/11, people in Japan are still

debating what possibly caused the Level 7 nuclear power accident in Fukushima. Just like

student debaters arguing over the good old issue of inherency (Zarefsky, 1977) at

tournament competition, people with various backgrounds and politico-ideological

persuasions are speculating about the cause of this nuclear crisis. Tokyo Electric Power

Company (TEPCO) which owns and operates the Fukushima Daiichi plant blames

nature, i.e., the unprecedented destructive power of the earthquake and tsunami, hoping

to absolve itself from incurring the full liability. While the natural disaster was an obvious

trigger, in the eyes of many others the disaster is nothing but a human-made crisis. With

the insidious cover-up and crisis communication of the past and current technical

failures of its nuclear facilities being debunked in the media, many people now put blame

on TEPCO for the accident, making it Japans current public enemy number one. As a

long-time friend of TEPCO, the Liberal Democratic Party, now a parliamentary minority,

rather accuses the government and the ruling majority coalition led by the Democratic

Party of Japan; Shinzo Abe (2011), the ex-Prime Ministry and the LDPs next Prime

Minister hopeful, marshaled strong words and publicly blamed Prime Minister Naoto

Kan and his Cabinet, whose mishandling of the situation, according to him, exacerbated

the crisis. Neither accepting nor rebutting the LDPs accusation, Banri Kaieda, then


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Economy, Trade and Industry Minister in the Kan Cabinet, apologetically stated, In

Japan, we have something called the 'safety myth. Its a fact that there was an

unreasonable overconfidence in the technology of Japan's nuclear power generation (qtd

in Ohnishi, 2011, p. A1). Official and non-official investigations of the disaster have now

begun circulating in the public domain (e.g., The National Diet of Japan, 2012; Japan

Restoration Initiative, 2012) and, partly echoing Kaieda, Kiyoshi Kurokawa, the

Chairman of the Diet-appointed investigation commission curiously blamed the Japanese

culture for the crisis when he stated that the Fukushima accident was a disaster Made in

Japan. Its fundamental causes are to be found in ingrained conventions of Japanese

culture (The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p.7).

Having observed this detective-like discourse, however, we find a set of

important questions is missing therein. For us at least, it is indeed curious that, in their

search of the potential location for the blame, many seem not to want to directly confront

the root cause of this nuclear crisis. In the first place, the disaster originated in

TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi, without which no nuclear accident would have occurred.

Moreover, as a nuclear power facility, Fukushima Daiichi is nothing unique; it is just one

of many nuclear power plants located throughout Japan. Even more importantly, Japan

has possessed one of the worlds leading nuclear power industries (Nuclear power: A

run-away national energy, 2011); some even go so far as to say that, with its technology,

capital, and abundance of stockpiled nuclear materials, Japan in some respects considers

itself, and is treated by others as, as a virtual nuclear weapons state (Federation of

American Scientists, n.d.). What then is the origin of Japans nuclear power program, of

which Fukushima Daiichi is a part? Why is it that the Japanese allowed their country to go

nuclear, despite the their bitter experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In what condition

did they allow that to happen, eventually leading to the disaster in Fukushima? How did

they learn to stop worrying and love the nuke?

Convinced that the real blame for 3/11 can be located by answering these

questions, in what follows we attempt to dwell on issues concerning the origins of Japans


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post-WWII nuclear power from a critical-rhetorical standpoint. At the outset, our choice

of the terms needs some clarification and qualification. Searching for the origin or the

original cause, it is not our intent to go back to late 19th/early 20th century Paris and blame

Marie Curie for her and her husbands discovery of radioactivity. Our task here would

rather require that we take a trans-Pacific perspective on nuclear policy making. As

Kuznick (2011), among others (Arima, 2008, 2012; Hirata, 2011; Kawamura, 2011; Ota,

2011; Tanaka, 2011; Tanaka & Kuznick, 2011; Yamazaki, 2011; Yoshimi, 2012;

Yoshioka, 2011a, 2011b), succinctly suggests, [the Japanese] nuclear program was born

not only in the fantasy of clean, safe power, but also in the willful forgetting of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki and the buildup of the US nuclear arsenal. Accordingly, the place to begin

our analytical endeavor will be Atoms for Peace (Eisenhower, [1953])), a significant

American politico-rhetorical offensive launched in the early phase of the Cold War, as it

is in this public pronouncement where nuclear power, as a symbol of war and destruction,

was pacified, given a new meaning, and became a symbol of peace and prosperity for the

first time in the international rhetorical history.

