Naxal Threat and State Response(Iim)

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Main Features

The disturbing features of the movement are

h Spread over a large geographical areah Increase in potential for violenceh Unification of PW and MCCIh Plan to have a Red Corridorh Nexus with other extremist groups

The Government of India have already expressed concern over the spread of the Naxalitemovement over a huge geographical area. The Prime Minister described Naxalitemovement as the single biggest threat to the internal security of the country. According tothe Institute for Conflict Management, the movement has actually spread to 194 districts in18 states.

The Naxals potential for violence has increased substantially with their acquisition of

sophisticated weapons and expertise in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).They are said to be in possession of at least 6,500 regular weapons including AK 47 riflesand SLRs. They have built this arsenal essentially by looting weapons frompolice/landlords, purchasing them from smugglers, acquiring from insurgent groups likethe NSCN (IM) and ULFA and also obtaining some weapons from Nepal.

The movement got a tremendous boost when its two major components, the Peoples War(PW) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), decided to merge on March 21,2004, though a formal announcement was made on October 14, 2004 only. The unifiedparty was called the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The merger, apart fromaugmenting the support base of the movement, has given it the character of a pan-Indianrevolutionary group. The Naxals plan to have a Compact Revolutionary Zone stretching

from Indo-Nepal border to the Dandakaranya Region is likely to get a fillip with theunification of their ranks.

The Naxalite groups nexus with the other extremist organizations has added to thecomplexity of the problem. There are indications that the PWG cadres received training inthe handling of weapons and IEDs from some ex-LTTE cadres. They have also someunderstanding with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (I-M) to support eachothers cause. Some batches of CPML-Party Unity also appear to have received armstraining under the guidance of United Liberation Front of Assam. The Communist Party ofIndia (Maoist) has close fraternal relations with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)also.

The nature of Naxal violence has undergone a subtle change in the recent years. Smallscale isolated attacks have been replaced by large scale, well organized attacks on thegovernment apparatus. The following incidents, which amounted to challenging theauthority of the State, demonstrate the growing confidence of the Naxals:

a. The attempt to assassinate the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N. ChandrababuNaidu (October 01, 2003), on a road between Tirupati and Tirumala in Chittoordistrict while he was proceeding to attend the Brahmotsavam celebrations.

b. The raid in Koraput district of Orissa (February 07, 2004), when the extremistsoverran several government establishments and decamped with about 200 weaponsincluding SLRs and carbines and about 60,000 rounds of ammunition.

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c. The attack on the J ehanabad District J ail in Bihar (November 13, 2005), when about200 cadres of the united Communist Party of India (Maoist) assisted by about 800sympathisers freed 389 prisoners which included quite a few Naxals while 20activists of the Ranvir Sena were taken away, out of whom nine were subsequentlymurdered.

d. The interception and capture of a train in the Latehar district of J harkhand (March 13,2006), when 628 Dn. Passenger was stopped between Mughalsarai and Barkanastations.

e. The attack on a police base camp at Rani Bodli village of Bijapur District inChhattisgarh (March 15, 2007) in which 55 persons including 16 personnel ofChhattisgarh Armed Force and 39 SPOs were killed.

f. The killing of the son of former Chief Minister, Babu Lal Marandi, along with 18other persons while they were watching a cultural programme in Giridih district ofJ harkhand (October 27, 2007).

g. The attack on Nayagarh town in Orissa (February 15, 2008), when the Naxalsoverran 3 police stations and killed 13 policemen and 2 civilians and decamped with1100 weapons, though 400 rifles were subsequently recovered by the police.

h. The attack on the combined Andhra Pradesh and Orissa Police parties inChitrakonda reservoir of Malkangiri District in Orissa (J une 29, 2008), resulting in thekilling/drowning of 35 security forces personnel belonging to the elite Greyhoundsforce of Andhra Police.

Government of Indias Policy

Government have prepared a 14-Point Plan to deal with the problem. The salient featuresof the policy are as follows:

deal sternly with the Naxals indulging in violence address the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts

in a holistic manner ensure inter-state coordination in dealing with the problem accord priority to faster socio-economic development in the Naxal affected or

prone areas supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and

development fronts promote local resistance groups against the Naxals

use mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence and the loss of life andproperty caused by it

have a proper surrender and rehabilitation policy for the Naxals affected states not to have any peace dialogue with the Naxal groups unless the

latter agree to give up violence and arms

The following administrative measures and arrangements have also been initiated at thehighest level:

i) Security related expenditure scheme (SRE) The SRE scheme envisagesreimbursing the expenditure incurred by the state on ammunition, training,upgradation of police posts, etc. At present 76 districts in 9 states badly affectedby Naxal violence are covered by this scheme.