The Peaceful Ambition

On December 3, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower, then President of the United States,

addressed his first major foreign policy speech before members of the United Nations

General Assembly. In this carefully crafted masterpiece known as the Atoms for Peace

speech, Eisenhower launched a series of rhetorical offensives. With this speech, he was

able to convince his electorate back home and the international community at large that

his administrations foreign and nuclear policy would benefit all on this planet. More

importantly, by way of his rhetoric, the context in which we speak about nuclear power

was also transformed significantly.

Following a rather simple organization, the Atoms for Peace speech basically

has two sections respectively addressing the ill (the problem) and the cure (the

solution), two essential stock issues for making any policy proposal. Eisenhower began


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the first section by drawing a gloomy picture of the status quo: Atomic bombs today are

more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned. . . .

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily,

exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that

came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of World War

II. And in demonstrating the significance of this ill, said he, he could not but use a

language he had preferred never to use: a language of atomic warfare. The atomic age

has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some

comprehension of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every

one of us.

Being consistent with Operation Candor (Alsop, 1953) to which his

administration had been committed since he took the office of presidency (Chernus,

2002a), Eisenhower faced and accepted the fact that the U.S. monopoly of nuclear power

had already ended. The Soviet Union now had an active nuclear weapon program and,

equally important, the knowledge of nuclear weapon production will eventually be

shared by others, possibly all others. Namely, nuclear proliferation is inevitable. In

addition, he expressed his fear of nuclear retaliation in such a nuclearized world that

would eventually lead to what we now call mutual assured destruction, an eventful

finale where there would be no Day After (Foss & Littlejohn, 1986) for all the parties

involved. Skillfully devising the discursive strategy combining a fear appeal and a

rhetorical question, Eisenhower closed the first section of the speech, warning that a

belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely

across a trembling world was not only to confirm the hopeless finality but also

to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyedthe annihilation

of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us generation from

generationand the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the

age-old struggle upward from savagery toward decency, and right, and justice.

Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such


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desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such

human degradation and destruction?

To cure these ills, Eisenhower offered his solution which is basically two-fold:

Further fostering of peaceful negotiation and disarmament talks between the East and the

West and the creation of an international organization that should deal with nuclear

matters. Regarding the negotiation, Eisenhower proudly declared that the U.S. and its

allies were fully committed to the creation of world peace. The U.S. had invited the

Soviets to join the conference table on many previous occasions, all of which were deeds

of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent.

Accentuating the open-mindedness and sincerity of his government and those of the

Western allies, Eisenhower humbly assured the Soviets, We never have, we never will,

propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs. We will never

say that the people of Russia are an enemy with whom we have not desire ever to deal or

mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship. In so doing, the attempt was made to call on

the Soviet Union for joining the making of a peaceful world. Any foreign policy or

diplomatic rhetoric takes on meaning in the domestic politics; determining the success of

such rhetoric needs to take into consideration a variety of audiences, the relative

importance of any given audience within the context of domestic politics, and the way in

which official statements are or are not adapted to them (Wander, 1984, p.341). As

Medhurst (1987) observes, the Atoms for Speech succeeded, at least in the eyes of many

Americans, in backing the Soviets into a corner (p.213), as it would rhetorically

pressure them to sit in the U.S.- and West-initiated arms reduction talks. Chernus (2002a)

also writes that the most news media in the U.S. [interpreted] the speech as a powerful

thrust against the enemy Whatever else it might or might not do, the presidents speech

would challenge and test the Soviet leadership (p.112).