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ii) Strengthening of law enforcement - This includes raising India ReserveBattalions to strengthen the security apparatus at the state level and alsoreleasing funds under the Police Modernization Scheme to the states tomodernize their police forces in terms of weaponry, communication equipmentand other infrastructure.

iii) Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) and Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) The government has included 55 Naxal affected districts in 9 states under theBackward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana(RSVY). The BRGF scheme covers a total of 250 districts and is to beadministered by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj. The scheme should acceleratesocio-economic development in these 250 districts.

iv) Task Force A Task Force has been constituted in the Home Ministry todeliberate upon the steps needed to deal with Naxalism more effectively and in acoordinated manner. The members of the Task Force comprise Nodal Officersof the Naxal affected states and representatives of the IB, CRPF and the SSB.

v) Coordination Centre A Coordination Centre was set up in 1998 headed by theUnion Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and DGPs of Naxal affected statesas its members. It reviews and coordinates the steps taken by the states tocontrol Naxal activities.

vi) Empowered Group of Ministers At a meeting of the Chief Ministers held onSeptember 5, 2006, it was decided to set up an Empowered Group of Ministers(EGoM) headed by the Home Minister and comprising select Union Ministers andChief Ministers to closely monitor the spread of Naxalism and evolve effectivestrategies to deal with the problem.

Recent Initiatives

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 - The Government of India announced anew rehabilitation policy on October 11, 2007 to make the displacement of people forindustrial growth a less painful experience. Land in return for land for displaced families,preference in project jobs to at least a member of each family, vocational training,scholarships for children and housing benefits including houses to affected families in ruraland urban areas are some of the benefits under the new policy.

Forest Rights Act, 2006 - The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, (popularly Forest Rights Act) is a significant stepin recognizing and vesting the forest rights of scheduled tribes and other traditional forest

dwellers who have been residing in such forests for generations but whose rights could notbe recorded. It provides a framework for recording the forest rights so vested.

National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2006 The NREGA is the largest everemployment programme visualized in human history. It holds out the prospect oftransforming the livelihoods of the poorest and heralding a revolution in rural governancein India. However, as brought out by the CAG report, there are significant deficienciesin implementation of the Act. There is lack of adequate administrative and technicalmanpower at the block and gram panchayat levels. This affects the preparation of plans,scrutiny, approval, monitoring and measurement of works, and maintenance of thestipulated records at the block and gram panchayat levels.

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Peoples Support Salwa Judum

Mobilising the support of the people is absolutely essential to weaken the support base ofthe Naxals. The political parties, with the possible exception of CPM, are not playing theirrole in this regard. The representatives of major political parties have virtually abdicatedtheir responsibility of engaging in any kind of anti-Naxal propaganda in theirconstituencies. In fact, most of them have sought shelter in the safety of the urban centresor the state capital

The circumstances in which Salwa J udum evolved in the state of Chhattisgarh must beclarified in this context. To start with, the Naxals were welcomed by the Bastar tribalsbecause they were harassed by corrupt revenue, police and forest officials and wereexploited by the traders from plains areas who never gave them fair price for theirproducts. The Naxals appeared as the benefactors, protecting and upholding theirinterests. However, in due course, as the Naxals entrenched themselves in the region,they started showing insensitivity to the feelings of tribals. They interfered with the social

customs and cultural practices of the local tribals. Ghotuls were closed. Weekly bazaarswere looted. Traditional celebrations at the time of marriage were discouraged. Images ofBudhadev (Lord Shiva) were damaged and the tribals were asked to worship Mao only.Village priests were driven away. All this deeply hurt the tribals. There was a strongfeeling of resentment. The Naxals did not allow the tribals to pluck tendu leaves also. Thiswas a regular source of income for them and every family earned Rs.10,000 to 15,000from the trade. This was denied to them. The resultant economic hardship proved to bethe proverbial last straw. Enough was enough, the tribals felt.

It was against this background that the tribals rebelled against the Naxals. Large groupsof people held rallies where they expressed their vehement opposition to the aggressionsof the Naxals. This was the beginning of Salwa J udum, reflecting the resentment of the

tribals against the activities of Naxals interfering with their social customs, culturalpractices and hurting their economic interests. Mahendra Karma, Congress (I) Leader,gave them the leadership. It was a spontaneous movement, though it is also a fact that atpresent the camps are being maintained and financed by the state government.

Peace Talks

Peace talks were held between the Peoples War Group and the state government ofAndhra Pradesh during J une-J uly 2002 at the initiative of Committee of ConcernedCitizens. Three rounds of talks were held but there was no agreement on the substantiveissues.

Peace talks were again held from October 15 to 18, 2004 at Hyderabad. The Naxalspresented an 11-point charter of demands. The most important point related to landreforms. Again, there could be no agreement.

The governments Status Paper on the Naxal problem appropriately mentions a holisticapproach and lays emphasis on accelerated socio-economic development of thebackward areas. However, clause 4 (v) of the Status Paper states that there will be nopeace dialogue by the affected states with the Naxal groups unless the latter agree to giveup violence and arms. This is incomprehensible and is inconsistent with governmentsstand vis--vis other militant groups in the country.

The government has been having peace talks with the Naga rebels of the NSCN (IM)faction for the last more than ten years even though the rebels have not only notsurrendered their weapons but continue to build up their arsenal. In relation to ULFA also,

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Naxal Threat and State Response(Iim)

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