Eisenhower, however, was not content with securing this psychological

victory at home. Stating the United States would seek more than the mere reduction or

elimination of atomic materials for military purposes and that [i]t must be put into the


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hands of those who will know how to strip military casting and adapt it to the arts of

peace, he offered the second solution: the peaceful proliferation of nuclear power:

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can

be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great

boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful

power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already

proved, is herenowtoday. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the worlds

scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with

which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be

transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage?

Referring to the U.N. General Assembly resolution that read, the

Disarmament Commission [should] study the desirability of establishing a

sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which

should seek in private an acceptable solution, Eisenhower went further, proposing that

the U.N should create the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to which the

Governments principally involved, including the U.S. and its allies as well as the Soviet

Union, should make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and

fissionable material. Being held responsible for impounding, storing and protecting

these materials, the mission of the IAEA would include to encourage world-wide

investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable materials and to

devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful

pursuits of mankind to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful

activities. Most importantly, [a] special purpose would be to provide abundant

electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers

would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of

mankind.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not

wish to present strength, but also the desire and the hope of peace. Reiterating that the


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die was cast to the U.N. member states including the U.S. allies and foes, he concluded

the speech, saying, [t]he United States pledged before youand therefore before the

worldits determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemmato devote its entire

heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be

dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. Framed with in a language of simple

problem solving, Eisenhowers Atoms for Speech succeeded in turning the context of

nuclear discourse. Nuclear power, once a significant problem we all face, now became a

peaceful solution, a promising cure for many of the ills in the world. And it is

Eisenhowers pledge to share the U.S. nuclear know-how with the less fortunate in the

world that attracted many in the international audience, particularly those to whom

[electric] power, agriculture and medicine are pressing needs (Medhurst, 1987, p.214).

The Nuclear Solution

Among those who were less fortunate at that time, Japan, a country that just

joined the post-WWII free world, was one which positively and ambitiously responded

to Eisenhowers call for the peaceful use of nuclear power. Approximately three years

after the speech, the Japanese government created the Japanese Atomic Energy

Commission (JAEC) under Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyamas Cabinet. In 1966, with the

help of the U.S., a nuclear power plant in Tokai-Mura, Ibaraki, began the first-ever

commercial operation on the Japanese soil. Using the U.S.-offered enriched uranium, this

gas-cooled reactor (GCR) utilized the technology of General Electric, then premier

manufacturer of nuclear reactors in the United States. Going through several decades,

Japan has introduced and operated the sum total of 63 nuclear reactor units on all of the

four main islands of its archipelago for (potential) commercial use. Just before 3/11, 54

reactor units, including boiling water reactors (BWR), advanced boiling water reactors

(ABWR), pressurized water reactors (PWR), and fast breeder reactors (FBR), had been in

constant commercial service (except for a period of regular maintenance and safety

check-up), accounting for an approximately one third of the total amount of electricity the


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country generates and consumes.

The Identity of Interest

"Now, while the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain so vivid,

construction of such a power plant in a country like Japan would be a dramatic and

Christian gesture which could lift all of us far above the recollection of the carnage of

those cities (Thomas Murray, then U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner, quoted in

Kuznick, 2011). Yet, attributing the root cause of the Japanese nuclear power

development to the U.S.-initiated Atoms for Peace alone and blaming Eisenhower and his

administrations foreign policy for all that happened including the Fukushima accident

are, of course, too hasty and simplistic. At this point, we should be reminded that, prior to

the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, the Japanese were already and fully aware that

nuclear power had potential for massive civilian and commercial applications. In the first

place, with or without the Atoms for Peace, the peaceful use of nuclear power was no

stranger to the Japanese, at least among the nations scientific circles. The history tells us

that research programs for nuclear physics and other sciences had been existent in Japan

all through the 1940s and 1950s (Kawamura, 2011). While these programs were banned

and made defunct during the post-WWII Occupation Period, preparation for resuming the

active nuclear research on the Japanese soil had been underway. In April 1950, for

example, Japanese nuclear scientists received the donation of radioactive isotope from

the U.S.; in May of the following year, Ernest Lawrence, an ex-Manhattan Project officer

who invented the cyclotron accelerator, visited the country, suggesting that Japan

should restore its experiments on research reactors (Yoshioka, 2011a; 2011b).

Second and perhaps more importantly, during the same period, the Japanese

politicians in the conservativeor pro-Western camp also saw political utility in

peaceful nuclear power. It is important to note that this was a period when Japan was in

need of economical and stable sources for its electricity supply in order to increase its

standard of living and boost economic growth; it was also the time when the country was


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in the midst of political flux. This was crucial for Shigeru Yoshida, then leader of the

conservative Liberal-Democratic coalition now known as the Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP), who took the office of Prime Minister for the second time when trade-union

activities became at once more militant (Colbert, 1952, p.181). In fact, Yoshidas first

term (1945-1947) in office ended rather abruptly, with the parliamentary oppositions

successful no-confidence vote, particularly regarding the issue of labor relations. In late

1946,

the Yoshida cabinet rejected the mediation proposal of the Central Labor

Relations Committee in a labor dispute in the electric power industry. The

unanimous left-wing resentment that this action aroused and the chorus of

demands for the resignation of the cabinet that it stimulated, as well as

widespread popular dissatisfaction with the governments economic policy in

general, all gave rise to new hopes of success on the part of proponents of the

[labors] united front. (Colbert, 1952, p.171)

In the following year, Tetsu Katayama and the Socialist Party of Japan immediately

succeeded Yoshidas government as they took advantage of the economic recession that

gave the rise to dissatisfied, angry working people in the form of organized labor, general

strikes and sabotage nationwide. Having seen this, it is reasonable for the conservative

politicians such as Yoshida to feel a compelling need to do something more significant

for the countrys economy; otherwise, Japan could continue to be socialized or, even

worse, Finlandized. For them, the peaceful use of nuclear power in the form of

large-scale electricity generation was particularly attractive, for it had promising

potentials to help the countrys economy to recover and grow, effectively silencing and

fighting the home-grown Red Menace. In the words of Matsutaro Shoriki (1956), then

Minister of State and the inaugural Chair of the JAEC,

The living standard of a nation is often measured, by the amount of energy it

consumes. It is estimated that twenty years from now Japan's energy

consumption will be doubled, if we are to continue on our course of normal


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development. On the other hand, the exploitation of our coal and water power

resources is fast reaching the limit both physically and economically. The

purpose of the Commission is to remedy this alarming situation by making

atomic energy available for general use.

And as Japan was becoming part of the Far Eastern Front of the West, doing so would, at

least in their eyes, not only help their domestic survival but also contribute to the defense

of the free world and Eisenhowers (Cold) War efforts where the communist threat was

totalized (Ivie, 1994). This was of particularly strategic significance in its neighboring

region where the Eastern bloc was gaining its allegiance in the Korean and Indo-China

peninsulas. Shoriki (1956) thus concludes: We the members of the Commission have

decided to dedicate ourselves to the atomic energy development program because of our

desire to serve the interests of all nations, including our own. Especially do we aspire to

contribute Japan's share to the development of atomic energy and the elevation of the

standards of living in Asia as a whole.

Given these accounts, we submit that the origins of Japans post-WWII nuclear

power is traceable to a peculiar rhetorical situation (Bitzer, 1969) set up by the identity

of interest across the Pacific during the Cold Wars formation period. First, it is important

to note that Japans active engagement in nuclear power was enabled as the country

restored and furthered the friendship and, by extension, security alliance, with the U.S.

Officially, it resumed in 1951 when Prime Minister Yoshida signed the Treaty of Peace

(as well as that of Mutual Security Alliance) with the U.S. in the City of San Francisco.

As Yoshioka (2011a; 2011b) suggests, that signing of the Treaty lifted the ban on the

countrys nuclear research programs and removed the obstacles for the Japanese

government to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear power of its own. In addition, by the

time when Japan was ready to actually go nuclear, the original idea contained in the

Atoms for Peace had to change. While the IAEA was created as a U.N. organization in

1957 under the U.S. leadership, it was far from what Eisenhower imagined. Particularly

important, as not all Governments principally involved were cooperative, he had to


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give up the idea of international allocation of the fissionable materials and technology

through the IAEA, which, he described in 1953, should be the agencys more important

responsibility. In fact, Japans first commercial nuclear reactor which began its

operation in 1966 used the enriched uranium leased directly from the U.S., which was the

result of coming into effect of the Japanese-American Atomic Energy Agreement

(Shoriki, 1956), i.e., a bilateral agreement between these two countries, significantly

diminishing the role of the international cooperation between the East and the West

regarding nuclear matters.

Finally, the above accounts suggest that, as a significant international-public

pronouncement, the Atoms for Peace speech came into being as a response to a question,

or a solution to a problem and was given significance as answer or as solution by the

question or problem (Bitzer, 1969, p.5-6) in the Japanese context, just as it did and was

for Eisenhower and the U.S foreign policy, during this time. More specifically, the Atoms

for Peace worked as a fitting response in the eyes of those Japanese nuclear power

proponents who were in need of a new linguistic context, namely that of peace and

prosperity. Almost reciting Eisenhowers language, Shoriki (1956) stated, The Japanese

people, who themselves have suffered the horrors of atomic war, fervently hope and pray

that mankind anywhere will never againbe subjected to the same harrowing experience

and the JAEC is pledged to concentrate all its efforts on peaceful uses of atomic energy.

He further contended, The swift and astounding progress of science should make us

realize all the more keenly our responsibility to see that new discoveries and inventions

are used for the betterment of society and for the furtherance of world peace and

prosperity. Needless to say, this new language of nuclear power makes sense only within

the context of the trans-Pacific friendship and alliance. As Yoshida ([1951]) stated at the

San Francisco Peace Conference approximately three years before Eisenhowers Atoms

for Peace speech,

With her[Japans] war-shattered economy salvaged through American aid,

Japan is making progress on the road of recovery. We are determined that our


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nation shall contribute positively to world prosperity, while observing fully

the fair trade practices in international commerce. For this purpose domestic

laws have already been promulgated. The present [peace] treaty opens the

door to the realization of such aspirations of Japan in the field of international

economy.

Japans Dreaming

Thus contextualized and given a new meaning, nuclear power has become the

countrys chief answer to many, if not all, of the problems that the Japanese people have

confronted all through the post-WWII years. Indeed, as a significant rhetorical idiom, the

peaceful use of nuclear power symbolizes New Japans post-WWII recovery and

prosperity. Given the scarcity of the domestic natural resources, the issue of energy

security has long been a significant politico-economic concern for the country. Going

through the oil crisis in the 1970s, the need for stable energy sources became even more

compelling, to which nuclear power was presented as a viable alternative. Regarding

economic growth, nuclear power has been an important public (construction) project for

the promotion and revitalization of both national and regional economy; from the

mid-1970 onward, the countrys leading heavy industry firms as well as electric

manufacturers have always been involved in the projects concerning nuclear power, such

as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Ishikawajima-Harima, Hitachi, and Toshiba, to name a few

(Nuclear power: A run-away national energy, 2011). In the 1990s nuclear power has

suddenly become, curiously enough, Japans chief answer to the issue of environmental

protection and global warming. Upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (which, in fact,

does exclude nuclear power as a means to reduce CO2 emission), this rhetorical climate

had further intensified as the government launched so called Team Minus Six Percent

project, a nation-wide campaign to raise eco-friendly public consciousness and encourage

the use of clean energy (What is team minus 6 percent, n.d.).

Just as in the U. S. (Hillgartner, Bell & OConnor, 1983), the public


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acceptance for nuclear power has been created and propagated through massive public

relations campaign by the national government and the electric power industry. They

spend the annual amount of approximately 200 billion yen on such media campaigns

(Sataka, 2011). It is important to note that the JAECs Shoriki owned one of these media

outlets, i.e., Yomiuri Newspaper Group, the biggest media firm in Japan; the history tells

us that this powerful media conglomerate has been playing a significant instrumental role

in the nuclear acceptance campaign all through the post-WWII period (Arima, 2008;

Shibata, 1985). Equally important, in many of these pro-nuclear power campaign

discourses, nuclear power is presented not only as a promising cure for all ills but also as

the significant national dream for the post-WWII generations (Yoshimi, 2011). This

dream of technology (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981) has become part of the nationalistic

discourse of techno-science, playing a powerful role to promote the peaceful use of

nuclear power as well as to shape a post-WWII politico-rhetorical climate where

techno-science-driven economic growth becomes of paramount important national

imperative.

Speaking generally, science and technology are what the Japanese could

identify with, because doing so would help them to regain their national pride after the

defeat in World War II. Many still conceive that techno-science is what has made Japan

Number One in the world; for instance, Toyota, Nissan, Toshiba, and Sony, to name a

few, are all considered as proud high-tech products of Japanese genius. Regarding nuclear

power in particular, a Japanese scientist named Hideki Yukawa won the countrys first

Nobel Prize in 1949 for his prediction of the existence of mesons, an elementary particle.

While Yukawa was already a world-renowned nuclear physicist by that time (in fact, he

had been invited to the U.S. as a physics professor and had taught at Princeton and

Columbia), [c]oming so soon after their disastrous defeat in World War II, Yuwakas

international recognition gave the Japanese particular pride and encouragement

(Yukawa Hideki, 2008). And for children of post-WWII generation, there is Tetsuwan

Atom (aka Astro Boy in the English speaking world), a popular cartoon/animation


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character created by Osamu Tezuka, to identify with (cf. Astro Boy, n.d; Davidson, 2001).

Just as Our Friend the Atom, a Disney animation project, did in 1950s America

(Mechling & Mechling, 1995), this robotic hero rhetorically worked to pacify and

domesticate nuclear power. As the name may suggest, Atom is nuclear power operated:

He is not only powerful and mighty; he also has human feelings and sense of justice that

are more conscientious than those of human beings. Precisely because of these, many

children cheered for Atom; not only that, they wanted to become (like) him, i.e., nuclear

children who love justice, peace and prosperity.

Given this, we agree with Morone and Woodhouse (1989) when they state that

the most accurate characterization of human relations to technology in general and, by

extension, the post-WWII Japanese relationship with nuclear power is technological

somnambulism, the term they borrow from Winner (1986). As they explain, this idea

holds that human choices indeed launch particular technological development

but that the new endeavors seldom receive the degree of conscious, careful

design necessary to satisfy the long-term needs of society. Moreover, human

choices may be substantially constrained and distorted by a variety of cultural,

organizational, political, and economic forces [B]efore diffusing new

technologies, governments and businesses do not ask sufficiently pointed

questions about the purposes the technologies are supposed to serve, how they

should be controlled, or how they are to be held to the intended purposes and

not others. The result is technological drift, in which technologies seem to take

on a life of their own. (p.20-21)

Since the mid-1990s, Japan has been engaged in the policy of nuclear fuel recycling.

Central to that policy is the so-called pluthermal program, a project that seeks to utilize

MOX (i.e., fuel composed of uranium mixed with recycled plutonium extracted and

reprocessed from nuclear waste) for thermal power plant operation (Katsuta & Suzuki,

2006). For the Japanese government, pluthermal reactors are just the next step toward

the long-cherished dream of nuclear self-sufficiency (Adams, 2010, italics added). It is


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important to note that the third reactor unit at Fukushima Daiich was one of the first

nuclear facilities that participate in this national energy policy of nuclear fuel recycling.

More importantly, just a half year before the Level-7 accident, in the eyes of the

Fukushima prefecture governor Yuhei Sato, Fukushima Daiichi was immune to natural

disaster risks. And we suspect that he, like many other Japanese, must have been

daydreaming when he stated to the press, I finally decided to accept (the [pluthermal]

project) since certain conditions (including quake resistance) we requested have been

met (Japan: Fukushima gov. to OK pluthermal, 2010).

More disturbingly, even 3/11 does not seem to have functioned as a wake-up

call in nuclearized Japan. Still sleepwalking and dreaming, Japan is currently attempting

to sell its state-of-the-art nuclear reactors as well as dreams of a nuclear renaissance in

advanced economies (Ohnish, 2012, italics added) to its Asian neighbors. A joint

statement issued at the close of the [Japanese Premier] Noda-Dung [the Vietnamese

counterpart] meeting declared Vietnam has expressed its strong desire for the provision

of nuclear technologies from Japan. Japan, for its part, has committed in the statement to

provide Vietnam with technologies that represent the world's highest level of nuclear

safety (Exports to Vietnam offer chance to prove nuclear safety, 2011, p.2). And these

Asian friends, we are afraid, seem to suffer from the exactly same technological

somnambulism as the Japanese:

Hien Pham Duy, one of Vietnam's most senior nuclear scientists and an adviser

to government agencies overseeing nuclear power, said it had been his dream

for many years to bring nuclear power to VietnamThe Vietnamese

government fears that the country's strong economic growth will be

jeopardized without the energy provided by nuclear plants. Vietnam, which

relies mostly on hydroelectricity, is expected to become a net importer of

energy in 2015. ''One of the reasons for the introduction of nuclear power in

Vietnam is the shortage of conventional fuel supply sources, including

imported,'' [said] Le Doan Phac, deputy director general of the Vietnam Atomic


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Energy Agency, the government's main nuclear research and development

body. (Ohnish, 2012, A4, italics added)

Conclusions

The foregoing endeavor has been our attempt to search the root cause of the

Japanese nuclear power program leading to the disaster in Fukushima from a

trans-Pacific rhetorical perspective. And if we are successful in engaging this critical

endeavor, we have at least demonstrated two things. First, it is truly unfortunate that

Eisenhower found an audience who were already receptive to, and welcomingpriori, his

call for Atoms for Peace in the trans-Pacific alliance. Namely, the post-WWII Japanese

nuclear program was not a product of Eisenhowers rhetoricper se but rather that of the

identity of the national interests between Japan and the U.S., i.e., the peace and prosperity

of the free world which his discourse symbolized. Second, it is equally unfortunate that

the Japanese dream of nuclear technology has continued unchecked all through the

post-WWII years. Extending the rhetorical situation that gave birth to Eisenhowers

Atoms for Peace and its own over time and space, nuclearized Japan ambitiously

continues to strive for its dream at home and to spread the gospel of nuclear peace and

prosperity abroad. In short, Japan is still in the midst of long, deep and dangerous

sleepwalking.

As we are closing our rhetorical endeavor, we are compelled to once again go

back to Eisenhowers discourse, not the 1953 Atoms for Peace addressed to the U.N.

General Assembly but his 1961 Farewell to the American people. In this televised speech

delivered three days before he left the office, Eisenhower publicly accused the

military-industrial complex [t]he potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced

power:

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or

democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted only an alert and

knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of huge industrial and


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military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that

security and liberty may prosper together. Akin to, and largely responsible for

the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the

technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has

become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A

steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal

government. Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been over

shadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the

same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and

scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research.

Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes

virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity The prospect of domination of

the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power

of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. (Eisenhower, [1961])

The post-WWII Japanese discourse of nuclear power advocacy are always

already hegemonic (cf. Gramsci, 1971), wherepublic policy regarding research and

development in the area of nuclear power is the captive of a scientific-technological elite

(Eisenhower, [1961]). As Yoshioka (2011a) coins the term, the Japanese development of

nuclear power is part of the governmental-industrial complex (p.24) which many

Japanese alternatively callgenshiryoku-mura or the nuclear village. As equally

insidious as Eisenhowers military-industrial complex, this village embraces and

represents a variety of the vested interests and promises of those who are involved in

nuclear power. Just as in any Japanese village, the like-mindednuclear industry

officials, bureaucrats, politicians and scientistshave prospered by rewarding one

another with construction projects, lucrative positions, and political, financial and

regulatory support. The few openly skeptical of nuclear powers safety become village

outcasts, losing out on promotions and backings (Ohnishi & Belson, 2011). In his

analysis of Eisenhowers Farewell, Griffin (1994) writes that, while it is unlikely that Ike


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will be remembered as an orator, [h]is rhetorical instinct, however, could be

uncommonly good, and they deserve our continuing attention (p.282). It is indeed

unfortunate that, unlike the Atoms for Peace, Eisenhowers admonition of

military-industrial complex found no timely, extended audience at the other end of the

Pacific.


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